Appendix — Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc.

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1982

WILLIE MAE PAYNE, et al., Petitioners,

Vv.

TRAVENOL LABORATORIES, INC. and

BAXTER LABORATORIES, INC.

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari To The United

States Court Of Appeals For The Fifth Circuit

APPENDIX TOC PETITION

FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

WILLIAM L. ROBINSON*

RICHARD T. SEYMOUR

Lawyers’ Committee for

Civil Rights Under Law

520 Woodward Building

733 15th Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 628-6700

NAUSEAD STEWART

Lawyers’ Committee for

Civil Rights Under Law

720 Milner Building

October 1982 210 South Lamar Street

Jackson, Mississippi 39201

(601) 948-5400

Attorneys for Petitioners

*Counsel of Record

SS

PRESS OF BYRON S. ADAMS PRINTING, INC.. WASHINGTON, D.C.

oie«

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Opinion of U.S. Court of Appeals,

5th Circuit, April 22, 1982...

Dissenting Opinion of Judge Gold-

berg, April 22, 1982 . * * . >. .

Order of U.S. Court of Appeals,

5th Circuit, denying Petitions

for Rehearing, July 6, 1982...

Order of U.S. District Court, Nor-

thern District of Mississippi,

certifying class, November 16,

1972 = . . . * >. . . * > o oe >. _

Order of U.S. District Court, Nor-

thern District of Mississippi,

redefining class, December 20,

1974 > . . > . . . . 7 >. * bl . .

Memorandum of Decision of U.S.

District Court, Northern District

of Mississippi, February 19, 1976

Memorandum of Decision of U.S.

District Court, Northern District

of Mississippi, December 9, 1976

Order of U.S. District Court, Nor-

thern District of Mississippi,

redefining class and certifying

Order for interlocutory appeal,

December 9, 1976 ...+-+«-ee-.

166a

170a

173a

207a

222a

oe 64 «

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

Opinion of U.S. Court of Appeals,

5th Circuit, January 6, 1978 .. 225a

Order of U.S. Court of Appeals,

5th Circuit, amending opinion

of January 6, 1978 and denying

Petition for Rehearing, March

23, 1978 . . . . . . . . . + 7 . 232a

Order of U.S. District Court, Nor-

thern District of Mississippi,

January 25, 1979 ...e«-«e«-e-«e 2338

Report and Recommendation of U.S.

Magistrate, U.S. District Court,

Northern District of Mississippi,

July 268, 1980 ..2.ceece2ec © 2358

Order of U.S. District Court, Nor-

thern District of Mississippi,

adopting Report and Recommenda-

tion of U.S. Magistrate, August

18, 1980 wzevsevcevece cc o 2648

Decree of U.S. District Court, Nor-

thern District of Mississippi,

August 18, 1980 . . . .« « « « « « 265a

F.R. Civ. Pa 23 - > . . . >. * . . 280a

- la -

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

WILLIE MAE PAYNE et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees

and Cross-Appellants,

Vv.

TRAVENOL LABORATORIES, INC.

and BAXTER LABORATORIES, INC.,

Defendants-Appellants

and Cross-Appellees.

No. 80-3764

(April 22, 1982)

673 F.2d 798

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of

Mississippi

Before CLARK, Chief Judge, and GOLDBERG

and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

JERRE S. WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge.

For the second time, we are asked to

resolve some of the issues arising in this

protracted employment discrimination class

action between Willie Mae Payne and

Travenol Laboratories, Inc. The district

court issued a decree on August 18, 1980.

- 2a -

The decree, while leaving unfinished the

back pay segment of this case, largely

concludes the formulation of injunctive

relief. Both parties have appealed urging

numerous errors, major and minor. Having

journeyed deep into the record of this case

to assess the merits of both parties’ ob-

jections, we conclude that the bulk of the

decree of the district court should be

affirmed. We disagree with certain aspects

of the decree, however, and therefore

remand the case for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

Nearly a decade old at the time of

this appeal, this case began on March 2,

1972 when Willie Mae Payne, a black female,

and several other named plaintiffs obtained

right-to-sue letters and filed suit under

Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seg. and

1. In this opinion we shall refer to Payne as

the plaintiff or the appellant, and to Travenol as

the defendant or the appellee.

-3a-

also filed claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981

against Travenol Laboratories. Payne

attacked a battery of Travenol's employment

practices at its Cleveland, Mississippi,

pharmaceutical plant as being racially

discriminatory. The complaint was later

amended to include charges of sex discrim-

ination as well.

Truvenol, the largest employer in

Cleveland, Mississippi, manufactures and

packages drugs, particularly intravenous

solutions, for distribution to medical

facilities. The solutions are packaged on

an assembly line by employees called

"operatives". Two types of employees work

on the assembly line: assemblers, who fill,

cap, and inspect the bottles, and material

handlers, who orchestrate and guide the

flow of materials through the assembly

process. Material handlers are compensated

considerably better than assemblers, whose

- 4a -

hourly pay is only slightly above the jani-

torial or custodial staff. The assembler

and material handler positions require no

special skills or experience.

Travenol employed no blacks at its

plant until prodded by the affirmative ac-

tion office of the Navy in 1964 or 1965.

At that point, Travenol began to hire

blacks. Simultaneously, Travenol required

all applicants to be screened and referred

by the Mississippi State Employment Service

(MSES) and imposed a requirement that all

applicants have a tenth-grade education or

General Equivalency Diploma. Travenol then

interviewed referred candidates and hired

upon subjective appraisals of their alert-

ness, comprehension, and cleanliness.

Until 1968, Travenol had MSES refer only

males for the material handler position and

females for the assembler position.

Travenol discontinued its reliance on MSES

—

in 1971, but retained the tenth-grade re-

quirement. Travenol also employs clerks,

technicians, and managers. These positions

have been filled both by promotions and by

outside hiring. Travenol requires a

twelfth-grade education or General Equi-

valency Diploma for some of these positions

and a college degree for others.

Travenol's staff above the operative level

was almost exclusively white until 1974.

In 1975 the case was tried on the

issue of liability, Payne representing a

class of black females. The district court

rendered its decision in 1976, finding that

Travenol had discriminated on the basis of

2

race and sex. The court enjoined certain

employment practices and directed the

eS 0 ee ores > Bee,

Inc., 416 F.Supp (N.D.

part and reversed and

vacated in part, 565 F.2d 895 (Sth Cir. 1978),

cart 439 U.S. 835, 99 S.Ct. 118, 58 L.Ed.

parties to submit suggestions on further

relief, including constructive seniority

and backpay.

On appeal, we vacated two aspects of

the injunction and affirmed two others.”

First, we held that the district court's

blanket injunction against Travenol not to

discriminate on the basis of race or gender

in its employment practices was not spe-

cific enough to satisfy Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 65(d). Second, we held

that no named plaintiff had standing to

challenge Travenol's requirement of a tenth

grade education for its entry-level as-

sembly-line positions and vacated the

district court's conclusion that the tenth-

grade requirement violated Title VII.

Third, we affirmed the district court's

injunction against Travenol's use of a

3. 565 F.2d 895 (Sth Cir. 1978), cert.

denied, 439 U.S. 835,99 S.Ct. 118, 58 L.Ed.2d 131

twelfth-grade requirement for certain posi-

tions above entry-level. Fourth, we

affirmed the injunction against Travenol's

college degree requirement for other,

higher-level positions. 4

After our decision in Payne I, the

district court directed that a magistrate

hear the parties’ suggestions for further

relief and devise a recommended order.

After ruling on numerous discovery skir-

mishes, the magistrate prepared a report

and a proposed decree which the district

court adopted in full. The decree is in-

terlocutory in that it does not provide for

a back-pay award.

The decree is tailored to provide in-

junctive relief for the discrimination that

ty coverage

pregnancy had to be vacated in the light of General

Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 97 S.Ct. 401,

50 L.Ed. 2d 343 (1976). See Payne I, 565 F.2d at

897.

the district court had found in its 1976

decision, taking into account our decision

in 1978 and hearings held before the magis-

trate in 1980. Paragraph one provides that

the district court will retain jurisdiction

for two years to supervise the decree, pro-

vided that back-pay litigation is concluded

by that date. Paragraph two reaffirms the

district court's earlier grant of injunc-

tive relief against Travenol's use of

twelfth-grade and college-degree require-

ments for certain positions above entry

level. Paragraph three prohibits Travenol

from discriminating subjectively on the

basis of race or sex in violation of Title

VII or § 1981 in its hiring and promotions

decisions.

Paragraphs four, five, six, seven, and

nine spell out more specific actions that

Travenol must take to remedy its discrimi-

natory hiring and promotion practices.

Paragraph four, for example, prohibits

Travenol from establishing new facially-

neutral job prerequisites except in accord

with guidelines promulgated by the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission. Para-

graph seven requires Travenol to post

notice of job vacancies, with details about

salary, shift, and other matters.

Paragraph eight provides that Travenol

must write to all unhired applicant class

members who had applied by February 19,

1976, and invite them to reapply for work

at Travenol. Those class members who re-

spond are to be given priority over other

applicants until they have refused an offer,

accepted an offer, or been rejected on le-

gitimate grounds. Travenol is also re-

quired to sort out those applicants who

were qualified for clerical work and who

indicated an interest in it, and invite

them to apply for clerical jobs, giving

them priority over other applicants.

- 10a -

Paragraph ten provides for granting

constructive seniority to applicant class

members who were rejected for discrimina-

tory reasons, and employee class members

whose date of hire was delayed by discri-

mination. Paragraph eleven provides for the

use of an employee class member's con-

structive seniority date in recalling: em-

ployees from layoff. The remaining para-

graphs provide the details for administer-

ing the decree.

Both parties object to portions of the

decree. First, Payne argues that the

decree denies her relief because the dis-

trict court erroneously excluded black males

trom the class she represents and also be-

cause it erroneously established March 3,

1970 as the opening date of the class. She

requests that we include black males in the

class and move the opening date of the

Class back to the period of limitations for

- lla -

Title VII and for § 1981. Second, Travenol

argues that the plaintiffs failed to prove

discrimination in hiring or promotions, and

asks us to reverse any relief in the decree

on these issues. Payne argues that she

proved discrimination in areas in which the

district court erroneously denied her re-

lief, and asks us to broaden the decree ac-

cordingly. Third, both parties lodge

various objecticns to the form of the

decree. Travenol claims that the decree

affords too much relief, if discrimination

was properly found. Payne argues that the

decree affords too little relief. Our

appellate jurisdiction to review this in-

terlocutory decree rests on 28 U.S.C.

§ 1292(a) (1). We address each issue in

turn.

II. LIMITATIONS ON THE CLASS

CERTIFIED BY THE DISTRICT COURT

The district court certified a class

in 1972 to include all black female

- l2a -

employees and applicants at Travenol's

plant, but limited the class to exclude all

applicants who applied before March 3, 1970,

and did not reapply thereafter. As initial-

ly certified, the class also included black

male employees and applicants, but in 1974

the court granted the defendant's motion to

exclude black males from the class. The

court made its class certification final in

December, 1976, and authorized an interlo-

cutory appeal of this order under

28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(b), but we declined to

accept the appeal. The grant of injunctive

“elief that we review today, therefore,

awards relief only to those members of the

class finally certified by order of the

district court in December, 1976.>

5. The district court certified the fol-

lowing class:

All present, past, and future black

female employees and all present, past and

future black female applicants for

(footnote continued)

- l3a -

Payne argues that the district court

denied injunctive relief to two groups of

persons who were shown at trial to be vic-

tims of discrimination. These two groups

are black males, and applicants who applied

before March 3, 1970 but not after that

date. Both groups were denied relief be-

cause they fell outside of the confines of

the class certified by the district court.

Payne urges us to reverse these limitations

on the class in order to afford full relief

for all those entitled to it.

employment at the facility operated by the

defendants at Cleveland, Mississippi, sub-

ject, however, to this limitation, that

to say, all black female applicants for

ployment at said “acility prior to March 3

1970, and all black female employees whose

further limitations that

all black female applicants who lack a tenth

- l4a -

[1] Before we may address these argu-

ments, however, we must decide whether our

jurisdiction to hear this interlocutory

appeal from the grant or denial of an in-

junction encompasses the power to review

the definition of a class, when injunctive

relief was denied to persons excluded from

the class. Travenol challenges our juris-

diction, claiming that under Gardner v.

Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 437 U.S. 478,

98 S.Ct. 2451, 57 L.Ed.2d 364 (1978), class

certification questions may not be heard on

interlocutory appeal. Because we find that

the appellees read Gardner too broadly, we

reject their arguments and conclude that

the definition of the class may be reviewed

to the extent that it led to the denial of

injunctive relief.

A. Jurisdiction to Review the Defini-

tion of the Class

In Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcast-

ing Co., supra, the plaintiff brought a

- 15a -

Title VII suit on behalf of herself and all

female applicants and employees who might

be subject to sex discrimination by the de-

fendant employer. After the district court

denied a pretrial motion for class certifi-

cation, the plaintiff immediately appealed

under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), arguing that

the refusal to certify the class effective-

ly denied her much of the injunctive relief

she sought. Refusing to allow the appeal,

the Supreme Court held that a pretrial

denial of class certification was not

appealable as a refusal of injunctive “e+

lief under section 1292(a)(1). The Court

noted that section 1292(a)(1) creates an

exception to the policy against interlocu-

tory and fragmentary appeals. The purpose

2f this exception is to give litigants a

chance to gain effective review of orders

with irreparable consequences. Concluding

that the denial of class certification at

the outset of the lawsuit does not carry a

- 16a -

threat of irreparable harm, the Court de-

clined to place class certification ques-

tions in the category of refusals of in-

junctive relief that may be appealed before

judgment on the merits.

We address a different question than

the one faced by the Supreme Court in

Gardner. Here, the district court conducted

a trial on the merits, granted an injunc-

tion, and withheld portions of injunctive

relief because of the definition of the

class. The appellant does not seek to

appeal the ruling on the composition of the

class as an independent matter. Rather,

she challenges the district court’s denial

of injunctive relief, which, in turn, re-

quires her to attack the order that lead|sic]

to the denial. That order was the district

court's certification of the class. Our

established power to review the denial of

injunctive relief embraces the power to

- 17a -

review the orders that underpin this denial.

The Gardner Court recognized that it

was not presented with the question we

answer today, and it limited its holding to

the facts before it. In a footnote, the

Court distinguished Jenkins v. Blue Cross

Mutual Hospital Insurance, Inc., 538 F.2d

164 (7th Cir., 1976) (en banc), cert. denied,

429 U.S. 986, 97 S.Ct. 506, 50 L.Ed.2d 598

(1976), in which the Seventh Circuit re-

viewed the district court's denial of class

certification when that denial led to the

refusal of a preliminary injunction. 437

U.S. at 479 n.3. This appeal fits the |

Jenkins mold rather than Gardner. We agree

6

with the Jenkins court. To hold that section

6. The case for reviewing the class question

here is even stronger than in Jenkins. In Jenkins,

the district court denied a pretrial mtion to

certify a class, and then refused a preliminary

injunction. The Court of Appeals entertained an

appeal of this ruling before a trial on the merits

as is authorized by section 1291(a)(1). Here, by

contrast, though we are not reviewing a final judg-

ment, we are presented with a case in a considerably

advanced stage of litigation. A two week trial on

(footnote continued)

- 18a -

1292(a) (1) does not permit interlocutory

appeals of denials of class certification,

even if injunctive relief might thereby be

compromised, is one thing; to hold that sec-

tion 1292(a)(1) does not permit review of

the district court's definition of a class

when a denial of injunctive relief turns on

that ruling is quite another. We find

injunctive relief.

- 19a -

We recently observed that otherwise un-

appealable orders may be reviewed when nec-

essary to review a denial of injunctive

relief. Gould v. Control Laser Corp., 650

F.2d 617, 621,n.7 (Sth Cir. 1981). The Su-

preme Court has gone even further in author-

izing review of otherwise unappealable

orders in a case properly before a Court of

Appeals to review a preliminary injunction

ruling. In Deckert v. Independence Shares

Corporation, 311 U.S. 282, 61 S.Ct. 229, 85

L.Ed. 189 (1940), the district court had

denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss,

then granted a preliminary injunction. The

defendants appealed from the injunction and

the Court of Appeals reversed not only the

injunction but also the district court's

denial of the motions to dismiss. The Su-

preme Court held that the Court of Appeals

“properly examined the interlocutory order

denying the motions to dismiss, although

generally it could consider such an order

- 20a -

only on appeal from a final decision.” 311

U.S. at 287, 61 S.Ct. at 232. We have

followed Deckert in Myers v. Gilman Paper

Corp., 544 F.2d 837, 847 (Sth Cir., 1977),

cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801, 98 S.Ct. 28,

54 L.Ed.2d 59 (1977), modified on other

grounds, 556 F.2d 758 (5th Cir., 1977), and

in Mercury Motors Express, Inc. v. Brinke,

475 F.2d 1086 (5th Cir. 1973). We need not

rely here on the theory of Deckert, however.

The questions concerning class certifica-

tion that Payne raises are directly tied to

the partial denial of an injunction that is

properly before us. We therefore have

power to resolve the questions of class

definition as an incident of our review of

the injunction. Accord: Adashunas v.

Negley, 626 F.2d 600, 602-03 (7th Cir. 1980),

B. Black males

We now turn to Payne's challenge to

the exclusion of black males from the

class. To place this challenge in

- 2la -

perspective we review the history of the

district court's treatment of the class as

it bears on this issue. This case was

filed as a class action on March 2, 1972,

by three named plaintiffs: two black

females, Willie Mae Payne and Alma Jean

Williams, and one black male, James

Williams. The complaint alleged that

Travenol discriminated against all three

and the class they represented on the basis

of race. On November 16, 1972, the court

conditionally certified the plaintiff class

to include all black applicants and em-

ployees.

On May 1, 1973 the court permitted

Willie Mae Payne to amend her complaint.

The amended complaint alleged sex discrim-

ination as well as race discrimination.

On May 8, 1973, the court granted James

Williams' motion to withdraw from the case

because of his religious views. More than

one year later, on July 31, 1973, two black

- 22a - ,

females, Delilah Cherry and Birdie Lee

Griffin, were permitted to intervene in the

case alleging race and sex discrimination.

These developments prompted the defendants

to move the district court to redefine the

class, and on December 20, 1974, the

_. district court did so. The new class ex-

cluded black males, and other changes were

made in the composition of the class.’

The district court made no written

findings on its reasons for excluding black

males, but the transcript of a hearing on

the issue reveals that the district court

was swayed by two factors. First, the

district court noted that no male plaintiff

remained in the case after James Williams’

withdrawal. The only remaining plaintiffs

were black females. Second, the court

- 23a -

believed that a conflict existed between the

interests of black males and the bleck fe-

male plaintiffs who sought to represent

them. The black females charged sex discrim-

ination in the assignment of material hand-

lers. According to the court, this created

a conflict because to the extent that fe-

males proved sex discrimination, the inter-

a

feat

at

ed

lh

EE

~

f

:

- 24a -

interests of black males.

After this ruling, counsel for the

plaintiffs requested that black males be

sent notice of their provisional exclusion

from the class and of the need for one of

them to step forward if black males were to

remain in the case, but the district court

declined. The court directed, however,

that members of the new provisional class

receive notice of their inclusion in the

case and be given an opportunity to opt out.

On December 8, 1976, after trial, the court

made its class definition order final.

The appellants contest the redefini-

tion of the class to exclude black males on

two grounds. First, Payne denies the exist-

ence of a conflict between black females

and black males that warrants excluding

males from the class. Second, Payne argues

that black males had a stake in the litiga-

tion because of their provisional inclusion

in the class, see Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S.

- 25a -

393, 95 S.Ct. 553, 42 L.Ed.2d 532 (1975),

and the district court had an obligation to

protect their interest. The district court,

therefore, should have sent notice to black

males to permit one to intervene as a plain-

tiff. Had this been done, the class could

have been subdivided to remove the conflict

between the interests of black females and

black males.

{2] The first inquiry must be whether

the district court erred in denying that

black females may represent a class inelud-

ing black males in a mixed sex and race

discrimination suit. The district court's

decision on the scope of the class can be

overturned only for abuse of discretion.

McGowan v. Faulkner Concrete Pipe Co., 659

P.2d 554, 559 (5th Cir. 1981); Zeidman v.

J. Ray McDermott & Co., 651 F.2d 1030, 1038

39 (5th Cir. 1981); Walker v. Jim Dandy Co.,

638 F.2d 1330, 1334 (Sth Cir. 1981).

[3] We start with the language of Rule

- 26a -

23. Under Rule 23(a) one of the four pre-

requisites to a class action is that “the

representative wawehans will fairly and ade-

quately protect the interests of the class."?

Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a). The claim that black

females hold interests in conflict with the

interests of black males, if true, is suf-

ficient to defeat the adequacy of their rep-

resentation. "It is axiomatic that a pu-

tative representative cannot adequately pro-

tect the class if his interests are anta-

gonistic to or in conflict with the objec-

tives ©* those he purports to represent."

7 C. Wright &A. Miller, Federal Practice &

Procedure § 1768 at 638 (1972); Johnson v.

Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d

1122, 1125 (5th Cir. 1969).

9. All four prerequisites of Rule 23(a) must

be met before certification of a class is

ate. Huff v. N.D. Cass O>., 485 F.2d 710 (5th Cir.

1973) (en banc). Of course, the court

i

:

- 27a -

[4-6] Of course, in an employment dis-

crimination case the court must interpret

Rule 23 to accommodate the substantive poli-

cies of Title VII. See Vuyanich v. Republic

National Bank of Dallas, 82 F.R.D. 420

(N.D.Tex. 1979). We have repeatedly upheld

the maintenance of across-the-board Title

VII class actions in which, for example, an

employee complaining of race discrimination

represents not only other employees but

also applicants suffering similar discrim-

10

ination. An across-the-board Title VII

10. See v. Joint lative Com

mittee, 63728 id ea Cir. ah Falcon v.

Frat 8 (SE Cie, 1080) ect ant amded

F.

a" , vacated and remanded on

, 450 U.S. 1036, 101 S.Ct. 1752, 68

other

L.Ed. 1), reinstated in part and remanded

in part, 647 F.2d 633 (1981), cert. ,

U.S. , 102 S.Ct. 668, 70 L.Bd.2d 81);

Vv. , 502 F.2d 34 (5th Cir., 1974), Carr v.

Inc., 423 F.2d 57 (5th Cir. 1970),

cert. , 400 U.S. 951, 91 S.Ct. 241, 27 L.Bd.2d

mapen. we Bheld hs ViGhe of Be PIAtneT Ein

- vw

TUE teem Oy ieaiaonhe ak aeumeiinn been Gh

VII action in Payne I, 567 F.2d at 900.

- 28a -

attack requires only that there be a suf-

ficient "nexus" between the claims of the

named plaintiff and the claims of the class.

Payne I, 565 F.2d at 900. Yet, while Title

VII policies support a broad reading of Rule

23, they do not justify the jettison of the

cardinal principle that a class representa-

tive ney not head a class including persons

whose interests substantially conflict with

his or her own. East Texas Motor Freight

System, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395,

405, 97 S.Ct. 1891, 1897, 52 L.Ed.2d 453

(1977).

{7] The conflict found by the district

court here is straightforward: the female

plaintiffs asserted that Travenol discrimi-

nates against females by typically assign-

ing them to the lower-paying job of assem-

bler while typically assigning males to the

higher-paying job of material handler. The

females, therefore, sought to establish

= 29a -

that males were favored at their expense.

This claim plainly draws the interests of

males into conflict with the interests of

11

females. We are aware of no case holding

that a black female plaintiff is an adequate

representative of black makes in a sex and

race discrimination suit when the interests

12

of the two groups conflict. On the

11. "Qn the one hand, [the black female

plaintiff] would argue that defendant's policies

and practices discriminated in favor of males, in-

cluding black males, and against females. At the

same time, she would claim that defendant favored

represe™

black males or white -" Colston V. land

i

5

:

,

;

possible

tween the plaintiff «und the class that might render

her representation inadequate under Rule 23(a) (4).

(footnote continued)

- 30a -

contrary, a host of district courts have re-

fused to permit black females to represent

black males in class actions alleging both

race and sex discrimination when a conflict

of interest appears. -?

Is) A court should not lightly reject

a black female's claim to represent all

blacks and all females in a sex and race

discrimination suit. Rather than determine

the question of conflict abstractly, the

court must examine the interlacing allega-

tio..s of race and sex discrimination to

Moreover, the plaintiff in Donaldson alleged that

the defendant employed favored white men at the

expense of both blacks and females. 554 F.2d at

830. Thus, the conflict we find here was not pres-

- ent in Donaldson.

13. See Stroma v: (eee ee & Blue

Shield, Inc., 8/7 F.R.D.

a ee eee

Vv. F.R.D. 375 (N.D.I11. 1980);

Repub 8 eee

~ 1979); v. land

7 "| 26 F.R.Serv.24 940

SR ie. ., Ta F.R.D. 639 (E.D.Pa. 1977);

Vv. Bechtel -, 21 F.R.Serv.2d 85 (N.D.Cal. 1975);

v. Hospital, 55 F.R.D. 62 (D.D.C.

- 3la -

determine whether an actual conflict exists.

For example, if a black female plaintiff |

argues that the employer favors white males

to the detriment of both females and blacks,

there is no inherent obstacle to her repre-

sentation of both groups. See Donaldson v.

Pillsbury, 554 F.2d 825 (8th Cir. 1977),

cert. denied, 434 U.S. 856, 98 S.Ct. 177,

54 L.Ed.2d 128 (1977); Vuyanich v. Republic

National Bank of Dallas, supra, 82 F.R.D.

at 435. In this case, however, the dis-

trict court found an actual conflict of

interest and we see no error in this conclu-

sion.

(9, 10) The plaintiffs argue that be-

cause both blacks and women were adequately

represented at trial, the existence of a

possible conflict between the two before

trial is not relevant. We reject this argu-

ment. It is true that the court's responsi-

bility to assess the adequacy of representa-

tion is an ongoing one. The district court

- 32a -

may decertify a class after trial if plain-

tiff's trial performance showed him or her

to be an inadequate class representative.

Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., 628 F.2d 419

(Sth Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded on

other grounds, 451 U.S. 902, 101 S.Ct. 1967,

68 L.Ed.2d 290 (1981). But the trial court

is not required to hypothesize about the

effect of an actual conflict of interests

on the adequacy of plaintiffs’ representa-

tion. It is enced ta deny representation

that the conflict is actual at the outset

of the trial.

The plaintiffs also argue that black

males have no "legally cognizable" interest

in perpetuating sex discrimination at

Travenol's plant, and we agree. But black

males do have an interest in representation

of their interests with undivided loyalty.

The existence vel non of sex discrimination

is at issue in this case. Black males are

entitled to a class representative who is

- 33a -

free from a desire to prove a claim that

will impair their interests.

{1l, 12] Finally, the plaintiffs con-

tend that we must balance the harms to

black males flowing from their inclusion in

the class against the harms flowing from

their exclusion. Payne maintains that the

harms of excluding black males overshadow

the potential harms of including them. The

district court's ruling deprives black

males of the benefits accorded to class

members, including constructive seniority

and back pay. To include them in the class

despite the conflict of interest, Payne ar-

gues, would have brought them much less

harm. This argument diverts attention from

the proper inquiry under Rule 23. Rule 23

forces a court to measure the adequacy of

representation because of the sensitive con-

siderations involved in binding parties not

before the court to a judgment won or lost

by class representatives. See Hansberry v.

- 34a -

Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 61 S.Ct. 115, 85 L.Ed. 22

(1940). A court need not look beyond the

issues in the suit before it to determine

when a conflict of interest precludes ade-

quate representation. We conclude, there-

fore, that the district court was within

its discretion in excluding black males

from the class.

{13, 14) Ordinarily, if a court dis-

cerns a conflict like the one in this case,

the proper solution is to create subclasses

of persons whose interests are in accord.

Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d

496, 499 (Sth Cir. 1968). Of course, each

subclass must be headed by a person who

claims the same injury as the subclass, but

who lacks the fatal conflict. See East

Texas Motor Freight System, Inc. v.

Rodriguez, supra: Johnson v. American Credit

Co., 581 F.2d 526, 532-33 (5th Cir., 1978).

In this case, after the sole black male

plaintiff, James Williams, withdrew from

- 35a -

the case, no named plaintiff existed to

head a class of black males. Payne there-

fore argues that having provisionally in-

cluded black males in the class, the dis-

trict court owed black males a duty to send

them notice of their pending exclusion from

the case to allow one of them to step for-

ward to intervene. We do not find this

obligation in the law.

[15] Rule 23 requires a district court

to give notice to absent class members of

developments in the suit in only two situa-

tions. The first is when the court certi-

fies a class under Rule 23(b)(3) because of

common questions of law or fact that pre-

dominate over other aspects of the suit and

render a class action the appropriate

vehicle to resolve the claims. Fed.R.Civ.P.

23(c) (2); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,

417 U.S. 156, 94 S.Ct. 2140, 40 L.Ed.2da 732

(1974). The second is when a class action

is to be dismissed or compromised. Fed.R.

- 36a -

Civ.P. 23(e) . +4 In all other cases, notice

lies within the district court's discretion.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(d)(2). The district court

. The plaintiffs have not argued that the

redefinition of the class in this case is a dis-

of Rule 23(e), and we

do not consider it to be me.

I.

15. In Silva v. Vowell, 621 F.2d 640, 649

(Sth Cir. 1980 v.

Co. , 581 F.24 at n.13), cert. denied,

u.s. S.Ct. 941, 67 L.Bd.2a .

subclass action.'" In

- 37a -

the court transgressed its authority in

failing to recruit a new black male plain-

tiff to intervene to permit subdivision of

the class. Cf. United States Parole Com-

mission v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 100 S.Ct.

1202, 1214, 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980) (after

denying class certification, a district

court must give the representative of the

plaintiff class an opportunity to propose

subclasses, but has no obligation to con-

struct them itself).

(16, 17] Were we to accept Payne's rea-

soning, a district comrt that provisionally

certified a class but later concluded that

the existing class representative was in-

adequate would have to send notice solicit-

ing a new class representative. Plainly,

that is not the rule in this Circuit, see

Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., supra,

628 F.2d at 423, nor should it be. The

rule that Payne proposes would shift a bur-

den onto the district court that properly

- 38a -

remains with the plaintift.*® only if the

black males had received notice of their

initial inclusion in the class, had relied

on the class suit to protect their rights,

and would be prejudiced as a practical

matter by exclusion from the class might the

district court be obligated to take some

action to safeguard their interests. See

Seligson v. Plum Tree, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 343,

346 (E.D.Pa. 1973); Berse v. Berman, 60

F.R.D. 414, 416 (S.D.N.¥. 1973). Here,

16. At oral argument, plaintiffs’ counsel

advised this Court that counsel failed to seek a

black male plaintiff to intervene on his own be-

cause of doubts that attorneys for the plaintiffs

could freely commmicate with class members.

Oil Oo. v. 452 U.S. 89, 101 S.Ct. ;

made clear that a district court

may not curtail commmications between the attorney

for the plaintiff and class members, at least in

the absence of specific findings that such an order

is appropriate or necessary to prevent abuses.

101 S.Ct. at 2193. Although in 1974 the plaintiffs

- 39a -

there is no showing that black males relied

to their detriment on the district court's

provisional inclusion of them in the class.

In the absence of such a showing, we decline

to hold that the district court abused its

discretion in failing to give them notice.

In sum, the district court on this record

was justified in its discretion in believing

that recruiting black males after the one

black make had dropped out almost two years

before would constitute the stimulation of

a new law suit by the court rather than a

comtinuation of the old.

C. Opening date for class membership

We now take up Payne's argument that

injunctive relief was improperly limited be-

cause the district court fixed an incorrect

opening date for membership in the class.

The district court limited the class to

black females who applied at Travenol after

March 3, 1970. Neither party is certain

why the district court chose this date, and

- 40a -

the court itself gave no reason. Payne

urges us to move the date back to include

all applications within the limitations pe-

riods for both Title VII and Section 1981.

Travenol resists any extension and maintains

that despite some difficulties in the date

chosen by the district court, there is no

abuse of the court's discretion. We are

persuaded that the court did abuse its dis-

cretion in choosing the opening date, al-

though our analysis differs from either of

the parties’.

[18-20] The opening date for member-

ship in a class for a Title VII claim

should be set by reference to <h@ earliest

charge filed by a named plaintiff. Laffey

v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429,

472 (D.C.Cir. 1976) cert. denied, 434 U.S.

1086, 98 S.Ct. 1281, 55 L.Ed.2d 792 (1978);

Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,

508 F.2d 239, 246 (3d Cir. 1975), cert.

denied, 421 U.S. 1011, 95 S.Ct. 2415,

- 4la -

44 L.Ed.2d 679 (1975). See also Crawford v.

Western Electric Co., 614 F.2d 1300, 1309

(Sth Cir. 1980). But see Chisholm v. United

States Postal Service, 665 F.2d 482, 489

(4th Cir. 1981) (opening date for class

membership set by reference to the date from

which a named plaintiff could collect back

pay). Here, that plaintiff is Willie Mae

Payne, who filed her first charge on January

17

29, 1970. For Title VII purposes, Payne

17. There are at present three named plain-

tiffs in this case. Willie Mae Payne acquired a

tenth grade GED on January 20, 1970. She applied

at the Mississippi State Employment Service (MSES)

for a referral to Travenol on January 29, 1970, but

referred by MSES shortly thereafter, and was denied

employment over the next two years despite repeated

(footnote continued)

- 42a -

can represent a class that includes all

18 black female applicants who

qualifying

could have filed a timely charge with the

19

EEOC when she did. See Laffey v. North-

west Airlines, Inc., supra; Wetzel v.

visits and phone calls to Travenol. She filed two

EEOC charges, the first on August 14, 1970, the

second on January 12, 1971.

Birdie Lee Griffin completed eleven years of

school, was referred by MSES in 1966, and was re-

fused employment despite renewed requests on

abundant instances over the next four years. Her

first EEOC charge is dated August 28, 1970. Like

the other two plaintiffs, she filed a second charge,

which the EEOC received on January 12, 1971.

18. The district court certified a class of

black female applicants subject to two limitations,

which are in addition to the date of application.

First, the applicant must possess a tenth grade edu-

cation. Second, she must have been referred by

MSES during the time such referral was required.

19. Payne's first charge covers Travenol's

alleged discriminatory acts that occurred after

she filed it because they are sufficiently related

to the allegations of the first charge. Gamble v.

Bimmingham Southern Railroad Co., 514 F.2d 678, 99

n.6 (5th Cir. 1975); Oubichon v. North American

Rockwell ., 482 F.2d 569 (Sth Cir. 1973). See

encompasses

Travenol's rejection of Payne on March 17, 1970,

after she was referred by the MSES.

- 43a -

Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., supra. The

charge filing period in 1970 was ninety days

after the alleged act of discrimination. 7°

See Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431

F.2d 455, 460 (5th Cir. 1970). Thus, the

opening date for the Title VII race discrim-

ination class, counting back ninety days

from the date of the January 20 charge, is

October 31, 1969. All black females who

satisfy the other requirements of class

- 44a -

membership and who applied on or after

October 31, 1969, should be members of the

class for purposes of Title VII race discri-

mination. The district court's later datr

cannot be sustained. 7+

For the Title VII sex discrimination

claim, the opening date of the class is

October 31, 1969, the same date as for the

Title VII race discrimination claim, be-

mentioned in the complaint. district

certified the class conditionally on Novenber 16,

1972. "s amended complaint, filed May 3,

1973, did having filed a charge with the

- 45a -

applicant suffering sex discrimination on

or after this date could have filed a timely

charge of sex discrimination with the EEOC

by the date Payne filed her charge. Thus,

the sex discrimination claims take in a

class of black female employees or appli-

cants beginning on October 31, 1969.

[21] Our inquiry is not ended here,

however, because the plaintiffs' alleged

violations of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 as well as

violations of Title VII. Although both of

these statutes apply to employment discrim-

ination cases, they have independent

remedies and independent statutes of limi-

tations. See Johnson v. Railway Express

Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 95 S.Ct. 1716,

44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975). Though both the

district court's decision on liability and

our earlier decision in this case failed to

mention Section 1981, there can be no doubt

that the Section 1981 claim was properly

pleaded and adjudicated. The decree that

- 46a -

we review today enjoins subjective employ-

ment practices in violation of Section 1981,

a ruling that must be premised on a finding

of Section 1981 liability. We therefore

examine what the appropriate Section 1981

class opening date should be. Cf.

McWilliams v. Escambia County School Board,

658 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1981) (the Court

separately examined whether a charge had

been timely filed under Title VII and

whether the acts complained of occurred

within the statute of limitations for

Section 1981 and Section 1983 before con-

cluding that all claims were time-barred) ;

Crawford v. Western Electric Co., supra,

614 F.2d at 1309. Petty v. Peoples Gas

Light and Coke Co., 86 F.R.D. 336, 342-

43 (N.D.I1l. 1979).

[22-24] Statutes of limitations for

Section 1981 actions ordinarily are bor-

rowed from state law. Johnson v. Railway

- 47a -

Express Agency, supra, 421 U.S. at 462, 95

S.Ct. at 1721. In Truvillion v. King's

Daughters Hospital, 614 F.2d 520 (5th Cir.

1980), we held that a Section 1981 claim

for a discriminatory refusal-to-hire is

governed by the six-year Mississippi general

22 614 F.24 at 528.

statute of limitations.

At least one of the named plaintiffs here,

Birdie Lee Griffin, applied for a job with

Travenol in 1966 after receiving an MSES

referral, and was refused employment.

Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 416

F.Supp. at 252. Thus, if the proof supports

it the plaintiffs may represent a Section

1981 race discrimination class that begins

six years before the date when the complaint

was filed in 1972, or March 2, 1966.

22. Mississippi Code Annotated, Section 15-1-49

(1972) provides:

- 48a -

Section 1981, of course, does not embrace

sex discrimination claims, Bobo v. ITT, Con-

tinental Baking Co., 662 F.2d 340 (5th Cir.

1981).

III. PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION

We come now to the merits of the plain-

tiffs' claim that Travenol's hiring, job as-

signment, promotion, and pay practices were

23

discriminatory. The district court found

23. The plaintiffs alleged discrimination in

four areas that are relevant to this appeal:

- 49a -

for the plaintiffs on most but not all lia-

bility issues. On appeal, the plaintiffs

charge error in the district court's failure

to find discrimination on the remaining

issues. But for the educational require-

ments that we struck down in Payne I, 565

F.2d at 899-900, the defendant contends that

the district court erred in finding any dis-—

crimination at all. We take up each issue

in turn.

A. Discrimination in hiring.

[25) At the outset, we note one diffi-

culty in assessing the proof of discrimina-

tion in hiring. When this case was tried,

the plaintiffs principally, though not exclu-

sively, strived to prove that Travenol's

hiring of operatives discriminated against

blacks because of the minimum requirement

of a tenth-grade education. See Payne v.

Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 416 F.Supp. at

255. Proof of such disparate impact dis-

crimination under Title VII is governed

- 50a -

by Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,

91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971). Griggs

holds that a facially neutral employment

practice that imposes a greater burden on

one group than another violates Title VII

unless the employer establishes that the

practice arises from business necessity. A

disparate impact plaintiff need not show in-

tentional discrimination. 401 U.S. at 430-

32, 91 S.Ct. at 853-54. A large quantity

of Payne's evidence was aimed precisely at

the Griggs elements of proof. Of course,

Payne also introduced testimony and statis-

tics undertaking to show the opportunity for

and the existence of subjective, intentional

discrimination in Travenol's hiring process-

disparate treatment.

[26] Confronted with this evidence,

the district court found that Travenol hired

proportionately fewer blacks, stating:

"Thie disparate result reflects the effect

of a tenth-grade requirement and of the

- 5la -

defendants’ subjective discrimination."

416 F.Supp. at 248. The district court

then struck down the tenth grade require-

ment, rejecting Travenol's business neces-

sity defense. In Payne I, we reversed the

injunction against the tenth-grade require-

ment, holding that no named plaintiff had

standing to challenge it because each had

a tenth grade education during the relevant

period. 565 F.2d at 898-99. 74

24. In I, Payne argued that she had

standing to the tenth grade requirement

because she lacked a tenth-grade equi for

- 52a -

In a disparate impact case,

{27] The removal of the tenth-grade re-

As Travenol properly contends,

the case must now be analyzed as a dispa-

rate treatment case rather than a disparate

impact case.

quirement issue transformed this case dra-

matically.

nat Hy lt ads

Hone que seis i9%

ays pains

igi ; i fi HE

THe reid rhe i

au paitell Ay th

i ith at ‘i

- 53a -

the plaintiff need not prove intent to dis-

criminate, while in a disparate treatment

case, such proof is crucial. International

Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,

431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1854,

n,15, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977). The plain-

tiffs' proof must now be tested under dis-

parate treatment principles.

With the removal of the tenth-grade re-

quirement as an issue in this case, Payne's

essential challenge is that Travenol's sub-

jective interviewing process led to discrim-

ination. Payne does not assert that

Travenol applied distinct, facially neutral

criteria to candidates in the interview

that operate disproportionately to exclude

blacks. Rather, Payne points to the ab-

sence of objective criteria and the result-

ant opportunity to discriminate subjective-

ly in Travenol's hiring. In support of the

contention that Travenol discriminated in

- 54a -

hiring, Payne recites the history of

Travenol's hiring, which reveals substantial

pre-Act discrimination, and compares appli-

cant flow to actual hires, stressing the

' consistently lower proportion of blacks than

whites hired. Payne also adverts to indi-

vidual instances of discrimination. This

evidence falls into the classic pattern of

a classwide disparate treatment case. See

Hazlewood School District v. United States,

433 U.S. 299, 97 S.Ct. 2736, 53 L.Ed.2d 768

(1977); International Brotherhood of Teams-

ters v. United States, supra; Wilkins v.

University of Houston, 654 F.2d 388, 394-95

(5th Cir. 1981); Phillips v. Joint Legisla-

tive Committee, 637 F.2d 1014, 1024-26 (5th

Cir. 1981).

Travenol's interviewing cannot be

viewed as a neutral practice with a dis-

parate effect thus subject to Griggs v. Duke

Power Co., supra, as Payne argues. Hiring

processes that rely heavily on subjective

- 55a -

interviewing provide an opportunity for the

intentional discrimination that lies at the

heart of a disparate treatment case. Payne

does not urge that Travenol has violated

Title VII by seeking alert, capable opera-

tive workers; rather she charges that Tra-

venol masked its intentional discrimina-

tion by purporting to screen applicants for

these qualities while actually discriminat-

ing on the basis of race. Subjective dis-

crimination in interviewing or in similar

evaluation processes has repeatedly been

held to fall into the disparate treatment

branch of Title VII law. See Hazlewood

School District, supra, 433 U.S. at 304, 97

S.Ct. at 2739-40; Pouncy v. Prudential In-

surance Co., 668 F.2d 795, at 801 (5th Cir.

1982) (subjective evaluation of employees

is not a selection procedure tested under

the disparate impact model); Wilkins v.

University of Houston, supra, 654 F.2d at

394-94; Phillips v. Joint Legislative

- 56a -

Committee, supra.

[28-30] Because this case now raises

Claims of classwide disparate treatment, we

must evaluate the evidence in light of

standards established by the Supreme Court

in such cases as Teamsters and Hazelwood.

See Pouncy v. Prudential Insurance Co.,

Supra. Teamsters and Hazelwood establish

that in a Title VII disparate treatment

class action, the plaintiff has the burden

of proving a prima facie case that the de-

fendant's regular practice was to discrimi-

nate intentionally against a protected

Class. The burden may be met solely with

statistics if they show a sufficiently

great disparity between the employer's

treatment of blacks and of whites---a dis-

parate result. In such circumstances, sta-

tistics alone justify an inference of dis-

criminatory motive. See Village of Arling-

ton Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Develop-

ment Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66, 97 S.Ct.

- 57a -

555, 563-64, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1971). The

statistical showing of disparate result may

also be buttressed with evidence of a his-

tory of discrimination practiced by the em-

ployer, individual instances of discrimina-

tion, and opportunities to discriminate that

exist in the employer's decision-making pro-

cesses. If the statistical disparity is in-

sufficient alone to establish a prima facie

case, the plaintiff may get over his or her

initial hurdle by combining statistics with

historical, individual, or circumstantial

evidence. See EEOC v. American National

Bank, 652 F.2d 1176 (4th Cir. 1981).

[31] Once the plaintiff has shown a

prima facie case that the employer has pur-

sued a policy of discrimination, the employ-

er may undertake to rebut this showing.

The rebuttal can proceed along two fronts.

First, proof that the plaintiff's statis-

tics are inaccurate or insignificant may

dispel the plaintiff's proof of disparate

- 58a -

result. For example, the employer may show

that the disparity between the percentage

of minorities in his work force and in the

general population results from discrimina-

tion before the enactment of Title VII.

Second, the employer may seek “to provide a

nondiscriminatory explanation for the appar-

ently discriminatory result." Teamsters,

431 U.S. at 360 n.46, 97 S.Ct. at 1867 n.46.

General assertions of good faith or of hir-

ing only the best applicants, however, are

insufficient to meet this burden. Id. at

342 n.24, 97 S.Ct. at 1858 n.24. If the em

ployer fails to rebut the plaintiff's case,

the district court may conclude that Title

VII has been violated. Id. at 361, 97 S.Ct.

at 1867.

[32] Discriminatory treatment claims

under § 1981 are measured by the same stand

ards that apply to discriminatory treatment

claims under Title VII. Rivera v. City of

Wichita Falls, 665 F.2d 531, 534 n.4 (5th

- 59a -

Cir. 1982); McWilliams v. Escambia County

School Board, 658 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1981).

Thus, we apply the Teamsters pattern of

proof to the § 1981 claims as well as the

Title VII claims in this case.

The defendants argue that because this

is a disparate treatment case, the burdens

of proof and production must conform to the

model established by the Supreme Court in

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.

792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973),

and Texas Department of Community Affairs

v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089,

67 L.Ed.2a 207 (1981).7> We have-held,

25. _Burdine holds that an individual seeking

to prove discriminatory treatment must establish

a prima facie case according to McDonnell-Douglas

- v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.

- ‘The defendant then has the evi-

must show that the defendant's reason is a pretext

for discrimination. See McWilliams v. Escanbia

County School Board, 658 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1961).

(footnote continued)

- 60a -

however, that McDonnell Dougias and Burdine

establish the model of proof only for an in-

dividual disparate treatment case. Ina

class action we adhere to the pattern of

proof set out in Teamsters and Hazelwood.

Our cases have recognized the distinction

between individual and class claims of dis-

parate treatment, see Phillips v. Joint Leg-

islative Committee, supra, 637 F.2d at 1024-

27 (5th Cir. 1981), and have consistently

applied the Teamsters model of proof to the

class claims, e.g., Markey v. Tenneco Oil

Co., 635 F.2d 497, 499 (5th Cir. 1981).

Nothing in Burdine, a single-plaintiff case,

suggests that the Court intended Burdine

procedures to supplant the procedures for

proving classwide disparate treatment an-

nounced in Teamsters and Hazelwood. See

The Third and the Ninth Circuits have ap-

plied Burdine to Title VII class actions. See

Croker v. Co., 662 F.2d 975 (3d Cir. 1981)

en ; Piva Vv. Corp., 654 F.2d 591 (9th

Cir. 1981).

- 6la -

Vuyanich v. Republic National Bank of Dallas,

521 F.Supp. 656 (N.D.Tex. 1981).

[33] We now turn to the question

whether the district court's findings sup-

port an inference of classwide disparate

treatment under Teamsters. In answering

this question we recite the statistical and

other facts reported in the opinion of the

district court that can, if supported in

the record, establish discrimination absent

the tenth-grade requirement. Travenol

asserts that the district court made a find

ing of discrimination only by overlaying

the disparate effects of the tenth-grade

education requirement and the subjective

screening accomplished through interviewing.

Because the district court never considered

the independent effect of interviewing,

Travenol maintains, there is no finding

that interviewing, without regard to the

tenth-grade requirement, is discriminatory.

- 62a -

The district court's findings, by its own

admission, are “brief and to some extent

conclusory." 416 F.Supp. at 255. Neverthe-

less, we believe that they are adequate to

support a conclusion of classwide discrimi-

nation, without regard for the tenth-grade

requirement.

First, the district court found that

Travenol hired proportionately fewer blacks

than whites from candidates referred by

uses . 7° Because MSES referred only candi-

dates possessing a tenth-grade education, |

this finding is untouched by our holding in

Payne I that the plaintiffs could not chal-

lenge the tenth-grade requirement. The

district court also found that after Tra-

venol ceased to require referral from MSES,

The district court cited no statistics

i

3

,

- 63a -

its hiring continued to exclude blacks dis-

a7 This finding reflects

proportionately.

both Travenol's imposition of the tenth-

grade requirement and its subjective discrim

ination. The court, therefore, did not

state how much of Travenol's disproportion-

ate exclusion of blacks was attributable to

subjective discrimination, but its finding

clearly implies that some of it resulted

from such discrimination.

In addition to these findings, the

court relied on work-force statistics. *®

27 =the court found that Travenol hired one

of three white applicants but only one of six

black applicants between April 1971 and August 1974.

28. ‘The statistics relied on by the court

showed the following percentages of whites in the

operative work force:

Percentage of the operative work

Year force that was white:

All Male Female

1964 100 — —

1966 84 -—- --

1970 ed 76.6% 82.8%

1973 _ 54.1% 70.1%

1974 _ 37.4% 57.5%

- 64a -

These statistics show a slow rise in the

percentage of blacks in Travenol's plant

from 1964, when there were none to 1971,

when blacks composed nearly 25% of male

operatives and slightly more than 20% of the

female operatives. After 1972, when the

plaintiffs filed suit, the percentage of

blacks grew rapidly.

Thus, the district court clearly found

that Travenol's hiring had a disparate re-

sult, even without regard to the tenth-

grade requirement. Although its statistical

findings are not elaborate enough to permit

us to conclude that Payne established a

prima facie case through statistics alone,

the court also made historical, circum-

stantial, and individual findings that but;

tress the statistics. The findings of dis-

parate result coalesce with Travenol's

history of discrimination, the opportunities

in its hiring process to discriminate, and

individual instances of discrimination, all

- 65a -

to establish a prima facie case.

[34] Travenol's entire work force, but

for custodial positions, was exclusively

white until 1964.2?

Before 1964, Travenol

hired persons, without regard to educational

requirements, based on subjective impres-

sions gained through interviewing. Com-

munity references were used heavily in the

plant's early years, but took on less im-

portance in the 1960s. Following the pas-

sage of Title VII in 1964, the plant's

porssanel manager sought the assistance of

MSES in evaluating how Travenol could bring

blacks into the operative work force. MSES

performed a study and recommended that

Travenol require a twelfth-grade education

for operative positions. Travenol refused

to set such a high standard, instead

29. Although liability under Title VII can-

not rest on Travenol's pre-Act discrimination, its

conduct before 1964 is relevant to the interpreta-

tion of post-Act disparate results. See Hazel-

wood School District, supra, 433 U.S. at 3097n.15,

97 S.Ct. at 2742 n.15.

requiring a tenth-grade education or GED.

It is unclear why Travenol decided that it

needed any educational requirement for the

first time only after the passage of Title

VII. Travenol also invoked the services of

MSES to screen and refer applicants to the

plant.

Between 1965 and 1971 Travenol con-

sidered only those applicants referred by

MSES. The referred applicants were then

interviewed by the plant's personnel manager.

Travenol's personnel manager between 1965

and 1967 hired applicants based on his in-

terview impression and the recommendation

of plant employees whom he consulted about

the applicants. The first personnel manager

initiated a practice of consulting a black

employee, Julius Lucas, about black appli-

cants, and this practice was continued by his

successors until 1971. The personnel manag-

er during 1967 and 1968 consulted members

of the local community as references to

- 67a -

supplement his reaction to applicants gained

through interviewing. The personnel manag-

er from 1968 to 1974 made his hiring deci-

sions almost exclusively by his subjective

30 At no time

impression at the interview.

either before or after Title VII's enactment

did Travenol give its personnel managers

written instructions on standards to apply

in hiring.

The district court also found that »11

three of the named plaintiffs belonged to a

racial minority, were qualified for the

operative pesition they sought, and were re-

jected by Travenol. It is also abundantly

clear from the district court's opinion that

Travenol continued to hire white applicants

for operative positions after these rejec-

tions. Thus, each named plaintiff fulfilled

- 68a -

the four-part test of establishing a prima

facie case under McDonnell--Douglas Corp. v.

Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36

L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).°+ ‘there is no indica-

tion in the district court's findings that

Travenol rebutted the inferences of indivi-

dual discrimination that arose from the

plaintiffs' showings.

These findings, evaluated in light of

Teamsters, establish a strong prima facie

case of disparate treatment, absent the

tenth-grade requirement. The burden then

31. Under McDonnell-Douglas the plaintiff

may establish a prima facie case of individual dis-

parate treatment by showing: "(i) that he belongs

to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was

qualified for a job for which the employer was

seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his quali-

fication, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his

rejection, the position remained open and the

continued to seek applicants from persons

of complainant's qualifications. 411 U.S. at 802,

93 S.Ct. at 1824. By noting that the named plain-

tiffs satisfied the McDonell criteria, we

do not imply that instances of

discrimination presented to support a case of class-

wide discrimination must conform to McDonnell-

Douglas.

fell on Travenol to rebut the plaintiffs'

showing. The district court, however, made

no findings that appear to us to blunt the

plaintiffs' evidence. We conclude, there-

fore, that if the district court's findings

are supported by the evidence, we are com-

pelled to hold that Travenol's hiring vio-

lated Title VII and Section 1981.

[35] We have now decided that the dis-

trict court's findings, if correct, warrant

a conclusion that unlawful discrimination

actually occurred. We now turn to evidence

of discrimination in hiring to see if it sup-

ports the district court's findings of fact.

In assessing this evidence, we apply the

clearly erroneous standard to the district

court's subsidiary findings of fact. Rivera

v. City of Wichita Falls, 665 F.2d at 535-36.

Danner v. United States Civil Service Com-

mission, 635 F.2d 427, 430-31 (5th Cir.

1981).

[36] Travenol asserts that the district

- 70a -

court's finding of a disparate result in

hiring is clearly erroneous in tiiat it is

unsupported by competent statis‘ical evi-+

dence. Travenol argues that ali. the stat-

istics in the record on applicant flow com-

bine applicants who had a tenth-grade educa-

tion and applicants who were without a

tenth-grade education. If Travenol were

correct, the district court's finding of a

disparate result in hiring that was the

product of discrimination in interviewing

could not be sustained. The statistics in

the record, however, amply support the dis-

trict court's findings and we may not set

them aside as clearly erroneous.

First, Payne introduced statistics

that show that between November 1969 and

November 1971, Travenol hired only 24.3%

of black females [sic] applicants referred

by MSES for operative positions and 21.0%

of black males, while hiring 44.3% of the

- 7Jla-

white males and 51.7% of the white females.“

32. The following chart presents the break-

down of applicants and hires:

firing Rates of Ppplicants Referrod by SES,

Ma Posi-

Hired 130 29 260 107

— Percent Hired 44.3% 21.0% 51.7% 24.3%

The calculation of standard deviations though

not essential, see Rivera v. City of Wichita Falls,

665 F.2d at 545, n.21, is extremely useful. Absent

explanation, standard deviations of greater than

three generally signal discrimination, see Hazelwood

School Dist., 433 U.S. at 311 n.17, 97 S.Ct. at 2743

n.l?. Standard deviation analysis here reveals that

the discrepancy between black and white hires is

probative of discrimination. The observed mumber

of hires is 7.54 standard deviations fewer than the

expected number.

The "standard deviation" is a way to calcu-

late the likelihood that chance is responsible for

the difference between a predicted result and an

actual result. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S.

482, 496 n.17, 97 S.Ct. 1272, 1281 n.17, 51 L.Ed.2a

498. For example, if we flip a penny one hundred

- 72a -

Payne's evidence also shows that between

1970 and 1974, Travenol hired 44.9% of white

operative-job applicants with a tenth-grade

education, but only 25% of black applicants

similarly qualified. >* More specific stat-

istics indicate that the disproportionate

exclusion of blacks continued but was

chalk it up to chance. But long before we get to

99 flips out of 100 producing heads, we suspect the

penny. Standard deviation analysis is the mathe-

matical means of expressing how likely it is that

the penny is suspect. For hiring discrimination,

the standard deviation is calculated by taking the

square root of the product of the number of appli-

root of 100 times .5 (the probability of heads)

ty of tails), or 5 [sic]. If

100 flips yield 40 heads, the observed value falls

two standard deviations below the expected value.

the expected value-—-is less than one in 100. Id,

Statisticians tend to discard chance as an explana-

tion for a result when deviations from the expected

value approach two standard deviations. Id.

33. The plaintiffs set out the following

:

:

- 73a -

tapering towards the end of this period.

In 1972 to 1974, Travenol hired 26.1% of the

qualified white applicants while hiring

21.5% of the qualified black applicants. >“

licants with a Tenth-Grade Education,

From Into

ve ns, 4

Whites Hlacks

Applicants for Operative Jobs

With a 10th Grade Education 1,478 2,193

Hires in Operative Jobs,

1970-74 664 548

% Hired 44.9% 25.0% —

Calculation of standard deviations reveals

that the observed number of black hires is 10.28

standard deviations fewer than the expected number.

34. The plaintiffs presented the following

licants With a Tenth-Grade Education,

- Into

ve e -

Whites Blacks

chart

Applicants for Operative Jobs

With a 10th Grade Education,

1972-74 636 1,658

Hires in Operative Jobs, 1972-74 166 356

% Hired 26.1% 21.5%

The disparity, though less than earlier years,

(footnote continued)

- 74a -

The record contains no applicant flow sta-

tistics for the period between 1974 and 1976,

although the decree includes class members up

to February 19, 1976, the date when the

district court rendered its decision on lia-

bility.

Travenol contends that flaws in Payne's

statistics render them incompetent to support

the district court's findings. We do not

agree that the picture of discrimination

suggested by these statistics is a mirage.

While Travenol has exposed defects and gaps

in the plaintiffs' statistics, none of them

are fatal.

Travenol lodges several objections to

the MSES statistics for 1969-1971. First,

Travenol argues that the MSES data omit

three months of statistics for material

handlers and nine months for assemblers.

is still significant: the mmber of black hires

falls short of the expected value by more than two

standard deviations.

- 75a -

We have condemned “extravagant extrapolation"

from small samples, Hester v. Southern Rail-

way Co., 497 F.2d 1374, 1381 (5th Cir. 1974).

In Hester, we refused to accept the infer-

ence that because 50% of the persons who

responded to an advertisement over a two-

week period were black that the same percent-

age would be found to have responded to a

series of ads over a two-year period.

Plainly, the gaps in proof alluded to here

are not of the magnitude we condemned in

Hester. Travenol also argues that MSES

disclaimed certainty at trial that its data

was complete. Such wavering as the wit-

nesses displayed, however, hardly warrants

discarding their evidence altogether.

Second, Travenol asserts that many of

the people who MSES referred to Travenol

Laboratories may never have shown up for an

interview. Thus, a comparison of referred

applicants to actual hires omits an impor-

tant variable: how many applicants Travenol

- 76a -

failed to interview because they did not

show up. Theoretically, this point is well

taken, but its major premise is wholly sine

lative. Contrary to Travenol's assertion,

the MSES witness did not testify that

"[(fl)ailure to report [for an interview] was

common." Rather, the witness stated that

MSES records failed to indicate which appli-

cants referred for an interview actually

showed up and which did not. The following

colloguy then took place between the MSES

witness and Travenol's counsel.

Q: Okay. But based on your experience

the probability is that there are

some who were referred and did not

report, is that correct?

A: Probably. I would suspect that

most of these reported, but some

may not have.

Thus, instead of supporting Travenol's ar-

gument, the record indicates that there was

no evidence how many applicants did not keep

their interview dates, and the witness in

the best position to estimate believed that

- 77a -

most applicants did show up for interviews.

Travenol also departs from the record when

it asserts that the MSES witness testified

that the MSES did not always keep records

of hires. In fact, the testimony reveals

that the opposite is true.

Travenol next objects to the applicant

flow data from 1971 to 1974. Travenol's

leading attack is that the figures are

marred by duplicate applications. Rebecca

Allen, the secretary for Trovenol's person-

nel director, testified that approximately

25% of the applications in the applicant

flow charts were duplicates. Relying on

Robinson v. Union Carbide Corp., 538 F.2d

652, 658 (Sth Cir. 1976), Travenol contends

that this level of duplicates precludes the

use of applicant flow statistics.

This contention, however, is too broad.

First, Robinson reached the conclusion that

applicant-flow statistics were inadequate on

the basis of testimony not only that

- 78a -

duplicates existed but also that some appli-

cants filled out three or four applications

amonth. This degree of repetition might

well render applicant-flow statistics sus-

pect. Rebecca Allen's estimate that ap-

proximately 25% of the applications were

duplicates, however, does not. Her earlier

testimony established that only when an

application expired did an applicant have

to fill out a new application; otherwise

the old application was renewed. >> Second,

and more important, Rebecca Allen specifi-

cally testified that she did not know

whether black duplicates exceeded white

duplicates. Thus, there was no testimony

that black duplicates occurred at a greater

rate than white duplicates, and we are un-

willing to make such an assumption without

evidence in the record to support it.

2

7

35

days in 1974 and later years. Before 1974, appli-

cations were considered current for thirty days.

- 79a -

Therefore, Rebecca Allen's estimate of

duplicates is not enough to render the

applicant flow statistics incompetent. >°

[37] Travenol also contends that com-

parisons between black and white rates of

hire are not relevant because they fail to

isolate class members: black females.

Travenol relies on Jefferies v. Harris

County Community Action Association, 615

F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980). Jefferies does

not support this contention. In Jefferies

we held that a black female plaintiff is

entitled to prove that she suffered discri-

mination as a black female, even if the

employer did not discriminate against either

blacks as a class or females as a class. Id.

at 1032. We did not imply, however, that a

black female may not claim and prove that

- 80a -

her employer discriminated against her sole-

ly because of her race or sex. In fact, the

Jefferies court addressed the plaintiff's

claim that she had suffered separate racial

and sexual discrimination. Thus, Travenol's

objection to Payne's racial statistics is

unsound. While Payne's statistics are not

perfect, we find that they clearly suffice

to support the district court's findings of

a disparate result.

(38, 39] We note, however, two areas

that the district court must address on re-

mand. First, Payne argues that Travenol

discriminated from 1966 to 1969, relying

for statistical evidence of applicant flow

solely on an affirmative action plan pre-

pared by Travenol. The district court

apparently never ruled on the admissibility

of this plan, which Travenol claims is

privileged. On remand, the district court

must rule on the admissibility of the plan

and must make findings of fact and

- 8la -

conclusions of law on Travenol's hiring

practices between 1966 and 1969. Second,

the district court awarded constructive

seniority relief to all black females who

applied to Travenol before February 19, 1976,

but made no findings that support a conclu-

sion that discrimination continued beyond

1974. In the absence of findings covering

this two year hiatus, we cannot decide

whether such relief was warranted. We

therefore must remand to allow the district

court to prepare findings to explain its

award, or to modify the decree. See Falcon

v. General Telephone Company of the South-

west, supra, 626 F.2d at 381-82.

[40] Travenol argues that it rebutted

the plaintiff's evidence of discrimination

and the district court erred in refusing to

accept the rebuttal evidence. We have in-

terpreted Teamsters' view of rebuttal evi-

dence to mean that:

- 82a -

[O]nce the plaintiff has offered some

evidence of disparity, it is then the

defendant's burden to come up with

more specific statistical evidence to

rebut the plaintiff's proof. :

Falcon v. General Telepiione Company of the

Sovthwest, 626 F.2d at 301. Travenol

offered two statistical alternatives in

rebuttal, but the district court was not

persuaded. We find that the district

court's rejection of Travenol's evidence

was not clearly erroneous.

First, Travenol presented statistics

that it hired equal proportions of blacks

and whites among applicants with their own

means of transportation. >”

The difficulty

with these statistics is that Travenol's

interviewers did not always ask applicants

about their own means of transportation,

particularly if the applicant received a low

interview rating. Thus, Travenol cannot

show that applicants it screened out in the

- 83a -

interview lacked transportation. Morecver,

the sample from which the defendant drew its

conclusions excluded one-fourth of all appli-

cations for the time it covered. The defend-

ant's witness could not testify that the

missing applications were removed randomly.

Hence, a large number of applications were

excluded from the defendant's study without

any showing that statistics about the remain-

ing applications reflected the entire appli-

cant pool. These weaknesses detract sig-

nificantly from the value of the defendant's

showing.

[41] Second, Travenol contends that its

hiring of blacks equaled or exceeded the

percentage of blacks among qualified persons

in the population. Those population figures,

according to Travenol, rebut the showing of

disparate result in applicant flow statis-

tics. We have held that an employer may

repel a finding of discrimination by show-

ing that the proportion of minorities in its

- 84a -

work force equals or exceeds the proportion

of minorities among the qualified populatia.

Robinson v. Union Carbide Corp., supra, 538

F.2d at 658. Robinson compared general

population figures to work force figures,

however, only after concluding that the

plaintiff's applicant flow statistics were

flawed by excessive duplicates. Id. Here,

by contrast, we have concluded that the

plaintiff's applicant flow statistics sur-

vive the employer's attack on their validity.

Applicant flow figures are more revealing

of an employer's hiring practices than

general population comparisons when, as

here, a greater percentage of qualified

blacks apply for work than qualified whites.

Travenol has an obligation not to discrimi-

nate illegally among applicants who present

themselves for work. Because of the heavy

minority applicant flow, Travenol cannot

show that it discharged this obligation by

presenting evidence that the composition of

- 85a -

its work force mirrored that of the

qualified general population.

[142] Travenol's final line of defense

against a finding of discrimination is to

argue that interviewing was necessary to

select alert, capable workers for its plant.

Travenol produces and packages drugs, large-

ly intravenous solutions. There is, there-

fore, obvious danger to human life if the

drugs are contaminated or improperly labeled.

Travenol argues that only through subjective

interviewing could it secure qualified work-

ers. We recognize Travenol's interest in

minimizing the risk of hiring careless

employees. But to recognize this interest

is not to sanction the discriminatory

practices demonstrated by the plaintiffs'

evidence.

We have repeatedly held that "hiring

procedures [that] rely heavily on the sub-

jective judgments of its executives from

personal interviews [create] a procedure

- 86a -

that can easily be used to mask racially

motivated hiring decisions." Phillips v.

Joint Legislative Committee, supra, 637

F.2d at 1026. This is particularly true

when an all-white supervisory staff con-

ducts the interviews, Pettway v. American

Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 21l, 240 (5th

Cir. 1974); Rowe v. General Motors Corp.,

457 F.2d 348, 359 (Sth Cir. 1972).

Travenol's occasional consultation of a

black employee does not alter the control

exercised by the white personnel staff.

Travenol's assertion that interviewing was

necessary amounts to no more than a claim

that Travenol used interviewing to select

only the best applicants. The Supreme Court

rejected such a defense in Teamsters, and

we similarly reject it here. Except as

noted, we affirm the district court's award

of relief for discrimination in hiring.

B. Discrimination in Initial Assignments

143] We now address the claim that

- 87a -

Travenol discriminated in the initial

assignment of those hired. Payne argues

that the district court erred in denying

injunctive relief against the disproportion-

ate assignment of blacks to custodial jobs.

The district court's 1976 opinion makes no

findings or conclusions on discrimination

in this area. The magistrate's 1980 report

and recommendation for further relief reject-

ed Payne's request, finding no statistical

foundation for it, and the district court

adopted the report as its own opinion. We

agree that the plaintiffs' evidence is not

sufficient.

The magistrate noted that as of Novem-

ber 30, 1979, blacks composed 61.9% of all

operatives and 70.8% of all custodians.

Believing this disparity to be insignificant,

the magistrate denied injunctive relief.

We do not hold that an 8.9% disparity is

necessarily insignificant, We agree, how-

ever, that the disparity between the

- 88a -

percentage of minorities in Travenol's opera-

tive work force and the percentage in its

custodial work force does not make out a

prima facie case. While a concentration of

minorities in the lower echelons of an or-

ganization ordinarily is probative of dis-

crimination, here there is no showing that

those assigned to the custodial work force

had a tenth grade education, and were thus

qualified for operative work when that re-

quirement was in effect. Moreover, the

disparity between the percentage of blacks

in operative work and in custodial work has

38

been steadily narrowing. We are therefore

38. The plaintiffs prepared the following

chart from Travenol's EEO-l reports:

Number of

Date of EEO-1 Jab Number of Black %

Report Categories Employees Employees Black

November 30, Operatives 1,532 880 57.4%

9 Servi

— ceentenane 87 67 —-77.08

November 30, Operatives 1,097 658 60.0%

(footnote continued)

unable to draw conclusions on Travenol's

assignment policies from bare work force

statistics.

The only other statistics cited by

plaintiffs show that between 1967 and 1974

Travenol assigned 6.8 of the blacks hired

for entry level work to custodial jobs,

while assigning only 0.7% of the whites to

custodial jobs. These figures are suggest-

ive but do not persuade us that Travenol

discriminated in initial assignments of

custodial workers. First, the sample is

very small; Travenol averaged seven assign-

ments to custodial work each year during the

period covered by these statistics. Second,

the plaintiffs admit that half of the blacks

assigned to custodial work lacked a tenth-

Number of

Date of EEO-l1 Jab Number of Black .

Report Categories Employees Employees Black

November 30, Operatives 1,109 687 61.9%

Workers 65 46 70.8%

grade education and, therefore, were not

eligible for operative positions. These

factors considerably erode the strength of

the plaintiffs' proof on this point and the

district court did not err in refusing to

grant injunctive relief.

C. Discrimination in Promotions

In this section we address Payne's con-

tention that Travenol structured its pro-

cedure for advancing from assembler to

material handler in a fashion that discri-

minated against females, and her contention

that black females suffered discrimination

in promotions above the operative level.

1. The “Hooks” Position

Payne claims that female assemblers

were impeded from entry into the material

handler work force by the defendant's use

of the “hooks” position as the entry job.

At the time of the trial in 1976, Travenol

had a material handler position that re-

quired lifting many bottles on and off the

production line with plastic devices called

"hooks." The "hooks" enabled a user to lift

more bottles at a time than could be lifted

by hand. The hooks position was arduous; it

demanded more sustained heavy lifting than

any other material handler slot. When

filling material handler vacancies other

than the hooks, Travenol gave priority to

hooks bidders even though any operative

employee could bid for the position. Since

hooks workers rarely declined the oppor-

tunity to transfer, "[t]his right of first

refusal ha[d] the effect of transforming any

material handler vacancy into a vacancy on

the ‘hooks' jobs." 416 F.Supp. at 262. The

district court also found that females were

deterred from applying for material handler

positions, and those who did were forced by

the hooks position to retreat back to as-

sembler jobs much more often than men. The

court therefore concluded that the use of

the hooks position as the entry into

- 92a -

material handling unlawfully discriminated

against females.

{44, 45] In response to a Food and

Drug Administration investigation in 1975

Travenol abolished the hooks position and

replaced it with the "bottle stack on,

bottle stack off" position. The “bottle

stack" position also involves putting

bottles on the line and taking them off, but

is less physically taxing than the former

hooks position. Travenol also ceased to

give bottle stackers priority in bidding for

other material handler positions. Travenol

denies that the hooks position did discrimi-

nate against women, and maintains that in

any event the new bottle stack position is

not sexually discriminatory. We affirm the

district court's conclusion that the hooks

position discriminated against females, but

agree with Travenol that its modifications

of this position remove its discriminatory

- 93a -

character.??

The plaintiffs presented statistics

that more females leave the bottle stack

position than men. The plaintiffs also

presented testimony of two females who were

loath to accept bottle stack positions be-

cause they require much more physical effort

than other material handler positions.

While this evidence indicates that bottle

stacking is still undesirable, we have no

warrant for overturning the magistrate's

judgment, approved by the district court,

that no injunctive relief against it is

warranted. Because females no longer must

- 94a -

become bottle stackers in order to ascend to

other material handler positions, the dis-

criminatory effect created by the hooks

position is not present.

2. Promotions Above the Operative Level

The district court tound Travenol guil-

ty of a variety of discriminatory promotion

practices, and the decree we review today

contains provisions designed to enjoin this

discrimination. Travenol argues that the

evidence failed to establish the existence

of racial discrimination in promotions, and,

therefore, the relief directed to this issue

should be struck down.

The district court relied on two major

categories of evidence in concluding that

Travenol discriminated in promotions. First,

the district court cited statistics that

leave no doubt that Travenol's work force

above the operative level was virtually all

- 96a -

white through 1974. 4°

Second, the district

court examined Travenol's promotion pro-

cedures and found them marred by the same

opportunity for subjective discrimination

that existed in the hiring process. Travenol

attacks both findings on appeal.

[46] Travenol argues that work force

statistics are not properly considered in

assessing discrimination in promotions be-

cause we determined in Payne I that many po-

sitions above the operative level were fill-

ed in part by lateral hiring. 565 F.2d at

895. In Payne I, we held that the district court

40. More recent statistics also reveal a con-

centration of blacks in the lower paid positions in

Travenol's plant. While whites constituted 38.1%

of the operative work force in 1979, the following

August 1979

Job Level No. % White

Officials & Managers 66 83.5%

Professionals 26 72.2%

Technicians 17 70.8%

Office & Clerical 44 77.2%

- 97a -

did not err in measuring the disparate

impact of Travenol's twelfth-grade require-

ment for positions above the operative level

by reference to general population figures.

We noted, however, that "the large majority

of the employees occupying positions subject

to the twelfth grade requirement were pro-

moted from operative jobs...." Id. Thus, it

is plain that work-force statistics are

relevant to the impact of Travenol'‘s promo-

tion procedures. See Johnson v. Uncle Ben's,

Inc., supra, 628 F.2d at 425 (when positions

are filled both by lateral hiring and by pro-

motion, "[a]s a general matter te cases are

dealt with in terms of the extreme [exclu-

sive promotion or exclusive lateral hiring]

to which they most closely accord").

[47] Travenol also attempts to rebut the

work-force figures by presenting statistics

on actual promotions. Travenol's evidence

is that 23.2% of all promotions between 1970

and 1974 went to blacks, and during this

period blacks averaged 29.9% of all opera-

tives. The district court apparently

rejected these rebuttal statistics, and the

record supports this evidentiary choice.

The testimony of the defendant's witness

shows that the charts from which Travenol

drew its statistics are flawed by a failure

clearly to categorize the positions filled

through promotions, and by omissions in

entries. These errors detract from the

force of the defendant's proof, and the dis-

trict court's decision to reject it is not

clearly erroneous.

[48] Travenol next argues that the pro-

cess through which it selected operatives for

promotions was free from bias. The district

court's finding that Travenol did have the

oppurtunity to discriminate in promotions,

however, is well supported by the evidence

and by our cases. The district court found

that Travenol's failure to post notice of

- 99a -

openings, and its reliance on the recom-

mendations of supervisors, the length of an

employee's service, and educational require-

ments in making promotion decisions all

operated discriminatorily. We affirmed the

district court's conclusion that the educa-

tional requirements were discriminatory in

Payne I, and we do not further address them

here.

[49] Travenol argues that the failure to

post notice of job vacancies is irrelevant

because it did not consider requests for

promotions to supervisory positions, and

did not require applications for promotions

te office, clerical or technical positions.

The district court concluded, however, that

job vacancy exposure was greater among

whites than blacks. Even if applications

were not required for certain positions,

when most of the supervisors are white,

failure to post job vacancies can only dis-

courage applications by blacks to a greater

- 100a -

degree than it discourages whites, who gar-

ner information through the grapevine. See,

e.g., Long v. Sapp, 502 F.2d 34, 41 (5th Cir. 1974).

[50] The district court found that a

major factor in eausiptiens, she supervisor's

recommendation, was delivered without gui-

dance by any objective standards and

operated to discriminate. "This court has

recognized that promotion systems utilizing

subjective evaluations by all white super-

visors provide a ready mechanism for dis-

crimination." Fisher v. Proctor & Gamble

Manufacturing Co., 613 F.2d 527, 544 (5th

Cir. 1980); James v. Stockham Valves &

Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 330 (5th Cir.

1977). We uphold this finding of the

district court.

[51] The district court also found

that Trayenol's consideration of length of

service as a criterion for advancement

tended to perpetuate past discrimination

in the hiring of operatives. Travenol

- 10la -

argues that under the Supreme Court's deci-

sion in Teamsters, supra, the district court

improperly premised Title VII liability on

the length-of-service factor. Teamsters

holds that a bona fide seniority system does

not violate Title VII merely because it per-

petuates the effects of discrimination be-

fore the enactment of Title VII. 433 U.S.

at 352-54, 97 S.Ct. at 1863-64. ‘e see no

application of Teamsters to the instant case,

Travenol's informal and erratic reliance on

length of service falls far short of being

a bona fide seniority system under the

statute and under Teamsters.

The district court's finding of dis-

crimination in promotions must be affirmed.

D. Discrimination in Merit System

Pay

For professional, technical, clerical,

and supervisory positions, Travenol deter-

mines salary subjectively according to its

merit pay system. Payne argued below that

- 102a -

Travenol discriminated against both blacks

and women in setting merit pay salaries.

The district court did not address this

point in its 1976 opinion, but implicitly

rejected the plaintiffs' claim when declin-

ing to accept proposed findings of fact and

conclusions of law with respect to it in

1976. Payne now asks us to reverse the dis-

trict court's implicit exoneration of

Travenol on the merit pay issue.

[52] Ordinarily we would be reluctant

to decide an issue on which the district

court was silent. In this instance, how-

ever, we affirm the district court's refusal

to find discrimination in merit pay. Payne

has called no statistics to our attention

upon which a finding of discrimination can

be based. Payné compares several sets of

statistics that show disparities between

the pay of blacks and whites or between

males and females. Each comparison, how-

ever, looks at groups that differ in

- 103a -

significant ways in addition to race or sex.

For instance, Payne asserts that among em-

ployees with a twelfth-grade education,

white males make $2,757.11 per year more

than black females. Payne does not tell us,

however, how many years the white males have

worked compared to the black females. Nor

does she compare white males to black fe-

males who occupy the same job category. Yet

length of service and job category could

clearly account for the pay differential

without regard to race or sex. Finally, the

comparison of black females and white males

includes all job categories at the plant,

not only merit pay jobs. The average salary

of all jobs tells us little about inequi-

ties, if they exist, in merit pay jobs.

Similar criticisms can be leveled at

every example of disparities in merit pay

41

that Payne alleges. We need not engage

41. Without reviewing in detail here all of

Payne's exhibits, we make the following

(footnote continued)

- 104a -

vist di litedlad tigasdlyfest tee

HA nti

juall i i ane

cli ee

eee itl fae pe Ht

hi Hila | rivdatds (lid ate

- 105a -

in a sophisticated analysis to conclude that

Payne has failed to isolate the influence

of sex or race on merit pay at Travenol.

Thus, the showing is insufficient to entitle

her to relief and we affirm the district

court's denial of it.

IIIT. CHALLENGES TO THE RELIEF ORDERED

Payne raises a number of challenges to

the relief ordered in the decree. We have

considered each of these objections and con-

clude that in most aspects, the district

court did not abuse its discretion in shap-

ing relief. Two objections with respect to

constructive seniority, however, have merit.

[53] Paragraph 10(a) of the decree pro-

vides that notice shall be given to each

black woman currently working in an hourly

job at Travenol "who applied for employment

prior to February 19, 1976, and was not hired

by that date." *? Payne correctly urges that

42, We recognize that February 19, 1976 is

(footnote continued)

- 106a -

a class member whose date of hire was delayed

by discrimination but who was eventually

hired before February 19, 1976 is also en-

titled to constructive seniority. The decree

must allow a black female operative who

applied to Travenol during the time that un-

lawful employment practices prevailed at

Travenol's plant to make a prima facie show-

ing that she would have been hired earlier

but for discrimination, even if she was in

fact hired before the date when Travenol

ceased to violate Title VII. Such a showing

is made if the time between her application

used in the decree because the district court found

that discrimination had ended by the date it ren

dered its decision on liability. We hold in II.A,

, that the district court did not make find-

that support a conclusion of discrimination in

hiring beyond 1974. We therefore are remanding to

permit the district court to make findings that

underpin its conclusion that discrimination continued

until 1976, or to modify its conclusion. The

decree, of course, must reflect any alteration that

the district court makes in the ending date for

discrimination at Travenol. We use February 19,

- 107a -

and date of hire is longer than the average

waiting time for white applicants who

applied the same time she did.

[54] Paragraph 1l of the decree provides

that emplayees laid off and awaiting recall

shall be recalled by seniority date, whether

43 The use of con-

actual or constructive.

structive seniority, we find, must go

further than the decree provides to afford

a complete remedy. Under the decree an

employee with normal seniority could fare

better than a class member with equal con-

structive seniority if the employee with

- 108a -

normal seniority has already been recalled

after a layoff while the employee with con-

structive seniority still awaits recall, **

In fact, an employee with normal seniority

may have escaped lay off altogether while a

class member with less normal seniority

(because of a discriminatory delay in hire)

but equal constructive seniority has been

leid off. The decree fails to make whole a

class member in either situation. The

decree therefore must be modified on remand

to allow a class member in either position

to be compensated for lost earnings.

in 1976. Travenol recalled employees in 1977 in

- 109a -

Travenol also challenges two paragraphs

of the decree as to the nature of the relief

granted. Paragraph 10(b) provides for the

establishment of the constructive seniority

date of an employee class member who claims

that her date of hire was discriminatorily

delayed beyond February 19, 1976. Travenol

argues that paragraph 10 denies it the right

to contest a constructive seniority date by

proving that the delay in hire was not dis-

criminatory.

155] ‘The parties agree that an employer must

have the right to prove that an employee is

not entitled to constructive seniority be-

cause her delay in hire was not caused by

discrimination; they disagree whether Para-

graph 10 affords Travenol that right. The

decree now establishes a means of calcu-

lating the presumptive constructive senio-

rity date, then allows iravenol to suggest

an alternative date. To remove any am-

biguity, the district court on remand should

- 110a -

modify paragraph 10 to provide explicitly

that Travenol may dispute a class member's

entitlement to any constructive seniority

at all as well as to suggest a date

different from the presumptive date.

[56] Paragraph 8 provides that Travenol mst

write to all unhired members of the plain-

tiff class Of whom they know, invite them

to reapply for a position, and give them

priority over other applicants. Travenol

contends that Paragraph 8 gives priority to

all applicants, even those rejected for non-

discriminatory reasons, and, therefore,

grants the plaintiff class greater relief

tian it deserves. Travenol also argues that

not all victims of discrimination should be

given hiring priority because Travenol

could not have hired all of them even if it

hired only black females. Travenol must be

‘afforded the right to contest priority by

arguing that an applicant was rejected for

legitimate reasons. In such disputes each

- llla -

applicant class member is entitled to a pre-

sumption that she would have been hired but

for discrimination. The burden will be on

Travenol to prove that it rejected her for

legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons. See

Teamsters, supra, 431 U.S. at 360-62, 97

S.Ct. at 1867-68.

Travenol's additional objection to para-

graph 8, that it grants priority to too many

applicants-discriminatees, is premature.

The Supreme Court noted in Teamsters that

"after the victims have been identified and

their rightful place determined, the

district court will again be faced with the

delicate task of adjusting the remedial in-

terest of discriminatees and the legitimate

expectations of other employees innocent of

any wrongdoing.” 431 U.S. at 372, 97 S.Ct.

at 1873. The district court here will be

faced with the delicate task of determining

to what extent the applicant class members

will be entitled to priority over innocent

- ll2a -

current applicants.

Before the district court balances

these interests, the number of applicant

class members who now seek work at Travenol

must be determined. It is not for us to

place a ceiling on applicant class members

entitled to priority. The district court

must exercise its discretion in this matter

after the facts have been developed more

fully. We note only that the number of

applicants entitled to priority need not

correspond exactly to the number of black

females that Travenol would have hired

absent discrimination.

IV. ATTORNEY'S FEES

Payne requests that we direct an award

of interim attorney's fees. See James v.

Stockham Valves & Fittings Co,, 559 F.2d

310, 358-59 (Sth Cir. 1977). The record

reveals that the district court entered an

interim fee award on December 8, 1976.

This order is not now before us. Requests

- ll3e -

for further interim attorney's fees should

be addressed in the first instance to the

district court.

V. CONCLUSION

In summary, we hold:

I. Our jurisdiction to review this

Title VII interlocutory decree includes the

power to review limitations on the scope of

the class when those limits have been the

basis for granting or withholding injunctive

relief.

II. The district court did not abuse

its discretion in redefining the class to

exclude black males once the sole black °

male plaintiff dropped out of the case, nor

was it obligated to give black males notice

of the redefinition.

III. The district court erred in

setting the opening date of the class.

For the Title VII race and sex claims, the

class should open on October 21, 1969

except as to any claims based upon the

- ll4a -

tenth-grade education requirements. For

Section 1981, the class may open on March

2, 1966, if the district court finds racial

discrimination going back to that date.

IV. We affirm the findings of discrim-

ination: (a) in the hiring of black women,

and (b) in promotions, to the extent that

these findings support challenged portions

of the decree.

V. We remand for the district court

to prepare findings and conclusions on dis-

crimination in hiring on a racial basis

from 1966 to 1969 and from 1975 to February

19, 1976 on the basis of race or sex.

VI. We affirm the denial of injunctive

relief against discrimination: (a) in the

initial assignment of custodians, (b) in

the "bottle stack on, bottle stack off"

position, and (c) in the merit pay system.

VII. We affirm the other parts of the

decree, except in four particulars. First,

paragraph 10(a) must provide for an

- 115a -

opportunity for black females who were hired

before Travenol ceased to discriminate, but

whose date of hire was discriminatorily de-

layed, to claim constructive seniority.

Second, paragraph 11 must be modified to

compensate class members for lost earnings

when layoffs have fallen more heavily on

them than on employees who were not the

subject of discrimination by Travenol.

Third, paragraph 8 must be modified to allow

Travenol to prove that applicant class

members were rejected for legitimate reasons.

Finally, paragraph 10(b) must be modified

to allow Travenol to prove that an operative

class member's date of hire was not delayed

because of discrimination,

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART,

AND REMANDED

GOLDBERG, Circuit Judgé, concurring in

part and dissenting in part:

I am in complete agreement with much of

my brethrens' thorough, scholarly, and

- 1l6a -

meticulous opinion. The Majority has re-

solved many of the complex legal and factual

problems presented by this protracted liti-

gation, setting the stage at long last for

a final resolution of the parties' claims.

However, one aspect of the Majority's Opin-

ion compels my dissent. The Majority has

affirmed the district court's decision to

exclude black males from the plaintiff

class? and to deny them relief, without,

however, permitting notice of their exclu-

sion and in spite of a finding that black

males had been the victims of unlawful dis~-

crimination. I believe that on this record,

denial of relief to black males is funda-

mentally unfair and erroneous as a matter

of law. Therefore, I must respectfully

dissent.

1. Section IIB of the Majority's Opinion

ante slip op. at 1991, at , discusses the ex-

Clusion of black males fram the plaintiff class.

- 1l7a -

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Proceedings in the District Court:

This class action was initially brought

by three named plaintiffs, (two black fe-

males and one black male) on behalf of the

black employees and job applicants at

Travenol Laboratories. Plaintiffs alleged

that the defendant corporation's employment

practices were racially discriminatery and

violative of Title VII.

On November 16, 1972, the trial court

conditionally certified and defined the

plaintiff class to include all black Travenol

employees and job applicants. On May l,

1973, Willie Mae Payne, a black female and a

class representative, amended her complaint

to include charges of gender based discrim-

ination in addition to her original claim

of racial discrimination. The following

week, James Williams, the sole male class

representative, chose to withdraw from the

case, citing “religious views.”

- 118a -

With the addition of the sex discrimina-

tion claim, and with the sole male class re-

presentative out of the case, defendant

Travenol moved that the plaintiff class be

narrowed to include only black females. The

district court was of the opinion that a

conflict between the objectives of black

males and black females might develop in the

litigation and that therefore black females

could not adequately represent black males,

Accordingly, on December 20, 1974, the trial

court conditionally granted defendant's mo-

tion and excluded black males from the

plaintiff class. However, no notice was

ever sent to inform the black male class

members that their named representative had

left the case and that henceforth they would

be excluded from the action.

The case went forward to a trial on the

merits, with the plaintiff class certified

to anclude only black women. Following a

trial on the issue of liability, the

- 119a -

district court made findings of fact and

conclusions of law. The trial court found,

inter alia, that Travenol had been guilty of

both gender and race discrimination in hir-

ing and promotion. Based on the evidence

introduced at trial, the district court

found that black females and black males had

been the victims of unlawful discrimination.

Following the trial, counsel for plain-

tiffs renewed their request that the plain-

tiff class be broadened to once again in-

clude black males. However, in an order

issued December 8, 1976, the trial court re-

affirmed its earlier ruling on class certi-

fication. Citing the supposed conflict be~-

tween the interests of black males and fe-

males, the district court persisted in its

ruling that black females could not adequate-

ly represent a class which included black

males.” Finally, on January 24, 1979, the

2. This ruling was certified for

(footnote continued)

- 120a -

district court entered an order once more

declining to make any change in the plaintiff

class.

B. Plaintiffs" Arguments on Appeal:

Plaintiffs now appeal from the district

court's ruling regarding the scope of the

plaintiff class. Plaintiffs argue: (1)

that the trial court initially erred in

refusing to allow a black female to repre-

sent black males in this class action; (2)

that insofar as the black female class re-

presentatives successfully established that

Travenol had discriminated against both

black females and males, the trial court

erred in its posttrial rulings denying relief

to black males; and (3) that in any event

the trial court erred in refusing to notify

interlocutory review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b),

Howeyer, the Fifth Circuit, by order of February

23, 1977, denied the petition for permission to ap-

peal from the district court's order of December

8, 1976.

- l2la -

absent black male class members that their

sole representative had withdrawn from the

suit and that henceforth <hey would be ex-

cluded from the action.

C. The Majority Opinion:

The Majority holds that the district

court did not abuse its discretion in making

its pretrial decision to exclude black males

from the plaintiff class. The Majority also

holds that the district court was not re-

quired to inform absent class members that

their sole representative had withdrawn from

the action and that henceforth they would be

excluded from the case.

D. This Dissent:

As I have stated at the outset, I enthu-

siastically concur with much of the Major-

ity's careful and thoughtful decision. Thus,

it is only with great hesitation that I must

register my disagreement with one part of

this otherwise exemplary opinion. I believe

the district court committed two analytically

- 122a -

distinct errors in excluding black males

from the plaintiff class. First, the dis-

trict court should not have excluded black

men from a class represented by black women

on the grounds of a potential conflict of

interest which in fact never materialized.

Second, even if the district court was cor-

rect in its theory that black women could

not represent black men, the district court

erred in failing to inform the absent class

members that their sole representative had

withdrawn from the suit and they would be

excluded from the action.

Each of these errors, standing alone,

mandates that the district court's decision

on exclusion of black males be reversed and

remanded with instructions to rectify these

mistakes.

II, EXCLUSION OF BLACK MALES FROM THE

PLAINTIFF CLASS: ANOTHER VIEW

A. The Pretrial Ruling:

The Majority Opinion focuses upon the

- 123a -

district court's pretrial decision to exclude

black men from the plaintiff class. The

Majority treats this decision as one within

the trial court's “discretion" and concludes

that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in excluding black males I do

not believe that the district court's ruling

should be examined under the "abuse of dis-

cretion" standard of review. It is true

that “[w]hen based upon facts adduced at an

evidentiary hearing," a district court's

decision as to the scope of a class is

reviewable only for abuse of discretion.

McGowan v. Faulkner Concrete Pipe Co., 659

F.2d 554, 559 (5th Cir. 1981). However,

class certification decisions made without

the benefit of such a factual record are

accorded less deference. See Geurine vy.

J & W Inv., Inc,, 544 F.2d 863, 864-865 (5th

Cir. 1977);. Jones v. Diamond, 519 F.2d 1090,

1099 (5th Cir. 1975); Boggs v. Alto Trailer

Sales, Inc., 511 F.2d 114, 117 (5th Cir. 1975.

- 124a -

In this case, the district court did

not consider any testimony or evidence bear-

ing on the existence of an actual antagonism

between male and female class members. Be-

cause the trial court did not rely upon live

testimony or evidence, we can only assume

that the trial court was of the opinion that

there was an inherent conflict between the

interests of black males and females and

that a black female could not adequately

3. ee Sees OS Cees se

conflict abstractly, the court must examine the

interlacing allegations of race and sex discrimina-

tion to determine whether an actual conflict exists."

Ante, .lip op. at 1993-1994, at - - Dis-

trict courts considering the problem of mixed race

ly held that a conflict of interest is not inherent,

but is a question of fact to be determined through

Mathcad Bane Of Bellas 83 FAB AI0y 434-

-D. Tex., ; v. Arkansas Blue Cross

& Blue Shield, 87 F.R.D. E.D.Ark. 1980); Hammonds

Vv. , 87 F.R.D. 600 (W.D. Miss. [sic] 1980)?

v. Simon, 86 F.R.D, 375 (N.D.I11. 1980).

No such evidentiary hearing was held in this case.

Thus, the factual record was not sufficiently de-

veloped to support a finding of an actual conflict

which would justify exclusion of black males.

- 125a -

represent black males during any phase of

the trial. I believe that this was a con-

clusion of law, and is reviewable as such,

The trial court's decision to exclude

black men was based on a mere hypothesis

that a conflict might develop between male

and female class members if females were al-

lowed to compete with males for the better

paying jobs of material handler. This is

not a case where the testimony of the named

plaintiffs revealed identifiable antagonism

toward other class members. “

Thus, I believe

that this is a case of mere possible and

not actual conflict.

Not only was this a case of mere poten-

tial conflict, upon careful examination it

4. a a eR

Cross & Blue T -R.D. ° °

1980) (black female plaintiff's testimony reveals

that other female employees were beneficiaries or

perpetuators of discrimination); Hammons v. polger

Coffee, Inc., 87 F.R.D. 600 (W.D.Mo.

female plaintiffs’ allegations that other femle

employees were promoted over her reflected actual

- 126a -

is clear that the conflict itself is in

large part illusory, since the district

court's fear of potential conflict among

class members was premised upon an erroneous

understanding of Title VII law.

In ruling that black men would be ex-

cluded from the plaintiff class, the dis-

trict court reasoned that plaintiffs would

try to prove at trial that women were dis-

proportionally excluded from the better-pay-

ing material handler jobs. Therefore, the

court concluded, women could not represent

any black males ... "who may have an interest

in retaining their jobs as materiai handlers."

(Emphasis added) ante, slip op. at 1991, n.8,

at__,n.8. The trial court apparently as-

sumed that black women plaintiffs would seek

to take material handler jobs away from

black men who held those positions. This

assumption is incorrect. A remedial order

could only affect future job placements; it

could not remove incumbent material handlers

- 127a -

from their jobs. See United States v. Hayes

International Corporation, 456 F.2d 112, 118

(Sth Cir. 1972); Local 189, United Papermak.

& Paperwork v. U. S., 416 F.2d 980, 988-989

(Sth Cir. 1969).° ‘Thus, there would be no

conflict between the interests of black fe-

males who might seek future positions as

material handlers and that of black males

already holding the jobs.

In fact, the only potential conflict I

can find in this case is that of compet’ ion

between black males and females seeking ma-

terial handler jobs. However, the "con-

flict” among these class members is indis-

tinguishable from the conflicts inherent in

5. ea eS eee & Paperwork

v. U. S., oinintiere’ eros VII case, this Court

rejected argurent that blacks should

Shamhdas chitis tncuadianlis tim hal Sehee to vd

blacks were entitled. The Court adopted instead the

they would have occupied but for wrongful discrimina-

tion." James 3. Stockham Valves & Fittings Oo.,

559 F.2d 310, 356 (5th Cir. 1977).

- 128a -

any Title VII class action. Whenever a Title

VII plaintiff class prevails, the class mem-

bers are thrown into competition with one

another, as well as with non-class members,

for a limited number of jobs. However, as

the Majority acknowledges, this Court has

consistently rejected the contention that

job competition among class members creates

a conflict sufficient to defeat class certi-

fication under F.R.Civ.P. Rule 23. See,

ante, slip. op. at 1992, n.10, at P

a)

n.10. To hold otherwise would effectively

- 129a -

destroy the class action as a procedural

device for enforcing Title VII rights, for

it is impossible to imagine a Title VII Glass

action that does not involve a potential

conflict among class members at the relief

stage of the litigation. ’

The inevitability of vonflict among

Title VII class members over forms of relief

should not be a cause for alarm. Rather

than dictating the downfall of class actions,

rict court and endorsed by the majority, Willie

Mae

- 130a -

such conflict has given rise to the bifur-

cated Title VII suit. In a bifurcated Title

VII action, such as the instant case, there

is a trial phase followed by a remedial phase.

At the trial stage, the defendant's liability

to the class as a whole is adjudicated by the

class representative; whereas at the remedial

stage, the class members' claims for back pay,

constructive seniority, and preferential hir-

ing are resolved on an individual basis. As

Judge Medina explained in that granddaddy of

all class actions, Eisen v. Carlisle &

Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 556 (2d Cir. 1968):

"Potential rivalry between class

members after an initial finding of

liability can be adequately handled

since the rule [Rule 23] gives a court

the power to divide the class into

appropriate subclasses or to require

the members to bring individual suits

for damages."

Competition among class members for limited

jobs will not affect the adequacy of re-

presentation at the initial liability stage

of the trial, since the class representative

- l3la -

is concerned with establishing a general

right to relief on behalf of all class

members. Once the class representative

proves that defendant's practices violated

Title VII, each individual class member may

come forward to establish his or her right

to back pay, constructive seniority or

preferential hiring. Conflicting interests

among class members, i.e. competition for

the same job, are taken into account in

formulating relief. Thus, competition among

class members can be handled on a case-by-

case basis. In a bifurcated Title VII suit,

such competition at the relief stage need not

detract from the named plaintiff's ability

to adequately represent all class members at

the liability stage.

In fact, it is only through the pro-

cedural device of a class action that the

competing claims of Title VII plaintiffs can

be equitably resolved. The very purpose of

- 132a -

a class action is to gather before the court

all parties entitled to relief. When all

are assembled, the court can distribute re-

lief fairly among the class members rather

than awarding relief to any one plaintiff at

the expense of other similarly injured indi-

viduals. See “Developments in the Law---

Class Actions," 89 Harv.L.Rev. 1318, 1366-

1367 (1976) (discussing the “limited fund"

theory of class actions).

As will be discussed more fully infra,

the district court in this case specifically

found that black males, as well as females,

were the victims of unlawful discrimination.

However, as a consequence of the Majority's

decision, the Magistrate is now actually

forbidden to consider the interests of black

men in designing those portions of his pro-

posed order which deal with individualized

relief. Because all the parties entitled

8. In his Report and Recommendation, the

Magistrate notes that he is bound by the court's

(footnote continued)

- 133a -

to relief were not gathered together in this

one action, the trial court is now unable to

equitably distribute the limited available

relief in the remedial phase of the litiga-

tion.”

Finally, the Majority justifies the ex-

clusion of black males from the class as

necessary to vindicate the black males’ right

to be represented with "undivided loyalty"

by "a class representative who is free from

a desire to prove a claim that will impair

their interests." Ante slip op. at 1994, at

The Platonic ideal of adequate represen-

tation is realized when one attorney zealous-

ly represents the individual interests of

definition of the plaintiff class in awarding indi-

vidualized relief.

9. oS ee at

1476-1477. of class members con-

- 134a -

one client. Every class action is necessari-

ly a departure from this ideal. In a class

action, attorneys advocate several interests

which are common to all class members. There-

fore, no one class member's interests are

ever represented with “undivided loyalty":

counsel's loyalty is necessarily owed to the

goals shared by the class as a whole.

Under this system of advocacy, there is

always the danger that a class attorney will

not urge all class members’ interests with

equal vigor. This possibility exists even

in the most homogeneous of classes. For

instance, as a matter of trial strategy, an

attorney may choose to press the claims

which are easiest or least expensive to prove,

10 Or, - attorney may advo-

cate the named plaintiff's interests more

ignoring others.

strongly than the interests of absentees . ++

10. See generzilly Crowley, supra at 676-677.

ll. See e.g. Gonzales v. — ay eal

continued)

* 135a -

However, the ever-present possibility of less

than vigorous representation of some class

members' claims has not necessitated abandon-

ment of the class action as a procedural

device for vindicating rights. Instead, the

trial judge presiding over a class action is

charged with the @uty to protect the inter-

ests of absentees by monitoring the adequacy

with which their interests are represented

throughout the litigation. If at trial the

class attorney does not fulfill his or her

duty to adequately represent all class inter-

ests, the trial court may at that time de-

certify the class. Ante slip op. at 1994,

at .

In this case, pllaimtiffs' attorneys

sought to prove both race and sex discrimina-

tion. Of course, there was a possibility

that counsel might concentrate on proving

(Sth Cir. 1973) (class attorney failed to appeal

a

- 136a -

sex discrimination, leaving the class

members’ race discrimination claims to lan-

guish unproven. In that event, it would be

the trial court's duty to decertify the

class, so that black men would not be bound

by the judgment. However, until class

counsel actually proved, by their trial per~

formance, that they would not represent both

race and sex claims with equal vigor, there

was no inherent reason to assume inadequate

representation of black males' interests.

Moreover, I fail to see how a black fre-

male class representative had any desire to

prove a claim that would impair the interests

of black males, as the Majority implies.

True, female plaintiffs sought to prove that

they were denied material handler positions

12 But Semales

on the basis of their sex.

- 137a -

also sought to prove that all blacks, male

and female, were discriminated against on

the basis of race in both hiring and assign-

ments. Even if it were established that

black females were doubly disadvantaged on

the basis of both race and sex, it would not

follow that females were thereby entitled to

“double relief." Instead, both black men

and women would be entitled to the same

relief. Under Title VII, black males and

females would lave a right to remedies, such

as back pey and constructive seniority, suf-

ficient to compensate them for periods of

time in which they were denied jobs they

would have occupied but for discrimination,

@ither race or gender-based. See note 5,

supre. Surely, female class members are not

entitled to more back pay or seniority be-

cause defemdant discriminated against them

on two of the grounds proscribed by Title

discrimination claim obviously cowld not impair the

interests of black males,

- 138a -

VII, rather than just one. Therefore, I do

not see how females’ claims of sex discrimi-

nation could impair the interests of black

males.

I do not take the position that there

could never be a case in which proof of some

Class members’ claims might impair the

interests of others. When one group of class

members seeks relief which is substantively

different from that sought by the class rep-

resentative, the named plaintiff is not an

adequate representative for the dissenting

group's interests. An example is provided

by school desegregation class actions, in-

volving groups of black parents who are

opposed to the relief sought by the class

representative. While the class representa-

tive typically seeks desegregation through

busing, the dissenting group may oppose

busing and advocate instead other court-

ordered programs which focus on educational

improvement. See, e.g., Tasby v. Wright,

- 138aa -

520 F. Supp. 683, 732-733 (N.D. Tex. 1981).

See generally Bell, "Serving Two Masters:

Integration Ideals and Client Interests

in School Desegregation Litigation," 85

Yale L.J. 740 (1976). Under these circum-

stances, dissenting groups should be allowed

to intevene in order to urge their separate

interests. See Tasby v. Wright, supra at

689-90.

- 139a -

The case of Bailey v. Ryan Stevedoring

Co., Inc., 528 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1976) is

illustrative of a fundamental conflict among

class members over the relief sought in an

action brought to redress Title VII viola-

tions. In Bailey, three blacks brought a

class action seeking inter alia an injunction

ordering integration of racially segregated

local stevedoring unions. 204 of the 280

members of the black union signed a petition

stating they did not wish the named plain-

tiffs to represent them, since the union

members did not want to dilute their strength

by integrating with a white local. Bailey v.

Ryan Stevedoring Co., Inc., supra at 553,

Accordingly, this Circuit upheld the district

court's decision to deny class certifica-

tion on the grounds that the three named

plaintiffs could not adequately represent

the majority of class members' interests.

14.

- 140a -

In this case, there was no such conflict

of interest over the fundamental goals of

the litigation. Both black men and women

sought to establish that defendant Travenol's

employment practices violated Title VII,

Both black men and women sought injunctive

relief prohibiting further illegal practices,

as well as individual relief to compensate

for past instances of discrimination.

In sum, the district court erred in

holding that, as a matter of law, the "in-

herent" conflictsof interest between black

male and female class members rendered the

latter inadequate representatives of the

former's interests. Conflicts of interest

between class members for a limited "fund"

of relief are inherent in every Title VII

Class action. Also inherent in the class

action system of advocacy is the possibility

that class counsel might not represent all

claims with equal vigor. If these types of

conflicts sufficed to defeat

- l4la -

class certification, there could be no class

actions. However, instead of soundine the

death knell for this useful procedural device,

the courts have developed new doctrines to

protect class members from conflicts which

could be inimical to their interests. A

duty has developed upon the trial court to

monitor the adequacy with which all class

members' interests are represented through-

out the trial. If conflicts in fact develop,

the trial court may create sub-classes,

allow intervention, or in extreme cases, de-

certify the class. But exclusion of black

males from the class in this case surely

cannot be justified on the basis of the

precise type of inter-class conflict which

is inherent, but tolerated, in every Title

VII class action.

There was no disagreement between black

men and women as to the outcome of this case:

both groups sought to prove that defendant

- 142a -

had discriminated against them in violation

of Title VII; and that accordingly, they

were entitled to appropriate relief. There

Was no reason, based on the law in this

Circuit, why a black female could not rep-

resent all black employees in their mutual

jihad against Travenol Laboratories.

B. The Post-Trial Exclusion of Black

Males From the Plaintiff Class:

The district court justified its pre-

trial decision to exclude black males from

the plaintiff class on the grounds that a

conflict of interest might develop during

litigation. For the reasons I have set forth

in Part IIA, I believe that this decision

was erroneous “®s a matter of law. However,

whatever justification there might be for the

pretrial class certification decision, the

trial court's post-trial order denying relief

to black males cannot be sustained.

In considering the class representatives'

claims that defendant Travenol discriminated

- 143a -

on the basis of both race and sex, the dis-

trict court necessarily reviewed evidence

bearing on the effect of Travenol's policies

on blacks. However, the district court did

not confine itself to an examination of

evidence bearing upon discrimination against

black women. Instead, the court specifically

found that Travenol's hiring policies, educa-

tional requirements, failure to post job

vacancies, and system of promotion adversely

13

affected all blacks, In some cases, the

findings were actually broken down to show

the specific effect of discriminatory poli-

14

cies on black men, Thus, although black

failure to notice of vacancies impedes the

access of the company's black to the better

peyton tnt save Seated ee x Travenol

Inc., 416 F.Supp.

ie eer i Ny, Scenatint chasm aatisherte tie

tend to perpetuate the past discrimination suffered

a ‘(egtasis eg)

supra at 261; (emphasis added) ,

14. The district court found that as a result

of defendant's hiring policies, in February, 1969,

",..82% of the male operatives [at the Travenol

plant] were white while 89% of the female operatives

(footnote continued)

- 144a -

males were excluded by pretrial order from

the class of plaintiffs bringing this action,

the district court proceeded to try the case

and make findings predicated on the assump-

tion that black men were properly included

in the class. In doing so, the district

judge quite properly exercised his duty to

monitor the class representative and to

protect the interests of absentees.

After trial, however, the district

judge refused to modify his original defini-

tion of the class.*> Instead of redefining

were white." v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc.,

416 F.Supp. , . eee .

male operati were white and 82.8% of the female

- 145a -

the class to include black males, the

district judge, in his Order of December 8,

1976, reiterated the class definition given

in his pretrial order, without, however,

providing any new explanation for this

16 In view of the district court's

decision.

finding that black males had indeed been the

victims of unlawful racial discrimination,

the December 8, 1976 decision was complete-

ly unjustified and should be reversed.

The district court's rationale for

continuing to exclude black males from tl..

plaintiff class even after trial was that

who are entitled to participate in the back pay award

and other related relief to be afforded members of

the class," in spite of his findings that defendants'

hiring and promotion policies discriminated against

all blacks, including black men.

Bae

“f d

t

i

rf

li

+

|

rf

|

- 146a -

there existed a potential conflict of inter-

est between black females and black males.

In this case, to paraphrase an old adage,

the proof of plaintiff's ability to represent

the interests of black males was in the repre-

sentation thereof. Clearly, any potential

conflicts at the relief stage of the litiga-

tion did not hinder plaintiffs’ counsel from

presenting sufficient evidence of discrimina-

tion against black men to support the district

court's findings that black men as well as

women were victims of defendant's discrinm

inatory hiring policies. What more should

be required to sustain a finding that the

interests of black males had been adequately

represented for the purposes of Rule 23?

Based on the district court's own find-

ings following the trial on the merits, its

post-trial order excluding black males from

the plaintiff class compels reversal.

- 147a -

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO

NOTIFY ABSENT CLASS MEMBERS THAT THEY

WOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM THE ACTION

The district court believed that in

this case black women could not adequately

represent the interests of black men. Only

one of the three original black plaintiffs

was male, a Mr. James Williams. Thus, Mr.

Williams was, in the eyes of the trial court,

the sole representative of the absent black

male class members.

In May 1973, Mr. Williams chose to

withdraw from the lawsuit, citing his

“religious views." As far as the trial court

was concerned, without Mr. Williams there was

no one to represent the interests of absent

black male members of the plaintiff class.

Therefore, when Mr. Williams voluntarily

chose to withdraw his racial discrimination

claim, the absent male class members were

left without a representative and wane.

upon the defendant's motior, excluded from

the lawsuit.

- 148a -

Once the district court had made it

clear that it considered Mr. Williams to

have been the sole adequate representative

of the black male class members, plaintiffs'

counsel requested that the absent class

members be informed of the fact that their

sole representative had decided to drop his

claim. However, the trial court refused to

17 + believe

allow the requested notice.

that this was error and that the district

court should have allowed notice for the

absent male class members, informing them

that their representative had decided to

drop his (and their) action.

F,R.Civ.P. 23(e) provides that "..,

a class action shall not be dismissed or

- 149a -

compromised without the approval of the

Court, and notice of the proposed dismissal

shall be given to all members of the class..."

(emphasis added). One “purpose of [Rule

23(e)] is to protect the nonparty members of

the class ... when the representatives become

fainthearted before the action is adjudicated.”

Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Pro-

cedure § 1797. I believe that there is no

question but that the mandatory notice re-

quirement of Rule 23(e) was triggered in

this case and that the trial court erred in

failing to provide notice to the soon-to-be-

excluded absentee class members.

Once a plaintiff class has been certi-

fied, the provisions of Rule 23(e) become

applicable.* As the Majority correctly

18. It has been held that notice to absent

class members is mandatory even when the class rep-

- 150a -

notes, ante, slip op. at 1995 at , the

notice requirement set forth in Rule 23(e)

is mandatory. Sagers v. Yellow Freight Sys-

tems, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 686 (N.D.Ge. 1975);

Duncan v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,

66 F.R.D. 615 (E.D.Wis.1975); Rotzenburg v.

Neenah Joint School District, 64 F.R.D. 181

(E.D.Wis. 1974); Muntz v- Ohio Screw Products,

61 F.R.D. 396 (N.D.Ohio 1973); Washington v.

Wyman, 54 F.R.D. 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) .

42 F.R.D. 324, 326 (E.D.Pa. 1967). However, there

is same counter authority. See, e.g., Shelton v.

Inc., 582 F.2d 1298 (4th Cir. 1978); Roper v.

, 661 F.2d 655 (7th Cir.

1981) (nile 25Te) Is Inegelicable prior to certifice-

Clause of the Fifth Amendment mandates notice to

putative class members). It is therefore important

to note that from Novenber 17, 1972, until December

20, 1974, black males were indeed members of the

certified plaintiff class. There may be same ques-

tion as to whether Rule 23(e) applies when a repre-

sentative chooses to withdraw te certification

Actions, 89 Harv.L.Rev. 1318, 1542 n.32 (1976).

- 15la -

However, the Majority has asserted that Mr.

Williams' witidrawal as class representative

and the resultant exclusion of black males

from the plaintiff class did not constitute

a "dismissal" within the meaning of Rule

23(e). Ante, slip op. at 1995, n.14, at

, n.l4. Thus, the Majority concludes

that Mr. Williams' departure and the exclu-

sion of black males did not trigger the

19

mandatory notice requirenent,. I must take

if the class representative invokes it. In a case

- 152a -

exception to this conclusion. When Mr.

Williams withdrew from the action, his depart-

ure was arranged through the use of F.R.Civ.P.

21 (motion to drop a party). However, it is

clear that "... the parties [should] not be

allowed to circumvent [Rule 23(e)] simply by

Classifying a dismissal as a motion to drop

one or more parties under Rule 21; the court

is obliged to determine if the change in

parties will affect the rights of the other

class members so that notice of the motion

should be given.” Wright & Miller, 7A

Federal Practice and Procedure § 1797. 7°

20. For the purpose of Rule 23(e), dropping a

party pursuant to Rule 21 is the functional equiva-

sr the to remaining plaintiffs are alequte Fep"

resentatives of absent class members' interests

Rule 23(e) notice is not required). Similarly,

- @ropping a class action claim pursuant to Rule 15(a)

will trigger the Rule 23(e) notice requirenent,

McArthur v. Southern Inc., 556 F.2d 298 .

Gth Cir. 1977), vac: on other grounds, 569 F.2d 276

Tfootnote continued)

- 153a -

Rule 23(e) is designed to serve at least

two important purposes. First, it protects

absent class members who may be relying upon

the pendency of a class action from being

prejudiced if their named representative

should choose to drop his (and their) action.

Second, the Rule is a prophylactic device,

a safeguard designed to discourage collusion. “4

Without Rule 23(e) class action defendants

might seek to "buy off" class representatives

in an effort to "turn off" a class action. 4

(Sth Cir. 1978), Moreover, when the scope of a pro-

posed plaintiff class is to be narrowed, and many of

those once in the class are to be excluded, Rule 23

notice is required. Foss v. Warner, 90 F.R.D. 85

(S.D.N.Y. 1978); Turoff v. Union Oil Co. of California,

61 F.R.D. 51 (N.D. Ghio 1973).

21. ‘The rule is in part intended to prevent

collusion, however it is not necessary to demonstrate

collusion in order to trigger the notification re-

quirement. 23(e) isa

quirement. ° 23(0) is & per se rule wich requires

tive plaintiff chooses to voluntarily withdraw his

- 154a -

Without in any way questioning the piety

or sincerity of the named plaintiff who chose

to withdraw from this case, we must recognize

that his fortuitous departure from the law-

suit did result in the exclusion of all black

males from the plaintiff class---a valuable

hoon to defendants. Thus, one can readily

see the grave potential for abuse which will

follow from the Majority's holding that Rule

23(e) notice is not required in a case such

as this. Under the rule set forth by the

Majority, future class action defendants may

be tempted to quietly secure the withdrawal

of the named class representative and thereby.

"turn off" the class action. If, as the

Majority holds, Rule 23(e) can be ignored,

there will be nothing to prevent such collu-

sion.

Although the Majority holds that Rule

23(e) is inapplicable in this case, ante at

"selling out" their fellow class members. Burks v.

Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 99 S.Ct. 1831, 1841, nl6, 60

[.Bd.2a 404 (1979).

- 155a -

19, n.14, the Majority does indicate that if

the absent class members were aware "of their

initial inclusion in the plaintiff class,

had relied on the class suit to protect

their rights, and would be prejudiced as a

practical matter by exclusion from the class,"

notice would indeed be mandatory. Ante slip

op. at 1996, at - However, the Ma-

jority concludes that because “there is no

showing that black males relied to their

detriment” on their provisional inclusion in

the class, notice of their exclusion was not

required. Ante slip op. at 1996, at__.

As the Majority suggests, there is some

authority for the proposition that 23(e) no-

tice need not be provided if the trial court

determines that the absent class members

have not detrimentally relied upon their

inclusion in the class. See, e.g., Roper v.

Consurve, 578 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1978);

Wallican v. Waterloo, 80 F.R.D. 492 (N.D.

Iowa 1978); Berse v. Berman, 60 F.R.D. 414

- 156a -

(S.D.N.¥. 1973); Elias v. National Car Rental,

59 F.R.D. 276 (D.Minn. 1973). But see, e.g.,

Rotzenburg v. Neenah Joint School District,

64 F.R.D. 181 (E.D,Wis. 1974); Muntz v. Ohio

Screw Products, 61 F,R.D. 396 (N.D.Ohio 1973).

However, in those cases where district courts

have seen fit to dispense with the 23(e)

notice requirement, they have done so only

after making a specific finding of fact con-

cerning the question of whether absent class

members may have detrimentally relied upon

their inclusion in the plaintiff class. In

each of these cases, the district court

recognized its affirmative duty to safeguard

the interests of absent class members. If

the court determined that absent class

members may have detrimentally relied upon

inclusion in the plaintiff class, notice was

ordered. See e.g., Rotzenburg v. Neenah

Joint School District, supra; Ross v.

Warner, 80 F.R.D. 88 (S.D.N.Y¥. 1978); Muntz

v. Ohio Screw Products, 61 F.R.D. 396

- 157a -

(N.D.Ohio 1973). Only if the court speci-

fically found that absent class members

could not have detrimentally relied was the

Rule 23(e) notice dispensed with. See, e.g.,

Elias v. National Car Rental Systems, Inc.,

59 F.R.D. 276 (D.Minn, 1973); Wallican v.

Waterloo, 80 F.R.D. 492 (N.D.Iowa 1978).

In the instant case, however, the dist-

rict court completely ignored its responsi-

bilities under Rule 23(e). The trial court

summarily rejected the request that the

black male class members be notified, see

note 17, supra, making no inquiry or determi-

nation as to whether the soon-to-be-excluded

class members may have detrimentally relied

upon their initial inclusion in the plain-

tiff class. I believe that this was error.

If a plaintiff representative voluntarily

takes action which will result in absent

class members being denied relief, Rule 23(e)

requires that the absent class members be

notified. Although there is some authority

- 158a -

for the proposition that such notice is

unnecessary if it is determined that absent

class members have not detrimentally relied

upon their initial inclusion in the plaintiff

class, notice can be dispensed with only if

the trial court determines that as a factual

matter absent class members did not detri-

mentally rely upon their initial inclusion,

In this case, no such finding was ever made.

The Majority seems to suggest that be-

cause black male class members were never

formally notified of their inclusion in the

plaintiff class, they therefore could not

have relied upon the pendency of the class

action. However, in many reported cases,

district courts have ordered 23(e) notice

to absent class members even though the ab-

sentees never received formal written notice

of their initial inclusion in the plaintiff

class. See, e.g., Rotzenburg v. Neenah

Joint School District, supra. Washington v.

Wyman, supra; Muntz v. Ohio Screw Products,

- 159a -

supra; Ross v. Warner, supra. Although the

absent class members in this case may never

have received formal written notice of their

inclusion in the plaintiff class, we cannot

just assume that they were unaware of the

existence of this action. The record indi-

cates that Travenol Laboratories was the

major employer in a small Mississippi town.

Thus, many of the absent class members might

well have learned of the pendency of this

suit by word of mouth.

In this case, Rule 23(e) notice was re-

quired because "[c]lass members ... may

have relied upon informal publicity about

the existence of the class suit and ab-

stained from filing individual or class

claims.... If a class member learned that

a suit had been filed, but not that it had

been terminated, he might lose his claim."

Developments, supra at 1541. Thus, I believe

that,

- 160a -

"[Mjany of the ... abandoned ...

class members may have received actual

notice of the suit ... through pub-

licity ... and were perhaps deterred

from instituting their own suits in

reliance on their membership. Equity

dictates that these possible litigants

not forfeit their rights for lack of

knowledge that they [were] once again

on their own.

Ross v. Warner, supra at 91.

The Majority has also noted that because

there had been “no showing" of detrimental

reliance on the part of absentees, 23(e)

no**-e was not required. Ante slip op. at

1996, at__—. «=The Majority seems to

suggest it was the plaintiff's burden to

establish that absent class members had

detrimentally relied upon their initial

inclusion in the »vlaintiff class. Of course,

this cannot be tte rule. Rule 23(e) is

designed to prot :ct absent class members

from collusion or abandonment by their own

representatives. Certainly the representa-

tive parties cannot be relied upon to

establish that 23(e) notice is required.

- 16la -

Rather, it is the trial court's affirmative

duty as monitor and guardian for the inter-

ests of absent class members to determine

whether Rule 23(e) notice is necessary.

Whenever a representative plaintiff

voluntarily chooses to take action which

will result in the denial of relief to

absent class members, Rule 23(e) notice is

required:

"By asserting a representative

role on behalf of the alleged class,

[the named plaintiff] voluntarily

accepted a fiduciary obligation to-

wards the members of the putative

Class they thus have undertaken to

represent. They may not abandon the

fiduciary role they assumed at will

or by agreement ... if prejudice +6

the members of the class they claimed

to represent would result..."

Shelton v. Pargo, 582 F.2d 1298 (4th Cir.

1978).

"... having nominated themselves

as class representatives, both plain-

tiff and his counsel have undertaken

responsibilities, and triggered

possible consequences, that may not

now be erased by routine acceptance

of the resignation they now tender."

Rothman v. Gould, 52 F.R.D. 494, 496

- 162a -

(S.D.N.Y. 1971).

As Judge Clark, a member of this Majority,

noted in an earlier case,

"dismissal or romise of the

class suit may be detr tal to those

persons who relied upon the class suit

as the primary means of vindicating

their legal claims ... Dismissal of

the class suit without notice may

result in absentee class members'

losing their claims entirely if they

subsequently fail to file individual

claims."

McArthur v. Southern Airways, Inc., 556 F.2d

298 (Sth Cir. 1977) vac. on other grounds.

569 F.24 276 (Sth Cir. 1978).7°

If, as the Majority contends, black

women could not adequately represent the

interests of black men, then Mr. Williams

was the sole representative of the black

male members of the plaintiff class. As we

know, Mr. Williams chose to withdraw from this

action. Once the district court aoternined

23. Although McArthur v. Southern ’

Inc. is

OP Rapepdape ypdioe. yn deny podheollh

reasoning and analysis.

- 163a -

that Williams' departure would result in the

exclusion of all black males from the plain-

tiff class, the court was duty bound to

inform the absent class members of the fact

that their sole representative had dropped

his (and their) claims. In refusing to

allow such notice, the district court clearly

failed in its role as guardian of the inter-

ests of the absent class members. This was

not a matter of discretion. Rule 23(e)

reguired that notice be sent.

IV. PARTING ADMONITIONS

It has not been my intent, in setting

forth my reasons for this dissent, to attempt

an exhaustive analysis of Title VII law. I

wish merely to sound a note of alarm at the

result reached by the Majority as to black

males’ exclusion from the class. There is

enough in the district court's findings to

indicate that black males have been discri-

_minated against in violation of Title VII.

kocordingly, black men are entitled to such

- 164a -

relief as will give them their just and

equitable place in the industrial orbit of

Travenol's Cleveland, Mississippi plant.

Certainly, they should not have been excom-

municated from this lawsuit without notice

and left to languish in industria’ purgatory.

As a result of the Majority's commenda-

ble reasoning in regard to other aspects of

class certification, this case must now be

remanded to allow the inclusion of new

members in the plaintiff class. See ante,

Section IIC. Thus, there is no reason to

suppose that adding black males to the plain-

tiff class will involve any further trespass

on the court's time and resources. Even if

we were to find that a new trial is required

in order to allow black men to prove their

Claims of racial discrimination, this fact

would not justify denial of relief. It is

true that in some cases, justice delayed is

justice denied. But on these facts, another

apothegm is appropriate: justice takes

- 165a -

precedence over the seccnds on a clock. Con-

siderations of time cannot be more important

than the imperative to compensate victims of

illegal conduct.

I, like my brethren, am mindful of the

fact that this case comes to us nearly a

decade old. See ante at 2. There is the

danger that Payne v. Travenol Laboratories,

Inc. will become another “judicial paleo-

lithic museum piece." Pettway v. American

Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1168 (5th

Cir. 1978) .4 Nevertheless, I believe my

position in that earlier case is as valid

today as it was then: we should "remain

mindful that the Court must not diverge

from the direction chartered for us by the

Title VII compass, no matter how long and

difficult the journey ."*>

24. At the time Pettway was so labeled, it

was before this Court for the fourth time in

thirteen years.

25. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Oo.,

See.

-166a -

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

WILLIE MAE PAYNE et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees

and Cross-Appellants,

Vv.

TRAVENOL LABORATORIES, INC.

and BAXTER LABORATORIES, INC.,

Defendants-Appellants

and Cross~-Appellees.

No. 80-3764

ON PETITIONS FOR REHEARING AND

SUGGESTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC

(Opinion April 22, 1982, 5 Cir. 1982,

F.2d ) (July 6, 1982)) ern

Before CLARK, Chief Judge, GOLDBERG

and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The Petitions for Rehearing are DENIED

and the Court having been polled at the

request of one of the members of the Court

and a majority of the Circuit Judges who

are in regular active service not having

voted in favor of it, (Rule 35 Federal Rules

of Appellate Procedure; Local Fifth Circuit

~

-167a -

Rule 16) the Suggestions for Rehearing En

Banc are also DENIED.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT:

/s/ 3.8. Williams

United States Circuit Judge

~168a-

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI

DELTA DIVISION

(Caption Omitted in Printing)

Order

Pursuant to the Memorandum of Decision this day re-

leased in the above numbered and captioned action, it is

ORDERED :

1) That the motion of defendants to dismiss and/or for

summary judgment shall be, and the same hereby is, in

all respects overruled and denied;

2) That the motion of defendants for an order defining

and limiting the class which plaintiffs may represent in

the action sub judice shall be, and the same hereby is,

denied and overruled;

3) That the motion of plaintiffs to certify this action as

a proper class action pursuant to Rule 23(c)(1), F. R. Civ.

P. shall be, and the same hereby is, sustained;

4) That the class to be represented by the plaintiffs

herein shall be, and the same hereby is, initially defined

as,

All present, past and future black employees and all

past and future black applicants for employment at

the facility operated by defendants, or either of them,

at Cleveland, Mississippi, subject, however, to this

limitation, that is to say, al) black employees of de-

fendants and all black applicants for employment at

said facility, prior to March 3, 1970 are excluded from

the class.

5) That the portion of this order defining the class

which may be represented by plaintiffs in this action is

-169a-

conditional and the court reserves the right to alter or

amend the same at any time and on as many occasions

as the court may find proper before the decision on the

merits, and to create such subclasses as the evidence re-

ceived, or to be received, in this action may require.

This, the 16th day of November, 1972,

/s/ Onma R. Surre

United States District Judge

~170a-

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI

DELTA DIVISION

(Caption Omitted .n Printing)

Order

The matters determined herein having been fully briefed

and orally agued by the parties and the Court being fully

advised in the premises, it is hereby

ORDERED :

1) That the motion of plaintiffs and plaintiff-interven-

ors to amend the time limitations in the initial definition

of the racial class filed September 20, 1973 shall be, and

the same hereby is, denied and overruled;

2) That the motior of plaintiffs and plaintiff-interven-

ors to define the sex class filed November 12, 1974 shall

be, and the same hereby is, denied and overruled;

3) That the motion of defendants to redefine the class

filed November 1, 1974 shall be, and the same hereby is,

granted and sustained;

4) That the class to be represented by plaintiffs and

plaintiff-intervenors herein shall be, and the same hereby

is, defined as,

All present, past, and future black female employees

and all present, past and future black female appli-

eants for employment at the facility sperated by the

defendants at Cleveland, Mississippi, subject, however,

to this limitation, that is to say, all black female ap-

plicants for employment at said facility prior to March

3, 1970, and all black female employees whose em-

ployment terminated prior to March 3, 1970, are ex-

cluded from the class; the class shall be subject to

the further limitation that all black female applicants

-l7la-

who lack a tenth grade education or equivalency or

who were not referred for employment at the Cleve-

land facility by the Mississippi State Employment

Service during the period such referral was required,

are excluded from the class.

5) That the portion of this Order defining the class

which may be represented by piaintiffs and plaintiff-inter-

venors in this action is conditional and the Court reserves

the right to alter or amend the same at any time and on

as many occasions as the Court may find proper before

the decision on the merits, and to create such subclasses

as the evidence received, or to be received, in this action

may require.

6) That the plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenors give the

best notice practicable of this Order to each person whom

they claim to be within the definition of the class as set

forth in Paragraph 4 of this Order. Said notice shall be

given by first class mail, postage prepaid, no later than

January 1, 1975, to each such person whose name and

address is known to plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenors or

to their counsel, or whose identity can be ascertained with

reasonable effort through the inspection of defendants’

files. Notice to such persons whose names and addresses

are unknown to plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenors or to

their counsel and whose identities cannot be ascertained

by reasonable effort, shall be given by publication of no-

tice three (3) times in three (3) consecutive weeks in The

Bolivar Commercial News, the first publication to be made

no later than January 1, 1975. Both individual and public

notice shall be in the forms which are attached to this

Order as Exhibits A and B and which are hereby ap-

proved by the Court.

7) On or before March 1, 1975, counsel for plaintiffs

and plaintiff-intervenors, after consultation with counsel

for defendants and after obtaining any necessary informa-

"7

-172a-

tion from the Clerk of this Court, shall prepare and sub-

mit Court a list of all persons who have indicated

r wish not to participate in this action by so respond-

the notice described in Paragraph 6 of this Order

list of all other persons to whom said notice was

sent; said counsel shall also submit to this Court proof of

publication of notice as set forth above.

Orperep. This 20th day of December, 1974.

/s/ Onma R. Surrz

United States District Judge

Counsel for plaintiffs and

plaintiff -intervenors

/3/ Roserrt S. Lasxy

Counsel for defendants

-173a-

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI

DELTA DIVISION

(Caption Omitted in Printing)

Memorandum of Decision

Following a two-week bench trial, this employment dis-

crimination action is now before the court for decision on

the merits.

The suit was commenced March 2, 1972, by the filing of

complaint by three individual plaintiffs seeking to repre-

sent a class of persons allegedly subjected to racial dis-

crimination at the hands of the defendants. The scope of

the plaintiff class was subsequently broadened by the ad-

dition of allegations of sex discrimination. Of the original

named plaintiffs, one was a black, male employee at de-

fendants’ Cleveland, Mississippi, facility and two were

black, female applicants for employment at the defend-.

ant’s Cleveland plant.

Defendants in the case are Travenol Laboratories, Inc.,

and Baxter Laboratories, Inc. Because Travenol is a

wholly-owned subsidiary of Baxter, the court will make

no attempt to differentiate between the defendants and

will refer to them indiscriminately as “Travenol”, “Bax-

ter”, or simply “the defendants”.

The course to trial and determination on the merits was

long and arduous. During the months following the filing

of complaint, the court was required to rule upon a mo-

tion to-strike jury demand (which was granted), a motion

té certify as a class action (which was granted), a motion

to dismiss and/or for summary judgment (which was

denied), a motion for a preliminary injunction (which was

denied) and various other motions concerning discovery

and the substitution of parties. On or about November 15,

1973, counsel approached the court and requested pro-

-174a-

ceedings in the case be held in abeyance pending the ont-

come of settlement negotiations. Negotiations dragged on

until June of 1974, at which time they collapsed.

During the summer of 1974, the parties resumed vig-

orous discovery. The court bifurcated the trial of the case,

deferring consideration of the appropriate relief to be af-

forded plaintiffs, if any, until after the court had deter-

mined if defendants’ conduct about which plaintiffs com-

plained is or was in contravention of Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964. The liability portion of the trial

began March 3, 1975, and concluded March 14, 1975. How-

ever, the end of the trial unfortunately did not mark the

end of the litigation of the matter of liability. Voluminous

and time-consuming post-trial motions filed on behalf of

both plaintiffs and defendants required disposition by the

court prior to consideration of the merits.

In the course of the three-year period between filing of

complaint and commencement of trial, the cast of the

named plaintiffs changed substantially. Two of the original

named plaintiffs, James Williams and Alma Jean Wil-

liams, sought and received permission of the court to

withdraw as parties. Willie Mae Payne remains the only

original named plaintiff in the lawsuit. In 1973, the court

sustained a motion for leave to intervene filed on behalf of

Delilah Cherry and Birdie Griffin. Thereafter, the case

proceeded to trial with Ms. Payne, Ms. Cherry, Ms. Griffin,

and the class which they represent opposing the defend-

ants, Travenol and Baxter.

Although she has since moved to Chicago, Dlinois, Willie

Mae Payne was, at the times pertinent to the issues now

before the court for determination, a black female resi-

dent of the Cleveland, Mississippi area in which the de-

fendants’ facility is located. There was some controversy

* 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) ef seq.

-175a-

as to when Ms. Payne initially applied for employment at

the Baxter plant; however, the parties have stipulated that

she did so at least as early as March 17, 1970. Although

Ms. Payne has no more than seven years of formal

schooling, she obtained a tenth grade rating on the Gen-

eral Educational Development (GED) test on January 19,

1970. Ms. Payne was never hired by the defendants.

Delilah Cherry is a black female resident of the C

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