Appendix — O'Bannon v. Shadis

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Opinion, Court of Appeals la

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 81-2734

JACK SHADIS, BELLE FEINBERG, MARIE BURTON,

Individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly

situated,

Appellees

Vv.

FRANK BEAL, Individually and as Secretary of the De-

partment of Public Welfare, Commonwealth of Pennsyl-

vania,

WILBUR E. HOBBS, Individually and as Deputy Secre-

tary of the Department of Public Welfare, Southeastern

Region, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,

LEO A. SULLIVAN, Individually and as Welfare Policy

Specialist, Office of Basic Family Maintenance, Depart-

ment of Public Welfare, Southeastern Region, Common-

wealth of Pennsylvania,

DON JOSE STOVALL, Individually and as Executive

Director of the Philadelphia County Board of Assistance,

HELEN HYDE, Individually and as Director of Opera-

tions, Philadelphia County Board of Assistance,

7

2a Opinion, Court of Appeals

JUNE REED, Individually and as District Supervisor,

Medical Assistance District Office, Philadelphia County

Board of Assistance,

CYNTHIA ANDERSON, Individually and as Assistant

District Supervisor, Medical Assistance District Office,

Philadelphia County Board of Assistance,

MILDRED DAVIS, Individually and as Assistant District

Supervisor, Medical Assistance District Office, Philadel-

phia County Board of Assistance,

and

AURELIUS ROBERTSON, Individually and as Casework

Supervisor, Medical Assistance District Office, Philade!-

phia County Board of Assistance,

WILLIAM HARDEN, JOHN GRADY,

Appellants

Opinion, Court of Appeals 3a

Appeal From the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania—

Philadelphia

D.C. Civil No. 75-3421

Argued May 13, 1982

Before: Gibbons, Hunter, Circuit Judges and

Gerry,* District Judge

(Opinion filed July 20, 1982)

John O. J. Shellenberger (Argued)

Attorney for Appellants

Jerome J. Shestack (Argued)

Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis

Susanna E. Lachs

Alan M. Lerner

Carolyn Lee Daffron

Cohen, Shapiro, Polisher,

Shiekman & Cohen

Attorneys for Appellees

OPINION OF THE COURT

Hunter, Circuit Judge.

1. This appeal raises the question of whether cer-

tain provisions of two contracts between the Pennsylvania

—_—_—_—_—_- —

* Honorable John F. Gerry, United States District Judye for

the District of New Jersey, sitting by designation.

4a Opinion, Court of Appeals

Department of Public Welfare (“PDPW”’) and the Penn-

sylvania Legal Services Center (“PLSC”) and between

PLSC and Community Legal Services (“CLS”), which

prohibit CLS from requesting or accepting attorneys’ fees

in suits against the Commonwealih of Pennsylvania or

Commonwealth employees, are void as contrary to public

policy. Having been successful in their case-in-chief,’

plaintiffs moved for an award of attorneys’ fees to their

counsel, CLS, pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorney a

Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. §1988 (“the Fees Awards Act”)

Appendix at 64a. yest es ated reer

dum Order of the district court on August 17, 1981 in

favor of CLS. Appendix at 330a. The court held that

the relevant contractual provisions between CLS and the

Commonwealth were void because they conflicted with the

1 Plaintiffs brought suit against the Commonwealth under the

1871 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. $1983. The litigation was com-

menced in 1975 as a class action by medically needy individuals

who alleged an unlawful deprivation of certain medical benefits.

Specifically, they requested injunctive and monetary relief be-

cause of: (1) violations of due process by the individual appel-

tiffs essentially prevailed and a Stipulation of Settlement was

executed on October 16, 1979. Appendix at 35a. This was ap-

proved by Order of the District Court on December 28, 1979.

Appendix at 49a.

2 Section 1988 provides in pertinent part :

sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985 and 1986 of this

IX of Public Law 92-318, or Title VI of the Civil

of 1964, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing

Opinion, Court of Appeals 5a

public policy underlying by the Fees Awards Act.2 We

agree and will affirm the order of the district court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

2. CLS is a non-profit legal services corporation the

sole purpose of which is to provide legal services to the

poor. It receives approximately half of its operating bud-

get directly from the federal Legal Services Corporation

under the National Legal Services Act, 42 U.S.C. §2996,

et seq. The remaining half is received under Title XX of

the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §1397, et seg. Appen-

dix at 107a-108a. Title XX funding is channelled from

the United States Department of Health and Human Ser-

vices to DPW. DPW then allocates a portion of the fed-

eral funds, together with a 25% matching state grant, to

various community based legal services programs, includ-

ing CLS. Appendix at 108a. The actual distribution and

administration of Title XX monies for legal services is

performed by the conduit organization, PLSC.

3. Pursuant to this funding arrangement, CLS en-

tered into a series of annual contracts with PLSC for the

fiscal years 1978-1981, during which CLS performed much

of the work in the preparation of this case. The contracts

for the fiscal periods 1979-1980 and 1980-1981 contained

the provisions which prevent CLS from requesting attor-

neys’ fees arising out of litigation against the Common-

wealth or Commonwealth employees.‘

*The parties had agreed that if attorney's fees were per-

mitted, a reasonable amount was $85,000. Appendix at 350a. Ac-

cordingly, judgment was entered in that amount by Order of

September 9, 1981. Appendix at 349a.

* Specifically, the PLSC-CLS contract for the period October

1, 1979 to June 30, 1980 provided :

6a Opinion, Court of Appeals

» 4, Before the no fees clause was inserted into the

PLSC-CLS contract, DPW used other arguments in at-

tempts to prevent CLS from obtaining fees when CLS

attorneys successfully sued the Commonwealth. Begin-

ning with fiscal year 1978-1979, DPW required, over the

objections of PLSC and CLS, that DPW-PLSC funding

contracts contain a no fees provision restricting the right

of PLSC to receive attorneys’ fees in cases against the Com-

monwealth. Since 1979, DPW has compelled PLSC to

include a similar provision in its funding agreements with

local legal services programs, including CLS. Appendix

at 110a-11 1a.

The Department of Public Welfare requires inclusion of

' the following provision. Its inclusion and terms and subject

to possible change, revision or other modification on the basis

of objections by the Corporation :

The [Legal Services Programs] and the Corporation shall

not request attorneys’ fees in any case brought against the

Commonwealth or Commonwealth employees. In the event

that any such attorneys’ fees are awarded to the Corporation

_or LSPs, DPW will. deduct the amount of fees so awarded

from payment on the next invoice submitted by the Corpora-

tion. This provision is not applicable to costs imposed pur-

suant to Rule 37(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Appendix at 123a.

The subsequent contract for the period ending June 30, 1981

a

The [Legal Services Programs] may not accept attor-

“neys’ fees in any cases brought against the Commonwealth

or Commonwealth employees. This provision is not applicable

to costs imposed pursuant to Rule 37(e) of the Federal Rules

- of Civil Procedure.

Appendix at 156a.

Opinion, Court of Appeals Ta

5. The 1978-1979 contract between PLSC and DPW

contained such & no fees provision. Although the 1978-

1979 contract between “LSC and CLS did not contain a

provision restricting the right to receive attorney's fees,

the Commonwealth asserted the no fees provision of the

PLSC/DPW contract as a defense to CLS’s request for

attorney’s fees in Bolden v. Pennsylvania State Police, 491

F. Supp. 959 (E.D. Pa. 1980). The district court in that

fees restraints. In August 1979, PLSC proposed a con-

tract to CLS for the fiscal year 1979-80 which contained

a no fees provision. Appendix at 113a. CLS signed and

returned the proposed contract on January 11, 1980 with

a letter objecting to the provision. Appendix at 147a.’

5 CLS’ letter acknowledged that the question of the

restriction was sub judice and that its obligations under

vision were conditional on the court in Bolden holding CLS

bound by the similar provision under challenge in that case.

fees issue also arose in Yecchione v. Wohigemuth, 481 F.

776 (E.D. Pa, 1979) where CLS had been awarded attorneys

and costs against the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth

CLS the Vecchione award in February, 1979.

monwealth attempted to subsequently reduce wag a

reimbursement by an equal amount.

CLS’ reimbursement by an approximately

before then District Judge Becker, the Commonwealth

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8a Opinion, Court of Appeals

7. In 1880 DPW again stated that no funding would

be forthcoming for any legal services program which did

not acquiesce in DPW’s demands by signing a contract

containing the no fees provision. Appendix at 117a.

_ 8. Shortly before the end of the fiscal year, DPW

and PLSC entered into a contract for fiscal year 1980-

1981, which again contained a no fees restraint. On June

30, 1980, CLS received from PLSC the proposed 1980-

1981 contract, with a demand that the document be ex-

ecuted and returned no later than the following week.

Appendix at 118a. On July 7, 1980, CLS officers, faced

with many obligations to poor clients and a severe fiscal

crisis, executed and returned the 1980-1981 contract to

PLSC. Again, CLS attached a letter asserting that CLS

did not, by executing the contract, waive its right to chal-

lenge the legality and enforceability of the no fees provi-

sion.® Appendix at 118a. CLS thus challenged the no

fees provision in this case and its position was upheld by

the district court. The Commonwealth has appealed.

* Because we decide this case on the public policy issue, we

need not address the appellees’ contention that the 1980-81 con-

tract was voidable as the product of economic duress, However,

for the sake of factual completeness it is important to stress that

DP'W had insisted that it would not provide any 1980-81 funding

for any social program which had not signed a contract which con-

formed to DPW demands (including the no fees provision). Ap-

pendix at 117a. On June 26, 1980, CLS unexpectedly suffered a

$118,000 reduction in its Title XX reimbursements for expenses

incurred during April and May of that year. Appendix at 116a.

In June 1980, CLS was facing its second successive annual fund-

ing cut by the Commonwealth which had already resulted in ser-

vice reductions and a 20% decrease in attorney staff. Appendix

at 115a.

2

Opinion, Court of Appeals

DISCUSSION

9. The threshold question in deciding this appeal is

whether the district court properly concluded that this

case presents a question of federal law, and not one of

Pennsylvania of contract law. The district court was

clearly correct. The underlying claim in this case is not

based on contracts, but is a federal civil rights claim.

Part of this claim is a request for attorneys’ fees, made

under a federal statute, to which a contract provision is

raised as a defense. Therefore, the district court was cor-

rect in concluding that it is to federal law that it should

turn for its rules of decision."

10. Appellants argue that this court’s decision in

Westmoreland Hospital Ass’n v. Blue Cross, et al., 605

F.2d 119, 123 (3d Cir. 1979), cert denied, 444 U.S, 1077

(1980), supports the proposition that the rules of Penn-

sylvania contract law control this case. We disagree. In

Westmoreland, we held that certain insurance contract

provisions deducting federal mental health staff grants

from computation of hospitals’ costs of operation were not

void as contrary to public policy. The underlying claim

in Westmoreland was based on contract and not, as here,

TOf course, as the district court noted, the Pennsylvania law

of illegal contracts may be instructive. Indeed, in Pennsylvania,

as in almost all Anglo-American jurisdictions, contracts that are

contrary to public policy, those which tend to be injurious to the

public good, are illegal and void. In Book's Estate, 297 Pa. 543,

147 A. 608, 609 (Pa, 1929), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

held that a contract is against public policy if it has ‘‘a tendency

to injure the public or to be against the public good, or [is) in-

consistent with good morals as to the consideration or the thing

to be done.’’ See generally 8 Pennsylvania Law Encyclopedia,

$103.

was no controversy to resolve. Thus, we are not restrained

by Westmoreland. The case before us is clearly at its roots

Public Policy Underlying the Fees Awards Act

11. Having decided that federal law is controlling

in this case, the district court held that the no fees re-

straints of the contracts between PLSC and CLS were un-

§178 (1981)." After considering and balancing the fac-

tors in favor of enforcement of the contracts against the

der the civil rights laws.” Quite simply, the policy behind

*The district court opinion cites §320 of the Restatement

(Second) of Contracts (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1977). The tentative

draft relied upon by the district court has now been officially

Opinion, Court of Appeals ila

of those laws. Maher v. Gagne, 448 US. 122 (1980);

Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980); Ross v. Horn,

598 F.2d 1312 (3d Cir. 1979) ; cert. denied, 448 U.S. 906;

Skehan v. Bd. of Trustees, 590 F.2d 470 (3d Cir. 1978),

cert. denied, 444 U.S, 832 (1979). See also, 8. Rep. No.

94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1976] US.

Code Cong. & Admin. News, pp. 5908, 5910. Congress

to the plaintiffs on a ‘‘private attorney general’’ theory. The

Court noted that ‘‘it would be inappropriate for the Judiciary,

without legislative guidance, to reallocate the burdens of litiga-

tion.’’ 421 U.S. at 240. The ‘private attorney general theory"’

was explicitly endorsed by the legislature in enacting the Fees

Awards Act. See 8. Rep. 1011, supra, at 5909-11. The statute

provided the bar with a greater incentive to pursue claims and

was especially aimed at encouraging litigation in areas where only

non-pecuniary relief was available. See ¢g., 122 Cong. Ree.

83,314 (1976) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy) :

[There is [sic] often important principles to be gained

in [civil rights) litigation, and rights to be conferred or en-

forced, but just as often no large promise of monetary re-

covery lies at the end of the tunnel. So civil rights cases—

unlike tort ov antitrust cases—do not provide the prevailing

plaintiffs with a large recovery from which he can pay his

- lawyer.

See generally, Note, ‘‘ Awards of Attorney's Fees to Legal Aid

Offices,’’ 87 Harv, L. Rev. 411 (1973); Malson, ‘‘In Response to

Alyeska—The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976."’

21 St. Lowis U.L.J. 480 (1976); Comment, ‘‘ Attorney's Fees in

Damage Actions Under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards

Act of 1976."" 47 U. Chi. L. Rev. 332 (1980) ; Note, ‘‘ Promoting

the Vindication of Civil Rights Through the Attorney's Fees

Awards Act. 89 Col, L. Rev. 346 (1980).

12a Opinion, Court of Appeals

gress intended, and to achieve uniformity in those statutes

and justice for all citizens.” H.R. Rep. No. 94-1558, 94th

Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 19 (1976). See Rodriguez v. Taylor,

569 F.2d 1231, 1245 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436

U.S. 913 (1978). Courts have stated that the Act must

be liberally construed to achieve these ends. Mid-Hudson

Legal Service, Inc. v. G. & U., Inc., 578 F.2d 34, 37 (2d

Cir. 1978); Dennis v. Chang, 611 F.2d 1302, 1306 (9th

Cir. 1980) .

13. The district court in this case outlined clearly

its view of the public policy involved:

The public policy embodied in Section 1988 is

a vital one. Congress could not have been clearer in

its intent or in the seriousness it attached to the at-

torneys’ fees provisions. The use of words such as

‘essential’ and ‘integral’ is prevalent in the legislative

history and in the cases construing the Act. The

policy is, quite clearly, an important one.

520 F. Supp. at 864. The court was referring, among

other things, ~ the Senate Report’s unambiguous state-

ment of the policy behind the Act:

Fee awards are an integral part of the remedies

necessary to obtain such compliance [with the civil

rights laws] . . . If our civil rights laws are not to

become mere hollow pronouncements which the aver-

age citizen cannot enforce, we must maintain the tra-

ditionally effective remedy of fee shifting in these

cases.

S. Rep. No. 94-1011 at 5913.

14. An important aspect of the enforcement scheme

designed by Congress is the collection of attorneys’ fees

Opinion, Court of Appeals 13a

from the states when states are losing defendants. It is

clear that Congress contemplated that states and state of-

ficials would often be the targets of civil rights actions:

[Defendants in these [civil rights] cases are

often state or local bodies of state or local officials.

In such cases, it is intended that attorneys’ fees, like

other items of costs, will be collected either directly

from the official, in his official capacity, from funds

of his agency or under his control, or from the state

or local government (whether or not the agency or

government is a named party) .

S.R. No. 94-1011, supra, at 5913 (footnotes omitted) .

15. In Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 694 (1977),

the Supreme Court held that the Eleventh Amendment did

not bar an award of attorneys’ fees against a state. The

Court noted:

The [Awards] Act itself could not be broader.

It applies to ‘any’ action brought to enforce certain

civil rights laws. It contains no hint of an exception

for States defending injunctive actions, indeed, the

Act primarily applies to laws passed specifically to

restrain state action. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §1983.

. . » The House Report is in accord: ‘The greater re-

sources available to governments provide an ample

base from which fees can be aw .ded to the prevail-

ing plaintiff in suits against governmental officials or

entities.’ H.R. Rep. No. 94-1558, p. 7 (1976).

437 US. at 694.

16. It is well settled that Congress intended legal

service programs, like private attorneys, to receive fees

under the Fees Awards Act. Courts have awarded attor-

140 Opinion, Court of Appeals

ney’s fees without regard to plaintiffs’ ability to pay for

counsel or the availability of free legal counsel. Riddell

v. National Democratic Party, 624 F.2d 539, 543 (5th Cir.

1980). In Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1245 (3d

Cir. 1977) , we stated:

The statutory policies underlying the award of

fees justify such shifting without regard to whether

the individual plaintiff initially assumed the financial

burdens of representation. . . . The award of fees to

legal aid offices and other groups furnishing pro bono

publico representation promotes the enforcement of

the underlying statutes as much as an award to pri-

vately retained counsel. Legal services organizations

often must ration their limited financial and man-

power resources. Allowing them to recover fees en-

hances their capabilities to assist in the enforcement

of congressionally favored individual rights. (Cita-

tions omitted.)

In Dennis v. Chang, the Ninth Circuit agreed that:

[a]n award [where plaintiff has been repre-

sented without charge by a legal service organization ]

serves the purposes of the [Fees Awards] Act for

two reasons: (1) the award encourages the legal ser-

vices organization to expend its limited resources in

litigation aimed at enforcing the civil rights statutes;

and (2) the award encourages potential defendants

to comply with civil rights statutes.

611 F.2d at 1306.

17. Thus, Legal Aid offices serve a private enforce-

ment role and further the policies contemplated by Con-

Opinion, Court of Appeals 15a

gress in the Fees Awards Act. In Rodriguez, we discussed

this role in more detail:

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16a Opinion, Court of Appeals

for the maximum benefit of the poor. We are not

suaded by the Commonwealth’s contention that the

tractual extraction of the financial incentives created by

the Fees Awards Act will have no effect on CLS because

it is “not free to pick its suits on the basis of pecuniary

concerns.” Appellants’ Brief at 18.

19. Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in

Alyeska Pipeline, federal courts had awarded attorneys’

fees as an exercise of their traditional equitable powers.

See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1973); Mills v. Electric

Auto Life Co., 396 U.S. 375, 392-93 (1970). By enacting

In return for a steady partial subsidy, the Common-

520 F. Supp. at 864 (emphasis added; footnotes and cita-

tions omitted). Congress expressed unambiguously the

significance it attached to the attorneys’ fees provisions,

and we conclude that the public policy embodied in $1968

is a vital one.”

“™ The importance of attorneys’ fees in civil rights cases is

also evidenced by the special standard to be used by district

courts in deciding whether to grant such fees. Although it will

be in the district court’s discretion to decide whether a plaintiff

is entitled to attorneys’ fees under §1988 :

[a] party seeking to enforce the rights protected by the

statutes covered by (§1988), if successful, should ordinarily

recover attorneys’ fees unless special circumstances would

render such an award unjust.

Staten v. Housing Authority of Pittsburgh, 638 F.2d 599, 604

(1980), citing Skehan v. Bd. of Trustees, 590 F.2d 470, 496

(3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979); citing S. Rep.

No. 94-1011, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in (1976) U.S.

Code Cong. & Admin. News, pp. 5908, 5912 (emphasis added).

See also Ross v. Horn, 598 F.2d 1312 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,

448 U.S. 906 (1980); Sethy v. Alameda County Water District,

18a Opinion, Court of Appeals

Public Policy in Favor of Enforcement

21. Appellants advance several arguments regard-

ing public policy considerations in favor of enforcement

of the contract provision which they contend outweigh the

considerations outlined above. Although appellants’ argu-

ments have some merit, they do not outweigh the public

policy embodied in the Fees Awards Act.

22. First, the Commonwealth argues that there is a

public benefit in funding legal services programs with a

fixed and known budget. This is true; but it misses the

mark. Attorneys’ fees awards to prevailing parties in civil

rights litigation are not part of public funding to legai ser-

vices programs. They are distinct payments of the cost

of litigation in accordance with rights and responsibilities

determined by Congress. The Commonwealth would have

had the burden of paying fees under the Act for violations

of civil rigints had the litigants’ counsel been private. The

fact that the taxpayer may be the ultimate payor is not a

602 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1046 (1980) ;

Dawson v. Pastrick, 600 F.2d 70 (7th Cir. 1979) ; Bonner v. Long,

599 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1979); Mid-Hudson Legal Services, Inc.

v. 6 & U, Inc., 578 F.2d 34 (2nd Cir. 1978) ; Brown v. Culpepper,

599 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1977).

12 Indeed, one of the Congressional purposes supporting the

fee-shifting provisions of the Fees Awards Act was to save tax-

payers’ funds by utilizing private attorney generals as a means of

Commonwealth contends that the state’s funding scheme

promotes civil rights litigation “more effectively than does

the statute . . . [thereby rendering it] all but superfluous.”

funding provided in the annual grant is not enough to pro-

vide incentives to undertake representation in the specific

types of civil rights litigation which Congress hoped to en-

courage. The case at bar is a prime example of the kind

of litigation that Congress intended to encourage through

the Fees Awards Act. Here, the district court granted in-

junctive and declaratory relief to two plaintiff classes.

The classes comprised, in the first class, recipients of and,

in the second class, applicants for, medical assistance to

the medically needy. The first class, succeeded in proving

that the state program conflicted with federal regulations.

The second class succeeded in showing that medical as-

sistance benefits had been unconstitutionally terminated.

Shadis, et al. v. Beal, et al., Civil Action No. 75-3421 (E.D.

Pa. August 10, 1976) (order granting declaratory and in-

junctive relief on liability issues.) The Commonwealth’s

argument that its grant to CLS of the minimum amount of

money required of it in order to obtain federal funding

benefits the poor more than the potential of attorneys’ fees

awards is disingenuous. The case at bar proves the con-

trary. Advanced funding does not serve as an inducement

‘‘limiting the growth of the enforcement bureaucracy.’’ See 8.

Rep. No. 94-1011 at 5911.

20a Opinion, Court of Appeals

centive. Indeed, the state may also have an incentive to

settle a case early. See Dennis v. Chang, 611 F.2d at 1307.

24. The Commonwealth slightly rephrases the con-

tention by arguing that it does not want to “pay legal fees

twice.” Appellants’ Brief at 17. This rhetorical ploy

avoids the issue. The Commonwealth does not pay

“twice” when it violates someone’s civil rights and is then

forced to pay attorneys’ fees. It pays only once—as a

violator of civil rights. Its role as a provider of public

services is distinct from its role as a defendant in a civil

rights case and has no bearing on the question of reim-

bursing individual citizens for individual wrong brought

upon them.”

Use of the Restatement of Contracts Standard

25. In balancing the policy considerations in con-

nection the contractual fee restraints, the district court

used the approach presented in Section 178 and 179 of the

Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1979). Section 178

provides:

18 The Ninth Circuit rejected an argument similar to the Com-

monwealth’s in Dennis v. Chang:

The remaining argument is that ‘double payment’ is

somehow ‘unfair.’ Since awards of attorneys’ fees to state

funded legal services organizations in civil rights litigation

against the state are encompassed within the statutory lan-

guage of the Fees Awards Act, were in all probability con-

templated by Congress, and serve the purpose for which the

Act was adopted, the question of fairness has been resolved

by Congress.

611 F.2d at 1307.

Opinion, Court of Appeals 21a

(1) A promise or other term of an agreement

is unenforceable on grounds of public policy if legis-

lation provides that it is unenforceable or the interest

in its enforcement is clearly outweighed in the cir-

cumstances by a public policy against enforcement of

such terms."*

28. The Commonwealth argues that the district

court’s application of the Restatement’s formulation was

incorrect because it failed to require that the legislation in

question either “expressly prohibit[s] the contract or. . .

require[s] a performance or a result that directly contra-

dicts what the contract requires.” Appellants’ Brief at

10-11. Neither federal nor Pennsylvania law requires

such a direct, explicit conflict. Such a requirement would

require that a contract be “illegal” in a literal sense before

it could be invalid. However, the scope of the public

4 Section 178 continues :

(2) In weighing the interest in the enforcement of a term,

account is taken of

(a) the parties’ justified expectations ;

(b) any forfeiture that would result if enforcement

were denied ; and

(e) any special public interest in the enforcement of a

particular term.

(3) In weighing a public policy against enforcement of a

term, account is taken of

(a) the strength of that policy as manifested by legis-

lation or judicial decisions ;

(b) the likelihood that a refusal to enforce the term

will further that policy ;

(ec) the seriousness of any misconduct involved and the

extent to which it was deliberate ; and

(d) the directness of the connection between that mis-

eouduct and the term.

22a Opinion, Court of Appeals

policy doctrine is broader and more encompassing than

the concept of illegality.”

29. Section 179 of the Restatement provides that

public policy against “the enforcement of promises or

other terms may be derived by the court from: “ (a) legis-

lation relevant to such a policy, or (b) the need to protect

some aspect of the public welfare ...” The Restatement

obviously does not require that the legislation in question

expressly prohibit or require an act inconsistent with the

contract; it is sufficient if the legislature makes an ade-

quate declaration of public policy which is inconsistent

with the contract’s terms. For example, the Restatement

notes:

The legislation is significant, not as controlling

the disposition of the case, but as enlightening the

court concerning some specific policy to which it is

relevant. A court will examine the particular statute

in the light of the whole legislative scheme. ... It

will look to the purpose and history of the statute.

15 The decisional law of Pennsylvania is consistent with this

position. In Central Dauphin School District v. American Cas-

ualty Co., 493 Pa. 254, 426 A.2d 94 (1981), the Supreme Court

of Pennsylvania endorsed the approach of the Restatement (See-

ond) of Contracts. Many years prior to Central Dauphin that

same court stated that a contract which is injurious to the public

interest may be held void even in the absence of express legis-

lative mandates contrary to the provisions of the agreement.

Kuhn v. Buhl, 251 Pa. 348, 370, 96 A. 977 (1916). Sections 178

and 179 represent an accurate reflection of the law regarding the

publie policy contractual defense. See, ¢.g., Jackson Purchase

Rural Electric Cooperative Association v. Local Union 816,

IBEW, 646 F.2d 264 (6th Cir. 1981); California Pacific Bank

v. Small Business Administration, 557 F.2d 218 (9th Cir. 1977).

Opinion, Court of Appeals 23a

Comment (b) to Section 179. See generally 6A A. Cor-

bin Corbin on Contracts $1375 (1962).

30. The Commonwealth primarily relied on West-

moreland Hospital, in which we held that certain cost-

reimbursement contracts were not illegal or contrary to

public policy. However, as noted supra, this court’s hold-

_ ing in that case was predicated in part on the absence of

a contrary public policy in the relevant legislation, and

administrative regulations. 605 F.2d at 125. Here, there

is such a contrary public policy, the impact of which the

state has attempted to avoid.

CONCLUSION

31. For the foregoing reasons, we rule that the no

fees provisions of the contracts between CLS and PLSC

are void as contrary to public policy . The judgment of

the district court will be affirmed.

A True Copy:

Teste:

Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

24a Judgment

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 81-2734

JACK SHADIS, BELLE FEINBERG, MARIE BURTON,

Individually and on behalf of all other persons simi-

larly situated,

Appellees

v.

FRANK BEAL, Individually and as Secretary of the De-

partment of Public Welfare, Commonwealth of Penn-

sylvania,

WILBUR E. HOBBS, Individually and as Deputy Secre-

tary of the Department of Public Welfare, South-

eastern Region, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,

LEO A. SULLIVAN, Individually and as Welfare Policy

Specialist, Office of Basic Family Maintenance, De-

partment of Public Welfare, Southeastern Region,

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,

DON JOSE STOVALL, Individually and as Executive

Director of the Philadelphia County Board of As-

sistance,

HELEN HYDE, Individually and as Director of Opera-

tions, Philadelphia County Board of Assistance,

JUNE REED, Individually and as District Supervisor,

Medical Assistance District Office, Philadelphia

County Board of Assistance,

Judgment 25a

CYNTHIA ANDERSON, Individually and as Assistant

District Supervisor, Medical Assistance District Of-

fice, Philadelphia County Board of Assistance,

MILDRED DAVIS, Individually and as Assistant District

Supervisor, Medical Assistance District Office, Phila-

delphia County Board of Assistance,

and

AURELIUS ROBERTSON, Individually and as Casework

Supervisor, Medical Assistance District Office, Phila-

delphia County Board of Assistance,

WILLIAM HARDEN, JOHN GRADY,

Appellants

(D.C. Civil No. 75-3421)

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENN-

SYLVANIA

PRESENT: GIBBONS and HUNTER, Circuit Judges; and

GERRY, District Judge.*

JUDGMENT

This cause came on to be heard on the record from the

United States District Court for the Eastern District of

Pennsylvania and was argued by counsel on May 13, 1982.

On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and

adjudged by this Court that the judgment of the said Dis-

trict Court, entered September 9, 1981, be, and the same

is hereby affirmed. Costs taxed against appellants.

ATTEST: /s/ Sally Mrvos

Clerk

July 20, 1982

* Honorable John F. Gerry, United States District

Judge for the District of New Jersey, sitting by designation.

26a Opinion, District Court

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Civil Action No. 75-3421

JACK SHADIS, ET AL

Vv.

FRANK S. BEAL, ET AL

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

NEWCOMER, J., August 17, 1981.

Plaintiffs, as the prevailing party in this case move

for an award of attorneys’ fees to their attorney, Com-

munity Legal Services (“CLS”). Defendants argue that

CLS is barred from accepting any such award.

The Shadis litigation was a class action brought

against several Commonwealth employees on behalf of

indigent persons who allegedly were deprived of certain

medical benefits to which they were entitled under a Medi-

cal Assistance program funded and administered by the

Commonwealth.

CLS and other legal services programs (“LSP’’) ac-

quire funds under the joint federal state title XX program

through the Pennsylvania Legal Services Center (“PLSC”),

a nonprofit corporation formed by the Commonwealth.

Opinion, District Court 27a

Pursuant to this funding arrangement, CLS entered into a

series of annucl contracts with PLSC for the fiscal years

1978-1981, during which CLS performed much of the

work in preparation of this case. The contracts for the

fiscal periods 1979-1980 and 1980-1981 contain provi-

sions which allegedly prevent CLS from requesting attor-

neys’ fees arising out of litigation against the Coramon-

wealth or Commonwealth employees.

Defendants initially argue that the CLS-PLSC fund-

ing contracts for 1979-1981 prevent CLS from requesting

attorneys’ fees generated in the fiscal year 1978-1979 be-

cause CLS did not file its request for fees until July, 1980.

Defendants argue that the primary funding contract for

1979-86 between PLSC and its funding source, the Com-

monwealth Department of Public Welfare contains lan-

guage to the effect that the LSP, including CLS, “may not

accept attorneys’ fees in any cases brought against the

Commonwealth.” Regardless of the validity of such a pro-

vision and its power to bind CLS, it does not exclude fees

for work done before the contracts went into effect. More-

over, the Court does not find the cases cited by defendant

concerning the applicability of changes in statutory laws

helpful to its consideration of the contract issues here.

The Court finds that the funding contracts between PLSC

and DPW and between PLSC and CLS for each of the

three fiscal periods pertain only to fees generated by CLS

in each of those periods.

1. The 1978-1979 Contract: Collateral Estoppel

and Res Judicata

Defendants argue that CLS is precluded by a contract

between DPW and PLSC from requesting legal fees gen-

28a Opinion, District Court

erated during the fiscal year 1978-1979. ‘That contract

provided in pertinent part that “the LSPs and the corpora-

tion [PLSC] shall not request attorneys’ fees in any case

against the Commonwealth or Commonwealth employees.”

Precisely the issue of whether this contract prevents CLS

from requesting legal fees for work done in 1978-1979 in

a case against the Commonwealth or its employees was be-

fore Judge Green in Bolden v. Pa. State Police, 491 F.

Supp. 958 (E.D. Pa. 1980).

The Bolden case was a class action in which plain-

tiffs alleged racial discrimination in the hiring and pro-

motion practices of the Pennsylvania State Police. The

parties agreed to the entry of a consent decree, later modi-

fied by the court, which substantially gave the plaintiff

class the relief it sought. CLS, attorney for the class,

moved for an award of attorneys’ fees. Judge Green held

that because CLS was not a signatory to the 1978-1979

PLSC-DPW contract and because the provision in ques-

tion was not ratified by the PLSC board of directors as

required, the DPW-PLSC contract did not bar CLS from

requesting attorneys’ fees for work done in the fiscal year

1978-1979.

Plaintiffs contend that, in light of the Bolden holding,

defendant is barred from asserting the 1978-1979 DPW-

PLSC contract provision as a defense by the doctrine of

res judicata. Defendants, on the other hand, take the

position that the doctrine of collateral estoppel rather than

res judicata applies. Defendants argue that since, under

the facts here, plaintiffs are urging an “offensive” col-

lateral estoppel, the applicability of the Bolden court’s hold-

ing to the contract defense raised in Shadis is to be evalu-

ated according to the criteria set forth in Parklane Hosiery

Opinion, District Court 29a

Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979). This Court

finds that defendants are collaterally estopped from as-

serting the contract as a defense. It is, therefore, un-

necessary to determine whether res judicata applies.”

In the Parklane case, the Supreme Court decided

“not to preclude the use of offensive collateral estoppel,

but to grant trial courts broad discretion to determine when

it should be applied.” Parklane, 493 U.S. 322, 331. The

1 An offensive use of ‘‘collateral estoppel oceurs when the

plaintiff seeks to foreclose defendant from litigating an issue de-

fendant has previously litigated unsuccessfully in an action with

another party.”’ Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322,

326 n. 4 (1979).

*If plaintiffs’ motions for attorneys’ fees in Shadis and

Bolden are considered rights of action separate from plaintiffs’

original class action claims, then these rights of action are iden-

tical. Under this view, the Bolden court's adjudication of a

cause of action identical to that in Shadis and the identity of the

parties to the motions (CLS and two agencies privy to the Com-

monwealth), see generally 1B Moore's Federal Practice §.411 (2d

ed. 1974), are sufficient to permit plaintiffs to invoke the doc-

trine of res judicata to bar defendants’ contract defense in Shadis.

Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 326 (1955).

original causes of action in Shadis and Bolden, defendants’ con-

Shadis is not res judicata. Cromwell v. County

351, 352 (1877). However, defendants may stil)

ng the contract defense by the doctrine of

collateral estoppel, which does not require that the causes of ac-

nection with other law suits. Finally, and importantly,

judicial economy would not be served by relitigating the

1978-1979 contract issue before this court.

del, 270 U.S. 611, 618 (1926).

Opinion, District Court 3la

The Court therefore concludes, for the reasons stated

above, that defendent is precluded from raising the 1978-

1979 PLSC-DPW contract as a defense to plaintiffs’ re-

quest for attorneys’ fees for work done in that fiscal year.

Finally, although this Court concludes that collateral

estoppel bars the contractual defense raised by defendant,

the Court is persuaded by the reasoning of Judge Green’s

opinion in Bolden, and would be inclined to follow Bolden

if defendants were not estopped in this case.

2. The 1979-1980, 1980-1981 Contracts: Public

Policy

Plaintiffs argue that the contractual term to which

they were forced to agree should be found unenforceable

because it is void as contrary to public policy.

In determining which rules of law to apply in deciding

this issue, the Court notes that the Court of Appeals for

this Circuit has suggested in a case treating similar issues

that the rules of contract law in the Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania should apply. Westmoreland Hospital Ass'n.

v. Blue Cross, et al., 605 F.2d 119, 123 (3d Cir. 1979)

cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1077 (1980). (Insurance contract

provisions deducting federal mental health staff grants

from computation of hospitals’ costs of operation not void

as contrary to public policy). Westmoreland does not,

however, necessarily govern this case. In the first place,

the district court in Westmoreland found no public policy

that was contradictory to the effect or purpose of the con-

tracts, and the Court of Appeals adopted its analysis, West-

moreland, 605 F.2d at 125. Having not found any conflict

between the contracts and the alleged public policy, the is-

sues of resolving that conflict were never actually reached.

In the second place, the fundamental claim in this case is

32a Opinion, District Court

not based on contract, as was the claim in Westmoreland.

Instead, this is a federal civil rights claim, a part of which

is a claim for attorneys’ fees, to which a contract is raised

as a defense.

Having concluded that it is not bound by any inference

that might be drawn from Westmoreland, the Court further

concludes that it is to federal law that it must turn for the

rules of decision. Of course, this is in part a contracts ques-

tion, and the Pennsylvania law of contracts would seem

germane, but more fundamentally it is an issue of federal

question litigation, federally guaranteed rights, and a fed-

eral policy of inducing lawyers to bring actions such as this

one. This is not at its root a contracts claim, but rather a

fees request to which defendants have raised a contracts

defense. Therefore, although the Pennsylvania law of “‘il-

legal” contracts may be instructive, the Court concludes

that it is an issue of federal law that it must now decide.

As a general rule, courts will not enforce contractual

provisions that are illegal, and illegal in this sense has been

defined as “if either its formation or its performance is

criminal, tortious, or otherwise opposed to public policy.”

Restatement of Contracts §512 (1932) quoted in Contrac-

tor Industries v. Zerr, 241 Pa. Super. 92, 97, 359 A.2d 803,

805 (1976). In this case, however, the Court is not pre-

sented with a contract that is illegal in the narrow sense;

that is, the contract is not prohibited by any express rule of

law. Instead, the contract here seems to function in such a

way as to counteract through economic duress an important

public policy that is carried out through economic induce-

ment. No case cited to the Court, or uncovered through

this Court’s research, treats this kind of “contrariness” to

public policy. The Restatement of Contracts, however,

provides a useful list of considerations. Section 320 of Re-

Opinion, District Court 33a

statement (Second) of Contracts (Tent. Draft No. 12,

1977) reads as follows:

WHEN A TERM IS UNENFORCEABLE ON

GROUNDS OF PUBLIC POLICY.

(1) A promise or other term of an agreement is

unenforceable on grounds of public policy if legisla-

tion provides that it is unenforceable or if the interest

in its enforcement is clearly outweighed in the circum-

stances by a public policy against the enforcement of

such terms.

(2) In weighing the interest in the enforcement

of a term, account is taken of

(a) the parties’ justified expectations,

(b) any forfeiture that would result if enforce-

ment were denied, and

(c) any special public interest in the enforce-

ment of the particular term.

(3) In weighing a public policy against en-

forcement of a term, account is taken of

(a) the strength of that policy as manifested

by legislation or judicial decisions,

(b) the likelihood that a refusal to enforce the

term will further that policy,

(c) the seriousness of any misconduct involved

and the extent to which it was deliberate, and

(d) the directness of the connection between

that misconduct and the term.

Pennsylvania law is not to the contrary. In Kuhn vy.

Buhl, 251 Pa. 348 (1916), the Pennsylvania Supreme

Court quoted certain legal authorities approvingly.

Opinion, District Court

[T]he relevant applicable principles are well stated

in the following excerpts from the authorities: ‘Where

a contract belongs to a class which is reprobated by

public policy, it will be declared illegal though in that

particular instance no actual injury may have resulted

to the public, as the test is the evil tendency of the

contract and not its actual result: 15 A.M. & Eng.

Encyc. of Law (2d Ed.), 934. In other words, its

validity is determined by its general tendency at the

time it is made, and if this is opposed to the interests

of the public it will be invalid, even though the intent

of the parties was good and no injury to the public

would result in the particular case. The test is the evil

tendency of the contract and not its actual injury to

the public in a particular instance: 9 Cyc. 481-2. In

the absence of any legislative prohibition of a particu-

lar agreement which may be brought before a court,

the latter, to declare it void on this ground, must find

that such contracts have a tendency to injure the pub-

lic—are against public good, or inconsistent with

sound policy and good morals as to the consideration

or thing to be done: 9 Cyc. 482. Whether a contract

is against public policy is a question of law for the

court to determine from all of the circumstances in

each case. It is clearly to the interest of the public that

and therefore illegal and void: 9 Cyc. 483-5.

Kuhn v. Buhl, 251 Pa. 348, 369-70 (1916) .*

The public policy underlying the Civil Rights Attor-

neys’ Fees Awards Act has been discussed at length else-

where.‘ Certainly, the legislative history of §1988 is clear

and unambiguous as to the federal policy envisioned by the

drafters. See Custom v. Quern, 482 F. Supp. 1000, 1003

(N.D. Ill. 1980). The statute was enacted to prompt the

vigorous enforcement of the civil rights laws, “and to

achieve uniformity in those statutes and justice for all

citizens.” H.R. Rep. No. 94-1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1,

19 (1976). The Senate Committee on the Judiciary found

the awarding of attorneys’ fees to be “essential” to the full

enforcement of the federal civil rights laws, and “an in-

tegral part of the remedies necessary to obtain . . . com-

pliance” with those laws. S.Rep. No. 94-1011, 94th Cong.,

2nd Sess. 5, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.

News 5908, 5913.

An important part of the enforcement scheme de-

signed by Congress is the collection of attorneys’ fees from

the states when states are the losing defendants. Explicit

in this element is Congress’s realization that states and state

officials are very often the targets of civil rights actions.

*The issue of what remains if a contract term is found to

be void is discussed below.

* See, ¢.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978), Riddell v.

Nat'l Democratic Party, 624 F.2d 539, 543 (5th Cir. 1980) ; Dennis

v. Chang, 611 F.2d 1302, 1306 (9th Cir. 1980) ; Custom v. Quern,

482 F. Supp. 1000, 1004 (N.D. Ill. 1980).

36a Opinion, District Court

[D]efendants in these cases are often state or local

bodies or state local officials. In such cases, it is in-

tended that attorneys’ fees, like other items of costs,

will be collected either directly from the official, in

his official capacity, from funds of his agency or under

his control, or from the State or local government

(whether or not the agency or government is a named

party) .

Senate Report No. 94-1011, 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in [1976]

U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5908, 5913, (footnotes

omitted) .

The attorneys’ fees scheme was a time-tested method

by 1976 when the Civil Rights Attorneys’ Fees Award Act

was efacted and Congress was familiar with the method

by which its policy would be carried out. As the Senate

Committee on the Judiciary recognized, “[t]he idea of the

‘private attorney general’ is not a new one... . We have,

since 1870, authorized fee shifting under more than 50

laws.” Senate Report No. 94-1011 at 3. Congress expected

that private lawyers who might otherwise refuse to repre-

sent indigent clients with meritorious civil rights claims

would be induced to take those cases by the prospect of

substantial fee awards made to prevailing plaintiffs. The

success of the scheme in this regard is clear beyond dispute.

It is also clear beyond dispute that legal aid societies

are entitled to attorneys’ fees, and that the case here may be

characterized as precisely the kind of litigation that Con-

gress intended to encourage through the Civil Rights At-

torneys’ Fees Act. In this case, the Court granted injunc-

tive and declaratory relief to two plaintiff classes. The

classes comprised, in the first class, recipients and, in the

second class, applicants for medical assistance to the medi-

cally needy. The first class succeeded in proving that the

Opinion, District Court 37a

state program conflicted with federal regulations. The sec-

ond class succeeded in showing that medical assistance

benefits were unconstitutionally terminated. Shadis, et al.

v. Beal, et al., Civil Action No. 75-3421 (E.D. Pa. August

10, 1976) (Order granting declaratory and injurctive re-

lief on liability issues.) °

In asserting its contractual defense, the Common

wealth argues that it should be permitted to erect a com-

pensation system for CLS apart from the national scheme

created by Congress. It states, “The contracts between the

Commonwealth, PLSC and CLS have met the interests of

the Act and in a way that is probably more useful to low

income persons and legal aid agencies than sole reliance on

the act. The Commonwealth has given the agencies funds

in advance. .. .” Defendants’ Supplementary Brief in Op-

position to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees at 7. The

Court disagrees with the contention that the contracts here

“have met the interests of the Act.”

It is quite clear, and courts have recognized, that CLS,

in “rationing” its resources must take into account the like-

lihood of obtaining attorneys’ fees.‘ Like any private law-

yer, CLS must remain within a budget, and only do the

legal work that it can afford to do. What the Common-

wealth has attempted to do here is to buy immunity from

CLS lawyers. In return for a steady partial subsidy, the

Commonwealth has demanded’ that CLS not seek attor-

*The damages claims were subsequently settled. Shadis v.

Beal, Civil Action No. 75-3421 (E.D. Pa. December 28, 1979)

(Order approving settlement of damages claims) .

*H.g., Rodriquez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1245 (3d Cir.

1977).

™*Demanded”’ is accurate usage. CLS protested from the

first year in which the contract term was proposed that the bar

38a Opinion, District Court

neys’ fees awards in cases brought against the Common-

wealth. The obvious effect of this, if the agreement is en-

forced, is to cause CLS not to bring actions against the

Commonwealth. In end result, an important member of

the plaintiffs’ civil rights bar would be removed from the

scene, and the vigorous enforcement of the civil rights laws

would be materially quelled. Dennis v. Chang, 611 F.2d

1302, 1306-7 (9th Cir. 1980).

The situation is exacerbated by the nature of particu-

lar defendants in this case. This Court has serious doubts

that any contractual term immunizing a defendant from the

Civil Rights Attorneys’ Fees Awards Act provisions would

be enforceable,® but here, where awards in cases brought

against this particular class of defendants are specifically

intended by Congress, the contradiction of public policy

by the contract is palpable. The Court must include that

factor in assessing the conflict between the Act and the con-

tractual term. This is not just a random, individual defend-

ant who has opted out of the rational scheme; this defend-

ant is among the most significant targets of the lawsuits

Congress meant to encourage, In short, Congress has made

a Clear and unambiguous statement that a certain kind of

lawsuit is to be encouraged. This lawsuit is of that kind.

to seeking attorneys’ fees was improper and contrary to public

policy.

. ® Contracting not to aecept fee awards against an entity or

person damages Congress’ national policy when any lawyer does

it, because it creates an inducement, however subtle, not to bring

actions against that putative defendant. The critical element is

that the agreement is a prior restraint on the lawyer's decision-

making. If such agreements were enforceable, the entity or per-

son could programmatically require such agreements from any

number of lawyers with whom it deals, thus diminishing the scope

and vitality of the inducement Congress wished to create.

Opinion, District Court 39a

The Court finds that the contractual term relied upon by

the Commonwealth operates to diminish the likelihood of

this kind of lawsuit being brought. The enforcement of

this contractual term is therefore contrary to public policy.

The only remaining issue to be resolved is whether the term

should therefore be considered void.

In weighing the interest in the enforcement of the term

against the public policy against enforcement of a term,

the Court observes that the public policy embodied in Sec-

tion 1988 is a vital one. Congress could not have been

clearer in its intent or in the seriousness it attached to the

attorneys’ fees provisions. The use of words such as “es-

sential” and “integral” is prevalent in the legislative his-

tory and in the cases construing the act. The policy is, quite

clearly, an important one. By contrast, the Court has dif-

ficulty in ascribing much importance to the enforcement of

the contract. The three factors listed in the Restatement

under “‘weighing the interest in the enforcement of a term,”

see Restatement (2d) of Contracts (Tent. Draft No. 12

1977) §320, give little support to the Commonwealth’s

position. The parties’ expectations were divergent,’ and

the Court can perceive neither “forfeiture” if enforcement

were derived,”® nor “any special public interest in the en-

forcement” of the term.”

The Commonwealth may legally decide to reduce its

funding of CLS. This was Hawaii's response, see Dennis

v. Chang, 611 F.2d 1302, 1307 n. 15 (9th Cir. 1980). It

may decide to stop funding CLS altogether. What it may

not do is contract with CLS in such a way that CLS will be

® Restatement (2d) Contracts (1977) §320(2) (a).

1 Id. §320(2) (b).

1 Jd. §320(2) (c).

40a Opinion, District Court

deterred from bringing civil rights cases against it. For

that reason, the Court will decline to enforce the agreement

that purports to bar an award of attorneys’ fees to CLS.

The Commonwealth argues that this conclusion by the

Court renders the entire funding contract void. The cases

cited by the Commonwealth, City of Pittsburgh v. Goshorn,

230 Pa. 212 (1910) and Dippel v. Brunozzi, 365 Pa. 264

(1950) do not support that broad contention.” In addi-

tion, the Restatement explicitly refers to a “term” of an

agreement. However, the Court need not rule on the issue

of what remains of the CLS contract because the only issue

before it is the adequacy of the defense to the attorneys’

fees request.

The parties have informed the Court informally that a

partial settlement has been reached, and that they have

agreed on the value of the services rendered to the class by

CLS. The Court will order that the parties file a stipulation

to that effect and judgment will be entered on the stipulated

award.

(s) Clarence C. Newcomer

Clarence C. Newcomer, J.

12 The cases do not address for example, the issue of divisi-

bility. Cf. Sideo Paper Co. v. Aaron, 465 Pa. 586 (1976).

Opinion, District Court 4la

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Civil Action No. 75-3421

JACK SHADIS, ET AL.

v.

FRANK S. BEAL, ET AL.

ORDER

AND NOW, this 17th day of August, 1981, it is here-

by ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for an Award of At-

torneys’ Fees is GRANTED.

The parties shall file a stipulation as to the amount

previously agreed upon.

AND IT IS SC ORDERED.

(s) Clarence C. Newcomer

Clarence C. Newcomer, J.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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