Appendix — Hecht v. Securities & Exchange Commission

Supreme Court brief1982

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Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For tHe Szeconp Cmcurr

No. 1116—August Term, 1981

(Argued May 4, 1982 Decided June 10, 1982)

Docket No. 81-6231

— — . —

Securities anp Excuance Commission,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Aqua-Sonic Propucts Conr., Urrasonic DentaL Propvets,

Inc., Lon Scmexren, Josovua M. Annan, Martin Hor,

Dewrasonic, N. V., Isvenre. Conr., Metviw Henson,

Defendants,

Margtms E. Hecutr and Iyvenre Corp.,

Defendants-Appellants.

Before:

Faewviy, Kavrman and Pierce, Circuit Judges.

Farenvxy, Circuit Judge:

Defendants Martin Hecht and Inventel Corporation

appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court

for the Southern District of New York, Sweet, J., 524 F.

Supp. 866 (1981), declaring that they had violated §§ 5(a),

5(c), and 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S. 0.

§§ 77e(a), T7e(c) and 77g(a) ; 5 10(b) of the Securities Ex-

change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78j(b); and Rule 10b-5

under the latter act, and enjoining them against future

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Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

violations. Defendants concede that if the licenses they

were promoting were ‘‘investment contracts’’, and there-

fore ‘‘securities’’ within the meaning of § 2(1) of the 1933

Act and § 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act, the securities laws were

violated in that no registration was effected and the pro-

motional materials omitted material information and con-

tained material misrepresentations. We affirm the district

court’s holding that the licensing scheme was an investment

contract and therefore a security within the 1933 and 1934

Acts.

I. Background

This case concerns a plan to manufacture and distribute

new dental devices termed Steri Products. Inventor Ar-

thur Kuris conceived of an improvement of the Cavii en

—a device that employs ultrasonic waves to dislodge plaque

in the vourse of dental prophylaxis—which would use

sterile water in place of tap water in order to reduce the

risk of contamination. Kuris had discussions with one of

his friends, M. Joshua Aber, a lawyer, and two of Aber’s

partners, Leon Schekter and defendant Hecht. The latter

three formed a professional corporation called Schekter,

Aber and Hecht, P.C. (SAH), and together the group es-

tablished four corporations: Aqua-Sonic and Ultrasonic,

New York corporations; Dentasonic, a Netherlands An-

tilles corporation; and Inventel, a Delaware corporation.

Aqua-Sonic and Ultrasonic were each wholly owned by

their respective principal officers ; Dentasonic was owned by

the three attorneys until November, 1978, when Kuris ac-

quired a 19% interest; Inventel was owned by the three

attorneys until February, 1979, at which time it redeemed

i a

ems

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Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

Schekter’s and Aber’s shares, leaving Hecht as the sole

owner.

Upon incorporation, Dentasonic purchased from Kuris

the patent and related rights to Steri Products for the

United States and Canada for $406,500, payable in in-

stallments. Dentasonic in turn sold the United States

manufacturing and marketing rights to Aqua-Sonic for

$26 million, to be paid from a percentage of the proceeds

from the sale by Aqua-Sonic of distribution licenses and

from a percentage of the proceeds from the sale of Steri

Products by Aqua-Sonic licensees. Until payment of the

$26 million, Dentasonic retained numerous rights vis a vis

Aqua-Sonic, including certain voting rights to all of Aqua-

Sonic’s stock.

The proposed method of operation was that Aqua-Sonic

would sell licensees the right to sell Steri Products in cer-

tain geographical regions. Ultrasonic was described to

potential licensees as an optional sales agent. Inventel

entered into agreements with Aqua-Sonic wherein Inventel

was to be paid $2.2 million, purportedly a finder’s fee, for

bringing about the arrangement between Dentasonic and

Aqua-Sonic and for consulting services; Inventel was also

to receive a portion of the proceeds from the sale of the

licenses and from the sale of Steri products and related

patents or trademarks.

The promotional materials used in discussion with po-

tential licensees or their representatives varied over the

course of the offering. From May through August of 1978,

the package included:

(a) an Information Memorandum describing the Steri

Products and the nature of the offering, with exhibits

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Opinion of the United Siates Court of Appeals

attached thereto including a tax opinion letter pre-

pared by SAH and financial illustrations projecting

sales of the products and revenues.

(b) the Aqua-Sonic license and security agreement

and notes payable to Aqua-Sonie (prior to inclusion of

the so-called Advertising Fund to be discussed below),

and related instructions.

(c) a document entitled ‘‘An Offer to Act as Sales

Agent.“

(d) the Ultrasonic sales agency agreement, security

agreements, and notes payable to Ultrasonic (prior to

inelusion of the Advertising Fund), and related in-

structions.

(e) a reprint of [an] article .. . from the Journal of

Periodontology [concerning the contamination of ul-

trasonic dental units].

(f) a four-page document entitled ‘‘Confidential for

Professional Use Only.’’

524 F.Supp. at 869. Over the next two months, the offering

package was quite similar. The Information Memorandum

noted in item (a) was updated. Added to the package were

„two large professional photographs of what appeared to

be [completed Steri Products units,]... a copy of a letter

. . concerning the commercial production of the Steri Prod-

ucts’’, and a cop, of a letter from a dental authority that

was used as an endorsement for Steri Products. Id. at

870. After November 1, 1978, the following documents

were added:

(a) a letter dated November 1, 1978 signed by defend-

ant Hersch with attachments relating to the creation

of the Steri Products, Advertising Fund and supple-

mental tax opinion by SAH.

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Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

(b) a package of revised closing documents relating

to the license, sales agency and Advertising Fund, and

(e) a revised summary of the offering entitled Con-

fidential for Professional Use Only—Summary of Re-

vised License for Steri Products.’’

Id. The E. formation Memorandum specified the numerous

obligations of the licensees, which are set out in the mar gin.“

censor; and (e) use of forms designed by and

(f) adherence to certain standards for advertising materials used

in connection with the business.

pore a eters ene Mgr alg gate yt Syn

275 — 9 Tim Licensor Site tes pocition om thle matter,

(footnote continued on next page)

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Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

The license was indicated to be available ‘‘only to a person

who has considerable knowledge and experience in financial

and business matters, [and] appreciates and understands

the merits and economic risks of this business.’’

If a licensee accepted the Offer to Act as Sales Agent“,

Ultrasonic would be responsible for all sales of Steri Prod-

ucts for the benefit of that licensee. Under the Ultrasonic

sales agency agreement, the licensee retained the right to

cancel at any time upon ninety days written notice, ultimate

control over pricing and other conditions relating to orders,

and the right to inspect the relevant records of Ultrasonic.

However, Ultrasonic was authorized to perform all signifi-

cant marketing functions, such as finding customers, taking

orders, collecting proceeds, and paying expenses and taxes.

Additionally, Ultrasonic was authorized to reduce the sales

price unilaterally so long as its commission on the sale was

reduced in the same amount. Prospective licensees were

informed that ‘‘by entering into the proposed Sales Agency

Agreement. . . you will derive substantial tax advantages

in connection with your acquisition of a license.

Franchises for over one hundred territories were avail-

able. The fee for a typical territory was $159,500: $9,150

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Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

to be paid in cash upon the granting of the license; $9,150

in the form of a 7% negotiable promissory note due Janu-

ary 15, 1979; and $141,200 by a 6% non-recourse promissory

note due January 1, 1985, but requiring pre-payment based

apon a portion of the proceeds from the sale of Steri Prod-

ucts. A typical licensee entering into the sales agency

agreement paid a $16,600 fee to defendant Ultrasonic: $500

in cash upon acceptance of the offer; $500 by a recourse

promissory note payable on January 15, 1979; and $15,600

by a non-recourse promissory note due December 1, 1984,

requiring pre-payment based upon a portion of the sales

proceeds.“ In addition, defendant Ultrasonic was entitled

to a commission of 20% of the gross proceeds from sales of

Steri Products.

After the offering had been available for some time,

SAH created the Advertising Fund to promote the product.

This purportedly increased the tax benefits available to

investors. Investors in the licenses were required to con-

tribute $400 in cash, $400 due on January 15, 1979, and

$13,200 by a non-recourse promissory note due December 1,

1984, requiring pre-payment based upon a portion of the

proceeds from the sales of Steri Products. The require-

ment of this mandatory payment did not increase the price

of the overall package to a licensee choosing to accept the

Ultrasonic sales agency offer because the amount payable

to Ultrasonic under that agreement was correspondingly

reduced. Payments made by investors prior to creation of

the Advertising Fund were transferred from Ultrasonic to

2. Originally, the total fee was $30,600. The figures in text

reflect the reduction to contributions to the Advertising Fund,

— 2 —

>

Ae

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Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

the Fund.“ After November 1, 1978, the Aqua-Sonic, Ultra-

materials were physically bound together and offered to

licensees in a single package.

The tax opinion letter and supplementary statements

indicated that all the payments covering the license fee,

ineluding the non-recourse notes, could be included in the

licensee’s basis for amortization over the eight year initial

period of the license. In addition, licensees were advised

that they could deduct the full price of the sales agency

agreement and Advertising Fund during 1978 and 1979.

Thus, a typical investor was personally liable for approxi-

mately $20,000 but could deduct $38,000 in 1978 and $20,000

in 1979, assuming that there were not yet any sales of the

product. Investors were informed that the tax benefits were

greater if they retained the sales agency. In addition, two

letters were sent by Aqua-Sonic advising licensees how to

treat their investment on their federal tax returns.

The Aqua-Sonic licenses were marketed throughout the

United States. Hecht contacted attorneys, accountants and

financial planners and recruited people to sell Aqua-Sonie

licenses on commission. Some of these individuals were

financial consultants for some of the investors who ulti-

mately purchased the licenses. Between May 1 and Decem-

ber 31, 1978, Aqua-Sonic investments were sold to 50 licen-

sees for approximately $12,100,000, of which $900,000 was

in cash and recourse notes.

oe oe 2 Se a

ment could not have been .

fact that all licensees up until time had accepted the Ultrasonic

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Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

All 50 licensees entered into Ultrasonic sales agency

agreement. None of these licensees had any exeprience

selling dental products. In most cases, the territories of

the licenses were not close to the licensee’s residence. The

promotional materials did not offer or advise of the ex-

istence of any sales agent other than Ultrasonic. —

The possible applicability of the federal securities laws

was brought to defendants’ attention from the beginning.

In the course of preparing he promotional materials, SAH

sought an independent legal opinion with respect to the

applicability of the securities laws to the proposed licensing

scheme. SAH was advised that the arrangement might be

eonsidered an investment contract. SAH then directed

one of its associates to research the issue and, after dis-

cussion, conchaded otherwise. David Glasser, Aqua-Sonic’s

rst president and sole shareholder, resigned in or about

August 1978 efter having been advised by his attorney that

the offering might be a security under the federal securities

laws and might violate other laws including antitrust and

federal food and drug statutes. Leonard Suroff, who was

recruited to be Ultrasonic’s first president and sole share-

holder and who never issued a check on behalf of Ultra-

sonic that was not co-signed by either Hecht or one of

Hecht’s partners, resigned in December 1978 because of

the SEC’s investigation.

The venture ultimately collapsed when mechanical dif-

ficulties prevented the timely manufacture of Steri Prod-

acts. fhe SEC then brought this action against Aqua-

Sonic, Ultrasonic, Dentasonic, Hersch, Hecht, Aber,

Schekter and Inventel, seeking an injunction against future

violations of the registration and antifraud provisions of

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Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

the securities laws. All the defendants except Hecht and

Inventel consented to such injunctions. Judge Sweet di-

rected, 524 F.Supp. at 867, 879-80, a similar injunction

against Hecht and Inventel which we now affirm.

IL Di :

As described above, and set out in greater detail in the

district court’s opinion, see 524 F.Supp. at 875, Hecht was

deeply involved in virtually every aspect of the enterprise.

Hecht and Inventel concede that if the licenses just de-

scribed were investment contracts, the securities laws were

violated in a number of ways. There was no registration

of the securities. Material information was omitted from

the promotional documents, including the interests of

various defendants, the role of SAH, financial information

relating to the use of the proceeds, and the reduced price

at which licenses were offered to insiders. In addition, the

market report upon vhich the tax opinion was based was

produced in 24 hours using unverified information and was

superficial with respect to key factors relevant to the tax

opinion. The highly optimistic financial projections were

lacking in objective support, and the product was not ready

to be marketed as indicated. There had been no clinical

testing, and the research materials gathered were insuffi-

cient to support the claim of the assertedly ‘‘definite causal

relationship’’ between the use of tap water and various

infections.

We thus must determine whether the enterprise de-

scribed above constitutes the offering of an investment

contract under the rule established in the leading case of

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Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). As was

there said, 328 U.S. at 298, [t Ihe term investment con-

tract’ is undefined by the Securities Act or by relevant

legislative reports.’’ However,

the term was common in many state ‘‘blue sky’’ laws

in existence prior to the adoption of the federal statute

and, although the term was also undefined by the state

laws, it had been broadly construed by state courts so

as to afford the investing public a full measure of pro-

tection. Form was disregarded for substance and

emphasis was placed upon economic reality. An in-

vestment contract thus came to mean a contract or

scheme for ‘‘the placing of capital or laying out of

money in a way intended to secure income or profit

from its employment. State v. Gopher Tire d Rubber

Co., 146 Minn. 52, 56, 177 N.W. 937, 938. This defini-

tion was uniformly applied by state courts to a variety

of situations where individuale were led to invest

money in a common enterprise with the expectation

that they would earn a profit solely through the efforts

of the promoter or of some one other than themselves.

By including an investment contract within the

scope of §2(1) of the Securities Act, Congress was

using a term the meaning of which had been crystalized

by this prior judicial interpretation. It is therefore

reasonable to attach that meaning to the term as used

by Congress, especially since such a definition is con-

sistent with the statutory aims. In other words, an

investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act

mears a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a

person invests his money in a common enterprise and

is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the

promoter or a third party. .. .

328 U.S. at 298-99 (footnote 4 omitted).

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Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

It is not contested that the scheme here at issue involves

“an investment of money in a common enterprise with

the expectation of profit. Rather, defendants claim that

the licensees undertook important obligations, that the sales

agency agreement was optional, and that even under that

agreement the licensees retained significant rights, such

that it cannot be said that they expected profits to be de-

rived solely from the efforts of others.

The Commission argues that the Court’s use of the

term solely in Howey is not to be taken literally. The

Ninth Circuit ruled some years ago that the the word

‘solely’ should not be read as a strict or literal limitation

on the definition of an investment contract [since] ... [i]t

would be easy to evadel, for example,] by adding a require-

ment that the buyer contribute a modicum of effort.“ SEC

v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482,

cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973). This was shortly fol-

lowed by the Fifth Cireuit in SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary,

Inc., 497 F. 2d 473, 479-84 (1974), where Judge Gewin made

a comprehensive survey of the cases in the courts of appeals

and the district courts, pointed out that in the Gopher Tire

Rubber case cited by Justice Murphy in Howey the in-

vestors were required to make some efforts, and referred

to one of the state cases cited in fn. 4 to the Howey opinion,

Stevens v. Liberty Packing Corp., N.J. Eq. 61, 161 A. 193

(1932), as having envisioned even more substantial in-

vestor participation. The Fifth Circuit has -ecently said:

4, . KK

. D

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Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals -

the Supreme Court has altogether omitted the word

„solely in its most recent formulation of the invest-

ment contract definition. In United Housing Founda

tion, Inc. v. Forman, supra , the Conrt quoted the

investment contract definitiua trom Howey and re-

stated it as an investment in a common venture prem-

‘sed on & reasonable expectation of profits to be derived

from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts cf

others. 421 U.S. at 852....

Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 418-19, cert. denied,

102 S. Ct. 396 (1981). If this was intended to mean that

the Supreme Court had already performed the necessary

‘surgery on the Howey opinion, it would read too much into

Forman since the Court there explicitly reserved the ques-

tion whether ‘‘solely’’ should be taken literally, 421 U.S. at

852 n.16 (quoting SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises,

Inc., supra, 474 F. 2d 476). However, given the Court’s re-

peated directions to consider investment schemes in light

of their economic realities and the ease of circumvention

of the solely“ language in Howey were to be taken lit-

erally, as well as the history summarized in Koscot, supra,

we think that if faced with the question the Court would

not insist on applying that language literally but would

consider whether, under all the circumstances, the scheme

was being promoted primarily as an investment or as a

means whereby participants could pool their own activities,

their money and the promoter’s contribution in a mean-

ingful way.

As a first step in the analysis it is useful to consider

whether the allegedly optional nature of the sales agency

‘agreements removes them from the concept of investment

‘ontracts. It has long been understood that the mere ex-

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Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

istence of such an option is not inconsistent with the entire

scheme’s being an investment contract. Howey, supra, 328

U.S. 293. Defendants assert that a major difference be-

tween their offering and that in Howey is that in the latter

it was not economically feasible for an investor to refuse

the option. Although the Court noted this, id. at 300, it

must be remembered that 15% of the acreage sold in the

scheme in that case was not covered by the optional service

contracts, id. at 295. Thus it appears that the Court fo-

cused not on whether it was somehow possible for an in-

vestor to profit without accepting the option, or whether

the investor had a bare theoretical right to reject the option,

but rather on whether the typical investor who was being

solicited would be expected under all the circumstances to

accept the option, thus remaining passive and deriving

profit from the efforts of others.

Similarly, in the instant case, while it cannot be said

with certainty that prospective licensees would be wholly

unable to benefit without taking advantage of the sales

agency agreement, it can hardly be said that realistically

the agency agreement was a mere option. In SEC v. C. M.

Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 352-53 (1943), the

Supreme Court indicated that the relevant factors include

not only the terms of the offer but also ‘‘the plan of distri-

bution, and the economic inducements beld out to the pros-

pect.’’ On both counts, the Aqua-Sonic offering appears to

be an investment contract. The offering materials pre-

sented the license and agency agreements as a package,

although within the package each was described separately

and each required separate signatures. Moreover, the pro-

motional materials indicated that additional tax benefits

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Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

would accrue to investors taking advantage of the option.

This is particularly important when the license agreement

itself was promoted largely for the tax advantages it of-

fered, suggesting that the prospective licensees who could

be expected to be attracted to the offering in the first in-

stance would be ones that would find the agency agreement

desirable for the same reasons. Defendants seek to re-

spond to all this by indicating that the projected cash flow

for the license without the sales agency option was substan-

tially higher than the package of the two. This statement

is quite misleading, and its obvious deficiency was not lost

on the fifty licensees, all of whom opted for the package.

The reason for the higher cash flows without the sales

agency is that the projections for the package (i.e., with the

agency agreement) deduct the price of the agency option

and the commissions that would be owed to the agent,

whereas the projections for the license alone assume equal

sales penetration with no deductions whatever for the costs

of distribution. In other words, the defendants’ argument

implicitly assumes that an investor could duplicate the re-

sults of the sales agent and could do this without any cost.

More realistically, an investor who contemplated doing his

own selling would have considered the likelihood that the

5. Defendants cite Forman, supra, 421 U.S. at 854-55 & n.20, to

their argument that the tax aspects of the transaction are

as a matter of law. However, in that context the Supreme

Court was considering what constitutes an expectation of profits.

not have been predicted to have an expectation of profits. The

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Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

sales projections could have been achieved without using

the agent, and what costs would have been entailed.

Of course, it is possible that there would be a prospective

licensee who would feel capable of doing as well or better

than Ultrasonic and, becanse of being retired or otherwise,

would have had minimal costs. In Howey, 15% of the

acreage was sold to such purchasers. In weighing ‘this

argument it is useful to consider Whether the offering was

directed in large part to prospective licensees who could be

expected to operate their own distribution system or wheth-

er the plan of distribution, Joiner, quoted supra, was

aimed primarily at investors who could not reasonably be

believed to be desirous and eapable of undertaking distribu-

tion on theirown. For the former, the target of the offering

would be individuals or corporations with experience in

selling dental products.“ However, none of the 50 licensees

had any such experience. This was not mere coincidence.

The record does not indicate that any attempts were made

to locate such purchasers. Hecht’s leading salesman was

an insurance agent and financial and tax consultant; other

salesmen included a salesman in investment opportunities

and an accountant. Thus, the defendants recruited sales-

men would could be expected to and did contact typical

passive investors, not persons with experience in the dis-

tribution of dental supplies. While it is true that in deter-

mining whether the offering is an investment contract

courts are to examine the offering from an objective per-

„77

6. This aiford an i Mr. Steak,

Inc. v. River City Steak, nen 60 F 24 666 (10 Cir 1972), see par-

ticularly p. 670, n cases on which defendants rely.

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Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

option by all 50 licensees is not decisive, this result is pre-

cisely what the defendants must have expected from their

behavior.

Defendants’ other major argument relies heavily upon

the Fifth Circuit’s dicta in Williamson, supra, 645 F. 2d at

421:

In each case the actual control exercised by the pur-

chaser is irrelevant. So long as the investor has the

right to control the asset he has purchased, he is not

dependent on the promoter or on a third party for

„those essential managerial efforts which affect the

failure or success of the enterprise.’’

See also id. at 423-25 (discussing circumstances in which

sufficient dependence might nevertheless exist). We do not

consider this, standing alone, to be an accurate statement

of the law. While it is true that in Howey, the service

contracts were generally for a 10-year duration without

option of cancellation, and other rights of the investors

were limited in some respects, 328 U.S. at 296, the Court

did not directly rely upon these factors in reaching its

conclusion, see id. at 299-300. Moreover, it would be incon-

gruous to attach decisive significance to mere legal formal-

ity when the Court explicitly refused to be bound by ‘‘the

legal terminology in which such contracts are clothed’’, id.

at 300, and preceded its conclusion with a discussion of the

purposes of the securities laws, which require disregarding

form for substance and placing emphasis upon economic

reality, id. at 298-99. Finally, if it would circumvent the

purposes of the securities laws to exonerate defendants who

had the guile to insert the requirement that the buyer

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Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

contribute a modicum of effort, see p. 11, supra (quoting

SEC v. Glenn F. Turner Enterprises, Inc., supra, 474 F.2d

476), it would be an even greater affront to the policies of

these laws to exempt schemes that preserved the mere right

to provide some effort.

This is not to suggest that if it was reasonable to expect

investors to exercise their retained rights under the sales

agency agreement in a nontrivial manner the scheme would

still be an investment contract. However, in the case of the

Aqua-Sonic offering, this simply was not the case. All of

the preceding analysis indicating that licensees would have

been expected to take the sales agency option equally sug-

gests that they would not be likely to terminate the option

and take over distribution for themselves shortly thereafter.

Adding to the implausibility of such an expectation is the

fact that licensees were obligated for the full price of the

8-year sales agency agreement upon acceptance; none of

this fee was refundable upon termination. While it is not

inconceivable that there might have been some licensees

who would have made some efforts at some point in time,

this is insufficient to defeat the conclusion that the scheme

was an investment contract.’

We recognize that to write a rule precisely defining the

line between contracts such as those here at issue and the

typical franchise agreement, whether for Cadillacs, Coca-

Cola or Kentucky Fried Chicken, may be impossible. Deci-

sion will necessarily turn on the totality of the cireum-

stances, not on any single one. This is a situation where,

in the words of Justice Holmes, lines are pricked out by

7. Recall once again that in Howey 15% of the acreage was sold

to purchasers not taking advantage of the service option.

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Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

the gradual approach and contact of decisions on the oppos-

ing sides. Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 112

(1911). But we have not the slightest doubt on which side

of the line this case falls. Defendants sought to attract the

passive investor for whose benefit the securities laws were

enacted. His retention of some legal rights over distribu-

tion does not render it unnecessary for him to have the

benefits of the disclosures provided in resgistration state-

ments or the protection of the antifraud provisions. If, by

contrast, the reasonable expectation was one of significant

investor control, a reasonable purchaser could be expected

to make his own investigation of the new business he

planned to undertake and the protection of the 1933 and

1934 Acts would be unnecesary. We thus conclude that in

light of the economic realities of this case and the prece-

dents in the Supreme Court, in the state courts prior to

adoption of the 1933 Act, and in the courts of appeals

thereafter, the Aqua-Sonic scheme was an investment con-

tract and therefore a ‘‘security’’.®

The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.

Opinion of the United States District Court

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Sovurnzrn Disraict or New Yorx

80 Civ. 5513 (RWS)

—— — oO

Securities anp Excuancs Commission,

against

Aqua-Somtc Propucts Conr, Urrasonic DenwtaL Propvcts,

Ixc., Lon Scnexren, M. Josuva Aus, Martin Heonr,

Dentasonic, N. V., Invewre. Cosporation and Mam

10 Defendants

Plaintiff,

APPEARANCES:

Dowatp N. Muawskr, Regional Administrator

Attorney for Plaintiff

26 Federal Plaza

New York, New York 10278

By: Marcaret M. McQueensy, Eso.

RAR A. Sicomiano, Esq.

Exizasera A. Banyes, Eso.

La Brenna Jonzs, Esq.

Mink D. Powsnrs, Eso.

Of Counsel

Litman, Frmpman, Kavrman & Aso, Esgs.

Attorneys for Defendants

Inventel Corp. and Martin E. Hecht

120 Broadway

New York, New York 10271

1

21a

Opinion of the United States District Court

Sweet, D.J.

The Securities and Exchange Commission (‘‘SEC’’)

seeks a declaration that defendants Martin Hecht

(„Hecht“) and Inventel Corporation (‘‘Inventel’’) have

violated Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act of

1938 (‘‘the Securities Act’’), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(a) and 77e

(e) (“the registration provisions’’), and Sections 17(a)

of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a), Section 10b of the

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (‘‘the Exchange Act’’),

15 U.S.C. §78j(b), and Rule 10b-5, 17 C. F. R. § 240.10b-5,

promulgated thereunder (‘‘the antifraud provisions’’).

The SEC also seeks a permanent injunction barring the

offering and sale of securities in the form of investment

contracts. The declaration will be entered in the form of

a judgment and the injunction will be granted as set forth

below.

PretimumnaBy PRoceepines

This action was commenced on September 30, 1980 by

the filing of a complaint, and a motion for preliminary in-

junction was filed on December 19, 1980. The SEC sought

to restrain the defendants, Aqua-Sonic Products Corp.

(‘‘Aqua-Sonic’’), Ultrasonic Dental Products, Ine. (Ul-

trasonic’’), Leon Schekter (‘‘Schekter’’), M. Joshua Aber

(‘‘Aber’’), Dentasonic, N.V. (‘‘Dentasonic’’), Melvin

Herseh (‘‘Hersch’’), Hecht and Inventel from certain con-

duct about to be described. Discovery was expedited, the

preliminary injunction motion was adjourned, and the de-

fendants’ motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal

of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction was denied on June

3, 1981. Thereafter, all defendants except Hecht and In-

22a

Opinion of the United States District Court

ventel entered into consent decrees and the SEC discon-

tinued its action against them.“ From June 10 to June 17,

1981 the SEC motion for preliminary injunction against

Hecht and Inventel, the remaining defendants, was tried to

the court and consolidated with the trial on the merits pur-

suant to F.R.Civ.P. 65(a). What follows are the court’s

findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Fixprves or Facr

The Enterprise

Arthur Kuris (‘‘Kuris’’) and Aber were neighbors and

friends, the former being an inventor and patent holder

and the latter an attorney. Kuris had obtained patents

applying the principles of ultrasonic wave propagation to

various fields, one of which was dentistry. A device under

the trade name of Cavitron was developed and marketed.

The Cavitron gained wide acceptability among dentists and

employed ultrasonic waves to dislodge plaque in the course

of dental prophylaxis. The operation of the Cavitron re-

quired a coolant which was provided by a spray of water

originating from the customary sources.“ Kuris conceived

1. Final Judgments of Permanent Injunction Consent

1 Aqua- Sonic, — . an

entered defendants Schekter and

Aber on June 15, 1981, enjoining them from further violations of the

istration and anti-fraud provisions in connection with any securi-

ders“) were entered as to defendants Hersch and Ultrasonic, also on

June 15, 1981, in which said defendants, under penalty of contempt,

agreed not to violate the registration and anti-fraud isions as to

any securities in the future. Pursuant to said ers, the action

=." a

230

Opinion of the United States District Court

of an improvement of the Cavitron which would employ

sterile water as the coolant for the ultrasonic process and

would thereby reduce the risk of any contamination result-

ing from micro-organisms which might be found in tap

water.

These new products for which Kuris held patent rights

were termed Steri Products. One of the products, known

as the Steri Prophy Unit, was designed as a complete, self-

contained ultrasonic prophylaxis unit utilizing pre-pack-

aged sterile water. The other Steri Product, called the

Steri Satellite Unit, was designed to be affixed to existing

dental equipment to supply pre-packaged sterile water.

After discussions with Aber, in early 1978 Kuris met

with Aber’s partners Hecht and Schekter to develop a plan

to market and distribute these Steri Products. The lawyers

had formed a professional corporation then called Schekter,

Aber and Hecht, P.C. („SAH“). As a consequence of

these discussions, four corporations were established by

Schekter, Aber and Hecht: Aqua-Sonie and Ultrasonic,

New York corporations; Dentasonic, a Netherlands Antilles

corporation ; and Inventel, a Delaware corporation. Schek-

ter, Aber and Hecht were the original shareholders of

Dentasonic until November, 1978 when Kuris acquired a

19% interest. The shares in both Aqua-Sonic and Ultra-

sonic were held by sole shareholders, their respective prin-

cipal officers. The original shareholders of Inventel were

Schekter, Aber and Hecht until February of 1979, at which

time the corporation redeemed the shares of Schekter and

Aber, leaving Hecht the sole shareholder.

Immediately after incorporation, Dentasonic purchased

from Kuris the patent and other related rights to the Steri

— |

—

24a

Opinion of the United States District Court

Products for the United States and Canada for $406,500

payable in installments. Kuris rc ained a security interest

in the patent and other rights conveyed to Dentasonic.

Dentasonic sold only the United States marketing and man-

ufacturing rights to the Steri Products to Aqua-Sonic,

which had been incorporated in April 1978, for $26 mifion

pursuant to an agreement dated June 1, 1978, this sum to

be paid not only from a percentage of the proceeds from

the sale by Aqua-Sonic of licenses to sell the Steri Products,

but also from a percentage of the profits received by Aqua-

Sonic from actual product sales. Until payment of the $26

million Dentasonic retained a security interest in the rights

conveyed to Aqua-Sonic, held certain voting rights to all

of Aqua-Sonic’s stock and was given a security interest in

certain accounts receivable and contract rights, certain

inventory and inventory records, equipment, inventions,

patent rights and trademarks in all products and proceeds

of Aqua-Sonic.

SAH developed certain materials for Aqua-Sonic de-

scribing its proposed method of doing business (‘‘the pro-

motional materials’’) to be set forth more fully below. In

short, Aqua-Sonic proposed to sell to licensees the right to

sell Steri Products in certain specified geographical areas.

Ultrasonic was described as an optional sales agent for the

licensees. Inventel, which was not described, entered into

a letter agreement with Aqua-Sonie by which Aqua-Sonic

agreed to pay Inventel $2.2 million, ostensibly as a finder’s

fee for bringing about the sale of the rights in the Steri

Products from Dentasonie to Aqua-Sonie and for past and

future consulting services. Under the letter agreemert,

Aqua-Sonic agreed to pay Inventel a portion of the pro-

25a

Opitton of the United States District Court

ceéds from the sale of licenses and the sale of the Steri

Products and related patents or trademarks.

The Promotional Materials

After the corporations were organized, in the course of

the preparation of the promotional materials, SAH sought

an Opinion of another law firm, Messrs. Baer, Marks &

Upham, with respect to the applicability of the securities

law to the proposéd enterprise. SAH received a memo-

randum in or about May, 1978 from an associate of that

firm, Barry Mandel, a prescient lawyer as things have

turned out, to the effect that the liccnse arrangement might

be considered an investment contract. The partners at

SAH directed one of their associates to research the issue

in the summer of 1978, and after considerable discussion

concluded otherwise. The promotional materials were mod-

ified as set forth below and the enterprise proceeded.

A market consultant was retained and for $500 provided

an analysis of the available market based primarily on the

use of Cavitron, and the marketing practices in the indus-

try which included the use of so-called dental depots, in

effect, wholesale houses offering dental supplies to all kinds

of dentists, a focal element in the licensing plan. Also,

Kuris obtained and passed on to Hecht a letter from a Dr.

Henry Goldman, an apparently well-regarded dental au-

thority, which could be construed as an endorsement of the

Steri Products. The letter was described succinctly by

Heeht in his investigative testimony, who realized the need

to overcome the resistance of dentists who were going to

be told that their present machines were unhygenic. Hecht

26a

Opinion of the United States District Court

likened their attitudes to those of the 19th century surgeons

who would say to Pasteur Get out of here Louis.“ In

addition, an article in the Journal of Periodontology en-

titled ‘‘Microbial Contamination of Dental Units and Ul-

trasonic Sealers’’ was obtained.

Prototype models had been developed, and Logical Tech-

nie d Services (‘‘LTS’’), an engineering firm specializing

in electronic applications, was retained in late 1978 to con-

vert them into finished marketable products.

With these preparations in hand or in contemplation,

certain documents were prepared to be used in the enter-

prise. During the period from on or about May 1, 1978

through August 31, 1978, these promotional materials were

developed and used in discussions with potential licensees

or their representatives. These included:

(a) an Information Memorandum describing the Steri

Products and the nature of the offering, with ex-

hibits attached thereto including a tax opinion let-

ter prepared by SAH and financial illustrations

projecting sales of the products and revenues.

(b) the Aqua-Sonic license and security agreement and

notes payable to Aqua-Sonic (prior to inclusion of

the so-called Advertising Fund to be discussed

below), and related instructions.

(e) a documer: entitled An Offer to Act as Sales

Agent.

(d) the Ultrasonic sales agency agreement, security

agreement, and notes payable to Ultrasonic (prior

to inclusion of the Advertising Fund), and related

instructions.

7

4

N 3

so at 4

27a

Opinion of the United States District Court

(e) a reprint of the aforementioned article by Arthur

Gross (and others) from the Journal of Perio-

dontology.

(f) a four-page document entitled ‘‘Confidential for

Professional Use Only.“

During the period from on or about September 1, 1978

through October 31, 1978, the following documents were

used in a two-pocketed packet, the second version of the

offering package.

(a) a new Information Memorandum Relating to Ex-

clusive Rights revised to reflect, among other

things, certain management changes at Aqua-

Sonic, the tax opinion letter and financial illustra-

tions.

(b) the Aqua-Sonic license and security agreement and

notes payable to Aqua-Sonic and related instruc-

tions.

(c) a document entitled ‘‘An Offer to Act as Sales

Agen I

(d) the Ultrasonic sales agency agreement, security

agreements, and notes payable to Ultrasonic and

related instructions.

(e) two large professional photographs of what ap-

peared to be a completed Steri Prophy Unit and

Steri Satellite Unit such as would be sold.

(f) The Journal of Periodontology article.

_(g) a copy of a letter dated September 12, 1978, to

Aqua-Sonic from E. A. Greenlee, President of

LTS, concerning the commercial production of the

Steri Products.

nT

28a

Opinion of the United States District Court

(h) acopy of the letter dated August 22, 1978, to Kuris

from Dr. Henry Goldman.

A third and final version of the materials in use after

November 1, 1978, consistea of the documents contained in

the second version plus the following documents:

(a) a letter dated November 1, 1978 signed by defend-

ant Hersch with attachments relating to the cre-

ation of the Steri Products, Advertising Fund and

supplemental tax opinion by SAH.

(b) a package of revised closing documents relating to

the license, sales agency and Advertising Fund,

and

(e) a revised summery of the offering entitled Confi-

dential for Professional Use Only—Summary of

Revised License for Steri Products.“

Licensees who had entered into the notes and agreements

contained in the first two versions of the offering materials

were asked to sign revised agreements and notes which

conformed to the third offering package.

The Information Memorandum summarized the obliga-

tions of the licensees in the licensing agreement as follows:

The License Agreement delineates the relationship be-

tween the parties and imposes specific duties and obli-

gations on the Licensee. These duties include, but ure

not limited to: (a) vigorous promotion of the distribu-

tion and sale of the Products Parts and Supplies; (b)

maintenance and employment of sufficient working cap-

ital and net worth to enable Licensee to fulfill all of his

duties, obligations and responsibilities under the Li-

cense Agreement; (c) employment of such agents, rep-

29a

Opinion of the United States District Court

resentatives and employees as Licensee in his sole

discretion, may deem to be necessary to assist him in

the performance of some or all of his duties and obliga-

tions as Licensee; (d) use and maintenance of an ac-

counting and reporting system as may be required by

Licensor; and (e) use of order forms designed by Li-

eensor and (f) adherence to certain standards for ad-

vertising materials used in connection with the busi-

ness.

Licensee will be an independent contractor and be solely

responsible for all expenses and costs incurred by him

in the conduct and promotion of his business. In addi-

tion, Licensee will be required to and be responsible for

the vigorous and satisfactory promotion, distribution

and sale of the Products, Parts and Supplies for use in

his Territory so as to obtain a reasonable share of the

market... In the event that a Licensee does not sat-

isfactorily fulfill his duties and responsibilities as set

forth in the License Agreement, Licensor may elect to

terminate his License.

Although the Information Memorandum did net mention

an offer by anyone to act as a sales agent, it did state that

a licensee may retain ‘‘agents, representatives or employ-

ees’’ to assist in marketing the Steri Products, and added:

The choice as to whether to deal with Dental Depots

and/or to retain agents, representatives, employees or

others is solely that of the Licensees. The Licensor

takes no position on this matter, for the most effective

means of achieving satisfactory market penetration

will vary according to the prior experience of the Li-

censee, the amount of time and effort the Licensee is

30a

Opinion of the United States District Court

willing to expend to exploit the License, and the nature

of Licensee’s Territory.

Annexed to the Information Memorandum as Exhibit

H is a set of financial illustrations designed to demonstrate

the potential profitability of the licenses. These illustra-

tions assume that a potential licensee does not retain the

sales agent. (A similar set of illustrations annexed to the

offer by Ultrasonic to act as sales agent makes the opposite

assumption.)

The Information Memorandum stated further:

In the event that a Licensee, in his sole discretion,

elects to retain and/or employ anyone to assist him in

the performance of some or all of his duties, obliga-

tions and responsibilities under the License, Licensee

must undertake to actively supervise their activities on

his behalf to ensure that they perform their activities

in a manner which will be consistent with Licensee’s

activities and responsibilities to Licensor.

In the event that a Licensee does not satisfactorily

fulfill his duties and responsibilities as set forth in the

License Agreement, Licensor may elect to terminate

his License.

The Information Memorandum and the license appli-

cation indicate that the license is available to a limited

class of persons who are capable of performing all their

obligations and exercising their rights under the license

agreement, and if they so chose, the sales agency agree-

ment. Under the heading ‘‘Who Should Apply for a Li-

cense,’’ the Memorandum stated:

31a

Opinion of the United States District Court

A License will be granted only to a person who has

considerable knowledge and experience in financial and

business matters, appreciates and understands the

merits and economic risks of this business. Experience

has shown that this type of business is not suitable for

and should not be pursued by persons who lack sub-

stantial assets

A License will be granted only to an Applicant in re-

liance on his representations and warranties that he

has himself, or together with any business and finan-

cial advisor with who he may consult, knowledge and

experience in financial and business matters, that he

is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of this

transaction, and that he is able to bear the economic

risks of this transaction.

The license application provided:

Applicant hereby represents and warrants as follows:

4. Applicant and/or his designated representative has

such knowledge and experience in financial and business

matters, and investments in particular, that he is ca-

pable of evaluating the merits and risks of the Appli-

cant’s acquisition of a License and has obtained, in

Applicant’s judgment, sufficient information from Li-

censor relating to the License to evaluate the merits

and risks of the contemplated transaction.

The Offer to Act as Sales Agent,“ if accepted by the

potential licensee, placed the responsibility for all sales of

Steri Products for the benefit of a particular licensee in

Ultrasonic. Certain rights, however, were retained by the

licensee.

32a

Opinion of the United States District Court

The Ultrasonic sales agency agreement provided that

the licensee has the absolute right to cancel this Agree-

ment at any time upon ninety days’ written notice and

that the agent:

will uniformly maintain the prices established from

time to time by Principal [licensee] for the Products,

and conform to such terms of sale and other selling

and ordering conditions as may be determined and re-

quired from time to time as herein provided.

It further provided that:

All orders shall be subject to approval of items, price

and credit by Principal and shall be confirmed by cus-

tomers. All quotations for sales made by Agent to

customers, or prospective customers, must be made

expressly subject to the approval and confirmation of

Principal and shall not be binding until such approval

is given by Principal. All Products shall remain the

property of Principal until sold.

and that:

[Books, records and copies of invoices shall be open

at all times during business hours to the inspection of

any duly authorized representative of Principal.

The Aqua-Sonic documents described over 100 geo-

graphical territories in the United States, and each stand-

ard territory was designed to contain approximately the

same number of dentists, although there were larger terri-

tories available. The fee for a typical license under the

Lieense Agreement was $159,500 payable as follows: $9,150

in cash upon the granting of the license; $9,150 in the form

leew

Fe

33a

Opinion of the United States District Court

of a negotiable promissory note, bearing interest at 7% per

annum and due January 15, 1979; and, $141,900 by a non-

recourse promissory note, bearing interest at 6% per an-

num and due January 1, 1985, but requiring pre-payment

based on a portion of the proceeds from the sale of the

Steri Products. The initial term of the license expires on

December 31, 1985; however, an option was included to

extend the license for an additional five-year period. Un-

der the license agreement Aqua-Sonic was solely responsible

for the development and manufacture of the Steri

Products.

The typical licensee under the sales agency agreement

paid a $16,600 fee to defendant Ultrasonic, as follows: $500

in cash upon acceptance of the offer; $500 by recourse

promissory note payable on January 15, 1979, and $15,600

by non-recourse promissory note due December 1, 1984,

but requiring pre-payment based on a portion of the pro-

ceeds from sales of the Steri Products. In addition, de-

fendant Ultrasonic was entitled to a commission of 20% of

gross sales of Steri Products under the terms of the sales

agency agreement.

During a later stage of the offering, SAH created the

Advertising Fund to promote the Steri Products for in-

vestors and to increase the tax benefits available to them.

The Fund was a joint venture to be administered by two

clients of SAH, Hanson Fassler Associates, Inc. and Mor-

ris Baumstein Associates, Inc. Investors were required

to make the following contribution to the Advertising

Fund: $400 in cash upon obtaining the license; a $400

negotiable promissory note due on January 15, 1979; and a

eal ip st a eee

34a

Opinion of the United Siates District Court

$13,200 non-recourse promissory note due December 1,

1984, but requiring pre-payment based on a portion of the

proceeds from sales of Steri Products. The addition of this

mandatory contribution did not increase the overall price

of a typical investment because the amount payable to de-

fendant Ultrasonic under the sales agency agreement was

correspondingly reduced by the amount payable to the

Fund. Moreover, monies paid by investors prior to the

creation of the Advertising Fund were reallocated from

Ultrasonic to the Fund apparently at the direction of SAH

through Aqua-Sonic.

After November 1, 1978 the Aqua-Sonic, Ultrasonic and

Advertising Fund Agreements, and the notes relating

thereto, were physically bound together and offered to

licensees in a single package. The entire cost of the Aqua-

Sonic enterprise for the typical licensee, including the

Aqua-Sonic license agreement, the Ultrasonic sales agency

agreement and the Advertising Fund was: $10,050 in cash;

$10,050 in recourse promissory notes due January 15, 1979;

and $170,000 in non-recourse notes due December, 1984 and

January, 1985.

The tax opinion letter and supplementary materials

stated that licensees could include the non-recourse notes,

the cash payments and the recourse notes in their basis for

amortization and that the licensee fee could be amortized

over eight years. Licensees were further advised that they

could deduct the full contract price of the sales agency

agreement and Advertising Fund contributions during

1978 and 1979. Thus, a typical investor who was personally

liable for $20,100 on his investment was advised that, as-

ix

35a

Opinion of the United States District Court

suming no sales of the products, he could take tax deduc-

tions of $38,400 in 1978 and $20,000 in 1979. Investors were

iuformed that they would reecive additional tax benefits by

retaining the sales agency. In addition to the described

materials two letters were sent by Aqua-Sonic to all licen-

sees instructing them how to treat their investment on their

1978 and 1979 federal income tax returns.

When an investor retained U!trasonic, the sales agency

agreements authorized Ultrasunic to perform all significant

marketing functions, including finding customers, taking

orders, collecting proceeds, and paying expenses and taxes.

Additionally, the selling price of the products was to be

agreed upon between Ultrasonic and the investor; however,

Ultrasonic was authorized to reduce the sales price uni-

laterally so long as its commission on the sale was corre-

spondingly reduced.

The Selling

The Aqua-Sonic licenses were offered and sold to in-

vestors throughout the United States. Hecht contacted

financial planners, accountants, and attorneys throughout

the country and recruited a number of individuals as com-

missioned salesmen, and with varying, not always success-

ful, results. These individuals, some of whom were finan-

cial consultants for some of the licensees, received commis-

sions for telling potential licensees about Aqua-Sonic, sign-

ing up licensees and transmitting properly executed agree-

ments to Aqua-Sonic.

Many offering packages were distributed to salesmen

and purchasers of the Aqua-Sonic offering from the South-

or

*

36a

Opinion of the United States District Court.

ern District of New York by making use of the means,

instruments and instrumentalities of interstate commerce

and of the mails. Generally, interstate commerce, the mails

and telephones were used in connection with the Aqua-

Sonic offering.

Hecht arranged sales meetings in various cities includ-

ing Phoenix, Portland, Los Angeles, Denver, New York

and San Francisco to recruit salesmen and svlicit licensees

and to describe the license and sales agency agreements

and the tax consequences of the Aqua-Sonic offering. Kuris

demonstrated the prototypes of Steri Products. In total,

between May 1 and December 31, 1978, Aqua-Sonic invest-

ments were purchased by 50 licensees for approximately

$12,100,000 of which $11,200,000 was in the form of non-

recourse promissory notes and $900,000 in cash and re-

course notes.

The testimony of eleven Aqua-Sonic licensees was taken

through depositions outside the jurisdiction, one of whom,,

Rex Zimmerman, was also a salesman of the offering. Two

licensees testified at trial. These individuals were, for the

most part, well established in full-time caree:s and business

endeavors or were retired and, with two or three exceptions,

all possessing some knowledge of finance and investment

and sufficient funds to employ that knowledge. Pursuant

to the promotional materials the licensees were required

to represent that each possessed net assets in excess of

$100,000 and incom in the 50% bracket.

The licensees included members of SAH, the wife of one

of the principals of the firm handling the advertising and

promotion for Steri Products, and a number of people who

be

= Sa

Na

Opinion of the United States District Court.

had engaged in over ten years of business transactions, a

vice-president of a substantial public corporation with ex-

tensive business experience, the president of businesses re-

lated to the sale, production and use of asphalt products,

a partner in the restaurant business, a shareholder of a

small manufacturing corporation, the vice-president .of a

public service corporation, and a petroleum jobber, a den-

tist, a farmer, a computer analyst, a builder and sell r of

private homes, a corporate vice-president of employee rela-

tions, a retired schoolteacher, a school principal, a full-time

physical therapist, the president of a data processing com-

pany, and retirees. None had any experience selling dental

products and for the most part the territories. of the

licenses were not close to the residences of the licensees.

Two or three of the licensees, Dorothy Baxa, Leonore Haas,

and possibly Edward Abrahamson, did not read the de-

scribed documente.

Most licensees testified they were primarily interested

in an income-producing investment and a tax shelter and

did not intend to become actively involved in the business.

Moreover, some licensees were told or otherwise led to be-

lieve that, after making the initial payments in 1978 and

1979, they would have no further responsibilities and that

no additional monies would be required. The availability

of the sales agency to market the product was an important

factor in certain of the licensees’ decision to purchase the

Aqua-Sonic license. Some investors did not distinguish

between Aqua-Sonic and Ultrasonic and viewed the offer-

ing as a single package.

The promotional materials, neither offered nox advised

of the existence of any sales agent other than Ultrasonic

lena

38a

Opinion of the United States District Court

and in fact, although acceptance of Ultrasonic’s offer to

act as sales agent was purportedly an optional feature of

the Aqua-Sonic offering, all Aqua-Sonic licensees executed

the sales agency agreement. A fair construction of the pro-

motional materials and the depositions indicate that Aqua-

Sonic was responsible for the development and production

of the products and Aqua-Sonic, Ultrasonic and the Adver-

tising Fund for the marketing and promotion of the

products.

The Operation of the Enterprise

David Glasser (‘‘Glasser’’) became Aqua-Sonic’s first

president and sole shareholder primarily at the suggestion

of Kuris and his advisors. Glasser resigned in or about

August 1978 because, among other reasons, he was advised

in an opinion letter written by his attorney that the offer-

ing might be a security under the federal securities laws

and might involve violations of other laws, including anti-

trust and federal food and drug statutes. Glasser had also

become concerned when he was asked to sign, on behalf of

Aqua-Sonic a series of documents, including a note for over

$25 million with Dentasonic. Following Glasser’s resig-

nation, Hecht in the summer of 1978 recruited a friend,

defendant Melvin Hersch, to be president and sole share-

holder of Aqua-Sonic.

Leonard Suroff (‘‘Suroff’’) was recruited to be Ultra-

sonic’s president and sole shareholder. Suroff was a prac-

ticing patent attorney who was recommended by Kuris and

who had had some experience dealing with the dental sup-

ply depots. During the time Suroff was associated with

—

89a

Opinion of the United States District Court

Ultrasonic, all checks were signed by Hecht or one of his

law partners as well as by Suroff. Suroff never executed

any sales agency agreements. Following Suroff’s resigna-

tion in December 1978, as a consequence of the SEC investi-

gation, Hecht recruited Melvin Ehrlich, a professor of

physics, to be president of Ultrasonic. Ehrlich has been

president and sole shareholder since that time.

At the time the Aqua-Sonic licenses were sold to in-

vestors, the Steri Products were in the prototype stage

and required further development before they could be

manufactured and sold. Aqua-Sonic had retained LTS to

convert them into finished marketable products, and evi-

dence was presented that in the summer of 1978 production

early in 1979 did not seem unreasonable. However, the

models viven to LTS in late 1978 were incapable of deliv-

ering sterile fluid and required significant redesign.

LTS did developmental work on the early models which

resulted in the creation of its first prototype model in late

1979 after the encountering of difficulties in obtaining cer-

tain of the ultrasonic components. However, the model

was incapable of delivering sterile water. Various corre-

spondence and reports from ITS advised Aqua-Sonic of

the progress and problems in the development of the Steri

Products. At about the time Hecht severed his relationship

with Aqua-Sonic and became of counsel to SAH, in March

1979, Aqua-Sonie bad a bank balance exceeding $250,000.

As of June, 1981 the units were still not ready for sale,

since final production models had not been produced and

for a period of one year until the spring of 1981 no work

had been performed due to Aqua-Sonic’s instruction that

it would no longer pay LTS. Testimony at trial established

99

40a.

Opinion of the United States District Court

that additional changes are required to produce the Steri |

Satellite at an estimated cost of $8,00C to $10,000 plus the

$36,000.and $78,000. required for hard tooling. The design

and twoling will take an estimated 24 to 32 weeks. Soft

tooling would cost less than hard tooling but the end prod- .

uct would be of much lower quality and the life of the tool

itself would be short. In order to make the Steri Prophyy

Units into commercially marketable products, additional

design changes would take approximately three months to

make at an estimated cost of $15,000 to $20,000 and $61,000: -

to $118,000 for hard tooling. No clinical testing has ever.

been performed on either unit, The tooling for production

has not yet begun and approximately $1,200 remained in

Aqua-Sonie's bank account as of June 16, 1981. Further-

more, Aqua-Sonie’s two-year agreement with Kuris’ Cre-

ative Ultrasonics Corp. has expired and Kuris is no longer

obligated to perform any more consulting services in con-

nection with his inventions.

Misrepresentations and Omissions

Hecht and Inventel.concede that if the licenses are held

to be investment contracts, the securities laws were vio-

lated, initially, of course, by the failure to register the

securities. It is also conceded that other information which

would have been required was left out of the promotional

materials, namely the interests of the named defendants,

the role of SAH, and financial information relating to the

corporations involved including the use of proceeds, com- .

mitment, working capital and the reduced price at which

the licenses were offered to insiders. Of course, given the

view of the license adopted by the defendants, no financial

Ala

Opinion of the United States District Court

information was supplied, and thus the categories of infor-

mation just described; required to be included in offering

materials, were omitted.

The market report upon which the tax opinion was based

was produced within 24 hours on unverified information

und was sufficiently superficial with respect to market fac-

tors, prices and amortization to make the tax opinion on

which it was based misleading. The financial projections

were similarly empty of objective support, and the product

was not ready for market as represented. The absence of

‘any clinical testing of the Steri Products was not set forth,

nor ‘was the research adequate to permit reference to the

underlying definite casual relationship“ claimed between

the use of unsterile water and various infections. The pho-

tographs of the Steri Products carried the implication that

th were the finished product when in fact they were pro-

totypes incapable of performing their professed prophylac-

tic function. All these matters constituted misrepresenta-

tions or omissions of material facts required if the licenses

are considered to be securities.

The Role of Hecht and Inventel

Hecht participated in the discussions which led to the

formation and structure of the enterprise and the prepara-

tion of the described materials by the law firm of which he

was a member. He attended meetings at which the enter-

prise was discussed in order to explain the transactions,

both to those who would seek to interest licensees and licen-

sees themselves. He assisted in the recruiting of officers

of Aqua-Sonic and Ultrasonic. For services in organizing

the selling effort, Inventel, of which Hecht had been the sole

42a

Opinion of the United States District Court

shareholder since February, 1979, received $200 and has

rights to substantial additional funds to be divided among

Hecht, Schekter and Aber, if the enterprise goes forward

based upon Hecht’s efforts.

In Hecht’s own words, ‘‘I was trying to sell the sellers.

He did so in significant ways, including the dissemination

of the SAH opinion letter concerning the application of the

securities laws to the enterprise. He also participated not

only in the selling and the structuring of the transaction

but SAH, during the time he was a member, initially served

virtually all administrative functions for Ultrasonic and

Aqua-Sonic, kept the books, bank accounts and prepared

correspondence. Although Hecht was not an officer, director

or employee of those corporate defendants, as a partner of

SAH he participated in the administrative activities just

described in addition to his selling and personnel activities.

The Role of the SEC

In 1978 the SEC initiated inquiries concerning the enter-

prise, requested information and received by September,

1978 certain of the requested documents. In 1979 investi-

gative examinations were conducted. Hecht’s for example,

took place on August 29, 1979. This action was commenced

in August, 1980 and the motion for preliminary injunction

was made in December, 1980.

Tue Issues

From the outset of this proc ding, Hecht’s skilled coun-

sel has urged that but two issues have been presented: (1)

wehther the court has jurisdiction, and if so, (2) what re-

lief is appropriate. Both parties have concentrated primar-

ae

43a

Opinion of the United States District Court

ily on the first issue, whether or not the Aqua-Sonic offer-

ing of a license, coupled with an offer by Ultrasonic to act

as a sales agent, constituted the offering and sale of an

„investment contract under the rules laid down in SEC

v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). According to

Hecht and Inventel, this is a case of first impression. At

the least, it is one more of a long line of cases presenting

the difficulties of determining the essential elements of an

investment contract.“

Since the described materials were drafted to avoid the

very issue now raised by the SEC, an additional threshold

issue is presented by the claim of the SEC that the evidence

relevant to the jurisdiction issue includes not only the

knowledge and intent of the defendants but also the state

of mind and capacity of the licensees beyond that which is

proclaimed in the described materials and reflected in the

licensee’s answers to the Aqua-Sonic questionaires. There

lies in this issue the troublesome taint of an ex post facto

determination, a revisionist view of the transaction, result-

ing from attitudes contrary to those expressed on paper at

the time the transactions at issue took place.

Concivusions or Law

The Relevant Evidence

It is already the law of this case by virtue of the denial

of defendant’s motion for summary judgment that the

economic realities of the transaction are controlling, not

simply the documents which constitute the formalities of

the transaction involved. The authorities for that propo-

sition were cited in the court’s opinion of June 5 and need

not be reiterated.

N g

4

Opinion of the United States District Court

The enterprise and the described materials, by the very

nature of the operation of the securities laws, must be ex-

amined as of the time that the transaction took place, to-

gether with the knowledge and the objective intentions and

expectations of the parties at that time. United Housing

Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852-53 (1975);

Piambino v. Bailey, 610 F.2d 1306, 1320 (5th Cir. 1980),

cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 568 (1980); SEC v. Int'l Scanning

Devices, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] Fed.Sec.L.Rep. (CCH)

96,147 at 92,171-175 (W.D.N.Y. 1977). The subj

intentions or motivations of the investors are irrelevant.

Piambino v. Bailey, supra. To the extent that subsequent

events give rise to inferences that are relevant to the eco-

nomic reality of the transactions at the time they occurred,

they were considered, but only to that extent. The LTS

discussions, correspondence and projections in 1980 and

1981 do not give rise to such inferences though they may be

relevant to the question of relief.“ Similarly, the SEC’s

proposed findings relative to the operation of the dental

supply depots is disregarded beyond that which was con-

tained in the described materials. No probative evidence

was offered in this connection, nor could any findings be

made concerning the ability of the licensees to conduct their

proposed business in the absence of actual experience which

was precluded by the march of events.

In fact, no sales of the products occurred and no opinion

evidence was offered that such sales could or could not

have occurred in the contemplated manner even if the prod-

3. Even for that purpose, the testimony is of doubtful use, given

er ee ee

preclude Aqua-Sonic’s resumption of business.

Opinion of the United States District Court

© ucts had been available. Although Mi. Abrahamson might

have intended to retire to Maine where his franchise is

located, and although Mrs. Baxa and others had purchased

‘(franchises across the country from their home, there was

‘insufficient evidence upon which it could be found, as op-

posed to surmised, that the licensees were not capable of

vigorously promoting the sale of Steri Products as they had

warranted to do. It is significant, however, both in terms

of relief and in terms of contemporaneous construction, to

note that after the defendants received the Mandel memo,

indicating the possi’le applicability of the securities laws,

the language casting responsibility on the licensee was

further strengthened and reinforeed while none of the op-

erative feature of the enterprise was altered.

Finally, perhaps the most significant determination in

terms of evidence of economic reality is the definition of

the enterprise. Hecht and Iuventel seek to limit the evi-

dence—and consequently the court’s consideration—to the

promotional materials, the license to se!) the patented prod-

ucts and the offer of Ultrasonic to perform that task, sub-

ject to the. licensees’ control, right to know, and capacity

to cancel the services of Ultrasonic on stated terms and con-

ditions. In the felicitous example of counsel for the de-

fendants, the license is likened to the independent dealer-

ship for the sale of automobiles which has yet to be termed

by the SEC, or anyone else, an investment contract. Were

the inquiry and the evidence so limited, perhaps the defense

would prevail, but if all the facts relevant to the enterprise

as it operated in 1978 and early 1979 are considered, inelud-

ing the capitalization, stage of development of the Steri

Products, tax consequence, and method of operation, the

46a

Opinion of the United States District Court

economic reality differs materially from the exemplary au-

tomobile dealership. It is those facts, pressed forward by

the SEC under the criteria set forth in the authorities that

compel the declaration that the L.cense agreement and sales

agency executed by the licensees constituted an investment

contract.

The Relevant Criteria

Howey is the obvious starting place, and its three eri-

teria for determining an investment contract are easily

stated: (1) an investment of money, (2) in a common en-

terprise, (3) on an expectation of profit to be derived solely

from the efforts of the promoter or third parties. Here

the input of money and the common enterprise are con-

ceded and the profit element is only slightly in conflict. The

principal field of battle between the parties has been in

their contentions concerning the efforts of others. The

defendants place their chief reliance on the promotional

materials, which clearly state that the licensee has the right

to sell the Steri Products without using Ultrasonic as a

sales agent, without reliance upon sole efforts of the pro-

moter or third parties. They urge further that, even hav-

ing contracted for the services of Ultrasonic, the Aqua-

Sonic licensees retained substantial rights, powers and

duties. The SEC contends to the contrary, claiming that

the economic reality dictated sole or very substantial re-

liance on others.

Early on in the development of this line of vases, the

requirement that the profits be the result of the sole effort

of the promoter or a third party was modified to unde-

niably significant’’ efforts of others. SEC v. Glenn W.

47a

Opinion of the United States District Court

Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F. 2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973). The Court of Appeals for our

circuit has cited Turner with approval in Glen-Arden Com-

modities, Inc. v. Costanino, 493 F. 2d 1027, 1035 (2d Cir.

1974) and affirmed Judge Neaher when he employed the

Turner modification in SEC v. Galaxy Foods, Inc., 417 F.

Supp. 1225, 1239 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), af d mem. 556 F. 2d 559

(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 895 (1977). Sce also Wil-

liamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 418-19 (5th Cir. 1981). I

conclude therefore that Hecht and Inventel do not escape

the ‘‘efforts of others’’ criterion by reliance on the word

„solely. It is the significance of the efforts of others to

produce the profits that must be established.

Even under the narrow interpretation of the enterprise

urged by defendants, namely, the conduct of the business

of the licenses to sell Steri Products, viewed realistically,

any profits would have resulted from the efforts of others.

All licensees signed the Ultrasonic sales agency agreement

and all thus retained Ultrasonic to sell the Steri Products.

Whether or not certain licensees might also have exerted

efforts to sell will never be known, given the terms of the

consent decrees. The sales agency agreement itself, and

the showing as to its actual centrality to the entire scheme,

constitutes significant evidence, in the absence of contrary

testimony, that the efforts of others would be ‘‘undeniably

significant.’’ However, the enterprise in its totality con-

sisted of far more than the sales agency. No sales could

be achieved absent the product to be sold, and for that—

the development of the Steri Products from the rough pro-

totype stage—the licensees were entirely dependent on

Aqua-Sonic, a dependence which could not be relieved from

~ 48a

Opinion of the United States District Court

any other source. See Galaxy Foods, supra, 417 F. Supp.

at 1241-42.

There is a series of cases cited by the SEC where the

sale of a franchise or a comniodity with the offer of services

have been held to be investment contracts. Gen- Arden

ODommodities v. Costantino, supra; Continental Marketing

Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,

391 U.S. 905 (1968) ; SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distributors,

Ine., 388 F. Supp. 1288 (S. D. N. V. 1975); SEC v. Galaxy

PFoods, supra; see also SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., supra.

Hecht and Inventel cite cases where a sale of a franchise

or land together with the offer of services has heen held not

to constitute an investment contract where purchasers have

retained non-illusory rights or powers, Schulte v. Dain

' Corp., 568 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1978); Fargo Partners v. Dain

Corp., 540 F. 2d 912 (8th Cir. 1976); Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River

' ‘City Steak, Inc., 460 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1972), affirming

324 F. Supp. 640 (D. Colo. 1970) ; Chapman v. Rudd Paint

t Varnish Co., 409 F. 2d 635, 641 (9th Cir. 1969) ; Wieboldt

v. Metz, 355 F. Supp. 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); see generally

‘ Williamson v. Tucker; supra, 419-21, 424-25.

The criterion by which these two lines of cases can be

reconciled has been stated to be passivity, Galary Foods,

“supra, 417 F. Sapp. at 1241, dependence, or latent investor

-eontrol, Williamson, supra at 421. Because of the nature

of the products being offered, the character of the sales

‘agency and the nature of the industry to be served, the

Aqua-Sonie licensees were dependent, passive and incapable

of latent investor control, or, in other words, unable to ex-

erxeise ‘whatever powers over the enterprise they formally

>» -

49a

Opinion of the United States District Court

Another criterion has been advanced by the SEC, then

tentatively withdrawn, the so-called risk capital“ basis

which has evolved under the California and Hawaii Se-

cutities laws, see Stanley v. Commercial Courier Service,

Iac., 411 F. Supp. 818, 821-22 (D. Ore. 1975); Wiebolt v.

Metz, supra, at 259-62; Mr. Steak, supra, 324 F. Supp. at

646; and has been the subject of considerable commentary,

see Forman, supra, 421 U.S. at 857 n.24. While this ap-

proach has not been accepted in the federal courts as a sub-

stitute for the classic Howey test, nor is it so embraced

here, in my view such a theory can be subsumed under the

efforts of others test of Howey, or as an extension or

further definition of passivity or dependence. See Stanley,

supra, at 823; Wiebolt v. Metz, supra, at 260-61. What is

really at issue in this formulation is whether the enterprise

more closely resembles a traditional offer to invest, to put

money at risk dependent on the efforts of others, or the

purchase of a right to conduct a business hose resources

are or practically can be controlled by the purchaser, not

by the seller. Here, the cash used to purchase the license,

some $900,000, was, on the basis of this record, the only

cash in the enterprise. True, Aqua-Sonic possessed some

know-how and patent rights, but the only operating capital,

as the term is commonly understood, came from the pay-

ments of licensees. There were no bank loans, stock issues,

notes or any other financing made available to Aqua-Sonic.

On this tecord I am not reluctant to conclude that a risk

capital approach is helpful, and that under such a criterion,

the deseribed materials constituted an investment contract.

However, such a conclusion merely buttresses the conclu-

sions already set forth; perhaps consideration of the risk

50a

Opinion of the United States District Court

capital concept merely casts the criteria of passivity and

dependence in somewhat more traditional terms, traditional

at least in the commercial, if not the legal, world.

The economic reality here is that the fuel which drove

this enterprise as far as it went was the concept character-

ized by Hecht as a TABA:

‘I don’t like to use the term ‘investment’: This year

[1979] I call what I do a TABA which is a tax ad-

vantage business acquisition, because, literally, the in-

dividual is still acquiring a business and it is only

through the method of his acquisition that he obtains

tax benefits. In this particular case [Pool Patrol] the

structure of the acquisition of the license gives tax

benefits (Hecht Investigative Transcript at 102).

The defendants offered a tax shelter and sought to make

it possible for the licensees to take advantage of the tax

provisions described in the tax opinion contained in the de-

scribed material. This tax treatment was the emphasis of

the selling effort and the questionnaire, and apparently the

underlying motivation of the licensees. The year-end dis-

cussions between Mr. Abrahamson, on the way to the opera,

and his accountart, placed in clear outline the principal

feature of the enterprise—its tax effect. The defendants

sought by the form of the transaction to make the enter-

prise a business and not an investment contract, a TABA

and not a security. The economic reality was otherwise.

The defendants, perhaps perceiving the drift of the au-

thorities, urged this case be treated as one of first impres-

sion with unique facts. When pressed for the authorities

closest on the facts defendants cited Williamson and Mr.

Steak. To the same inquiry, the SEC responded Galazy

.

5la

Opinion of the United States District Court

Foods. The difference in the factual setting of eacn of the

cases cited seems to this court to reinforce the conclusions

reached above. A restaurant franchise or an undivided

interest in realty could be managed as an independent

business and possessed features other than those identified

with a traditional investment. The franchised sale of

groceries depended much more heavily on the ability of

others to obtain and deliver the goods. Here, as it in fact

turned out, the licensees were totally dependent on defend-

ants not only for the merchandising of Steri Products, in

which arguably the licensees could have been involved,

either practically or as a matter of right, but also upon

Aqua-Sonic for the products to be sold. Finally, the only

source for funds for such production was the payment by

the licensees. Although structured as a TABA, it turned

out to be an investment in which the licensees were at risk

and where in reality there was no latent investor control

of the enterprise nor any evidence of the existence or exer-

cise of such control other than the nominal right to sell the

products without Ultrasonic, a right which I conclude failed

to constitute control.

The Relief

Defendants have urged that the relief to be granted, if

any, for the violations—conceded and found—must meet

the strictures of SEC v. Commonwealth Chemical Secur-

ities, Inc., 574 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1978), affirming 410 F. Supp.

1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), a proposition not seriously chal-

lenged by the SEC. In determining whether or not to issue

a permanent injunction the Honorable Lloyd F. MacMahon

in Commonwealth listed the factors to be considered. 410

52a

Opinion of the United States District Court

F. Supp. at 1020, a listing which was quoted with approval

by the Court of Appeals, 594 F.2d at 100. Thee included

a finding of liability for illegal conduct, the degree of scien-

ter, whether the occurrence was an isolated one or not, con-

trition, and whether, because of his professional occupation,

the defendant might be in a position where future violations

could be anticipated.

Obviously, the liability has been found although Hecht

and Inventel are expected to continue their assertions that

the licenses were not investment contracts.“ At the same

time, the defendants throughout have been straightforward

and candid in their acknowledgment that no attempt was

made to comply with the securities law and have consist-

ently conceded a violation of those laws by way of a failure

to register, for example, if it is concluded, contrary to their

contention, that the enterprise involved an investment con-

tract. Of course, that concentrates the issue on the heart

of Judge Friendly’s opinion in Commonwealth, scienter

and the likelihood of similar future conduct.

On three occasions Hecht was made aware that other

members of the bar viewed the enterprise as one that might

be required to comply with the securities laws. The memo

of the associate of the Baer Marks firm was rendered to

SAH specifically with respect to this issue. Glasser and

Suroff, the first presidents of Aqua-Sonie and Ultrasonic,

resigned, stating that their counsel had raised questions

concerning the applicability of the securities laws and a

letter was shown to Hecht to that effect. Finally, of course,

the inquiries of the SEC itself constituted notice of the

4. bin tha wg Pade Sats cog tee i Shag Poe

held ing by the Honorable Neaher in Galary Foods,

but rather closely related scienter and future intent.

<i tae

53a

Opinion of the United States District Court

possibility of the impending litigation. However, the un-

favorable memorandum by the Baer Marks associate was

reviewed by a SAH associate, the authorities were appar-

ently discussed and the SAH partners reached a different

con ‘usion. Whatever their secret convictions may have

been, there is no direct evidence of a knowing violation.

Nevertheless, in the context of this case, under the law

of this circuit, recklessness Would amount to scienter. See

Oleck v. Fischer, $23 F. 2d 791, 794 (2d Cir. 1980). Here two

outside firms rendered opinions contrary to the final SAH

conclusion. The SAH conclusion was bottomed on research

and analysis by an associate who, it must be inferred, knew

the details of the enterprise including the financial interests

of his employer partners. Not to have obtained another

outside opinion and to rely on the opinion of financially in-

terested attorneys must be considered reckless under these

cireumstances, so reckless as to constitute scienter.

What then remains is the most significant af the factors,

the likelihood of fature violations by Hecht, who through

his counsel, professes an abandonment of the practice of

law. (As far as his relationship with SAH, this has been

established.) Hecht seems equally adamant in his intent

to continue the offering of TABA’s, whether those known

to tie SEC as a consequence of this investigation—the sale

of the pool alarm system or the ultrasonic toothbrush—or

other similar enterprises. A reading of Hecht’s investi-

gative transcript reveals a man who has obtained new

knowledge of an area of opportunity—the TABA—includ-

ing an identification of others who participate in the mer-

chandising of such acquisitions. The blurring of definitions

of these acquisitions and investment contracts is amply

54a

Opinion of the United States District Court

demonstrated by this litigation. It can therefore be in-

ferred that there is a likelihood that Hecht could again ere,

to view it charitably, in the same fashion as he has done

here. Therefore the requirements of Commonwealth have

been met and a permanent injunction will issue.

What really is at stake, one suspects, is not the oppro-

brium attached to District Court determination of a se-

curities act violation in a difficult and evolving area of the

law but rather the procedural consequences which would

flow from a permanent injunction and a contempt citation

which might flow from the injunction, were the SEC and

Hecht to differ in the future on the essential character of

a TABA which he might seek to sell. Obviously, every

effort should be made to fit the terms of any injunctive

relief to the violation found to have been committed. par-

ticularly here, where the argument has been advanced with

some force that even the SEC took over a yoar, or almost

two, depending on when one starts counting, to conclude

that Hecht and the other defendants had acted in violation

of the securities acts. It is to be hoped that the SEC will

help the court to clarify, or at least characterize, the con-

duct to be enjoined, by a description of the prohibited con-

duct in specific rather than general terms.

A judgment will be submitted on notice within ten (10)

days.

Ir Is So Onpenep.

Dated: New York, N.Y.

August 7, 1981

Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For tHe Ssconn Cmcurr

At a stated Term of the United States Court

of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the

United States Courthouse in the City of New

York, on the tenth day of June one thousand

nine hundred and eighty-two.

Present:

How. Henry J. Farewpiy

How. Irvine R. Kavur.man

How. Lawrence W. Prerce

Cireuit Judges

#81-6231

——_-

Securities AN Excuance ComMiIssion,

Plaintiff-Avpellee,

v.

Aqua-Sontc Prepucts, Corp., U:rrasontc DENTAL Propvcts,

Inc., et al.,

Defendants,

Martin E. Hecur and Invenret Corp.,

Defendants-A ppellants.

— 82 —

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of New York.

PR *

56a

Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of

record from the United States District Court for the South-

n District of New York, and was argued by counsei.

Ox Constpenation Wuentor, it is now hereby ordered,

adjudged, and desreed that the judgment of said District

Court be and it hereby is affirmed in accordance with the

opinion of this court with costs to be taxed against the

appellants.

A. Daniel Fusaro, Clerk

by /s/ Epwarp J. Guarparo

Edward J. Guardaro,

Deputy Clerk

b

57a

Statutes and Rules Involved

Section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933,

15 U.S.C. 77b(1)

§ 77). Definitions

When used in this subchapter, unless the context

otherwise requires—

(1) The term security“ means any note, stock,

treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebt-

edness, certificate of interest or participation in any

profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate,

preorganization certificate or subscription, transfer-

able share, investment contract, voting-trust cer-

tificate, certificate of deposit for a security, frac-

tional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral

rights, or, in general, any interest or instrument com-

monly known as a security“, or any certificate of

interest or participation in, temporary or interim

certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant

or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the

foregoing.

Sections 5(a) & (c) of the Securities Act of 1933,

15 U.S.C. 77e(a) & (e)

§ Ne. Prohibitions relating to interstate commerce and

the mails

(a) Sale or delivery after sale of unregistered securities

Unless a registration statement is in offect as to a

security, it shall be unlawful for any person, directly

or indirectly—

(1) to make use of any means or instruments of

transportation or communication in interstate com-

58a

Statutes and Rules Involved

merce or of the mails to sell such security throngh

the use or medium of any prospectus or otherwise; or

(2) to carry or cause to be carried through the

mails or in interstate commerce, by any means or in-

struments of transportation, any such security for

the purpose of sale or for delivery after sale.

(c) Necessity of filing registration statement

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or in-

directly, to make use of any means or instruments of

transportation or communication in interstate com-

merce or of the mails to offer to sell or offer to buy

through the use or medium of any prospectus or other-

wise any security, unless a registration statement has

been filed as to such security, or while the registration

statement is the subject of a refusal order or stop order

or prior to the effective date of the registration state-

ment) any publie proceeding or examination under sec-

tion 77h of this title.

Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933,

15 U.S.C. 77q(a)

§77q. Fraudulent interstate transactions

(a) Use of interstate commerce for purpose of fraud

or deceit

It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or

sale of any securities by the use of any means or instru-

ments of transportation or communication in interstate

commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or in-

directly

59a

Statutes and Rules Involved

(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to

det raud, or a

(2) to obtain money or property by means of any

untrue statement of a material fact or any omission

to state a material fact necessary in order to make

the statements made, in the light of the circumstances

under which they were made, not misleading, or

(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or

course of business which operates or would operate

as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.

Section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange

Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78c(10)

§ 78c. Definitions and application

(a) Definitions

When used in this chapter, unless the context othe: -

wise requires—

(10) The term ‘‘security’” means any note, stock,

treasury stock, bond, debenture, certificate of interest

or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in

any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any

collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate

or subscription, transferable share, investment con-

tract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit, for

a security, or in general, any instrument commonly

known as a ‘‘security’’; or any certificate of interest or

participation in, temporary or interim certificate for,

receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or pur-

chase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include cur-

rency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker’s

60a

Statutes and Rules Involved

acceptance which has a maturity at the time of issu-

ance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of

grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is

likewise limited.

Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange

Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b)

§ 78j. Manipulative and deceptive devices

It shall be unlawful for a::y person, directly or in-

directly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of

interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility

of any national securities exchange—

(b) To use or emplay, in connection with the pur-

chase or sale of any security registered on a national

securities exchange or any security not so registered,

any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in

contravention of such rules and regulations as the Com-

mission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in

the public interest or for the protection of investors.

Commission Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR 240.10b-5

§ 240.10b-5 Employment of manipulative and decep-

tive devices.

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or in-

directly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of

interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility

of any national securities exchange,

(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to

defraud,

7 1

61a

Statutes and Rules Involved

(b) To make any untrue statement of a material

fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in

order to make the statements made, in the light of the

circumstances under which they were made, not mis-

leading, or

(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of

business which operates or would operate as a fraud

or deceit upon any person, in connection with the pur-

chase or sale of any security.

2

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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