Brief for the United States — Rice v. Rehner

Supreme Court brief1982

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QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether 18 U.S.C. 1161 grants the States authority

to impose liquor licei.sing requirements and fees upon In-

dian tribal entities or tribal Indians acting under tribal

authorization engaged in the business of selling liquor

within an Indian reservation.

(1)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

The interest of the United States :

1111 8

Introduction and summary of argument 6

Argument:

I. 18 U.S.C. 1161 does not grant the States au-

thority to require a tribal vendor of liquor to

obtain a State liquor license in order to operate

on a tribal Reservation 6— 9

II. The Twenty-First Amendment does not grant

the States regulatory jurisdiction over tribal In-

dians on their Reservations 22

r b 27

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373.......7, 12, 13, 17, 18,

19, 21, 22, 25

California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 20

Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona Tax Commission,

r 2, 8

Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S.

—1ͤ¹.wm¹ ⅛ ur Lĩꝛĩ⏑̃ve;ͤ ˙—ie . 8, 23, 26

Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Moe, 392

F. Supp. 1297, aff’d, 425 U.S. 463 7

Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240 10

EPA v. State Water Resources Control Board, 426

17000TTTT—000—T0——————————— 18, 19

Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 16 18, 19

McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 411

1 ⁵˙ 0—½—— 2, 8, 13, 20, 24, 25

Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130. 12, 13

Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145. 10, 16, 25

Mescalero Apache Tribe v. New Mezico, 630 F.2d

724, vacated, 450 U.S. 1036, on remand, 677 F. 2d

55, cert. granted, No. 82-331 (Nov. 15, 1982) 6

(u.)

1

Cases Continued:

Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 8ꝝ2

Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes,

ee

Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544444.

Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 _..........................

People v. Bray, 105 Cal. 344, 38 P. 711

Ramah Navajo School Board, Inc. v. Bureau of

Revenue, No. 80-2162 (July 2, 198277 6

Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532

— —2 8 26

9

22

2 2 8 1

=

—

S

State v. Lindsey, 138 Wash. 140, 233 P. 327

United States v. John, 437 U.S. 664„

United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 54. 10, 11, 12

United States v. State Tax Commission, 412 U.S.

WWW 8, 23, 24, 26

United States v. State Tax Commission, 421 U.S.

1 A ˙¹—ẽ¹ —¾üQͤò̃ VW las 24, 25

United States v. New Merico, 590 F.2d 323, cert.

. 2

r q 2, 8

Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Col-

ville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 114444 6

White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Arizona, 649

6

6

Williams v. Lee, 368 U.S. 217777 8

Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 71111 22

Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. [6 Pet.] 518 — 25

Zaste v. North Dakota, AL-75-29 (D. N. D. Janu-

. 2

Constitution, statutes and rule:

United States Constitution:

Article I, Section 8, Cl. 3

Article II, Section 2, Cl. 2 ................................-- 24

Twenty-First Amendment 5, 6, 8, 22, 23, 24, 25

Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 732 1 q

Act of August 15, 1876, 25 U.S.C. 261 —... 2,4,8

— —äää ee cece ewes ccecoeoees

Vv

Constitution, statutes and rule—Continued

Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S. C. 1423232

Clean Air Act:

Section 118, 42 U.S.C. 1857ꝶ

Section 118, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV) 7418

Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments

of 1972:

Section 313, 33 U.S.C. 1323 ema 19

Section 313, 33 U.S.C. (Supp. Vv) 1323 ä 19

Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. 115338 22

Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, Section 8, 32

r een 20

Public law No. 277, 67 Stat. 58 12

Public Law No. 280, 67 Stac. 588 12, 14-15, 20, 21, 26

Section 2, 18 U.S.C. 1162 .......................... 14, 20, 21, 26

Section 4, 28 U.S.C. 1360 * 7, 20, 21, 26

Section 4 (a), 28 U.S.C. 1360 (a n 21

r ö] —— 10

414 — 6 — — 22

1111 T eeee ne 8 4, 11, 22

JA ceed tenstmncntentnecennennetin 9

FETA Nace na ne 10

„I 4 „ 10

TES AT aT 10, 11, 22

4 Ce passim

re ee 21

25 U.S.C. 767 ............... aa li ee aii ae 21

r ee 8,9

Cal. Bus. and Prof. Code § 23000 (West repl.

1964 & Cum. Supp. 1982) et seg... 4

Z eiatcietinharieninmastinammneninememeneiien 26

„ 26

ꝗX— . eee eentcabeenaten 5

K —— . iasitaiasitett 5

ü ů—zuũ— 5

— ee 5

—— .. 26

— — * 26

VI

Constitution, statutes and rule—Continued

Cal. Penal Code § 398 (West 1954)

K TT TCR 6— —

Miscellaneous:

25 Fed. Reg. 3343 (1980: ***

37 Fed. Reg. 1253-1254 (1971777)

ret

H. R. No. 1055, 83d Cong., Ist Sess. (1953)

H.R. Rep. No. 775, 83d Cong., Ist Sess. (1953)

Hearings on H.R. 1055 Before the Comm. on In-

terior and Insular Affairs, 83d Cong., Ist Sess.

Kꝗ4•L‚—; , En SRI PLR SE Crane an

Hearings on H.R. 1055 Before the Subcomm. on

Indian Affairs of the House Comm. on Interior

and Insular Affairs, 85a Cong., Ist Sess. (1953)

1 C. Kappler, Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties

r !

S. Rep. No. 722, 83d Cong. Ist Sess. (1953) *

State Legal Jurisdiction In Indian Country: Hear-

ings on H.R. 459, H.R. 3235 and H.R. 3624 Be-

fore the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the

House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs,

82d Cong., 2d Sess. 29-34 (195277

U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Federal Indian Law

11WW6WWWWGWWWWWWTT

11

2

15

16, 17

16

15

14

In the Supreme Cuurt of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1982

No. 82-401

BAXTER RICE, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS DIRECTOR OF THE

DEPARTMENT OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL

OF CALIFORNIA, PETITIONER

V.

Eva REHNER

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THF UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE

THE INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES

The present case arises under 18 U.S.C. 1161, which

exempts from an array of otherwise applicable federal

criminal proscriptions attaching to the sale of liquor in

Indian country any transaction carried out “in conformity

both with the laws of the State in which [it] occurs and

with an ordinance duly adopted by the tribe having juris-

diction over such area of Indian country, certified by the

S_retary of the Interior, and published in the Federal

Register.” The question presented is whether this federal

statute grants State governments the power to require

tribal Indians or tribal enterprises that intend to sell

alcoholic beverages on trust lands within an Indian Res-

ervation pursuant to tribal authorization to secure State

licenses.

(1)

The United States has a special relationship with the

Indian tribes generally. See McClanahan v. Arizona T'ax

Commission, 411 U.S. 164, 168-169 (1973). In addition,

Eva Rehner, respondent in this case, is federally licensed

as an Indian trader pursuant to 25 U.S.C. 261. The

United States has an interest in protecting its authority

to regulate trading on an Indian Reservation. See Ceni:ai

Machinery Co. v. Arizona Tax Commission, 448 U.S. 160,

163 (1980) ; Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Com-

mission, 380 U.S. 685, 690 (1965).

The United States has consistently interpreted 18

U.S.C. 1161 as not granting States regulatory licensing

power cover tribal Indians. In 1971, the Solicitor of the

Department of the Interior issued an opinion concerning

the application of Montana’s liquor licensing laws to a

tribal Indian on Rocky Boy’s Reservation, 78 Interior Dec.

39, concluding that Section 1161 does not grant the

States licensing jurisdiction over tribal Indians doing

business on Reservations In 1977, the United States filed

suit on behalf of the Mescalero Apache Tribe to prevent

the State of New Mexico from imposing its liquor licens-

ing requirements on the Inn of the Mountain Gods, a

tribal resort on its Reservation. In that case the United

States District Court for the District of New Mexico and

the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

held that 18 U.S.C. 1161 did not grant the State licensing

jurisdiction over the tribal enterprise; this Court denied

review. United States v. New Merico, 590 F.2d 323

(10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979).

And, beginning in 1978, the United States participated

as amicus curiae in the proceedings before the Ninth

Circuit in the present case. Again, the government ar-

gued that Section 1161 does not grant States licensing

jurisdiction over tribal Indians or tribal enterprises en-

gaging in liquor transactions on Indian Reservations.

1 A similar result was reached in Zaste v. North Dakota, AL-75-29

(D.N.D. Jan. 31, 1977), an unreported case in which the United

States did not participate.

Section 1161 is a statute of nationwide applicability

affecting all Indian Reservations. These Reservations dif-

fer in location, size, tribal organization, and non-Indian

presence. Many of the largest Reservations, such as the

Navajo Reservation, which occupies an area in excess of

20,000 square miles, have highly developed tribal govern-

ments and extremely limited non-Indian presence within

Reservation boundaries. Because Section 1161 is a na-

tionwide statute, an interpretation of its terms binds

all Reservations regardless of local circumstances. Peti-

tioner’s suggestion (Pet. Br. 80-81) that this Court

decide this case in his favor based upon local circum-

stances not shown to have been within the contemplation

of Congress is accordingly of particular concern to the

United States.

A conclusion that 18 U.S.C. 1161 embodies a grant of

authority to require State licensure of tribal Indians and

tribal entities selling liquor under tribal authorization

would significantly undermine federal policies favoring

tribal self-determination and economic development of In-

dian Reservations. Such jurisdiction would grant to the

States the power to select the tribal member or, indeed,

tribal entity, who may engage in liquor transactions on

Reservations, even for purposes of transactions involving

only tribal members. Imposition of licensing requirements

would also create a substantial, if not insurmountable,

barrier to tribal economic development efforts based upon

resorts and retail establishments, especially in sparsely

populated areas.

The United States is not insensitive to the policy con-

siderations advanced by the State. It is our view, how-

ever, that the relevant State interests do not require and

cannot support the proposed interpretation of Section

1161 as a source of plenary State regulatory authority.

Section 1161 itself requires the tribal ordinance per-

mitting Reservation liquor transactions to be certified by

the Secretary of the Interior. Legitimate State concerns

respecting on-Reservation liquor sale activities may be ac-

4

commodated through the certification process and the co-

operation of interested federal, State and tribal authori-

ties.

STATEMENT

1. Eva Rehner is a member of the Pala Band of the

Mission Indians. She operates a general store located on

trust land within the Pala Reservation in San Diego

County, California. The Pala Reservation was created by

an Executive Order of the President of December 27,

1875, which set apart the land “for the permanent use

and occupancy of the Mission Indians in Lower Califor-

nia.” 1 C. Kappler, Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties 820-

821 (2d ed. 1904). Rehner is licensed by the Bureau of

Indian Affairs of the United States Department of the

Interior to trade on the Reservation under the provisions

of the Act of Aug. 15, 1876, ch. 289, 25 U.S.C. 261.

Under longstanding federal law, introduction of liquor

into Indian country is generally prohibited. 18 U.S.C.

1154. This prohibition does not apply, however, to “any

act or transaction * * * in conformity both with the laws

of the State in which [it] occurs and with an ordinance

duly adopted by the tribe having jurisdiction * * *.” 18

U.S.C. 1161. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1161, the Pala Band

adopted an ordinance permitting the “introduction, sale

or possession of intoxicating beverages * * * within the

Indian country under the jurisdiction of the Pala Band

** *.” 25 Fed. Reg. 3343 (1960). This ordinance was

approved by the Secretary of the Interior on April 11,

1960. Id.

In the mid-1970’s Rehner determined to sell distilled

spirits at her general store, but was informed by the Cali-

fornia State Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control

that she had first to obtain an off-sale general license

from the Department. Off-sale general licenses make up

one of the classes of liquor licenses issued by the State

authorities, see Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 23000 et seq.

(West repl. 1964 & Cum. Supp. 1982). An application for

a new license in this category must be accompanied by a

fee of $6,000 which is deposited into the general fund of

the State treasury. Bus. & Prof. Code § 23954.5 (West

Cum. Supp. 1982). In addition, the State imposes an

annual license fee of $350. Bus. & Prof. Code § 23320(21)

(West Cum. Supp. 1982). The number of licenses that

may be issued within a county is limited by a quota deter-

mined by reference to population. Bus. & Prof. Code

§ 23817. Off-sale general licenses are, however, transfer-

able. Bus. & Prof. Code § 24070 (West Cum. Supp.

1982). Rehner alleges that such licenses were being sold

on the open market for approximately $55,000 in 1977.

2. On February 10, 1977, Rehner filed suit in the

United States District Court for the Southern District of

California seeking a declaratory judgment that she was

not required to obtain a California State liquor license

to sell distilled spirits at her store and seeking an order

directing the California authorities to inform wholesalers

that sale of liquor to her was permissible. The district

court granted petitioner’s motion to dismiss, ruling that

18 U.S.C. 1161 required Rehner to obtain a State license

to sell liquor at her store.

On appeal, the petitioner claimed that 18 U.S.C. 1161

granted the State jurisdiction to require State licensing

of triba) Indians wishing to sell liquor on the Pala Reserva-

tion. He did not assert that the Twenty-First Amend-

ment to the United States Constitution conferred such

power on the States. This appeal was originally argued

in the spring of 1979 before a three-judge panel of the

Ninth Circuit. Before any opinion was rendered by that

panel, two other cases presenting related questions in-

volving tribes in the State of Washington, came before

the court of appeals.* The three cases were then sched-

uled together for argument to an en banc panel of 11

members. See 9th Cir. R. 25.

The en banc court, with Judge Goodwin dissenting, re-

versed the judgment of the district court in this case.

2 The additional cases were: “Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. Wash-

ington, No. 79-4403 (9th Cir.) and Tulalip Tribe v. Washingt: ..,

No. 79-4404 (9th Cir.).

The court held that 18 U.S.C. 1161 did not confer licens-

ing jurisdiction on the States (Pet. App. 8-A to 27-A).

Upon consideration of the additional issues raised by the

companion cases, the court of appeals remanded for con-

sideration in light of Washington v. Confederated Tribes

of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980),

respecting the questions whether the State of Washington

may tax tribal sales of liquor to non-tribal members and

impose record-keeping requirements (Pet. App. 27-A to

30-A). See page 26 note 23, infra. The court of appeals

also rejected Washington’s contention that the Twenty-

First Amendment to the United States Constitution

granted the States regulatory jurisdiction over tribal

liquor transactions on Indian Reservativus (Pet. App.

30-A to 32-A).

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

It is useful to begin by specifying the issues this case

does and does not present. First, unlike many of this

Court’s recent decisions, there is here no question respect-

ing State taxation of Reservation activities of non-

Indians. Compare Ramah Navajo School Board, Inc. v.

Bureau of Revenue, No. 80-2162 (July 2, 1982); White

Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980) ;

Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian

Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980). Nor does this case in-

volve general State regulation of non-Indian activities on

Indian Reservations. Compare generally White Mountain

Apache Tribe v. Arizona, 649 F.2d 1274 (9th Cir. 1981) ;

Mescalero Apache Tribe v. New Mexico, 630 F.2d 724

(10th Cir. 1980), vacated, 450 U.S. 1036 (1981), on

remand, 677 F.2d 55 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. granted,

No. 82-331 (Nov. 15, 1982).* Finally, there is no issue

Some of the amici interpret the court of appeals’ decision as

holding that Indian Tribes have exciusive power to license non-

Indians to engage in liquor transactions on reservations. See, e.g.,

Amicus Br. for Minnesota, et al. 10-13. While there is introductory

language in the court of appeals’ opinion (Pet. App. 1-A) that lit-

erally may be so read, the cases before the court did not present that

7

concerning State power to enforce its liquor laws and

policies by means other than through a business privilege

licensing requirement.“

Instead, the only question presented here is whether

the State has authority to require a tribal Indian or a

tribal entity to obtain a State liquor license for the privi-

lege of engaging in liquor transactions within the con-

fines of the tribal Reservation. Thus, this case returns the

Court to an area of law last visited in 1976: the direct

regulatory power of States over tribal Indian activities on

their Reservations. See Moe v. Confederated Salish &

Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976); Bryan v. Itasca

County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976). In Moe the Court affirmed

the decision of a three-judge district court holding that

the State of Montana lacked authority to “require a mem-

ber of [an Indian tribe] who sells cigarettes on the [tri-

bal] Reservation to possess its cigarette dealer’s license.”

Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Moe, 392 F.

Supp. 1297, 1317 (D. Mont. 1975), aff’d, 425 U.S. 463, 480-

481 (1976). In Bryan, this Court held that the grant of

general civil adjudicatory jurisdiction made to particular

States in Section 4 of Public Law 280, 28 U.S.C. 1360,

did not “confer upon the States general civil regulatory

question and it is our view that the court of appeals properly left that

question undecided. We note that this case involves a tribal Indian

doing business on trust land within her Reservation and that Tulalip

and Muckleshoot involved tribal liquor authorities exercising a

monopoly on liquor sales within their Reservations. The question

shether an Indian tribe can authorize a non-Indian to engage in

Reservation liquor transactions without obtaining an otherwise

required State license is not presented here.

* The court of appeals held that “so long as Mrs. Rehner complies

with the certified tribal ordinance authorized by 18 U.S.C. 1161,

she need not obtain a California license to sell liquor in Indian

country” (Pet. App. 36-A). The court of appeals did not address

respondent’s demand that the petitioner be directed to inform

wholesalers that liquor could properly be sold to her, and that aspect

of the case appears to have been rendered moot by the enactment

of legislation by the State. See Br. in Opp. 4-5, A-1.

powers, including taxation, over reservation Indians” (426

US. at 390).

The basic rule is that “ ‘State laws generally are not

applicable to tribal Indians on an Indian reservation ex-

cept where Congress has expressly provided that State

laws shall apply.“ McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax

Commission, 411 U.S. 164, 170-171 (1973) (quoting U.S.

Dep’t of the Interior, Federal Indian Law 845 (1958) );

see Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959). As a gen-

eral matter, therefore, this Court’s decisions establish that

States lack regulatory jurisdiction to impose licensing re-

quirements on tribal Indians or entities doing business on

Reservations. In this particular case, moreover, the fed-

eral exclusion of State power to imposing a license re-

quirement respecting Rehner’s on-Reservation commercial

activities is especially clear, for Rehner is federally li-

censed as an Indian trader pursuant to 25 U.S.C. 261—

a scheme which leaves “no room * * * for state laws

imposing additional burdens on traders.” Warren Trad-

ing Post v. Arizona Tax Commission, 380 U.S. 685, 690

(1965). See also Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona Tax

Commission, supra, 448 U.S. at 165-166.

The only question that this case properly presents in

its present posture, is whether special provisions of

federal law governing liquor transactions alter this

allocation of regulatory power and grant the States

regulatory jurisdiction they would not otherwise possess

simply because liquor is involved. As shown below, 18

U.S.C. 1161 does not contain a jurisdictional grant to the

States. The Twenty-First Amendment to the United

States Constitution, while increasing the States’ powers

within their jurisdiction, does not extend the territorial

scope of that jurisdiction. Collins v. Yosemite Park &

Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518, 538 (1938); United States v.

State Tax Commission, 412 U.S. 363, 378 (1973). Ace-

cordingly, neither of these provisions grants the States

regulatory jurisdiction to license tribal Indians and en-

tities to engage in liquor transactions within the confines

of their Reservation.

ARGUMENT

I

18 U.S.C. 1161 DOES NOT GRANT THE STATES AU-

THORITY TO REQUIRE A TRIBAL VENDOR OF

LIQUOR TO OBTAIN A STATE LIQUOR LICENSE IN

ORDER TO OPERATE ON A TRIBAL RESERVATION

1. Since 1834, federal law has prohibited liquor trans-

actions involving tribal Indians. Act of June 30, 1834,

ch. 161, 4 Stat. 732. As it stood in 1953, the federal prohibi-

tion, which forms a part of the criminal code, had several

parts. First, the sale of liquor to tribal Indians anywhere

in the United States was prohibited. 18 U.S.C. 1154 (a).“

5 Specifically, the law prohibited sale to an Indian to “whom an

allotment of land has been made” while legal title to the land re-

mained in the United States, to an Indian “who is a ward of the

Government” or to an Indian “over whom the Government * * *

exercises guardianship.” The federal liquor prohibition applicable

outside Indian country accordingly did not establish a racial classifi-

cation but, instead, was a manifestation of the special relationship

between tribal Indians and the federal government. See Morton v.

Maneari, 417 U.S. 535, 552-554 (1974).

In contrast to the federal prohibition, State laws which also

prohibited sales of liquor to Indians appear to have established a

true racial classification. Indeed, the case petitioner cites for the

proposition that the States historically exercised authority to regu-

late Indian transactions involving liquor was based upon such a stat-

ute. People v. Bray, 105 Cal. 344, 38 P. 731 (1894). In that case a

non-Indian was prosecuted under State law for selling liquor to an

assimilated Indian, with no tribal affiliation, not living on any Reser-

vation. The State court held that the State prohibition applied to

Indians as a race. Whatever the validity of such a State law under

modern standards of equal protection, this State precedent hardly

serves as a basis for the assertion of State regulatory jurisdiction

over a tribal Indian engaged in liquor transactions on a Reservation.

Of all the State cases cited by petitioner (Pet. Br. 40), only one

explicitly concerns State jurisdiction over on-Reservation activities,

and that case involved the Reservation activities of non-Indians.

State v. Lindsey, 133 Wash. 140, 233 P. 327 (1925). There the State

prosecuted a non-Indian for manufacturing liquor within the exterior

confines of a Yakima Reservation. The court found jurisdiction

10

Second, the introduction of liquor into Indian country was

prohibited. Ibid. Third, the federal statutes prohibited

possession of intoxicants in Indian country. 18 U.S.C.

1156.° When Congress set out in 1953 to eliminate these

federal liquor restrictions which discriminated against

Indians, it did not simply repeal these criminal statutes.

Rather, Congress overlaid the existing prohibitions with

18 U.S.C. 1161, which is the subject of the dispute in

this case, thereby establishing a division of jurisdictional

authority congruent with the ordinary distribution of ju-

risdictional power respecting the activities of Indians.’

Outside Indian country, where tribal Indians are gen-

erally subject to nondiscriminatory State law, see Mes-

calero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-149

based on this Court’s ruling in Draper v. United States, 164 U.S.

240 (1896) and explicitly found that “no personal or property right

of an Indian” was involved in the case. 233 P. at 328. The remain-

ing cases cited by petitioner involved laws similar to that considered

in People v. Bray, supra, prohibiting sale to Indians on the basis of

race.

The cases cited by petitioner rest upon statutes enacted before

repeal in 1953 of the absolute federal ban on liquor sale and posses-

sion in Indian country, and therefore could in no event lend sup-

port to petitioner’s thesis (Pet. Br. 38-40) that Congress was aware

of, and acquiesced in, State exercise of regulatory authority over on-

Reservation liquor trade. Because federal law and the State laws in

question prohibited sale of liquor to tribal Indians in Indian country

at that time, no question as to State authority to require licensure

or to regulate the terms and conditions of sale could have arisen.

®In 1949, the definition of Indian country was modified for the

purposes of the federal liquor prohibitions. The general definition,

set out at 18 U.S.C. 1151, was amended to exclude “fee-patented

lands in non-Indian communities or rights of way through Indian

reservations.” 18 U.S.C. 1154(c) and 1156. In United States v.

Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975), the Court considered the application

of the term “non-Indian communities.”

Another federal liquor prohibition, not affected by enactment of

18 U.S.C. 1161, outlaws intoxicants at Indian schools “in the former

Indian Country.” 18 U.S.C, 1155. That statute is not involved in

this case.

11

(1973), Congress in Section 1161 simply made the federal

liquor prohibitions inapplicable.* Within Indian country,

however, where tribes exercise inherent tribal sover-

eignty, the criminal prohibitions on liquor sale and pos-

session were lifted to the extent that particular transac-

tions were undertaken “in conformity both with the laws

of the State in which such act or transaction occurs and

with an ordinance duly adopted by the tribe having juris-

diction over such area of Indian country, certified by the

Secretary of the Interior and published in the Federal

Register” 18 U.S.C. 1161. But this conditional exemption

from the otherwise applicable federal criminal sanctions

was in favor of the Tribes, not the State. As the Court

explained in United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 547

(1975), Section 1161 is

local-option legislation allowing Indian tribes, with

the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, to regu-

late the introduction of liquor into Indian Country,

so long as state law was not violated.““

2. a. The court of appeals correctly concluded that 18

U.S.C. 1161 does not grant the States authority to require

purveyors of liquor under tribal authority to obtain a State

license as a condition of operation. On its face, as the

The pertinent portion of 18 U.S.C. 1161 provides that the pro-

visions of 18 U.S.C. 1154 and 1156 “shall not apply within any area

that is not Indian country.”

*In Mazurie, the Court also concluded that the delegation of

authority to the tribes in 18 U.S.C. 1161 was constitutional in

the context of tribal regulation of a non-Indian doing business on

the Reservation. 419 U.S. at 557. The Court also noted that tribes

have some measure of inherent authority within the Reservation over

non-Indians who do business with tribal members or who affect the

internal or social relations of tribal life. Ibid. See also Montana v.

United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-566 (1981).

The tribal ordinance of the Wind River Reservation at issue

in Mazurie, supra, required non-Indians to obtain both State and

tribal liquor licenses. In contrast, tribal members were required

only to obtain a tribal license. 37 Fed. Reg. 1253-1254 (1971).

court of appeals observed (Pet. App. 13-A), Section 1161

is not “a jurisdictional grant to anyone; it simply pro-

vides for the inapplicability of certain federal criminal

statutes under specified conditions.” It is significant,

moreover, that Congress enacted Section 1161 as part of

the federal penal code, Title 18. Here, as in Bryan v.

Itasca County, supra, 426 U.S. at 384 n.11 (addressing

civil jurisdiction under Public Law 280), it is plain that

“(Section 1161] would be expected to be codified in Title

25, governing Indian affairs if * * * state regulatory”

power over Indian reservations were being granted.”

The most that can be said is that Section 1161 reflects

Congress’ intention that the law of the State in which

an on-Reservation liquor transaction occurs provide sub-

stantive limits upon conduct that may be undertaken un-

der the jurisdiction of the tribe without incurring liabil-

ity under the federal criminal law.“

1% In Bryan v. Itasca County, the Court also considered the title

of the legislation and of the codified enactment to be significant

indicators of congressional intent. 426 U.S. at 384 n.11. Here, of

course, the introductory title of the leigslation, “An Act to eliminate

certain discriminatory legislation against Indians in the United

States,” Public Law No. 277, 67 Stat. 586, contains not the slightest

suggestion that tribal authority over on-Reservation activities was to

be subjected to State jurisdiction. Similarly the title prescribed by

Congress for Section 1161 itself, “Application of Indian Liquor

Laws” contains no such suggestion.

11 As to the tribes themselves, there was no need for Section 1161

actually to bestow regulatory authority respecting reservation liquor

transactions—at least when conducted by tribal members or entities

—for the tribes possess important “attributes of sovereignty over

both their members and their territory.” United States v. Mazurie,

supra, 419 U.S. at 557. It was thus sufficient as to the tribes that

Section 1161 removed the pre-existing federal law impediment to

exercise of tribal authority. Of course, in Mazurie, 419 U.S. at 547,

556-558, the Court recognized that Section 1161 did bestow upon the

tribes authority to regulate liquor transactions by non-Indians in

Indian country, reserving the question whether, as to such non-

Indians, the inherent authority of the tribe would be a sufficient

basis for the exercise of tribal authority. Cf. Merrion v. Jicarilla

13

b. Nor can it be said that Section 1161 recognizes

State authority to impose licensing requirements upon

tribal members selling liquor under tribal authority (com-

pare page 12 note 11, supra). The longstanding policy of

the United States to leave tribal Indians free from State

jurisdiction and control has been recognized by this Court.

McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Commission, supra, 411 U.S.

at 168. In deference to this policy, the Court has required

a direct and unambiguous indication of congressional in-

tent to depart therefrom in considering claims that a par-

ticular statute grants the States jurisdiction over the

Reservation activities of tribal Indians. Bryan v. Itasca

County, supra, 426 U.S. at 392. Doubtful expressions are

resolved against claims of State authority. Ibid. In light

of these cannons of construction, petitioner’s claim that

Section 1161 recognizes State licensing authority over

Reservation vendors of liquor is unsound.

First, as the court of appeals observed (Pet. App. 11-A

to 15-A), insofar as Section 1161 recognizes the authority

of the States to legislate respecting the sale of liquor in In-

dian country, that authority is not identical to that of the

tribes, and does not extend to regulation, administration

of State law standards, or to licensing. As to the tribes,

the authority recognized (see page 12 note 11, supra) is

described by the statute in terms of exercise of “jurisdic-

tion,” whereas the authority of the State is merely de-

scribed as the application of subsisting “laws”—norms of

conduct. The absence of any parallel reference to State

jurisdiction is a telling indication that Congress did not ex-

pect or intend the States actually to administer a regula-

tory scheme affecting Reservation liquor transactions oc-

curring under the “jurisdiction” of the tribe.

Congress’ understanding that State and tribal authority

were not congruent is also reflected in the statutory de-

Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 140-141, 147 (1982). As we explain

in the ensuing text, neither the language nor the legislative history

of Section 1161 suggests that an identical grant of authority was

made to the States.

14

scriptions of the instruments by which a State and a tribe

were respectively to exercise their authority. The tribe is

to enact a specific ordinance for this purpose, which must

be specially certified by the Secretary. Enactment of such

ordinances was, of courr®, necessary because under the pre-

existing statutory scheme there was no reason for the

tribes to have legislated on this subject. Congress ap-

pears to have intended that such newly-enacted ordi-

nances form the plenary authority under which Reserva-

tion liquor transactions might take place. By contrast,

Congress contemplated that the State’s authority be given

effect through the general requirement of conformity with

“the laws of the State.” It thus appears that Congress

did not expect that the States would undertake any spe-

cial legislation or any administration of its liquor laws

to apply them to Indian Reservation transactions; rather,

it was sufficient that the pre-existing body of State law

was available to provide the substantive standards gov-

erning sale of alcoholic beverages.

Second, the legislative history of Section 1161 provides

no support for petitioner’s contention that Congress in-

tended to subject reservation liquor sales under tribal au-

thority to the licensing authority of the States. A pred-

ecessor to Section 1161 was considered during the 82d

Congress in 1952. The original proposal of the Depart-

ment of the Interior was to tie the repeal of federal

criminal prohibitions on sale of liquor to Indians to a

broader proposal (a forerunner of Public Law 280), also

then pending, to transfer criminal jurisdiction to the

States. See State Legal Jurisdiction In Indian Country:

Hearings on H.R. 459, H.R. 3235 and H.R. 3624 Before

the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the House Comm. on

Interior and Insular Affairs, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 29-24

(1952). In the next Congress, that course was abandoned

and the two proposals were separated. As ultimately en-

acted the liquor provision, 18 U.S.C. 1161, was designed

to apply nationwide to all Indian Reservations; the statute

transferring criminal jurisdiction to the States, Public

15

Law 280, 18 U.S.C. 1162, on the other hand was made

applicable only to designated Reservations and States.

As originally introduced in the 83d Congress, H.R.

1055, 1st Sess. (1953) was applicable only within the

State of Arizona. See Hearings on H.R. 1055 Before

the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the House Comm.

on Interior and Insular Affairs, 83d Cong., Ist Sess.

(March 18, 1953), reproduced at Pet. Br. App. A-4 to

A-7, A-8. In its original form the bill provided simply

that the federal Indian liquor laws “shall not hereafter

apply to any transaction within an Indian reservation in

the State of Arizuna which is in conformity with the ordi-

nances of the tribe or tribes having jurisdiction over the

said reservation” (Pet. Br. App. A-6). Commissioner of

Indian Affairs Dillon S. Myer testified at the hearings in

support of an amended version of H.R. 1055 that in es-

sential respects resembles Section 1161 as enacted. He

explained that the sole purpose of the proposal was to

eliminate federal legislation that discriminated against

Indians (Pet. Br. App. A-15, A-17). As proposed by

Commissioner Myer, the bill rendered the federal liquor

prohibitions entirely inapplicable outside Indian country,

as well as to

any * * * transaction within any area of Indian

country over which the State lacks full criminal juris-

diction that is in conformity both with the laws of

the State in which such act or transaction occurs

and with an ordinance duly adopted by the tribe hav-

ing jurisdiction over such area of Indian country,

certified by the Secretary of the Interior and pub-

lished in the Federal Register.

Pet. Br. App. A-18 to A-19. Commissioner Myer thus made

explicit the general understanding that the State lacked ju-

risdiction upon Indian Reservations, and that rather than

granting such jurisdiction to the States, the preferred ap-

12 So far as we are aware these hearings are not officially pub-

lished. They have been reproduced in the appendix to petitioner’s

brief on the merits. “Pet. Br. App.” denotes that appendix.

16

proach was to mandate conformity with the substantive

requirements of State law as a condition of exemption

from federal criminal sanctions. He explained (Pet. Br.

App. A-21; emp) is added):

What [the proposed statute] does is to eliminate, I

believe, all the statutes regarding prohibition on the

use of liquor whether on Indian country or outside,

and provide for tribal ordinances in case they do not

want liquor on reservation areas, where state laws

do not apply.!“

The bill as reported favorably by the House Committee

substantially conformed to the recommendations of the

Department of the Interior. See H.R. Rep. No. 775, 83d

Cong., Ist Sess. 2-3 (1953); Hearings on H.R. 1055 Be-

fore the Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 83d

Cong., Ist Sess. (June 2, 1953), reproduced at Pet. Br.

App. A-70. The House Report makes no mention what-

ever of imposition of any grant of State jurisdiction over

activities on Indian Reservations or State authority to

require licensure. The Report includes the favorable Re-

port of the Interior Department upon the bill reflecting

that liquor transactions upon Reservations would be ex-

empted from special federal criminal sanctions if made

“in conformity with the ordinances of the tribes con-

13 Read in context, the additional remarks of Commissioner Myer

stressed by petitioner (Br. 34-35) are not to the contrary. Com-

missioner Myer's statement that “we certainly do not intend to try

to revise state laws regarding Indians or anyone else” (Pet. Br.

App. A-26) was made in response to questions about the authority

of the States to apply their laws to govern off-Reservation sales of

liquor to Indians.

Petitioner's reliance on Congressman Patten's statement (Pet.

Br. App. A-69) that “the Indians would still have to comply with

State law in every reg is misplaced. That remark was

made in the context of discussion of a »ossible repeal of 18 U.S.C.

1155, an act that prohibits liquor on lands embracing Indian schools

in “former Indian Country.” See page 10 note 7, supra. Former

Indian Country is by definition outside any Reservation. Accord-

ingly, absent contrary provisions federal law, tribal Indians are

subject TO state jurisdiction at such locations. See Mescalero Apache

Tribe v. Jones, supra.

17

cerned and * * * not contrary; to State law.” H.R. Rep.

No. 775, supra, at 3 (emphasis added). The bill passed

the House swiftly with little no debate, and was re-

ported favorably by the Senate Committee without fur-

ther hearings. Although the Senate Report indicated that

actual sales could be restricted under substantive state

law, S. Rep. No. 722, 83d Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1953), there

is no suggestion that State licensure could be required.

And the Senate Report, like the House Report, reflects

the Interior Department’s view that the legislation would

permit sales in Indian country that are “in con‘ smnity

with the ordinances of the tribes concerned and are not

contrary to state law.” S. Rep. No. 722, supra, at 2.

This formulation makes clear that Congress had no intent

to subject tribal sales to State regulatory or administra-

tive jurisdiction or to require State licenses, but only to

invoke the substantive corpus of State law as a set of

standards limiting tribal discretion in regulating liquor

Sales.

Here, as in Bryan v. Itasca County, supra, 426 U.S. at

381, the complete absence of any indication in the legisla-

tive history of any intention to effect “a sweeping change

in the status of tribal government” by “confer[ring] upon

the States an authority to [administer regulations affect-

ing] Indians or Indian property on reservations” is tell-

ing evidence that no such change was intended.

3. The State argues (Br. 18-26), however, that statu-

tory recognition of State authority to adopt general laws

affecting the sale of liquor that are binding with respect

to Reservation sales cannot logically be confined to those

State laws that establish substantive standards for sale,

and must accordingly extend to State licensing laws. This

contention is flawed for several reasons.

First, as we have explained (pages 13-17), the language

and legislative history of Section 1161 both suggest that

1 Most importantly, of course, the State prohibition laws were

thus given effect, as were State standards governing the actual sale

of liquor (as opposed to the seller)—for instance prohibitions on

sales to minors, and restrictions upon hours of sale.

18

Congress withheld from the States any grant of jurisdic-

tion to actually apply their laws to on-Reservation sales

under tribal authority. Moreover, especially because Sec-

tion 1161 was not on its face a direct grant of authority to

any party, but only a limitation upon the reach of the fed-

eral criminal law, the natural reading of the phrase in

conformity with the laws of the State” is that only the sub-

stantive standards of those laws are to apply and not the

licensing requirements of State law. In this context it was

unnecessary for Congress to expressly negate any infer-

ence that State licensing authority was recognized; it is

sufficient, that Congress nowhere conferred such author-

ity. By contrast, recognition of State authority to adopt

substantive standards to be applied through the federal

criminal law did not entai] any separate grant of author-

ity (see page 22, infra). Petitioner’s contention is thus

contrary to the plain language of Section 1161.

Moreover, because application of State licensing require-

ments to tribal sellers of liquor on a Reservation pursuant

to tribal authority is a markedly greater intrusion upon

traditional notions of tribal sovereignty than the applica-

tion of the substantive requirements of State law, any

ambiguity in the statutory text should be resolved against

recognition of State licensing authority. Bryan v. Itasca

County, supra, 426 U.S. at 381, 390.

Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976), and EPA v.

State Water Resources Control Board, 426 U.S. 200

(1976), are instructive in this regard. In those cases,

decided at the same Term as Bryan, this Court concluded

that language in environmental protection statutes ex-

pressly requiring federal facilities to comply with State

antipollution requirements did not subject such facilities

to State permit or licensing provisions.“ Because a clear

15In Hancock the Court considered the effect of Section 118 of

the Clean Air Act, which then provided (42 U.S.C. 1857f):

Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the executive,

legislative and judicial branches of the Federal Government

19

and unambiguous congressional mandate is needed to sub-

ject federal installations to regulation by States, this

Court concluded in each case that the statutory direction

to comply with State requirements did not subject federal

facilities to State permitting authority. So, too, in this

case, the analogous congressional reference to acts or

transactions “in conformity with” State law should not

be read to subject tribal Indians to State licensing

power.“ instead, 18 U.S.C. 1161 should be read, as the

statutes involved in Hancock and EPA were read, to re-

quire, as a matter of federal law, that liquor sale trans-

actions be made in accordance with State substantive

(1) having jurisdiction over any property or facility, or (2) en-

gaged in any activity resulting, or which may result, in the dis-

charge of air pollutants, shall comply with Federal, State,

interstate, and local requirements respecting control and abate-

ment of air pollution to the same extent that any person is sub-

ject to such requirements.

In EPA v. State Water Resources Control Board the Court con-

sidered Section 313 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act

Amendments of 1972, the language of which was then essentially

identical to the analogous provision of the Clean Air Act. 33 U.S.C.

1323.

We note that Congress subsequently accepted the invitations

extended in Hancock (426 U.S. at 198) and State Water Resources

Control Board (426 U.S. at 227-228) by amending the federal air and

water pollution statutes to subject federal facilities to State permit-

ting requirements. See 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1323; 42 U.S.C. (Supp.

IV) 7418. Congress thus validated the Court’s conclusion ( Hancock,

supra, 426 U.S. at 198) that it would speak unequivocally if it

wished to subject the United States to State permitting require-

ments. In light of this Court’s decision in Bryan v. Itasca County,

supra, Congress may equally be held to the requirement of plain

speaking in determining whether the States have been authorized to

enforce their licensing requirements upon Indian Reservations.

16 Because, unlike the statutory provisions considered in Hancock

and State Water Resources Control Board (see note 15, supra),

Section 1161 contains no affirmative requirement of conformity with

State law, but merely sets up such conformity as a condition for

exemption from federal criminal proscriptions, the absence from

Section 1161 of any grant of authority to the States to impose

license requirements is especially clear.

standards but not subject to State licensing or permitting

authority.“

b. As the court of appeals observed (Pet. App. 15-A to

21-A), the absence from Section 1161 of any grant of au-

thority to the States to enforce their licensing require-

ments against Reservation liquor vendors operating un-

der tribal authority is highlighted by a comparison of

that statute with other federal laws that do accord the

States varying measures of jurisdiction over the Reser-

vation affairs of tribal Indians. On the one hand, Section

1161 may profitably be compared with Public Law 280,

18 U.S.C. 1162 and 28 U.S.C. 1360, enacted by the 83d

Congress on the very day it enacted Section 1161.

17 Contrary to the petitioner’s contention (Br. 8-9), California v.

United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978), does not suggest that State

licensing requirements are, under Section 1161, applicable to liquor

vendor operators under tribal authority. To be sure, in that case

the Court held that Section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902, ch.

1093, 32 Stat. 390, which directs the Secretary of the Interior to

proceed “in conformity with” State law in carrying out the provi-

sions of that Act, subjected the Bureau of Reclamation to State per-

mit requirements respecting the appropriation and distribution of

water for a federal dam project. But this conclusion rested heavily

upon the historical background of federal deference to State water

law, 438 U.S. at 653-663, and specific legislative history reflecting an

intention to subject the Bureau to State procedures, id. at 665-670.

Here, by contrast, the general policy of Congress has been to the

contrary: to leave the reservation activities of tribal Indians free

from State control, McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Commission, supra,

411 U.S. at 168, and neither the language nor the legislative history

of Section 1161 reflects any intention to impose State license re-

quirements. In any event, the issue in California v. United States

was whether the Bureau of Reclamation must comply with the sub-

stantive provisions of State law; no issue was raised as to the

applicability of the State’s permit mechanism the Bureau had

actually applied for such a permit and contested by litigation only

the enforceability of the permit conditions. 438 U.S. at 647. More-

over, California is to be distinguished because Section 8 of the

Reclamation Act is a direct command to the Secretary to follow

State law, whereas Section 1161 merely shields from federal crimi-

nal sanctions conduct taken under a governing tribal ordinance and

in conformity with State law.

21

Public Law 280, of course, grants enumerated States

general criminal and private civil adjudicatory jurisdic-

tion in some or all of the Indian country within their

borders. 18 U.S.C. 1162 and 28 U.S.C. 1360 both ex-

plicitly declare that “each of the States [enumerated]

shall have jurisdiction * * *” in respect of matters within

their scope. (emphasis added). Thus, the 83d Congress

was perfectly capable of making clear its intention to

confer authority upon the States in explicit terms when

it wished to do so. On the other hand, because of the

absence of the requisite clarity of congressional inten-

tion, the Court has recognized that separate language in

Section 4(a) of Public Law 280, 28 U.S.C. 1360(a), pro-

viding that “those civil laws of [the enumerated States]

that are of general application to private persons or pri-

vate property shall have the same force and effect within

{the designated areas of] Indian country as they have

elsewhere within the State[s] * * *” does not authorize

the exercise of “general state civil regulatory control over

Indian reservations.” Bryan v. Itasca County, supra, 426

U.S. at 384, 388-389, 390. The Court held that the quoted

language merely authorizes the State courts to apply

State law as a rule of decision in the private civil actions

over which jurisdiction was conferred by the introductory

clause of Section 1360. 426 U.S. at 384. As we have ex-

plained (pages 11-17) this Court’s reasoning in Bryan is

equally applicable to the present case.

As the Court stressed in Bryan (426 U.S. at 387-390)

the Congress that enacted Public Law 280 (and Section

1161) also enacted several termination acts, the language

of which indicates that Congress well knew how to sub-

ject an Indian tribe to the full range of State civil reg-

ulatory authority. The termination acts provide that “the

laws of the several States shall apply to the tribe and its

members in the same manner as they orply to other citi-

zens or persons within their jurisdiction.” 25 U.S.C.

564q and 757 (emphasis added). The difference between

this language and the bare requirement of “conformity

* * * with the laws of the State” imposed by Section 1161

is striking. The statutes are to be read in pari materia,

Bryan, supra, 426 U.S. at 390. Plainly, Congress did

not by enacting Section 1161 confer upon the States au-

thority to apply its liquor laws to Reservation sales by

tribal Indians under tribal authority “in the same man-

ner as may apply to other citizens”; it merely required

conformity with the substantive provisions of State law.

As the court of appeals explained (Pet. App. 21-A to

24-A), incorporation of substantive State standards into

federal criminal statute in this manner is a familiar de-

vice previously employed by Congress when jurisdiction

is not to be transferred to the States. The Assimilative

Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. 13, for example, is made appli-

cable in some circumstances to offenses committed by

tribal Indians on reservations. See 18 U.S.C. 1152; Wi-

liams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711 (1946). More di-

rectly, the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. 1153, provides

that crimes enumerated therein committed by Indians

in Indian country “shall be defined and punished in ac-

cordance with the laws of the State in which such offense

was committed” to the extent not defined by federal law.

No grant of State jurisdiction was created by these stat-

utes. See Williams v. United States, supra, 327 U.S. at

714; United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 651 (1978).

See, also, Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382

(1939), construing 25 U.S.C. 357. Thus, Section 1161

follows an historic pattern. The statute contemplates that

the substantive standards of State law will be incorpo

rated into the federal criminal sanctions against liquor

on Indian Reservations contained in 18 U.S.C. 1154 and

1156. It does not provide that the standards wi be en-

forced by the State through the application of ‘sense

requirements.

II

THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT DOES NOT

GRANT THE STATES REGULATORY JURISDIC-

TION OVER TRIBAL INDIANS ON THEIR RESER-

VATIONS

In this Court, petitioner claims that the Twenty-First

Amendment to the United States Constitution confers

upon the States regulatory jurisdiction over liquor activi-

ties of tribal Indians or entities within the confines of an

Indian Reservation.“ As early as 1938, Collins v. Fo-

semite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518, 538 (1938), and

as recently as 1973, United States v. State Tax Com-

mission, 412 U.S. 363, 378 (1973) (“State Tax Com-

mission I’), however, this Court has held that under the

Twenty-First Amendment a State’s territorial jurisdic-

tion to regulate the sale of liquor or to impose licensing

requirements reaches only as far as its pre-existing juris-

diction.

In Collins, California had reserved taxing jurisdiction

within certain areas of Yosemite National Park at the

time it conveyed those areas to the United States; other-

wise jurisdiction rested exclusively in the United States.

See 204 U.S. at 525, 530. Because of the express reserva-

tion of taxing jurisdiction, the State’s authority to tax

liquor transactions within the areas of the park granted

by the State was sustained. Id. at 534-536. On the other

hand, the Court held that the State lacked authority to

regulate liquor traffic or require liquor licenses within the

park. Id. at 533-534. The Court rejected California’s

contention that the Twenty-First Amendment empowered

it to exercise the disputed authority, reasoning that, while

“the Amendment may have increased ‘the state’s power to

deal with [commerce in liquor] . . ., it did not increase its

jurisdiction.’” 304 U.S. at 538 (quoting with approval

the conclusion of a three-judge district court). Because

the State had no authority to regulate commerce in

alcohol within the Park before the ratification of the

Twenty-First Amendment, the enhanced power afforded

the State by that provision did not create such jurisdiction.

Ibid.

In State Tax Commission I, supra, the Court re-

affirmed the holding of Collins, holding that, notwithstand-

As indicated above (page 5), petitioner did not present this

contention in the court of appeals. It was, however, considered by

the court of appeals in response to the submission of the State of

Washington in the companion cases (see page 6, supra).

ing the Twenty-First Amendment, the State had no au-

thority “to regulate—whether by licensing, taxation, or

otherwise—the importation of distilled spirits into”

military bases over which the United States exercised ex-

clusive jurisdiction. 412 U.S. at 373-377. The Court re-

iterated that the Twenty-First Amendment increased the

power of the States within the area of its jurisdiction but

not the geographical reach of that jurisdiction. 412 U.S.

at 378. On the other hand, the Court made clear (id. at

379-381) that as to military bases within the concur-

rent jurisdiction of the State, reliance on the Twenty-First

Amendment was not necessary to support the exercise of

State jurisdiction over liquor—the only question remain-

ing was whether some provision of federal law affirma-

tively barred the exercise of State authority. In sum,

the Twenty-First Amendment simply has no bearing upon

the territorial reach of the State’s jurisdiction to regulate

commerce in liquor.“

After a remand to the trial court for disposition of the

issues unresolved in State Tax Commission I, in United

States v. State Tax Commission, 421 U.S. 599 (1975)

(“State Tax Commission II“), the Court struck down the

disputed State liquor tax as applied to federal reserva-

tions subject to concurrent State jurisdiction on the

ground that the tax was unconstitutionally imposed upon

an instrumentality of the United States. The Court re-

10 The petitioner attempts to distinguish Collins and State Tar

Commission I (Br. 87-88) as based upon the authority of the

United States over its “real property and instrumentalities, such

as national parks or military reservations,” explaining that “Con-

gress’ power to regulate liquor traffic in Indian country stems from

its power over Indian people and their affairs, not their land or

instrumentalities.” The attempted distinction is artificial. Congress’

power respecting Indian tribes is plenary and rests upon Article I,

Section 8, Cl. 3 and Art, II, Section 2, Cl. 2 of the Constitution. See

McClanahan V. Arizona Tax Commission, supra, 411 U.S. at 172 n.7.

The authority of the United States extends without distinction to

the Reservations set aside for the benefit of the Indians, legal title

to which is held in trust by the United States, and to the Indian

tribes and their members.

jected the State’s contention that the Twenty-First

Amendment abolished the immunity of federal instru-

mentalities from State taxation in the area as to com-

merce in liquor, describing as “patently bizarre” and “ex-

traordinary” the suggestion] that the Twenty-first

Amendment abolished federal immunity.” The language

and history of that Amendment are equally devoid of sup-

port for the novel contention that the States were thereby

granted plenary jurisdiction to legislate in this area re-

specting Indian Reservations.”

The authority claimed by petitioner accordingly cannot

be sustained. The State here seeks to enforce its licensing

requirement against a tribal Indian operating within a

Reservation under tribal authority. Neither that licens-

ing requirement nor a licensing fee can be justified as

necessary to regulate transportation of liquor from the

2 Citing Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973),

petitioner argues (Br. 87 n.12) that the second State Tax Com-

mission case is inapposite because the federal instrumentality

analysis has been rejected in Indian cases. We do not suggest that

respondent is a federal instrumentality and for that reason consti-

tutionally immunized from State licensing requirements. On the

other hand, Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, itself reflects the sharp

distinction the Court has observed between State authority as

to the Reservation affairs of tribal Indians and State authority

respecting off-Reservation activities. 411 U.S. at 147-155. Indeed,

the Court there recognized the “historic immunity ‘rom state and

local control” of “Indian tribes and their reservation lands.” 411

U.S. at 152 (emphasis added). And it is not inapt to describe as an

immunity the longstanding policy of the United States of “ ‘leaving

Indians free from state jurisdiction and control’” (McClanahan v.

Arizona Tax Commission, supra, 411 U.S. at 168, quoting Rice v.

Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 789 (1945) ). See also Worcester v. Georgia, 31

U.S. [6 Pet.] 515, 557 (1832) (“The Cherokee Nation * * * is a dis-

tinct community * * * in which the laws of Georgia can have no

force.”) This “historic immunity,” although analytically distinct

from the special immunity from State taxation of federal instru-

mentalities, is no more lightly to be set aside absent a clear indica-

tion that that result was intended. See Bryan v. Itasca County,

supra, 426 U.S. at 392.

Reservation to areas within State jurisdiction. See United

States v. State Tax Commission, supra, 412 U.S. at 376-

377; Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., supra, 304

US. at 533.”

* * * * _

In closing, we note that the State of California is not

powerless to enforce its State liquor policies against tribal

Indians with respect to their activities on a Reservation.

As a Public Law 280 State (see 18 U.S.C. 1162), Cali-

fornia may prosecute an Indian for violation of criminal

proscriptions that do not rest upon an underlying license

requirement or the terms of a license. For example, the

proscriptions against sale of liquor between 2 a.m. and

6 a. m., Cal. Penal Code § 298 (West 1954) and against

sale to minors, Bus. & Prof. Code § 25658, would appear

to be enforceable against Indian sellers.” In addition, ex-

pressions of State liquor policy in the general civil laws of

the State such as those that govern the tort liability of

purveyors of alcohol for tortious acts committed by those

who consume it, see, e.g., Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 25602 (b

and (c), 25602.2 (Cum. Supp. 1982), would be applicable

as rules of decision in private civil actions brought in

State court against an individual Indian under the civil

jurisdiction conferred by Public Law 280, 28 U.S.C. 1360.

In addition, the State authorities remain free to cooperate

actively with the Secretary of the Interior, the United

States Attorneys and the tribal governments to insure

that the substantive requirements of State law are not

flouted. This may be accomplished through the exercise

21 We note that concerns about the location of liquor establish-

ments (see Pet. Br. 70) are, in the context of Reservation activi-

ties, legitimately the concern of tribal government. See Santa

Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F. 2d 655 (9th Cir. 1975).

22 By contrast a misdemeanor prosecution under Bus. & Pro?. Code

§ 23301 would be barred because the State lacks authority to apply

the license requirement of Section 23300 to Reservation vendors of

alcohol acting under tribal authority.

23 We understand that upon remand (see page 6, supra) the com-

panion case below, Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. Washington, was

settled by an agreement among the parties.

27

of the Secretary’s statutory authority to certify tribal

ordinances, the sanctions available to the tribes against

their members and permittees and, where necessary,

through invocation of the available federal criminal sanc-

tions.“ What the petitioner cannot do is to require re-

spondent to seek permission from the State and to pay a

license fee for the privilege of engaging in liquor trans-

actions on the Pala Reservation.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the court of appeals should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted.

Rex E. Lee

Solicitor General

CAROL E. DINKINS

Assistant Attorney General

JOSHUA I. SCHWARTZ

Assistant to the Solicitor General

RogERT L. KLARQUIST

ANNE S. ALMY

Attorneys

JANUARY 1983

24 Resort to federal criminal prosecution is obviously the enforce-

ment mechanism directly contemplated by Congress in framing

Section 1161 as an exemption from the otherwise applicable federal

liquor laws. Although resort to prosecution is likely to be reserved

for extreme cases, any contention that this enforcement mechanism

is inadequate must be directed to a legislative forum rather than

this Court. See page 19 note 15, supra.

r ©. „ covddiuwcer reverie orrice; 1909 397109 1270

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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