Appendix — Coastal Petroleum Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp.

Supreme Court brief1982

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In THE

United States District Court

For THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

TCA 79-1082

Mosit O11 Corp., a New York Corporation,

Plaintiff,

v.

COASTAL PETROLEUM COMPANY, a Florida corporation,

and

Tue Boarp Or Trustees Or THe INTERNAL

IMPROVEMENT TRUST FUND OF

Tue State Or FLoripa,

Defendants.

ORDER

This case is before the court for consideration of Mobil Oil

Corporation’s motion to remand (Document 6). Following the

submission of extensive memoranda by all parties to this

litigation, the court heard oral argument of the motion on

March 10, 1980 ( Documents 6, 10, 11, 14, 24, 25, 27 and 30).

Mobil urges remand to the state court from which this case

was removed on the basis of (1) absence in this court of

“original jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising under

the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States”, i.¢., the

absence of federal question jurisidiction had the suit been

instituted herein, and (2) the alleged impropriety of removal

by the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust

Fund of the State of Florida because the Board of Trustees is

2a

not a defendant under 28 USC § 1441 and because the Board

of Trustees “voluntarily” submitted to the jursdiction of the

state court.

The history of this action is well-known to the parties and

need not be reiterated here, except to note that the Board's

petition for removal followed Mobil’s filing on November 28,

1979 of a “counterclaim” in response to Coastal’s second

counterclaim in the state action and joinder of the Trustees in

its counterclaim. Mobil seeks declaratory judgment with

respect to lands assertedly owned by Mobil in the area in issue

under Coastal’s second counterclaim, which charges Mobil

conducted phosphate mining operations upon sovereignty lands

owned by the Board and subject to a mineral lease to Coastal.

These sovereignty lands are alleged to lay naturally beneath

navigable waterbodies which traverse Mobil’s mining proper-

ties. Mobil seeks a declaration of its rights of ownership and a

declaration that the sovereignty claim of Coastal and the

Trustees is invalid because the waterbodies upon which the

claim is premised were not navigable at the date of statehood

under federal law.

The navigability of the waterbodies in issue in 1845 and

the location of the ordinary high water line of the waterbodies

in 1845, if they were navigable, are issues to be determined by

federal law. Oregan ex rel State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand

& Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977) at 370, 376; United States v.

Oregon, 295 U.S. 1,14 (1934); United States v. Utah, 283 U.S.

64, 75 (1931). See also Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S.

91, 99 (1972). Additionally, in this case the determination of

these federal questions is a condition precedent to a declaration

of Mobil’s rights of ownership with respect to the lands which it

claims through various deeds and patents. Mobil correctly

states that a determination of whether the property in question

was transferred into private ownership is a State question,

which must be determined in accordance with State law,

necessarily involving the State test of navigability. Corvallis,

supra, at 377-8. However, Mobil ignores the essential and

initial necessity for a determination of the federal question

raised by its declaratory action before the State questions may

even be reached. Thus, the federal questions involved are an

3a

essential element of Mobil’s claim; Mobil’s rights may be

defeated or supported if federal law is given one construction or

effect; there is a genuine controversy with respect to the federal

questions involved; and the non-navigability of waterbodies at

statehood which is alleged in Mobil’s declaratory “counter-

claim” is not simply anticipation of Coastal and the Trustees’

probable defense, as Mobil has argued in its motion to remand,

but is an essential element of Mobil’s cause of action. Gully v.

First National Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109 ( 1936); May v.

Holley, 59 So. 2d 636, 639 (1952).

Mobil’s “counterclaim” can thus be seen to have brought

this action within the original jurisdiction of this Court as an

action “arising under” federal law. Mobil’s declaratory claim

seeks fundamentaily to resolve whether the sovereignty claim of

the Trustees and Coastal, upon which the conversion claim is

based, is valid. A determination of the validity of the sover-

eignty claim depends on the navigability of the rivers in issue at

statehood, a federal question.

A reciprocal request for declaratory relief such as Mobil’s

purported “counterclaim” is necessarily a permissive counter-

claim. In substance this particular reply “counterclaim” is an

amendment to plaintiff's complaint. 3 Moore's Federal Practice

913.08; Vines v. Emerald Equipment Co., 342 So. 2d 137, 138

(Fla. Ist DCA 1977). Mobil is plaintiff and Coastal and

Trustees are defendants with respect to the declaratory claim

and recasting of the parties is inappropriate. Shamrock Oil and

Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 104, 107, 108 (1941). See

also Cliett v. Scott, 283 F.2d 269, 271 (Sth Cir. 1956).

The essential concern is determining the right to remove is

consideration of which party selected the original forum, with

removal being limited to parties who made no such choice.

Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Hugo Neu Corporation, 196 F.

Supp. 64, 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). Both Coastal and the Trustees

are defendants entitled to removal with respect to Mobil’s

declaratory action and the court finds no waiver of that right by

the Trustees’ actions prior to the filing of Mobil’s reply “count-

4a

erclaim™ for declaratory judgment in the state court action.

Cliett v. Scott, supra at 269, 271; Paris v. Affleck, 431 F. Supp.

878, 880 (M.D. Fla. 1977); Wright v. Lupton, 118 F. Supp. 25

(W.D. Mo. 1954).

In accordance with the foregoing, ix is ORDET ED AND

ADJUDGED that Mobil Oil Corporation's motion to remand

(Document 6) should be, and hereby is, DENIED.

DONE AND ORDERED this 3rd day of June, | 980.

WiLuiaM STAFFORD

Unrrep States District JupGe

Sa

Mosit Om Corporation, a New York Corporation,

Pilaintiff-Appellant,

Vv.

COASTAL PetroLeum Company, a Florida Corporation,

Defendant- Appellee.

Mosit On Corporation, a New York Corporation,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

of Trustees of the Internal Improvement

Trust Fund of the State of Florida,

Dahateeetepeien

Nos. 21-5533, 81-5812.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit.

March 4, 1982.

Vacated with instructions.

Appeals from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Florida.

Before MORGAN, TJOFLAT and JOHNSON, Circuit

Judges.

December 20, 1979, the Trustees and Coastal (appellees)

removed the case to the district court, asserting that Mobil’s

reply counterclaim raised a substantial federal question by

challenging the Trustees’ sovereignty claim to the subject land.

Mobil moved to remand the case to the state court, but the

In December of 1980, Coastal’s fourth counterclaim was

tried in the district court, resulting in a final judgment on a jury

verdict in favor of Coastal. In No. 81-5533, Mobil appeals that

judgment, contending that the district court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction of the reply counterclaim, and therefore of

the case, and that the district court committed error in the

conduct of the trial.’

' In addition to its jurisdictional contention, Mobil argues that the record

contains no evidence to support the jury’s assessment of

damages and that the district court erred in ruling that the Mobil-Coastal oi!

(footnote continued)

7a

On July 29, 1981, Coastal moved the district court for an

injunction to prohibit Mobil from proceeding further in a

related state court quiet title action. The district court entered

an order enjoining the parties from filing or further litigating in

any state or federal court any lawsuit which would require the

determination of any legal or factual issue forming the basis of

this lawsuit or necessarily relating thereto. In No. 81-5812,

Mobil appeals the injunction, coniending that it is prohibited by

the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976), and, again,

challenging the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court.

Because we conclude that the district court lacks jurisdiction of

this case, we reach none of the other issues raised in these

consolidated appeals.

IL.

The federal removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1976),

permits defendants to remove state court civil actions of which

the federal courts have original jurisdiction. The jurisdictional

(footnote continues)

exploration agreement required Mobil to furnish a geochemical report to

Coastal; in instructing the jury that it could award more than nominal

damages under Count One of Coastal's fourth counterclaim; in submitting a

misrepresentation claim to the jury; and in submitting Coastal’s request for

Punitive damages to the jury.

228 U.S.C. § 1441 (1976) provides in pertinent part:

(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of

Congress, any civii action brought in a State court of which the

district courts of the United States have orginal junsdiction, may

be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district

court of the United States for the district and division embracing

the place where such action is pending.

(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original

jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising under the

Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be

removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the

parties. Any other such action shall be removable only if none of

the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is

a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.

8a

question presented in this case is whether Mobil’s reply counter-

claim arises under federal law within the meaning of 28

U.S.C.A. § 1331(a) (West Supp. 1980)? so as to be remo-

vable.* The reply counterclaim alleges in relevant part:

ALLEGATIONS COMMON TO ALL COUNTS

1. This is an action for declaratory judgment

pursuant to Chapter 86, Florida Statutes. The subject

matter of the controversy exceeds $2,500 in value.

2. MOBIL owns, and is in possession of the SE

% of NW % and SW % of NE % of Section 23,

Township 31 South, Range 25 East, Polk County,

Florida. The Peace River courses a part of these

lands and parts lie within the swamps that adjoin the

river.

3. MOBIL’s ownership is based on a continuous

chain of title which began with a deed from the State

of Florida to Henry S. Seward dated November 20,

1862. The deed . . . does not mention any rivers,

waterbodies or watercourses nor does it reserve any

interest in STATE.

4. STATE and COASTAL have asserted in this

suit that MOBIL has converted phosphate by having

mined certain lands allegedly owned by STATE and

that are subject to a mineral lease between STATE

and COASTAL ... . The lands described in para-

328 U.S.C.A. § 1331(a) ( West Supp. 1980) provides: The district courts

shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Con-

stitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.

* No other claim in the case is asserted to arise under federal law. The

Trustees correctly concede that the action could not be removed on diversity

grounds because, assuming arguendo that the Trustees are a citizen for

purposes of diversity, removal on diversity grounds is permitted only if no

defendant is a resident of the state where the action was brought. See 28

U.S.C. § 1441(b), supra, note 2. Coastal’s argument that Mobil waived the

right to challenge removal of diversity grounds is meritless.

5. The conversion claims of STATE and

COASTAL are bottomed on the contention that the

lands from which the phosphate was allegedly taken

underlie waterbodies or watercourses which were

navigable in fact when Florida became a State on

March 3, 1845, and, as such, are sovereignty lands.

COUNT 1

( Lands are not sovereignty in character)

10. The Peace River was not “meandered”

(which would have indicated navigability ) nor other-

wise designated as navigable, by the original govern-

ment surveyors or those who prepared ine original

township plats at any point north of the dividing line

between Townships 38 and 39.

11. The Peace River was not navigable in fact on

March 3, 1845, at any point north of the dividing line

between Townships 38 and 39. Township 31 is north

of that line.

12. Inasmuch as there were no navigable water-

bodies on the lands described in paragraph 2, above,

on March 3, 1845, no part of the lands are sover-

eignty lands.

The eight remaining counts of the reply counterclaim involve,

all parties agree, only state law questions.

[1-3] For a case to arise under federal law a right or

immunity created by that law must be an essential element of

the plaintiff's claim; the federal right or immunity that forms

the basis of the claim must be such that the claim will be

supported if the federal law is given one construction or effect

and defeated if it is given another. Maxwell v. First Nat'l Bank

10a

of Monroeville, 638 F.2d 32, 35 ( Sth Cir. 1981 )5; In Re Carter,

618 F.2d 1093, 1100 (Sth Cir. 1980), citing Gully v. First Nat'l

Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109, 112, 57 S.Ct. 96, 97, 81 L.Ed.

70 (1936). In order to determine whether the claim arises

under the Constitution or laws of the United States, we look to

the complaint unaided by anticipated defenses and with due

regard to the real nature of the claim. Maxwell, 638 F.2d at 35;

Gully, 299 U.S. at 113, 57 S.Ct. at 98. “A suit to enforce a right

which takes its origin in the laws of the United States is not

necessarily, or for that reason alone, one arising under those

laws, for a suit does not so arise unless it really and substan-

tially involves a dispute or controversy respecting the validity,

construction or effect of such a law, upon the determination of

which the result depends. This is especially so of a suit

involving rights to land acquired under a law of the United

States.” Heirs of Burat v. Bd. of Levee Comm'rs, 496 F.2d 1336,

1342 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049, 95 S.Ct. 625, 42

L.Ed.2d 644 (1974), quoting Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 US.

561, 569, 32 S.Ct. 704, 706, 56 L.Ed. 1205 (1912).

[4, 5] Acknowledging these precepts, the parties differ-

ently characterize Mobil’s pleading. Pointing to the reply

counterclaim’s challenge to Florida’s acquisition of title to the

disputed lands as sovereignty lands, the Trustees and Coastal

argue that Mobil’s claim turns on a federal question, namely,

the navigability of the Peace River on March 3, 1845, the date

Florida was admitted to the Union. If the Peace River was

navigable at that date, title to the lands beneath the river

passed from the United States to the State of Florida under the

equal footing doctrine® and were received by Florida as

5The Eleventh Circuit has adopted as binding precedent decisions

rendered by the former Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit before the close

of business on September 30, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206

( tith Cir. 1981) (en banc).

* Under the equal footing doctrine, “the new States... have the same

rights, sovereignty and jurisdiction... as the original States possess within

their respective borders.” Mumford ». Wardwell, 6 Wall. 423, 436, 18 L.Ed.

756 (1867). Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 11 L.Ed. 565 ( 1845),

held that “oder the equal footing doctrine, new states, upon their adminis-

ee eS ee ee ee

within their boundaries.

sovereign lands. The passing of title under the equal footing

doctrine, the argument continues, is a federally created right

which is governed by federal law; thus, the navigability of the

Peace River on March 3, 1845, is a substantial federal question

supporting federa! subject matter jurisdiction.

Mobil maintains that its reply counterclaim involves a

mere title dispute between Florida land claimants, each of

whom derives its claim from the State, so that Florida law, and

not federal law, governs the controversy. While federal law

may determine the navigability of waters for the limited

purpose of ascertaining ehether title to a riverbed passed from

the United States to Florida when Florida became a state, once

title has passed, as the parties agree has occurred here, Florida

law governs any subsequent claim to the property.

In its denial of Mobil’s motion to remand, the district court

embraced the characterization advanced by the Trustees and

Coastal:

The navigability of the waterbodies in issue in 1845 and

the location of the ordinary high water line of the waterbodies

in 1845, if they were navigable, are issues to be determined by

federai law. Additionally, in this case the determination of

these federal question is a condition precedent to a declaration

of Mobil’s rights of ownership with respect to the lands which it

states that a determination of whether the property in question

was transferred into private ownership is a state question, which

must be determined in accordance with State law, necessarily

involving the State test of navigability. However, Mobil ignores

the essential and initial necessity for a determination of the

federal questions raised by its declaratory action before the

State questions may even be reached... .

Mobil’s “counterclaim” can thus be seen to have brought

this action within the original jurisdiction of this Court as an

action “arising under” federal law. Mobil’s deciaratory claim

seeks fundamentally to resolve whether the sovereignty claim of

the Trustees and Coastal, upon which the conversion claim is

12a

based, is valid. A determination of the validity of the sover-

Ceny Galen Gopenin en Ce anigetiny of Gis Sven) & ane a

statehood, a federal question.

(citations omitted ).

[6] Clearly enough, Mobil does allege that the Peace

River was not navigable in fact on March 3, 1845, and that the

disputed property is therefore not sovereignty land. The

appellees cite United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. |, 55 S.Ct. 610,

79 L.Ed. 1267 (1935), and United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64,

51 S.Ct. 438, 75 L.Ed. 844 (1931), for the proposition that the

question whether a river is navigable so that the submerged

iands pass to a state at statehood is a federal question support-

ing federal jurisdiction. Those cases were property contests

between the United States and a state. We do not question that

when the United States and a state dispute whether submerged

land has passed to a state under the equal footing doctrine or

remains federal land, navigability is a federal question. In

order to ascertain whether Mobil’s claim, with due regard to its

real nature, presents a substantial controversy respecting the

validity, construction, or effect of federal law, however, we must

identify the role which the asserted federal question plays in the

present controversy.

The disputed property was deeded by the State of Florida

to Mobil’s predecessor in interest in 1862, and the state held

title to the property at the time of the conveyance. Title had

passed to the state by one of two means: either Florida acquired

the lands under the equal footing doctrine at statehood on

March 3, 1845, because the Peace River was then navigable, or

Florida acquired the lands in 1850 under the Swamp and

Overflow Lands Grant Act, 9 Stat. 520, now codified at 43

U.S.C. § 982 (1976). If the state acquired the lands under the

equal footing doctrine in 1845, they were received as sover-

eignty lands; otherwise, they were not. Florida law treats

sovereignty lands differently than other lands: sovereignty

lands, unlike other lands, are held by the state in public trust

and are subject to certain restrictions on alienation.

The position of the Trustees and Coastal is that the Peace

River was navigable on March 3, 1845, so that the state

13a

received the disputed lands as sovereignty lands and the 1862

deed did not, under Florida law, convey the property to Mobil’s

predecessor in interest. Mobil’s position is that the Peace River

was not navigable on March 3, 1845, so that the state received

the disputed lands in 1850 as nonsovereignty lands, and the

1862 deed, under Florida law, conveyed the property to Mobil’s

, in j

[7] The sole significance in this case of the navigability of

th eace River in 1845 is that the State of Florida elects to

denominate lands acquired from the United States under the

equal footing doctrine as sovereign lands and to restrict the

alienability of those lands. The federal question relied on by

the appellees is a mere criterion which Florida chooses to adopt

as the determinant of a rule of state real property law. In 1862,

before the state deeded the disputed property to Mobil’s

predecessor in interest, the state was at absolute liberty, so far

as federal law was concerned, to treat the property as it wished.

If the property was subject to restrictions on alienation, those

restrictions were imposed by state law. That the state chose to

look to the equal footing origin of the lands as fixing forever

their sovereign character is no predicate for federal jurisdiction.

Properly viewed, then, the question which is asserted to

support the jurisdiction of the district court is incidental to

Mobil’s claim and not at its essence; nor does the fact that a

determination of navigability may resolve the controversy alter

our conclusion.

The whole foundation of the duty is [state] law,

which at its sole will incorporated the other law as it

might incorporate a document. The other law or

document depends for its relevance and effect not on

its own force but upon the law that took it up, so...

the cause of action arises wholly from the law of the

State.... The mere adoption by a State law of a

United States law as a criterion or test, when the law

of the United States has no force proprio vigore, does

not cause a case under the State law to be also a case

under the law of the United States. .. .

4a

Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 214-15,

41 S.Ct. 243, 250, 65 L.Ed. 577 (1921) (Holmes, J., dis-

senting ).

The decision of the Supreme Court in Oregon ex rel. State

Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 97 $.Ct.

582, 50 L.Ed.2d 550 (1977), strongly supports our holding.

There, the State of Oregon had brought a state court ejectment

action against an Oregon corporation over the ownership of two

portions of land underlying the navigable Willamette River.

One portion had been within the riverbed since Oregon’s

admission to the Union, while the other had only later become

part of the riverbed because of changes in the river’s course.

The Oregon courts took the view that federal common law

controlled the dispute because the extent of a state’s sovereign

right under the equal footing doctrine was a federal question.

On this basis, they award ‘ the first portion to the state and the

second to the corporation.

On certiorari, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment

and remanded, holding that ownership of the disputed lands

should be decided solely as a matter of Oregon law and not

federal common law, because application of federal common

law was required neither by the equal footing doctrine nor by

any other principle of federal law. So holding, the Court

overruled Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 94 S.Ct.

517, 38 L.Ed.2d 526 (1973), and repudiated Bonelli’s holding

that the nature of the title conferred by the equal footing

doctrine is governed by federal common law. 429 US. at 369-

70, 97 S.Ct. at 586-587. “Although federal law may fix the

initial boundary line between fast lands and the riverbeds at the

time of a State’s admission to the Union, the State’s title to the

riverbed vests absolutely as of the time of its admission and is

not subject to later defeasance by operation of any doctrine of

federal common law.” Jd. at 370-71, 97 S.Ct. at 587. Most

significantly here, the Court reaffirmed that:

[W]henever the question in any Court, sta

federal, is, whether a title to land which had once

been the property of the United States has passed,

that question must be resolved by the laws o

¢

15a

United States; but ... whenever, according to those

laws, the title shall have passed, then that property,

like all other property in the state, is subject to state

legislation; so far as that legislation is consistent with

the admission that the title passed and vested accord-

ing to the laws of the United States.

Id. at 377, 97 S.Ct. at 590, quoting Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Pet.

498, 517, 10 L.Ed. 264 (1839) (emphasis in original).

The Trustees and Coastal would limit Corvallis to title

disputes in which the parties agree that the lands previously

acquired by the state were acquired as sovereignty lands. The

Supreme Court in Corvallis foreclosed this interpretation of its

decision. The Court held that state law governs the disposition

of property held by a state regardless of whether or not the state

acquired the property as sovereignty land under the equal

footing doctrine:

Thus, if the lands at issue did pass under the

equal-footing doctrine, state title is not subject to

defeasance and state law governs subsequent dis-

positions.

. * o a

A similar result obtains in the case of riparian

lands which did not pass under the equal footing

doctrine. This Court has consistently held that state

law governs issues relating to this property, like other

real property, unless some other principle of federal

law requires a different result.

429 US. at 378, 97 S.Ct. at 591.

The appellees insist that the pivotal issue in this case is

indeed, as Corvallis requires, “whether a title to land which had

once been the property of the United States has passed,”

the principal controversy is whether the Trustees ac-

quired title to the disputed lands in 1845 under the equal

footing doctrine, or in 1850 as swamp and overflow lands. But

there is no question in this case whether, in the sense obviously

16a

parties agree that it has. The issue is whether, under Florida

law, the 1862 deed to Mobil’s predecessor conveyed the

disputed property. That Florida chooses to answer this ques-

tion by inquiring by what means it initially acquired title to the

property does not alter the fact that this is a case in which, title

having passed to the state, state law controls.

A case bearing more directly on the collateral relationship

between the navigability of the Peace River in 1845 and the

present controversy is Miller's Executors v. Swann, 150 US.

132, 14 S.Ct. 52, 37 L.Ed. 1028 (1893). In Swann, Congress

had granted public lands to the State of Alabama to aid in the

construction of railroads. The Act granting the land provided

explicit conditions governing any further conveyance by the

State. The State conveyed the land to a railroad company,

retaining a mortgage whose terms paralleled the conditions

imposed by Congress. Upon the bankruptcy of the railroad, the

State and a vendee of the railroad both claimed a certain parcel

of land, disputing whether the railroad had sufficiently com-

plied with the conditions of the Act of Congress (as in-

corporated in the mortgage) to give it the power to convey to

the third party claimant. The Alabama Supreme Court deter-

mined that the conditions had not beer met, and that the State

was entitled to the land. On appeal to the United States

Supreme Court, the Court concluded that it was without

jurisdiction to hear the matter for want of a federal question:

Now, whether [the Supreme Court of Alabama's]

was a correct construction or not of the act [con-

veying the land to the railroad] and the reservation

17a

question. A state may prescribe the procedure in the

federal courts as the rule of practice in its own

tribunals: it may authorize the disposal of its own

lands in accordance with the provisions for the sale of

the public lands of the United States; and in such

cases an examination may be necessary of the acts of

congress, the rules of the federal courts, and the

practices of the land department, and yet the questions

for decision would not be of a federal character. The

inquiry along federal lines is only incidental to a

determination of the local question of what the state

has required and prescribed. The matter decided is

one of state rule and practice. The facts by which that

state rule and practice are determined may be of a

federal origin.

Id. at 136-37, 14 S.Ct. at 54 (emphasis added ).

We find nothing in the case law since Swann that causes us

to question its currency, see ¢.g., Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio

Ry. Co., 291 US. 205, 54 S.Ct. 402, 78 L.Ed. 755 (1934);

Morris v. Danna, 411 F.Supp. 1300 (D.Minn.1976), aff'd, 547

F.2d 436 (8th Cir. 1977), or its obvious applicability to this

case.

Our conclusion that the district court has no jurisdiction of

this case comports with the fact that there is no federal interest

whatever in the resolution of this controversy. Federal law is

appropriately indifferent to Florida's invocation or application

of a federal test of navigability as a precondition to determining

a question of state law. The appellees direct us to United States

v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55-56, 46 S.Ct. 197, 199, 70

L.Ed. 465 (1926), in which the Court held that “Navigability,

when asserted as the basis of a right arising under the Con-

stitution of the United States, is necessarily a question of federal

law to be determined according to the general rule recognized

and applied in the federal courts.... To treat the question as

turning on the varying local rules would give the Constitution a

diversified operation where uniformity was intended.” Here,

not as in Holt State Bank, neither party asserts navigability as

the basis of a right arising under the Constitution or laws of the

United States. Moreover, no uniform interpretation of federal

law is intended or needed when the federal law exerts no force

proprio vigore but is merely set up by the state as a criterion by

which to decide a state law question.

We hold, then, that the district court lacks jurisdiction of

this case. The judgment appealed in No. 81-5533 is vacated,

and on receipt of the mandate the district court shall remand

the case to the state court. The injunction appealed in No. 81-

5812 is dissolved.*

VACATED, with instructions.

* We note that on October 15, 1981, the district court extended the

injunction in this case to apply to American Cyanamid Company which is

involved in a similar lawsuit against Coastal Amencan Cyanamid Company's

appeal of that injunction is now pending before this court in Case No. $1!-

6061.

19a

In THE

Bnited States Court of Appeals

For THE ELEVENTH CiRcurIT

No. 81-5533

D.C. Docket No. 79-1082

Mosi Om Corporation, a New York Corporation,

Plaintiff -Appellant,

CoasTaL PETROLEUM ComPaNny, a Florida Corporation,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 81-5812

Mos On Corporation, a New York Corporation,

Plaintiff-Appeliant,

Coastal PeTro.eum Company, a Florida Corporation,

and The State of Florida Department of Natural

Resources and The Board of Trustees of the Internal

Improvements Trust Fund of the State of Florida,

Defendants- Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

Before MORGAN, TJOFLAT and JOHNSON, Circuit Judges.

20a

JUDGMENT

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the

record from the United States District Court for the Northern

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is now here or-

dered and adjudged by this Court that the judgment is hereby

vacated with instructions in appeal no. 81-5533; the injunction

appealed in no. 81-5812 is dissolved;

It is further ordered that Appellauts pay to Appellees the

costs on appeal to be taxed by the Clerk of this Court.

March 4, 1982

2la

Filed Apr 231982 Norman E. Zeller Clerk

In THE

‘Puited States Court of Appeals

For THE ELEVENTH CircurT

No. 81-5533 and 81-5812

Mosit On Corporation, a New York Corporation,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Vv.

CoasTAL PetTro_eum Company, a Florida Corporation,

Defendant-Appellee.

Mosit Om Corporation, a New York Corporation,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Vv.

CoasTaL PeTroLeum Company, a Florida Corporation,

and The State of Florida Departinent

of Natural Resources and The Board

of

Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust

Fund of the State of Florida,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States

District Court for the

Northern District of Florida

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING AND SUGGESTION

FOR REHEARING EN BANC

(Opinion March 4, 11 Cir., 1982, _. F.2d —_).

22a

Before MORGAN, TJOFLAT and JOHNSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

(X) The Petition for Rehearing is DENIED and no member of

this panel nor Judge in regular active service on the Court

having requested that the Court be polled on rehearing en banc

(Rule 35, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure; Eleventh

Circuit Rule 26), the suggestion for Rehearing En Banc is

DENIED.

( ) The Petition for Rehearing is DENIED and the Court

having been polled at the request of one of the members of the

Court and a majority of the Circuit Judges who are in regular

active service not having voted in favor of it (Rule 35, Federal

Rules of Appellate Procedure; Local Eleventh Circuit Rule 26),

the suggestion for Rehearing En Banc is also DENIED.

( ) A member of the Court in active service having requested

a poll on the reconsideration of this cause en banc, and a

majority of the judges in active service not having voted in

favor of it, rehearing en banc is DENIED.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT:

/s/ GeraLD B. TJOFLAT

United States Circuit Judge

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