Amicus Brief — Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co.

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Office Supreme Court, U.S,

FILED

FEB.) 1963

Nos. 82-354, 82-355, 82-398 een

IN THE K Bea

Supreme Court of the United States

OcTOBER TERM, 1982

Moror Venice MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION OF THE

Unrrep Srares, Inc., et al., Petitioners,

V.

Srate Farm Mutua. Avtromosi.e Insurance Company, et al.,

Respondents.

Cowsumer ALERT AND Paciric Lecat Founpation, Petitioners,

V.

Srate Fanu Murua Auro nom Insura? ce Company, et al.,

Respondents.

Unrrep States DerparTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, et al.,

Petitioners,

V.

Sratre Farm Mutua. Avromosite Insurance Company, et al.,

Respondents.

On Writs Of Certiorari To The United States Court

Of Appeals For The District Of Columbia Circuit

BRIEF FOR THE AMERICAN INSURANCE

ASSOCIATION, AMICUS CURIAE IN

SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS

NATHAN LEWIN

(Counsel of Record)

ANNE SHERE WALLWORK

Mun, Cassipy, Larroca & Lewin

2555 M Street, N.W., Suite 500

maa 20037

Attorneys for the American Insurance Association,

Amicus Curiae

PRESS OF BYRON 8. ADAMS PRINTING, INC., WASHINGTON, D.C.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

1 cccccnsucsoccecesescccscccess iii

OUUREST OF THB AMICUS e eee eee l

eee 6666660 60 2

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ........... 2

I. NHTSA’s Rescission or SAFETY STANDARD 208 Was

UNLAWFUL Because It Restep Upon EARLIER OFFI.

CIAL ACTIONS PROMPTED By THE AGENCY'S IMPERMIS-

SIBLE CONCERN OVER THE DEPRESSED Economic

STATE OF THE Domestic AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY. .. 5

A. NHTSA Explicitly Cited The Automobile In-

dustry’s Economie Difficulties As The Principal

Reason For Dela And Proposing to Amend

The Passive Restraint Requirements. 6

(1) — proposes delay to help the indus-

(3) NHTSA proposes rescission because of

the industry's “economic difficulties." .. 8

(4) NHTSA's steps are described as “Actions

to Help the U.S. Auto Industry.“ 8

P B. In The Absence Of An Explicit Repudiation

NHTSA Should Be Presumed To Have Iss

Its Final Rule In Accordance With The Primary

Considerations It Expressed At Earlier Stages

113. 9

C. Consideration Of The Economie Condition Of

The Automobile Industry Is Beyond NHTSA's

Statutory Authorit̃““)ꝰ . . 12

(1) The legislative history indicates that the

economic welfare of the automobile indus-

try is not to be considered by NHTSA. . 13

II. NHTSA AcTED IRRATIONALLY AND ARBITRARILY IN

FaILinc To RETAIN THE PASSIVE RESTRAINT

REQUIREMENT WITHOUT THE ALLEGEDLY INEFFEC-

* AUrouarie BELT Option By ReQuIRING AIR- 2

U eee

Table of Contents Continued

Page

III. Tur Case SHoutp Be REMANDED To THE CouRT oF

AppeaLs Errurx To Direct NHTSA To Enrorce

THE AIR-BAG REQUIREMENT OR, IF PETITIONERS PRE.

vaiL, To Have Tuat Court ApPLy THE CoRRECT

D 26

A. The Court Of Appeals Should Order NHTSA

To Issue An Amended Safety Standard. 27

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES: Page

Adams v. Richardson, 480 F. 2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) 27

American Federation of Government Employees v. De-

vine, 525 F. Supp. 250 (D. D. C. 1981) 12

American Iron & Steel Institute v. Environmental

Protection Agency, 568 F.2d 284 (3d Cir, 1977) .. 25

American Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan,

452 U.S. 490 (1981) ..... cc cece eee eees 12, 15, 18, 19

Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Witchita

Board of Trade, 412 U.S. 800 (1973) ............ 12

Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight

System, Inc., 419 U.S. 281 (1974) .......... tr 13, 26

Burli Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S.

ES INET: LPNS ie RR I 12, 26

Chrysler Corp . Department of Transportation, 472

2d 659 59 (th Gb BEUED ccccvccscccocéscececes 17, 18

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402

eee ess sees ese 86080000 13

n Federal Maritime Commission, 383 U.S. 607

Davis v. Romney, 490 F.2d 1360 (3d Cir. 1974) 27, 28

Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1979) 28

Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439

Ps GE GOED eee eee ee eee ee 28

Federal Trade Commission v. Texaco, Inc., 417 U.S, 380

Fenn 12

Forester v. Consumer Product Safety Comm., 559 F. 2d

r A Eee: 25

H & H Tire Co. v. Department of Transportation, 471

F.2d 350 (Stn Cir, 1973) * eee 18

Industrial Union rtment v. American Petroleum

Institute, 488 U.S. 607 (198177) 10, 11, 12

Industrial Union Department v. Hodgson, 499 F. 2d 467

(D.C, Cir. — ae pidubabestswese 19

2 Harvester v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F. 2d 615

Jacob Siegel Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 327 U.S.

608 (1946) 23

iv

Table of Authorities Continued

Page

Lead Industries Association, Inc. v. Donovan, 453 U.S.

DD ere 19

McCulloch Gas Processing Corp. v. Department of Ener-

gy, 650 F.2d 1216 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1981) . 25

Nader v. Saxbe, 497 F.2d 676 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ....... 29

National Labor Relations Board v. Walton Manufactur-

ing Co., 360 U.S. 404 (1962)... . cece cccceeees

National Tire Dealers & Retread Association, Inc. v.

Brinegar, 491 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1974) .......... 18

National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Associa-

tion of Railroad Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974) 28-29

Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 102 S. Ct. 1781 (1982) . 29, 30

Rockbridge v. Lincoln, 449 F. 2d 567 (9th Cir. 1971) .... 28

318 U.S. 80 (194))))) . 11-12

United Sveelworkers of America v. Marshall, 647 F. 2d

1189 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. Lead

Industries Association, Inc. v. Donovan, 435 U.S.

r c 19

Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations

Board, 340 U.S. 4751 D ’˙˖§öṼ . eae

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Re-

sources Defense Council, Inc., U.S. 519 (1978) 29

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS:

2 ccc cccccscccccccccccccevcces 3. 13

15 U.S.C. § 1892 (197) )) 13

29 U.S.C. 68 481 et seq. (1976) 28

42 U.S.C. § 2000d (17%) 27

49 U.S.C. § 1652(a) (1976) ) 5

Pub. L. 89-670, 88 Stat. 1533 (1966) ))) 5

82 Fed. Reg. 8225 (1967 q . 5

42 Fed. Reg. 34289 (190 - . 22

43 Fed. Reg. 8628 (19780 ))) q 5

Vv

Table of Authorities Continued

Page

46 Fed. Reg. 12033 (1981777 6, 7

46 Fed. Reg. 21172 (1981777777) 7, 8, 16

46 Fed. Reg. 21205 (198·nʒůuůu „ 8, 24

46 Fed. Reg. 53418 (19817 9, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25

47 Fed. Reg. 21280 (1982))))) : 6

40 C. F. R. 1. So) (11) ccc reecccevvceveecvens 5

III 5

112 Cong. Rec. 14245 (19660)))⸗:: cece ees 15, 16

112 Cong. Rec. 14246 (1966)0))))))) 14

112 Cong. Rec. 19647 (1966) ᷣ 77 14

112 Cong. Rec. 19648 (19660) 17

112 Cong. Rec. 19649 (1966 U 17

112 Cong. Rec. 19654 (1966) · PP „„ 14

LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS:

H.R. Rep. No. 1776, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) ... 13, 17

„56946 6 6 6 66660 13, 14, 15, 16, 17

MISCELLANEOUS:

Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative

Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1669 (1975)

Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programs and Private

Rights, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1198 (1982) ...........

Transcript of remarks of Raymond Peck. Administrator ,

sy 2 Highway Traffic Administration (October *

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OcTOBER TERM, 1982

Nos. 82-354, 82-355, 82-398

Motor VEHICLE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION OF THE

Unitep Srates, Inc., et al., Petitioners,

V.

State Farm Mutvat Avutomosi_e Insurance Company, et al.,

Respondents.

ConsumMER ALERT AND Paciric Lecat Founpation, Petitioners,

V.

State Farm Mutvuat Avutomosite Insurance Company, et al.,

Respondents.

Unrvep States DeparRTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, ef ul.,

Petitioners,

V.

State Farm Mutua AuronostlkE Insurance Company, et al.,

Respondents.

On Writs Of Certiorari To The United States Court

Of Appeals For The District Of Columbia Circuit

BRIEF FOR THE AMERICAN INSURANCE

ASSOCIATION, AMICUS CURIAE IN

SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS

INTEREST OF THE AMICUS

The American Insurance Association is an unincorporated

trade association of 168 publicly-owned property and casualty

insurers who write substantial amounts of private passenger

and commercial automobile insurance in the United States. In

1981, the Association’s members wrote a total of $5.3 billion in

2

private passenger automobile insurance premiums, accounting

for more than fifteen percent of the market for such insurance.

The Association has long been committed to promoting high-

way safety. It has a substantial interest in the implementation

of the automatie erash proteetion requirements of Federal

Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208, and in any clarification or

modification of Standard 208, because its members are certain

that mandatory installation of passive restraint systems will

significantly improve the safety of automobiles driven on the

country’s highways and will, consequently, affect the in-

surance market.

Accordingly, the American Insurance Association, as ami-

cus curiae, supports the implementation of Safety Standard

208 and believes that the Department of Transportation,

through the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

(“NHTSA”), acted unlawfully in rescinding the passive re-

straint requirement. Consent to file this brief has been

obtained from all parties pursuant to Rule 36.2 of the Rules of

this Court.

ARGUMENT

Introduction And Summary Of Argument

This amicus brief is being submitted not to restate or add to

any argument made by the respondents but to present, for the

Court’s consideration, three discrete and relatively simple

propositions:

First, although this case, in its present posture, involves the

validity of a final rule issued by an Executive Department in

Octeber 1981 with an accompanying statement of reasons, a

reviewing court should not blind itself to the history of admin-

istrative decision-making on this subject—and particularly to

official public explanations made by the Executive Depart-

ment less than nine months before issuing its final rule. It is

patent from the complete record of administrative action that

the decision by NHTSA to rescind the passive restraint regula-

tion in October 1981 was influenced in large measure by the

3

same economic considerations that (1) had induced NHTSA in

February 1981 to delay the imposition of the identical passive

restraint requirements and (2) had caused it in April 1981 to

propose amendments to the Safety Standard imposing those

requirements. The primary economic consideration expressly

invoked by NHTSA in its earlier rulings—the depressed state

of the domestic automobile industry—is a totally impermissi-

ble factor for NHTSA to evaluate and utilize under the Nation-

al Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C.

$§ 1381 et seg. (1976). By the time its final ruling was issued,

NHTSA realized that it could not lawfully base its decision to

withdraw the automatic safety requirement explicitly on the

economic difficulties of the automobile industry. Consequent-

ly, the published explanation that accompanies NHTSA’s

October 1981 decision strikingly omits a justification on which

NHTSA depended heavily in its earlier public pronounce-

ments. Such calculated silence at the eleventh hour should not

bar a reviewing court from considering the realities proved by

earlier official pronouncements.

Second, NHTSA's stated reason for rescinding in toto the

passive restraint requirement suffers from so obvious a logical

flaw that it calls to mind the fairy tale of the Emperor’s New

Clothes: It must be obvious to a child that just as the Emperor

truly had no clothes, NHTSA, notwithstanding its flurry of

words, has no rational basis for doing what it has done.

NHTSA invoked the 1966 Safety Act through several

Administrations to develop a safety standard for a goal that

has been uniformly found to be necessary and desirable—a

protective system not dependent on action by a vehicle’s occu-

pants. In order to provide the greatest latitude to each auto-

mobile manufacturer to achieve this objective within its own

financial and technological capabilities, NHTSA gave its offi-

cial blessing to two forms of passive restraint. NHTSA has

now found fault with one of the two officially approved options

that most automobile manufacturers would have unilaterally

chosen, and on this basis NHTSA has discarded the entire

Safety Standard—including the unquestioned safety goal and

the remaining effective option. No principle of law or rational

4

regulatory policy permits an agency entrusted with the lives

and safety of millions of Americans so arbitrarily to flush away

a live and vigorous baby with what it finds to be dirty bath-

water. We do not agree with NHTSA’s poorly reasoned and

unjustified rejection of automatic belts as a passive restraint

option. But in any event, i: was arbitrary and capricious for

NHTSA not to adjust its safety standard to its new findings by

simply eliminating the alternative which it now finds inade-

quate to achieve the desired safety objective, and requiring

use of air-bags, a form of passive restraint that NHTSA does

not question at all.

Third, we turn to the relief which should be granted here. If

this Court agrees that the Safety Standard should have been

amended by NHTSA to retain whatever alternative is effec-

tive, the court of appeals should be directed to order NHTSA

promptly to implement such an amended standard. Judicial

decisions have approved the entry of such orders. If, on the

other hand, the petitioners’ positions are sustained and this

Court decides that the court below applied a review standard

that exceeded its statutory authority, the question of the valid-

ity of NHTSA’s rescission of Safety Standard 208 should be

returned to the court of appeals for decision in light of the

correct standard of review. This Court has had occasion re-

cently to apply this principle in the analogous context where a

court of appeals, in reviewing a district court’s judgment,

concluded that the district court had utilized an erroneous legal

standard. The appellate court’s proper function is then to re-

mand the case to the district court for it to apply the correct

legal standard to the facts. By the same token, if the petition-

ers prevail, the court of appeals should be directed in this case

to evaluate the bulky administrative record by the correct

standard of review. It is not this Court’s duty to announce that

standard and, at the same appellate juncture, to apply itself

the correct yardstick to the particular facts.

5

NHTSA’'S RESCISSION OF SAFETY STANDARD 208 WAS

UNLAWFUL BECAUSE IT RESTED UPON EARLIER

OFFICIAL ACTIONS PROMPTED BY THE AGENCY'S

IMPERMISSIBLE CONCERN OVER THE DEPRESSED

ECONOMIC STATE OF THE DOMESTIC AUTOMOBILE

INDUSTRY.

The Safety Act established a regulatory structure under

which the Secretary of Transportation or his designee’ was

directed to issue objective motor vehicle safety standards to

carry out the Act’s purposes. Like other legislation, the Act

enumerated those considerations that the Executive Branch

officer or his designee—in this case, NHTSA (see 49 C. F. R.

$§ 1.50(a), 501.2 (1981))}—may evaluate. Plainly, NHTSA is

not authorized to import into its determinations of safety

standards a host of factors that are within the areas and ex-

pertise of other federal agencies. It would, for example, be

improper for NHTSA to consider federal tax policy in deciding

when and how to impose federal auto safety regulations. By

the same token, it would be impermissible for NHTSA to

determine its safety standards weighing issues of labor

relations, foreign policy, or antitrust law. Consequently, had

NHTSA stated on October 23, 1981, that it was rescinding the

passive restraint requirement of Safety Standard 208 because

of the depressed state of the domestic automobile industry—a

subject that should be of no concern to the agency—that action

would have been patently unlawful. It would have been an

instance of an agency exceeding its authority by rendering a

decision based on factors that Congress had not committed to

its appraisal.

When the Safety Act was passed, the Department of Transporta-

tion did not exist, and the statutory function was assigned to the

Department of Commerce. Shortly thereafter, in October 1966, the

of Transportation was created by Pub. L. 89-670, 88

Stat. 1533 (1966) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1652(a) (1976)), and in 1967

NHTSA’s precursor, the National Highway Safety Bureau, was

formed. See 32 Fed. Reg. 8225 (1967). NHTSA came into existence

and assumed responsibility for federal motor vehicle safety stand-

ards in 1978. See 43 Fed. Reg. 8525 (1978).

6

NHTSA did not, in fact, explicitly rest its October 23, 1981,

ruling on the de, ressed state of the automobile industry. But

several formal steps leading to rescission, which were taken in

the same year that rescission was announced, were explicitly

based on the economic ills of the domestic automobile industry.

After relying upon that impermissible consideration as it

moved towards rescission, NHTSA cannot avoid the con-

sequences by merely omitting any mention of this economic

factor when the final step is taken.

A. NHTSA Explicitly Cited The Automobile Industry's Eco-

nomic Difficulties As The Principal Reason For Delaying

And Proposing to Amend The Passive Restraint Require-

mer ts.

(1) NHTSA proposes delay to help the industry.

On February 12, 1981, less than seven months before imple-

mentation of the first phase of compliance with the passive

restraint requirements, and barely three weeks after Secreta-

ry of Transportation Drew Lewis took office, NHTSA pro-

posed a one-year delay, from September 1, 1982, until Septem-

ber 1, 1983, in the effective date of the automatic restraint

requirements for large cars.“ 46 Fed. Reg. 12033 (1981) (R.

1622).° One stated reason for the proposed delay was the

This came soon after the automobile manufacturers sent Presi-

dent Reagan a long letter asking for a number of Executive Branch

concessions to aid the industry. As reported in a February 9, 1981,

issue of Automotive News (reproduced as Appendix A to this brief),

the letter asked the Department of Transportation “to reevaluate the

need for the passive-restraint standards” as well as to establish “a

reduced bumper standard—from 5 MPH to 2.5 MPH for longitudinal

forces and a reduction in corner requirements to 1.5 MPH.” The

passive restraint requirements were delayed on April 9, 1981, and

rescinded on October 23, 1981. The bumper standard was reduced,

precisely as requested by the automobile industry, on May 20, 1982.

47 Fed. Reg. 21820.

References to the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in the Court

of Appeals are cited as R. References to the Appendix to the

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari filed by the Motor Vehicle Manufac-

turers Association are cited as “Pet. App. —..”

7

“changed economic circumstances since the schedule was

adopted in 1977.” Jd. Explaining the basis for the proposed

delay, NHTSA emphasized the well-known “difficulties of the

automobile industry and some of its members.“

(2) NHTSA grants delay to maintain sales and profits in

the industry.

Two months later, in April 1981, the agency adopted the

one-year delay (46 Fed. Reg. 21172 (R. 1272)), despite the fact

that all of the professional economists’ cost-benefit analyses

indicated that the economic costs of the delay greatly exceeded

its benefits. See R. 511, 606, 714. The “current poor economic

condition of the automobile industry” was again a crucial factor

underlying the agency’s action. 46 Fed. Reg. at 21173 (R.

1273). The final notice announcing the one-year delay declared

(46 Fed. Reg. 21174 (R. 1274) (emphasis added)):

On the basis of the record herein, the Department has

concluded that — 12 of FMVSS 208 in MY 1982

to Roque cars W icable and — 4

uiring such compliance — reduce sales and prof-

its, ite ond imcrease unemployment, for the manufacturers

of such vehicles.

‘NHTSA stated (46 Fed. Reg. 12033-34 (R. 1622-23)):

Sales continue at a very depressed level. . Losses — even the

largest of the domestic manufacturers have been reported

These losses come at a time when the domestic manufacturers

must continue to spend unprecedented sums to meet the con-

tinuing demand for ever more fuel efficient cars and to meet the

challenge of foreign car manufacturers.

soon tation now shift some demand from

cars to mid-size cars at a time when large car sales are y

slumping badly

* * *

D PSD

provide monufacturers with a

resources to devote toward . —.——

. Ifthe Department should decide together so

tp at cars, — and Ford

up to $37 million in investments, .

8

NHTSA asserted at the time that the Safety Act authorized

it to consider the “general economic health of the automobile

industry,” not only in deciding whether to delay implementa-

tion but also in deciding whether to rescind or retain a safety

standard (46 Fed. Reg. 21175 (R. 1275)). This reasoning was

explained as follows (id.):

What is reasonable and practicable for a healthy firm or

industry may not be for an ailing one. . . Vehicle sales

remain at depressed levels and unemployment in the

domestic industry is extremely high. . . .

The Department concludes . . . that economic hardship

to the affected industry and individual companies must be

balanced with all other considerations in determining the

“reasonableness” and “practicability” of a particular safe-

ty standard.

(3) NHTSA proposes rescission because of the industry's

“economic difficulties.”

When it adopted the one-year delay, NHTSA also proposed,

as one of several alternatives, the rescission of the Safety

Standard’s passive restraint requirements. 46 Fed. Reg. 21205

(1981) (Pet. App. 147a). In so doing, it again emphasized the

poor economic condition of the domestic automobile industry.

NHTSA said that the “same factors” set forth in the initial

notice and final rule for the one-year delay had also led it to

propose totally rescinding the automatic restraint require-

ments. 46 Fed. Reg. 21206-07 (Pet. App. 152a). NHTSA said it

was considering rescission partly because of (46 Fed. Reg.

21206 (Pet. App. 15la) (emphasis added)):

the substantial impact of automatic restraints on manufac-

ooh — consumer yf the — — of ene

manufacturer impacts economic difficulties of the

automobile industry.

(4) NHTSA's steps are described as “Actions to Help the

U.S. Auto Industry.”

A telling indication of the primacy given to the economic

condition of the automobile industry in NHTSA’s April 1981

actions was the title of the public announcement made by the

White House Press Office. Both the final order adopting the

9

one-year delay and the notice proposing possible rescission

were included in a package distributed to the press under the

title “Actions to Help the U.S. Auto Industry” (R. 1281, 1285,

1318-1321).

B. In The Absence Of An Explicit Renudiation, NHTSA

Should Be Presumed To Have Issued Its Final Rule In

Accordance With The Primary Considerations It Ex-

pressed At Earlier Stages In Its Process.

Having emphasized the difficult straits of the automobile

industry at the stages leading up to the final rule issued on

October 23, 1981, NHTSA cannot simply omit reference to that

important consideration at the most critical point and thereby

remove it from the sight of a reviewing court. The agency's

published explanation of its final rule rescinding the passive

restraint requirement, 46 Fed. Reg. 53418 (1981) (Pet. App.

88a), did not highlight or even cite explicitly the misfortunes of

the automobile industry. There were, to be sure, several pass-

ing references in the final rule and accompanying Regulatory

Impact Analysis (“RIA”) to the possibility of reduced auto-

mobile sales.“ These were ambiguous enough that they could

Also announced as part of the “Actions to Help the U.S. Auto

Industry” was a proposed amendment of the uniform tire quality

grading standards (R. 1322). On February 2, 1983, NHTSA sus-

pended the tire grading system. See New York Times, February 3,

1983, p. Al (reproduced as Appendix B to this brief).

See, e. g., 46 Fed. Reg. at 53423 (Pet. App. 105a), where NHTSA

explained that automatic restraint requirements were not “reason-

able” and “practicable” partly because

while the car manufacturers might be able to pass along some or

all of their costs [of complying with the with the safety standard] to

consumers, the necessary price increases reduce sales.

sales losses would cause net employment losses.

Additional sales losses might occur due to consumer uncertain-

y one or antipathy toward the detachable automatic belts

See oie 46 Fed. Reg. 53426 (Pet. App. 117a), where NHTSA said

that rescinding the automatic restraint requirement would enable

“the car manufacturers to reallocate $400 million in capital invest-

ment that they would have had to allocate for the purpose of complet-

ing their (compliance) efforts.”

10

not be said to relate unequivocally to the economic ills of the

industry. In addition, at a press conference held on the day that

the rescission was issued, the NHTSA Administrator claimed

that he placed no reliance “whatsoever” in his “personal deci-

sion” on “the current economic slump in the automotive indus-

try.

But NHTSA’s published explanation contained no explicit

repudiation or rejection of the assertion that had theretofore

been made by NHTSA that the economic condition of the

automobile industry required amelioration of the passive re-

straint requirement. While that previously important factor

was not, at the ultimate stage, explicitly reaffirmed, it was also

not rejected or explicitly disclaimed.

This state of the record is similar to what this Court con-

fronted in Industrial Union Department v. American Pet-

roleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607 (1980). That case involved the

validity of the Occupational Safety and Health Administra-

tion’s (“OSHA's”) benzene standard. When it initially pro-

Transcript of remarks of Raymond Peck, Administrator, Nation-

al Highway Traffic Safety Administration, at a news conference on

October 23, 1981, at 8.

In answer to the question which immediately followed, however,

he said, “It is, of course, a fact that the industry is in distress; but that

fact alone cannot ever be a determinative question on the issue of a

safety standard. It was certainly not determinative in this case.” The

use of the words “alone” and “determinative” implies that the state of

distress was one factor that was considered, even if not the determi-

native one. This is consistent with a statement that the Administra-

tor made when opening the press conference. He said (id. at 2):

Other factors, e since 1977, have also been taken into

account. These , of course, estimates of the cost to the

consumer of the that would be used, and the econom-

ie circumstances of this injury [sic]. No one factor has been

determinative. My overwhelming concern has been safety.

The word “injury” makes little sense in the context of the full para-

graph. The word “industry” fits the context more than any other

word with similar sound.

11

posed its standard - hich barred benzene in even very minute

quantities such as one part per million parts of air—OSHA had

indicated that it was placing the burden of proving safety on

industry representatives because it viewed benzene as a carci-

nogen. This Court's plurality opinion, per Justice Stevens,

assumed that in its final decision OSHA had applied the stand-

ard it had originally announced in its proposed ruling. See 448

U.S. at 623-25, 635-36. In dissent, Justice Marshall noted that

OSHA did not have to rely on its “Draconian carcinogen ‘poli-

ey (448 U.S. at 695), and that it had, in fact, conducted

seventeen days of hearings and heard from ninety-five witnes-

ses (448 U.S. at 696) on the dangers of benzene in even minute

quantities. Justice Marshall then observed that OSHA issued

“an extensive statement of reasons summarizing and evaluat-

ing the results of the hearings” (448 U.S. at 697), so that its

decision was not explicitly based on its “carcinogen policy.”

The Court’s plurality in the benzene standard case looked,

however, not alone at what OSHA had said," but at the stand-

ards and principles on which it had relied in its earlier proposed

rulemaking. Finding an impermissible standard at that junc-

ture, it carried that standard over to the final ruling and

invalidated the ruling, over the dissent of four Justices, be-

cause of it. By the same token, the final rule NHTSA issued

should be invalidated because the agency never repudiated the

judgment that special administrative actions, including delay

and amendment of passive restraint requirements, should be

taken to accommodate automobile manufacturers because of

the economic difficulties of the industry.

It is true, of course, that a reviewing court ordinarily judges

an administrative action by the explanation the agency has

given. See Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery

The Court said that “discussion . . must, of course, begin with

the Agency’s rationale. 448 U.S. at 631. It did not say that

published rationale was the last word on the subject—only that

discussion must “begin” with it.

12

Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943); Federal Trade Commission v.

Texaco, Inc., 417 U.S. 380, 397 (1974). There are, however,

times when, within the four corners of a particular agency

statement, one cannot find the true considerations that led to

the agency action. When such considerations have been articu-

lated in earlier public pronouncements, a court should assume

that they have influenced the finai action taken by the agency.’

If an agency has specifically reconsidered its earlier published

views and determined to repudiate them, it should formalize

this determination in the agency’s published statement of

reasons. If the agency fails to make any such statement, a

reviewing court should conclude that notwithstanding the

omission of the prior consideration from the final published

statement, it continues to have a significant impact on the

agency's determination—as this Court held in the benzene

standard case.

C. Consideration Of The Economic Condition Of The Auto-

mobile Industry ls Beyond NHTSA’s Statutory Authority.

It is a fundamental tenet of administrative law that an agen-

cy must act within its statutory mandate. See, e.g., American

Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490,

540 (1981); Industrial Union Department v. American Pet-

roleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607, 659 (1981); Atchison, Topeka

and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Wichita Board of Trade, 412

U.S. 800, 806 (1973) (plurality opinion); Burlington Truck

Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 167-69 (1962).

Agency decisions must be “based on a consideration of the

*Compare American Federation of Government Employees v.

Devine, 525 F. Supp. 250, 253 (D. D. C. 1981), where a District Judge

rejected reasons stated by the Office of Personnel and Management

for taking certain actions and concluded that the motivation was

“prompted primarily by ideological considerations.” See also Amer-

ican Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 540

n.74 (1981), where this Court refused to accept a “boilerplate” state-

ment as the true reason for agency action and an impermissible

consideration had been weighed and expressed by OSHA.

13

relevant factors” under the authorizing statute. Citizens to

Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971)

(emphasis added). Accord, Bowman Transportation, Inc. v.

Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285 (1974).

The Safety Act directs NHTSA to issue “appropriate” motor

vehicle safety standards that “shall be practicable, shall meet

the need for motor vehicle safety, and shall be stated in objec-

tive terms.” 15 U.S.C. § 139 c). The agency is also directed to

consider whether a proposed standard “is reasonable, practic-

able and appropriate for the particular type of motor vehicle

for which it is prescribed,” and “the extent to which such

standards will contribute to carrying out the purposes” of the

Safety Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1392(f)(3),(4). The Safety Act specifi-

cally instructs the agency to consider “relevant available motor

vehicle safety data“ (15 U.S.C. § 1392(f)(1)), but it does not tell

the agency to consider the economic health of the automobile

industry. The Act’s legislative history and judicial decisions

interpreting the Act clearly establish that NHTSA has no

authority to consider the general economic condition of the

automobile industry in deciding when and whether to imple-

ment passive restraint requirements.

(1) The legislative history indicates that the economic

welfare of the automobile industry is not to be con-

sidered by NHTSA.

The purpose of the Safety Act is “to reduce traffic accidents,

deaths and injuries to persons resulting from traffic acci-

dents.” 15 U.S.C. § 1381. Congress intended “safety . . . [to]

be the overriding consideration in the issuance of standards.”

S. Rep. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1966) (hereinafter

“Sen. Rep.“). See also H. R. Rep. No. 1776, 89th Cong., 2d

Sess. 16 (1966) (hereinafter “H. R. Rep.”) (“Motor vehicle

safety is the paramount purpose of this bill and each standard

must be related thereto.”)

In enacting the Safety Act, Congress was well aware of the

automobile industry's conviction that “safety doesn't sell.“

Sen. Rep. 2. The Report expressed its concern over “the auto-

14

mobile industry's chronic subordination of safe design to prom-

otional styling and ... [its] overriding stress on power,

acceleration, speed, and ‘ride’ to the relative neglect of safe

performance or collision protection.” Sen. Rep. 2. While Con-

gress did not foresee the current industry slump, it plainly

intended to impose safety standards without capitulating to

industry claims that compliance would reduce automobile

sales. Senator Mondale, who was heavily involved in drafting

the Safety Act, accorded minimal weight to charges that the

Safety Act “is unfair to the automobile industry . . and that

the threat of its passage has affected the volume of sales which

in turn has influenced the economy.” 112 Cong. Rec. 14246. He

acknowledged that “the obvious objective of any businessman”

was to “attract customers,” but emphasized that “there is well

documented... evidence showing that [the automobile] could

be so designed and so constructed as to protect the driver and

passengers from death and injury in most kinds of accidents.”

Id.

Representative Ryan noted that auto “industry spokesmen

have wailed that this legislation will be damaging to both the

industry and the national economy.” His answer was that

Congress’ “primary concern must be. . the pain, the grief,

the permanent disabilities, and the thousands of deaths motor

vehicles cause every year. . . The lives of American citizens

must come first.” 112 Cong. Rec. 19647. See 112 Cong. Rec.

19654 (Rep. Tenzer) (rejecting automobile industry’s argu-

ment that Safety Act “will have an adverse impact on auto-

mobile sales” as invalid “especially when weighed against the

purpose of the legislation—the saving of human lives”). These

statements all show that Congress did not intend to let the

sales curve for the industry determine the death and injury

curve on the Nation’s highways.

The terms “practicable,” “reasonable,” and “appropriate,”

as used in the Safety Act, were not intended by Congress to

permit the general economic condition of the automobile indus-

try to enter into decisions to issue or revoke particular safety

standards. The Senate Report explained that by requiring that

15

safety standards be “reasonable” and “practicable,” Congress

meant that the Secretary was to issue standards covering

“only . . . those vehicle characteristics that have a significant

bearing on safety,” rather than “every component and function

of a motor vehicle.” Sen. Rep. 6. The Senate Report added that

“tests of reasonableness of cost, feasibility’ and adequate lead

time should be included among the factors considered in the

development of safety standards under the Act. /d.

Floor debates on the bill show that the Senate Report's

references to “reasonableness of cost” and “practicability” are

to the direct costs of the safety device itself, and do not autho-

rize consideration of the general economic condition of the

regulated industry. Senator Lausche stated (112 Cong. Rec.

14245 (emphasis added)):

In the committee, an extensive discussion took place

the right of the Secretary to consider the costs

that be entailed in promulgating the adoption of

certain types of equipment. It was argued by some that

the language did not allow the Secre to consider the

cost that would be added to the a ile.

10 The Senate Report uses “feasibility” in its ordinary meaning, and

clearly intended that the agency was to consider whether the safety

requirements mandated by a standard were “capable of being done.”

See American Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan, 452 U.S.

at 508-09 (defining “feasibility” as “capable of being done, executed or

effected”).

The Senate Report also indicates that economic factors relating

to lead time may be considered under the Act. It stated that in

deciding whether to specify an effective date later than the normal

one-year maximum for compliance, the agency could consider

whether requiring across-the-board compliance within one year is “a

practical economic and engineering impossibility, as well as a source

of great hardship and unnecessary additional cost.” Sen. Rep. 7. Like

the references to the economic realities of lead time in the House (see

pp. 16-17 & n.12, infra), nothing in this Senate Report statement

indicated that the general economic condition of the industry, caused

by a sales slump and unrelated to lead time considerations, was

meant to be a relevant factor in deciding whether to impose a particu-

lar safety standard.

16

1 agreed to write into the report a

in 33— eee

— — the language used

The — ethene, It related to the

Seeretary's authority to consider the costs added to the auto-

mobile by virtue of a safety standard. Senator Magnuson, the

floor manager and Chairman of the Senate Committee on Com-

merce, quoted the Senate Report's instruction that

“reasonableness of cost, feasibility, and adequate lead time

should be included among those factors which the Secretary

could consider in making his total judgment.” 112 Cong. Rec.

14245.

House floor discussion of the term “practicability” also fails

to provide support for NHTSA’s consideration of the general

economic condition of the industry. The House Report relates

the Act’s practicability requirement to “consideration of all

relevant factors, including technological ability to achieve the

goal of a particular standard as well as consideration of eco-

nomic factors.” H. R. Rep. 16. NHTSA relied on this reference

to “economic factors” for its published position that the eco-

nomic condition of the auto industry is a permissible factor in

issuing or rescinding the passive restraint requirements. See

46 Fed. Reg. 21175 (R. 1275). But the House debates demon-

strate that in making “economic factors” relevant under the

Act’s practicability requirement, Congress intended the agen-

cy to consider costs associated with the adequacy of lead time

for implementing a particular safety standard, not the general

economic health of the automobile industry.”

Representative Dingell, a member of the House Committee on

Interstate and Foreign Commerce who was actively involved in the

drafting and passage of the Safety Act, explained that “a standard is

not practicable or reasonable if it cannot be met by the best efforts of

manufacturers within the constraints of time and technology. To

assure practicability, lalmong those economic factors which the

Secretary will have to consider is the matter of adequate lead time.”

The agency was to consider whether the normal compliance period

would cause cause “exorbitant cost or . . severe economic disloca-

17

Nor does the Act’s “appropriateness” criterion authorize

NHTSA’s consideration of the sales prospects of the depressed

auto industry. The Senate Report indicates that the require-

ment that safety standards be “appropriate for the particular

type of motor vehicle” was included so the Secretary could

“consider the desirability of affording consumers continuc4

wide range of choices in the selection of motor vehicles” 1.

that he would not eliminate particular types of cars by applying

to them standards that were unsuitable. Sen. Rep. 6. The

House interpreted the “appropriateness” directive the same

way. H.R. Rep. 18; 112 Cong. Rec. 19649 (Rep. Dingell). See

also Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transportation, 472

F. 2d 659, 679 (6th Cir. 1972).

In summary, none of the broad terms used in the Safety Act

to define the Secretary’s authority was intended by Congress

to empower him to grant general reprieves based on economic

appraisals of the automobile industry. Just as the Federal

Trade Commission may not permit manufacturers to engage in

unfair and deceptive practices simply because they are in eco-

nomic difficulties and the Securities and Exchange Commis-

sion may not allow the sale of unregistered securities whenev-

er it believes the stock markets are experiencing a slump,

NHTSA may not approve the manufacture of unsafe cars

merely because automobile manufacturers are expenencing an

unprofitable period.

tion,” such as would occur if “the cost of compliance on a crash basis

. . . [was] so great as to price vehicles out of the mass market.” 112

Cong. Rec. 19648. The Act’s practicability criterion authorized con-

sideration of “economic factors” to determine whether it would be “a

physical or economic impossibility” for manufacturers to comply with

a standard within the normal statutory compliance period. To meet

this problem the Secretary was authorized to “make the standard

effective later than one year from its issuance if he finds that this is in

the public interest . . . .” 112 Cong. Rec. 19648.

18

(2) No judicial precedent authorizes consideration of this

factor.

In light of the clear legislative history, none of the cases

construing the Safety Act even discusses the possibility that

the general economic condition of the regulated industry can be

a relevant factor for safety standard decisions. The cases hold

only that the agency may consider whether a standard is so

onerous that it cannot be performed by those subject to it. In

Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transportation, 472 F. 2d

659, 672-73 (6th Cir. 1972), which endorsed NHTSA’s author-

ity to issue the prior 1972 restraint standard requiring devel-

opment of new technology, the court stated that the Act’s

mandate did not “suggest that the Agency might impose stand-

ards so demanding as to require a manufacturer to perform the

impossible, or impose standards so imperative as to put a

manufacturer out of business.” In H & H Tire Co. v. Depart-

ment of Transportation, 471 F. 2d 350, 354-55 (8th Cir. 1973),

the court agreed “that ‘the fact that a government regulation

may cause economic hardship to a party does not make such

regulation unreasonable.’ See also, National Tire Dealers &

Retread Association, Inc. v. Brinegar, 491 F. 2d 31, 33, 37-38

& n.34 (D.C. Cir. 1974). These cases do not suggest that

NHTSA may properly consider the auto industry’s short-term

economic interests in making a safety-standard decision.

In like vein, nothing in the discussion of economic feasibility

in American Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan, 452

U.S. 490 (1981), suggests that an agency may consider the

current economic distress of an industry, as distinguished from

an inquiry into its basic economic viability under the particular

regulation. That case held that a regulation is economically

feasible if it permits the affected industry to “maintain long-

term profitability and competitiveness.” 452 U.S. at 530-31

n.55. It cited with approval two cases that stand for the

proposition that a statute’s feasibility qualification

— 1 Oe. geneen S eante Waa paneat

employers or industries ma 3 reforms con-

templated by the Act. be economically

19

feasible even though, from the standpoint of employers,

- AOA be

adversely. Nor does the concept of economic feasi vity

— 2 —2 id-

Industrial Union Department v. Hodgson, 499 F. 2d 467, 478

(D.C. Cir. 1974); accord, United Steelworkers of America v.

Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied

sub nom. Lead Industries Association, Inc. v. Donovan, 435

U.S. 913 (1981).

Under American Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Dono-

van, when a regulation issued under a statute with a feasibility

requirement threatens to put the affected industry out of busi-

ness or to cause massive economic disruption, it is appropriate

for an agency to examine the rule’s impact on production,

employment, competition, and prices in order to determine

whether compliance is “within the financial capability of the

covered industry.” 452 U.S. at 530-31 n. 55. But that is not what

NHTSA did. No claim was nor could have been made that the

average incremental cost of the passive restraints would drive

auto manufacturers out of business by pricing cars out of the

reach of ordinary consumers, or that compliance would require

exorbitant capital expenditures by the industry, or that the

standard would otherwise catastrophically disrupt the indus-

try. Rather, NHTSA considered the economic condition of the

industry out of a desire to improve auto sales and profits. That

consideration conflicts with the feasibility analysis con-

templated by American Textile Manufacturers Institute v.

Donovan, or by any other case of which we are aware.

NHTSA’s appraisal of the economic health of the auto industry

was as fully outside its statutory authority as was OSHA's

wish “to repair general unfairness to employees. . unrelated

to achievement of health and safety goals” when it issued a

wage guarantee provision in its Cotton Dust Standard. Amer-

ican Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan, 452 U.S. at

540. Consequently, NHTSA's rescission of the passive re-

straint requirement, affected by this consideration, must be

set aside.

20

NHTSA ACTED IRRATIONALLY AND ARBITRARILY IN

FAILING TO RETAIN THE PASSIVE RESTRAINT

REQUIREMENT WITHOUT THE ALLEGEDLY

INEFFECTIVE AUTOMATIC BELT OPTION BY

REQUIRING AIR-BAGS.

In the first portion of this amicus brief we have argued that

NHTSA's expressed reasons for rescinding the passive re-

straint requirement should not be taken as the total rationale

for its decision. A reviewing court should determine the valid-

ity of the rescission in light of the agency’s previously

expressed—and still unrepudiated—policies on the same sub-

ject, which laid great stress on the poor economic condition of

the industry. We turn now to an alternative argument that

takes NHTSA’s explanation at face value. Even if the Court

were to ignore the various public statements indicating that

NHTSA accommodated automobile safety to the economic

needs of the automobile industry and were to look no further

than the final rule ard RIA of October 23, 1981, it is patent that

the agency’s explanation is illogical and irrational. The con-

clusion reached by the agency—that the safety standard

should be rescinded in toto—does not follow from the findings

and policies announced by NHTSA.

We begin with a proposition that NHTSA does not question

at any point in its statements of October 23, 1981—that auto-

matic or “passive” crash protection is a highly desirable goal.

Commitment to that objective is expressed at the beginning of

NHTSA’s explanations of the rescission and is even more

firmly repeated in the concluding paragraph of the “Summary

of Agency Conclusion“ (46 Fed. Reg. 53426 (Pet. App. 116a)

(emphasis added)):

After 12 years of rulemaking, NHTSA has not yet suc-

ceeded in its original intent, the widespread offering of

automatic crash protection that will produce —~ parame

benefits. The agency is still committed to this goal.

Safety Standard 208 sought to implement this objective *

automobile manufacturers to use either of two

21

passive restraint devices—(1) an air cushion restraint (“air-

bag”) or (2) an automatic belt (which does not require buckling

by the occupant). There was no suggestion in the history of the

development of Safety Standard 208 that if only one of these

two options had been technologically feasible, no passive re-

straint system would have been initiated. In other words, the

availability of equally effective alternative technologies was

not a precondition of NHTSA’s institution of the safety stand-

ard. If only air-bags had been technologically developed by

1977, it is clear that a passive restraint standard requiring the

use of air-bags would have been issued at that time. Indeed, in

1977 it had been estimated that more than sixty percent of new

cars would be equipped with air-bags, and less than forty

percent with automatic belts. 46 Fed. Reg. 53420 (Pet. App.

95a). Automatic belts were added to the safety standard as an

alternative only because it was then thought that automatic

belts were as effective as air-bags in achieving the safety goal.

It would have been unfair to automobile manufacturers to bar

use of an alternative passive restraint that was no less protec-

tive.

NHTSA has now determined that detachable automatic

belts will not achieve the desired result. We disagree with this

conclusion, which was rejected by the court of appeals and is

forcefully challenged ir the respondents’ briefs. Respondent

State Farm demonstrates cogently in its brief that nondetach-

able automatic belts do not share the problems of detachable

automatic belts which led the agency to its conclusion. But

even resolution of the detachable/nondetachable debate in

favor of petitioners would not justify acceptance of NHTSA's

rescission of the entire passive restraint standard. No rational

decision-maker could conclude from any finding made by

NHTSA that air-bags should no longer be required.

This is the point at which there is an unbridgeable chasm

between NHTSA’s new finding and the conclusion that no

passive restraints should now be required. Rather than revert-

ing, as reason requires, to the remaining uncontestedly effec-

tive passive restraint (which was initially to be the primary

technology used by the industry), NHTSA has, without a

single word critical of air-bags, discarded totally the passive

restraint obligation it initially imposed on automobile manufac-

turers and thereby sacrificed the lives of thousands of Amer-

icans.

Absolutely no reason was given in NHTSA's published

statements of October 23, 1981, for the rejection of air-bags as

an obligatory form of passive restraint. It appears that the

only reason for refusing to consider air-bags was that the

automobile manufacturers had previously determined to

comply with Safety Standard 208, if it was to be enforced, by

installing automatic belts rather than air- bags. This industry

decision—which was doubtless based on the anticipated grea-

ter costs of air-bags than belts—effectively controlled

8 Petitioner MVMA asserts that “the existing record abounds with

references to the difficulties that an airbags-only standard would

raise, including questions about the installation of airbags in small

cars... MVMA Brief at 39 n.71. This assertion has not, however,

been made by the responsible agency, and it cannot, therefore, be a

basis for sustaining the agency's decision. Moreover, when NHTSA

promulgated the 1977 passive restraint requirements, it said (42

Fed. Reg. 34289, 34295 (1977) (R. 1740)):

more stringent limits on air r — yment time. thers ave are

no insuperable difficulties in the... rw quirements of

Standard 208 in cars as small as 2, pounds Wich existing

In addition, NHTSA continues to find that air-bags are techuically

sound. See, ¢.g., RIA at XI1-4-5 (R. 264-65).

See RIA at XI-6 (R.226):

— ot gy — tor {in

tp ape air Sages, Ce N their decision. fine

not be to comply 352 — the

must focus on automatic seat be

See also RIA at XI-5(R. te ar eae vara is not in fact

squarely before the Agency at this time. . . . Manufacturers’ plans

for compliance, at least in the short run, do not include air bags.

23

NHTSA’s judgment. On the premise that only one percent of

new cars would be equipped with air-bags, NHTSA did not

even discuss the effectiveness of air-bags in achieving the

still-desired safety goal.

Here, again, NHTSA’s reasoning was hopelessly illogical.

Obviously, if automatic belts were eliminated as a permissible

alternative because they are ineffective in achieving the de-

sired safety result, 100 percent of new cars, rather than one

percent, would be equipped with air-bags.

NHTSA does not appear to question in the slightest the

effectiveness of air-bags. Indeed, its “Summary of Agency

Conclusion” refers to the “almost certain benefits that had

been anticipated as a result of the use of air bag technology.” 46

Fed. Reg. 53425 (Pet. App. 112a)."* NHTSA has also referred

to the added economic incentives for air-bag use provided by

“premium reductions generally . . available only to owners of

cars equipped with air bags. 46 Fed. Reg. 53423 (Pet.

App. 106a). There are, therefore, significant and unrebutted

benefits in the use of air-bags, which, by any rational standard,

should remain as required safety features in new automo-

biles.“

NHTSA's total failure to consider and implement the

remaining effective and technologically sound passive re-

straint is the same kind of error that caused this Court to direct

that an agency’s determination be vacated in Jacob Siegel Co.

v. Federal Trade Commission, 327 U.S. 608 (1946). The

Federal Trade Commission had totally prohibited use of the

name “Alpacuna” on coats because it believed that the name

was misleading and deceptive. This Court held it to have been

Air-bag technology has continued to improve, and air-bags are

being used as options in highly desirable automobiles. See New York

Times, February 3, 1983, p. D2, reproduced as Appendix C to this

brief.

Although air-bags do cost more than automatic belts, they are

still cost-effective. See Nordhaus Comment, May 1981, at 15(R. 525).

24

error for the Commission “not to have considered” whether

qualifying language accompanying the name “would eliminate

the deception which it found lurking in the word Alpacuna.”

327 U.S. at 613. The Court said (id.):

[T]he Commission seems not to have considered whether

in that way the ends of the Act could be satisfied and the

trade name at the same time saved are left in the

dark whether some 22 of name short of excision would

in the judgment of ommission be adequate.

By the same token, NHTSA failed to consider how the

consistently approved safety goal of requiring an effective

passive restraint could be reconciled with its recent conclusion

that automatic belts cannot do the job. That was the agency's

responsibility, and, as was true in Siegel, a reviewing court is

“left in the dark” whether action short of rescission—

particularly implementation of an air-bag requirement—would

not satisfy both objectives. Indeed, by any rational measure,

that is the way both objectives could and should be achieved.

Nor was there any procedural obstacle to NHTSA’s amend-

ment of Safety Standard 208 to prescribe the use of air-bags

only. NHTSA had authority to amend Standard 208, and as the

government concedes, “NHTSA in fact did consider” amend-

ing the standard to mandate compliance by belts with a use-

compelling feature. Brief for the Federal Parties at 36; see 46

Fed. Reg. 53424 (Pet. App. 109a-110a). It is therefore difficult

to understand how the government can now contend that if

NHTSA had amended Standard 208 to require compliance by

air-bags “it might have faced challenges from the manufactur-

ers and others on the ground that its notice of proposed rule-

making did not give adequate warning that such a rule might be

adopted.” Brief for the Federal Parties at 37.

In any event, the notice of rulemaking was adequate to have

permitted NHTSA to amend Standard 208 to bar detachable

belts and require compliance by air-bags or nondetachable

belts, since it identified one of the issues as “the most effective

and reasonable approach to addressing the safety problems

posed by the low rate of safety belt use.” 46 Fed. Reg. 21206

25

(R. 13). Commentators responding to the notice understood

that the scope of the rulemaking encompassed possible amend-

ments to Standard 208, and several commentators suggested

on the record that detachable belts be barred. See 46 Fed. Reg.

53424 (Pet. App. 109a). It is well established that Jan agency

need not publish in advance every precise proposal it may

ultimately promulgate as a rule.” McCulloch Gas Processing

Corp. v. Department of Energy, 650 F. 2d 1216 (Temp. Emer.

Ct. App. 1981). Notice is sufficient if it apprises interested

persons of the “subject and issues” before the agency and

therefore affords a reasonable and meaningful opportunity to

participate in the rulemaking process. McCulloch Gas

Processing Corp. v. Department of Energy, 650 F. 2d at 1221;

Forester v. Consumer Product Safety Commission, 559 F. 2d

774, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1977); International Harvester v. Ruckels-

haus, 478 F. 2d 615, 632 n.51 (1973). So long as the agency

furnishes such notice of the subject and issues, the final regula-

tions actually adopted may be “substantially more stringent”

than the proposals outlined in the notice of rulemaking. Amer-

ican Iron & Steel Institute v. Environmental Protection Agen-

cy, 568 F. 2d 284, 293 (3d Cir. 1977); International Harvester v.

Ruckelshaus, 478 F. Ad at 632 n.51; McCulloch Gas Processing

Corp. v. Department of Energy, 650 F. 2d at 1221.

In summary, NHTSA arbitrarily and irrationally refused to

direct use of air-bags or even to evaluate their cost-

effectiveness simply because the auto industry was not plan-

ning to install thern. In this way it allowed an anticipated

industry preference for allegedly ineffective technology to de-

fine the agency's inquiry into the reasonableness and practica-

bility of the safety standard. NHTSA thus failed to discharge

its statutory duty independently to promulgate reasonable and

practicable safety standards to protect the American public

from unnecessary injury and death on the nation’s highways.

Precisely because NHTSA lost sight of this statutory duty, no

“rational connection exists between the facts found” by

NHTSA—that automobile manufacturers intended to install

detachable automatic belts aid that such belts were functional-

ly equivalent to manual belts—and the decision NHTSA made

to rescind the entire passive restraint standard without con-

sidering whether compliance with air-bags would render it

reasonable and practicable. See Bowman Transportation, Inc.

v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285

(1974); Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156,

168 (1962). For this reason, NHTSA’s rescission order is

arbitrary and capricious, and must be set aside.

THE CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED TO THE COURT OF

APPEALS EITHER TO DIRECT NHTSA TO ENFORCE THE

AIR-BAG REQUIREMENT OR, IF PETITIONERS

PREVAIL, ', HAVE THAT COURT APPLY THE CORRECT

STANDARD

Our final point relates to the matter of remedy. We submit

that in any event, whether petitioners or respondents prevail,

the court of appeals must be called upon to make substantive

judgments beyond those it has already made. If the respon-

dents are upheld in their contention that NHTSA erred in

failing simply to strike the detachable automatic belt alterna-

tive, or if the Court agrees with us that at least the air-bag

option should have been imposed, the court of appeals should

be instructed to direct the agency promptly to amend Safety

Standard 208 in accordance with this Court's conclusion. As we

demonstrate below, it is well within the authority of reviewing

courts to take such direct measures.

If, on the other hand, petitioners prevail in their argument

that the court of appeals “misapprehended or grossly misap-

plied” the correct standard of review, the case must be reman-

ded to the court of appeals for that court to apply the correct

standard. This Court’s decisions clearly establish that this is a

task that ist be assigned to the court having the primary

reviewing function and should not be assumed by the court

which has only an appellate role.

27

A. The Court Of Appeals Should Order NHTSA To Issue An

Amended Safety Standard.

The court of appeals was not prepared to issue an order

directing implementation of an amended Safety Standard 208.

It gave NHTSA time to submit a proposal for “resolving the

questions raised” in its opinion, and thereafter directed that

the standard be implemented for the 1984 Model Year. If this

Court were now to conclude that it was irrational for NHTSA

to rescind rather than amend Safety Standard 208, the appro-

priate remedy would be to direct the agency to issue the

amendment. That direction should be given, of course, by the

court of appeals on remand of the case from this Court.

If an agency fails to implement and enforce its organic

regulatory statute, courts may order the administrative action

that the agency itself should have undertaken. In the leading

case of Adams v. Richardson, 480 F. 2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973)

(en banc), the court of appeals agreed with the district court's

conclusion that the then-Department of Health, Education and

Welfare had failed to enforce Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976). It then upheld with minor

modifications, the district court’s order directing che agency to

enforce Title VI by, inter alia, commencing administrative

enforcement proceedings against certain segregated school

districts, demanding explanations of racial disproportion from

other school districts, and monitoring districts under court

desegregation orders. 480 F. 2d at 1161. This judicial action

Was a fitting exercise of the judiciary’s responsibility “to

assure that the agency properly construes its statutory obliga-

tions, and that the policies it adopts and implements are con-

sistent with those duties and not a negation of them.” 480 F. 2d

at 1163-64 (emphasis added).

In Davis v. Romney, 490 F. 2d 1360 (3d Cir. 1974), the Third

Circuit found that the National Housing Act imposed a duty on

the Federal Housing Administration to “make reasonable

efforts to ascertain that the homes securing FHA-insured

mortgages meet Housing Code standards” (490 F. 2d at 1368),

and held that a reviewing court could order injunctive relief

tailored to remedy the harm to the plaintiffs inflicted by the

agency’s failure to conform to the requirements of its regulato-

ry statute. 490 F. 2d at 1370. See also Environmental Defense

Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F. 2d 584, 593-95 (D.C. Cir.

1971); Rockbridge v. Lincoln, 449 F. 2d 567, 569-70 (9th Cir.

1971).

These cases establish that even in areas generally left to

agency discretion, courts may order agencies to take particular

administrative action necessary to effectuate the con-

gressional intent expressed in the agency’s organic statute.

See Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights,

95 Harv. L. Rev. 1195, 1197-98 & n.13 (1982); Stewart, The

Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L.

Rev. 1669, 1755 (1975) (“When the agency has clearly failed to

protect the beneficiaries of the administrative scheme, courts

have gone so far as to mandate appropriate enforcement

measures.“ In this case NHTSA may and should be promptly

Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975), is not to the contrary.

The Court observed in Dunlop v. Bachowski that the Labor-

Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. 66 481

et ge., “relie{(d) upon the special knowledge and discretion” of the

Secretary of Labor to determine whether to bring suit to set aside

union elections. 421 U.S. at 576. Accordingly, the Court directed that

generally “the court’s review should be confined to examination of

the [Secretary's] ‘reasons’ statement, and the determination [of]

whether . the decision. . . [was) arbitrary and capricious . . .

[without an adjudicatory hearing on the complainant's} challenges to

the factual bases for the Secretary's conclusion. 421 U.S. at

572-73. Dunlop v. Bachowski specifically left open the possibility

that the reviewing court could find the Secretary's decision to be

arbitrary and capricious and would then be “empowered to order the

Secretary to bring a civil suit against the union to set aside the

election.” 421 U.S. at 575. The Court recognized that compelling the

Secretary to bring suit “obviously presents some difficulty in light of

the strong evidence that Congress deliberately gave exclusive

enforcement authority to the Secretary,” but it then suggested, by

citing National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Assoc. of R. NR.

ordered to issue an amended Safety Standard incorporating

the technologically suitable means for achieving automatic or

passive restraint in cases of automobile crashes.

B. The Court Of Appeals Has The Primary Duty To Apply

The Correct Legal Standard To The Record.

We turn now to a second possibility—i.e., that this Court

may hold that petitioners are correct in their challenge to the

standard of review actually applied by the court of appeals. If

this Court were to uphold that argument, it would be inappro-

priate for this Court to rule directly on the validity of NHTSA’s

rescission of Safety Standard 208. This Court should, rather,

remand the case to the court of appeals so that court could

apply the correct standard to the voluminous administrative

record.

This Court has said frequently that it intervenes in the

review of agency decisions by courts of appeal “only when the

standard [of judicial review) appears to have been mis-

apprehended or grossly misapplied.” When that happens, this

Court traditionally remands the case to the court of appeals for

its consideration in light of the correct standard. National

Labor Relations Board v. Walton Manufacturing Co., 369

U.S. 404, 408 (1962). See Universal Camera Corp. v. National

Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 491, 497 (1951); Co

v. Federal Maritime Commission, 383 U.S. 607, 621 (190

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources

Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 547, 549 (1978).

This limited role is consistent with the course this Court has

recently instructed courts of appeal to take in reviewing dis-

trict court judgments. In Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 102

S.Ct. 1781 (1982), this Court reversed a decision of a court of

Passengers, 414 U.S. 453. 465 (1974) (Brennan, J., concurring), and

Nader v. Saxbe, 497 F. 2d 676, 679-80 n. 19 (D.C. Cir. 1974), that even

in situations involving prosecutorial discretion, a court may order the

agency to pursue judicial action if its refusal to do so “ ‘went [beyond]

any rational exercise of discretion. National R.R. Passenger

Corp., 414 U.S. at 465.

appeals which had not only vacated a district court’s factual

conclusion but had entered its own contrary finding. This

Court said (102 S.Ct. at 1791-92):

When an appeilate court discerns that a district court

neo teiied te tathe — ——

of the law, the usual rule is that there should be a remand

for further proceedings to it the trial court to make

the missing findings. . wise, where findings are

I.. A a aremand is

the course unless the record permits only one

of the factual issue.

In this analogous situation, this Court should, if petitioners

prevail, remand this case to the court of appeals so that it may

review the administrative record by the correct legal stand-

ard.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, as well as those stated by respon-

dents and amici supporting their position, the decision of the

court of appeals invalidating NHTSA's rescission of Safety

Standard 208 should be affirmed or the case remanded to the

court of appeals with instructions to direct NHTSA to issue

promptly an amended Safety Standard requiring installation of

effective passive restraints in new automobiles.

Respectfully submitted,

NATHAN LEWIN

(Counsel of Record)

ANNE SHERE WALLWORK

MILLER, Cassipy, Larroca & LEWIN

2555 M Street, N.W., Suite 500

Washington, D.C. 20037

(202) 293-6400

Attorneys for the

American Insurance Association,

February 7, 1983 Amicus Curiae

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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