Appendix — Skehan v. Board of Trustees

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Text

Octeber Term, 1981

—————

DR. JOSEPH T. SKEHAN,

Petitioner,

v.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF BLOOMSBURG STATE

COLLEGE, DR. ROBERT NOSSEN, DR. CHARLES

CARLSON, JOHN PITTENGER, Superintendent

of Education, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and

BLOOMSBURG STATE COLLEGE,

Ow Warr or Certiornarn! To THe Unrrep Srares Covrr or

AppEaLs For THE Turep Ciacurt at

Nos. 81-1094 and 81-1299

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

DR. JOSEPH T. SKEHAN

petitioner

pro se

Dr. J. T. Skehan

638 East Third Street

Bloomsburg, Pa., 17815

tel. (717) 784-7368

— EEE

INDEX

Third Circuit Court of Appeals (1981-82)

alia cei da pecceucceee !

Order: Deny Rehearing 26 Mar. 1982 .................. 27

Order: Modify Denial 6 Apr. 1982 ..................... 29

Excerpts: amicus curiae Brief, AAUP, 2 Mar. 1982 . 31

(American Assoc. University Professors)

District Court (M.D.PA) (1980-81)

Order: Deny Special Damages, 2 Nov. 1980 ........... 37

Opinion: Deny Enforce Judgment, 5 Dec. 1930 ........ 38

Order: Alter/Amend, 3 Feb. 1981 ................ 42

U.S. Supreme Court (1979) 444 U.S. 832

Order: Deny Certiorari Petition #78-1719, 1 Oct. 1979 .. 44

EE TT ES a ean | 44

Third Circuit Court of Appeals (1977-78)

Opinion and Judgment 28 Dec. 1978 .................. 45

Order: Deny Rehearing 14 Feb. 1979 .................. 97

ee eee ree aera OO omy mm

Oden Deny big tbDA God 6 tos i wepecetes 100

Coliege Proceedings Oct.-Dec. 1977

Final Report: Cmte. on Professional Affairs 6 Dec. 1977

District Court (1976-77)

Order: Deny Reconsider Stay Denial 8 Dec. 1977 ...... 104

Post-Trial Orders:

2 Aug. 1977 Deny New Trial w/o Prejudice ...... 107

10 Aug. 1977 Demy pro se .... 2.6.66 ccc cc cece ee eeee 109

22 Aug. 1977 Deny New Trial w/o Prejudice ...... 111

31 Aug. 1977 Grant Withdrawal of Counsel ....... 113

22 Aug. 1977 Deny Withdrawal of Counsel ........ 115

12 Sept. 1977 Grant pro se ........ 2.6... c cece eeues 117

22 Sept. 1977 Deny New Trial .................... 119

Opinion and Order: 20 July 1977 ...................05. 122

Opinion, Order and Judgment: Contract and Liability 18

EEL tide Salibitebass cobssbhdceossniebinctncces 145

Opinion, Order and Judgment: Ist Amend. 24 Mar. 1977 |! 73

Order: Deny ist Amend. testimony ................... 190

Order: Deny Amend Complaint 23 Dec. 1976 .......... 195

“U.S. Supreme Court 421 U.S. 983 (1975)

Order: Certiorari Granted Appellant/Pitf. 22 May 1975 220

Third Circuit Court of Appeals (1973-74)

Opinion and Judgment: 3 May 1974 .................. 221

Order: Amending Opinion 11 June 1974 ............... 248

Order: Deny Rehearing 11 June 1974 ................. 250

District Court (1972-73)

Opinion and Judgment: 9 May 1973 .................. 251

Post-Trial Orders:

12 June 1973 Deny Amend Judgment

Deny Attorneys’ Fees ............... 253

13 June 1973 Deny Reconsider ................... 266

Memorandum Report: Chmn. Academic Freedom Cmte. re

SR GR GU ccccccckbsccdeatonccicoseces 268

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Nos. 81-1094, 81-1299

DR. JOSEPH T. SKEHAN,

Appellant

Vv.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF BLOOMSBURG STATE

COLLEGE and DR. ROBERT NOSSEN and DR.

CHARLES CARLSON and JOHN PITTENGER,

Superintendent of Education Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania and BLOOMSBURG STATE

COLLEGE

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

(D.C. Civil No. 72-0644)

Argued October 29, 1981

Before: ADAMS, ROSENN ar’ SLOVITER, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed January 26, 1982)

Susan J. Forney (Argued)

Cletus P. Lyman (Argued)

Lyman & Ash

1612 Latimer Street

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Attorney for Appellant

OPINION OF THE COURT

SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.

1.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Before us is another phase of litigation which began

over nine years ago arising out of the decision of

Bloomsburg State College (College) not to renew the

contract of one of its faculty members, Dr. Joseph T.

Skehan, and subsequently to dismiss him from the Col-

lege faculty in mid-term of his final contract year.

Skehan’s suit has been the subject of three previous

opinions of this court, a decision by the Supreme Court,

and several district court opinions, some reported and

some unreported.’ Skehan here appeals from two orders

of the district court dealing with his remedy: (1) the or-

der denying, on the ground of the Eleventh Amend-

ment, his motion for an award of special damages in the

form of back pay, and (2) the order denying his motion to

1. The reported decisions are Skehan v. Board of Trustees of

State College, 353 F. Supp. 542 (M.D. Pa. 1973); 358

F. Supp. 430 (M.D. Pa. 1973), vacated and remanded, 501 F.2d 31

(3d Cir. 1974), vacated, 421 U.S. 983 (1975), remanded, 538 F.2d

53 (3d Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976), on

remand, 431 F. Supp. 1379 (M.D. Pa. 1977); 436 F. Supp. 657

(M.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 590 F.2d 470 (3d Cir.

1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979), on remand, 501 F. Supp.

1360 (M.D. Pa. 1980).

Skehan was appointed as a non-tenured Associate

Professor of Economics at the College in January, 1969

under a six-month trial contract, which was renewed for

the 1969-70 academic year. In May, 1970 Skehan was

notified by letter from then college president, Robert

Nossen, that his contract would be renewed for the

1970-71 academic year, but would not be renewed be-

yond that year. We will refer to this decision throughout

as the nonrenewal decision. Skehan, who accepted the

offer of employment for the 1970-71 academic year, pro-

tested that the nonrenewal decision had been caused by

considerations violative of his academic freedom and

claimed that he was therefore entitled to a hearing pur-

suant to Article 5e of the Statement of Policy for Con-

tinuous Employment and Academic Freedom at

Bloomsburg State College [hereinafter Article 5e}, The

College rejected Skehan’s request for an Article 5e hear-

ing on the reasons for the nonrenewal decision.

In the fall of 1970, during Skehan’s terminal con-

4

claim was rejected and it is not before us. He was more

successful on his claim of procedural violations. The dis-

trict court found that Skehan’s one year employment

contract was a property interest within the meaning of

Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), and Per-

ry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), and that

Skehan’s dismissal violated due process because it was

accomplished before he was given a hearing at which he

had the opportunity to justify his actions or present rea-

sons why dismissal was not the appropriate sanction.

Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State Col-

lege, 358 F. Supp. 430 (M.D. Pa. 1973). In a subsequent

decision, following remand to the district court which

conducted a hearing on the issue, that court concluded

that Skehan also possessed a contractual right to a hear-

ing as provided in Article 5e (which incorporates the pro-

cedures specified in Article 9) on the College’s non-

renewal decision, that he had invoked that right within a

reasonable time, and that the College’s failure to afford

him those procedures violated the due process clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment. Skehan v. Board of Trust-

ees of Bloomsburg State College, 431 F. Supp. 1379,

1391 (M.D. Pa. 1977).

Thereafter, the district court held bearings on the

appropriate remedy. In an opinion filed July 20, 1977,

the court declined to order full and immediate rein-

statement, but concluded that the proper remedy for the

College’s failure to provide “kehan with the necessary

hearings was his reinstatement, without teaching du-

ties, to the suspended status he held on October 15,

1970, after he was suspended for refusing to teach his

classes but before he was formally terminated and re-

moved from the payroll pending administrative he arings

to determine whether nonrenewal and dismissai were

proper. Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State

College, 436 F. Supp. 657, 664 (M.D. Pa. 1977). The dis-

trict court held that the College would be required to

afford Skehan a hearing in accordance with the con-

tractual Article 5e procedures on his nonrenewal and a

hearing comporting with due prucess on his dismissal,

in that order. Id. at 664, 668-69.

Following the district court’s order, Skehan was

reinstated as a faculty member, and received approxi-

mately $22,000 in salary from August 1, 1977 through

June 2, 1978. He also negotiated with the College and

received $51,500 for attorney's fees and expenses. Ap-

pellant’s brief at 3. A hearing on Skehan’s nonrenewal

was conducted before the Committee on Professional Af-

fairs, an elected committee of faculty members which

was the body ‘esignated in Article 5e and which was or-

dered recreateu because the Policy Statement of which

that article was a part was no longer in effect, having

been superceded by a collective bargaining agreement.

That Committee found his contract was not renewed for

reasons violative of academic freedom and recommend-

ed his reinstatement and reconsideration. Thereupon,

the College’s president, James H. McCormick, decided

to withdraw the nonrenewal letter, and to rely instead cn

the dismissal action. The College conducted the dismiss-

al proceedings which are at issue on this appeal. The

majority of the Committee which heard those proceed-

ings recommended Skehan’s termination, and on June

2, 1978, the College’s president notified Skehan in writ-

ing that he accepted the Committee’s findings of fact

and recommendation, and that Skehan was terminated

from employment at the College and removed from the

payroll effective as of the end of that day.

II.

THE COLLEGE’S IMMUNITY

Skehan has throughout this litigation, beginning

with the filing of his complaint, contended that he was

entitled, inter alia, to reinstatement and an award of

back pay. In our first consideration of this issue, we held

that “if under Pennsylvania law the College is an agent

of : .e Commonwealth, state sovereign immunity would

preclude the award of any relief against it directly and

any but prospective monetary relief, equitable or legai, in

an order directed against the individual defendants.”

Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State Cv'-

lege, 501 F.2d 31, 42 (3d Cir. 1974). The Supreme Court

granted Skehan’s petition for a writ of certiorari and, in a

summary disposition, remanded the case to us for fur-

ther consideration’ in light of, inter alia, Wood v.

Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975). Skehan v. Board of

Trustees of Bloomsburg State College, 421 U.S. 983

(1975).? We thereupon reviewed the case en banc, and

held that in light of Wood v. Strickland our prior as-

sumption of an unqualified common law immunity for

the individual defendants was erroneous. Skehan v.

Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State College, 538 F.2d

53, 60 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979

(1976). We remanded to the district court so that it could

determine whether the individual defendants acted

without malice and whether they knew or reasonably

should have known that the actions taken would violate

Skehan’s constitutional rights. In addition, we reex-

amined the issue of the College’s immunity in light of

the decision in Brungard v. Hartman, 12 Pa. Commw.

477, 315 A.2d 913 (1974), which had not been called to

our attention before our prior opinion was filed. We con-

2. In our opinion which was reviewed by the Supreme Court

we had also held that if the College did not share Pennsylvania's im-

munity, the district court must consider awarding Skehan attor-

ney's fees, as well as back pay, as a private attorney general vindi-

cating a public interest in having state-related institutions comply

with the Fourteenth Amendment. 501 F 2d at 44-45. The Supreme

Court directed that we consider the effect of Alyeska Pipeline Ser-

vice Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). In our en banc

reconsideration, we held that Alyeska foreclosed recovery of attor-

ney’s fees on the private attorney general theory but not on the basis

of litigation obduracy. 538 F.2d at 55-59. As we noted in the text,

the attorney's fee issue has been settled and is not before us.

a back pay award could not be made out of the College’s

treasury.

On remand, the district court found that the one in-

dividual defendant whose conduct was at issue, Presi-

dent Nossen, acted in good faith and without :ualice,

and was entitled to the qualified immunity recognized in

Wood v. Strickland, supra. 431 F. Supp. 1379 (M.D. Pa.

1977). The district court also declined to entertain

Skehan's argument that this court had erred in holding

that an award of damages in the form of back pay against

the College was barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

436 F. Supp. 657, 665 (M.D. Pa. 1977). On appeal,

Skehan relied on the intervening decision of the Penn-

sylvania Supreme Court in Mayle v. Pennsylvania De-

partment of Highways, 479 Pa. 384, 388 A.2d 709

(1978), which abrogated the judicially-created doctrine

of sovereign immunity in suits against the Common-

wealth for torts of its agents. We rejected Skehan’s claim

on the ground that the passage of Act No. 152° by the

Pennsylvania legislature “reaffirming and preserving

sovereign immunity as a bar to claims brought against

the Commonwealth and its agencies, officials, and em-

ployees,” had “effectively overruled the decision of the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Mayle” and therefore

3. Act of September 28, 1978, 1978 Pa. Laws 788, Act No.

1978-152. The Act reaffirms the doctrine of sovereign immunity,

see §1 (codified at 1 Pa. Cons. Stat. §2310), but permits limited

waiver of protection from tort liability in eight specific areas, see §2

(originally codified at 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §5110; currently codified at

42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §8522). Section 5(e) of the Act (codified at 42 Pa.

Cons. Stat. §8521(b)) provides that “[n)jothing contained in this act

shall be cunstrued to waive the Commonwealth's immunity from

suit in federal courts guaranteed by the eleventh amendment to the

United States Constitution.”

we had no need to interpret the effect of the Mayle

court's abrogation of Pennsylvania’s.state law sovereign

immunity on that state’s Eleventh Amendment immuni-

ty from damage actions in federal court. Skehan v. Board

of Trustees of Bloomsburg State College, 590 F.2d 470,

487-88 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (£979).

We thus declined to disturb our previous ruling that the

Eleventh Amendment precluded an award of back pay

against the College. Id. at 488.*

When the case was again before the district court,

Skehan filed a motion for an award of special damages in

the form of back pay for the period, inter alia, from Octo-

ber 17, 1970 through July 31, 1977, on the ground of an

intervening change in Pennsylvania law. The district

court’s denial of this motion on November 24, 1980

raises one of the two issues on appeal.

Skehan contends that the recent decision of the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Gibson v. Common-

wealth of Pennsylvania, 490 Pa. 156, 415 A.2d 80

(1980), requires us to reconsider our previous holding

that Act No. 152 overruies Mayle. In Gibson the court

held that Act No. 152 could not be applied retroactively

to extinguish causes of action which became actionable

prior to the effective date of the Act. In reaching this

conclusion, the court relied upon state and federal deci-

sions which hold that a legislature may not constitution-

ally eliminate a remedy which has already accrued. Id. at

161-62; 415 A.2d at 83. The court further reasoned that

although tort claims against the Commonwealth were

not actionable prior to Mayle, the abrogation of sovereign

4. We also rejected Skehan’'s argument that the holding in

Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436

U.S. 658 (1978), that local government entities may be deemed

“persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §1983, compels the con-

clusion that section 1983 must be construed as a Congressional

waiver of the state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity. 590 F.2d at

488-91.

immunity in Mayle retroactively applied to claims which

arose prior to the Mayle decision. Id. at 162-63; 415 A.2d

at 84. Shortly thereafter, in Brungard v. Mansfield State

College, 491 Pa. 114, 419 A.2d 1171 (1980), the Pennsy]-

vania Supreme Court applied the rule of Gibson, and

held that a negligence action against a state college

which had been filed in 1972 should not have been dis-

missed by the lower court on the ground that Act No.

152 barred the action.

Skehan’s action accrued and was in existence prior

to the passage of Act No. 152 on September 28, 1978.

Therefore, under the Gibson decision, the Act cannot be

retroactively applied, as we previously assumed. Be-

cause “an appellate court must apply the law in effect at

the time it renders its decision,” Bradley v. School Board

of the City of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696 (1974) (citations

omitted), we must reconsider our earlier holding that the

Eleventh Amendment bars the award sought by Skehan.

The Eleventh Amendment provides, in relevant

part: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not

be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, com-

menced or prosecuted against one of the United States

by Citizens of another State. . . .” It applies only to bar

suit against a state in federal court. Whether a state may

be sued in its own state courts is a matter of its own state

law. Skehan notes that in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S.

1, 17 (1890), the Supreme Court construed the Eleventh

Amendment to permit a state to be sued in federal court

by its own consent. Skehan argues that although the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Mayle did not expressly

address the applicability of its holding to Pennsylvania's

Eleventh Amendment immunity, the decision should

nevertheless be construed to waive the College’s immu-

nity because the court’s language in Mayle rejects the

sovereign immunity doctrine and its justifications in

sweeping and unequivocal language, and thus implicitlv

abrogates sovereign immunity in federal as well as state

court.

10

The issue now before us has been addressed by a

number of the district courts in this circuit which have

been almost unanimous in their conclusion that Mayle

does not constitute consent by the Commonwealth and

its agencies to be sued in federal court. Moore v.

Colautti, 483 F. Supp. 357, 374 n.26 (E.D.Pa. 1979),

aff d without opinion, 633 F.2d 210 (3d Cir. 1980); Sa-

vory v. Kawasaki Motor Corp., 472 F. Supp. 1216,

1217-18 (E.D.Pa. 1979); Skrbina v. Pennsylvania De-

partment of Highways, 468 F. Supp. 215 (W.D.Pa.

1979); Ruman v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 462

F. Supp. 1355, 1360-61 (M.D.Pa.), affd without opin-

ion, 612 F.2d 574 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S.

964 (1979); Hernandez v. Whitesell, 462 F. Supp. 569,

573-74 (E.D.Pa. 1978). Contra Greenfield v. Vesella, 457

F. Supp. 316, 319-20 (W.D.Pa. 1978). For the reasons

discussed below, we agree with the conclusion of these

courts.

The cases which have considered a state’s waiver of

its Eleventh Amendment immunity have generally con-

cerned the following issues: First, whether a particular

legislative enactment permitting suits against a state in

its courts serves as a consent to comparable suits in fed-

eral court. See, e.g., Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax

Commission, 327 U.S. 573 (1946) (Utah statute giving

consent to certain taxpayers’ suits not applicable to suits

in federal court). Second, whether certain actions by the

state, such as participation in federal aid programs, con-

stitute consent to suit in federal court. See, e.g., Edelman

v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671-74 (1974) (no waiver by

mere participation in federal welfare programs); Daye v.

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 483 F.2d 294, 298 (3d

Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 946 (1974) (no waiver

based on mere accemtance of funds by the Common-

wealth under the Federal-Aid Highway Act). See also

Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 192-93 (1964)

(where congressional statute authorized suit in federal

court against any railroad operating in interstate com-

merce, state’s operation of railroad in interstate com-

merce constituted consent to suit in federal court); Petty

v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commission, 359 U.S.

275 (1959) (waiver of immunity found in states’ enter-

ing into interstate compact approved by Congress).

Third, whether Eleventh Amendment immunity has

been waived by a general or voluntary appearance in fed-

eral court by an officer of the state, such as the

general. See, e.g., Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436,

447-48 (1883) (waiver found based on voluntary appear-

ance by the state in litigation in federal court). But see

Richins v. Industrial Construction, Inc., 502 F.2d 1051,

1056 (10th Cir. 1974) (no waiver by litigating on the

merits in light of state statute precluding suits against

state in federal court).

Neither party has directed us to any case in which

the issue of waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity

by judicial decision alone has arisen. While we are aware

of no case law authority indicating that the judiciary is

without authority in this regard, we agree with appellees

that strong policy considerations support a conclusion

that the question of waiver of Eleventh Amendment im-

munity would ordinarily be a decision for the legislature

or executive rather than for the judiciary. The legislative

and executive branches have the information needed to

evaluate the ability of the state treasury to bear the po-

tential monetary burden that may result from consent to

suit in federal court. Indeed, the sequence of events

which followed the Mayle decision, enactment of an at-

believe that the Mayle decision constitutes a waiver of

such immunity. The Supreme Court has held that “[i}n

12

deciding whether a State has waived its constitutional

under the Eleventh Amendment, we will find

waiver only where stated ‘by the most express language

or by such overwhelming implications from the text as

[will] leave no room for any other reasonable construc-

tion.” Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. at 673 (quoting

Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171

(1909)). Similarly, in Daye v. Commonwealth of Penn-

sylvania, 483 F.2d at 298, we also stated that “the con-

been a waiver will not

be lightly inferred” and that “when a waiver does take

and unequivocal.” This rule of

clear and express waiver has been consistently applied

in cases in which a state has consented to suit in its own

courts by statute; absent a clear declaration of a state’s

consent to a similar suit against itself in federal court,

such consent has not been inferred. See Kennecott Cop-

per Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 327 U.S. at 577;

Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasu y of Indiana,

323 U.S. 459, 465 (1945); Great Northern Life Insur-

ance Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 54-55 (1944). The situa-

tion here is analogous.

The opinion of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in

Mayle does not, by even the most liberal standards, con-

stitute a clear and unequivocal waiver of Eleventh

Amendment immunity. The precise question before the

court in Mayle was whether Pennsylvania could be sued

in state court for injuries suffered by the plaintiff as a re-

sult of a negligently maintained public highway. See 479

Pa. at 386; 388 A.2d at 709. In reversing the lower

court’s dismissal of appellant's complaint based on the

sovereign immunity doctrine, the Pennsylvania court

expressly “abrogated” that doctrine, reasoning that since

sovereign immunity in Pennsylvania was a non-consti-

tutional doctrine® that was established by judicial deci-

5. The court found that the language of Article |, section 11 of

the Pennsylvania Constitution was neutral with respect to sovereign

immunity. This section provides, “Suits may be brought against the

E

:

z

13

sions, the state constitution did not preclude it from

abolishing this judicially-created doctrine. The court

further reasoned that none of the historical arguments

favoring retention of the doctrine have continuing valid-

ity. Except to note that the Pennsylvania legis!ature had

refused to ratify the Eleventh Amendment when it was

proposed by Congress, the Mayle opinion does not dis-

cuss, either expressly or impliedly, the question of waiv-

er of Pennsylvania's federal constitutionally-based im-

munity from suit in federal court. Rather, the opinion

focuses on the judicially-created common law doctrine

of sovereign immunity.

In light of the requirement applicable in this case

that states® must clearly and expressly waive their Elev-

enth Amendment immunity to suit in federal court, we

cannot infer that the Mayle court’s waiver of Pennsylva-

nia’s immunity under state law constitutes a waiver of its

Eleventh Amendment immunity. We, therefore, adhere

to our earlier holding that an award of special damages

against the College is barred by the Eleventh Amend-

ment and affirm the lower court's denial of Skehan’s mo-

tion for an award of special damages.’

Commonwealth in such manner, in such courts and in such cases

as the legislature may by law direct.” See 479 Pa. at 399-400; 388

A.2d at 716-17.

6. Congress’ power to provide for suits against states in federal

courts implementing a constitutional provision is not at issue here.

See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (upholding the

power of Congress to authorize private suits under Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§20006e et seq. (1976 & Supp.

Ill 1979), for money damages in federal courts against

unconsenting states liable for employment discrimination in viola-

tion of the Fouvteenth Amendment); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678

(1978) (approving ar. award of attorney's fees under the Civil Rights

Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §1988 (1976), pay-

able from the state treasury in an action in federal court

state officers to correct unconstitutional conditions in the Arkansas

State prison system).

7. In view of our disposition of this issue. we need not address

appellee's additional contention that under the Supreme Court's

14

Il.

ADEQUACY OF HEARING PROCEDURE

In the same letter dated December 15, 1977 in

which President McCormick notified Skehan that the

College was no longer proceeding with its nonrenewal

action, he also informed Skehan that the College would

proceed to the required hearing on Skehan’s dismissal.

By letter dated January 5, 1978 from Assistant Attorney

General C. Glendon Frank, who was acting as counsel to

President McCormick, Skehan was notified that this

hearing would take place on January 14, 1978 before “a

committee composed of one representative chosen by

the President and the four highest vote-getting members

of the Committee on Professional Affairs who can be

available on that date and time.” App. at 600a. The letter

enclosed a Statement of Charges against Skehan, pre-

pared by Deputy Attorney General Howard Levinson

who presented the charges against Skehan at the hear-

ing, and stated that “The administration takes no posi-

tion on the truth or falsity of these charges.” In this re-

gard, the letter stated, “As counsel to the President, |

view his position as one of a decision maker, not a pros-

ecutor in this instance.” The letter further stated that

each side would have the right to present witnesses at

the hearing who would be subject to cross-examination

by opposing counsel and that “the hearing committee

[would] make findings of fact as to the truth or falsity of

the Statement of Charges, and make a recommendation

thereon to the President.” Skehan objected to the proce-

dure and notified the members of the entire Committee

on Professional Affairs that neither he nor any represen-

NOTE — (Continued)

dictum in Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978), denial of comper-

satory damages was proper since such an award would constitute a

“windfall” to Skehan rather than compensation because his termi-

nation was justified and would have occurred even if due process

had been provided. ‘

15

tative on his behalf would attend. The hearing commit-

tee was thereafter reconstituted to the full nine-member

Committee on Professional Affairs and held its first

meeting at the time scheduled.

Skehan was subsequently notified of the commit-

tee’s intention to hold additional meetings on January

27, February 10, February 17 and February 18, but he

did not appear at any of the meetings except to appear at

the meeting on January 27th to make an objection to the

“jurisdiction” of the Committee on Professional Affairs.

Skehan subsequently received a copy of the final report

of the hearing commitee dated April 10, 1978 which

made findings of fact and recommended that Skehan’s

contract be terminated. A two-member minority report

recommenued against termination. By letter dated May

11, 1978 from Assistant Attorney General Frank,

Skehan’s attorney was granted the oppcrtunity to file a

post-hearing brief and was invited to attend and present

his views at the meeting of the Board of Trustees on May

17, 1978, at which the Board would consider its recom-

mendation to the President on whether Skehan should

be dismissed.

On June 2, 1978, President McCormick informed

Skehan that based on the recommendations of the hear-

ing committee and the Board, he was being terminated

and removed from the College payroll, effective that day.

Skehan then filed a motion with the district court to en-

force paragraphs 11 and 12 of that court’s judgment of

July 20, 1977. Skehan contended the hearings were not

timely, failed to comply with the requirements of the dis-

trict court’s order of July 20, 1977, and did not comport

with due process. Each of these contentions was reject-

ed by the district court.

Skehan contends that he had a right to have the dis-

missal procedure comport with the procedures set forth

in article 9 of the Statement of Policy for Continuous

Employment and Academic Freedom at Bloomsburg

16

College, and he also appears to contend that the district

court specifically so provided in its judgment of July 20,

1977. Turning to the latter contention first, we note that

in its July 20, 1977 opinion the district court stated:

Skehan’s reinstatement to a suspended status may

be ended either by his full reinstatement or a termi-

nation. The College will be required to afford him a

hearing comporting with due process at which h—

will have an opportunity to refute any charges relat-

ing to his conduct in 1970.

436 F. Supp. at 664.* Looking to the plain language of

the district court’s order, we agree with its interpretation

that the order did not require defendants to provide

Skehan with any particular sort of hearing, other than

one which “comported with the due process clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment.”

We also reject Skehan’s contentiun that he had a

contractual right to the procedures se: forth in Article 9

upon dismissal for cause.” As this court has previously

8. In an accompanying order, the court detailed the dismissal

procedures to be afforded Skehan:

11. A pretermination hearing mz2y, at the option of the Presi-

dent of [the College}, be held within 30 days after the Board of

Trustees determines whether or not to renew Skehan's employ-

ment contract or within: 30 days after another final decision has

been reached on the question of renewal or non-renewal,

whichever shal! first occur.

12. If no pretermination hearing is conducted within the time

period set forth in the preceding paragraph, Skehan shall be

reinstated to the position he held on October 7, 1970.

436 ¥F. Supp. at 668-69. These paragraphs starkly contrast with

paragraphs 3 through 10 of the same order which set forth detailed

instructions for the nonrenewal proceedings that tracked Article 9.

9. Article 9 of the Statement of Policy for Continuous Employ-

ment and Academic Freedom at Bloomsburg State College set out

the formal procedures applicable to the dismissal of a tenured facul-

ty member. It provided first for discussion between the faculty

member and the appropriate administrative officers, followed by ref-

17

recognized, Article 9 by its terms prescribed the proce-

dures to be afforded tenured faculty members upon dis-

missal for cause. See 590 F.2d at 473 n.1. It is conceded

that Dr. Skehan was a non-tenured faculty member. The

Article 9 procedures also applied to nonrenewal deci-

sions when the faculty member alleged “that a decision

not to reappoint him has been caused by « nsiderations

violative of academic freedom.” It was this language

which was applied to support the holding that Skehan

was entitled to the Article 9 procedure on his non-

renewal decision. See 431 F.Supp. at 1388. There is no

oo language applying those procedures to for

se dismissals of non-tenured faculty. While we may

squne wits Shaheen Geet the Ribees to ao ene ten &

logical, we cannot read into the Stotement language that

does not appear in that detailed document. '°

erence to the Committee on Professional Affairs of the Faculty. In

the absence of adjustment, the Committee was to recommend to

the President of the College whether in its view formal proceedings

to consider the dismissal of the faculty member should be institut-

ed. Notice to the faculty member including a detailed written expla-

nation of the reasons for the action was required before any such

proceedings. The action of the President was final, although the fac-

ulty member could request further consideration by the President.

If the President of the College reaffirmed the action, the faculty

member could request a hearing, to be held within thirty (30) days,

before an ad hoc hearing committee (of five (5) members and two

(2) alternates) elected by the “aculty of the College. That commit-

tee was to present its report, along with recommendations, to the

President of the College and the Board of Trustees within thirty (30)

days after the date of the completion of the hearing. The faculty

me-nber had the right to be present at the meeting of the Board of

Trustees when the report of the ad hoc hearing commiitee was con-

sidered and could be accompanied by an advisor, although not legal

counsel, both there and at the meetings of the ad hoc committee.

10. Appellees contend that Skehan has waived his claim of enti-

tlement to a right to Article 9 procedures by failing to press such a

claim at the preliminary injunction hearing in 1973, at the tirne that

record was stipulated as the record on the motion for permanent in-

junction, or at the hearing on the final remedy. In light of our dispo-

sition of this appeal, we need not reach that issue.

Although Skehan contends that various policy state-

ments of the American Association of University Profes-

sors should be read into the College's written policy,

even under the nuwost liberal interpretation we could con-

clude only that the reference in the College's Faculty

Handbook for 1970-71 to the 1940 Statement of Princi-

ples on Academic Freedom and Tenure of the American

Association of University Professors'' constituted an

adoption of the 1940 Statement. The specific procedures

which Skehan argues were not applied in his case are

not derived from the 1940 Statement, but from subse-

quent additions and revisions which were not specifical-

ly referred to in the College's Faculty Handbook. There-

fore, even if we were to agree with Skehan that the

College had adopted the 1940 Statement, there is no ba-

sis on this record to find that the College also intended to

adopt those additional statements upon which Skehan

relies. Moreover, as discussed infra, the record estab-

lishes that the procedures afforded Skehan in connec-

tion with his dismissal hearing substantially complied

with the 1940 Statement.

Thus, we conclude that the College was not re-

quired to afford Skehan the precise procedures set out in

11. The 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom

and Tenure of American Association of University Professors

provided:

Termination for cause of a continuous appointment, or the dis-

missal for cause of a teacher previous to the expiration of a term

appointment, should, if possible, be considered by both a facul-

ty committee and the governing board of the institution. In all

cases where the facts are in dispute, the accused teacher

should be informed before the hearing in writing of the charges

against him and should have the opportunity to be heard in his

own defense by all bodies that pass judgment upon his case. He

should be permitted to have with him an adviser of his own

choosing who may act as counsel. There should be a full steno-

graphic record of the hearing available to the parties

concerned.

Article 9. We must still determine whether there is any

validity to his claim that the procedures he was afforded

did not comport with the minimal constitutional require-

ments of due process. We are guided in our inquiry by

the standards established in Chung v. Park, 514 F.2d

382 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 489 (1975), where

we reviewed the procedures afforded a college faculty

member upon the college's decision not to renew his

contract. In holding that the procedures afforded the

plaintiff in Chung satisfied the requirements of due proc-

ess, we emphasized that “[i)f the procedure used by the

college is adequate to prevent unreasonable, arbitrary or

capricious termination decisions, it satisfies due proc-

ess.” Id. at 387. We further noted that “in pre-

termination hearings. . . the person being deprived of

his ‘property interest’ is entitled to minimum procedural

which are adapted to the particular charac-

teristics of the interests involved and the limited nature

of the controversy.” Id. at 386. The safeguards enumer-

ated in that decision were:

(1) written notice of the grounds for termination;

(2) disclosure of the evidence supporting termina-

tion; (3) the right to confront and cross-examine

adverse witnesses; (4) an opportunity to be heard in

person and to present witnesses and documentary

evidence; (5) a .veutral and detached hearing body;

and (6) a written statement by the fact finders as to

the evidence relied upon.

Id.

Applying the principles enunciated in Chung, the

distxict court found that the procedures ¢ “orded Skehan

fully satisfied the requirements of due p.: cess. The dis-

trict court found that: (1) Skehan received written no-

tice of the grounds for termination; (2) a pretermination

hearing was conducted by members of the Committee

on Professional Affairs; (3) Skehan was advised of the

20

nature of the proceedings and was given the right to

pi sent witnesses at the hearing but chose not to partici-

pate; (4) Skehan received a copy of the committee's find-

ings of fact and final recommendation, dated April 10,

1978, recommending that his contract be terminated;

and (5) Skehan’s counsel was provided with a tape of the

gs and was able to file post-hearing briefs.

App. at 919a-923a. Having reviewed the evidence before

the district court, we agree that the pretermination pro-

cedures afforded Skehan satisfied the requirements of

due process.

Skehan contends that the above procedures failed to

satisfy the requirements of due process because (1) he

was “bombarded with contradictory proposals and au-

thoritative announcements as to the identity of his ac-

cuser, the identity of the hearing body that would hear

his case, and the time and place of hearing,” Appellant's

brief at 46; (2) he was not provided a transcript of the

proceedings before the Committee on Professional Af-

fairs; and (3) attorneys from the same agency advised

the Committee and the College President, and presented

the charges against Skehan to the Committee on behalf

of the College.

We do not agree. The record does show some evi-

dence of initial confusion as to the date’? and identity of

the hearing body.'’ However, on January 11, 1978

12. As noted in the text, Assistant Attorney General Frank's

letter to Skehan, dated January 5, 1978, corroctly informed him that

inexplicably stated that the hearing would be held on January 12,

1978. App. at 603a. Skehan however concededly knew that in fact

the hearing would be held on January 14, 1978, as it was.

21

Skehan wrote to all members of the Committee on Pro-

fessional Affairs, the body ultimately designated to con-

duct the hearing, stating that he would not attend the

meeting on January 14, 1978, which clearly establishes

that on that date Skehan was aware that a meeting

would take place on January 14, 1978 but that he volun-

tarily chose not to attend on the ground, inter alia, that

the College president failed to sign the charges. The re-

cord also establishes that while no transcripts of the

hearings were provided, due to the unavoidable absence

of the reporter who had been scheduled to attend, the

hearings were tape recorded and the tapes were made

available to Skehan's attorney. Skehan suggests the Col-

lege should have notified him that a new nine-mernber

committee had been formed. Since he declined to attend

the hearing allegedly because of the failure of Dr.

McCormick to sign the charges, we do not believe that

the apparent failure to notify Skehan that the committee

was reconstituted amounted to a denial of due process.

Although he may not have known at that time that the

hearing committee was expanded to the full

nine-member Committee on Professional Affairs rather

than che smaller group to which he had objected, he

concededly was aware of the composition of the hearing

committee by the second meeting when he ap eared be-

fore it. He did not at that time or thereafter change his

position and participate. Therefore under these circum-

stances, we cannot conclude that the failure to notify

him of the reconstituted hearing committee violated any

of Skehan’s rights.

With regard to the involvement of the attorneys

from the Pennsylvania Attorney General's Office,'* the

mittee which had served as the nonrenewal committee and, accord-

ing to the President's special advisor, “had proved their objectivity

by their recommendation in favor of Dr. Skehan in that matter.”

App. at 900a.

14. Jack E. Solomon, Assistant Attorney General, Pennsylva-

nia Department of Education, served as counsel to the Committee

district court found no violation of Skenan's due process

rights:

Plaintiff has submitted nothing to indicate that the

three individuals involved in any way influenced the

decision of the hearing committee. The fact that all

were employed by the same agency is not sufficient.

Moreover, it is undisputed that the role of the Assist-

ant Attorney General advising the committee was

merely to advise it on procedural and evidentiary

matters subject at all times to being cverruled by

the Committee. Moreover, affidavits submitted by

the Committee's counsel explain in detail his ac-

tions and show no basis to conclude that Plaintiff's

due process rights were not respected.

App. at 922. In Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975),

the Court considered a claim that a Wisconsin procedure

which authorized the state's medical hearing board to

“investigate, hear and act upon” practices by doctors and

order temporary suspensions violated procedural due

process. In rejecting this claim, the Court held that the

combination of investigatory and adjudicatory functions

in an administrative agency does not in and of itself

amount to a denial of procedural due process and that

before such a combination of functions can be found vio-

lative of due process there must be a showing that the

combination interferes with the “honesty and integrity”

of the adjudicator, and that there is such a risk of “actual

NOTE — (Continued)

on Professional Affairs; Howard Levinson, Deputy Attorney Gener-

al, Pennsylvania Department of Justice, served as attorney for

Bloomsburg State College and presented the case on behalf of the

Commonwealth at the hearings; C. Glendon Frank, Assistant Attor-

ney General, served as advisor to College President McCormick. Al-

though these attorneys had different titles, the appellees explain

that at the time of the hearing Assistant Attorneys General were as-

signed to various Commonwealth agencies, while Deputy Attorneys

General were employed by the Pennsvivania Department of Justice

and therefore the titles of the attorneys were not reflective of rank.

23

bias” that the practice must be forbidden if due process

is to be afforded. Id. at 47. See also Hoke v. Board of

Medical Examiners, 395 F. Supp. 357 (W.D.N.C. 1975)

(three-judge court) (holding that combined role of Board

of Medical Examiners under state statute as investigator

and adjudicator does not constitute a denial of due proc-

ess). Here Skehan did not allege that the hearing com-

mittee performed multiple functions, but merely that the

attorneys advising the committee and the President of

the College were employed by the same office as the at-

torney presenting the facts in favor of termination.

Skehan does not allege any specific improper con-

duct or bias on the part of these attorneys. In fact, the

three different attorneys were originally assigned to the

Skehan case so as to avoid unfairness “so that each level

of review will be able io act independently of the prior

level.” Letter to Skehan from Deputy Attorney General

Gerald Gornish (Oct. 24, 1977), App. at 480a. We find

that under the facts of this case, the involvement of he

three attorneys from the Pennsylvania Attorney General's

Office did not amount to a denial of due process.

Accordingly, we conclude that the procedures af-

forded Skehan satisfied the requirements of due process.

He was fully informed of the charges against him prior

to the hearing and was presented with an opportunity to

be heard and to present witnesses before a neutral hear-

ing body, but chose not to participate. Under the stand-

ards established in Chung v. Park, 514 F.2d at 387, the

procedures were “adequate to prevent unreasonable, ar-

betrary or capricious termination decisions.”

Finally, we turn to Skehan's contention that the dis-

trict court erred in failing to conduct a hearing regarding

his motion to enforce the July 20, 1977 judgment of the

district court. Skehan contends that he relied upon an

indication by the trial judge that there would be a hear-

ing and that the failure to conduct a hearing precluded

24

him from introducing additional evidence in support of |

his motion at such a hearing.

An order entered in this case by the district court on

May 2, 1980, prior to the submission of Skehan's motion,

provided: “Submissions and determinations of motions

shall be upon briefs, without hearing or oral argument,

unless the court specifically directs otherwise.” At a con-

ference with the district court on September 10, 1980,

following filing of the motion in question, the district

judge specifically asked Skehan's counsel whether there

was a need for a hearing on this motion:

THE COURT: Well, is it going to be a need for a

hearing on the motions, for instance, to enforce the

Court order?

MR. GLASSBERG: We believe we have contained

all our facts in the affidavit and that it can be decid-

ed on the brief and the affidavit — rather, the mo-

tion and the affidavit in support of the brief.

App. at 772a. While the court at the same hearing did

indicate its reluctance “to decide anything on affidavits,”

and interpreted the standing order regarding decisions

on briefs alone as inapplicable if there were any factual

items in dispute, the court did not make a conclusive de-

termination that a hearing would take place. Further-

more, Skehan does not allege that he specifically re-

quested a hearing at any time prior to the ultimate

disposition of his motion on December 5, 1980.'°

In considering Skehan's motion to alter or amend

the court’s order denying his “motion to enforce the

judgment”, the district court ruled that “an evidentiary

hearing is not required in order for the Court to deter-

15. At most, Skehan in his reply brief filed in the district court

in support of his motion to enforce the 1977 judgment, “suggested

that a hearing be conducted in order to form a basis for determining

both factual and legal issues.” App. at 915a. (emphasis added).

mine what type of hearing was required by its order” and

that plaintiff's motion “raises nothing to warrant altering

the Court’s conclusion that the undisputed facts show

that the hearing provided Plaintiff satisfied the require-

ments of due process.” App. at 935a-936a. At least two

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 43(e) and Rule

78, authorize the district court to dispense with hearings

in appropriate circumstances. The district court was ful-

ly cognizant that a hearing would be required if there

were contested material factual issues upon which its

deed, in reaching its decision, the district court relied

primarily upon the facts contained in Skehan’s own

affidavit.

Although we conclude that the district court did not

err in declining to award back pay to Skehan and deciin-

sional Affairs that “the decision not to renew Dr.

Skehan’s contract was for reasons which were violative

of his academic freedom” and that it “has seen no con-

vincing evidence that Dr. Skehan would not have been

rehired had he remained silent about campus issues,”

aun ects oa ic detnd Oe ences due

sion, a decision that was upheld by a majority of the

same faculty committee. This lengthy and divisive dis-

covering both substance and procedure of all decisions

affecting faculty status, including dismissal for cause.

We return to a theme sounded previously, that the

courts are hardly the best fora for resolution of academic

disputes. See Trotman v. Board of Trustees of Lincoln

University, 635 F.2d 216, 218-19 (3d Cir. 1980), cert.

denied, 101 S.Ct. 2320 (1981). We continue to hope that

the same spirit of light, of liberty, and of learning which

we believe characterizes places of higher education'®

applies not only to faculty and student learning and re-

search but also to the relations between faculty and

administration.

For the reasons set forth above, the orders of the dis-

trict court denying Skehan’s motion for an award of spe-

cial damages and his motion to enforce the juagment of

July 20, 1977 will be affirmed.

A True Copy:

Teste:

Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

16. See Speech by B. Disraeli, House of Commons (March 11,

1873), reprinted in,.|| Selected Speeches of the Late Right Honorable

the Earl of Beaconsfield 377 (T.E. Kebbell ed. 1882).

27

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Nos. 81-1094 and 81-1299

DR. JOSEPH T. SKEHAN,

Appellant

Vv.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF BLOOMSBURG STATE

COLLEGE, DR. ROBERT NOSSEN, DR.

CHARLES CARLSON, JOHN PITTENGER, Su-

perintendent of Education, Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania, and BLOOMSBURG STATE

COLLEGE,

Appellees

SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING

Present: SEITZ, Chief Judge,

ALDISERT, ADAMS, GIBBONS, ROSENN, HUNTER, WEIS,

GARTH, HIGGINBOTHAM, SLOVITER, and BECKER,

Circuit Judges

The petition for rehearing filed by Appellant, Dr. Jo-

seph T. Skehan, in the above entitled case having been

submitted to the judges who participated in the decision

of this court and to all the other available circuit judges

of the circuit in regular active service, and no judge who

concurred in the decision having asked for rehearing,

and a majority of the circuit judges of the circuit in regu-

lar active service not having voted for rehearing by the

court in banc, the petition for rehearing is denied.

By the Court,

_Dovores K. SLOVITER_

Dated: March 26, 1982 Circuit Judge

28

STATEMENT BY JUDGE ADAMS SUR DENIAL OF

PETITION FOR REHEARING

OR REHEARING EN BANC

Although I vote to deny the petition for rehearing in

this case, I agree that it is unnecessary for this Court to

reach the question whether certain policy statements of

the American Association of University Professors

(AAUP) should be read into Bloomsburg's written policy

regarding dismissal of non-tenured faculty Members.

Such an inquiry would be relevant only in reference to

Skehan's claim chat, before dismissal for cause, he had a

contractual right to the procedures set forth in Article 9

of Bloomsburg’s Statement of Policy for Continuous Em-

ployment and Academic Freedom.

Whatever the merit of that contention, it appears

previously to have been rejected both by this Court, see

590 F.2d at 473 n.1, and by the district court, whose

July, 1977 decision merely required the College “to af-

ford [Skehan] a hearing comporting with due proc-

ess. . . ." 436 F. Supp. at 664. Inasmuch as Skehan did

not appeal that portion of the district court’s July 1977

order, he would appear to be precluded from raising the

issue at this late stage.

When a college has chosen to adopt the policy state-

ments of the AAUP, such statements can serve a valu-

able function in encouraging the internal resolution of

faculty disputes, without the necessity for judicial inter-

ference. Thus, because tie present case does not

squarely and properly raise the issue, | would be reluc-

tant to read the opinion as foreclosing future use of

AAUP statements in interpreting ambiguous college

teaching contracts.

Judge Higginbotham joins in this stat nent.

A True Copy:

Teste:

Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

29

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Nos. 81-1094 and 81-1299

DR. JOSEPH T. SKEHAN,

Appellant

v.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF BLOOMSBURG STATE

COLLEGE, DR. ROBERT NOSSEN, DR.

CHARLES CARLSON, JOHN PITTENGER, Su-

perintendent of Education, Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania, and BLOOMSBURG STATE

COLLEGE,

Appellees

Present: SEITZ, Chief Judge,

ALDISERT, ADAMS, GIBBONS, ROSENN, HUNTER, WEIS,

GARTH, HIGGINBOTHAM, SLOVITER, and BECKER,

Circuit Judges

Filed March 26, 1982

ORDER AMENDING STATEMENT BY JUDGE ADAMS

SuR DENIAL OF PETITION FOR REHEARING

It is ORDERED that the statement by Judge Adams

in the above matt’r be and is hereby amended as

Page 2, first paragraph, first sentence should read:

I vote to deny the petition for rehearing in this case.

I agree, however, with the American Association of

University Professors (AAUP), which filed an

30

amicus brief, that it is unnecessary for this Court to

reach the question whether certain AAUP policy

statements should be read into Bloomsburg’s writ-

ten policy regarding dismissal of non-tenured facul-

ty members.

BY THE COURT:

ARLIN M. ADAMS

Circuit Judge

DATED: April 6, 1982

A True Copy:

Teste:

Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

31

Nos. 81-1094, 81-1299

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE

of the

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY

PROFESSORS

In Support of Petition for Rehearing

INTEREST OF AMICUS

A passage on page 18 of the decision by the Third

Circuit panel in this case, by implying that pclicy

statements of the American Association of University

Professors (AAUP) must be specifically referred to in

institutional regulations in order to have legal

significance, raises fundamental questions about the role

of these documents in judicial review of campus disputes.

This passage also contradicts a growing body of

precedents from federal and state courts throughout the

United States ...

Since its inception the Association has formulated

Statements, frequently in concert with other national

organizations, intended to establish minimum standards

of institutional practice in higher education. Paramount

among these is the 1940 Statement of Principles on

Academic-Freedom and Tenure (1940 Statement), drafted

jointly with the Association of American Colleges (AAC)

AAUP, the American Council on Education, and the

Academic Freedom and Tenure . . . “Redbook” of AAUP

Policy Documents. To a large extent, AAUP standards

32

are recognized as national norms in institutions of higher

education and are relied on by faculties, administrations,

and governing boards. .. . [Delaware State College v.

Ricks, No. 79-939 ( U.S.———-) (1980)]

QUESTION PRESENTED

Should a court, in construing a contract between a

faculty member and a university, disregard AAUP policy

statements not expressly included in an institution’s

governing uocuments?

Argument

This Court Should Not Limit Its Consideration of

AAUP Policies to Those Specifically Mentioned in the

College’s Faculty Handbook.

The decision by this Court, contrary to developing

case law throughout the United States, unnecessarily

narrows judicial consideration of AAUP policy

statements. This paragraph misconstrues the express

meaning of the 1940 Statement, which requires as a

fundamental principle that a nontenured faculty member

dismissed for case during the term of a contract receive

the same procedural protections as a tenured faculty

member. . . .

Commentators and courts have concluded that

AAUP policy statements are useful sources in inter-

preting the contractual relationship between a faculty

member and a university, and, on occasion, are con-

trolling where a different construction would render a

contract illogical. As the Court of Appeals for the District

of Columbia Circuit pointed out while relying on AAUP

standards:

Contracts are written, and are to be read, by reference to the norms

of conduct and expectations founded upon them. This is especially

true of contracts in and among a community of scholars, which is

what a university is. The readings of the market place are not

invariably apt in this non-commercial context. Greene v. Howard

University, 271 F. Supp. 609, 614 (D.D.C. 1967).

See generally Finkin, Regulation by Agreement: The

Case of Private Higher Education, 65 Jowa L. Rev. 1119,

’

33

1145-54 (1980)... Note, The Role of Academic Freedom in

Defining the Faculty Employment Contract, 31 Case

Western Reserve L. Rev. 608, 610-11, 615-37 (1981); Note,

Financial Exigency as Cause for Termination of Tenured

Faculty Members in Private Post Secondary Educational

Institutions, 62 Jowa L. Rev. 481, 508-10 (1976).

Judge Wright’s decision in Browzin v. Catholic

University of America, 527 F.2d 843 (D.D. Cir. 1975),

contains the fullest discussion of the legal significance of

AAUP policy statements. . . . Judge Wright found it

“entirely proper to look to” other AAUP policy

statements, not specifically contained ir. the Faculty

Handbook or the stipvlation, “interpreting the contract

before us.” Id. at 847-48. Judge Wright noted that several

of these AAUP policy statements “form a kind of

legislative history for the 1968 Regulations, and they do

represent widely shared norms within the academic

community, having achieved acceptance by

onganizations which represent teachers as well as

organizations which represent college administrators

contract here could hardly be questioned.” . . . Judge

Wright suggested the proper judicial stance: “Deter-

mining the relevance of each [AAUP document] requires

a sensitive exploration of its impact on the academic

community, assessing whether it represents accepted

norms of conduct or has founded widely shared expec-

tations.” Id. at 848. He also reiterated that the meaning of

the recommended institutional regulations must be

interpreted by reference to their “purpose and history” as

well as to their explicit

Other courts have relied on AAUP policy statements

as guides to interpretation even though these statements

were neither incorporrted nor referred to in the in-

stitution’s faculty handbook. . . . AAUP (Bloomfield

College Chapter) v. Bloomfield College, 322 A.2d 846(N.J.

Super. 1974), aff'd, 346 A.2d615 (App. Div. 1975), the court

reasoned that disregarding the requirements of the

AAUP documents “would render tenure meaningless by

34

allowing the College to serve as the sole judge of its own

behavior.” 322 A.2d at 855... .

Krotkoff v. Goucher College, 585 F.2d 675 (4th Cir.

1978), . . . despite the College’s failure to mention

“financial exigency” in its by-laws as a permissible

ground for termination. The court .. . “contract must be

interpreted consistently with the understanding of the

national academic community about tenure and finan-

cial exigency.” 585 F.2d at 680. At the same time, the

Fourth Circuit rejected . . . the narrow construction of the

1940 Statement . . . based its construction on additional

AAUP documents, including the AAUP-AAC 1925

Conference Statement on Academic Freedom and

Tenure, the AAUP 1976 Recommended Institutional

Regulations on Academic Freedom and Tenure, and

various reports by AAUP investigating committees.

The Supreme Court of Rhode Island .. . relied on

AAUP policy statements to supply “the custom and

usage of the academic community.” Drans v. Providence

College, 383 A.2d 1033, 1038 (1978). . . . the Faculty

Manual at Providence College “made no mention of

retirement for age at a possible ground for the termina-

tion of tenured professors.” Id. at 1036 .. . relied on the

1940 Statement and the AAUP-AAC 1950 Statement on

Retirement as evidence of national norms regarding

academic retirement plans. In both cases, AAUP

documents provided evidence of a common law of the

academic profession, which created implied contractual

conditions allowing colleges rights beyon« the actual

language of their governing documents while assuring

faculty members that these rights must be exercised

within enforceable limitations. See generally Perry v.

Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602 (1972); Steelworkers v.

Warrior & Gulf Co., 363 U.S. 574, 579 (1960). Mabey v.

Reagan, 537 F.2d 1036, 1043 (9th Cir. 1976). Many other

courts have also cited AAUP policy statements as guides

to their legal decisions. See, e.g., Adamian v. Jacobsen,

523 F.2d 929, 934 (9th Cir. 1975) (AAUP Advisory Letter);

Cusumano v. Ratchford, 507 F.2d 980, 986 n.14 (8th Cir.

1974) (AAUP Advisory Letter); Bruce v. Board of Regents,

35

414 F. Supp. 559, 567 n.12 (W.D. Mo. 1976) (Statement of

Principles on Leaves of Absence), Stricklin v. Regents of

the University of Wisconsin, 297 F. Supp. 416, 420 (W.D.

Wis. 1969) (Joint Statement on Rights and Freedoms of

Students); Soglin v. Kauffman, 295 F. Supp. 978, 990

(W.D. Wis. (1968) (Statement on the Acadeniic Freedom of

Students).

Amicus AAUP therefore agrees with petitioner that

documents such as the joint AAUP-AAC 1958 Statement

on Procedural Standards in Faculty Dismissal

Proceedings, designed to supplement the 1940 Statement,

should be considered by this Court in construing the

contract between Dr. Skehan and Bloomsburg State

College. Indeed, the 1940 Statement, which was

specifically. referred to in the Bloomsburg Faculty

Handbook, itself applies the same procedural re-

quirements to “dismissal for cause of a teacher previous

to the expiration of a term appointment” as to “termina-

tion for cause of a continuous appointment.” Slip Opinion

at 18 and n. 11. This language provides a strong basis for

remedying the acknowledged illogic of the Bloomsburg ©

Faculty Handbook, Slip Opinion at 17, by finding that

Article 9 applies to dismissals within term of nontenured

where institutional regulations were silent or ambiguous.

""” Judge Wright’s admonition in Browzin that courts

which new AAUP documents are rooted in normative

policy, the intrinsic persuasiveness of an AAUP docu-

ment, and the fit between an AAUP document and the

36

actual facts of a case are among the factors which should

influence a court. Limiting judicial consideration only to

those AAUP documents that have been specifically

included or referenced in the interns! regulations of a

particulur university, as suggested on page 18 of this

development of policy within the academic community

and encourages the very resort to litigation that this

Court, in the instant case and elsewhere, has eloquently

CONCLUSION

For the reasons expressed in this brief, amicus AAUP

respectfully urges this Court to grant plaintiff's petition

for rehearing in order to revise its construction of the role

of AAUP policy statements and, if necessary, to alter its

judgment.

Respectfully submitted,

David M. Rabban

American Association of University

2 March 1982 Professors

One Dupont Circle, N.W.

Washington, D. C. 20036

Attorney for Amicus Curiae

Of Counsel:

Julius G. Getman

Yale Law School

New Haven, Connecticut 06520

Robert A. Gorman

University of Pennsylvania Law School

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19174

37

SPECIAL DAMAGES

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOSEPH T. SKEHAN,

Plaintiff

vs.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF

BLOOMSBURG STATE COLLEGE,

et al.,

Defendants

: Civil No. 72-644

: (Judge Muir)

ORDER

November 24, 1980

THE BACKGROUND OF THIS ORDER IS AS

FOLLOWS: .

On September 8, 1980, the Plaintiff filed a motion,

accompanied by a brief, for an award of special damages.

The Defendants filed a brief in opposition to the motion

on September 23, 1980. Plainfiff was afforded an

extension to October 21, 1980 in which to file a brief in

reply but chose not to do so. For the reasons that follow,

the Plaintiff's motion will be denied.

Plaintiff's motion argues that the case of Gibson vs.

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Pa. , 415

A.2d 80 (1980), constitutes a change in the law warran-

ting a reexamination of the conclusion by this Court and

the Court of Appeals that Skehan’s claims for damages

against the Bloomsburg State College are barred by the

38

Eleventh Amendment. Gibson held that the Act of 1978-

152, creating by statute sovereign immunity for the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and its agencies,

cannot be applied to bar actions that had accrued as of its

effective date.

Under Gibson Skehan’s claims against the

Bloomsburg State College may be cognizable in a state

court. The fact that Pennsylvania may not be able to

assert its sovereign immunity in state court does not

remove the bar of the Eleventh Amendment to the

exercise of this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction over

Skehan’s claims for damages against Bloomsburg State

College. The jurisdictional limitation of the Eleventh

Amendment applies even if Pennsylvania enjoys no

sovereign immunity under state law. Consequently, the

intervening change in Pennsylvania law does not remove

the bar of the Eleventh Amendment.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED THAT:

Plaintiff's motion for an award of special damages is

denied.

MUIR, U.S. District Judge

ENFORCEMENT OF THE JUDGEMENT

OPINION

MUIR, District Judge.

On September 8, 1980 Plaintiff filed a motion to

enforce the Court’s judgment of July 20, 1977 accom-

panied by a brief, affidavit, and exhibits. The Defendants

filed a brief in opposition to the motion on October 1, 1980

and the Plaintiff filed a reply brief on October 23, 1980.

el wa aut ae bi Plaintiff's motion will be

The Court’s Order of July 20, 1977 set forth certain

procedures to be followed in this case. Specifically,

39

re 2 ne ree

A pretermination hearing may, at the option of the President

op Gaseaainnn Gants Cotene te Gale eit o> dame adur Ge

Board of Trustees determines whether or not to renew Skehan’s

employment contract or within 30 days after another final

decision has been reached on the question of renewal or non-

renewal, whichever shall first occur.

12. If no pretermination hearing is conducted within. the time

:

,

:

|

40

Fourteenth Amendment. The Court’s review of the

undisputed facts in this case indicates that the Defen-

dants have done so.

Due process required that the Plaintiff have an

opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a

meaningful manner. Mathews vs. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,

333 (1976). “{T he function of the hearing procedure is to

inform the professor of the grounds for his non-retention

decisions, it satisfies due process.” Chung vs. Park, 514

F.2d 382, 387 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 948 (1975).

The exhibits attached to Plaintiff's affidavit disclose

thai he received written notice of the grounds for

termination. Exhibit 8 to that affidavit is a letter dated

of whom served on the Committee of Professional Affairs

which had concluded that the decision not to renew Dr.

Skehan’s contract was for reasons violative of

41

President. The President will then make the decision on

and what procedural righte he would have. These rights

comport with the requirements of due process. Plaintiff

chose not to participate in the termination hearing

proceedings.

Plaintiff's reply brief argues that he would have

waived his due process claims had he participated in the

termination hearings and cites in support of that

argument Chung vs. Park, 514 F.2d 382 (3d Cir.), cert.

denied, 423 U.S. 948 (1975). The Court has reviewed

Chung and it does not support Plaintiff's argument. That

case held that a person in Plaintiff's position may waive

certain procedural rights by agreeing to others. It does

not hold that the participation in a hearing, without

more, constitutes a waiver of procedural due process.

~ Saatetllt oftatte Ghat te cunien » enw of @e

termination committee’s findings of fact a | ‘ecommen-

dation dated April 10, 1978 shortly after that date. That

report is attached as Exhibit 14 to the Plaintiffs

affidavit. That statement adequately sets forth the

findings of the hearing body. That witnesses were not

placed under oath and that no stenographic record was

kept of the proceedings do not amount to a denial of due

process. Plaintiff's counsel was provided with a tape of

the proceedings and was able to file post hearing briefs.

Plaintiff appears to argue that the fact that different

members of the Attorney General’s Office served in

various capacities to the President of Bloomsburg State

College, the hearing committee, and also served as the

presentor of the charges against Skehan violates due

process. Plaintiff has submitted nothing to indicate that

the three individuals involved in any way influenced the

decision of the hearing cominittee. The fact that all were

employed by the same agency is not sufficient. Moreover,

it is undisputed that the role of the Assistant Attorney

General advising the committee was merely to advise it

on procedural and evidentiary matters subject at all times

to being overruled by the Committee. Moreover, af-

42

fidavits submitted by the Committee’s counsel explain in

detail his actions and show no basis to conclude that

Plaintiff's due process rights were not respected. See

Woodland Nursing Home Corp. vs. Weinberger, 411

F.Supp. 501, 504 (S.D. N.Y. 1976).

Plaintiffs contention that the hearing did not

comply with various state laws relating to the conduct of

hearings and meetings fails to show a violation of due

process. Whether Plaintiff has a right under those laws

which may be enforceable in state court is a matter not

before the Court. Finally, the Court notes that although

Skehan was finally terminated on June 2, 1978, he did not

seek any relief from this Court with respect to the

termination proceedings until the motion to enforce

judgment was filed on September 8, 1980.

Based upon the Court’s view of the undisputed facts

in relation to the termination hearing the Court concludes

that Defendants have complied with the Court’s order of

July 20, 1977 and provided Plaintiff with a hearing that

comported with the requirements of the Fourteenth

Amendment. Consequently, Plaintiff's motion to enforce

judgment will be denied.

An appropriate order will be entered.

MUIR, U.S. District Judge

DATED: December 5, 1980

MOTION TO ALTER/ AMEND

ORDER

February 3, 1981

THE BACKGROUND OF THIS ORDER IS AS

FOLLOWS:

On December 15, 1980 Plaintiff filed a motion to alter

or amend the Court’s order of December 5, 1980 that

denied Plaintiff's motion to enforce the Court’s judgment

of July 20, 1977. A supporting brief was filed on December

the proceedings that were held to comply with due

process. The Court adheres to its position that the

undisputed facts of record show that due process has been

afforded Plaintiff.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED TiIAT:

Plaintiff's motion to alter or amend the Court’s order

of December 5, 1980 is denied.

MUIR, U.S. District Judge

44

No. 78-1719 Denial of Certiorari

No. 78-1719. Joseph T. Skehan, petitioner, v Board of

Trustees of Bloomsburg State College et al.

444 US 832, 62 L Ed 2d 41, 100 S Ct 61.

October 1, 1979. Petition for writ of certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

%

Statement of Questions Presented for Review

1. In damages suits against state bodies under Title 42

U.S.C. § 1983, should federal Courts decide independently

whether such bodies are “persons” able to be sued or should

they accept holdings of state Courts that such bodies are agen-

cies of the state for which it claims sovereign immunity?

2. Are siate colleges or their boards of trustees “persons”

under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983?

3. Was it settled constitutional law before this Court's

decision in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), that

a public college professor's liberty and property interests in a

written contraci providing for specific hearings before non-

renewal, suspension and dismissal, were protected by the due

process clause?

4. Is a college official who denies due process hearings

before termination of employment, required by contract and

the due process clause, immune from suit under Wood v.

Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975), simply because the contract is

~~t adjudicated by a Court before the denial of the hearings?

44a

5. Does Pennsylvania Act No. 1978-152 (House Bill No.

2437) claim sovereign immunity from a claim for damages un-

der Title 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in light of the historic state remedy

of mandamus and the incorporation of state remedies into

§ 1988?

6. May a state annul a vested right of action by one of its

citizens against it by enacting sovereign immunity with

retroactive effect? May it do so with the assistance of the

State’s attorney, who is opposing the citizen in court, but

without notice to the citizen or opportunity for him to be

heard?

7. Where a college faculty member alleges that he was not

renewed and was suspended and dismissed on account of

protected speech and in violation of his right to hearings by

faculty consmittees on the reasons for these actions, should a

federal Court stay its hand until these academic procedures

are completed?

8. Can a subsidiary governmental unit waive a defense of

sovereign immunity by not raising it in the trial Court?

9. Where a defendant is permitted to raise sovereign im-

munity for the first time on plaintiff's appeal, should a piain-

tiff be given the right to amend his complaint and introduce

new evidence on remand?

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For ras Tuarap Crmovir

Nos. 77-2311 and 77-2312

DR. JOSEPH T. SKEHAN

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF BLOOMSBURG STATE

COLLEGE and DR. ROBERT NOSSEN and DR.

CHARLES CARLSON and JOHN PITTENGER, Sx-

perintendent of Education, Commonwealth of Pennsyl-

vania and BLOOMSBURG STATE COLLEGE.

DR. JOSEPH T. SKEHAN,

Appellant in No. 77-2311,

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF BLOOMSBURG

STATE COLLEGE and DR. ROBERT NOSSEN

and DR. CHARLES CARLSON and JOHN PIT-

TENGER, Superintendent of Education, Common -

wealth of Pennsylvania and BLOOMSBURG

STATE COLLEGE,

Appellants in No. 77-3819.

Ow Appma, From ros Unrrep Srares Disrarcr Court

ror THe Miopiz Dwraicr or Panwsyivaniu

(Civ. No. 72-644, M.D. Pa.)

Argued September 29, 1978

Before Surrz, Chief Judge, Hunan, Circwit Judge, and

Lacer*, District Judge.

(Opinion filed December 21, 1978)

of eT Le United States District Court Judge

for

46

Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

Cletus P. Lyman, Esquire

Richard A. Ash, Esquire

Lyman & Ash

Philadelphia, Pa. 19103

Larry Glass, Esquire

Philadelphia, Pa. 19128

Attorneys for Appellant

in No. 77-2311

Howard M. Levinson

Deputy Attorney General

J. Justin Blewitt, Jr.

Deputy Attorney General

Director, Office of Civil Law

Gerald Gornish

Acting Attorney General

Department of Justice

Harrisburg, Pa. 17120

Attorneys for Appellants

in No, 77-2312

OPINION OF THE. COURT

Surrz, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff, Dr. Joseph T. Skehan (appellant in No. 77-

2311), appeals from the following aspects of a final judg-

ment entered by the district court, embodied in three sep-

arate orders and opinions: 1) a denial of Skehan’s motion

for judgment in his behalf on a claim that his contract as a

faculty member of Bloomsburg State College was not re-

newed beyond the 1970-71 academic year for reasons viola-

tive of the first amendment ; 2) a denial of Skehan’s request

for en award of monetary damages from either the College

or the individual defendants as a remedy for the defend-

47

Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

ants’ violation of his due process rights with respect to

both his nonrenewal and his later dismissal from the Col-

lege faculty; 3) a denial of Skehan’s request that he be

awarded equitable relief in the nature of full rei~statement

to the College faculty as a remedy for the defendants’

violations of his constitutional rights; and 4) a denial of

Skehan’s claim for attorney’s fees and expenses.

Defendants, Bloomsburg State College, its Board of

Trustees, Dr. Robert Nossen (President of the College dur-

ing the period in which the events culminating in this law-

suit transpired), Dr. Charles Carlson (acting President of

the College at the time Skehan filed his complaint) and

John Pittenger (Pennsylvania Superintendent of Educa-

tion) (appellants in No. 77-2312), cross-appeal from that

aspect of the district court’s judgment finding that Skehan

was contractually entitled to an ‘‘academic freedom’’ hear-

ing following his nonrenewal and that their failure to pro-

vide him with such a hearing violated his rights under the

due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.

Factual Background

The history of this litigation over the course of the

Professor of Economics at Bloomsburg State College in

48

Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

On September 21, 1970, Skehan wrote Nossen a letter

invoking Article 5e of the Statement of Policy for Con-

tinuous Employment and Academic Freedom at Blooms-

burg State College [hereinafter Article 5e]. In that letter

he alleged that the decision not to reappoint him after

1970-71 had been caused by considerations violative of his

academic freedom.' Nossen did not refer Skehan’s letter

to the Committee on Professional Affairs, the College body

charged with initiating proceedings under Article 5e to re-

solve such allegations, nor did Skehan take any further

action to secure an Articie 5e hearing.

Contemporaneous with his invocation of Article 5e, Dr.

Skehan became embroiled in a dispute between the eco-

nomics department and the College’s administration con-

cerning the scheduling of classes. During that dispute

Skehan was warned that his failure to teach his classes as

scheduled by the College would result in the taking of im-

mediate and direct administrative action against him. On

or about October 1, 1970, Dr. Skehan was observed teaching

a course not assigned to him, and on October 9 Dr. Nossen

notified Skehan that he was relieved of all classroom re-

sponsibilities pending a final hearing. Nossen’s letter of

October 9 also demanded of Skehan a ‘‘full and complete

accountability’’ of his actions on campus since the start of

the semester. When Skehan failed to comply with this

1. The Statement of iy Se Continuous Employment and

49

Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

demand, Dr. Nossen informed him that, effective October

17, 1970, he was removed from the College’s payroll, sub-

ject to final approval by the Board of Trustees. That ap-

proval was obtained at the Board’s regularly scheduled

meeting of October 23, 1970.

Skehan filed a complaint in district court on October

10, 1972. He alleged that his suspension and ultimate dis-

missal in the Fall of 1970 were in retaliation for his active

role in campus political issues, and hence were violative of

his rights under the first amendment. He also alleged that

the defendants suspended and dismissed him without com-

plying with the applicable College laws and regulations

governing faculty status, thereby depriving him of that

due process of law guaranteed by the fourteenth amend-

ment. He requested preliminary and permanent injunctive

relief in the nature of reinstatement and an award of at-

torney’s fees.

The district court held a hearing on Skehan’s request

for a preliminary injunction on January 11 and 12, 1973.

Preliminary injunctive relief was denied in an opinion and

order dated January 31, 1973. Skehan v. Board of Trustees

of Bloomsburg State College, 353 F. Supp. 542 (M.D. Pa.

1973). Subsequently, the parties stipulated that a final

hearing could be held on the record developed at the pre-

its opinion on the merits on May 9, 1973. Skehan v. Board

of Trustees of Bloomsburg State College, 358 F. Supp. 430

(M.D. Pa. 1973).

In that opinion, the district court held that Skehan’s

dismissal from the faculty had been a result of his actions

during the scheduling dispute. Thus, his dismissal was

found not to have been violative of the first amendment.

However, the district court did find that Skehan’s dismissal

during the term of his contract entitled him, under the due

process clause, to a prior hearing on the grounds of his

dismissal, and that such a hearing had not been afforded

Skehan by the College.

50

Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

On appeal this Court affirmed both findings with re-

spect to Skehan’s dismissal, but noted that Skehan had also

challenged the constitutionality of the Board of Trustees’

decision not to renew his contract beyond 1970-71. Thus,

this case was remanded to the district court for findings on

the questions whether the nonrenewal decision had been

motivated by the College administration’s disagreement

with Skehan’s stands on campus issues and whether

Article 5e had contractually entitled Skehan to a hearing

on the reasons for his nonrenewal. This Court also directed

the district court to consider whether the College shared in

the sovereign immunity of the Commonwealth of Penn-

sylvania so that it would be immune under the eleventh

amendment from Skehan’s claim for damages. We held

that the individual defendants were entitled to absolute

immunity from damages as executive officials exercising

discretionary governmental functions, and indicated that

Skehan might be entitled to an award of attorney’s fees

from the College as a private attorney general vindicating

a public interest. Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Blooms-

burg State College, 501 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1974).

Trial on the issues remanded to the district court was

postponed while Skehan’s petition for writ of certiorari to

the Supreme Court was pending. On May 27, 1975, the

Supreme Court granted his writ, vacated the judgment of

this Court, and remanded the case ‘‘for further considera-

tion in light of Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness

Society, (421 U.S. 240 (1975)], and Wood v. Strickland,

420 U.S. 308 (1975).’’ 421 U.S. 983 (1975). This Court

reviewed the ca * en banc on remand from the Supreme

Court, and addressed itself to three issues respecting the

. relief to which Skehan might be entitled for the defendants’

actions in bringing about his nonrenewal and termination.

Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State College,

538 F.2d 53 (3d Cir. 1976).

First, we noted that Alyeska had overruled the cases

upon which this Court had earlier relied in determining

51

Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

that Skehan, as a ‘‘private attorney general,’’ was entitled

to an award of attorney’s fees. Thus, the attorney’s fees

aspect of the case was remanded to the district court for

findings on pre-litigation obduracy, and for consideration

of an award of fees based on the defendants’ future main-

tenance of this litigation in bad faith. This Court held that

only the latter ground could be the basis of a fee award

against the College given that it was a staie agency for

which the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania claimed sov-

ereign immunity. 538 F.2d at 55-59.

Second, we noted that the Supreme Court had demon-

strated in Wood v. Strickland that this Court’s earlier

holding that the individual defendants were absolutely im-

mune from liability as nonjudicial government officials

performing adjudicatory functions was inappropriate.

Thus, the question of official immunity was remanded to

the district court for findings of fact with respect to the

immunity of each defendant under the test articulated by

the Supreme Court in Wood. Id. 59-62.

Finally, this Court stated that an intervening decision

of the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, Brungard v.

Hartman, 12 Pa. Commw. Ct. 477, 315 A.2d 913 (1974),

holding that state colleges are agencies for which Penn-

sylvania claims sovereign immunity, was dispositive of the

eleventh amendment issue concerning the College’s liability

for damages. Thus, we held that a back pay award could

not be made out of the College’s treasury, and that an

award of attorney’s fees against the College could only be

based on the exception to the American rule for the main-

tenance of litigation in bad faith. 538 F.2d at 62.

In conclusion, this Court reiterated that on remand

the district court was to make findings of fact on th.

nature of the interest created by Article 5e and on whether

the decision not to renew Skehan’s contract beyond 1970-71

lad been impermissibly based on his stands on campus

issues. The Supreme Court denied defendants’ petition

for a writ of certiorari on November 29, 1976. 429 U.S.

979 (1976).

52

Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

It is with this background in mind that we turn to the

parties’ challenges to the district court’s disposition of the

issues remanded to it by this Court.

I. Tas FPmst Amenpment Cram

The district court issued its first opinion after remand

on plaintiff’s and defendants’ cross-motions for judgment

on Skehan’s claim that the decision not to reappoint him

after 1970-71 was for reasons violative of the first amend-

ment. Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State

College, No. 72-644 (M.D. Pa., filed March 24, 1977) (un-

Before meeting those contentions we must address the

did :

renewal decision, and that the question whether that de-

cision was violative of the first amendment was litigated

by the parties at the preliminary injunction hearing held

in January, 1973. In fact, the district court decided n.. to

take additional testimony on the first amendment non-

renewal issue after remand precisely because the parties

had had a full opportunity to pr sent all evidence concern-

ing the reasons which may have motivated the Board’s

decision not to renew Skehan’s contract at that earlier

53

Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

hearing. See Part 1,B infra. Moreover, this Court’s

en banc opinion remanding the first amendment issue to

the district court represents the ‘‘law of the case’’ with

respect to that aspect of Skehan’s claim. We are bound

by the earlier determination of this Court, and thus reject

defendants’ argument, raised at this late date, that the

not have been remanded to the district court.

Part ILA infra.

A. Statute of Limitations

The district court found that Skehan’s nonrenewal

im stated a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Be-

cause § 1983 does not contain its own statute of limitations,

the court turned to Pennsylvania law to determine the pe-

riod of limitations applicable to the most analogous state

law claim. The court held that the six year statute of lim-

itations established by the Act of March 27, 1713, 1 Sm. L.

76, §1, 12 P.S. $31, governed Skehan’s claim, as it gov-

erned the state law claim the court found to be most anal-

ogous to it, namely a claim of wrongful interference with

an employment contract. Defendants argue that thy court

erred in holding the six year period of limitations appli-

cable to Skehan’s claim, contending that the two year period

of limitations established for personal injury actions in the

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55

Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

for bodily injury whereas [plaintiff's] claim is for tortious

interference with his right to contract for the purchase of

a house.’’ Id. (footnote omitted).

In Davis r. Uuited States Steel Supply, 581 F.2d 335

(3d Cir. 1978), this Court reversed a district court decision,

relied upon by the defendants here, that had held the two

year period of limitations in 12 P.S. § 34 applicable to a

cause of action challenging racially Jiscriminatory ew-

ployment practices brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

Relying on Meyers, supra, the Davis Court noted that § 34

is applicable only to actions seeking damages for bodily

injury. 581 F.2d at 339. The Court held that the plain-

tiff’s cause of action in Davis, alleging ‘‘an unlawful

interference with another’s economic rights or in "

Id. 339 (footnote omitted) (emphasis supplied).

The district court properly noted that Skehan’s claim,

mination that 12 P.S. § 31 provides the applicable statute

of limitations for Skehan’s claim, we also rely on the fact

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Opinion of the Third Circuit Court uf Appeals.

issue; was unjust given thet the court applied a test to

the merits of the claim that had been formulated by the

Supreme Court in 1977; was inconsistent with the court’s

decision to allow additional testimony on the defendants’

official immunity defense; caused the court to decide the

issue on a stale record; was inconsistent with the court’s

earlier orders respecting pre-trial discovery; and pre-

vented plaintiff from -producing a great quantity of

It is clear that ‘‘[gJenerally, whether a trial court will

reopen a case to take more testimony is discretionary with

that court.’’ Rochez Brothers, Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d

891, 894 n.6 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 993

(1976). see Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,

401 U.S. 321, 331 (1971). The contention that Skehan

presses most vigorously in arguing that the trial court

abused that discretion in this instance is that by not taking

57

Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

additional testimony on the first amendment claim the dis-

trict court failed to comply with the mandate of this Court

to make findings of fact on the causes of Skehan’s nonre-

newal. To the contrary, however, neither opinion of this

Court specifically instructed the district court to take

further evidence on any issue remanded to it for findings

of fact. In fact, we feel that there was an assumption im-

plicit in those opinions that the trial court need not reopen

the record of this case for further testimony on the first

amendment issue in order to make the required findings.

This Court was fully aware that the parties had stipu-

lated that the district court could hold a final hearing on

the record developed at the preliminary injunction hearing

in January, 1973. See 501 F.2d at 37. Yet, it was only with

respect to the issue of the individual defendants’ official

immunity that this Court indicated that the record might

court in the first instance. See 538 F.2d at 62. Thus, con-

trary to Skehan’s contention that the trial court’s jeriz/

of his motion to take additional testimony was inconsistent

need to reopen the record to the sound discretion of the

trial court. See Rochee Brothers, supra at 894 (failure

Our seope of review on this question is quite limited.

As Professor Moore has stated:

A district court, then, should consider a motion

to take additional testimony in light of all the surround-

ing circumstances and grant or deny it in the interest

of fairness and substantial justice.... [T]he grant

or denial involves an exercise of discretion by the trial

court; and because this court has a feel for the case

58

Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

that an appellate court can seldom have, the trial

OS Ses Sian So SENSES Gy ah Oe

where abuse is clearly shown.

6A Moore’s Federal Practice 159.04 [13] at 36-37 (2d ed.

1974) (footnotes omitted). In Rochez Brothers, supra at

894 n.6, this Court stated that the district court should be

concerned with several factors in deciding whether to re-

open a case, including the burden which would be placed on

the parties and their witnesses, undue prejudice which

might result by a refusal to take new testimony, and con-

siderations of judicial economy.

The district court was clearly concerned with the

burdens placed on the parties and the court system by the

failure of that system to dispose of the dispute in this case

promptly and fairly. That theme is prominent throughout

the court’s numerous pre-trial orders attempting to bring

the parties into court for resolution of the issues remanded

by this Court. Following a final pre-trial conference on

December 1, 1976, the court directed that the parties file

motions for the taking of such additional testimony on those

issues as they deemed advisable. In spite of Skehan’s con-

tention to the contrary, we do not find that the district court

in prior orders had indicated to the parties that there

would be further testimony taken on the first amendment

issue. In its order of January 10, 1977, the court, after

considering all the points raised here by Skehan, save one

that is discussed below; denied his motion to reopen the

record on the first amendment nonrenewal claim. The

court relied on the fact that Skehan had had a full op-

portunity to present evidence on the defendants’ motivation

in declining to renew his contract beyond 1970-71 at the

preliminary injunction hearing; any responsibility for in-

adequacies in that presentation was deemed to rest with

Skehan. Furthermore, the court determined that the real

thrust of Skehan’s request wes to insure that he would

have an opportunity to rebut any evidence offered by the

defendants on the question of their official immanity from

59

Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

an award of damages arising from the alleged first amend-

ment violation. The court offered Skehan the opportunity

to present such rebuttal evidence if the issue of official i im-

munity from liability were to arise.

We believe that the concerns raisca here by Skehan,

and rejected by the distrivi court, do not compel a conclu-

sion that the trial court abused its discretion in denying

his motion to take additional testimony on the first amend-

ment nonrenewal claim. This is not one of the exceptional

cases envisioned in Rochez Brothers, supra at 894-95, in

which a party failed to put into evidence all the necessary

elements of his claim because of a misunderstanding among

the parties and the trial court; nor was the trial court un-

able to make findings of fact on the nonrenewal claim with-

out the proffered testimony. See Pittsburgh Press Club v.

United States, 426 F. Supp. 553, 554 (W.D. Pa. 1977), aff’d

in relevant part, 579 F.2d 751, 755 (3d Cir. 1978). Rather,

as Skehan concedes, at the time of the preliminary injunc-

tion hearing, the district court and the parties probably

considered the question of the College’s motivation in its

nonrenewal of Skehan to be merged with the first amend-

ment challenge to his dismissal. Thus, Skehan did present

evidence with respect to his first amendment activities, and

the College’s reaction to them, relevant to the whole period

of his employment by the College. The district court in

no way hindered him from offering proof that the nonre-

newal decision was motivated by his engaging in conduct

protected by the first amendment. Skehan’s counsel made

a tactical judgment to rest on the record made at the pre-

liminary injunction hearing and, based on that record, the

district court was able to detail Skehan’s campus activism

prior to the nonrenewal decision in the Spring of 1970 in

twelve findings of fact contained in its opinion on the

merits of the first amendment claim, discussed below.

Skehan has presented one contention for the considera-

tion of this Court that, of necessity, he did not present to

the district court prior to its order of January 10, 1977.

60

Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

That contention is that the district court should have re-

versed its order denying his motion to present additional

testimony on the first amendment issue when it became

aware of the change in the law represented by the decision

of the Supreme Court in Mt. Healthy City School District

Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). The

Mt. Healthy decision was issued by the Supreme Court on

January 11, 1977, one day after the district court’s order

denying Skehan’s motion, but prior to the court’s ruling

on the merits of the first amendment claim on March 24,

1977, in which it relied on the test of causation formulated

in Mt. Healthy.

Skehan is correct in his assertion that a change in legal

standards may warrant the reopening of a case where addi-

tional testimony would be pertinent to the change of law.

See 6A Moore’s Federal Practice § 59.04[13] at 36 (2d ed.

1974). In fact, the district court relied on this ground in

deciding to grant the defendants’ request to take additional

testimony on the official immunity defense. However, we

believe that the Mt. Healthy decision did not reflect a ~

change in the law that would warrant the district court’s

reopening of the record in this case to allow Skehan to

present additional testimony on his claim that the defend-

ants’ decision not to reappoint him beyond 1970-71 violated

the first amendment.

Mt. Healthy did not substantially affect the affirmatjve

burden of a plaintiff in Skehan’s position to show by. a

preponderance of the evidence that his first amendment

activities were a substantial or motivating factor in an

adverse employment decision. The standard ‘of proof

adopted in Mt. Healthy is, if anything, more stringent than

the standard applied by the district court in its ruling in

1973 that Skehan had failed to prove he had been termi-

nated for reasons violative of the first amendment, 358 F.

Supp. at 434—a ruling affirmed by this Court, 501 F.2d at

39. To the extent the Mt. Healthy Court adopted a ‘‘new”’

formulation of the test of causation for claims alleging dis-

61

Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

missal from public employment for reasons violative of the

first amendment, the ‘‘new’’ aspect of that formulation was

the Court’s holding that the defendants in such a case must

be afforded an opportunity to rebut a prima facie case of

impermissible motivation by showing by a preponderance

of the evidence that they would have reached the same de-

cision even in the absence of the constitutionally protected

conduct of plaintiff. 429 U.S. at 284-87. Because Skehan

was permitted to adduce all testimony relevant to his first

amendment nonrenewal claim at the preliminary injunction

hearing, and because no evidence pertinent to his affirma-

tive case after Mt. Healthy would not have been equally

pertinent then, we cannot say that Skehan was prejudiced

-by the court’s application of a ‘‘new’’ legal standard to

his first amendment claim.

We conclude that it was not an abuse of discretion for

the district court to have declined to reopen that aspect of

the record of this case dealing with Skehan’s claim that

the College’s decision not to renew his appointment beyond

1970-71 violated the first amendment.

C. The Merits of the First Amendment Claim

The district court found that the evidence adduced by

Skehan at the preliminary injunction hearing failed to

establish by a preponderance of the evidence that his con-

stitutionally protected conduct was a ‘‘substantial’’ or

**motivating’’ factor in the decision of the Board of Trus-

tees to offer him a terminal contract for the 1970-71 aca-

demic year. See Mt. Healthy, supra at 287. Furthermore,

the court went on to find that even if Skehan had met that

initial burden, the defendants had shown by a preponder-

ance of the evidence that Skehan’s contract would not have

been renewed beyond that year even if he had not spoker

out on campus issues. See id. Having concluded that the

court’s findings on Skehan’s failure to meet his initial

burden of proof are not clearly erroneous, we affirm the

court’s judgment on the first amendment nonrenewal issue.

62

Opinion of the Third Circuit Cour: of Appeals.

The district court found as a fact that ‘‘Dr. Skehan

assumed an activist position on many of the issues raised

in the campus community, a position often grating to the

administration of Bloomsburg State College.’’ However,

the court also found:

There is no evidence on the record to establish that the

Board of Trustees based their decision not to renew

Skehan’s contract on his criticism of administrative

policies or his comments on campus issues. Skehan

has shown only that after he spoke out on campus

issues his contract was not renewed. No evidence es-

tablisbing a relationship or nexus between the two

events has been presented.

Unpublished opinion of March 24, 1977, at 14.

Skehan argues that the district court’s finding that

there was no evidence connecting the College’s nonrenewal

decision with his first amendment activities should be set

aside as clearly erroneous. He relies on the following

passage from Dr. Nossen’s letter to him, dated October 9,

1970, informing him that he was being relieved of class-

room responsibilities for his actions during tbe scheduling

dispute, as proof of the nexus the district court found

lacking :

I hardly need remind you that you are, during this

current year, on terminal appointment. You were, at

the time that appointment was offered, advised that

your previous disruptive activities made your presence

on this campus unwelcome, and the hope was expressed

that you would not accept. [emphasis supplied].

Skehan contends that those ‘‘previous disruptive activi-

ties’? must have been a reference to activities protected by

the first amendment and that the foregoing passage proves

that the College’s nonrenewal decision was substantially

motivated by considerations violative of the Constitution.

63

Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

The district court found, however, that the phrase could

have been a reference to Skehan’s refusal to meet his

classes at the appointed times. There was testimony intro-

duced at the preliminary injunction hearing by Skehan’s

department chairman that prior to Skehan’s nonrenewal

he had arranged, without approval and contrary to past

instructions, to have other faculty members take charge of

his classes.

It is also possible that the ‘‘disruptive activities’’

referred to by Dr. Nossen in his letter of October 9 were

the same activities he mentioned in an earlier letter of

June 15, 1970, admitted into evidence at the preliminary

injunction hearing as defendants’ exhibit 12. In that

letter, reaffirming the Board of Trustees’ determination

that Skehan’s appointment for the 1970-71 academic year

was to be a terminal contract, Dr. Nossen stated:

The Board members have expressed deep concern

over your continued failure to cooperate with your

Department Chairman, to meet established depart-

mental deadlines, and to contribute to constructive

departmental operation. Your Chairman has, in

desperation, requested that you no longer attend de-

partmental meetings and that you report, should you

return for 1970-71, to the Dean of Instruction rather

than to him.

Whatever the true meaning of the phrase ‘‘disruptive

activities’ in the October 9 letter might be, we can find

no error in the district court’s determination that Skehan

failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that

Dr. Nossen acted to prevent the renewal of Skehan’s con-

tract because of his disagreement with Skehan’s avowed

positions on campus issues. Moreover, there is no evi-

dence that the members of the Board of Trustees were

even aware of Skehan’s first amendment activities at the

time they approved the decision not to renew his contract.

Such a failure of proof requires that we credit the district

64

Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appea's.

court’s evaluation of the testimony and affirm, as not

clearly erroneous, its finding of fact that ‘‘Skehan’s criti-

cism and disagreement with the administration, specifically

Dr. Nossen and the Board of Trustees . . . concerning cer-

tain campus issues . . . was not a motivating or substantial

factor in the decision not to renew his contract of employ-

ment beyond the 1970-1971 year.’’ Unpublished opinion

of March 24, 1977, at 7. See Franklin v. Atkins, 562 F.2d

1188, 1192 (10th Cir. 1977) ; cf. Mazaleski v. Treusdell, 562

F.2d 701, 716 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Mt. Healthy requires that

a dismissed public employee’s first amendment claim be

supported by more than post hoc ergo propter hoc allega-

tions).

Having considered all of Skehan’s arguments perti-

nent to this aspect of his appeal, we concur in the con-

clusion of the district court that Skehan did not establish

that his first amendment activities were a substantial or

motivating factor in the College's decision not to renew

his contract beyond 1970-71. We need not review the

district court’s determination that, even if Skehan had

established a prima facie case of a first amendment viola-

tion, the defendants proved by a preponderance of the

evidence that he would have been offered a terminal con-

tract based on reasons independent of his constitutionally

protected conduct.

Il. Tae Arrtiote 5e Procepura, Dus Process Ciam

On April 14 and 15, 1977, the district court heard

testimony without a jury concerning, inter alia, the nature

of the interest created by Article 5e of the College’s State-

ment of Policy for Continuous Employment and Academic

Freedom, and whether Skehan’s right to a hearing under

Article 5e had been violated by defendant Nossen’s failure

to institute the proceedings called for by that provision

upon receipt of Skehan’s letter of September 21, 1970.

yx. an opinion issued on May 18, 1977, the district court

held that Skehan possessed a contractual right to the

65

Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

procedures set forth in Article 5e, that he had invoked

that right within a reasonable time, and that the College’s

failure te afford Skehan those procedures violated the

due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Skehan

v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State College, 431

F. Supp. 1379, 1391 (M.D. Pa. 1977).

The defendants’ cross-appeal raises two challenges to

that holding: first, they assert that the district court

should not have considered the Article 5e claim, even

though this Court had specifically instructed that it do so,

because the claim was never raised by Skehan at any stage

of this litigatio.:; second, they contend that Skehan did

not have a contractual right to the procedures set forth

in Article 5e because the College’s Statement of Policy

was not a contract supported by consideration nor one

whose obligations were set forth with sufficient certainty,

because it had not been practical for the College to adhere

to those procedures in Skehan’s case, because Skehan’s

behavior during the scheduling dispute had discharged the

College’s obligation to provide him with an Article 5e

hearing and because Skehan’s letter to President Nossen

was not a proper invocation of Article 5e. If we reverse

the district court’s finding that Skehan was contractually

entitled to the procedures set forth in Article 5e, the

defendants rightly conclude that Skehan would have no

property interest in those procedures rising ‘‘to the level

of a ‘legitimate claim of entitlement’ protected by the

Due Process Clause.’’ Memphis Light, Gas &@ Water

Division v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978).

A. Skehan’s Alleged Failure to Raise the Article 5e Claim

The defendants argue that the district court’s holding

in Skehan’s favor on the procedural due process claim

should be reversed because it was error for the court to

have addressed that issue in the first instance. The dis-

trict court noted in its opinion on this issue that the Article

5e claim was never set forth in Skehan’s complaint, never

66

Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

, 1382. The court also stated its view that

Skehan’s failure to raise the claim in his complaint ran

afoul of the requirement that facts be pleaded with spec-

ificity in civil rights actions, and that the ‘‘creation’’ of

the issue by this Court was inconsistent with our juris-

prudential system. Jd. Nonetheless, the court felt itself

bound by the directions of this Court to fully consider the

issue as though it had been initially raised by Skehan in

his complaint.

Defendants rely on the foregoing observations of the

injunction hearing, we decline to accept the validity of the

district court’s observations. Moreover, in the unanimous

panel opinion of this Court entered on May 3, 1974, we

stated that Skehan had presented a due process claim based

on the College’s failure to provide him with an Article 5e

hearing and that the district court had failed to make find-

ings of fact on that claim. 501 F.2d at 38. Thus, this

Court remanded the case to the district court for findings

‘*as to the nature of the interest created under Pennsyl-

vania law by article 5(e) of the Statement of Policy for

.Continuous Employment and Academic Freedom at Blooms-

burg State College... .’’ Id. 45. In our unanimous

en banc opinion on remand from the Supreme Court, we

again directed that findings be made on the Article 5e issue.

538 F.2d at 63. The defendants did not seek review of the

original order of this Court; their petition for certiorari to

the Supreme Court, filed after the issuance of our opinion

en banc, did not raise the contention they now press that

this Court impermissibly created the Article 5e issue sua

sponte. Thus, even if we were to agree with the defend-

ants’ contention and the district court’s observations, we

would have to rule that this Court’s prior opinions repre-

67

Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

sent the law governing this case with respect to the ques-

tion whether it was permissible to remand the Article 5e

claim to the district court.

B. The Merits of the Article 5e Due Process Claim

The district court held that the College’s Statement

of Policy ‘‘sets forth its purpose in terms that meet the

general requirement that a contract be supported by con-

sideration.’’ 431 F. Supp. at 1388. The court found that

the Statement had been adopted by the College to insure

the more effective services of faculty members, and that

during the period in which it was in effect each faculty

member was given a copy of the Statement at the start of

his term of employment and was asked to acknowledge in

writing his familiarity with its provisions. Jd. 1387-88.

Thus, the court found the Statement to be an integral part

of the contractual structure defining the employment rela-

tionship between the College and its faculty.

The defendants dispute the district court’s characteri-

zation of the Statement as a contract, arguing that under

Pennsylvania law it was not an enforceable agreement, but

rather an ‘‘illusory promise,’’ lacking in certainty with

respect to the nature and extent of the obligations of the

parties thereto. They base this argument on a clause in

that section of the Statement’ preamble labeled “*Pur-

Statement to follow its procedures only when ‘‘practical’’

they argue that it was a promise merely in form.

The district court held, to the contrary, that the

ee een ee tee Seay 00 eae

a factfinder and, hence, its presence in the Statement

not render its provisions unenforceable but rather per-

mitted the College to avoid its obligations only by estab-

lishing that compliance in a given case was impractical.

431 F. Supp. at 1588. We believe the district court’s ruling

68

Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

on this question to be consistent with applicable Penn-

sylvania law. See Kirk v. Brentwood Manor Homes, Inc.,

191 Pa. Super. Ct. 488, 159 A.2d 48, 51 (1960).

The holding of the district court that the College’s

enforceability the maxim ‘‘ ‘id certum est quod certum

reddi potest’ (that is certain which can be made certain)’’

cision. They also defend the merits of their decision,

Findings of fact made by the district court, and sup-

ported by the testimony of President Nossen, belie the

claim that the appropriate officers of the College made a

reasoned determination that emergency conditions caused

by Skehan’s refusal to comply with administrative direc-

tives concerning the scheduling of classes compelled them

not to comply with Article 5e in spite of Skehan’s request

that they do so. Rather, President Nossen did not respond

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69

Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

without reading the Statement, that the College’s Commit-

tee on Professional Affairs was the appropriate body to

initiate such proceedings. 431 F. Supp. at 1385. The dis-

trict court also found that no evidence had been presented

by the defendants in support of their contention that, given

the scheduling dispute, it had been impractical for the

College to implement the procedures of Article 5e in Ske-

han’s case. Jd. 1388. Thus, we find no error in the dis-

trict court’s determination that the defendants did not

establish that proof of impracticality needed to avoid their

contractual obligation to provide Skehan an Article 5e hear-

ing.

now before this Court is that he was contractually entitled

to a hearing into the reasons for his earlier nonrenewal.

He requested such a hearing on September 21, 1970, which

was found by the district court to be a reasonable time to

70

Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

that Skehan’s actions justified their termination of the Col-

lege’s contractual obligations to him until some four weeks

after he had requested an Article 5e hearing. Under such

circumstances we cannot agree that the defendants were

discharged from their contractual obligations with respect

to Skehan’s challenge to his nonrenewal at uny time prior

to the date on which the College itself decided to treat his

contract as terminated. During the interval between Sep-

tember 21 and October 19, 1970, Dr. Nossen made no at-

tempt to set inte motion the procedures of Article 5e. We

agree with the holding of the district court that the College

was not discharged from its obligation to do so by Skehan’s

failure to obey administrative directives during the sched-

uling dispute. We feel supported in this. ruling by the

observation of the district court that the very purpose of

Article 5e would be defeated if the College were permitted

to deny a faculty member a hearing on the causes of his’

nonrenewal whenever it asserted that his failure to perform

his obligations to the College discharged the College’s

obligation to comply with Article 5e. 431 F. Supp. at 1388.

Finally, the defendants contend that it was error for

the district court to hold that Skehan’s letter of September

appropriate method of initiating its procedures, and hold-

Skehan should have submitted a copy of

letter to the Committee; his failure to do so did not

the College’s failure to act upon his: request for a

431 F. Supp. at 1389. We believe that the dis-

court’s decision was amply supported by the terms of

5e and Skehan’s letter. cee

5e provided that the President of the College —

to explain to a nontenured faculty member

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71

Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

the basis of a nonrenewal decision if that faculty member

alleged an infringement of academic freedom. It also

provided that such an allegation ‘‘shall be given pre-

liminary consideration by the Committee on Professional

Affairs ... .’’ See note 1 supra. In his letter to Dr.

Nossen Skehan stated: ‘‘I hereby invoke article 5e .. .

affirming that the decision not to re-appoint me has been

caused by considerations violative of academic freedom.’’

There was testimony given at the preliminary injunction

hearing by a former dean of the College that upon receipt

of Skehan’s letter it would have been the President’s re-

sponsibility to refer the matter to the Committee on Pro-

fessional Affairs. Thus, there is evidence to support the

district court’s implicit holding that, given the ambiguity

in the language of Article 5e, Skehan’s peinted invocation

of its procedures by letter to the President of the College

was an appropriate means to initiate those procedures.

The district court held that Skehan had a property

interest in the procedures of Article 5e and that the failure

of the College to initiate those procedures upon his request

violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-

ment. The court’s conclusions are consistent with ap-

plicable Pennsylvania law and with the purpose of the

Statement of Policy to provide a procedural structure to

the College’s employment relationship with its faculty.

The district court’s finding that the College breached its

contractual obligations in Skehan’s case, and hence violated

procedural due process, is amply supported by the record.

Thus, we affirm that aspect of the district court’s jndgment

and proceed to a consideration of whether the relief

awarded Skehan by the district court was appropriate.

Ill. Racer

A. The Present Posture of this Case

In its en banc opinion this Court decided that any

award of back pay to which Skehan was otherwise entitied

72

Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

from the College itself was barred by the eleventh amend-

ment. This holding was based on the decision of the Penn-

sylvania Commonwealth Court in Brungard v. Hartman, 12

Pa. Commw. C(t. 477, 315 A.2d 913 (1974), that state col-

leges are agencies for which Pennsylvania claims sovereign

immunity. The College’s sovereign immunity status under

state law was deemed by this Court to be dispositive of the

eleventh amendment immunity issue as well. 538 F.2d at 62.

This Court did direct the district court to consider an

award of back pay against the individual defendants in this

case; the availability of such an award would depend upon

each defendant’s ability to establish that he acted in good

faith and without malice under the official immunity doc-

trine. The period for which back pay could be awarded

was to depend upon the district court’s findings as to

Skehan’s constitutiona! challenges to his nonrenewal. Thus,

this Court directed that ‘‘[i)f Skehan’s only contract right

expired by its terms at the end of the 1970-71 academic

year, and there was no first amendment violation, a back

pay award . . . covering the 1970-71 period, must be con-

sidered.’’ Jd. 63. On the other hand, ‘‘[i]f either the

article 5(e) claim or the first amendment claim should be

decided in Skehan’s favor, the court should consider the

award of back pay to date against the individual defend-

ants, and also prospective reinstatement . . . at least until

appropriate college termination procedures have taken

place.’’ Id.

We also directed that an award of attorney’s fees be

considered against the individual defendants for bad faith,

vexatious, wanton or oppressive conduct either prior to or

during the course of this litigation, and against the College

for such conduct during this litigation. Subsequent to our

en banc opinion, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Attor-

ney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, and in the proceedings on

remand Skehan based his fee request on that statutory

p-ovision.

73

Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

The district court was not required to consider the

amount of back pay to which Skehan was entitled for the

violations of his right to procedural due process with re-

spect to either the nonrenewal or the termination decision

because Skchan was not successful in the proceedings below

in establishing the liability of any defendant for damages

arising from those violations. He was also unsuccessful in

his effort to recover attorney’s fees because the district

court held that sovereign immunity barred a fee recovery

from the College, and it exercised its discretion under the

Awards Act to deny Skehan an award of fees from the

individual defendants. The court did prospectively rein-

state Skehan to a suspended with pay status at the College,

pending the completion of nonrenewal and termination pro-

ceedings. Various aspects of the district court’s award of

relief and this Court’s instructions with respect to that

award have been raised as grounds of appeal by the parties

here.

B. Sovereign Immunity

In spite of this Court’s holding that Bloomsburg State

College is an entity of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

to which sovereign immunity attaches, Skehan asked the

district court to consider his claim for monetary relief

against the College. In its opinion on the remedial aspects

of this case, filed on July 20, 1977, the district court, deem-

ing itself bound by our earlier holding, refused to entertain

Skehan’s argument that this Court had erred. Skehan v.

Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State College, 436 F.

Supp. 657, 665 (M.D. Pa. 1977). We, too, are bound by the

determination of this Court en banc unless intervening

decisions of the Supreme Court, acts of Congress, or

changes in applicable state law require us to reconsider

our prior holding.

Although Skehan was unable to present any arguments

based on the effects of intervening law on the sovereign

immunity issuc to the district court, he argued before this

74

Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

Court that the cleventh amendment immunity of the Col-

lege has been waived both by the effects of a recent decision

of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and by recent decisions

of the United States Supreme Court. We shall consider

the effects of this intervening decisional law on our earlier

holding that the eleventh amendment bars an award of

monetary relicf against the College in this case. We do so

in the light of the Supreme Court’s admonition that ‘‘ ‘an

appellate court must apply the law in effect at the time it

renders its decision.’’’ Bradley v. School Board of the

City of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 714 (1974), quoting Thorpe

v. Housing Authority of the City of Durham, 393 U.S. 268,

281 (1969).

1. Intervening State Law

We shall first address Skehan’s argument based on

changes in the applicable state law. He contends that the

decision of the Pennsylvenia Supreme Court in Mayle v.

Pennsylvania Department of Highways, — Pa. —, 388 A.2d

709 (1978), entered on July 14, 1978, constituted consent by

the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and all its agencies to

be sued in federal court

The eleventh amendment has been construed by the

Supreme Court not to bar an action in federal court against

the state or its officers acting in their official capacities for

prospective injunctive relief from unconstitutional state

actions. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664 (1974) ;

Ea parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Thus, this Court

earlier held that the eleventh amendment presented no im-

pediment to Skehan’s request for prospective reinstatement

as relief for the constitutional violations he established.

538 F.2d at 63. However, Edelman maie it clear that, ab-

sent consent to suit by the state, a federal court may not

award relief against state officers or agencies that consti-

tutes a compensatory money judgment payable out of the

state treasury, even if that relief is labeled as equitable in

nature. 415 U.S. at 666.

75

Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

Skehan does not challenge this Court’s earlier holding

‘that his request for a hack pay awurd from the College is

tthe ttype of retroactive monetary relief proscribed by Edel-

man; rather, he contends that the Pennsylvania Supreme

Gourt waived the Commonwealth’s immunity to such an

ward in the Mayle decision. Although it cannot be gain-

wail that a state may waive its constitutional protection

‘uniler the eleventh amendment, see Edelman, supra at 673,

events subsequent to the decision in Mayle make it clear

tthat Pennsylvania has not consented to the imposition of

tthe type of monetary relief sought by Skehan in this case.

In Mayle a divided Pennsylvania Supreme Court

‘‘abrogated’’ the doctrine of sovereign immunity, whereby

the Commonwealth had previously been immune from lia-

bility arising from the torts of its agents except where a

legislativ< act authorized recovery. — Pa. at — , 388 A.2d

at 709-10. The court held that sovereign immunity in Penn-

¥ivania was a non-constitutional doctrine that had its

wrigins in judicial decisions, and that neither the state

eonstitution nor legislative enactments precluded the court

ffrom abolishing the doctrine it had created and overruling

aillyprior inconsistent opinions. Id. at — - — , 388 A.2d at

718-20.

Skehan argues that although the Mayle opinion did not

im tterms address the applicability of its holding to the

Commonwealth’s eleventh amendment immunity from suits

for damages in federal court, it should be construed to

waive Bloomsburg State’s immunity here because the lan-

guage of Mayle rejects the sovereign immunity doctrine

aud its justifications in broad terms, and because the opin-

‘jon relies in part upon the refusal of the Pennsylvania legis-

lature to ratify the eleventh amendment when it was pro-

posed by Congress in 1794. See — Pa. at — , — , 388 A.2d

aat 712, 718.

The Supreme Court has held that ‘‘[iJn deciding

whether a State has waived its constitutional protection

under the Eleventh Amendmeut, we will find waiver only

76

Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

where stated ‘by the most express language or by such

overwhelming implications from the text as [will] leave

no room for any other reasonable construction.’’’ Edel-

man, supra at 673, quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling

Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909). This rule has been applied

to cases in which a state has consented to suit in its own

courts by statute; consent to a similar suit in the federal

courts has not been inferred absent a clear declaration in

the statutory language that the state intended to waive its

eleventh amendment immunity as well as its sovereign

immunity under state law. See Kennecott Copper Corp. r.

State Tax Commission, 327 U.S. 573, 577 (1946); Ford

Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Indiana, 323 U.S.

459, 465 (1945) ; Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read,

322 U.S. 47, 54 (1944).

We would face an apparently novel application of this

rule were we required to interpret the effect of a state’s

abrogation of its state law sovereign immunity by judicial

decision on its eleventh amendment immunity fron! damage

actions in federal court. See Greenfield v. Vesella, 457

F. Supp. 316, 319-20 (W.D. Pa. 1978) (holding that the de-

cision in Mayle has waived the Commonwealth’s eleventh

amendment immunity). Recent action by the Pennsylvania

legislature has precluded our need to enter this thicket.

On September 28, 1978, the Pennsylvania legislature

enacted House Bill No. 2437, Act No. 1978-152, reaffirming

and preserving sovereign immunity as a bar to claims

brought against the Commonwealth and its agencies, offi-

cials, and employees. See 1978 Pa. Legis. Serv. 629-36.

Section 2 of that Act amends the Judicial Code, Act of

July 9, 1976, P.L. 586, Act No. 142, 42 Pa. C.S.A., by adding

new sections 5110 and 5111, limiting the scope of the Com-

monwealth’s waiver of sovereign immunity to particular

types of actions and limiting recovery to particular types

of damages. Section 5(a) of the Act, eutitled ‘‘Construc-

tion and Application,’’ states the legislature's intent that

the Act ‘‘specifically respond to and prescribe limitations

77

Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

on the decision of Mayle v. Commonwealth ....’’ More-

over, section 5(b)(1) bars any cause of action against the

Commonwealth not permitted under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5110,

regardless of when it arose, unless it would not have been

barred by applicable statutory or decisional law prior to

the Mayle decision. Finally, section 5(e) provides that

‘*[n]othing contained in this act shall be construed to waive

the Commonwealth’s immunity from suit in Federal courts

guaranteed by the eleventh amendment to the United States

Constitution.’’ The Act went into effect on the date of its

enactment, September 28, 1978.

In enacting the foregoing statutory provision the Penn-

sylvania legislature has effectively overruled the decision

of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Mayle. Thus, for

Skehan to prevail in his argument that intervening changes

in Pennsylvania law require us to disregard the earlier

determination of the en bane Court on the sovereign im-

munity issue he would have to demonstrate that state col-

leges like Bloomsburg State are no longer deemed to be

agencies cloaked with the Commonwealth’s sovereign im-

munity. Nothing in the new sovereign immunity statute

suggests such a result and recent decisions of the Pennsyl-

vania Commonwealth Court have reaffirmed the holding of

Brungard v. Hartman to the contrary. See Finkelstein v.

Shippensburg State College, — Pa. Commw. Ct. —, 370

A.2d 1259 (1977) ; Williams v. West Chester State College,

— Pa. Commw. Ct. —, 370 A.2d 744 (1977). Our previous

ruling that Bloomsburg State College cannot be made

liable to Skehan for an award of back pay will not be

disturbed on the ground of intervening changes in appli-

cable state law.

2. Intervening Decisions of the Supreme Court

Skehan also argues that the Supreme Court’s holding

_in Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New

York, — U.S. —, 98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978), that local govern-

mental units may be deemed ‘‘persons’’ within the mean-

78

Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

ing of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 compels the conclusion that § 1983

now must be construed as a valid Congressional waiver

of the states’ eleventh amendment immunity to suits for

damages in federal court. Thus, he requests this Court

to make a determination as to the College’s status as a

‘*person’’ liable to an award of damages under § 1983.

Because we do not believe that the necessary implication

of the Monell decision is an overruling of prior Supreme

Court cases holding that § 1983 does not abrogate the

states’ eleventh amendment sovereign immunity, we find

it unnecessary to make the requested finding as to the

College’s status as a § 1983 ‘‘person.’’

In ruling on Skehan’s argument here it is necessary

to first review recent opinions of the Supreme Court touch-

ing upon the legislative authority of Congress to impose

upon the states consent to being sued in actions otherwise

barred by the eleventh amendment. Parden v. Terminal

Railway Co., 377 U.S. 184 (1964), is the seminal case in

this area. There the Supreme Court held that Alabama

had consented to a suit for damages under the Federal

Employers’ Liability Act brought by an employee of a

state-owned interstate railroad who had sustained injuries

in the scope of his employment. The Court’s holding was

based on the fact that the F.E.L.A. was a congressional

enactment which by its terms authorized suit against a

general class of defendants literally including states and

state instrumentalities, and the fact that Alabama began

to operate an interstate railroad twenty years after the

passage of the Act. See Edelman v. Jordan, supra at 672.

In Edelman, supra, the Court of Appeals had held

that Parden compelled a similar finding of consent to suit

waiving the eleventh amendment. There plaintiffs had

sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for retroactive payment of

welfare benefits allegedly withheld from them by the Iili-

nois Department of Public Aid in violation of applicable

federal laws and the equal protection clause. The Court

of Appeals held, and three dissenters from the Supreme

79

Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

Court’s reversal of that holding agreed, that § 1983 created

a private cause of action to enforce the applicable provi-

sions of the Social Security Act, and that the state’s par-

ticipation in the federally assisted welfare program con-

stituted constructive consent to suits challenging the

state’s failure to comply with the terms of participation

in that program. See Edelman v. Jordax, supra at 688-96

(Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting) ; id. 678-87 (Doug-

las, J., dissenting).

The Court majority disagreed, however, holding that

a federal court’s remedial power under § 1983 was limited

by the eleventh amendment to awarding prospective in-

junctive relief against the state, absent ‘‘the threshold

fact of congressional authorization to sue a class of defend-

ants which literally includes States....’’ Id.672. Section

1983 was held by the Court not to be such an authorization

because it was not deemed to authorize suits against the

states themselves but only against state officers. Id. 675-77.

In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), the

Court was faced with the question whether the eleventh

amendment proscribed Congress’ authorization of suits

for backpay awards brought by employees against state

governmental bodies found to have violated the antidis-

crimination provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. Congress had

amended Title VII to include governmental bodies within

the Act’s definition of employers through passage of the

Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. The Second

Circuit had held that insofar as the amendments to Title

VII authorized a private action for the recovery of dam-

ages against the states they were unconstitutional under

the interpretation of the eleventh amendment adopted by

the Supreme Court in Edelman.

The Supreme Court, in unanimously reversing that

judgment, noted that in Fitzpatrick ‘‘[o]ur analysis

begins where Edelman ended, for in this Title VII case

the ‘threshold fact of congressional authorization,’ .. .

80

Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

to sue the State as employer is clearly present.’’ 427 U.S.

at 452. The Court reiterated that neither the Social Se-

curity Act nor 4 1983 had provided that threshold predicate

to a finding of eleventh amendment waiver in Edelman.

The Court explained that § 1983 had not been read as such

an embodiment of congressional intent to abrogate sover-

eign immunity -because ‘‘it had been held in Monroe v.

Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187-191 (1961), to exclude cities and

other municipal corporations from its ambit; that being

the case, it could not have been intended to include States

as parties defendant.’’ 427 U.S. at 452 (emphasis sup-

).

Having found the predicate of congressional authoriza-

tion that was absent in Edelman to be present in Fite-

patrick, the Court went on to hold that Congress’ imposi-

tion of suit against the states in the Title VII amendments

was a valid exercise of its power under §5 of the four-

teenth amendment ‘‘to enforce, by appropriate legislation,

the provisions’’ of that amendment:

{We think that the Eleventh Amendment, and the

principle of state sovereignty which it embodies .. .

are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions

of §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In that section

Congress is expressly granted authority to enforce

‘*by appropriate legislation’’ the substantive provi-

sions of the Fourteenth Amendment, which themselves

embody limitations on state authority. We think that

os tan te Medenndis ad by Madpemn dats

legislation’’ for the purpose of enforcing the provi-

sions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for pri-

vate suits against States or state officials which are

81

Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

constitutionally impermissible in other contexts. See

Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) ....

427 U.S. at 456 (citations and footnec omitted).

Significantly, in this context of Congress’ exercise of

its enforcement powers under § 5 of the fourteenth amend-

ment, che Court did not even discuss the requirement earlier

expressed in Parden and Edelman that a valid waiver of

the state’s eleventh amendment immunity depends upon its

consent to congressional authorization of damage actions

by private parties against state defendants. See Field,

The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity

Doctrines: Congressional Imposition of Suit Upon the

States, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1203, 1235-37 (1978).

Justices Brennan and Stevens separately concurred in

the Court’s judgment in Fitzpatrick on grounds not ap-

plicable to our discussion here. See 427 U.S. at 457-58

(Brennan, J., concurring); id. 458-60 (Stevens, J., con-

curring).

Skehan’s argument is that the Supreme Court’s de-

cision in Monell last term, overruling Monroe v. Pape, re-

moved any distinction between Edelman and Fitzpatrick

and, in effect, overruled sub silentio the holding in Edelman

that § 1983 was not a congressional authorization of suits

against a class of defendants literally including states.

We need not review here the Supreme Court’s analysis

of the legislative history of § 1983 in Monell that led it to

its conclusion ‘‘that Congress did intend municipalities and

other local government units to be included among those

persons to whom § 1983 applies.*”’ — U.S. at —, 98 8. Ct.

at 2035 (footnote omitted; Court’s emphasis). However,

we should note that the Court also held that ‘‘the language

of § 1983, read against the background of the same legis-

lative history, compels the conclusion that Congress did not

intend municipalities to be held liable unless action pur-

suant to official municipal policy of some nature caused

constitutional tort. [I]n other words, a municipality

not be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat

i

82

Opinion of the Third Circuit Cour: of Appeals.

theory.” Id. at —, 98 S. Ct. at 2036. Rather, the Court

concluded that “‘it is when execution of a government’s

policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by

those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent

official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an

entity is responsible under § 1983.’’ Id. at —, 98 8. Ct. at

2038,

The possible effect of this holding on the eleventh

amendment sovereign immunity doctrine was not addressed

by the Court; the Monell holding was ‘‘limited to local

government units which are not considered part of the

State for Eleventh Amendment purposes.’’ Jd. at —, n.54,

98 S. Ct. at 2035 n.54. In the case before us today we are

confronted with a local government defendant that has

been held to share in the eleventh amendment sovereign

immunity of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. How-

ever, Bloomsburg State College’s status as a person under

$1983 has not been ; reviously determined by this Court

or the district court; up until now subject matter juris-

diction over the College in this case has been affirmed only

under the general federal question jurisdiction of 28 U.S.C.

$1331. See 501 F.2d at 44. If we were to accept Skehan’s

contention that Monell overruled Edelman sub silentio on

the question of § 1983's effect on the state’s eleventh

amendment immunity it might first be necessary to remand

this case to the district court with instructions to determine

the College’s liability as a § 1983 defendant under the

guidelines set forth in Monell. See Norris v. Frame, —

F.2d —, No. 78-1090, slip op. at 5 n.8 (3d Cir., filed Oct. 31,

1978).

Such a remand is unnecessary in this case because,

absent a much clearer statement by the Supreme Court to

the effect that § 1983 must now be construed as waiving the

states’ sovereign immunity from awards of monetary dam-

ages, this Court considers itself bound by the holding of

Edelman to the contrary. We note that of the present

members of the Supreme Court, Justice Brennan has ex-

pressed his view that it is at least an open question whether

83

Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

Edelman has been overruled by Monell. See Hutto v.

Pinney, — US. —, —-—, 98 S. Ct. 2565, 2579-81 (1978)

(Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Powell, joined by the

Chief Justice and Justices White and Rehnquist, has

argued, to the contrary, that the vitality of the Edelman

holding has not been undermined sub silentio by Fitzpatrick

and Monell. See id. — n.6, 98 S. Ct. at 2583 n.6 (Powell, J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part). Thus, the con-

clusion that Edelman is no longer good law is certainly not

an inescapable one. We feel that it would be inappropriate

for this Court to hold that Edelman has been overruled by

Monell, an opinion issued only four years later, when such

a result was not even intimated by the authors of the

majority, concurring and dissenting opinions in Monell.

We conclude that Skehan’s argument that the College’s

sovereign immunity has been waived by the congressional

imposition of suits upon the states in § 1983 is precluded

by the Supreme Court’s opinion in Edelman v. Jordan.

Thus, our prior determination that Skehan is not en-

titled to a back pay award against the College because of

its status as an agency of the Commonwealth to which

eleventh amendment sovereign immunity attaches will not

be disturbed.

C. Official Immunity

additional testimony on the question of the defendants’

good faith in failing to comply with Skehan’s request for

an Article 5e hearing and in terminating his employment

with the College without a prior hearing. See Part LB

supra. That the defendants violated procedural due

process with respect to Article 5e has today been affirmed

by this Court, see Part II supra; we earlier affirmed that

the defendants violated procedural due process by terminat-

ing Skehan’s employment during the term of his contract

without a prior hearing, see 501 F.2d at 38.

In its opinion issued on May 18, 1977, the district court

concluded, based on its findings of fact, that defendant

84

Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

Nossen’s actions with respect to both violations of pro-

cedural due process established by Skehan had been taken

in good faith and without malicious intention. The court

also concluded that he had acted in a reasonable manner

and had not violated clearly established constitutional

rights with respect to either denial of due process. 431

F. Supp. at 1391. In its later opinion, entered on July 20,

1977, the court stated that the only individual defendant

from whom Skehan had sought monetary damages was

President Nossen, and because he and the College were

both immune from liability, the court was unable to award

Skehan any relief in the nature of backpay. 436 F. Supp.

at 659. Skehan challenges both the district court’s refusal

te address the question of the liability of each individual

defendant in this case, and its findings and conclusions with

respect to Nossen’s immunity from liability.

Language in this Court’s en banc opinion indicated

our belief that the district court would be required to

consider the availability of the official immunity defense

to each of the individual defendants. For example, we

stated :

The district court will be required to inquire into the

status and responsibility of each individual defendant

and to determine whether, for example, a trustee

should be held responsible for the same level of

knowledge of constitutional rights as a college presi-

dent or a commissioner of education. The determina-

tion may turn on the relative availability to each

defendant of counsel, as well as the relative certainty

of the legal issue, a criterion to which the Wood v.

Strickland Court expressly adverted.

538 F.2d at 62. In the concluding section of our opinion,

summarizing the directions to the district court on remand,

we included an instruction that ‘‘[t]he court should then

make findings of fact with respect to the immunity of each

defendant in conformance with this opinion.’’ Id. 63.

85

Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

Of course, if the district court was correct in its con-

clusion that Skehan was only seeking monetary damages

from one of the individual defendants, then this Court’s

assumption to the contrary could not alter that fact.

On December 1, 1976, the district court issued an

order reducing to writing certain agreements made be-

tween the parties at a pre-trial conference held that day.

Within that order the court stated: ‘‘The parties stipulated

at the final pre-trial conference that the Defendants Pit-

tenger and Carlson are not liable to the Plaintiff for

damages.’’ Skehan has not presented any challenge to

the accuracy of that statement, nor any reason why that

stipulation should not be binding. Thus, there was :\0

error in the district court’s failure to consider the ap-

plicability of the official immunity defense to defendants

Pittenger and Carlson.

Skehan did not name the individual members of the

College’s Board of Trustees as defendants in his complaint.

In his description of the parties therein he identified the

defendant Board of Trustees as ‘‘the official supervisory

body of defendant, Bloomsburg State College.’’ On De-

cember 1, 1976, Skehan filed a motion with the district

court for leave to file an amendment to his complaint

adding the names of the individual members of the Board

to the list of parties defendant. The district court denied

that motion in an order dated December 23, 1976, and

Skehan challenges that order.

The district court held that Skehan’s assumption that

the individual trustees had already been made parties to

this suit, and the fact that they had been made aware of

its institution and progress to date, did not override the

t that they be properly served as parties de-

fendant under Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-

cedure. In ruling on Skehan’s motion, the court did not

reach the whether the requested amendment would

be barred by the statute of limitations, or whether it might

i under

86 ws

Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

Rather, the sole basis of its decision denying Skehan’s

motion was that ‘‘justice requires that the amendment not

be allowed at this stage of the proceedings,’’ given that

the trustees had not bec previously informed that they

were subject to individ . liability, that portions of the

case had ulready been decided on the merits and that trial

on the remaining portions was about to commence.

Skehan contends that the district court abused its

discretion in denying his motion to add the trustees as

defendants. He argues that basic fairness required the

court to grant his motion because he was not made aware

that he would have to name the trustees as individuals

in order to obtain back pay until this Court raised the

issue of the College’s possible sovereign immunity in its

panel opinion entered on May 3, 1974. See 501 F.2d at

41-43.

Like a motion te reopen the record for the taking of

additional testimony, see Part I,B supra, a Rule 15(a)

motion for leave to amend the pleadings is within the

sound discretion of the trial court. Zenith Radio Corp. v.

Haeeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 330 (1971); Foman

v. Davis, 37 U.S».178, 182 (1962). Although district

courts are required to allow amendments freely under the

terms‘of the Rule, certain factors, such as undne prejudice

to the other party, and undue delay by the movant, have

been found to establish sufficient justification for the

denial of such motions. See 3 Moore’s Federal Practice

7 15.08[4] at 91-94 (2d ed. 1978). Here, the district court

found that the trustees would be prejudiced by their addi-

tion as parties defendant in their individual capacities

because they had not been participants .n the proceedings

that established Skehan’s right to recovery on the pre-

termination hearing claim. Moreover, Skehan’s motion

was not filed until a short time prior to the scheduled date

of trial on his remaining substantive claims. In light of

_the district court’s careful consideration of these factors

we cannot find the court’s denial of Skehan’s motion for

87

Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

leave to add the individual members of the Board of

Trustees as named defendants in his complaint to have

been contrary to the sound exercise of its discretion.

Thus, the district court was correct in its assertion

that Skehan had sought monetary damages from only one

of the ‘ndividual defendants properly served as a party

to this action. The earlier assumption of this Court to

the contrary cannot alter that fact, and, therefore, there

was no error in the court’s failure to consider the ap-

plicability of the official immunity defense to any defendant

other than President Nossen.

This Court directed the district court to make findings

concerning ‘‘whether the defendants met their burden of

establishing (1) that they did not know and reasonably

need not have known that depriving Skehan of a pre-

termination hearing violated due process, and (2) that

they acted without malicious intention to deprive him of

his constitutional rights or cause him to suff-r other

injury.’’ 538 F.2d at 62. Similar findings were to be

made if the district court found for Skehan on his Article

5e claim. Jd. 63. After hearing testimony on this issue

the district court concluded that defendant Nossen had

met his burden of proving both elements of the official

immunity test, as set forth by the Supreme Court in

Wood ». Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975). The court fully

set forth the factual findings it relied upon in reaching

those conclusions.

Our review of the record does not support Skehan’s

contention that the district court’s factual findings should

be set aside as clearly erroneous. In reviewing those find-

ings we must credit the district court’s evaluation of the

testimony, and that testimony clearly supports the court’s

findings that President Nossen did not act with malicious

intent or in knowing violation of Skehan’s constitutional

rights in failing to provide him with either the procedures

set forth in Article 5e or a hearing prior to his termination.

Additionally, we agree with the district court that at

the time these events occurred in the Fall of 1970, défend-

88

Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

ant Nossen did not have reason te know that his actions

would later he held to have violated Skehan’s constitutional

rights. As the district court pointed out, quoting an opinion

of the Seventh Circuit, ‘‘The first definitive holding that a

termination of teachers’ property interests in their em-

ployment contracts with state institutions required due

process hearings was Board of Regents of State Colleges

v. Roth, (408 U.S. 564 (1972)].’’ 431 F. Supp. at 1391,

quoting Hostrop v. Board of Junior College District No.

515, 523 F.2d 569, 578 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.

963 (1976). The first definitive holding that Skehan was

contractually entitled, under Pennsylvania law, to the pro-

visions of Article 5e, and that the College’s failure to af-

ford him those procedures violated due process, was the

district court’s opinion in this case on the 5e issue. Para-

phrasing the Supreme Court’s opinion in Wood v. Strick-

land, supra at 321, we cannot say that President Nossen

acted in ‘‘ignorance or disregard of settled, indisputable

law’’ when he terminated Skehan’s employment with the

College without a prior hearing and without having acted

upon his request for an Article 5e hearing.

We agree with the district court’s findings and con-

clusions that defendant Nossen established by a preponder-

ance of the evidence that he was entitled to an official im-

munity defense from Skehan’s claims for monetary

damages arising from either his dismissal from the College

without a prior hearing or his failure to receive the aca-

demic freedom hearing set forth in Article 5e.*

D. Injunctive Relief

The district court issued a final order, unchallenged,

Fn oe oe ene ee

89

Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

suspended with pay status he held at the College on October

15, 1970; the College was ordered to recreate for his case

the procedures of Article 5e; a reconstituted Committee on

Professional Affairs was to conduct the initial investigation

of Skehan’s allegation that his nonrenewai resulted from

considerations violative of his academic freedom ; deadlines

were established for each stage of the nonrenewal proceed-

ings set out in Article 5e and Article 9, see note 1 supra;

and, following a final decision on Skehan’s renewal or non-

renewal, the President of the College was given the option

of holding a pretermination hearing within 30 days—failure

to hold that hearing within the stated time would result in

Skehan’s full reinstatement as a faculty member of the

College. 436 F. Supp. at 668-69.

Skehan contends that he should have been fully rein-

stated as a faculty member of the College pending the

appropriate proceedings. In spite of his assertion to the

contrary, nothing in this Court’s prior opinions in this

case required the district court to order Skehan fully rein-

stated to the position he held at the time prior to his sus-

pension from teaching responsibilities. Rather, in our

opinion en banc this Court directed that the district court

should consider prospective reinstatement as a remedy for

the College’s violation of Skehan’s right to the procedures

set forth in Article 5e ‘‘at least until appropriate college

termination procedures have taken place.’’ 538 F.2d at 63.

We did not instruct the district court that it had to award

Skehan prospective reinstatement as a remedy for the 5e

violation, nor did we define the terms of such reinstatement

with particularity.

The district court determined that Skehan’s reinstate-

ment to the suspenced with pay status he held prior to his

termination from the College’s employment on October 19,

1970, was a grant of equitable relief appropriate to this

case. We believe that the court's order minimized the dis-

ruptive effects that would have resulted at the College had

it required the administration to provide classes for Skehan

90

Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

to teach pending the results of the mandated hearing pro-

ceedings. Additional disruption of scheduling would have

occurred had the College altered its teaching assignments

to accommodate Skehan’s reinstatement only to determine

some months later that its earlier decision to terminate

Skehan’s employment as a faculty member was to be

reaffirmed.

On the other hand, the court’s order enabled Skehan to

return to the College’s payroll pending the proceedings to

which he was entitled and, thus, he was not ‘‘ unduly limited

in his ability to pursue the hearing remedy.’’ 436 F. Supp.

at 664. We belicve that the relief afforded by the district

court presented an equitable accominodation of the interests

of both the College and Dr. Skehan. Noting the admoni-

tion of the Supreme Court that, ‘‘[iJn shaping equity

decrees, the trial court is vested with broad discretionary

power; appellate review is correspondingly narrow,”’’

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 200 (1973), we hold that

the district court’s failure to order the College to provide

Skehan with teaching responsibilities pending his Article

5e and pretermination hearings did not constitute an abuse

of discretion.

Skehan has apprised this Court of proceedings that

have taken place at the College subsequent to the district

court’s order reinstating him to a suspended status. He

argues that this Court should fully reinstate him to his

former position at Bloomsburg State because the College

did not comply with that aspect of the district court’s order

mandating his full reinstatement if no pretermination hear-

ing were held within 30 days of a final decision on the ques-

tion of his renewal or nonrenewal. We believe that any

questions concerning the College’s compliance with the

district court’s final order of July 20, 1977, should be ad-

dressed to that court in the uret instance. Thus, we shall

deny the motion filed by Skehan in this Court for leave to

file a supplemental appendix detailing events that have

transpired at the College subsequent to the district court’s

order.

91

Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

During the proceedings below Skehan based his claim

for an award of attorney’s fees on the provisions of the

Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976,‘ which

had been enacted subsequent to this Court’s en bane opin-

ion. The district court made factual findings, unchallenged

here, that would preclude a fee award based on the alterna-

tive grounds of the defendants’ bad faith either in the pre-

litigation stages of this case or in the pursuit of their de-

fense. See 436 F. Supp. at 663. The court also denied

Skehan’s request for attorney’s fees under the provisions

of the Awards Act. Skehan’s challenge to this aspect of the

district court’s order is governed by the opinion of the

Supreme Court in Hutto v. Finney, — U.S. —, 98 8. Ct.

2565 (1978).

The district court’s ruling denying Skehan’s request

for attorney’s fees under the Awards Act from either de-

fendant Nossen or from the College was multifaceted.

First, the court heid that defendant Nossen was not

personally liable for such an award because Skehan was

not a ‘‘prevailing party’’ vis a vis Nossen. This followed

from the fact that Nossen had established immunity to

Skehan’s claim for damages. 436 F. Supp. at 665. Even

if Nossen’s successful official immunity defense could not

be viewed as preventing Skehan from characterizing him-

self as a prevailing party, the court held that it

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Appendix — Skehan v. Board of Trustees · 459 U.S. 1048 | Frix