Petition — Leichtling v. United States

In THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Octoser Term, 1982

Lee S. Leicutiina, D.D.S.,

Petitioner,

Vv.

THe Unirep States Or AMERICA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH CIRCUIT

Artuur S. MARGULIS

Marou is, Rapp & Grant

7701 Forsyth Bivd., Suite 1070

St. Louis, Missouri 63105

(314) 721-6677

Attorney of Record

for Petitioner

_——— ee ——

St. Louis Law Printing Co., Inc., 411 No. Tenth Street 63101 314-231-4477

No.

In THE

Supreme Court of the Bnited States

Octoser Term, 1982

Lee S. Leicutiine, D.D.S.,

Petitioner,

v.

Tue Unrrep States Or AMERICA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH CIRCUIT

The petitioner, Lee S. Leichtling, D.D.S., respectfully prays

that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment and opin-

ion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

entered in this.proceeding on July 19, 1982.

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the affidavit in support of the search warrant for

petitioner’s residence submitted to the United States Magistrate

contained sufficient facts to establish probable cause to believe

that the petitioner was concealing cocaine therein.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12

L.BG.2d 723 (1964) 0. cc cccsccvscevesccseceees

Anthony v. United States, 667 F.2d 870 (10th Cir. 1981)

Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.

BE POTD TRG oc cc ccvencccvccccccccocccesecs

Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3

1.6.26 327 (IDES) nc cc cccccccccscsscccccces

Grimaldi v. United States, 606 F.2d 332 (ist Cir. 1980) .

Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d

Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 27

L.Ed.2d 637 (1969) ... 6... cece cece nee e een enees

12

12

iv

United States v. Anderson, 453 F.2d 174 (ist Cir. 1971).

United States v. Brown, 584 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1978) ...

United States v. Charest, 602 F.2d 1015 (ist Cir. 1979). .

United States v. Coppage, 635 F.2d 683 (8th Cir. 1980) .

United States v. Drake, 673 F.2d 15 (ist Cir. 1982) .....

United States v. Flanagan, 423 F.2d 745 (Sth Cir. 1970) .

United States v. Fleming, 566 F.2d 623 (8th Cir. 1977) ..

United Statse v. Gillespie, 368 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1966) ...

United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 91 S.Ct. 2075,

29 L.Bd.2d 723 (1971)... cece cece cece ee eeeee 7

United States v. Jackstadt, 617 F.2d 12 (2nd Cir. 1980) . 10,11

United States v. Lockett, 674 F.2d 843 (11th Cir. 1982) . 9

United States v. Lucarz, 430 F.2d 1051 (9th Cir. 1970) . . 8

United States v. Maestas, 546 F.2d 1177 (Sth Cir. 1977) . 6

United States v. Melvin, 596 F.2d 492 (ist Cir.), cert.

denied, 444 U.S. 837, 100 S.Ct. 73, 62 L.Ed.2d 48

QOTED veccsdccccvcccccccbecvvosevcevessceses 5,9

United States v. Pinkerman, 374 F.2d 988 (4th Cir. 1967) 5

United States v. Rambis, 526 F.Supp. 866 (N.D. Ill.

ww aunwnsuswe eT wv

BIDED occcccvcrreeeseeverssteebvcdeeerecovece 6

United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 100 S.Ct. 2547,

65 L.Bd.2d 619 (1980)... ccc ee neee 5

United States v. Schmidt, 662 F.2d 498 (8th Cir. 1981). . 10

United States v. Solario, 577 F.2d 554 (9th Cir. 1978)... il

United States v. Taylor, 599 F.2d 832 (8th Cir. 1979) ... 10

United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 85 S.Ct. 741,

13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965)....... TTT TT Litt 7

Zurcher v. Stanford Daily News, 436 U.S. 547, 98 S.Ct.

1970, 56 L.Ed.2d 525 (1978) «0... cece eee eeees 5

Tue Unirep States Or AMERICA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH CIRCUIT

The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,

not yet reported, appears in the Appendix hereto. The Federal

Reporter citation, however, is 684 F.2d 553. No opinion was

rendered by the District Court for the Eastern District of

Missouri.

The judgment and opinion of the Court of Appeals for the

Eighth Circuit was entered on July 19, 1982. A timely petition

for rehearing with suggestions for rehearing en banc was denied

on August 10, 1982, and this petition for certiorari was filed

within sixty (60) days of that date. The Court’s jurisdiction is in-

voked under Title 28 United States Code, Section 1254(1).

=< vo

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, RULES

United States Constitution, Amendment 4:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,

shail not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon

probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-

ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or

things to be seized.

Rule 41, Federal Rules Of Criminal Procedure

(ch 1) Warrant Upon Affidavit

A warrant other than a warrant upon oral testimony under

paragraph (2) of this subdivision shall issue only on an affidavit

or affidavits sworn to before the federal magistrate or state

judge and establishing the grounds for issuing the warrant. If

the federal magistrate or state judge is satisfied that grounds for

the application exist, he shall issue a warrant identifying the

property or person to be seized and naming or describing the

person or place to be searched. The finding of probable cause

may be based upon hearsay evidence in whole or in part.

Before ruling on a request for a warrant the federal magistrate or

state judge may require the affiant to appear personally or may

examine under oath the affiant and any witnesses he may pro-

duce, provided that such preceeding shall be taken down by a

court reporter or recording equipment and made a part of the

affidavit. The warrant shall be directed to a civil officer of the

United States authorized to enforce or assist in enforcing any

law therefore or to a person so authorized by the President of

the United States. It shall command the officer to search, within

a specified period of time not to exceed 10 days, the person or

place named for the property or person specified. The warrant

shall be served in the daytime, unless the issuing authority, by

appropriate provision in the warrant, and for reasonable cause

shown, authorizes its execution at times other than daytime. It

shall designate a federal magistrate to whom it shall be returned.

atQian

Tithe 21, United States Code, Section 843(a)(3):

Set out in Appendix.

Title 21, United States Code, Section 841(a)(1):

Set out in Appendix.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On October 27, 1981, the petitioner, Lee S. Leichtling,

D.D.S., was found guilty, pursuant to a jury verdict, on six (6)

counts of obtaining a controlled substance by fraud, in violation

of Title 21, United States Code, Section 843(a)(3), and one (1)

count of possession of a controlled substance with the intent to

distribute, in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section

841(a)(1). The case was tried in the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Missouri, the Honorable James H.

Meredith presiding. The petitioner was sentenced to imprison-

ment for a period of ten (10) years on Count VII; sentenced to

imprisonment for a period of three (3) years on each of Counts

1, I and III to run consecutively, but to run concurrently with

the sentence imposed under Count VII; sentenced to imprison-

ment for a period of three (3) years on each of Counts IV, V and

VI to run consecutively, but to run concurrently with the

sentence imposed under Count VII. In addition, a three (3) year

special parole term was imposed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit af-

firmed petitioner’s conviction in a judgment and opinion issued

July 19, 1982, and denied petitioner’s timely petition for rehear-

ing with suggestions for rehearing en banc on August 10, 1982.

On July 16, 1981, a Special Agent of the Drug Enforcement

Administration (affiant) appeared before a United States

Magistrate for the Eastern District of Missouri seeking a search

warrant for petitioner’s residence. The information presented to

the Magistrate consisted solely of the affiant’s sworn affidavit,

a copy of which is included in the Appendix.

witli e

The affidavit stated that the affiant received information that

two one-ounce bottles of pharmaceutical cocaine would be

delivered to a pharmacy on May 27, 1981. On that date the af-

fiant observed the petitioner exit the pharmacy carrying ‘“‘what

appeared to be two similar bottles in a plastic case,’’ and, ‘‘enter

a blue Mercedes automobile and drive in the direction of the

residence which is the subject of this search warrant.’’ (em-

phasis supplied).

The affiant further stated that he received information that

another shipment of two one-ounce bottles of pharmaceutical

cocaine was to be delivered to the same pharmacy on July 10,

1981. On that date, the petitioner was seen to receive two one-

ounce bottles from the pharmacist and exit the pharmacy.

Surveillence agents further ‘‘observed the subject Lee Leichtling

to place a pharmacy bag inside a brown vinyl case which ap-

peared to be identical to the case he used on May 22, 1981;

thereafter, the subject Lee Leichtling entered a blue Mercedes

automobile which is registered to him, and proceeded to drive to

the above-described residence.’’ (emphasis supplied).

Based upon the information contained within the affidavit,

the Magistrate determined that probable cause existed for the is-

suance of a search warrant, and on July 17, 1981 law enforce-

ment officers executed a search of petitioner’s residence. The

search uncovered, among other items, bottles containing co-

caine hydrochloride. All of the items seized in the search of peti-

tioner’s residence were admitted into evidence over counsel’s

timely objections.

=

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution

States that ‘‘no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause

supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing

the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.’’

Petitioner submits that he has standing to challenge the search

and seizure in the instant case because his own Fourth Amend-

ment rights were violated by an illegal intrusion into his

residence in which he had a legitimate expectation of privacy.

United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65

L.Ed.2d 619 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct.

421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978).

When seeking to obtain a search warrant for an individual's

residence, government officials must adhere to strict constitu-

tional guidelines and rules of procedure. Rule 41(c) of the

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that a neutral and

detached magistrate may issue a search warrant only upon a find-

ing of probable cause. The finding of probable cause must be

based upon information contained solely in the sworn affidavit

and/or sworn recorded testimony presented to him. Zurcher v.

Stanford Daily News, 436 U.S. 547, 558, 98 S.Ct. 1970, 1977, 56

L.Ed.2d 525 (1978). This ‘‘four corners’’ approach has been

adopted by this Court and is widely recognized among the Cir-

cuits. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 109 n.1, 84 S.Ct. 1509,

1511 n.1, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1963); United States v. Melvin, 596

F.2d 492 (ist Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 837, 100 S.Ct. 73, 63

L.Ed.2d 48 (1979); United States v. Anderson, 453 F.2d 174,

177 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Pinkerman, 374 F.2d 988

(4th Cir. 1967); United States v. Gillespie, 368 F.2d 1 (8th Cir.

1966).

Probable cause exists if facts within the magistrate’s

knowledge and of which he had reasonably trustworthy infor-

mation would warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief

that a crime was committed and that the evidence is at the place

to be searched. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313, 79

S.Ct. 329, 333, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1964); United States v. Maestas,

$46 F.2d 1177, 1180 (Sth Cir. 1977).

The Circuit Courts have thus attempted to balance the deci-

sions of this Court against the dictates of the Fourth Amend-

ment to establish a standard for the issuance of a warrant to

search a residence. The Circuits are divided over the specificity

of information which is needed to lay the foundation for the

magistrate’s finding. The differentiation primarily rests with the

required nexus between the objects to be seized and the premises

to be searched.

The Fifth Circuit requires the affidavit to reveal factual

observations that the objects were at the defendant’s residence.

United States v. Flanagan, 423 F.2d 745, 747 (Sth Cir. 1970).

The Flanagan affidavit recited that a home was burglarized,

that the stolen property remained unrecovered, that the defen-

dant was a known felon, and that the defendant was arrested

earlier in the day with some of the stolen property on his person.

In holding the affidavit insufficient to support a finding of

probable cause to search defendant's residence, the Court

noted:

“The affidavit contained nothing, either in the limited

recital of the DA’s personal knowledge (that Flanagan was

a known felon) or communications from informants (fac-

tual or conclusory) that the missing goods were where the

DA said they might be, other than the house was said to be

Flanagan’s residence.”’ Jd., at 747.

Similarly, a recent decision from a District Couit in the Seventh

Circuit requires the affiant’s direct observations of the ob-

ject of the search entering a residence before probable cause is

met to sustain the issuance of a search warrant. United States v.

Rambis, 526 F.Supp. 866 (N.D. Ill. 1981).

tes Gees

This Court has also indicated that a direct link between the

“‘contraband”’ and the inside of the residence to be searched is

required. In Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 423, 89

S.Ct. 584, 27 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969), Justice White, concurring

with the opinion of the Court, which held an affidavit insuffi-

cient, writes, “‘[A}n investigator’s affidavit that he has seen

gambling equipment being moved into a house at a specified ad-

dress will support the issuance of a search warrant.’’ Thus,

where the affidavit states the affiant’s or informer’s personal

observations of the items to be seized inside the residence, the

Courts have had little difficulty validating the warrant. See

United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 29

L.Ed.2d 723 (1971) (an informant recited that while in the

suspect house he observed and purchased iliegal whiskey);

United States v. Fleming, 566 F.2d 623 (8th Cir. 1977) (infor-

mant saw one-half pound of marijuana at defendant's residence

and the defendant offered to sell the informant marijuana).

Courts have also upheld affidavits based upon the observa-

tions of the affiant while situated outside the premises to be

searched. In United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 85 S.Ct.

741, 13 L.Bd.2d 684 (1965), this Court upheld an affidavit

which stated that the affiant smelled the odor of fermentation

eminating from the suspect house, heard metallic and pump

noises from within, observed the defendant on four occasions

unload sixty pound bags of sugar from his vehicle, and observed

the vehicle being loaded with five gallon cans which were

brought from the house. Clearly, the nexus between criminal ac-

tivity and the residence to be searched was established.

Likewise, where the affidavit included information that the

defendant received two orders of chemicals at a specified ad-

dress which, when combined, could only produce metham-

phetamine, that the defendant made late night and Sunday en-

tries into the structure, and that the defendant was observed to

assemble lab equipment inside the address, a search warrant was

properly issued. United States v. Drake, 673 F.2d 15 (ist Cir.

1982). See also, United States v. Coppage, 635 F.2d 683 (8th

Cir. 1980).

Searches have been upheld where the affiant witnessed no ac-

tivity inside, nor outside of the premises to be searched. An-

thony v. United States, 667 F.2d 870 (10th Cir. 1981); United

States v. Brown, 584 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v.

Lucarz, 430 F.2d 1051 (9th Cir. 1970). The Court in Anthony,

supra, stated:

**The situation here does not differ markedly from other

cases wherein this court and others, albeit usually without

discussion, have upheld searches although the nexus

between the items to be seized and the place to be searched

rested not on direct observation, as in the normal search-

and-seizure case, but on the type of crime, the nature of —

the missing items, the extent of the suspect's opportunity

for concealment, and normal inferences as to where a

criminal would be likely to hide stolen property.”’ /d., at

874.

See also, Grimaldi v. United States, 606 F.2d 332 (ist Cir.

1980).

The case before the Court is a possessory offense of two one-

ounce bottles. It is not the type of case where bulky apparatus is

required for the manufacture of explosive devices, narcotics or

illegal whiskey. In the latter cases, the very nature of the offense

demands a fixed, sheltered situs from which to operate. The

Courts have reasonably inferred, then, that the subject items of

the search would be found at the location named in the af-

fidavit.

No Anthony, et al, inference can be drawn from the facts in

Leichtling to suggest that the two bottles were probably located

inside petitioner’s residence. Indeed, the most plausible

hypothesis, given the facts within the affidavit, is that the bot-

tles were located at petitioner’s office, where cocaine-

hydrochloride has an accepted dental use as a topical anesthetic.

In addition, the opportunities for ,concealment of two one-

ounce bottles are boundless. Petitioner submits that the An-

thony line of ‘‘reasonable inferences"’ cases is inopposite, and

that direct factual observations are required in order to link the

items sought and the place to be searched.

Even in the Courts which do not require direct observation of

criminal activity, there still exists the fundamental requirement

that the affidavit allege sufficient facts to warrant a reasonable

person to believe that the objects sought would be found in the

place described. Where an affidavit recited that the defendant

purchased explosives, that he threatened a former employer and

alluded to explosives in the threat, that a bomb was found at the

former employer’s plant and that no proper storage facilities ex-

isted at defendant’s residence, the Eleventh Circuit found the

affidavit insufficient to support a finding of probable cause.

United States v. Lockett, 674 F.2d 843, 846 (11th Cir. 1982).

The Lockett Court made clear that the nexus necessary be-

tween the objects to be seized and the premises to be searched

must be clear-cut. In Lockett, the affidavit was held insufficient

because there was a link missing ‘‘in the chain of facts and cir-

cumstances which would lead to a reasonable belief that

dynamite was improperly stored at Lockett’s Sweetwater ad-

dress."’ Id., at 846. The affidavit set forth no facts from which

the magistrate could infer that dynamite was located at that par-

ticular place. The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that:

**[{I}t is true that the nexus between the objects to be seized

and the premises searched can be established from the par-

ticular circumstances involved and need not rest on direct

observation. United States v. Charest, 602 F.2d 1015 (ist

Cir. 1979). It is equally true that a search will be upheld if

‘the facts described in the affidavits warrant a reasonable

person to believe that the objects sought would be found.’

United States v. Green, 634 F.2d 222, 225 (Sth Cir. 1981).

Nevertheless, there still must be a ‘substantial basis’ to

conclude that the instrumentalities of the crime will be

discovered on the searched premises.’’ Aguilar v. Texas,

378 U.S. at 111, 84 S.Ct. at 1512; United States v. Melvin,

supra. Id., at 846. (emphasis supplied).

The Eighth Circuit, in United States v. Taylor, 599 F.2d 832

(8th Cir. 1979), held that the magistrate must not use his im-

agination when making a probable cause determination. In

Taylor, the affidavit was based upon, and the search warrant

was issued solely on the conclusion that the instrumentalities

were hidden inside the residence in question. The Court held

that this unsupported conclusion was inadequate to allow the

inference of probable cause:

**Nowhere in the affidavit is it set forth that the surveilling

officer saw Worley [a co-defendant] on any occasion enter

the house at 1728 or exit the premises. Nowhere in the af-

fidavit is it set forth that the surveilling officers observed

the defendant on any occasion either entering or exiting

said house... Therefore, at that point, it was a conclusion,

based on a mere suspiciion of the surveilling agents, that

the house in question contained the firearms. Consequently,

the official who issued the warrant relied on the same con-

clusion.”’ /d., at 836.

The Taylor Court subsequently held the search warrant invalid

because the magistrate ‘‘[could not] rely on facts...which raise a

mere suspicion or conclusion which he equates to be a proper

finding of probable cause.’ /d., at 836. See also, United States

v. Schmidt, 662 .2d 498, 505 n.9 (8th Cir. 1981).

Recently, the Second Circuit found that the ‘‘substantial

basis”’ test was satisfied. In United States v. Jackstadt, 617 F.2d

12 (2nd Cir. 1980), the affidavit revealed the following allega-

tions: that large purchases of petroleum ether (used to extract

hashish oil from marijuana) had veen made by the defendants

using false names; that there were links between one of the

defendants and the manufacture of hashish oil; that the

transporting automobile was parked at the residence after being

followed from the chemical company; and that a defendant was

observed removing a five-gallon can of petroleum ether from

the rear of the vehicle. Although the affidavit did not recite that

the defendant carried the can into the residence, the Court

upheld the search, reasoning:

“*{I}t would be surprising indeed if Jackstadt had purchased

petroleum ether, driven it to his home, removed a five-

gallon can from his car and then strolled with it down the

street. The inference that Jackstadt ca ried the ether into

the house was plainly a reasonab’e one in the cir-

cumstances of the case.”’ /d., at 14.

In comparing the affidavits in Jackstadt and the case before

the Court, a crucial distinction is apparent. The petitioner con-

curs that the Jackstadt Court was reasonable in its inference

that the defendant would not “‘stroll’’ with the five-gallon can,

but would likely enter his residence. In Leichtling, however, the

affidavit states the: on one occasion the petitioner ‘‘drove in the

direction of’’ his residence, and on another occasion ‘‘drove to

his residence.’’ On the first occasion, the affidavit does not even

place the petitioner at or near the premises to be searched. On

neither occasion does the affidavit allege that the petitioner

entered or approached his residence, removed cocaine

hydrochloride from the vehicle, nor even that the petitioner ex-

ited his vehicle. While the affidavit may allege sufficient facts to

justify a search of the person or vehicl., United States v.

Solario, 577 F.2d 554 (9th Cir. 1978), the Leichtling affidavit

lacked the requisite ‘substantial basis’’ to conclude that the

items would be found in petitioner’s residence.

In addressing this issue, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals

overcame these obstacles by holding:

**(W]e think the recitation in the affidavit that Dr. Leicht-

ling was observed to drive ‘to’ his residence raises a

reasonable inference that he actually entered his residence,

because we can think of few situations where a person

would drive to his residence without entering it.’’ Leicht-

ling opinion, at 6.

—

Petitioner submits that the Eighth Circuit overlooked the essen-

tial requirement in determining the sufficiency of an affidavit,

i.e., the nexus necessary between the item to be sought and the

place to be searched. Assuming arguendo, that a magistrate may

infer that a person driving ‘‘to’’ his residence will enter it, the

Eighth Circuit must then make the second assumption, without

any basis, that the Petitioner carried cocaine into his residence

with him.

This Court must not condone the Eighth Circuit’s “inference

upon inference’’ approach in determining the sufficiency of an

affidavit. Absent in the Eighth Circuit’s opinion is the justifica-

tion for the second inference. The Court only addresses the

issue of inferring that the petitioner entered his residence. In so

doing, the Eighth Circuit has taken a quantum leap from the

‘*reasonable inferences’’ - ‘‘substantial basis’’ approaches per-

mitted by the other Circuits, and has authorized magistrates to

use speculation and conjecture to fill in the missing links in a

defective affidavit.

Not to be forgotten is the Court’s admonition that ‘‘[T]he

proceeding by search warrant is a drastic one, and must be

carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions

of the ‘sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.’ "’

Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d

1040 (1967), citing, Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6

S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886).

a

Petitioner contends that the Eighth Circuit’s opinion in

Leichtling is in conflict with every Circuit, especially the Fifth

and Eleventh, which has addressed the sufficiency of an af-

fidavit to support the search of a residence. The issues presented

herein are ripe for review by this Court, not only to prevent Rule

41(c) from becoming a ‘‘rubber-stamp”’ procedure, but also to

provide guidance to all the courts of the country in this crucial

Fourth Amendment question.

Respectfully submitted,

ARTHUR S. MARGULIS

MARGULIS, RAPP & GRANT

7701 Forsyth Bivd., Suite 1070

St. Louis, Missouri 63105

(314) 721-6677

Attorney of Record for

Petitioner