Appendix — Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc.
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IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1982
WILLIE MAE PAYNE, et al., Petitioners,
Vv.
TRAVENOL LABORATORIES, INC. and
BAXTER LABORATORIES, INC.
On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari To The United
States Court Of Appeals For The Fifth Circuit
APPENDIX TOC PETITION
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
WILLIAM L. ROBINSON*
RICHARD T. SEYMOUR
Lawyers’ Committee for
Civil Rights Under Law
520 Woodward Building
733 15th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 628-6700
NAUSEAD STEWART
Lawyers’ Committee for
Civil Rights Under Law
720 Milner Building
October 1982 210 South Lamar Street
Jackson, Mississippi 39201
(601) 948-5400
Attorneys for Petitioners
*Counsel of Record
SS
PRESS OF BYRON S. ADAMS PRINTING, INC.. WASHINGTON, D.C.
oie«
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Opinion of U.S. Court of Appeals,
5th Circuit, April 22, 1982...
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Gold-
berg, April 22, 1982 . * * . >. .
Order of U.S. Court of Appeals,
5th Circuit, denying Petitions
for Rehearing, July 6, 1982...
Order of U.S. District Court, Nor-
thern District of Mississippi,
certifying class, November 16,
1972 = . . . * >. . . * > o oe >. _
Order of U.S. District Court, Nor-
thern District of Mississippi,
redefining class, December 20,
1974 > . . > . . . . 7 >. * bl . .
Memorandum of Decision of U.S.
District Court, Northern District
of Mississippi, February 19, 1976
Memorandum of Decision of U.S.
District Court, Northern District
of Mississippi, December 9, 1976
Order of U.S. District Court, Nor-
thern District of Mississippi,
redefining class and certifying
Order for interlocutory appeal,
December 9, 1976 ...+-+«-ee-.
166a
170a
173a
207a
222a
oe 64 «
TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)
Opinion of U.S. Court of Appeals,
5th Circuit, January 6, 1978 .. 225a
Order of U.S. Court of Appeals,
5th Circuit, amending opinion
of January 6, 1978 and denying
Petition for Rehearing, March
23, 1978 . . . . . . . . . + 7 . 232a
Order of U.S. District Court, Nor-
thern District of Mississippi,
January 25, 1979 ...e«-«e«-e-«e 2338
Report and Recommendation of U.S.
Magistrate, U.S. District Court,
Northern District of Mississippi,
July 268, 1980 ..2.ceece2ec © 2358
Order of U.S. District Court, Nor-
thern District of Mississippi,
adopting Report and Recommenda-
tion of U.S. Magistrate, August
18, 1980 wzevsevcevece cc o 2648
Decree of U.S. District Court, Nor-
thern District of Mississippi,
August 18, 1980 . . . .« « « « « « 265a
F.R. Civ. Pa 23 - > . . . >. * . . 280a
- la -
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
WILLIE MAE PAYNE et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees
and Cross-Appellants,
Vv.
TRAVENOL LABORATORIES, INC.
and BAXTER LABORATORIES, INC.,
Defendants-Appellants
and Cross-Appellees.
No. 80-3764
(April 22, 1982)
673 F.2d 798
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Mississippi
Before CLARK, Chief Judge, and GOLDBERG
and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
JERRE S. WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge.
For the second time, we are asked to
resolve some of the issues arising in this
protracted employment discrimination class
action between Willie Mae Payne and
Travenol Laboratories, Inc. The district
court issued a decree on August 18, 1980.
- 2a -
The decree, while leaving unfinished the
back pay segment of this case, largely
concludes the formulation of injunctive
relief. Both parties have appealed urging
numerous errors, major and minor. Having
journeyed deep into the record of this case
to assess the merits of both parties’ ob-
jections, we conclude that the bulk of the
decree of the district court should be
affirmed. We disagree with certain aspects
of the decree, however, and therefore
remand the case for further proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
Nearly a decade old at the time of
this appeal, this case began on March 2,
1972 when Willie Mae Payne, a black female,
and several other named plaintiffs obtained
right-to-sue letters and filed suit under
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seg. and
1. In this opinion we shall refer to Payne as
the plaintiff or the appellant, and to Travenol as
the defendant or the appellee.
-3a-
also filed claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981
against Travenol Laboratories. Payne
attacked a battery of Travenol's employment
practices at its Cleveland, Mississippi,
pharmaceutical plant as being racially
discriminatory. The complaint was later
amended to include charges of sex discrim-
ination as well.
Truvenol, the largest employer in
Cleveland, Mississippi, manufactures and
packages drugs, particularly intravenous
solutions, for distribution to medical
facilities. The solutions are packaged on
an assembly line by employees called
"operatives". Two types of employees work
on the assembly line: assemblers, who fill,
cap, and inspect the bottles, and material
handlers, who orchestrate and guide the
flow of materials through the assembly
process. Material handlers are compensated
considerably better than assemblers, whose
- 4a -
hourly pay is only slightly above the jani-
torial or custodial staff. The assembler
and material handler positions require no
special skills or experience.
Travenol employed no blacks at its
plant until prodded by the affirmative ac-
tion office of the Navy in 1964 or 1965.
At that point, Travenol began to hire
blacks. Simultaneously, Travenol required
all applicants to be screened and referred
by the Mississippi State Employment Service
(MSES) and imposed a requirement that all
applicants have a tenth-grade education or
General Equivalency Diploma. Travenol then
interviewed referred candidates and hired
upon subjective appraisals of their alert-
ness, comprehension, and cleanliness.
Until 1968, Travenol had MSES refer only
males for the material handler position and
females for the assembler position.
Travenol discontinued its reliance on MSES
—
in 1971, but retained the tenth-grade re-
quirement. Travenol also employs clerks,
technicians, and managers. These positions
have been filled both by promotions and by
outside hiring. Travenol requires a
twelfth-grade education or General Equi-
valency Diploma for some of these positions
and a college degree for others.
Travenol's staff above the operative level
was almost exclusively white until 1974.
In 1975 the case was tried on the
issue of liability, Payne representing a
class of black females. The district court
rendered its decision in 1976, finding that
Travenol had discriminated on the basis of
2
race and sex. The court enjoined certain
employment practices and directed the
eS 0 ee ores > Bee,
Inc., 416 F.Supp (N.D.
part and reversed and
vacated in part, 565 F.2d 895 (Sth Cir. 1978),
cart 439 U.S. 835, 99 S.Ct. 118, 58 L.Ed.
parties to submit suggestions on further
relief, including constructive seniority
and backpay.
On appeal, we vacated two aspects of
the injunction and affirmed two others.”
First, we held that the district court's
blanket injunction against Travenol not to
discriminate on the basis of race or gender
in its employment practices was not spe-
cific enough to satisfy Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 65(d). Second, we held
that no named plaintiff had standing to
challenge Travenol's requirement of a tenth
grade education for its entry-level as-
sembly-line positions and vacated the
district court's conclusion that the tenth-
grade requirement violated Title VII.
Third, we affirmed the district court's
injunction against Travenol's use of a
3. 565 F.2d 895 (Sth Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 835,99 S.Ct. 118, 58 L.Ed.2d 131
twelfth-grade requirement for certain posi-
tions above entry-level. Fourth, we
affirmed the injunction against Travenol's
college degree requirement for other,
higher-level positions. 4
After our decision in Payne I, the
district court directed that a magistrate
hear the parties’ suggestions for further
relief and devise a recommended order.
After ruling on numerous discovery skir-
mishes, the magistrate prepared a report
and a proposed decree which the district
court adopted in full. The decree is in-
terlocutory in that it does not provide for
a back-pay award.
The decree is tailored to provide in-
junctive relief for the discrimination that
ty coverage
pregnancy had to be vacated in the light of General
Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 97 S.Ct. 401,
50 L.Ed. 2d 343 (1976). See Payne I, 565 F.2d at
897.
the district court had found in its 1976
decision, taking into account our decision
in 1978 and hearings held before the magis-
trate in 1980. Paragraph one provides that
the district court will retain jurisdiction
for two years to supervise the decree, pro-
vided that back-pay litigation is concluded
by that date. Paragraph two reaffirms the
district court's earlier grant of injunc-
tive relief against Travenol's use of
twelfth-grade and college-degree require-
ments for certain positions above entry
level. Paragraph three prohibits Travenol
from discriminating subjectively on the
basis of race or sex in violation of Title
VII or § 1981 in its hiring and promotions
decisions.
Paragraphs four, five, six, seven, and
nine spell out more specific actions that
Travenol must take to remedy its discrimi-
natory hiring and promotion practices.
Paragraph four, for example, prohibits
Travenol from establishing new facially-
neutral job prerequisites except in accord
with guidelines promulgated by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission. Para-
graph seven requires Travenol to post
notice of job vacancies, with details about
salary, shift, and other matters.
Paragraph eight provides that Travenol
must write to all unhired applicant class
members who had applied by February 19,
1976, and invite them to reapply for work
at Travenol. Those class members who re-
spond are to be given priority over other
applicants until they have refused an offer,
accepted an offer, or been rejected on le-
gitimate grounds. Travenol is also re-
quired to sort out those applicants who
were qualified for clerical work and who
indicated an interest in it, and invite
them to apply for clerical jobs, giving
them priority over other applicants.
- 10a -
Paragraph ten provides for granting
constructive seniority to applicant class
members who were rejected for discrimina-
tory reasons, and employee class members
whose date of hire was delayed by discri-
mination. Paragraph eleven provides for the
use of an employee class member's con-
structive seniority date in recalling: em-
ployees from layoff. The remaining para-
graphs provide the details for administer-
ing the decree.
Both parties object to portions of the
decree. First, Payne argues that the
decree denies her relief because the dis-
trict court erroneously excluded black males
trom the class she represents and also be-
cause it erroneously established March 3,
1970 as the opening date of the class. She
requests that we include black males in the
class and move the opening date of the
Class back to the period of limitations for
- lla -
Title VII and for § 1981. Second, Travenol
argues that the plaintiffs failed to prove
discrimination in hiring or promotions, and
asks us to reverse any relief in the decree
on these issues. Payne argues that she
proved discrimination in areas in which the
district court erroneously denied her re-
lief, and asks us to broaden the decree ac-
cordingly. Third, both parties lodge
various objecticns to the form of the
decree. Travenol claims that the decree
affords too much relief, if discrimination
was properly found. Payne argues that the
decree affords too little relief. Our
appellate jurisdiction to review this in-
terlocutory decree rests on 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(a) (1). We address each issue in
turn.
II. LIMITATIONS ON THE CLASS
CERTIFIED BY THE DISTRICT COURT
The district court certified a class
in 1972 to include all black female
- l2a -
employees and applicants at Travenol's
plant, but limited the class to exclude all
applicants who applied before March 3, 1970,
and did not reapply thereafter. As initial-
ly certified, the class also included black
male employees and applicants, but in 1974
the court granted the defendant's motion to
exclude black males from the class. The
court made its class certification final in
December, 1976, and authorized an interlo-
cutory appeal of this order under
28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(b), but we declined to
accept the appeal. The grant of injunctive
“elief that we review today, therefore,
awards relief only to those members of the
class finally certified by order of the
district court in December, 1976.>
5. The district court certified the fol-
lowing class:
All present, past, and future black
female employees and all present, past and
future black female applicants for
(footnote continued)
- l3a -
Payne argues that the district court
denied injunctive relief to two groups of
persons who were shown at trial to be vic-
tims of discrimination. These two groups
are black males, and applicants who applied
before March 3, 1970 but not after that
date. Both groups were denied relief be-
cause they fell outside of the confines of
the class certified by the district court.
Payne urges us to reverse these limitations
on the class in order to afford full relief
for all those entitled to it.
employment at the facility operated by the
defendants at Cleveland, Mississippi, sub-
ject, however, to this limitation, that
to say, all black female applicants for
ployment at said “acility prior to March 3
1970, and all black female employees whose
further limitations that
all black female applicants who lack a tenth
- l4a -
[1] Before we may address these argu-
ments, however, we must decide whether our
jurisdiction to hear this interlocutory
appeal from the grant or denial of an in-
junction encompasses the power to review
the definition of a class, when injunctive
relief was denied to persons excluded from
the class. Travenol challenges our juris-
diction, claiming that under Gardner v.
Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 437 U.S. 478,
98 S.Ct. 2451, 57 L.Ed.2d 364 (1978), class
certification questions may not be heard on
interlocutory appeal. Because we find that
the appellees read Gardner too broadly, we
reject their arguments and conclude that
the definition of the class may be reviewed
to the extent that it led to the denial of
injunctive relief.
A. Jurisdiction to Review the Defini-
tion of the Class
In Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcast-
ing Co., supra, the plaintiff brought a
- 15a -
Title VII suit on behalf of herself and all
female applicants and employees who might
be subject to sex discrimination by the de-
fendant employer. After the district court
denied a pretrial motion for class certifi-
cation, the plaintiff immediately appealed
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), arguing that
the refusal to certify the class effective-
ly denied her much of the injunctive relief
she sought. Refusing to allow the appeal,
the Supreme Court held that a pretrial
denial of class certification was not
appealable as a refusal of injunctive “e+
lief under section 1292(a)(1). The Court
noted that section 1292(a)(1) creates an
exception to the policy against interlocu-
tory and fragmentary appeals. The purpose
2f this exception is to give litigants a
chance to gain effective review of orders
with irreparable consequences. Concluding
that the denial of class certification at
the outset of the lawsuit does not carry a
- 16a -
threat of irreparable harm, the Court de-
clined to place class certification ques-
tions in the category of refusals of in-
junctive relief that may be appealed before
judgment on the merits.
We address a different question than
the one faced by the Supreme Court in
Gardner. Here, the district court conducted
a trial on the merits, granted an injunc-
tion, and withheld portions of injunctive
relief because of the definition of the
class. The appellant does not seek to
appeal the ruling on the composition of the
class as an independent matter. Rather,
she challenges the district court’s denial
of injunctive relief, which, in turn, re-
quires her to attack the order that lead|sic]
to the denial. That order was the district
court's certification of the class. Our
established power to review the denial of
injunctive relief embraces the power to
- 17a -
review the orders that underpin this denial.
The Gardner Court recognized that it
was not presented with the question we
answer today, and it limited its holding to
the facts before it. In a footnote, the
Court distinguished Jenkins v. Blue Cross
Mutual Hospital Insurance, Inc., 538 F.2d
164 (7th Cir., 1976) (en banc), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 986, 97 S.Ct. 506, 50 L.Ed.2d 598
(1976), in which the Seventh Circuit re-
viewed the district court's denial of class
certification when that denial led to the
refusal of a preliminary injunction. 437
U.S. at 479 n.3. This appeal fits the |
Jenkins mold rather than Gardner. We agree
6
with the Jenkins court. To hold that section
6. The case for reviewing the class question
here is even stronger than in Jenkins. In Jenkins,
the district court denied a pretrial mtion to
certify a class, and then refused a preliminary
injunction. The Court of Appeals entertained an
appeal of this ruling before a trial on the merits
as is authorized by section 1291(a)(1). Here, by
contrast, though we are not reviewing a final judg-
ment, we are presented with a case in a considerably
advanced stage of litigation. A two week trial on
(footnote continued)
- 18a -
1292(a) (1) does not permit interlocutory
appeals of denials of class certification,
even if injunctive relief might thereby be
compromised, is one thing; to hold that sec-
tion 1292(a)(1) does not permit review of
the district court's definition of a class
when a denial of injunctive relief turns on
that ruling is quite another. We find
injunctive relief.
- 19a -
We recently observed that otherwise un-
appealable orders may be reviewed when nec-
essary to review a denial of injunctive
relief. Gould v. Control Laser Corp., 650
F.2d 617, 621,n.7 (Sth Cir. 1981). The Su-
preme Court has gone even further in author-
izing review of otherwise unappealable
orders in a case properly before a Court of
Appeals to review a preliminary injunction
ruling. In Deckert v. Independence Shares
Corporation, 311 U.S. 282, 61 S.Ct. 229, 85
L.Ed. 189 (1940), the district court had
denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss,
then granted a preliminary injunction. The
defendants appealed from the injunction and
the Court of Appeals reversed not only the
injunction but also the district court's
denial of the motions to dismiss. The Su-
preme Court held that the Court of Appeals
“properly examined the interlocutory order
denying the motions to dismiss, although
generally it could consider such an order
- 20a -
only on appeal from a final decision.” 311
U.S. at 287, 61 S.Ct. at 232. We have
followed Deckert in Myers v. Gilman Paper
Corp., 544 F.2d 837, 847 (Sth Cir., 1977),
cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801, 98 S.Ct. 28,
54 L.Ed.2d 59 (1977), modified on other
grounds, 556 F.2d 758 (5th Cir., 1977), and
in Mercury Motors Express, Inc. v. Brinke,
475 F.2d 1086 (5th Cir. 1973). We need not
rely here on the theory of Deckert, however.
The questions concerning class certifica-
tion that Payne raises are directly tied to
the partial denial of an injunction that is
properly before us. We therefore have
power to resolve the questions of class
definition as an incident of our review of
the injunction. Accord: Adashunas v.
Negley, 626 F.2d 600, 602-03 (7th Cir. 1980),
B. Black males
We now turn to Payne's challenge to
the exclusion of black males from the
class. To place this challenge in
- 2la -
perspective we review the history of the
district court's treatment of the class as
it bears on this issue. This case was
filed as a class action on March 2, 1972,
by three named plaintiffs: two black
females, Willie Mae Payne and Alma Jean
Williams, and one black male, James
Williams. The complaint alleged that
Travenol discriminated against all three
and the class they represented on the basis
of race. On November 16, 1972, the court
conditionally certified the plaintiff class
to include all black applicants and em-
ployees.
On May 1, 1973 the court permitted
Willie Mae Payne to amend her complaint.
The amended complaint alleged sex discrim-
ination as well as race discrimination.
On May 8, 1973, the court granted James
Williams' motion to withdraw from the case
because of his religious views. More than
one year later, on July 31, 1973, two black
- 22a - ,
females, Delilah Cherry and Birdie Lee
Griffin, were permitted to intervene in the
case alleging race and sex discrimination.
These developments prompted the defendants
to move the district court to redefine the
class, and on December 20, 1974, the
_. district court did so. The new class ex-
cluded black males, and other changes were
made in the composition of the class.’
The district court made no written
findings on its reasons for excluding black
males, but the transcript of a hearing on
the issue reveals that the district court
was swayed by two factors. First, the
district court noted that no male plaintiff
remained in the case after James Williams’
withdrawal. The only remaining plaintiffs
were black females. Second, the court
- 23a -
believed that a conflict existed between the
interests of black males and the bleck fe-
male plaintiffs who sought to represent
them. The black females charged sex discrim-
ination in the assignment of material hand-
lers. According to the court, this created
a conflict because to the extent that fe-
males proved sex discrimination, the inter-
a
feat
at
ed
lh
EE
~
f
:
- 24a -
interests of black males.
After this ruling, counsel for the
plaintiffs requested that black males be
sent notice of their provisional exclusion
from the class and of the need for one of
them to step forward if black males were to
remain in the case, but the district court
declined. The court directed, however,
that members of the new provisional class
receive notice of their inclusion in the
case and be given an opportunity to opt out.
On December 8, 1976, after trial, the court
made its class definition order final.
The appellants contest the redefini-
tion of the class to exclude black males on
two grounds. First, Payne denies the exist-
ence of a conflict between black females
and black males that warrants excluding
males from the class. Second, Payne argues
that black males had a stake in the litiga-
tion because of their provisional inclusion
in the class, see Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S.
- 25a -
393, 95 S.Ct. 553, 42 L.Ed.2d 532 (1975),
and the district court had an obligation to
protect their interest. The district court,
therefore, should have sent notice to black
males to permit one to intervene as a plain-
tiff. Had this been done, the class could
have been subdivided to remove the conflict
between the interests of black females and
black males.
{2] The first inquiry must be whether
the district court erred in denying that
black females may represent a class inelud-
ing black males in a mixed sex and race
discrimination suit. The district court's
decision on the scope of the class can be
overturned only for abuse of discretion.
McGowan v. Faulkner Concrete Pipe Co., 659
P.2d 554, 559 (5th Cir. 1981); Zeidman v.
J. Ray McDermott & Co., 651 F.2d 1030, 1038
39 (5th Cir. 1981); Walker v. Jim Dandy Co.,
638 F.2d 1330, 1334 (Sth Cir. 1981).
[3] We start with the language of Rule
- 26a -
23. Under Rule 23(a) one of the four pre-
requisites to a class action is that “the
representative wawehans will fairly and ade-
quately protect the interests of the class."?
Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a). The claim that black
females hold interests in conflict with the
interests of black males, if true, is suf-
ficient to defeat the adequacy of their rep-
resentation. "It is axiomatic that a pu-
tative representative cannot adequately pro-
tect the class if his interests are anta-
gonistic to or in conflict with the objec-
tives ©* those he purports to represent."
7 C. Wright &A. Miller, Federal Practice &
Procedure § 1768 at 638 (1972); Johnson v.
Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d
1122, 1125 (5th Cir. 1969).
9. All four prerequisites of Rule 23(a) must
be met before certification of a class is
ate. Huff v. N.D. Cass O>., 485 F.2d 710 (5th Cir.
1973) (en banc). Of course, the court
i
:
- 27a -
[4-6] Of course, in an employment dis-
crimination case the court must interpret
Rule 23 to accommodate the substantive poli-
cies of Title VII. See Vuyanich v. Republic
National Bank of Dallas, 82 F.R.D. 420
(N.D.Tex. 1979). We have repeatedly upheld
the maintenance of across-the-board Title
VII class actions in which, for example, an
employee complaining of race discrimination
represents not only other employees but
also applicants suffering similar discrim-
10
ination. An across-the-board Title VII
10. See v. Joint lative Com
mittee, 63728 id ea Cir. ah Falcon v.
Frat 8 (SE Cie, 1080) ect ant amded
F.
a" , vacated and remanded on
, 450 U.S. 1036, 101 S.Ct. 1752, 68
other
L.Ed. 1), reinstated in part and remanded
in part, 647 F.2d 633 (1981), cert. ,
U.S. , 102 S.Ct. 668, 70 L.Bd.2d 81);
Vv. , 502 F.2d 34 (5th Cir., 1974), Carr v.
Inc., 423 F.2d 57 (5th Cir. 1970),
cert. , 400 U.S. 951, 91 S.Ct. 241, 27 L.Bd.2d
mapen. we Bheld hs ViGhe of Be PIAtneT Ein
- vw
TUE teem Oy ieaiaonhe ak aeumeiinn been Gh
VII action in Payne I, 567 F.2d at 900.
- 28a -
attack requires only that there be a suf-
ficient "nexus" between the claims of the
named plaintiff and the claims of the class.
Payne I, 565 F.2d at 900. Yet, while Title
VII policies support a broad reading of Rule
23, they do not justify the jettison of the
cardinal principle that a class representa-
tive ney not head a class including persons
whose interests substantially conflict with
his or her own. East Texas Motor Freight
System, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395,
405, 97 S.Ct. 1891, 1897, 52 L.Ed.2d 453
(1977).
{7] The conflict found by the district
court here is straightforward: the female
plaintiffs asserted that Travenol discrimi-
nates against females by typically assign-
ing them to the lower-paying job of assem-
bler while typically assigning males to the
higher-paying job of material handler. The
females, therefore, sought to establish
= 29a -
that males were favored at their expense.
This claim plainly draws the interests of
males into conflict with the interests of
11
females. We are aware of no case holding
that a black female plaintiff is an adequate
representative of black makes in a sex and
race discrimination suit when the interests
12
of the two groups conflict. On the
11. "Qn the one hand, [the black female
plaintiff] would argue that defendant's policies
and practices discriminated in favor of males, in-
cluding black males, and against females. At the
same time, she would claim that defendant favored
represe™
black males or white -" Colston V. land
i
5
:
,
;
possible
tween the plaintiff «und the class that might render
her representation inadequate under Rule 23(a) (4).
(footnote continued)
- 30a -
contrary, a host of district courts have re-
fused to permit black females to represent
black males in class actions alleging both
race and sex discrimination when a conflict
of interest appears. -?
Is) A court should not lightly reject
a black female's claim to represent all
blacks and all females in a sex and race
discrimination suit. Rather than determine
the question of conflict abstractly, the
court must examine the interlacing allega-
tio..s of race and sex discrimination to
Moreover, the plaintiff in Donaldson alleged that
the defendant employed favored white men at the
expense of both blacks and females. 554 F.2d at
830. Thus, the conflict we find here was not pres-
- ent in Donaldson.
13. See Stroma v: (eee ee & Blue
Shield, Inc., 8/7 F.R.D.
a ee eee
Vv. F.R.D. 375 (N.D.I11. 1980);
Repub 8 eee
~ 1979); v. land
7 "| 26 F.R.Serv.24 940
SR ie. ., Ta F.R.D. 639 (E.D.Pa. 1977);
Vv. Bechtel -, 21 F.R.Serv.2d 85 (N.D.Cal. 1975);
v. Hospital, 55 F.R.D. 62 (D.D.C.
- 3la -
determine whether an actual conflict exists.
For example, if a black female plaintiff |
argues that the employer favors white males
to the detriment of both females and blacks,
there is no inherent obstacle to her repre-
sentation of both groups. See Donaldson v.
Pillsbury, 554 F.2d 825 (8th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 856, 98 S.Ct. 177,
54 L.Ed.2d 128 (1977); Vuyanich v. Republic
National Bank of Dallas, supra, 82 F.R.D.
at 435. In this case, however, the dis-
trict court found an actual conflict of
interest and we see no error in this conclu-
sion.
(9, 10) The plaintiffs argue that be-
cause both blacks and women were adequately
represented at trial, the existence of a
possible conflict between the two before
trial is not relevant. We reject this argu-
ment. It is true that the court's responsi-
bility to assess the adequacy of representa-
tion is an ongoing one. The district court
- 32a -
may decertify a class after trial if plain-
tiff's trial performance showed him or her
to be an inadequate class representative.
Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., 628 F.2d 419
(Sth Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded on
other grounds, 451 U.S. 902, 101 S.Ct. 1967,
68 L.Ed.2d 290 (1981). But the trial court
is not required to hypothesize about the
effect of an actual conflict of interests
on the adequacy of plaintiffs’ representa-
tion. It is enced ta deny representation
that the conflict is actual at the outset
of the trial.
The plaintiffs also argue that black
males have no "legally cognizable" interest
in perpetuating sex discrimination at
Travenol's plant, and we agree. But black
males do have an interest in representation
of their interests with undivided loyalty.
The existence vel non of sex discrimination
is at issue in this case. Black males are
entitled to a class representative who is
- 33a -
free from a desire to prove a claim that
will impair their interests.
{1l, 12] Finally, the plaintiffs con-
tend that we must balance the harms to
black males flowing from their inclusion in
the class against the harms flowing from
their exclusion. Payne maintains that the
harms of excluding black males overshadow
the potential harms of including them. The
district court's ruling deprives black
males of the benefits accorded to class
members, including constructive seniority
and back pay. To include them in the class
despite the conflict of interest, Payne ar-
gues, would have brought them much less
harm. This argument diverts attention from
the proper inquiry under Rule 23. Rule 23
forces a court to measure the adequacy of
representation because of the sensitive con-
siderations involved in binding parties not
before the court to a judgment won or lost
by class representatives. See Hansberry v.
- 34a -
Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 61 S.Ct. 115, 85 L.Ed. 22
(1940). A court need not look beyond the
issues in the suit before it to determine
when a conflict of interest precludes ade-
quate representation. We conclude, there-
fore, that the district court was within
its discretion in excluding black males
from the class.
{13, 14) Ordinarily, if a court dis-
cerns a conflict like the one in this case,
the proper solution is to create subclasses
of persons whose interests are in accord.
Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d
496, 499 (Sth Cir. 1968). Of course, each
subclass must be headed by a person who
claims the same injury as the subclass, but
who lacks the fatal conflict. See East
Texas Motor Freight System, Inc. v.
Rodriguez, supra: Johnson v. American Credit
Co., 581 F.2d 526, 532-33 (5th Cir., 1978).
In this case, after the sole black male
plaintiff, James Williams, withdrew from
- 35a -
the case, no named plaintiff existed to
head a class of black males. Payne there-
fore argues that having provisionally in-
cluded black males in the class, the dis-
trict court owed black males a duty to send
them notice of their pending exclusion from
the case to allow one of them to step for-
ward to intervene. We do not find this
obligation in the law.
[15] Rule 23 requires a district court
to give notice to absent class members of
developments in the suit in only two situa-
tions. The first is when the court certi-
fies a class under Rule 23(b)(3) because of
common questions of law or fact that pre-
dominate over other aspects of the suit and
render a class action the appropriate
vehicle to resolve the claims. Fed.R.Civ.P.
23(c) (2); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
417 U.S. 156, 94 S.Ct. 2140, 40 L.Ed.2da 732
(1974). The second is when a class action
is to be dismissed or compromised. Fed.R.
- 36a -
Civ.P. 23(e) . +4 In all other cases, notice
lies within the district court's discretion.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(d)(2). The district court
. The plaintiffs have not argued that the
redefinition of the class in this case is a dis-
of Rule 23(e), and we
do not consider it to be me.
I.
15. In Silva v. Vowell, 621 F.2d 640, 649
(Sth Cir. 1980 v.
Co. , 581 F.24 at n.13), cert. denied,
u.s. S.Ct. 941, 67 L.Bd.2a .
subclass action.'" In
- 37a -
the court transgressed its authority in
failing to recruit a new black male plain-
tiff to intervene to permit subdivision of
the class. Cf. United States Parole Com-
mission v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 100 S.Ct.
1202, 1214, 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980) (after
denying class certification, a district
court must give the representative of the
plaintiff class an opportunity to propose
subclasses, but has no obligation to con-
struct them itself).
(16, 17] Were we to accept Payne's rea-
soning, a district comrt that provisionally
certified a class but later concluded that
the existing class representative was in-
adequate would have to send notice solicit-
ing a new class representative. Plainly,
that is not the rule in this Circuit, see
Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., supra,
628 F.2d at 423, nor should it be. The
rule that Payne proposes would shift a bur-
den onto the district court that properly
- 38a -
remains with the plaintift.*® only if the
black males had received notice of their
initial inclusion in the class, had relied
on the class suit to protect their rights,
and would be prejudiced as a practical
matter by exclusion from the class might the
district court be obligated to take some
action to safeguard their interests. See
Seligson v. Plum Tree, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 343,
346 (E.D.Pa. 1973); Berse v. Berman, 60
F.R.D. 414, 416 (S.D.N.¥. 1973). Here,
16. At oral argument, plaintiffs’ counsel
advised this Court that counsel failed to seek a
black male plaintiff to intervene on his own be-
cause of doubts that attorneys for the plaintiffs
could freely commmicate with class members.
Oil Oo. v. 452 U.S. 89, 101 S.Ct. ;
made clear that a district court
may not curtail commmications between the attorney
for the plaintiff and class members, at least in
the absence of specific findings that such an order
is appropriate or necessary to prevent abuses.
101 S.Ct. at 2193. Although in 1974 the plaintiffs
- 39a -
there is no showing that black males relied
to their detriment on the district court's
provisional inclusion of them in the class.
In the absence of such a showing, we decline
to hold that the district court abused its
discretion in failing to give them notice.
In sum, the district court on this record
was justified in its discretion in believing
that recruiting black males after the one
black make had dropped out almost two years
before would constitute the stimulation of
a new law suit by the court rather than a
comtinuation of the old.
C. Opening date for class membership
We now take up Payne's argument that
injunctive relief was improperly limited be-
cause the district court fixed an incorrect
opening date for membership in the class.
The district court limited the class to
black females who applied at Travenol after
March 3, 1970. Neither party is certain
why the district court chose this date, and
- 40a -
the court itself gave no reason. Payne
urges us to move the date back to include
all applications within the limitations pe-
riods for both Title VII and Section 1981.
Travenol resists any extension and maintains
that despite some difficulties in the date
chosen by the district court, there is no
abuse of the court's discretion. We are
persuaded that the court did abuse its dis-
cretion in choosing the opening date, al-
though our analysis differs from either of
the parties’.
[18-20] The opening date for member-
ship in a class for a Title VII claim
should be set by reference to <h@ earliest
charge filed by a named plaintiff. Laffey
v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429,
472 (D.C.Cir. 1976) cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1086, 98 S.Ct. 1281, 55 L.Ed.2d 792 (1978);
Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,
508 F.2d 239, 246 (3d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 1011, 95 S.Ct. 2415,
- 4la -
44 L.Ed.2d 679 (1975). See also Crawford v.
Western Electric Co., 614 F.2d 1300, 1309
(Sth Cir. 1980). But see Chisholm v. United
States Postal Service, 665 F.2d 482, 489
(4th Cir. 1981) (opening date for class
membership set by reference to the date from
which a named plaintiff could collect back
pay). Here, that plaintiff is Willie Mae
Payne, who filed her first charge on January
17
29, 1970. For Title VII purposes, Payne
17. There are at present three named plain-
tiffs in this case. Willie Mae Payne acquired a
tenth grade GED on January 20, 1970. She applied
at the Mississippi State Employment Service (MSES)
for a referral to Travenol on January 29, 1970, but
referred by MSES shortly thereafter, and was denied
employment over the next two years despite repeated
(footnote continued)
- 42a -
can represent a class that includes all
18 black female applicants who
qualifying
could have filed a timely charge with the
19
EEOC when she did. See Laffey v. North-
west Airlines, Inc., supra; Wetzel v.
visits and phone calls to Travenol. She filed two
EEOC charges, the first on August 14, 1970, the
second on January 12, 1971.
Birdie Lee Griffin completed eleven years of
school, was referred by MSES in 1966, and was re-
fused employment despite renewed requests on
abundant instances over the next four years. Her
first EEOC charge is dated August 28, 1970. Like
the other two plaintiffs, she filed a second charge,
which the EEOC received on January 12, 1971.
18. The district court certified a class of
black female applicants subject to two limitations,
which are in addition to the date of application.
First, the applicant must possess a tenth grade edu-
cation. Second, she must have been referred by
MSES during the time such referral was required.
19. Payne's first charge covers Travenol's
alleged discriminatory acts that occurred after
she filed it because they are sufficiently related
to the allegations of the first charge. Gamble v.
Bimmingham Southern Railroad Co., 514 F.2d 678, 99
n.6 (5th Cir. 1975); Oubichon v. North American
Rockwell ., 482 F.2d 569 (Sth Cir. 1973). See
encompasses
Travenol's rejection of Payne on March 17, 1970,
after she was referred by the MSES.
- 43a -
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., supra. The
charge filing period in 1970 was ninety days
after the alleged act of discrimination. 7°
See Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431
F.2d 455, 460 (5th Cir. 1970). Thus, the
opening date for the Title VII race discrim-
ination class, counting back ninety days
from the date of the January 20 charge, is
October 31, 1969. All black females who
satisfy the other requirements of class
- 44a -
membership and who applied on or after
October 31, 1969, should be members of the
class for purposes of Title VII race discri-
mination. The district court's later datr
cannot be sustained. 7+
For the Title VII sex discrimination
claim, the opening date of the class is
October 31, 1969, the same date as for the
Title VII race discrimination claim, be-
mentioned in the complaint. district
certified the class conditionally on Novenber 16,
1972. "s amended complaint, filed May 3,
1973, did having filed a charge with the
- 45a -
applicant suffering sex discrimination on
or after this date could have filed a timely
charge of sex discrimination with the EEOC
by the date Payne filed her charge. Thus,
the sex discrimination claims take in a
class of black female employees or appli-
cants beginning on October 31, 1969.
[21] Our inquiry is not ended here,
however, because the plaintiffs' alleged
violations of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 as well as
violations of Title VII. Although both of
these statutes apply to employment discrim-
ination cases, they have independent
remedies and independent statutes of limi-
tations. See Johnson v. Railway Express
Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 95 S.Ct. 1716,
44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975). Though both the
district court's decision on liability and
our earlier decision in this case failed to
mention Section 1981, there can be no doubt
that the Section 1981 claim was properly
pleaded and adjudicated. The decree that
- 46a -
we review today enjoins subjective employ-
ment practices in violation of Section 1981,
a ruling that must be premised on a finding
of Section 1981 liability. We therefore
examine what the appropriate Section 1981
class opening date should be. Cf.
McWilliams v. Escambia County School Board,
658 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1981) (the Court
separately examined whether a charge had
been timely filed under Title VII and
whether the acts complained of occurred
within the statute of limitations for
Section 1981 and Section 1983 before con-
cluding that all claims were time-barred) ;
Crawford v. Western Electric Co., supra,
614 F.2d at 1309. Petty v. Peoples Gas
Light and Coke Co., 86 F.R.D. 336, 342-
43 (N.D.I1l. 1979).
[22-24] Statutes of limitations for
Section 1981 actions ordinarily are bor-
rowed from state law. Johnson v. Railway
- 47a -
Express Agency, supra, 421 U.S. at 462, 95
S.Ct. at 1721. In Truvillion v. King's
Daughters Hospital, 614 F.2d 520 (5th Cir.
1980), we held that a Section 1981 claim
for a discriminatory refusal-to-hire is
governed by the six-year Mississippi general
22 614 F.24 at 528.
statute of limitations.
At least one of the named plaintiffs here,
Birdie Lee Griffin, applied for a job with
Travenol in 1966 after receiving an MSES
referral, and was refused employment.
Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 416
F.Supp. at 252. Thus, if the proof supports
it the plaintiffs may represent a Section
1981 race discrimination class that begins
six years before the date when the complaint
was filed in 1972, or March 2, 1966.
22. Mississippi Code Annotated, Section 15-1-49
(1972) provides:
- 48a -
Section 1981, of course, does not embrace
sex discrimination claims, Bobo v. ITT, Con-
tinental Baking Co., 662 F.2d 340 (5th Cir.
1981).
III. PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION
We come now to the merits of the plain-
tiffs' claim that Travenol's hiring, job as-
signment, promotion, and pay practices were
23
discriminatory. The district court found
23. The plaintiffs alleged discrimination in
four areas that are relevant to this appeal:
- 49a -
for the plaintiffs on most but not all lia-
bility issues. On appeal, the plaintiffs
charge error in the district court's failure
to find discrimination on the remaining
issues. But for the educational require-
ments that we struck down in Payne I, 565
F.2d at 899-900, the defendant contends that
the district court erred in finding any dis-—
crimination at all. We take up each issue
in turn.
A. Discrimination in hiring.
[25) At the outset, we note one diffi-
culty in assessing the proof of discrimina-
tion in hiring. When this case was tried,
the plaintiffs principally, though not exclu-
sively, strived to prove that Travenol's
hiring of operatives discriminated against
blacks because of the minimum requirement
of a tenth-grade education. See Payne v.
Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 416 F.Supp. at
255. Proof of such disparate impact dis-
crimination under Title VII is governed
- 50a -
by Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971). Griggs
holds that a facially neutral employment
practice that imposes a greater burden on
one group than another violates Title VII
unless the employer establishes that the
practice arises from business necessity. A
disparate impact plaintiff need not show in-
tentional discrimination. 401 U.S. at 430-
32, 91 S.Ct. at 853-54. A large quantity
of Payne's evidence was aimed precisely at
the Griggs elements of proof. Of course,
Payne also introduced testimony and statis-
tics undertaking to show the opportunity for
and the existence of subjective, intentional
discrimination in Travenol's hiring process-
disparate treatment.
[26] Confronted with this evidence,
the district court found that Travenol hired
proportionately fewer blacks, stating:
"Thie disparate result reflects the effect
of a tenth-grade requirement and of the
- 5la -
defendants’ subjective discrimination."
416 F.Supp. at 248. The district court
then struck down the tenth grade require-
ment, rejecting Travenol's business neces-
sity defense. In Payne I, we reversed the
injunction against the tenth-grade require-
ment, holding that no named plaintiff had
standing to challenge it because each had
a tenth grade education during the relevant
period. 565 F.2d at 898-99. 74
24. In I, Payne argued that she had
standing to the tenth grade requirement
because she lacked a tenth-grade equi for
- 52a -
In a disparate impact case,
{27] The removal of the tenth-grade re-
As Travenol properly contends,
the case must now be analyzed as a dispa-
rate treatment case rather than a disparate
impact case.
quirement issue transformed this case dra-
matically.
nat Hy lt ads
Hone que seis i9%
ays pains
igi ; i fi HE
THe reid rhe i
au paitell Ay th
i ith at ‘i
- 53a -
the plaintiff need not prove intent to dis-
criminate, while in a disparate treatment
case, such proof is crucial. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1854,
n,15, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977). The plain-
tiffs' proof must now be tested under dis-
parate treatment principles.
With the removal of the tenth-grade re-
quirement as an issue in this case, Payne's
essential challenge is that Travenol's sub-
jective interviewing process led to discrim-
ination. Payne does not assert that
Travenol applied distinct, facially neutral
criteria to candidates in the interview
that operate disproportionately to exclude
blacks. Rather, Payne points to the ab-
sence of objective criteria and the result-
ant opportunity to discriminate subjective-
ly in Travenol's hiring. In support of the
contention that Travenol discriminated in
- 54a -
hiring, Payne recites the history of
Travenol's hiring, which reveals substantial
pre-Act discrimination, and compares appli-
cant flow to actual hires, stressing the
' consistently lower proportion of blacks than
whites hired. Payne also adverts to indi-
vidual instances of discrimination. This
evidence falls into the classic pattern of
a classwide disparate treatment case. See
Hazlewood School District v. United States,
433 U.S. 299, 97 S.Ct. 2736, 53 L.Ed.2d 768
(1977); International Brotherhood of Teams-
ters v. United States, supra; Wilkins v.
University of Houston, 654 F.2d 388, 394-95
(5th Cir. 1981); Phillips v. Joint Legisla-
tive Committee, 637 F.2d 1014, 1024-26 (5th
Cir. 1981).
Travenol's interviewing cannot be
viewed as a neutral practice with a dis-
parate effect thus subject to Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., supra, as Payne argues. Hiring
processes that rely heavily on subjective
- 55a -
interviewing provide an opportunity for the
intentional discrimination that lies at the
heart of a disparate treatment case. Payne
does not urge that Travenol has violated
Title VII by seeking alert, capable opera-
tive workers; rather she charges that Tra-
venol masked its intentional discrimina-
tion by purporting to screen applicants for
these qualities while actually discriminat-
ing on the basis of race. Subjective dis-
crimination in interviewing or in similar
evaluation processes has repeatedly been
held to fall into the disparate treatment
branch of Title VII law. See Hazlewood
School District, supra, 433 U.S. at 304, 97
S.Ct. at 2739-40; Pouncy v. Prudential In-
surance Co., 668 F.2d 795, at 801 (5th Cir.
1982) (subjective evaluation of employees
is not a selection procedure tested under
the disparate impact model); Wilkins v.
University of Houston, supra, 654 F.2d at
394-94; Phillips v. Joint Legislative
- 56a -
Committee, supra.
[28-30] Because this case now raises
Claims of classwide disparate treatment, we
must evaluate the evidence in light of
standards established by the Supreme Court
in such cases as Teamsters and Hazelwood.
See Pouncy v. Prudential Insurance Co.,
Supra. Teamsters and Hazelwood establish
that in a Title VII disparate treatment
class action, the plaintiff has the burden
of proving a prima facie case that the de-
fendant's regular practice was to discrimi-
nate intentionally against a protected
Class. The burden may be met solely with
statistics if they show a sufficiently
great disparity between the employer's
treatment of blacks and of whites---a dis-
parate result. In such circumstances, sta-
tistics alone justify an inference of dis-
criminatory motive. See Village of Arling-
ton Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Develop-
ment Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66, 97 S.Ct.
- 57a -
555, 563-64, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1971). The
statistical showing of disparate result may
also be buttressed with evidence of a his-
tory of discrimination practiced by the em-
ployer, individual instances of discrimina-
tion, and opportunities to discriminate that
exist in the employer's decision-making pro-
cesses. If the statistical disparity is in-
sufficient alone to establish a prima facie
case, the plaintiff may get over his or her
initial hurdle by combining statistics with
historical, individual, or circumstantial
evidence. See EEOC v. American National
Bank, 652 F.2d 1176 (4th Cir. 1981).
[31] Once the plaintiff has shown a
prima facie case that the employer has pur-
sued a policy of discrimination, the employ-
er may undertake to rebut this showing.
The rebuttal can proceed along two fronts.
First, proof that the plaintiff's statis-
tics are inaccurate or insignificant may
dispel the plaintiff's proof of disparate
- 58a -
result. For example, the employer may show
that the disparity between the percentage
of minorities in his work force and in the
general population results from discrimina-
tion before the enactment of Title VII.
Second, the employer may seek “to provide a
nondiscriminatory explanation for the appar-
ently discriminatory result." Teamsters,
431 U.S. at 360 n.46, 97 S.Ct. at 1867 n.46.
General assertions of good faith or of hir-
ing only the best applicants, however, are
insufficient to meet this burden. Id. at
342 n.24, 97 S.Ct. at 1858 n.24. If the em
ployer fails to rebut the plaintiff's case,
the district court may conclude that Title
VII has been violated. Id. at 361, 97 S.Ct.
at 1867.
[32] Discriminatory treatment claims
under § 1981 are measured by the same stand
ards that apply to discriminatory treatment
claims under Title VII. Rivera v. City of
Wichita Falls, 665 F.2d 531, 534 n.4 (5th
- 59a -
Cir. 1982); McWilliams v. Escambia County
School Board, 658 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1981).
Thus, we apply the Teamsters pattern of
proof to the § 1981 claims as well as the
Title VII claims in this case.
The defendants argue that because this
is a disparate treatment case, the burdens
of proof and production must conform to the
model established by the Supreme Court in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973),
and Texas Department of Community Affairs
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089,
67 L.Ed.2a 207 (1981).7> We have-held,
25. _Burdine holds that an individual seeking
to prove discriminatory treatment must establish
a prima facie case according to McDonnell-Douglas
- v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.
- ‘The defendant then has the evi-
must show that the defendant's reason is a pretext
for discrimination. See McWilliams v. Escanbia
County School Board, 658 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1961).
(footnote continued)
- 60a -
however, that McDonnell Dougias and Burdine
establish the model of proof only for an in-
dividual disparate treatment case. Ina
class action we adhere to the pattern of
proof set out in Teamsters and Hazelwood.
Our cases have recognized the distinction
between individual and class claims of dis-
parate treatment, see Phillips v. Joint Leg-
islative Committee, supra, 637 F.2d at 1024-
27 (5th Cir. 1981), and have consistently
applied the Teamsters model of proof to the
class claims, e.g., Markey v. Tenneco Oil
Co., 635 F.2d 497, 499 (5th Cir. 1981).
Nothing in Burdine, a single-plaintiff case,
suggests that the Court intended Burdine
procedures to supplant the procedures for
proving classwide disparate treatment an-
nounced in Teamsters and Hazelwood. See
The Third and the Ninth Circuits have ap-
plied Burdine to Title VII class actions. See
Croker v. Co., 662 F.2d 975 (3d Cir. 1981)
en ; Piva Vv. Corp., 654 F.2d 591 (9th
Cir. 1981).
- 6la -
Vuyanich v. Republic National Bank of Dallas,
521 F.Supp. 656 (N.D.Tex. 1981).
[33] We now turn to the question
whether the district court's findings sup-
port an inference of classwide disparate
treatment under Teamsters. In answering
this question we recite the statistical and
other facts reported in the opinion of the
district court that can, if supported in
the record, establish discrimination absent
the tenth-grade requirement. Travenol
asserts that the district court made a find
ing of discrimination only by overlaying
the disparate effects of the tenth-grade
education requirement and the subjective
screening accomplished through interviewing.
Because the district court never considered
the independent effect of interviewing,
Travenol maintains, there is no finding
that interviewing, without regard to the
tenth-grade requirement, is discriminatory.
- 62a -
The district court's findings, by its own
admission, are “brief and to some extent
conclusory." 416 F.Supp. at 255. Neverthe-
less, we believe that they are adequate to
support a conclusion of classwide discrimi-
nation, without regard for the tenth-grade
requirement.
First, the district court found that
Travenol hired proportionately fewer blacks
than whites from candidates referred by
uses . 7° Because MSES referred only candi-
dates possessing a tenth-grade education, |
this finding is untouched by our holding in
Payne I that the plaintiffs could not chal-
lenge the tenth-grade requirement. The
district court also found that after Tra-
venol ceased to require referral from MSES,
The district court cited no statistics
i
3
,
- 63a -
its hiring continued to exclude blacks dis-
a7 This finding reflects
proportionately.
both Travenol's imposition of the tenth-
grade requirement and its subjective discrim
ination. The court, therefore, did not
state how much of Travenol's disproportion-
ate exclusion of blacks was attributable to
subjective discrimination, but its finding
clearly implies that some of it resulted
from such discrimination.
In addition to these findings, the
court relied on work-force statistics. *®
27 =the court found that Travenol hired one
of three white applicants but only one of six
black applicants between April 1971 and August 1974.
28. ‘The statistics relied on by the court
showed the following percentages of whites in the
operative work force:
Percentage of the operative work
Year force that was white:
All Male Female
1964 100 — —
1966 84 -—- --
1970 ed 76.6% 82.8%
1973 _ 54.1% 70.1%
1974 _ 37.4% 57.5%
- 64a -
These statistics show a slow rise in the
percentage of blacks in Travenol's plant
from 1964, when there were none to 1971,
when blacks composed nearly 25% of male
operatives and slightly more than 20% of the
female operatives. After 1972, when the
plaintiffs filed suit, the percentage of
blacks grew rapidly.
Thus, the district court clearly found
that Travenol's hiring had a disparate re-
sult, even without regard to the tenth-
grade requirement. Although its statistical
findings are not elaborate enough to permit
us to conclude that Payne established a
prima facie case through statistics alone,
the court also made historical, circum-
stantial, and individual findings that but;
tress the statistics. The findings of dis-
parate result coalesce with Travenol's
history of discrimination, the opportunities
in its hiring process to discriminate, and
individual instances of discrimination, all
- 65a -
to establish a prima facie case.
[34] Travenol's entire work force, but
for custodial positions, was exclusively
white until 1964.2?
Before 1964, Travenol
hired persons, without regard to educational
requirements, based on subjective impres-
sions gained through interviewing. Com-
munity references were used heavily in the
plant's early years, but took on less im-
portance in the 1960s. Following the pas-
sage of Title VII in 1964, the plant's
porssanel manager sought the assistance of
MSES in evaluating how Travenol could bring
blacks into the operative work force. MSES
performed a study and recommended that
Travenol require a twelfth-grade education
for operative positions. Travenol refused
to set such a high standard, instead
29. Although liability under Title VII can-
not rest on Travenol's pre-Act discrimination, its
conduct before 1964 is relevant to the interpreta-
tion of post-Act disparate results. See Hazel-
wood School District, supra, 433 U.S. at 3097n.15,
97 S.Ct. at 2742 n.15.
requiring a tenth-grade education or GED.
It is unclear why Travenol decided that it
needed any educational requirement for the
first time only after the passage of Title
VII. Travenol also invoked the services of
MSES to screen and refer applicants to the
plant.
Between 1965 and 1971 Travenol con-
sidered only those applicants referred by
MSES. The referred applicants were then
interviewed by the plant's personnel manager.
Travenol's personnel manager between 1965
and 1967 hired applicants based on his in-
terview impression and the recommendation
of plant employees whom he consulted about
the applicants. The first personnel manager
initiated a practice of consulting a black
employee, Julius Lucas, about black appli-
cants, and this practice was continued by his
successors until 1971. The personnel manag-
er during 1967 and 1968 consulted members
of the local community as references to
- 67a -
supplement his reaction to applicants gained
through interviewing. The personnel manag-
er from 1968 to 1974 made his hiring deci-
sions almost exclusively by his subjective
30 At no time
impression at the interview.
either before or after Title VII's enactment
did Travenol give its personnel managers
written instructions on standards to apply
in hiring.
The district court also found that »11
three of the named plaintiffs belonged to a
racial minority, were qualified for the
operative pesition they sought, and were re-
jected by Travenol. It is also abundantly
clear from the district court's opinion that
Travenol continued to hire white applicants
for operative positions after these rejec-
tions. Thus, each named plaintiff fulfilled
- 68a -
the four-part test of establishing a prima
facie case under McDonnell--Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36
L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).°+ ‘there is no indica-
tion in the district court's findings that
Travenol rebutted the inferences of indivi-
dual discrimination that arose from the
plaintiffs' showings.
These findings, evaluated in light of
Teamsters, establish a strong prima facie
case of disparate treatment, absent the
tenth-grade requirement. The burden then
31. Under McDonnell-Douglas the plaintiff
may establish a prima facie case of individual dis-
parate treatment by showing: "(i) that he belongs
to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was
seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his quali-
fication, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his
rejection, the position remained open and the
continued to seek applicants from persons
of complainant's qualifications. 411 U.S. at 802,
93 S.Ct. at 1824. By noting that the named plain-
tiffs satisfied the McDonell criteria, we
do not imply that instances of
discrimination presented to support a case of class-
wide discrimination must conform to McDonnell-
Douglas.
fell on Travenol to rebut the plaintiffs'
showing. The district court, however, made
no findings that appear to us to blunt the
plaintiffs' evidence. We conclude, there-
fore, that if the district court's findings
are supported by the evidence, we are com-
pelled to hold that Travenol's hiring vio-
lated Title VII and Section 1981.
[35] We have now decided that the dis-
trict court's findings, if correct, warrant
a conclusion that unlawful discrimination
actually occurred. We now turn to evidence
of discrimination in hiring to see if it sup-
ports the district court's findings of fact.
In assessing this evidence, we apply the
clearly erroneous standard to the district
court's subsidiary findings of fact. Rivera
v. City of Wichita Falls, 665 F.2d at 535-36.
Danner v. United States Civil Service Com-
mission, 635 F.2d 427, 430-31 (5th Cir.
1981).
[36] Travenol asserts that the district
- 70a -
court's finding of a disparate result in
hiring is clearly erroneous in tiiat it is
unsupported by competent statis‘ical evi-+
dence. Travenol argues that ali. the stat-
istics in the record on applicant flow com-
bine applicants who had a tenth-grade educa-
tion and applicants who were without a
tenth-grade education. If Travenol were
correct, the district court's finding of a
disparate result in hiring that was the
product of discrimination in interviewing
could not be sustained. The statistics in
the record, however, amply support the dis-
trict court's findings and we may not set
them aside as clearly erroneous.
First, Payne introduced statistics
that show that between November 1969 and
November 1971, Travenol hired only 24.3%
of black females [sic] applicants referred
by MSES for operative positions and 21.0%
of black males, while hiring 44.3% of the
- 7Jla-
white males and 51.7% of the white females.“
32. The following chart presents the break-
down of applicants and hires:
firing Rates of Ppplicants Referrod by SES,
Ma Posi-
Hired 130 29 260 107
— Percent Hired 44.3% 21.0% 51.7% 24.3%
The calculation of standard deviations though
not essential, see Rivera v. City of Wichita Falls,
665 F.2d at 545, n.21, is extremely useful. Absent
explanation, standard deviations of greater than
three generally signal discrimination, see Hazelwood
School Dist., 433 U.S. at 311 n.17, 97 S.Ct. at 2743
n.l?. Standard deviation analysis here reveals that
the discrepancy between black and white hires is
probative of discrimination. The observed mumber
of hires is 7.54 standard deviations fewer than the
expected number.
The "standard deviation" is a way to calcu-
late the likelihood that chance is responsible for
the difference between a predicted result and an
actual result. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S.
482, 496 n.17, 97 S.Ct. 1272, 1281 n.17, 51 L.Ed.2a
498. For example, if we flip a penny one hundred
- 72a -
Payne's evidence also shows that between
1970 and 1974, Travenol hired 44.9% of white
operative-job applicants with a tenth-grade
education, but only 25% of black applicants
similarly qualified. >* More specific stat-
istics indicate that the disproportionate
exclusion of blacks continued but was
chalk it up to chance. But long before we get to
99 flips out of 100 producing heads, we suspect the
penny. Standard deviation analysis is the mathe-
matical means of expressing how likely it is that
the penny is suspect. For hiring discrimination,
the standard deviation is calculated by taking the
square root of the product of the number of appli-
root of 100 times .5 (the probability of heads)
ty of tails), or 5 [sic]. If
100 flips yield 40 heads, the observed value falls
two standard deviations below the expected value.
the expected value-—-is less than one in 100. Id,
Statisticians tend to discard chance as an explana-
tion for a result when deviations from the expected
value approach two standard deviations. Id.
33. The plaintiffs set out the following
:
:
- 73a -
tapering towards the end of this period.
In 1972 to 1974, Travenol hired 26.1% of the
qualified white applicants while hiring
21.5% of the qualified black applicants. >“
licants with a Tenth-Grade Education,
From Into
ve ns, 4
Whites Hlacks
Applicants for Operative Jobs
With a 10th Grade Education 1,478 2,193
Hires in Operative Jobs,
1970-74 664 548
% Hired 44.9% 25.0% —
Calculation of standard deviations reveals
that the observed number of black hires is 10.28
standard deviations fewer than the expected number.
34. The plaintiffs presented the following
licants With a Tenth-Grade Education,
- Into
ve e -
Whites Blacks
chart
Applicants for Operative Jobs
With a 10th Grade Education,
1972-74 636 1,658
Hires in Operative Jobs, 1972-74 166 356
% Hired 26.1% 21.5%
The disparity, though less than earlier years,
(footnote continued)
- 74a -
The record contains no applicant flow sta-
tistics for the period between 1974 and 1976,
although the decree includes class members up
to February 19, 1976, the date when the
district court rendered its decision on lia-
bility.
Travenol contends that flaws in Payne's
statistics render them incompetent to support
the district court's findings. We do not
agree that the picture of discrimination
suggested by these statistics is a mirage.
While Travenol has exposed defects and gaps
in the plaintiffs' statistics, none of them
are fatal.
Travenol lodges several objections to
the MSES statistics for 1969-1971. First,
Travenol argues that the MSES data omit
three months of statistics for material
handlers and nine months for assemblers.
is still significant: the mmber of black hires
falls short of the expected value by more than two
standard deviations.
- 75a -
We have condemned “extravagant extrapolation"
from small samples, Hester v. Southern Rail-
way Co., 497 F.2d 1374, 1381 (5th Cir. 1974).
In Hester, we refused to accept the infer-
ence that because 50% of the persons who
responded to an advertisement over a two-
week period were black that the same percent-
age would be found to have responded to a
series of ads over a two-year period.
Plainly, the gaps in proof alluded to here
are not of the magnitude we condemned in
Hester. Travenol also argues that MSES
disclaimed certainty at trial that its data
was complete. Such wavering as the wit-
nesses displayed, however, hardly warrants
discarding their evidence altogether.
Second, Travenol asserts that many of
the people who MSES referred to Travenol
Laboratories may never have shown up for an
interview. Thus, a comparison of referred
applicants to actual hires omits an impor-
tant variable: how many applicants Travenol
- 76a -
failed to interview because they did not
show up. Theoretically, this point is well
taken, but its major premise is wholly sine
lative. Contrary to Travenol's assertion,
the MSES witness did not testify that
"[(fl)ailure to report [for an interview] was
common." Rather, the witness stated that
MSES records failed to indicate which appli-
cants referred for an interview actually
showed up and which did not. The following
colloguy then took place between the MSES
witness and Travenol's counsel.
Q: Okay. But based on your experience
the probability is that there are
some who were referred and did not
report, is that correct?
A: Probably. I would suspect that
most of these reported, but some
may not have.
Thus, instead of supporting Travenol's ar-
gument, the record indicates that there was
no evidence how many applicants did not keep
their interview dates, and the witness in
the best position to estimate believed that
- 77a -
most applicants did show up for interviews.
Travenol also departs from the record when
it asserts that the MSES witness testified
that the MSES did not always keep records
of hires. In fact, the testimony reveals
that the opposite is true.
Travenol next objects to the applicant
flow data from 1971 to 1974. Travenol's
leading attack is that the figures are
marred by duplicate applications. Rebecca
Allen, the secretary for Trovenol's person-
nel director, testified that approximately
25% of the applications in the applicant
flow charts were duplicates. Relying on
Robinson v. Union Carbide Corp., 538 F.2d
652, 658 (Sth Cir. 1976), Travenol contends
that this level of duplicates precludes the
use of applicant flow statistics.
This contention, however, is too broad.
First, Robinson reached the conclusion that
applicant-flow statistics were inadequate on
the basis of testimony not only that
- 78a -
duplicates existed but also that some appli-
cants filled out three or four applications
amonth. This degree of repetition might
well render applicant-flow statistics sus-
pect. Rebecca Allen's estimate that ap-
proximately 25% of the applications were
duplicates, however, does not. Her earlier
testimony established that only when an
application expired did an applicant have
to fill out a new application; otherwise
the old application was renewed. >> Second,
and more important, Rebecca Allen specifi-
cally testified that she did not know
whether black duplicates exceeded white
duplicates. Thus, there was no testimony
that black duplicates occurred at a greater
rate than white duplicates, and we are un-
willing to make such an assumption without
evidence in the record to support it.
2
7
35
days in 1974 and later years. Before 1974, appli-
cations were considered current for thirty days.
- 79a -
Therefore, Rebecca Allen's estimate of
duplicates is not enough to render the
applicant flow statistics incompetent. >°
[37] Travenol also contends that com-
parisons between black and white rates of
hire are not relevant because they fail to
isolate class members: black females.
Travenol relies on Jefferies v. Harris
County Community Action Association, 615
F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980). Jefferies does
not support this contention. In Jefferies
we held that a black female plaintiff is
entitled to prove that she suffered discri-
mination as a black female, even if the
employer did not discriminate against either
blacks as a class or females as a class. Id.
at 1032. We did not imply, however, that a
black female may not claim and prove that
- 80a -
her employer discriminated against her sole-
ly because of her race or sex. In fact, the
Jefferies court addressed the plaintiff's
claim that she had suffered separate racial
and sexual discrimination. Thus, Travenol's
objection to Payne's racial statistics is
unsound. While Payne's statistics are not
perfect, we find that they clearly suffice
to support the district court's findings of
a disparate result.
(38, 39] We note, however, two areas
that the district court must address on re-
mand. First, Payne argues that Travenol
discriminated from 1966 to 1969, relying
for statistical evidence of applicant flow
solely on an affirmative action plan pre-
pared by Travenol. The district court
apparently never ruled on the admissibility
of this plan, which Travenol claims is
privileged. On remand, the district court
must rule on the admissibility of the plan
and must make findings of fact and
- 8la -
conclusions of law on Travenol's hiring
practices between 1966 and 1969. Second,
the district court awarded constructive
seniority relief to all black females who
applied to Travenol before February 19, 1976,
but made no findings that support a conclu-
sion that discrimination continued beyond
1974. In the absence of findings covering
this two year hiatus, we cannot decide
whether such relief was warranted. We
therefore must remand to allow the district
court to prepare findings to explain its
award, or to modify the decree. See Falcon
v. General Telephone Company of the South-
west, supra, 626 F.2d at 381-82.
[40] Travenol argues that it rebutted
the plaintiff's evidence of discrimination
and the district court erred in refusing to
accept the rebuttal evidence. We have in-
terpreted Teamsters' view of rebuttal evi-
dence to mean that:
- 82a -
[O]nce the plaintiff has offered some
evidence of disparity, it is then the
defendant's burden to come up with
more specific statistical evidence to
rebut the plaintiff's proof. :
Falcon v. General Telepiione Company of the
Sovthwest, 626 F.2d at 301. Travenol
offered two statistical alternatives in
rebuttal, but the district court was not
persuaded. We find that the district
court's rejection of Travenol's evidence
was not clearly erroneous.
First, Travenol presented statistics
that it hired equal proportions of blacks
and whites among applicants with their own
means of transportation. >”
The difficulty
with these statistics is that Travenol's
interviewers did not always ask applicants
about their own means of transportation,
particularly if the applicant received a low
interview rating. Thus, Travenol cannot
show that applicants it screened out in the
- 83a -
interview lacked transportation. Morecver,
the sample from which the defendant drew its
conclusions excluded one-fourth of all appli-
cations for the time it covered. The defend-
ant's witness could not testify that the
missing applications were removed randomly.
Hence, a large number of applications were
excluded from the defendant's study without
any showing that statistics about the remain-
ing applications reflected the entire appli-
cant pool. These weaknesses detract sig-
nificantly from the value of the defendant's
showing.
[41] Second, Travenol contends that its
hiring of blacks equaled or exceeded the
percentage of blacks among qualified persons
in the population. Those population figures,
according to Travenol, rebut the showing of
disparate result in applicant flow statis-
tics. We have held that an employer may
repel a finding of discrimination by show-
ing that the proportion of minorities in its
- 84a -
work force equals or exceeds the proportion
of minorities among the qualified populatia.
Robinson v. Union Carbide Corp., supra, 538
F.2d at 658. Robinson compared general
population figures to work force figures,
however, only after concluding that the
plaintiff's applicant flow statistics were
flawed by excessive duplicates. Id. Here,
by contrast, we have concluded that the
plaintiff's applicant flow statistics sur-
vive the employer's attack on their validity.
Applicant flow figures are more revealing
of an employer's hiring practices than
general population comparisons when, as
here, a greater percentage of qualified
blacks apply for work than qualified whites.
Travenol has an obligation not to discrimi-
nate illegally among applicants who present
themselves for work. Because of the heavy
minority applicant flow, Travenol cannot
show that it discharged this obligation by
presenting evidence that the composition of
- 85a -
its work force mirrored that of the
qualified general population.
[142] Travenol's final line of defense
against a finding of discrimination is to
argue that interviewing was necessary to
select alert, capable workers for its plant.
Travenol produces and packages drugs, large-
ly intravenous solutions. There is, there-
fore, obvious danger to human life if the
drugs are contaminated or improperly labeled.
Travenol argues that only through subjective
interviewing could it secure qualified work-
ers. We recognize Travenol's interest in
minimizing the risk of hiring careless
employees. But to recognize this interest
is not to sanction the discriminatory
practices demonstrated by the plaintiffs'
evidence.
We have repeatedly held that "hiring
procedures [that] rely heavily on the sub-
jective judgments of its executives from
personal interviews [create] a procedure
- 86a -
that can easily be used to mask racially
motivated hiring decisions." Phillips v.
Joint Legislative Committee, supra, 637
F.2d at 1026. This is particularly true
when an all-white supervisory staff con-
ducts the interviews, Pettway v. American
Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 21l, 240 (5th
Cir. 1974); Rowe v. General Motors Corp.,
457 F.2d 348, 359 (Sth Cir. 1972).
Travenol's occasional consultation of a
black employee does not alter the control
exercised by the white personnel staff.
Travenol's assertion that interviewing was
necessary amounts to no more than a claim
that Travenol used interviewing to select
only the best applicants. The Supreme Court
rejected such a defense in Teamsters, and
we similarly reject it here. Except as
noted, we affirm the district court's award
of relief for discrimination in hiring.
B. Discrimination in Initial Assignments
143] We now address the claim that
- 87a -
Travenol discriminated in the initial
assignment of those hired. Payne argues
that the district court erred in denying
injunctive relief against the disproportion-
ate assignment of blacks to custodial jobs.
The district court's 1976 opinion makes no
findings or conclusions on discrimination
in this area. The magistrate's 1980 report
and recommendation for further relief reject-
ed Payne's request, finding no statistical
foundation for it, and the district court
adopted the report as its own opinion. We
agree that the plaintiffs' evidence is not
sufficient.
The magistrate noted that as of Novem-
ber 30, 1979, blacks composed 61.9% of all
operatives and 70.8% of all custodians.
Believing this disparity to be insignificant,
the magistrate denied injunctive relief.
We do not hold that an 8.9% disparity is
necessarily insignificant, We agree, how-
ever, that the disparity between the
- 88a -
percentage of minorities in Travenol's opera-
tive work force and the percentage in its
custodial work force does not make out a
prima facie case. While a concentration of
minorities in the lower echelons of an or-
ganization ordinarily is probative of dis-
crimination, here there is no showing that
those assigned to the custodial work force
had a tenth grade education, and were thus
qualified for operative work when that re-
quirement was in effect. Moreover, the
disparity between the percentage of blacks
in operative work and in custodial work has
38
been steadily narrowing. We are therefore
38. The plaintiffs prepared the following
chart from Travenol's EEO-l reports:
Number of
Date of EEO-1 Jab Number of Black %
Report Categories Employees Employees Black
November 30, Operatives 1,532 880 57.4%
9 Servi
— ceentenane 87 67 —-77.08
November 30, Operatives 1,097 658 60.0%
(footnote continued)
unable to draw conclusions on Travenol's
assignment policies from bare work force
statistics.
The only other statistics cited by
plaintiffs show that between 1967 and 1974
Travenol assigned 6.8 of the blacks hired
for entry level work to custodial jobs,
while assigning only 0.7% of the whites to
custodial jobs. These figures are suggest-
ive but do not persuade us that Travenol
discriminated in initial assignments of
custodial workers. First, the sample is
very small; Travenol averaged seven assign-
ments to custodial work each year during the
period covered by these statistics. Second,
the plaintiffs admit that half of the blacks
assigned to custodial work lacked a tenth-
Number of
Date of EEO-l1 Jab Number of Black .
Report Categories Employees Employees Black
November 30, Operatives 1,109 687 61.9%
Workers 65 46 70.8%
grade education and, therefore, were not
eligible for operative positions. These
factors considerably erode the strength of
the plaintiffs' proof on this point and the
district court did not err in refusing to
grant injunctive relief.
C. Discrimination in Promotions
In this section we address Payne's con-
tention that Travenol structured its pro-
cedure for advancing from assembler to
material handler in a fashion that discri-
minated against females, and her contention
that black females suffered discrimination
in promotions above the operative level.
1. The “Hooks” Position
Payne claims that female assemblers
were impeded from entry into the material
handler work force by the defendant's use
of the “hooks” position as the entry job.
At the time of the trial in 1976, Travenol
had a material handler position that re-
quired lifting many bottles on and off the
production line with plastic devices called
"hooks." The "hooks" enabled a user to lift
more bottles at a time than could be lifted
by hand. The hooks position was arduous; it
demanded more sustained heavy lifting than
any other material handler slot. When
filling material handler vacancies other
than the hooks, Travenol gave priority to
hooks bidders even though any operative
employee could bid for the position. Since
hooks workers rarely declined the oppor-
tunity to transfer, "[t]his right of first
refusal ha[d] the effect of transforming any
material handler vacancy into a vacancy on
the ‘hooks' jobs." 416 F.Supp. at 262. The
district court also found that females were
deterred from applying for material handler
positions, and those who did were forced by
the hooks position to retreat back to as-
sembler jobs much more often than men. The
court therefore concluded that the use of
the hooks position as the entry into
- 92a -
material handling unlawfully discriminated
against females.
{44, 45] In response to a Food and
Drug Administration investigation in 1975
Travenol abolished the hooks position and
replaced it with the "bottle stack on,
bottle stack off" position. The “bottle
stack" position also involves putting
bottles on the line and taking them off, but
is less physically taxing than the former
hooks position. Travenol also ceased to
give bottle stackers priority in bidding for
other material handler positions. Travenol
denies that the hooks position did discrimi-
nate against women, and maintains that in
any event the new bottle stack position is
not sexually discriminatory. We affirm the
district court's conclusion that the hooks
position discriminated against females, but
agree with Travenol that its modifications
of this position remove its discriminatory
- 93a -
character.??
The plaintiffs presented statistics
that more females leave the bottle stack
position than men. The plaintiffs also
presented testimony of two females who were
loath to accept bottle stack positions be-
cause they require much more physical effort
than other material handler positions.
While this evidence indicates that bottle
stacking is still undesirable, we have no
warrant for overturning the magistrate's
judgment, approved by the district court,
that no injunctive relief against it is
warranted. Because females no longer must
- 94a -
become bottle stackers in order to ascend to
other material handler positions, the dis-
criminatory effect created by the hooks
position is not present.
2. Promotions Above the Operative Level
The district court tound Travenol guil-
ty of a variety of discriminatory promotion
practices, and the decree we review today
contains provisions designed to enjoin this
discrimination. Travenol argues that the
evidence failed to establish the existence
of racial discrimination in promotions, and,
therefore, the relief directed to this issue
should be struck down.
The district court relied on two major
categories of evidence in concluding that
Travenol discriminated in promotions. First,
the district court cited statistics that
leave no doubt that Travenol's work force
above the operative level was virtually all
- 96a -
white through 1974. 4°
Second, the district
court examined Travenol's promotion pro-
cedures and found them marred by the same
opportunity for subjective discrimination
that existed in the hiring process. Travenol
attacks both findings on appeal.
[46] Travenol argues that work force
statistics are not properly considered in
assessing discrimination in promotions be-
cause we determined in Payne I that many po-
sitions above the operative level were fill-
ed in part by lateral hiring. 565 F.2d at
895. In Payne I, we held that the district court
40. More recent statistics also reveal a con-
centration of blacks in the lower paid positions in
Travenol's plant. While whites constituted 38.1%
of the operative work force in 1979, the following
August 1979
Job Level No. % White
Officials & Managers 66 83.5%
Professionals 26 72.2%
Technicians 17 70.8%
Office & Clerical 44 77.2%
- 97a -
did not err in measuring the disparate
impact of Travenol's twelfth-grade require-
ment for positions above the operative level
by reference to general population figures.
We noted, however, that "the large majority
of the employees occupying positions subject
to the twelfth grade requirement were pro-
moted from operative jobs...." Id. Thus, it
is plain that work-force statistics are
relevant to the impact of Travenol'‘s promo-
tion procedures. See Johnson v. Uncle Ben's,
Inc., supra, 628 F.2d at 425 (when positions
are filled both by lateral hiring and by pro-
motion, "[a]s a general matter te cases are
dealt with in terms of the extreme [exclu-
sive promotion or exclusive lateral hiring]
to which they most closely accord").
[47] Travenol also attempts to rebut the
work-force figures by presenting statistics
on actual promotions. Travenol's evidence
is that 23.2% of all promotions between 1970
and 1974 went to blacks, and during this
period blacks averaged 29.9% of all opera-
tives. The district court apparently
rejected these rebuttal statistics, and the
record supports this evidentiary choice.
The testimony of the defendant's witness
shows that the charts from which Travenol
drew its statistics are flawed by a failure
clearly to categorize the positions filled
through promotions, and by omissions in
entries. These errors detract from the
force of the defendant's proof, and the dis-
trict court's decision to reject it is not
clearly erroneous.
[48] Travenol next argues that the pro-
cess through which it selected operatives for
promotions was free from bias. The district
court's finding that Travenol did have the
oppurtunity to discriminate in promotions,
however, is well supported by the evidence
and by our cases. The district court found
that Travenol's failure to post notice of
- 99a -
openings, and its reliance on the recom-
mendations of supervisors, the length of an
employee's service, and educational require-
ments in making promotion decisions all
operated discriminatorily. We affirmed the
district court's conclusion that the educa-
tional requirements were discriminatory in
Payne I, and we do not further address them
here.
[49] Travenol argues that the failure to
post notice of job vacancies is irrelevant
because it did not consider requests for
promotions to supervisory positions, and
did not require applications for promotions
te office, clerical or technical positions.
The district court concluded, however, that
job vacancy exposure was greater among
whites than blacks. Even if applications
were not required for certain positions,
when most of the supervisors are white,
failure to post job vacancies can only dis-
courage applications by blacks to a greater
- 100a -
degree than it discourages whites, who gar-
ner information through the grapevine. See,
e.g., Long v. Sapp, 502 F.2d 34, 41 (5th Cir. 1974).
[50] The district court found that a
major factor in eausiptiens, she supervisor's
recommendation, was delivered without gui-
dance by any objective standards and
operated to discriminate. "This court has
recognized that promotion systems utilizing
subjective evaluations by all white super-
visors provide a ready mechanism for dis-
crimination." Fisher v. Proctor & Gamble
Manufacturing Co., 613 F.2d 527, 544 (5th
Cir. 1980); James v. Stockham Valves &
Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 330 (5th Cir.
1977). We uphold this finding of the
district court.
[51] The district court also found
that Trayenol's consideration of length of
service as a criterion for advancement
tended to perpetuate past discrimination
in the hiring of operatives. Travenol
- 10la -
argues that under the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Teamsters, supra, the district court
improperly premised Title VII liability on
the length-of-service factor. Teamsters
holds that a bona fide seniority system does
not violate Title VII merely because it per-
petuates the effects of discrimination be-
fore the enactment of Title VII. 433 U.S.
at 352-54, 97 S.Ct. at 1863-64. ‘e see no
application of Teamsters to the instant case,
Travenol's informal and erratic reliance on
length of service falls far short of being
a bona fide seniority system under the
statute and under Teamsters.
The district court's finding of dis-
crimination in promotions must be affirmed.
D. Discrimination in Merit System
Pay
For professional, technical, clerical,
and supervisory positions, Travenol deter-
mines salary subjectively according to its
merit pay system. Payne argued below that
- 102a -
Travenol discriminated against both blacks
and women in setting merit pay salaries.
The district court did not address this
point in its 1976 opinion, but implicitly
rejected the plaintiffs' claim when declin-
ing to accept proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law with respect to it in
1976. Payne now asks us to reverse the dis-
trict court's implicit exoneration of
Travenol on the merit pay issue.
[52] Ordinarily we would be reluctant
to decide an issue on which the district
court was silent. In this instance, how-
ever, we affirm the district court's refusal
to find discrimination in merit pay. Payne
has called no statistics to our attention
upon which a finding of discrimination can
be based. Payné compares several sets of
statistics that show disparities between
the pay of blacks and whites or between
males and females. Each comparison, how-
ever, looks at groups that differ in
- 103a -
significant ways in addition to race or sex.
For instance, Payne asserts that among em-
ployees with a twelfth-grade education,
white males make $2,757.11 per year more
than black females. Payne does not tell us,
however, how many years the white males have
worked compared to the black females. Nor
does she compare white males to black fe-
males who occupy the same job category. Yet
length of service and job category could
clearly account for the pay differential
without regard to race or sex. Finally, the
comparison of black females and white males
includes all job categories at the plant,
not only merit pay jobs. The average salary
of all jobs tells us little about inequi-
ties, if they exist, in merit pay jobs.
Similar criticisms can be leveled at
every example of disparities in merit pay
41
that Payne alleges. We need not engage
41. Without reviewing in detail here all of
Payne's exhibits, we make the following
(footnote continued)
- 104a -
vist di litedlad tigasdlyfest tee
HA nti
juall i i ane
cli ee
eee itl fae pe Ht
hi Hila | rivdatds (lid ate
- 105a -
in a sophisticated analysis to conclude that
Payne has failed to isolate the influence
of sex or race on merit pay at Travenol.
Thus, the showing is insufficient to entitle
her to relief and we affirm the district
court's denial of it.
IIIT. CHALLENGES TO THE RELIEF ORDERED
Payne raises a number of challenges to
the relief ordered in the decree. We have
considered each of these objections and con-
clude that in most aspects, the district
court did not abuse its discretion in shap-
ing relief. Two objections with respect to
constructive seniority, however, have merit.
[53] Paragraph 10(a) of the decree pro-
vides that notice shall be given to each
black woman currently working in an hourly
job at Travenol "who applied for employment
prior to February 19, 1976, and was not hired
by that date." *? Payne correctly urges that
42, We recognize that February 19, 1976 is
(footnote continued)
- 106a -
a class member whose date of hire was delayed
by discrimination but who was eventually
hired before February 19, 1976 is also en-
titled to constructive seniority. The decree
must allow a black female operative who
applied to Travenol during the time that un-
lawful employment practices prevailed at
Travenol's plant to make a prima facie show-
ing that she would have been hired earlier
but for discrimination, even if she was in
fact hired before the date when Travenol
ceased to violate Title VII. Such a showing
is made if the time between her application
used in the decree because the district court found
that discrimination had ended by the date it ren
dered its decision on liability. We hold in II.A,
, that the district court did not make find-
that support a conclusion of discrimination in
hiring beyond 1974. We therefore are remanding to
permit the district court to make findings that
underpin its conclusion that discrimination continued
until 1976, or to modify its conclusion. The
decree, of course, must reflect any alteration that
the district court makes in the ending date for
discrimination at Travenol. We use February 19,
- 107a -
and date of hire is longer than the average
waiting time for white applicants who
applied the same time she did.
[54] Paragraph 1l of the decree provides
that emplayees laid off and awaiting recall
shall be recalled by seniority date, whether
43 The use of con-
actual or constructive.
structive seniority, we find, must go
further than the decree provides to afford
a complete remedy. Under the decree an
employee with normal seniority could fare
better than a class member with equal con-
structive seniority if the employee with
- 108a -
normal seniority has already been recalled
after a layoff while the employee with con-
structive seniority still awaits recall, **
In fact, an employee with normal seniority
may have escaped lay off altogether while a
class member with less normal seniority
(because of a discriminatory delay in hire)
but equal constructive seniority has been
leid off. The decree fails to make whole a
class member in either situation. The
decree therefore must be modified on remand
to allow a class member in either position
to be compensated for lost earnings.
in 1976. Travenol recalled employees in 1977 in
- 109a -
Travenol also challenges two paragraphs
of the decree as to the nature of the relief
granted. Paragraph 10(b) provides for the
establishment of the constructive seniority
date of an employee class member who claims
that her date of hire was discriminatorily
delayed beyond February 19, 1976. Travenol
argues that paragraph 10 denies it the right
to contest a constructive seniority date by
proving that the delay in hire was not dis-
criminatory.
155] ‘The parties agree that an employer must
have the right to prove that an employee is
not entitled to constructive seniority be-
cause her delay in hire was not caused by
discrimination; they disagree whether Para-
graph 10 affords Travenol that right. The
decree now establishes a means of calcu-
lating the presumptive constructive senio-
rity date, then allows iravenol to suggest
an alternative date. To remove any am-
biguity, the district court on remand should
- 110a -
modify paragraph 10 to provide explicitly
that Travenol may dispute a class member's
entitlement to any constructive seniority
at all as well as to suggest a date
different from the presumptive date.
[56] Paragraph 8 provides that Travenol mst
write to all unhired members of the plain-
tiff class Of whom they know, invite them
to reapply for a position, and give them
priority over other applicants. Travenol
contends that Paragraph 8 gives priority to
all applicants, even those rejected for non-
discriminatory reasons, and, therefore,
grants the plaintiff class greater relief
tian it deserves. Travenol also argues that
not all victims of discrimination should be
given hiring priority because Travenol
could not have hired all of them even if it
hired only black females. Travenol must be
‘afforded the right to contest priority by
arguing that an applicant was rejected for
legitimate reasons. In such disputes each
- llla -
applicant class member is entitled to a pre-
sumption that she would have been hired but
for discrimination. The burden will be on
Travenol to prove that it rejected her for
legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons. See
Teamsters, supra, 431 U.S. at 360-62, 97
S.Ct. at 1867-68.
Travenol's additional objection to para-
graph 8, that it grants priority to too many
applicants-discriminatees, is premature.
The Supreme Court noted in Teamsters that
"after the victims have been identified and
their rightful place determined, the
district court will again be faced with the
delicate task of adjusting the remedial in-
terest of discriminatees and the legitimate
expectations of other employees innocent of
any wrongdoing.” 431 U.S. at 372, 97 S.Ct.
at 1873. The district court here will be
faced with the delicate task of determining
to what extent the applicant class members
will be entitled to priority over innocent
- ll2a -
current applicants.
Before the district court balances
these interests, the number of applicant
class members who now seek work at Travenol
must be determined. It is not for us to
place a ceiling on applicant class members
entitled to priority. The district court
must exercise its discretion in this matter
after the facts have been developed more
fully. We note only that the number of
applicants entitled to priority need not
correspond exactly to the number of black
females that Travenol would have hired
absent discrimination.
IV. ATTORNEY'S FEES
Payne requests that we direct an award
of interim attorney's fees. See James v.
Stockham Valves & Fittings Co,, 559 F.2d
310, 358-59 (Sth Cir. 1977). The record
reveals that the district court entered an
interim fee award on December 8, 1976.
This order is not now before us. Requests
- ll3e -
for further interim attorney's fees should
be addressed in the first instance to the
district court.
V. CONCLUSION
In summary, we hold:
I. Our jurisdiction to review this
Title VII interlocutory decree includes the
power to review limitations on the scope of
the class when those limits have been the
basis for granting or withholding injunctive
relief.
II. The district court did not abuse
its discretion in redefining the class to
exclude black males once the sole black °
male plaintiff dropped out of the case, nor
was it obligated to give black males notice
of the redefinition.
III. The district court erred in
setting the opening date of the class.
For the Title VII race and sex claims, the
class should open on October 21, 1969
except as to any claims based upon the
- ll4a -
tenth-grade education requirements. For
Section 1981, the class may open on March
2, 1966, if the district court finds racial
discrimination going back to that date.
IV. We affirm the findings of discrim-
ination: (a) in the hiring of black women,
and (b) in promotions, to the extent that
these findings support challenged portions
of the decree.
V. We remand for the district court
to prepare findings and conclusions on dis-
crimination in hiring on a racial basis
from 1966 to 1969 and from 1975 to February
19, 1976 on the basis of race or sex.
VI. We affirm the denial of injunctive
relief against discrimination: (a) in the
initial assignment of custodians, (b) in
the "bottle stack on, bottle stack off"
position, and (c) in the merit pay system.
VII. We affirm the other parts of the
decree, except in four particulars. First,
paragraph 10(a) must provide for an
- 115a -
opportunity for black females who were hired
before Travenol ceased to discriminate, but
whose date of hire was discriminatorily de-
layed, to claim constructive seniority.
Second, paragraph 11 must be modified to
compensate class members for lost earnings
when layoffs have fallen more heavily on
them than on employees who were not the
subject of discrimination by Travenol.
Third, paragraph 8 must be modified to allow
Travenol to prove that applicant class
members were rejected for legitimate reasons.
Finally, paragraph 10(b) must be modified
to allow Travenol to prove that an operative
class member's date of hire was not delayed
because of discrimination,
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART,
AND REMANDED
GOLDBERG, Circuit Judgé, concurring in
part and dissenting in part:
I am in complete agreement with much of
my brethrens' thorough, scholarly, and
- 1l6a -
meticulous opinion. The Majority has re-
solved many of the complex legal and factual
problems presented by this protracted liti-
gation, setting the stage at long last for
a final resolution of the parties' claims.
However, one aspect of the Majority's Opin-
ion compels my dissent. The Majority has
affirmed the district court's decision to
exclude black males from the plaintiff
class? and to deny them relief, without,
however, permitting notice of their exclu-
sion and in spite of a finding that black
males had been the victims of unlawful dis~-
crimination. I believe that on this record,
denial of relief to black males is funda-
mentally unfair and erroneous as a matter
of law. Therefore, I must respectfully
dissent.
1. Section IIB of the Majority's Opinion
ante slip op. at 1991, at , discusses the ex-
Clusion of black males fram the plaintiff class.
- 1l7a -
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Proceedings in the District Court:
This class action was initially brought
by three named plaintiffs, (two black fe-
males and one black male) on behalf of the
black employees and job applicants at
Travenol Laboratories. Plaintiffs alleged
that the defendant corporation's employment
practices were racially discriminatery and
violative of Title VII.
On November 16, 1972, the trial court
conditionally certified and defined the
plaintiff class to include all black Travenol
employees and job applicants. On May l,
1973, Willie Mae Payne, a black female and a
class representative, amended her complaint
to include charges of gender based discrim-
ination in addition to her original claim
of racial discrimination. The following
week, James Williams, the sole male class
representative, chose to withdraw from the
case, citing “religious views.”
- 118a -
With the addition of the sex discrimina-
tion claim, and with the sole male class re-
presentative out of the case, defendant
Travenol moved that the plaintiff class be
narrowed to include only black females. The
district court was of the opinion that a
conflict between the objectives of black
males and black females might develop in the
litigation and that therefore black females
could not adequately represent black males,
Accordingly, on December 20, 1974, the trial
court conditionally granted defendant's mo-
tion and excluded black males from the
plaintiff class. However, no notice was
ever sent to inform the black male class
members that their named representative had
left the case and that henceforth they would
be excluded from the action.
The case went forward to a trial on the
merits, with the plaintiff class certified
to anclude only black women. Following a
trial on the issue of liability, the
- 119a -
district court made findings of fact and
conclusions of law. The trial court found,
inter alia, that Travenol had been guilty of
both gender and race discrimination in hir-
ing and promotion. Based on the evidence
introduced at trial, the district court
found that black females and black males had
been the victims of unlawful discrimination.
Following the trial, counsel for plain-
tiffs renewed their request that the plain-
tiff class be broadened to once again in-
clude black males. However, in an order
issued December 8, 1976, the trial court re-
affirmed its earlier ruling on class certi-
fication. Citing the supposed conflict be~-
tween the interests of black males and fe-
males, the district court persisted in its
ruling that black females could not adequate-
ly represent a class which included black
males.” Finally, on January 24, 1979, the
2. This ruling was certified for
(footnote continued)
- 120a -
district court entered an order once more
declining to make any change in the plaintiff
class.
B. Plaintiffs" Arguments on Appeal:
Plaintiffs now appeal from the district
court's ruling regarding the scope of the
plaintiff class. Plaintiffs argue: (1)
that the trial court initially erred in
refusing to allow a black female to repre-
sent black males in this class action; (2)
that insofar as the black female class re-
presentatives successfully established that
Travenol had discriminated against both
black females and males, the trial court
erred in its posttrial rulings denying relief
to black males; and (3) that in any event
the trial court erred in refusing to notify
interlocutory review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b),
Howeyer, the Fifth Circuit, by order of February
23, 1977, denied the petition for permission to ap-
peal from the district court's order of December
8, 1976.
- l2la -
absent black male class members that their
sole representative had withdrawn from the
suit and that henceforth <hey would be ex-
cluded from the action.
C. The Majority Opinion:
The Majority holds that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in making
its pretrial decision to exclude black males
from the plaintiff class. The Majority also
holds that the district court was not re-
quired to inform absent class members that
their sole representative had withdrawn from
the action and that henceforth they would be
excluded from the case.
D. This Dissent:
As I have stated at the outset, I enthu-
siastically concur with much of the Major-
ity's careful and thoughtful decision. Thus,
it is only with great hesitation that I must
register my disagreement with one part of
this otherwise exemplary opinion. I believe
the district court committed two analytically
- 122a -
distinct errors in excluding black males
from the plaintiff class. First, the dis-
trict court should not have excluded black
men from a class represented by black women
on the grounds of a potential conflict of
interest which in fact never materialized.
Second, even if the district court was cor-
rect in its theory that black women could
not represent black men, the district court
erred in failing to inform the absent class
members that their sole representative had
withdrawn from the suit and they would be
excluded from the action.
Each of these errors, standing alone,
mandates that the district court's decision
on exclusion of black males be reversed and
remanded with instructions to rectify these
mistakes.
II, EXCLUSION OF BLACK MALES FROM THE
PLAINTIFF CLASS: ANOTHER VIEW
A. The Pretrial Ruling:
The Majority Opinion focuses upon the
- 123a -
district court's pretrial decision to exclude
black men from the plaintiff class. The
Majority treats this decision as one within
the trial court's “discretion" and concludes
that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in excluding black males I do
not believe that the district court's ruling
should be examined under the "abuse of dis-
cretion" standard of review. It is true
that “[w]hen based upon facts adduced at an
evidentiary hearing," a district court's
decision as to the scope of a class is
reviewable only for abuse of discretion.
McGowan v. Faulkner Concrete Pipe Co., 659
F.2d 554, 559 (5th Cir. 1981). However,
class certification decisions made without
the benefit of such a factual record are
accorded less deference. See Geurine vy.
J & W Inv., Inc,, 544 F.2d 863, 864-865 (5th
Cir. 1977);. Jones v. Diamond, 519 F.2d 1090,
1099 (5th Cir. 1975); Boggs v. Alto Trailer
Sales, Inc., 511 F.2d 114, 117 (5th Cir. 1975.
- 124a -
In this case, the district court did
not consider any testimony or evidence bear-
ing on the existence of an actual antagonism
between male and female class members. Be-
cause the trial court did not rely upon live
testimony or evidence, we can only assume
that the trial court was of the opinion that
there was an inherent conflict between the
interests of black males and females and
that a black female could not adequately
3. ee Sees OS Cees se
conflict abstractly, the court must examine the
interlacing allegations of race and sex discrimina-
tion to determine whether an actual conflict exists."
Ante, .lip op. at 1993-1994, at - - Dis-
trict courts considering the problem of mixed race
ly held that a conflict of interest is not inherent,
but is a question of fact to be determined through
Mathcad Bane Of Bellas 83 FAB AI0y 434-
-D. Tex., ; v. Arkansas Blue Cross
& Blue Shield, 87 F.R.D. E.D.Ark. 1980); Hammonds
Vv. , 87 F.R.D. 600 (W.D. Miss. [sic] 1980)?
v. Simon, 86 F.R.D, 375 (N.D.I11. 1980).
No such evidentiary hearing was held in this case.
Thus, the factual record was not sufficiently de-
veloped to support a finding of an actual conflict
which would justify exclusion of black males.
- 125a -
represent black males during any phase of
the trial. I believe that this was a con-
clusion of law, and is reviewable as such,
The trial court's decision to exclude
black men was based on a mere hypothesis
that a conflict might develop between male
and female class members if females were al-
lowed to compete with males for the better
paying jobs of material handler. This is
not a case where the testimony of the named
plaintiffs revealed identifiable antagonism
toward other class members. “
Thus, I believe
that this is a case of mere possible and
not actual conflict.
Not only was this a case of mere poten-
tial conflict, upon careful examination it
4. a a eR
Cross & Blue T -R.D. ° °
1980) (black female plaintiff's testimony reveals
that other female employees were beneficiaries or
perpetuators of discrimination); Hammons v. polger
Coffee, Inc., 87 F.R.D. 600 (W.D.Mo.
female plaintiffs’ allegations that other femle
employees were promoted over her reflected actual
- 126a -
is clear that the conflict itself is in
large part illusory, since the district
court's fear of potential conflict among
class members was premised upon an erroneous
understanding of Title VII law.
In ruling that black men would be ex-
cluded from the plaintiff class, the dis-
trict court reasoned that plaintiffs would
try to prove at trial that women were dis-
proportionally excluded from the better-pay-
ing material handler jobs. Therefore, the
court concluded, women could not represent
any black males ... "who may have an interest
in retaining their jobs as materiai handlers."
(Emphasis added) ante, slip op. at 1991, n.8,
at__,n.8. The trial court apparently as-
sumed that black women plaintiffs would seek
to take material handler jobs away from
black men who held those positions. This
assumption is incorrect. A remedial order
could only affect future job placements; it
could not remove incumbent material handlers
- 127a -
from their jobs. See United States v. Hayes
International Corporation, 456 F.2d 112, 118
(Sth Cir. 1972); Local 189, United Papermak.
& Paperwork v. U. S., 416 F.2d 980, 988-989
(Sth Cir. 1969).° ‘Thus, there would be no
conflict between the interests of black fe-
males who might seek future positions as
material handlers and that of black males
already holding the jobs.
In fact, the only potential conflict I
can find in this case is that of compet’ ion
between black males and females seeking ma-
terial handler jobs. However, the "con-
flict” among these class members is indis-
tinguishable from the conflicts inherent in
5. ea eS eee & Paperwork
v. U. S., oinintiere’ eros VII case, this Court
rejected argurent that blacks should
Shamhdas chitis tncuadianlis tim hal Sehee to vd
blacks were entitled. The Court adopted instead the
they would have occupied but for wrongful discrimina-
tion." James 3. Stockham Valves & Fittings Oo.,
559 F.2d 310, 356 (5th Cir. 1977).
- 128a -
any Title VII class action. Whenever a Title
VII plaintiff class prevails, the class mem-
bers are thrown into competition with one
another, as well as with non-class members,
for a limited number of jobs. However, as
the Majority acknowledges, this Court has
consistently rejected the contention that
job competition among class members creates
a conflict sufficient to defeat class certi-
fication under F.R.Civ.P. Rule 23. See,
ante, slip. op. at 1992, n.10, at P
a)
n.10. To hold otherwise would effectively
- 129a -
destroy the class action as a procedural
device for enforcing Title VII rights, for
it is impossible to imagine a Title VII Glass
action that does not involve a potential
conflict among class members at the relief
stage of the litigation. ’
The inevitability of vonflict among
Title VII class members over forms of relief
should not be a cause for alarm. Rather
than dictating the downfall of class actions,
rict court and endorsed by the majority, Willie
Mae
- 130a -
such conflict has given rise to the bifur-
cated Title VII suit. In a bifurcated Title
VII action, such as the instant case, there
is a trial phase followed by a remedial phase.
At the trial stage, the defendant's liability
to the class as a whole is adjudicated by the
class representative; whereas at the remedial
stage, the class members' claims for back pay,
constructive seniority, and preferential hir-
ing are resolved on an individual basis. As
Judge Medina explained in that granddaddy of
all class actions, Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 556 (2d Cir. 1968):
"Potential rivalry between class
members after an initial finding of
liability can be adequately handled
since the rule [Rule 23] gives a court
the power to divide the class into
appropriate subclasses or to require
the members to bring individual suits
for damages."
Competition among class members for limited
jobs will not affect the adequacy of re-
presentation at the initial liability stage
of the trial, since the class representative
- l3la -
is concerned with establishing a general
right to relief on behalf of all class
members. Once the class representative
proves that defendant's practices violated
Title VII, each individual class member may
come forward to establish his or her right
to back pay, constructive seniority or
preferential hiring. Conflicting interests
among class members, i.e. competition for
the same job, are taken into account in
formulating relief. Thus, competition among
class members can be handled on a case-by-
case basis. In a bifurcated Title VII suit,
such competition at the relief stage need not
detract from the named plaintiff's ability
to adequately represent all class members at
the liability stage.
In fact, it is only through the pro-
cedural device of a class action that the
competing claims of Title VII plaintiffs can
be equitably resolved. The very purpose of
- 132a -
a class action is to gather before the court
all parties entitled to relief. When all
are assembled, the court can distribute re-
lief fairly among the class members rather
than awarding relief to any one plaintiff at
the expense of other similarly injured indi-
viduals. See “Developments in the Law---
Class Actions," 89 Harv.L.Rev. 1318, 1366-
1367 (1976) (discussing the “limited fund"
theory of class actions).
As will be discussed more fully infra,
the district court in this case specifically
found that black males, as well as females,
were the victims of unlawful discrimination.
However, as a consequence of the Majority's
decision, the Magistrate is now actually
forbidden to consider the interests of black
men in designing those portions of his pro-
posed order which deal with individualized
relief. Because all the parties entitled
8. In his Report and Recommendation, the
Magistrate notes that he is bound by the court's
(footnote continued)
- 133a -
to relief were not gathered together in this
one action, the trial court is now unable to
equitably distribute the limited available
relief in the remedial phase of the litiga-
tion.”
Finally, the Majority justifies the ex-
clusion of black males from the class as
necessary to vindicate the black males’ right
to be represented with "undivided loyalty"
by "a class representative who is free from
a desire to prove a claim that will impair
their interests." Ante slip op. at 1994, at
The Platonic ideal of adequate represen-
tation is realized when one attorney zealous-
ly represents the individual interests of
definition of the plaintiff class in awarding indi-
vidualized relief.
9. oS ee at
1476-1477. of class members con-
- 134a -
one client. Every class action is necessari-
ly a departure from this ideal. In a class
action, attorneys advocate several interests
which are common to all class members. There-
fore, no one class member's interests are
ever represented with “undivided loyalty":
counsel's loyalty is necessarily owed to the
goals shared by the class as a whole.
Under this system of advocacy, there is
always the danger that a class attorney will
not urge all class members’ interests with
equal vigor. This possibility exists even
in the most homogeneous of classes. For
instance, as a matter of trial strategy, an
attorney may choose to press the claims
which are easiest or least expensive to prove,
10 Or, - attorney may advo-
cate the named plaintiff's interests more
ignoring others.
strongly than the interests of absentees . ++
10. See generzilly Crowley, supra at 676-677.
ll. See e.g. Gonzales v. — ay eal
continued)
* 135a -
However, the ever-present possibility of less
than vigorous representation of some class
members' claims has not necessitated abandon-
ment of the class action as a procedural
device for vindicating rights. Instead, the
trial judge presiding over a class action is
charged with the @uty to protect the inter-
ests of absentees by monitoring the adequacy
with which their interests are represented
throughout the litigation. If at trial the
class attorney does not fulfill his or her
duty to adequately represent all class inter-
ests, the trial court may at that time de-
certify the class. Ante slip op. at 1994,
at .
In this case, pllaimtiffs' attorneys
sought to prove both race and sex discrimina-
tion. Of course, there was a possibility
that counsel might concentrate on proving
(Sth Cir. 1973) (class attorney failed to appeal
a
- 136a -
sex discrimination, leaving the class
members’ race discrimination claims to lan-
guish unproven. In that event, it would be
the trial court's duty to decertify the
class, so that black men would not be bound
by the judgment. However, until class
counsel actually proved, by their trial per~
formance, that they would not represent both
race and sex claims with equal vigor, there
was no inherent reason to assume inadequate
representation of black males' interests.
Moreover, I fail to see how a black fre-
male class representative had any desire to
prove a claim that would impair the interests
of black males, as the Majority implies.
True, female plaintiffs sought to prove that
they were denied material handler positions
12 But Semales
on the basis of their sex.
- 137a -
also sought to prove that all blacks, male
and female, were discriminated against on
the basis of race in both hiring and assign-
ments. Even if it were established that
black females were doubly disadvantaged on
the basis of both race and sex, it would not
follow that females were thereby entitled to
“double relief." Instead, both black men
and women would be entitled to the same
relief. Under Title VII, black males and
females would lave a right to remedies, such
as back pey and constructive seniority, suf-
ficient to compensate them for periods of
time in which they were denied jobs they
would have occupied but for discrimination,
@ither race or gender-based. See note 5,
supre. Surely, female class members are not
entitled to more back pay or seniority be-
cause defemdant discriminated against them
on two of the grounds proscribed by Title
discrimination claim obviously cowld not impair the
interests of black males,
- 138a -
VII, rather than just one. Therefore, I do
not see how females’ claims of sex discrimi-
nation could impair the interests of black
males.
I do not take the position that there
could never be a case in which proof of some
Class members’ claims might impair the
interests of others. When one group of class
members seeks relief which is substantively
different from that sought by the class rep-
resentative, the named plaintiff is not an
adequate representative for the dissenting
group's interests. An example is provided
by school desegregation class actions, in-
volving groups of black parents who are
opposed to the relief sought by the class
representative. While the class representa-
tive typically seeks desegregation through
busing, the dissenting group may oppose
busing and advocate instead other court-
ordered programs which focus on educational
improvement. See, e.g., Tasby v. Wright,
- 138aa -
520 F. Supp. 683, 732-733 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
See generally Bell, "Serving Two Masters:
Integration Ideals and Client Interests
in School Desegregation Litigation," 85
Yale L.J. 740 (1976). Under these circum-
stances, dissenting groups should be allowed
to intevene in order to urge their separate
interests. See Tasby v. Wright, supra at
689-90.
- 139a -
The case of Bailey v. Ryan Stevedoring
Co., Inc., 528 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1976) is
illustrative of a fundamental conflict among
class members over the relief sought in an
action brought to redress Title VII viola-
tions. In Bailey, three blacks brought a
class action seeking inter alia an injunction
ordering integration of racially segregated
local stevedoring unions. 204 of the 280
members of the black union signed a petition
stating they did not wish the named plain-
tiffs to represent them, since the union
members did not want to dilute their strength
by integrating with a white local. Bailey v.
Ryan Stevedoring Co., Inc., supra at 553,
Accordingly, this Circuit upheld the district
court's decision to deny class certifica-
tion on the grounds that the three named
plaintiffs could not adequately represent
the majority of class members' interests.
14.
- 140a -
In this case, there was no such conflict
of interest over the fundamental goals of
the litigation. Both black men and women
sought to establish that defendant Travenol's
employment practices violated Title VII,
Both black men and women sought injunctive
relief prohibiting further illegal practices,
as well as individual relief to compensate
for past instances of discrimination.
In sum, the district court erred in
holding that, as a matter of law, the "in-
herent" conflictsof interest between black
male and female class members rendered the
latter inadequate representatives of the
former's interests. Conflicts of interest
between class members for a limited "fund"
of relief are inherent in every Title VII
Class action. Also inherent in the class
action system of advocacy is the possibility
that class counsel might not represent all
claims with equal vigor. If these types of
conflicts sufficed to defeat
- l4la -
class certification, there could be no class
actions. However, instead of soundine the
death knell for this useful procedural device,
the courts have developed new doctrines to
protect class members from conflicts which
could be inimical to their interests. A
duty has developed upon the trial court to
monitor the adequacy with which all class
members' interests are represented through-
out the trial. If conflicts in fact develop,
the trial court may create sub-classes,
allow intervention, or in extreme cases, de-
certify the class. But exclusion of black
males from the class in this case surely
cannot be justified on the basis of the
precise type of inter-class conflict which
is inherent, but tolerated, in every Title
VII class action.
There was no disagreement between black
men and women as to the outcome of this case:
both groups sought to prove that defendant
- 142a -
had discriminated against them in violation
of Title VII; and that accordingly, they
were entitled to appropriate relief. There
Was no reason, based on the law in this
Circuit, why a black female could not rep-
resent all black employees in their mutual
jihad against Travenol Laboratories.
B. The Post-Trial Exclusion of Black
Males From the Plaintiff Class:
The district court justified its pre-
trial decision to exclude black males from
the plaintiff class on the grounds that a
conflict of interest might develop during
litigation. For the reasons I have set forth
in Part IIA, I believe that this decision
was erroneous “®s a matter of law. However,
whatever justification there might be for the
pretrial class certification decision, the
trial court's post-trial order denying relief
to black males cannot be sustained.
In considering the class representatives'
claims that defendant Travenol discriminated
- 143a -
on the basis of both race and sex, the dis-
trict court necessarily reviewed evidence
bearing on the effect of Travenol's policies
on blacks. However, the district court did
not confine itself to an examination of
evidence bearing upon discrimination against
black women. Instead, the court specifically
found that Travenol's hiring policies, educa-
tional requirements, failure to post job
vacancies, and system of promotion adversely
13
affected all blacks, In some cases, the
findings were actually broken down to show
the specific effect of discriminatory poli-
14
cies on black men, Thus, although black
failure to notice of vacancies impedes the
access of the company's black to the better
peyton tnt save Seated ee x Travenol
Inc., 416 F.Supp.
ie eer i Ny, Scenatint chasm aatisherte tie
tend to perpetuate the past discrimination suffered
a ‘(egtasis eg)
supra at 261; (emphasis added) ,
14. The district court found that as a result
of defendant's hiring policies, in February, 1969,
",..82% of the male operatives [at the Travenol
plant] were white while 89% of the female operatives
(footnote continued)
- 144a -
males were excluded by pretrial order from
the class of plaintiffs bringing this action,
the district court proceeded to try the case
and make findings predicated on the assump-
tion that black men were properly included
in the class. In doing so, the district
judge quite properly exercised his duty to
monitor the class representative and to
protect the interests of absentees.
After trial, however, the district
judge refused to modify his original defini-
tion of the class.*> Instead of redefining
were white." v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc.,
416 F.Supp. , . eee .
male operati were white and 82.8% of the female
- 145a -
the class to include black males, the
district judge, in his Order of December 8,
1976, reiterated the class definition given
in his pretrial order, without, however,
providing any new explanation for this
16 In view of the district court's
decision.
finding that black males had indeed been the
victims of unlawful racial discrimination,
the December 8, 1976 decision was complete-
ly unjustified and should be reversed.
The district court's rationale for
continuing to exclude black males from tl..
plaintiff class even after trial was that
who are entitled to participate in the back pay award
and other related relief to be afforded members of
the class," in spite of his findings that defendants'
hiring and promotion policies discriminated against
all blacks, including black men.
Bae
“f d
t
i
rf
li
+
|
rf
|
- 146a -
there existed a potential conflict of inter-
est between black females and black males.
In this case, to paraphrase an old adage,
the proof of plaintiff's ability to represent
the interests of black males was in the repre-
sentation thereof. Clearly, any potential
conflicts at the relief stage of the litiga-
tion did not hinder plaintiffs’ counsel from
presenting sufficient evidence of discrimina-
tion against black men to support the district
court's findings that black men as well as
women were victims of defendant's discrinm
inatory hiring policies. What more should
be required to sustain a finding that the
interests of black males had been adequately
represented for the purposes of Rule 23?
Based on the district court's own find-
ings following the trial on the merits, its
post-trial order excluding black males from
the plaintiff class compels reversal.
- 147a -
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
NOTIFY ABSENT CLASS MEMBERS THAT THEY
WOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM THE ACTION
The district court believed that in
this case black women could not adequately
represent the interests of black men. Only
one of the three original black plaintiffs
was male, a Mr. James Williams. Thus, Mr.
Williams was, in the eyes of the trial court,
the sole representative of the absent black
male class members.
In May 1973, Mr. Williams chose to
withdraw from the lawsuit, citing his
“religious views." As far as the trial court
was concerned, without Mr. Williams there was
no one to represent the interests of absent
black male members of the plaintiff class.
Therefore, when Mr. Williams voluntarily
chose to withdraw his racial discrimination
claim, the absent male class members were
left without a representative and wane.
upon the defendant's motior, excluded from
the lawsuit.
- 148a -
Once the district court had made it
clear that it considered Mr. Williams to
have been the sole adequate representative
of the black male class members, plaintiffs'
counsel requested that the absent class
members be informed of the fact that their
sole representative had decided to drop his
claim. However, the trial court refused to
17 + believe
allow the requested notice.
that this was error and that the district
court should have allowed notice for the
absent male class members, informing them
that their representative had decided to
drop his (and their) action.
F,R.Civ.P. 23(e) provides that "..,
a class action shall not be dismissed or
- 149a -
compromised without the approval of the
Court, and notice of the proposed dismissal
shall be given to all members of the class..."
(emphasis added). One “purpose of [Rule
23(e)] is to protect the nonparty members of
the class ... when the representatives become
fainthearted before the action is adjudicated.”
Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Pro-
cedure § 1797. I believe that there is no
question but that the mandatory notice re-
quirement of Rule 23(e) was triggered in
this case and that the trial court erred in
failing to provide notice to the soon-to-be-
excluded absentee class members.
Once a plaintiff class has been certi-
fied, the provisions of Rule 23(e) become
applicable.* As the Majority correctly
18. It has been held that notice to absent
class members is mandatory even when the class rep-
- 150a -
notes, ante, slip op. at 1995 at , the
notice requirement set forth in Rule 23(e)
is mandatory. Sagers v. Yellow Freight Sys-
tems, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 686 (N.D.Ge. 1975);
Duncan v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
66 F.R.D. 615 (E.D.Wis.1975); Rotzenburg v.
Neenah Joint School District, 64 F.R.D. 181
(E.D.Wis. 1974); Muntz v- Ohio Screw Products,
61 F.R.D. 396 (N.D.Ohio 1973); Washington v.
Wyman, 54 F.R.D. 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) .
42 F.R.D. 324, 326 (E.D.Pa. 1967). However, there
is same counter authority. See, e.g., Shelton v.
Inc., 582 F.2d 1298 (4th Cir. 1978); Roper v.
, 661 F.2d 655 (7th Cir.
1981) (nile 25Te) Is Inegelicable prior to certifice-
Clause of the Fifth Amendment mandates notice to
putative class members). It is therefore important
to note that from Novenber 17, 1972, until December
20, 1974, black males were indeed members of the
certified plaintiff class. There may be same ques-
tion as to whether Rule 23(e) applies when a repre-
sentative chooses to withdraw te certification
Actions, 89 Harv.L.Rev. 1318, 1542 n.32 (1976).
- 15la -
However, the Majority has asserted that Mr.
Williams' witidrawal as class representative
and the resultant exclusion of black males
from the plaintiff class did not constitute
a "dismissal" within the meaning of Rule
23(e). Ante, slip op. at 1995, n.14, at
, n.l4. Thus, the Majority concludes
that Mr. Williams' departure and the exclu-
sion of black males did not trigger the
19
mandatory notice requirenent,. I must take
if the class representative invokes it. In a case
- 152a -
exception to this conclusion. When Mr.
Williams withdrew from the action, his depart-
ure was arranged through the use of F.R.Civ.P.
21 (motion to drop a party). However, it is
clear that "... the parties [should] not be
allowed to circumvent [Rule 23(e)] simply by
Classifying a dismissal as a motion to drop
one or more parties under Rule 21; the court
is obliged to determine if the change in
parties will affect the rights of the other
class members so that notice of the motion
should be given.” Wright & Miller, 7A
Federal Practice and Procedure § 1797. 7°
20. For the purpose of Rule 23(e), dropping a
party pursuant to Rule 21 is the functional equiva-
sr the to remaining plaintiffs are alequte Fep"
resentatives of absent class members' interests
Rule 23(e) notice is not required). Similarly,
- @ropping a class action claim pursuant to Rule 15(a)
will trigger the Rule 23(e) notice requirenent,
McArthur v. Southern Inc., 556 F.2d 298 .
Gth Cir. 1977), vac: on other grounds, 569 F.2d 276
Tfootnote continued)
- 153a -
Rule 23(e) is designed to serve at least
two important purposes. First, it protects
absent class members who may be relying upon
the pendency of a class action from being
prejudiced if their named representative
should choose to drop his (and their) action.
Second, the Rule is a prophylactic device,
a safeguard designed to discourage collusion. “4
Without Rule 23(e) class action defendants
might seek to "buy off" class representatives
in an effort to "turn off" a class action. 4
(Sth Cir. 1978), Moreover, when the scope of a pro-
posed plaintiff class is to be narrowed, and many of
those once in the class are to be excluded, Rule 23
notice is required. Foss v. Warner, 90 F.R.D. 85
(S.D.N.Y. 1978); Turoff v. Union Oil Co. of California,
61 F.R.D. 51 (N.D. Ghio 1973).
21. ‘The rule is in part intended to prevent
collusion, however it is not necessary to demonstrate
collusion in order to trigger the notification re-
quirement. 23(e) isa
quirement. ° 23(0) is & per se rule wich requires
tive plaintiff chooses to voluntarily withdraw his
- 154a -
Without in any way questioning the piety
or sincerity of the named plaintiff who chose
to withdraw from this case, we must recognize
that his fortuitous departure from the law-
suit did result in the exclusion of all black
males from the plaintiff class---a valuable
hoon to defendants. Thus, one can readily
see the grave potential for abuse which will
follow from the Majority's holding that Rule
23(e) notice is not required in a case such
as this. Under the rule set forth by the
Majority, future class action defendants may
be tempted to quietly secure the withdrawal
of the named class representative and thereby.
"turn off" the class action. If, as the
Majority holds, Rule 23(e) can be ignored,
there will be nothing to prevent such collu-
sion.
Although the Majority holds that Rule
23(e) is inapplicable in this case, ante at
"selling out" their fellow class members. Burks v.
Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 99 S.Ct. 1831, 1841, nl6, 60
[.Bd.2a 404 (1979).
- 155a -
19, n.14, the Majority does indicate that if
the absent class members were aware "of their
initial inclusion in the plaintiff class,
had relied on the class suit to protect
their rights, and would be prejudiced as a
practical matter by exclusion from the class,"
notice would indeed be mandatory. Ante slip
op. at 1996, at - However, the Ma-
jority concludes that because “there is no
showing that black males relied to their
detriment” on their provisional inclusion in
the class, notice of their exclusion was not
required. Ante slip op. at 1996, at__.
As the Majority suggests, there is some
authority for the proposition that 23(e) no-
tice need not be provided if the trial court
determines that the absent class members
have not detrimentally relied upon their
inclusion in the class. See, e.g., Roper v.
Consurve, 578 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1978);
Wallican v. Waterloo, 80 F.R.D. 492 (N.D.
Iowa 1978); Berse v. Berman, 60 F.R.D. 414
- 156a -
(S.D.N.¥. 1973); Elias v. National Car Rental,
59 F.R.D. 276 (D.Minn. 1973). But see, e.g.,
Rotzenburg v. Neenah Joint School District,
64 F.R.D. 181 (E.D,Wis. 1974); Muntz v. Ohio
Screw Products, 61 F,R.D. 396 (N.D.Ohio 1973).
However, in those cases where district courts
have seen fit to dispense with the 23(e)
notice requirement, they have done so only
after making a specific finding of fact con-
cerning the question of whether absent class
members may have detrimentally relied upon
their inclusion in the plaintiff class. In
each of these cases, the district court
recognized its affirmative duty to safeguard
the interests of absent class members. If
the court determined that absent class
members may have detrimentally relied upon
inclusion in the plaintiff class, notice was
ordered. See e.g., Rotzenburg v. Neenah
Joint School District, supra; Ross v.
Warner, 80 F.R.D. 88 (S.D.N.Y¥. 1978); Muntz
v. Ohio Screw Products, 61 F.R.D. 396
- 157a -
(N.D.Ohio 1973). Only if the court speci-
fically found that absent class members
could not have detrimentally relied was the
Rule 23(e) notice dispensed with. See, e.g.,
Elias v. National Car Rental Systems, Inc.,
59 F.R.D. 276 (D.Minn, 1973); Wallican v.
Waterloo, 80 F.R.D. 492 (N.D.Iowa 1978).
In the instant case, however, the dist-
rict court completely ignored its responsi-
bilities under Rule 23(e). The trial court
summarily rejected the request that the
black male class members be notified, see
note 17, supra, making no inquiry or determi-
nation as to whether the soon-to-be-excluded
class members may have detrimentally relied
upon their initial inclusion in the plain-
tiff class. I believe that this was error.
If a plaintiff representative voluntarily
takes action which will result in absent
class members being denied relief, Rule 23(e)
requires that the absent class members be
notified. Although there is some authority
- 158a -
for the proposition that such notice is
unnecessary if it is determined that absent
class members have not detrimentally relied
upon their initial inclusion in the plaintiff
class, notice can be dispensed with only if
the trial court determines that as a factual
matter absent class members did not detri-
mentally rely upon their initial inclusion,
In this case, no such finding was ever made.
The Majority seems to suggest that be-
cause black male class members were never
formally notified of their inclusion in the
plaintiff class, they therefore could not
have relied upon the pendency of the class
action. However, in many reported cases,
district courts have ordered 23(e) notice
to absent class members even though the ab-
sentees never received formal written notice
of their initial inclusion in the plaintiff
class. See, e.g., Rotzenburg v. Neenah
Joint School District, supra. Washington v.
Wyman, supra; Muntz v. Ohio Screw Products,
- 159a -
supra; Ross v. Warner, supra. Although the
absent class members in this case may never
have received formal written notice of their
inclusion in the plaintiff class, we cannot
just assume that they were unaware of the
existence of this action. The record indi-
cates that Travenol Laboratories was the
major employer in a small Mississippi town.
Thus, many of the absent class members might
well have learned of the pendency of this
suit by word of mouth.
In this case, Rule 23(e) notice was re-
quired because "[c]lass members ... may
have relied upon informal publicity about
the existence of the class suit and ab-
stained from filing individual or class
claims.... If a class member learned that
a suit had been filed, but not that it had
been terminated, he might lose his claim."
Developments, supra at 1541. Thus, I believe
that,
- 160a -
"[Mjany of the ... abandoned ...
class members may have received actual
notice of the suit ... through pub-
licity ... and were perhaps deterred
from instituting their own suits in
reliance on their membership. Equity
dictates that these possible litigants
not forfeit their rights for lack of
knowledge that they [were] once again
on their own.
Ross v. Warner, supra at 91.
The Majority has also noted that because
there had been “no showing" of detrimental
reliance on the part of absentees, 23(e)
no**-e was not required. Ante slip op. at
1996, at__—. «=The Majority seems to
suggest it was the plaintiff's burden to
establish that absent class members had
detrimentally relied upon their initial
inclusion in the »vlaintiff class. Of course,
this cannot be tte rule. Rule 23(e) is
designed to prot :ct absent class members
from collusion or abandonment by their own
representatives. Certainly the representa-
tive parties cannot be relied upon to
establish that 23(e) notice is required.
- 16la -
Rather, it is the trial court's affirmative
duty as monitor and guardian for the inter-
ests of absent class members to determine
whether Rule 23(e) notice is necessary.
Whenever a representative plaintiff
voluntarily chooses to take action which
will result in the denial of relief to
absent class members, Rule 23(e) notice is
required:
"By asserting a representative
role on behalf of the alleged class,
[the named plaintiff] voluntarily
accepted a fiduciary obligation to-
wards the members of the putative
Class they thus have undertaken to
represent. They may not abandon the
fiduciary role they assumed at will
or by agreement ... if prejudice +6
the members of the class they claimed
to represent would result..."
Shelton v. Pargo, 582 F.2d 1298 (4th Cir.
1978).
"... having nominated themselves
as class representatives, both plain-
tiff and his counsel have undertaken
responsibilities, and triggered
possible consequences, that may not
now be erased by routine acceptance
of the resignation they now tender."
Rothman v. Gould, 52 F.R.D. 494, 496
- 162a -
(S.D.N.Y. 1971).
As Judge Clark, a member of this Majority,
noted in an earlier case,
"dismissal or romise of the
class suit may be detr tal to those
persons who relied upon the class suit
as the primary means of vindicating
their legal claims ... Dismissal of
the class suit without notice may
result in absentee class members'
losing their claims entirely if they
subsequently fail to file individual
claims."
McArthur v. Southern Airways, Inc., 556 F.2d
298 (Sth Cir. 1977) vac. on other grounds.
569 F.24 276 (Sth Cir. 1978).7°
If, as the Majority contends, black
women could not adequately represent the
interests of black men, then Mr. Williams
was the sole representative of the black
male members of the plaintiff class. As we
know, Mr. Williams chose to withdraw from this
action. Once the district court aoternined
23. Although McArthur v. Southern ’
Inc. is
OP Rapepdape ypdioe. yn deny podheollh
reasoning and analysis.
- 163a -
that Williams' departure would result in the
exclusion of all black males from the plain-
tiff class, the court was duty bound to
inform the absent class members of the fact
that their sole representative had dropped
his (and their) claims. In refusing to
allow such notice, the district court clearly
failed in its role as guardian of the inter-
ests of the absent class members. This was
not a matter of discretion. Rule 23(e)
reguired that notice be sent.
IV. PARTING ADMONITIONS
It has not been my intent, in setting
forth my reasons for this dissent, to attempt
an exhaustive analysis of Title VII law. I
wish merely to sound a note of alarm at the
result reached by the Majority as to black
males’ exclusion from the class. There is
enough in the district court's findings to
indicate that black males have been discri-
_minated against in violation of Title VII.
kocordingly, black men are entitled to such
- 164a -
relief as will give them their just and
equitable place in the industrial orbit of
Travenol's Cleveland, Mississippi plant.
Certainly, they should not have been excom-
municated from this lawsuit without notice
and left to languish in industria’ purgatory.
As a result of the Majority's commenda-
ble reasoning in regard to other aspects of
class certification, this case must now be
remanded to allow the inclusion of new
members in the plaintiff class. See ante,
Section IIC. Thus, there is no reason to
suppose that adding black males to the plain-
tiff class will involve any further trespass
on the court's time and resources. Even if
we were to find that a new trial is required
in order to allow black men to prove their
Claims of racial discrimination, this fact
would not justify denial of relief. It is
true that in some cases, justice delayed is
justice denied. But on these facts, another
apothegm is appropriate: justice takes
- 165a -
precedence over the seccnds on a clock. Con-
siderations of time cannot be more important
than the imperative to compensate victims of
illegal conduct.
I, like my brethren, am mindful of the
fact that this case comes to us nearly a
decade old. See ante at 2. There is the
danger that Payne v. Travenol Laboratories,
Inc. will become another “judicial paleo-
lithic museum piece." Pettway v. American
Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1168 (5th
Cir. 1978) .4 Nevertheless, I believe my
position in that earlier case is as valid
today as it was then: we should "remain
mindful that the Court must not diverge
from the direction chartered for us by the
Title VII compass, no matter how long and
difficult the journey ."*>
24. At the time Pettway was so labeled, it
was before this Court for the fourth time in
thirteen years.
25. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Oo.,
See.
-166a -
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
WILLIE MAE PAYNE et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees
and Cross-Appellants,
Vv.
TRAVENOL LABORATORIES, INC.
and BAXTER LABORATORIES, INC.,
Defendants-Appellants
and Cross~-Appellees.
No. 80-3764
ON PETITIONS FOR REHEARING AND
SUGGESTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC
(Opinion April 22, 1982, 5 Cir. 1982,
F.2d ) (July 6, 1982)) ern
Before CLARK, Chief Judge, GOLDBERG
and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The Petitions for Rehearing are DENIED
and the Court having been polled at the
request of one of the members of the Court
and a majority of the Circuit Judges who
are in regular active service not having
voted in favor of it, (Rule 35 Federal Rules
of Appellate Procedure; Local Fifth Circuit
~
-167a -
Rule 16) the Suggestions for Rehearing En
Banc are also DENIED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT:
/s/ 3.8. Williams
United States Circuit Judge
~168a-
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
DELTA DIVISION
(Caption Omitted in Printing)
Order
Pursuant to the Memorandum of Decision this day re-
leased in the above numbered and captioned action, it is
ORDERED :
1) That the motion of defendants to dismiss and/or for
summary judgment shall be, and the same hereby is, in
all respects overruled and denied;
2) That the motion of defendants for an order defining
and limiting the class which plaintiffs may represent in
the action sub judice shall be, and the same hereby is,
denied and overruled;
3) That the motion of plaintiffs to certify this action as
a proper class action pursuant to Rule 23(c)(1), F. R. Civ.
P. shall be, and the same hereby is, sustained;
4) That the class to be represented by the plaintiffs
herein shall be, and the same hereby is, initially defined
as,
All present, past and future black employees and all
past and future black applicants for employment at
the facility operated by defendants, or either of them,
at Cleveland, Mississippi, subject, however, to this
limitation, that is to say, al) black employees of de-
fendants and all black applicants for employment at
said facility, prior to March 3, 1970 are excluded from
the class.
5) That the portion of this order defining the class
which may be represented by plaintiffs in this action is
-169a-
conditional and the court reserves the right to alter or
amend the same at any time and on as many occasions
as the court may find proper before the decision on the
merits, and to create such subclasses as the evidence re-
ceived, or to be received, in this action may require.
This, the 16th day of November, 1972,
/s/ Onma R. Surre
United States District Judge
~170a-
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
DELTA DIVISION
(Caption Omitted .n Printing)
Order
The matters determined herein having been fully briefed
and orally agued by the parties and the Court being fully
advised in the premises, it is hereby
ORDERED :
1) That the motion of plaintiffs and plaintiff-interven-
ors to amend the time limitations in the initial definition
of the racial class filed September 20, 1973 shall be, and
the same hereby is, denied and overruled;
2) That the motior of plaintiffs and plaintiff-interven-
ors to define the sex class filed November 12, 1974 shall
be, and the same hereby is, denied and overruled;
3) That the motion of defendants to redefine the class
filed November 1, 1974 shall be, and the same hereby is,
granted and sustained;
4) That the class to be represented by plaintiffs and
plaintiff-intervenors herein shall be, and the same hereby
is, defined as,
All present, past, and future black female employees
and all present, past and future black female appli-
eants for employment at the facility sperated by the
defendants at Cleveland, Mississippi, subject, however,
to this limitation, that is to say, all black female ap-
plicants for employment at said facility prior to March
3, 1970, and all black female employees whose em-
ployment terminated prior to March 3, 1970, are ex-
cluded from the class; the class shall be subject to
the further limitation that all black female applicants
-l7la-
who lack a tenth grade education or equivalency or
who were not referred for employment at the Cleve-
land facility by the Mississippi State Employment
Service during the period such referral was required,
are excluded from the class.
5) That the portion of this Order defining the class
which may be represented by piaintiffs and plaintiff-inter-
venors in this action is conditional and the Court reserves
the right to alter or amend the same at any time and on
as many occasions as the Court may find proper before
the decision on the merits, and to create such subclasses
as the evidence received, or to be received, in this action
may require.
6) That the plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenors give the
best notice practicable of this Order to each person whom
they claim to be within the definition of the class as set
forth in Paragraph 4 of this Order. Said notice shall be
given by first class mail, postage prepaid, no later than
January 1, 1975, to each such person whose name and
address is known to plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenors or
to their counsel, or whose identity can be ascertained with
reasonable effort through the inspection of defendants’
files. Notice to such persons whose names and addresses
are unknown to plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenors or to
their counsel and whose identities cannot be ascertained
by reasonable effort, shall be given by publication of no-
tice three (3) times in three (3) consecutive weeks in The
Bolivar Commercial News, the first publication to be made
no later than January 1, 1975. Both individual and public
notice shall be in the forms which are attached to this
Order as Exhibits A and B and which are hereby ap-
proved by the Court.
7) On or before March 1, 1975, counsel for plaintiffs
and plaintiff-intervenors, after consultation with counsel
for defendants and after obtaining any necessary informa-
"7
-172a-
tion from the Clerk of this Court, shall prepare and sub-
mit Court a list of all persons who have indicated
r wish not to participate in this action by so respond-
the notice described in Paragraph 6 of this Order
list of all other persons to whom said notice was
sent; said counsel shall also submit to this Court proof of
publication of notice as set forth above.
Orperep. This 20th day of December, 1974.
/s/ Onma R. Surrz
United States District Judge
Counsel for plaintiffs and
plaintiff -intervenors
/3/ Roserrt S. Lasxy
Counsel for defendants
-173a-
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
DELTA DIVISION
(Caption Omitted in Printing)
Memorandum of Decision
Following a two-week bench trial, this employment dis-
crimination action is now before the court for decision on
the merits.
The suit was commenced March 2, 1972, by the filing of
complaint by three individual plaintiffs seeking to repre-
sent a class of persons allegedly subjected to racial dis-
crimination at the hands of the defendants. The scope of
the plaintiff class was subsequently broadened by the ad-
dition of allegations of sex discrimination. Of the original
named plaintiffs, one was a black, male employee at de-
fendants’ Cleveland, Mississippi, facility and two were
black, female applicants for employment at the defend-.
ant’s Cleveland plant.
Defendants in the case are Travenol Laboratories, Inc.,
and Baxter Laboratories, Inc. Because Travenol is a
wholly-owned subsidiary of Baxter, the court will make
no attempt to differentiate between the defendants and
will refer to them indiscriminately as “Travenol”, “Bax-
ter”, or simply “the defendants”.
The course to trial and determination on the merits was
long and arduous. During the months following the filing
of complaint, the court was required to rule upon a mo-
tion to-strike jury demand (which was granted), a motion
té certify as a class action (which was granted), a motion
to dismiss and/or for summary judgment (which was
denied), a motion for a preliminary injunction (which was
denied) and various other motions concerning discovery
and the substitution of parties. On or about November 15,
1973, counsel approached the court and requested pro-
-174a-
ceedings in the case be held in abeyance pending the ont-
come of settlement negotiations. Negotiations dragged on
until June of 1974, at which time they collapsed.
During the summer of 1974, the parties resumed vig-
orous discovery. The court bifurcated the trial of the case,
deferring consideration of the appropriate relief to be af-
forded plaintiffs, if any, until after the court had deter-
mined if defendants’ conduct about which plaintiffs com-
plained is or was in contravention of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. The liability portion of the trial
began March 3, 1975, and concluded March 14, 1975. How-
ever, the end of the trial unfortunately did not mark the
end of the litigation of the matter of liability. Voluminous
and time-consuming post-trial motions filed on behalf of
both plaintiffs and defendants required disposition by the
court prior to consideration of the merits.
In the course of the three-year period between filing of
complaint and commencement of trial, the cast of the
named plaintiffs changed substantially. Two of the original
named plaintiffs, James Williams and Alma Jean Wil-
liams, sought and received permission of the court to
withdraw as parties. Willie Mae Payne remains the only
original named plaintiff in the lawsuit. In 1973, the court
sustained a motion for leave to intervene filed on behalf of
Delilah Cherry and Birdie Griffin. Thereafter, the case
proceeded to trial with Ms. Payne, Ms. Cherry, Ms. Griffin,
and the class which they represent opposing the defend-
ants, Travenol and Baxter.
Although she has since moved to Chicago, Dlinois, Willie
Mae Payne was, at the times pertinent to the issues now
before the court for determination, a black female resi-
dent of the Cleveland, Mississippi area in which the de-
fendants’ facility is located. There was some controversy
* 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) ef seq.
-175a-
as to when Ms. Payne initially applied for employment at
the Baxter plant; however, the parties have stipulated that
she did so at least as early as March 17, 1970. Although
Ms. Payne has no more than seven years of formal
schooling, she obtained a tenth grade rating on the Gen-
eral Educational Development (GED) test on January 19,
1970. Ms. Payne was never hired by the defendants.
Delilah Cherry is a black female resident of the C
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