Appendix — Skehan v. Board of Trustees
Supreme Court brief1982
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Octeber Term, 1981
—————
DR. JOSEPH T. SKEHAN,
Petitioner,
v.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF BLOOMSBURG STATE
COLLEGE, DR. ROBERT NOSSEN, DR. CHARLES
CARLSON, JOHN PITTENGER, Superintendent
of Education, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and
BLOOMSBURG STATE COLLEGE,
Ow Warr or Certiornarn! To THe Unrrep Srares Covrr or
AppEaLs For THE Turep Ciacurt at
Nos. 81-1094 and 81-1299
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
DR. JOSEPH T. SKEHAN
petitioner
pro se
Dr. J. T. Skehan
638 East Third Street
Bloomsburg, Pa., 17815
tel. (717) 784-7368
— EEE
INDEX
Third Circuit Court of Appeals (1981-82)
alia cei da pecceucceee !
Order: Deny Rehearing 26 Mar. 1982 .................. 27
Order: Modify Denial 6 Apr. 1982 ..................... 29
Excerpts: amicus curiae Brief, AAUP, 2 Mar. 1982 . 31
(American Assoc. University Professors)
District Court (M.D.PA) (1980-81)
Order: Deny Special Damages, 2 Nov. 1980 ........... 37
Opinion: Deny Enforce Judgment, 5 Dec. 1930 ........ 38
Order: Alter/Amend, 3 Feb. 1981 ................ 42
U.S. Supreme Court (1979) 444 U.S. 832
Order: Deny Certiorari Petition #78-1719, 1 Oct. 1979 .. 44
EE TT ES a ean | 44
Third Circuit Court of Appeals (1977-78)
Opinion and Judgment 28 Dec. 1978 .................. 45
Order: Deny Rehearing 14 Feb. 1979 .................. 97
ee eee ree aera OO omy mm
Oden Deny big tbDA God 6 tos i wepecetes 100
Coliege Proceedings Oct.-Dec. 1977
Final Report: Cmte. on Professional Affairs 6 Dec. 1977
District Court (1976-77)
Order: Deny Reconsider Stay Denial 8 Dec. 1977 ...... 104
Post-Trial Orders:
2 Aug. 1977 Deny New Trial w/o Prejudice ...... 107
10 Aug. 1977 Demy pro se .... 2.6.66 ccc cc cece ee eeee 109
22 Aug. 1977 Deny New Trial w/o Prejudice ...... 111
31 Aug. 1977 Grant Withdrawal of Counsel ....... 113
22 Aug. 1977 Deny Withdrawal of Counsel ........ 115
12 Sept. 1977 Grant pro se ........ 2.6... c cece eeues 117
22 Sept. 1977 Deny New Trial .................... 119
Opinion and Order: 20 July 1977 ...................05. 122
Opinion, Order and Judgment: Contract and Liability 18
EEL tide Salibitebass cobssbhdceossniebinctncces 145
Opinion, Order and Judgment: Ist Amend. 24 Mar. 1977 |! 73
Order: Deny ist Amend. testimony ................... 190
Order: Deny Amend Complaint 23 Dec. 1976 .......... 195
“U.S. Supreme Court 421 U.S. 983 (1975)
Order: Certiorari Granted Appellant/Pitf. 22 May 1975 220
Third Circuit Court of Appeals (1973-74)
Opinion and Judgment: 3 May 1974 .................. 221
Order: Amending Opinion 11 June 1974 ............... 248
Order: Deny Rehearing 11 June 1974 ................. 250
District Court (1972-73)
Opinion and Judgment: 9 May 1973 .................. 251
Post-Trial Orders:
12 June 1973 Deny Amend Judgment
Deny Attorneys’ Fees ............... 253
13 June 1973 Deny Reconsider ................... 266
Memorandum Report: Chmn. Academic Freedom Cmte. re
SR GR GU ccccccckbsccdeatonccicoseces 268
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Nos. 81-1094, 81-1299
DR. JOSEPH T. SKEHAN,
Appellant
Vv.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF BLOOMSBURG STATE
COLLEGE and DR. ROBERT NOSSEN and DR.
CHARLES CARLSON and JOHN PITTENGER,
Superintendent of Education Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania and BLOOMSBURG STATE
COLLEGE
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(D.C. Civil No. 72-0644)
Argued October 29, 1981
Before: ADAMS, ROSENN ar’ SLOVITER, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed January 26, 1982)
Susan J. Forney (Argued)
Cletus P. Lyman (Argued)
Lyman & Ash
1612 Latimer Street
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Attorney for Appellant
OPINION OF THE COURT
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
1.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Before us is another phase of litigation which began
over nine years ago arising out of the decision of
Bloomsburg State College (College) not to renew the
contract of one of its faculty members, Dr. Joseph T.
Skehan, and subsequently to dismiss him from the Col-
lege faculty in mid-term of his final contract year.
Skehan’s suit has been the subject of three previous
opinions of this court, a decision by the Supreme Court,
and several district court opinions, some reported and
some unreported.’ Skehan here appeals from two orders
of the district court dealing with his remedy: (1) the or-
der denying, on the ground of the Eleventh Amend-
ment, his motion for an award of special damages in the
form of back pay, and (2) the order denying his motion to
1. The reported decisions are Skehan v. Board of Trustees of
State College, 353 F. Supp. 542 (M.D. Pa. 1973); 358
F. Supp. 430 (M.D. Pa. 1973), vacated and remanded, 501 F.2d 31
(3d Cir. 1974), vacated, 421 U.S. 983 (1975), remanded, 538 F.2d
53 (3d Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976), on
remand, 431 F. Supp. 1379 (M.D. Pa. 1977); 436 F. Supp. 657
(M.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 590 F.2d 470 (3d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979), on remand, 501 F. Supp.
1360 (M.D. Pa. 1980).
Skehan was appointed as a non-tenured Associate
Professor of Economics at the College in January, 1969
under a six-month trial contract, which was renewed for
the 1969-70 academic year. In May, 1970 Skehan was
notified by letter from then college president, Robert
Nossen, that his contract would be renewed for the
1970-71 academic year, but would not be renewed be-
yond that year. We will refer to this decision throughout
as the nonrenewal decision. Skehan, who accepted the
offer of employment for the 1970-71 academic year, pro-
tested that the nonrenewal decision had been caused by
considerations violative of his academic freedom and
claimed that he was therefore entitled to a hearing pur-
suant to Article 5e of the Statement of Policy for Con-
tinuous Employment and Academic Freedom at
Bloomsburg State College [hereinafter Article 5e}, The
College rejected Skehan’s request for an Article 5e hear-
ing on the reasons for the nonrenewal decision.
In the fall of 1970, during Skehan’s terminal con-
4
claim was rejected and it is not before us. He was more
successful on his claim of procedural violations. The dis-
trict court found that Skehan’s one year employment
contract was a property interest within the meaning of
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), and Per-
ry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), and that
Skehan’s dismissal violated due process because it was
accomplished before he was given a hearing at which he
had the opportunity to justify his actions or present rea-
sons why dismissal was not the appropriate sanction.
Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State Col-
lege, 358 F. Supp. 430 (M.D. Pa. 1973). In a subsequent
decision, following remand to the district court which
conducted a hearing on the issue, that court concluded
that Skehan also possessed a contractual right to a hear-
ing as provided in Article 5e (which incorporates the pro-
cedures specified in Article 9) on the College’s non-
renewal decision, that he had invoked that right within a
reasonable time, and that the College’s failure to afford
him those procedures violated the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Skehan v. Board of Trust-
ees of Bloomsburg State College, 431 F. Supp. 1379,
1391 (M.D. Pa. 1977).
Thereafter, the district court held bearings on the
appropriate remedy. In an opinion filed July 20, 1977,
the court declined to order full and immediate rein-
statement, but concluded that the proper remedy for the
College’s failure to provide “kehan with the necessary
hearings was his reinstatement, without teaching du-
ties, to the suspended status he held on October 15,
1970, after he was suspended for refusing to teach his
classes but before he was formally terminated and re-
moved from the payroll pending administrative he arings
to determine whether nonrenewal and dismissai were
proper. Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State
College, 436 F. Supp. 657, 664 (M.D. Pa. 1977). The dis-
trict court held that the College would be required to
afford Skehan a hearing in accordance with the con-
tractual Article 5e procedures on his nonrenewal and a
hearing comporting with due prucess on his dismissal,
in that order. Id. at 664, 668-69.
Following the district court’s order, Skehan was
reinstated as a faculty member, and received approxi-
mately $22,000 in salary from August 1, 1977 through
June 2, 1978. He also negotiated with the College and
received $51,500 for attorney's fees and expenses. Ap-
pellant’s brief at 3. A hearing on Skehan’s nonrenewal
was conducted before the Committee on Professional Af-
fairs, an elected committee of faculty members which
was the body ‘esignated in Article 5e and which was or-
dered recreateu because the Policy Statement of which
that article was a part was no longer in effect, having
been superceded by a collective bargaining agreement.
That Committee found his contract was not renewed for
reasons violative of academic freedom and recommend-
ed his reinstatement and reconsideration. Thereupon,
the College’s president, James H. McCormick, decided
to withdraw the nonrenewal letter, and to rely instead cn
the dismissal action. The College conducted the dismiss-
al proceedings which are at issue on this appeal. The
majority of the Committee which heard those proceed-
ings recommended Skehan’s termination, and on June
2, 1978, the College’s president notified Skehan in writ-
ing that he accepted the Committee’s findings of fact
and recommendation, and that Skehan was terminated
from employment at the College and removed from the
payroll effective as of the end of that day.
II.
THE COLLEGE’S IMMUNITY
Skehan has throughout this litigation, beginning
with the filing of his complaint, contended that he was
entitled, inter alia, to reinstatement and an award of
back pay. In our first consideration of this issue, we held
that “if under Pennsylvania law the College is an agent
of : .e Commonwealth, state sovereign immunity would
preclude the award of any relief against it directly and
any but prospective monetary relief, equitable or legai, in
an order directed against the individual defendants.”
Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State Cv'-
lege, 501 F.2d 31, 42 (3d Cir. 1974). The Supreme Court
granted Skehan’s petition for a writ of certiorari and, in a
summary disposition, remanded the case to us for fur-
ther consideration’ in light of, inter alia, Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975). Skehan v. Board of
Trustees of Bloomsburg State College, 421 U.S. 983
(1975).? We thereupon reviewed the case en banc, and
held that in light of Wood v. Strickland our prior as-
sumption of an unqualified common law immunity for
the individual defendants was erroneous. Skehan v.
Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State College, 538 F.2d
53, 60 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979
(1976). We remanded to the district court so that it could
determine whether the individual defendants acted
without malice and whether they knew or reasonably
should have known that the actions taken would violate
Skehan’s constitutional rights. In addition, we reex-
amined the issue of the College’s immunity in light of
the decision in Brungard v. Hartman, 12 Pa. Commw.
477, 315 A.2d 913 (1974), which had not been called to
our attention before our prior opinion was filed. We con-
2. In our opinion which was reviewed by the Supreme Court
we had also held that if the College did not share Pennsylvania's im-
munity, the district court must consider awarding Skehan attor-
ney's fees, as well as back pay, as a private attorney general vindi-
cating a public interest in having state-related institutions comply
with the Fourteenth Amendment. 501 F 2d at 44-45. The Supreme
Court directed that we consider the effect of Alyeska Pipeline Ser-
vice Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). In our en banc
reconsideration, we held that Alyeska foreclosed recovery of attor-
ney’s fees on the private attorney general theory but not on the basis
of litigation obduracy. 538 F.2d at 55-59. As we noted in the text,
the attorney's fee issue has been settled and is not before us.
a back pay award could not be made out of the College’s
treasury.
On remand, the district court found that the one in-
dividual defendant whose conduct was at issue, Presi-
dent Nossen, acted in good faith and without :ualice,
and was entitled to the qualified immunity recognized in
Wood v. Strickland, supra. 431 F. Supp. 1379 (M.D. Pa.
1977). The district court also declined to entertain
Skehan's argument that this court had erred in holding
that an award of damages in the form of back pay against
the College was barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
436 F. Supp. 657, 665 (M.D. Pa. 1977). On appeal,
Skehan relied on the intervening decision of the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court in Mayle v. Pennsylvania De-
partment of Highways, 479 Pa. 384, 388 A.2d 709
(1978), which abrogated the judicially-created doctrine
of sovereign immunity in suits against the Common-
wealth for torts of its agents. We rejected Skehan’s claim
on the ground that the passage of Act No. 152° by the
Pennsylvania legislature “reaffirming and preserving
sovereign immunity as a bar to claims brought against
the Commonwealth and its agencies, officials, and em-
ployees,” had “effectively overruled the decision of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Mayle” and therefore
3. Act of September 28, 1978, 1978 Pa. Laws 788, Act No.
1978-152. The Act reaffirms the doctrine of sovereign immunity,
see §1 (codified at 1 Pa. Cons. Stat. §2310), but permits limited
waiver of protection from tort liability in eight specific areas, see §2
(originally codified at 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §5110; currently codified at
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §8522). Section 5(e) of the Act (codified at 42 Pa.
Cons. Stat. §8521(b)) provides that “[n)jothing contained in this act
shall be cunstrued to waive the Commonwealth's immunity from
suit in federal courts guaranteed by the eleventh amendment to the
United States Constitution.”
we had no need to interpret the effect of the Mayle
court's abrogation of Pennsylvania’s.state law sovereign
immunity on that state’s Eleventh Amendment immuni-
ty from damage actions in federal court. Skehan v. Board
of Trustees of Bloomsburg State College, 590 F.2d 470,
487-88 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (£979).
We thus declined to disturb our previous ruling that the
Eleventh Amendment precluded an award of back pay
against the College. Id. at 488.*
When the case was again before the district court,
Skehan filed a motion for an award of special damages in
the form of back pay for the period, inter alia, from Octo-
ber 17, 1970 through July 31, 1977, on the ground of an
intervening change in Pennsylvania law. The district
court’s denial of this motion on November 24, 1980
raises one of the two issues on appeal.
Skehan contends that the recent decision of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Gibson v. Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania, 490 Pa. 156, 415 A.2d 80
(1980), requires us to reconsider our previous holding
that Act No. 152 overruies Mayle. In Gibson the court
held that Act No. 152 could not be applied retroactively
to extinguish causes of action which became actionable
prior to the effective date of the Act. In reaching this
conclusion, the court relied upon state and federal deci-
sions which hold that a legislature may not constitution-
ally eliminate a remedy which has already accrued. Id. at
161-62; 415 A.2d at 83. The court further reasoned that
although tort claims against the Commonwealth were
not actionable prior to Mayle, the abrogation of sovereign
4. We also rejected Skehan’'s argument that the holding in
Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436
U.S. 658 (1978), that local government entities may be deemed
“persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §1983, compels the con-
clusion that section 1983 must be construed as a Congressional
waiver of the state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity. 590 F.2d at
488-91.
immunity in Mayle retroactively applied to claims which
arose prior to the Mayle decision. Id. at 162-63; 415 A.2d
at 84. Shortly thereafter, in Brungard v. Mansfield State
College, 491 Pa. 114, 419 A.2d 1171 (1980), the Pennsy]-
vania Supreme Court applied the rule of Gibson, and
held that a negligence action against a state college
which had been filed in 1972 should not have been dis-
missed by the lower court on the ground that Act No.
152 barred the action.
Skehan’s action accrued and was in existence prior
to the passage of Act No. 152 on September 28, 1978.
Therefore, under the Gibson decision, the Act cannot be
retroactively applied, as we previously assumed. Be-
cause “an appellate court must apply the law in effect at
the time it renders its decision,” Bradley v. School Board
of the City of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696 (1974) (citations
omitted), we must reconsider our earlier holding that the
Eleventh Amendment bars the award sought by Skehan.
The Eleventh Amendment provides, in relevant
part: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, com-
menced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State. . . .” It applies only to bar
suit against a state in federal court. Whether a state may
be sued in its own state courts is a matter of its own state
law. Skehan notes that in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S.
1, 17 (1890), the Supreme Court construed the Eleventh
Amendment to permit a state to be sued in federal court
by its own consent. Skehan argues that although the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Mayle did not expressly
address the applicability of its holding to Pennsylvania's
Eleventh Amendment immunity, the decision should
nevertheless be construed to waive the College’s immu-
nity because the court’s language in Mayle rejects the
sovereign immunity doctrine and its justifications in
sweeping and unequivocal language, and thus implicitlv
abrogates sovereign immunity in federal as well as state
court.
10
The issue now before us has been addressed by a
number of the district courts in this circuit which have
been almost unanimous in their conclusion that Mayle
does not constitute consent by the Commonwealth and
its agencies to be sued in federal court. Moore v.
Colautti, 483 F. Supp. 357, 374 n.26 (E.D.Pa. 1979),
aff d without opinion, 633 F.2d 210 (3d Cir. 1980); Sa-
vory v. Kawasaki Motor Corp., 472 F. Supp. 1216,
1217-18 (E.D.Pa. 1979); Skrbina v. Pennsylvania De-
partment of Highways, 468 F. Supp. 215 (W.D.Pa.
1979); Ruman v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 462
F. Supp. 1355, 1360-61 (M.D.Pa.), affd without opin-
ion, 612 F.2d 574 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
964 (1979); Hernandez v. Whitesell, 462 F. Supp. 569,
573-74 (E.D.Pa. 1978). Contra Greenfield v. Vesella, 457
F. Supp. 316, 319-20 (W.D.Pa. 1978). For the reasons
discussed below, we agree with the conclusion of these
courts.
The cases which have considered a state’s waiver of
its Eleventh Amendment immunity have generally con-
cerned the following issues: First, whether a particular
legislative enactment permitting suits against a state in
its courts serves as a consent to comparable suits in fed-
eral court. See, e.g., Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax
Commission, 327 U.S. 573 (1946) (Utah statute giving
consent to certain taxpayers’ suits not applicable to suits
in federal court). Second, whether certain actions by the
state, such as participation in federal aid programs, con-
stitute consent to suit in federal court. See, e.g., Edelman
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671-74 (1974) (no waiver by
mere participation in federal welfare programs); Daye v.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 483 F.2d 294, 298 (3d
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 946 (1974) (no waiver
based on mere accemtance of funds by the Common-
wealth under the Federal-Aid Highway Act). See also
Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 192-93 (1964)
(where congressional statute authorized suit in federal
court against any railroad operating in interstate com-
merce, state’s operation of railroad in interstate com-
merce constituted consent to suit in federal court); Petty
v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commission, 359 U.S.
275 (1959) (waiver of immunity found in states’ enter-
ing into interstate compact approved by Congress).
Third, whether Eleventh Amendment immunity has
been waived by a general or voluntary appearance in fed-
eral court by an officer of the state, such as the
general. See, e.g., Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436,
447-48 (1883) (waiver found based on voluntary appear-
ance by the state in litigation in federal court). But see
Richins v. Industrial Construction, Inc., 502 F.2d 1051,
1056 (10th Cir. 1974) (no waiver by litigating on the
merits in light of state statute precluding suits against
state in federal court).
Neither party has directed us to any case in which
the issue of waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity
by judicial decision alone has arisen. While we are aware
of no case law authority indicating that the judiciary is
without authority in this regard, we agree with appellees
that strong policy considerations support a conclusion
that the question of waiver of Eleventh Amendment im-
munity would ordinarily be a decision for the legislature
or executive rather than for the judiciary. The legislative
and executive branches have the information needed to
evaluate the ability of the state treasury to bear the po-
tential monetary burden that may result from consent to
suit in federal court. Indeed, the sequence of events
which followed the Mayle decision, enactment of an at-
believe that the Mayle decision constitutes a waiver of
such immunity. The Supreme Court has held that “[i}n
12
deciding whether a State has waived its constitutional
under the Eleventh Amendment, we will find
waiver only where stated ‘by the most express language
or by such overwhelming implications from the text as
[will] leave no room for any other reasonable construc-
tion.” Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. at 673 (quoting
Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171
(1909)). Similarly, in Daye v. Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania, 483 F.2d at 298, we also stated that “the con-
been a waiver will not
be lightly inferred” and that “when a waiver does take
and unequivocal.” This rule of
clear and express waiver has been consistently applied
in cases in which a state has consented to suit in its own
courts by statute; absent a clear declaration of a state’s
consent to a similar suit against itself in federal court,
such consent has not been inferred. See Kennecott Cop-
per Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 327 U.S. at 577;
Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasu y of Indiana,
323 U.S. 459, 465 (1945); Great Northern Life Insur-
ance Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 54-55 (1944). The situa-
tion here is analogous.
The opinion of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Mayle does not, by even the most liberal standards, con-
stitute a clear and unequivocal waiver of Eleventh
Amendment immunity. The precise question before the
court in Mayle was whether Pennsylvania could be sued
in state court for injuries suffered by the plaintiff as a re-
sult of a negligently maintained public highway. See 479
Pa. at 386; 388 A.2d at 709. In reversing the lower
court’s dismissal of appellant's complaint based on the
sovereign immunity doctrine, the Pennsylvania court
expressly “abrogated” that doctrine, reasoning that since
sovereign immunity in Pennsylvania was a non-consti-
tutional doctrine® that was established by judicial deci-
5. The court found that the language of Article |, section 11 of
the Pennsylvania Constitution was neutral with respect to sovereign
immunity. This section provides, “Suits may be brought against the
E
:
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13
sions, the state constitution did not preclude it from
abolishing this judicially-created doctrine. The court
further reasoned that none of the historical arguments
favoring retention of the doctrine have continuing valid-
ity. Except to note that the Pennsylvania legis!ature had
refused to ratify the Eleventh Amendment when it was
proposed by Congress, the Mayle opinion does not dis-
cuss, either expressly or impliedly, the question of waiv-
er of Pennsylvania's federal constitutionally-based im-
munity from suit in federal court. Rather, the opinion
focuses on the judicially-created common law doctrine
of sovereign immunity.
In light of the requirement applicable in this case
that states® must clearly and expressly waive their Elev-
enth Amendment immunity to suit in federal court, we
cannot infer that the Mayle court’s waiver of Pennsylva-
nia’s immunity under state law constitutes a waiver of its
Eleventh Amendment immunity. We, therefore, adhere
to our earlier holding that an award of special damages
against the College is barred by the Eleventh Amend-
ment and affirm the lower court's denial of Skehan’s mo-
tion for an award of special damages.’
Commonwealth in such manner, in such courts and in such cases
as the legislature may by law direct.” See 479 Pa. at 399-400; 388
A.2d at 716-17.
6. Congress’ power to provide for suits against states in federal
courts implementing a constitutional provision is not at issue here.
See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (upholding the
power of Congress to authorize private suits under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§20006e et seq. (1976 & Supp.
Ill 1979), for money damages in federal courts against
unconsenting states liable for employment discrimination in viola-
tion of the Fouvteenth Amendment); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678
(1978) (approving ar. award of attorney's fees under the Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §1988 (1976), pay-
able from the state treasury in an action in federal court
state officers to correct unconstitutional conditions in the Arkansas
State prison system).
7. In view of our disposition of this issue. we need not address
appellee's additional contention that under the Supreme Court's
14
Il.
ADEQUACY OF HEARING PROCEDURE
In the same letter dated December 15, 1977 in
which President McCormick notified Skehan that the
College was no longer proceeding with its nonrenewal
action, he also informed Skehan that the College would
proceed to the required hearing on Skehan’s dismissal.
By letter dated January 5, 1978 from Assistant Attorney
General C. Glendon Frank, who was acting as counsel to
President McCormick, Skehan was notified that this
hearing would take place on January 14, 1978 before “a
committee composed of one representative chosen by
the President and the four highest vote-getting members
of the Committee on Professional Affairs who can be
available on that date and time.” App. at 600a. The letter
enclosed a Statement of Charges against Skehan, pre-
pared by Deputy Attorney General Howard Levinson
who presented the charges against Skehan at the hear-
ing, and stated that “The administration takes no posi-
tion on the truth or falsity of these charges.” In this re-
gard, the letter stated, “As counsel to the President, |
view his position as one of a decision maker, not a pros-
ecutor in this instance.” The letter further stated that
each side would have the right to present witnesses at
the hearing who would be subject to cross-examination
by opposing counsel and that “the hearing committee
[would] make findings of fact as to the truth or falsity of
the Statement of Charges, and make a recommendation
thereon to the President.” Skehan objected to the proce-
dure and notified the members of the entire Committee
on Professional Affairs that neither he nor any represen-
NOTE — (Continued)
dictum in Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978), denial of comper-
satory damages was proper since such an award would constitute a
“windfall” to Skehan rather than compensation because his termi-
nation was justified and would have occurred even if due process
had been provided. ‘
15
tative on his behalf would attend. The hearing commit-
tee was thereafter reconstituted to the full nine-member
Committee on Professional Affairs and held its first
meeting at the time scheduled.
Skehan was subsequently notified of the commit-
tee’s intention to hold additional meetings on January
27, February 10, February 17 and February 18, but he
did not appear at any of the meetings except to appear at
the meeting on January 27th to make an objection to the
“jurisdiction” of the Committee on Professional Affairs.
Skehan subsequently received a copy of the final report
of the hearing commitee dated April 10, 1978 which
made findings of fact and recommended that Skehan’s
contract be terminated. A two-member minority report
recommenued against termination. By letter dated May
11, 1978 from Assistant Attorney General Frank,
Skehan’s attorney was granted the oppcrtunity to file a
post-hearing brief and was invited to attend and present
his views at the meeting of the Board of Trustees on May
17, 1978, at which the Board would consider its recom-
mendation to the President on whether Skehan should
be dismissed.
On June 2, 1978, President McCormick informed
Skehan that based on the recommendations of the hear-
ing committee and the Board, he was being terminated
and removed from the College payroll, effective that day.
Skehan then filed a motion with the district court to en-
force paragraphs 11 and 12 of that court’s judgment of
July 20, 1977. Skehan contended the hearings were not
timely, failed to comply with the requirements of the dis-
trict court’s order of July 20, 1977, and did not comport
with due process. Each of these contentions was reject-
ed by the district court.
Skehan contends that he had a right to have the dis-
missal procedure comport with the procedures set forth
in article 9 of the Statement of Policy for Continuous
Employment and Academic Freedom at Bloomsburg
16
College, and he also appears to contend that the district
court specifically so provided in its judgment of July 20,
1977. Turning to the latter contention first, we note that
in its July 20, 1977 opinion the district court stated:
Skehan’s reinstatement to a suspended status may
be ended either by his full reinstatement or a termi-
nation. The College will be required to afford him a
hearing comporting with due process at which h—
will have an opportunity to refute any charges relat-
ing to his conduct in 1970.
436 F. Supp. at 664.* Looking to the plain language of
the district court’s order, we agree with its interpretation
that the order did not require defendants to provide
Skehan with any particular sort of hearing, other than
one which “comported with the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.”
We also reject Skehan’s contentiun that he had a
contractual right to the procedures se: forth in Article 9
upon dismissal for cause.” As this court has previously
8. In an accompanying order, the court detailed the dismissal
procedures to be afforded Skehan:
11. A pretermination hearing mz2y, at the option of the Presi-
dent of [the College}, be held within 30 days after the Board of
Trustees determines whether or not to renew Skehan's employ-
ment contract or within: 30 days after another final decision has
been reached on the question of renewal or non-renewal,
whichever shal! first occur.
12. If no pretermination hearing is conducted within the time
period set forth in the preceding paragraph, Skehan shall be
reinstated to the position he held on October 7, 1970.
436 ¥F. Supp. at 668-69. These paragraphs starkly contrast with
paragraphs 3 through 10 of the same order which set forth detailed
instructions for the nonrenewal proceedings that tracked Article 9.
9. Article 9 of the Statement of Policy for Continuous Employ-
ment and Academic Freedom at Bloomsburg State College set out
the formal procedures applicable to the dismissal of a tenured facul-
ty member. It provided first for discussion between the faculty
member and the appropriate administrative officers, followed by ref-
17
recognized, Article 9 by its terms prescribed the proce-
dures to be afforded tenured faculty members upon dis-
missal for cause. See 590 F.2d at 473 n.1. It is conceded
that Dr. Skehan was a non-tenured faculty member. The
Article 9 procedures also applied to nonrenewal deci-
sions when the faculty member alleged “that a decision
not to reappoint him has been caused by « nsiderations
violative of academic freedom.” It was this language
which was applied to support the holding that Skehan
was entitled to the Article 9 procedure on his non-
renewal decision. See 431 F.Supp. at 1388. There is no
oo language applying those procedures to for
se dismissals of non-tenured faculty. While we may
squne wits Shaheen Geet the Ribees to ao ene ten &
logical, we cannot read into the Stotement language that
does not appear in that detailed document. '°
erence to the Committee on Professional Affairs of the Faculty. In
the absence of adjustment, the Committee was to recommend to
the President of the College whether in its view formal proceedings
to consider the dismissal of the faculty member should be institut-
ed. Notice to the faculty member including a detailed written expla-
nation of the reasons for the action was required before any such
proceedings. The action of the President was final, although the fac-
ulty member could request further consideration by the President.
If the President of the College reaffirmed the action, the faculty
member could request a hearing, to be held within thirty (30) days,
before an ad hoc hearing committee (of five (5) members and two
(2) alternates) elected by the “aculty of the College. That commit-
tee was to present its report, along with recommendations, to the
President of the College and the Board of Trustees within thirty (30)
days after the date of the completion of the hearing. The faculty
me-nber had the right to be present at the meeting of the Board of
Trustees when the report of the ad hoc hearing commiitee was con-
sidered and could be accompanied by an advisor, although not legal
counsel, both there and at the meetings of the ad hoc committee.
10. Appellees contend that Skehan has waived his claim of enti-
tlement to a right to Article 9 procedures by failing to press such a
claim at the preliminary injunction hearing in 1973, at the tirne that
record was stipulated as the record on the motion for permanent in-
junction, or at the hearing on the final remedy. In light of our dispo-
sition of this appeal, we need not reach that issue.
Although Skehan contends that various policy state-
ments of the American Association of University Profes-
sors should be read into the College's written policy,
even under the nuwost liberal interpretation we could con-
clude only that the reference in the College's Faculty
Handbook for 1970-71 to the 1940 Statement of Princi-
ples on Academic Freedom and Tenure of the American
Association of University Professors'' constituted an
adoption of the 1940 Statement. The specific procedures
which Skehan argues were not applied in his case are
not derived from the 1940 Statement, but from subse-
quent additions and revisions which were not specifical-
ly referred to in the College's Faculty Handbook. There-
fore, even if we were to agree with Skehan that the
College had adopted the 1940 Statement, there is no ba-
sis on this record to find that the College also intended to
adopt those additional statements upon which Skehan
relies. Moreover, as discussed infra, the record estab-
lishes that the procedures afforded Skehan in connec-
tion with his dismissal hearing substantially complied
with the 1940 Statement.
Thus, we conclude that the College was not re-
quired to afford Skehan the precise procedures set out in
11. The 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom
and Tenure of American Association of University Professors
provided:
Termination for cause of a continuous appointment, or the dis-
missal for cause of a teacher previous to the expiration of a term
appointment, should, if possible, be considered by both a facul-
ty committee and the governing board of the institution. In all
cases where the facts are in dispute, the accused teacher
should be informed before the hearing in writing of the charges
against him and should have the opportunity to be heard in his
own defense by all bodies that pass judgment upon his case. He
should be permitted to have with him an adviser of his own
choosing who may act as counsel. There should be a full steno-
graphic record of the hearing available to the parties
concerned.
Article 9. We must still determine whether there is any
validity to his claim that the procedures he was afforded
did not comport with the minimal constitutional require-
ments of due process. We are guided in our inquiry by
the standards established in Chung v. Park, 514 F.2d
382 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 489 (1975), where
we reviewed the procedures afforded a college faculty
member upon the college's decision not to renew his
contract. In holding that the procedures afforded the
plaintiff in Chung satisfied the requirements of due proc-
ess, we emphasized that “[i)f the procedure used by the
college is adequate to prevent unreasonable, arbitrary or
capricious termination decisions, it satisfies due proc-
ess.” Id. at 387. We further noted that “in pre-
termination hearings. . . the person being deprived of
his ‘property interest’ is entitled to minimum procedural
which are adapted to the particular charac-
teristics of the interests involved and the limited nature
of the controversy.” Id. at 386. The safeguards enumer-
ated in that decision were:
(1) written notice of the grounds for termination;
(2) disclosure of the evidence supporting termina-
tion; (3) the right to confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses; (4) an opportunity to be heard in
person and to present witnesses and documentary
evidence; (5) a .veutral and detached hearing body;
and (6) a written statement by the fact finders as to
the evidence relied upon.
Id.
Applying the principles enunciated in Chung, the
distxict court found that the procedures ¢ “orded Skehan
fully satisfied the requirements of due p.: cess. The dis-
trict court found that: (1) Skehan received written no-
tice of the grounds for termination; (2) a pretermination
hearing was conducted by members of the Committee
on Professional Affairs; (3) Skehan was advised of the
20
nature of the proceedings and was given the right to
pi sent witnesses at the hearing but chose not to partici-
pate; (4) Skehan received a copy of the committee's find-
ings of fact and final recommendation, dated April 10,
1978, recommending that his contract be terminated;
and (5) Skehan’s counsel was provided with a tape of the
gs and was able to file post-hearing briefs.
App. at 919a-923a. Having reviewed the evidence before
the district court, we agree that the pretermination pro-
cedures afforded Skehan satisfied the requirements of
due process.
Skehan contends that the above procedures failed to
satisfy the requirements of due process because (1) he
was “bombarded with contradictory proposals and au-
thoritative announcements as to the identity of his ac-
cuser, the identity of the hearing body that would hear
his case, and the time and place of hearing,” Appellant's
brief at 46; (2) he was not provided a transcript of the
proceedings before the Committee on Professional Af-
fairs; and (3) attorneys from the same agency advised
the Committee and the College President, and presented
the charges against Skehan to the Committee on behalf
of the College.
We do not agree. The record does show some evi-
dence of initial confusion as to the date’? and identity of
the hearing body.'’ However, on January 11, 1978
12. As noted in the text, Assistant Attorney General Frank's
letter to Skehan, dated January 5, 1978, corroctly informed him that
inexplicably stated that the hearing would be held on January 12,
1978. App. at 603a. Skehan however concededly knew that in fact
the hearing would be held on January 14, 1978, as it was.
21
Skehan wrote to all members of the Committee on Pro-
fessional Affairs, the body ultimately designated to con-
duct the hearing, stating that he would not attend the
meeting on January 14, 1978, which clearly establishes
that on that date Skehan was aware that a meeting
would take place on January 14, 1978 but that he volun-
tarily chose not to attend on the ground, inter alia, that
the College president failed to sign the charges. The re-
cord also establishes that while no transcripts of the
hearings were provided, due to the unavoidable absence
of the reporter who had been scheduled to attend, the
hearings were tape recorded and the tapes were made
available to Skehan's attorney. Skehan suggests the Col-
lege should have notified him that a new nine-mernber
committee had been formed. Since he declined to attend
the hearing allegedly because of the failure of Dr.
McCormick to sign the charges, we do not believe that
the apparent failure to notify Skehan that the committee
was reconstituted amounted to a denial of due process.
Although he may not have known at that time that the
hearing committee was expanded to the full
nine-member Committee on Professional Affairs rather
than che smaller group to which he had objected, he
concededly was aware of the composition of the hearing
committee by the second meeting when he ap eared be-
fore it. He did not at that time or thereafter change his
position and participate. Therefore under these circum-
stances, we cannot conclude that the failure to notify
him of the reconstituted hearing committee violated any
of Skehan’s rights.
With regard to the involvement of the attorneys
from the Pennsylvania Attorney General's Office,'* the
mittee which had served as the nonrenewal committee and, accord-
ing to the President's special advisor, “had proved their objectivity
by their recommendation in favor of Dr. Skehan in that matter.”
App. at 900a.
14. Jack E. Solomon, Assistant Attorney General, Pennsylva-
nia Department of Education, served as counsel to the Committee
district court found no violation of Skenan's due process
rights:
Plaintiff has submitted nothing to indicate that the
three individuals involved in any way influenced the
decision of the hearing committee. The fact that all
were employed by the same agency is not sufficient.
Moreover, it is undisputed that the role of the Assist-
ant Attorney General advising the committee was
merely to advise it on procedural and evidentiary
matters subject at all times to being cverruled by
the Committee. Moreover, affidavits submitted by
the Committee's counsel explain in detail his ac-
tions and show no basis to conclude that Plaintiff's
due process rights were not respected.
App. at 922. In Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975),
the Court considered a claim that a Wisconsin procedure
which authorized the state's medical hearing board to
“investigate, hear and act upon” practices by doctors and
order temporary suspensions violated procedural due
process. In rejecting this claim, the Court held that the
combination of investigatory and adjudicatory functions
in an administrative agency does not in and of itself
amount to a denial of procedural due process and that
before such a combination of functions can be found vio-
lative of due process there must be a showing that the
combination interferes with the “honesty and integrity”
of the adjudicator, and that there is such a risk of “actual
NOTE — (Continued)
on Professional Affairs; Howard Levinson, Deputy Attorney Gener-
al, Pennsylvania Department of Justice, served as attorney for
Bloomsburg State College and presented the case on behalf of the
Commonwealth at the hearings; C. Glendon Frank, Assistant Attor-
ney General, served as advisor to College President McCormick. Al-
though these attorneys had different titles, the appellees explain
that at the time of the hearing Assistant Attorneys General were as-
signed to various Commonwealth agencies, while Deputy Attorneys
General were employed by the Pennsvivania Department of Justice
and therefore the titles of the attorneys were not reflective of rank.
23
bias” that the practice must be forbidden if due process
is to be afforded. Id. at 47. See also Hoke v. Board of
Medical Examiners, 395 F. Supp. 357 (W.D.N.C. 1975)
(three-judge court) (holding that combined role of Board
of Medical Examiners under state statute as investigator
and adjudicator does not constitute a denial of due proc-
ess). Here Skehan did not allege that the hearing com-
mittee performed multiple functions, but merely that the
attorneys advising the committee and the President of
the College were employed by the same office as the at-
torney presenting the facts in favor of termination.
Skehan does not allege any specific improper con-
duct or bias on the part of these attorneys. In fact, the
three different attorneys were originally assigned to the
Skehan case so as to avoid unfairness “so that each level
of review will be able io act independently of the prior
level.” Letter to Skehan from Deputy Attorney General
Gerald Gornish (Oct. 24, 1977), App. at 480a. We find
that under the facts of this case, the involvement of he
three attorneys from the Pennsylvania Attorney General's
Office did not amount to a denial of due process.
Accordingly, we conclude that the procedures af-
forded Skehan satisfied the requirements of due process.
He was fully informed of the charges against him prior
to the hearing and was presented with an opportunity to
be heard and to present witnesses before a neutral hear-
ing body, but chose not to participate. Under the stand-
ards established in Chung v. Park, 514 F.2d at 387, the
procedures were “adequate to prevent unreasonable, ar-
betrary or capricious termination decisions.”
Finally, we turn to Skehan's contention that the dis-
trict court erred in failing to conduct a hearing regarding
his motion to enforce the July 20, 1977 judgment of the
district court. Skehan contends that he relied upon an
indication by the trial judge that there would be a hear-
ing and that the failure to conduct a hearing precluded
24
him from introducing additional evidence in support of |
his motion at such a hearing.
An order entered in this case by the district court on
May 2, 1980, prior to the submission of Skehan's motion,
provided: “Submissions and determinations of motions
shall be upon briefs, without hearing or oral argument,
unless the court specifically directs otherwise.” At a con-
ference with the district court on September 10, 1980,
following filing of the motion in question, the district
judge specifically asked Skehan's counsel whether there
was a need for a hearing on this motion:
THE COURT: Well, is it going to be a need for a
hearing on the motions, for instance, to enforce the
Court order?
MR. GLASSBERG: We believe we have contained
all our facts in the affidavit and that it can be decid-
ed on the brief and the affidavit — rather, the mo-
tion and the affidavit in support of the brief.
App. at 772a. While the court at the same hearing did
indicate its reluctance “to decide anything on affidavits,”
and interpreted the standing order regarding decisions
on briefs alone as inapplicable if there were any factual
items in dispute, the court did not make a conclusive de-
termination that a hearing would take place. Further-
more, Skehan does not allege that he specifically re-
quested a hearing at any time prior to the ultimate
disposition of his motion on December 5, 1980.'°
In considering Skehan's motion to alter or amend
the court’s order denying his “motion to enforce the
judgment”, the district court ruled that “an evidentiary
hearing is not required in order for the Court to deter-
15. At most, Skehan in his reply brief filed in the district court
in support of his motion to enforce the 1977 judgment, “suggested
that a hearing be conducted in order to form a basis for determining
both factual and legal issues.” App. at 915a. (emphasis added).
mine what type of hearing was required by its order” and
that plaintiff's motion “raises nothing to warrant altering
the Court’s conclusion that the undisputed facts show
that the hearing provided Plaintiff satisfied the require-
ments of due process.” App. at 935a-936a. At least two
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 43(e) and Rule
78, authorize the district court to dispense with hearings
in appropriate circumstances. The district court was ful-
ly cognizant that a hearing would be required if there
were contested material factual issues upon which its
deed, in reaching its decision, the district court relied
primarily upon the facts contained in Skehan’s own
affidavit.
Although we conclude that the district court did not
err in declining to award back pay to Skehan and deciin-
sional Affairs that “the decision not to renew Dr.
Skehan’s contract was for reasons which were violative
of his academic freedom” and that it “has seen no con-
vincing evidence that Dr. Skehan would not have been
rehired had he remained silent about campus issues,”
aun ects oa ic detnd Oe ences due
sion, a decision that was upheld by a majority of the
same faculty committee. This lengthy and divisive dis-
covering both substance and procedure of all decisions
affecting faculty status, including dismissal for cause.
We return to a theme sounded previously, that the
courts are hardly the best fora for resolution of academic
disputes. See Trotman v. Board of Trustees of Lincoln
University, 635 F.2d 216, 218-19 (3d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 101 S.Ct. 2320 (1981). We continue to hope that
the same spirit of light, of liberty, and of learning which
we believe characterizes places of higher education'®
applies not only to faculty and student learning and re-
search but also to the relations between faculty and
administration.
For the reasons set forth above, the orders of the dis-
trict court denying Skehan’s motion for an award of spe-
cial damages and his motion to enforce the juagment of
July 20, 1977 will be affirmed.
A True Copy:
Teste:
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
16. See Speech by B. Disraeli, House of Commons (March 11,
1873), reprinted in,.|| Selected Speeches of the Late Right Honorable
the Earl of Beaconsfield 377 (T.E. Kebbell ed. 1882).
27
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Nos. 81-1094 and 81-1299
DR. JOSEPH T. SKEHAN,
Appellant
Vv.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF BLOOMSBURG STATE
COLLEGE, DR. ROBERT NOSSEN, DR.
CHARLES CARLSON, JOHN PITTENGER, Su-
perintendent of Education, Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, and BLOOMSBURG STATE
COLLEGE,
Appellees
SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING
Present: SEITZ, Chief Judge,
ALDISERT, ADAMS, GIBBONS, ROSENN, HUNTER, WEIS,
GARTH, HIGGINBOTHAM, SLOVITER, and BECKER,
Circuit Judges
The petition for rehearing filed by Appellant, Dr. Jo-
seph T. Skehan, in the above entitled case having been
submitted to the judges who participated in the decision
of this court and to all the other available circuit judges
of the circuit in regular active service, and no judge who
concurred in the decision having asked for rehearing,
and a majority of the circuit judges of the circuit in regu-
lar active service not having voted for rehearing by the
court in banc, the petition for rehearing is denied.
By the Court,
_Dovores K. SLOVITER_
Dated: March 26, 1982 Circuit Judge
28
STATEMENT BY JUDGE ADAMS SUR DENIAL OF
PETITION FOR REHEARING
OR REHEARING EN BANC
Although I vote to deny the petition for rehearing in
this case, I agree that it is unnecessary for this Court to
reach the question whether certain policy statements of
the American Association of University Professors
(AAUP) should be read into Bloomsburg's written policy
regarding dismissal of non-tenured faculty Members.
Such an inquiry would be relevant only in reference to
Skehan's claim chat, before dismissal for cause, he had a
contractual right to the procedures set forth in Article 9
of Bloomsburg’s Statement of Policy for Continuous Em-
ployment and Academic Freedom.
Whatever the merit of that contention, it appears
previously to have been rejected both by this Court, see
590 F.2d at 473 n.1, and by the district court, whose
July, 1977 decision merely required the College “to af-
ford [Skehan] a hearing comporting with due proc-
ess. . . ." 436 F. Supp. at 664. Inasmuch as Skehan did
not appeal that portion of the district court’s July 1977
order, he would appear to be precluded from raising the
issue at this late stage.
When a college has chosen to adopt the policy state-
ments of the AAUP, such statements can serve a valu-
able function in encouraging the internal resolution of
faculty disputes, without the necessity for judicial inter-
ference. Thus, because tie present case does not
squarely and properly raise the issue, | would be reluc-
tant to read the opinion as foreclosing future use of
AAUP statements in interpreting ambiguous college
teaching contracts.
Judge Higginbotham joins in this stat nent.
A True Copy:
Teste:
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
29
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Nos. 81-1094 and 81-1299
DR. JOSEPH T. SKEHAN,
Appellant
v.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF BLOOMSBURG STATE
COLLEGE, DR. ROBERT NOSSEN, DR.
CHARLES CARLSON, JOHN PITTENGER, Su-
perintendent of Education, Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, and BLOOMSBURG STATE
COLLEGE,
Appellees
Present: SEITZ, Chief Judge,
ALDISERT, ADAMS, GIBBONS, ROSENN, HUNTER, WEIS,
GARTH, HIGGINBOTHAM, SLOVITER, and BECKER,
Circuit Judges
Filed March 26, 1982
ORDER AMENDING STATEMENT BY JUDGE ADAMS
SuR DENIAL OF PETITION FOR REHEARING
It is ORDERED that the statement by Judge Adams
in the above matt’r be and is hereby amended as
Page 2, first paragraph, first sentence should read:
I vote to deny the petition for rehearing in this case.
I agree, however, with the American Association of
University Professors (AAUP), which filed an
30
amicus brief, that it is unnecessary for this Court to
reach the question whether certain AAUP policy
statements should be read into Bloomsburg’s writ-
ten policy regarding dismissal of non-tenured facul-
ty members.
BY THE COURT:
ARLIN M. ADAMS
Circuit Judge
DATED: April 6, 1982
A True Copy:
Teste:
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
31
Nos. 81-1094, 81-1299
BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE
of the
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY
PROFESSORS
In Support of Petition for Rehearing
INTEREST OF AMICUS
A passage on page 18 of the decision by the Third
Circuit panel in this case, by implying that pclicy
statements of the American Association of University
Professors (AAUP) must be specifically referred to in
institutional regulations in order to have legal
significance, raises fundamental questions about the role
of these documents in judicial review of campus disputes.
This passage also contradicts a growing body of
precedents from federal and state courts throughout the
United States ...
Since its inception the Association has formulated
Statements, frequently in concert with other national
organizations, intended to establish minimum standards
of institutional practice in higher education. Paramount
among these is the 1940 Statement of Principles on
Academic-Freedom and Tenure (1940 Statement), drafted
jointly with the Association of American Colleges (AAC)
AAUP, the American Council on Education, and the
Academic Freedom and Tenure . . . “Redbook” of AAUP
Policy Documents. To a large extent, AAUP standards
32
are recognized as national norms in institutions of higher
education and are relied on by faculties, administrations,
and governing boards. .. . [Delaware State College v.
Ricks, No. 79-939 ( U.S.———-) (1980)]
QUESTION PRESENTED
Should a court, in construing a contract between a
faculty member and a university, disregard AAUP policy
statements not expressly included in an institution’s
governing uocuments?
Argument
This Court Should Not Limit Its Consideration of
AAUP Policies to Those Specifically Mentioned in the
College’s Faculty Handbook.
The decision by this Court, contrary to developing
case law throughout the United States, unnecessarily
narrows judicial consideration of AAUP policy
statements. This paragraph misconstrues the express
meaning of the 1940 Statement, which requires as a
fundamental principle that a nontenured faculty member
dismissed for case during the term of a contract receive
the same procedural protections as a tenured faculty
member. . . .
Commentators and courts have concluded that
AAUP policy statements are useful sources in inter-
preting the contractual relationship between a faculty
member and a university, and, on occasion, are con-
trolling where a different construction would render a
contract illogical. As the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit pointed out while relying on AAUP
standards:
Contracts are written, and are to be read, by reference to the norms
of conduct and expectations founded upon them. This is especially
true of contracts in and among a community of scholars, which is
what a university is. The readings of the market place are not
invariably apt in this non-commercial context. Greene v. Howard
University, 271 F. Supp. 609, 614 (D.D.C. 1967).
See generally Finkin, Regulation by Agreement: The
Case of Private Higher Education, 65 Jowa L. Rev. 1119,
’
33
1145-54 (1980)... Note, The Role of Academic Freedom in
Defining the Faculty Employment Contract, 31 Case
Western Reserve L. Rev. 608, 610-11, 615-37 (1981); Note,
Financial Exigency as Cause for Termination of Tenured
Faculty Members in Private Post Secondary Educational
Institutions, 62 Jowa L. Rev. 481, 508-10 (1976).
Judge Wright’s decision in Browzin v. Catholic
University of America, 527 F.2d 843 (D.D. Cir. 1975),
contains the fullest discussion of the legal significance of
AAUP policy statements. . . . Judge Wright found it
“entirely proper to look to” other AAUP policy
statements, not specifically contained ir. the Faculty
Handbook or the stipvlation, “interpreting the contract
before us.” Id. at 847-48. Judge Wright noted that several
of these AAUP policy statements “form a kind of
legislative history for the 1968 Regulations, and they do
represent widely shared norms within the academic
community, having achieved acceptance by
onganizations which represent teachers as well as
organizations which represent college administrators
contract here could hardly be questioned.” . . . Judge
Wright suggested the proper judicial stance: “Deter-
mining the relevance of each [AAUP document] requires
a sensitive exploration of its impact on the academic
community, assessing whether it represents accepted
norms of conduct or has founded widely shared expec-
tations.” Id. at 848. He also reiterated that the meaning of
the recommended institutional regulations must be
interpreted by reference to their “purpose and history” as
well as to their explicit
Other courts have relied on AAUP policy statements
as guides to interpretation even though these statements
were neither incorporrted nor referred to in the in-
stitution’s faculty handbook. . . . AAUP (Bloomfield
College Chapter) v. Bloomfield College, 322 A.2d 846(N.J.
Super. 1974), aff'd, 346 A.2d615 (App. Div. 1975), the court
reasoned that disregarding the requirements of the
AAUP documents “would render tenure meaningless by
34
allowing the College to serve as the sole judge of its own
behavior.” 322 A.2d at 855... .
Krotkoff v. Goucher College, 585 F.2d 675 (4th Cir.
1978), . . . despite the College’s failure to mention
“financial exigency” in its by-laws as a permissible
ground for termination. The court .. . “contract must be
interpreted consistently with the understanding of the
national academic community about tenure and finan-
cial exigency.” 585 F.2d at 680. At the same time, the
Fourth Circuit rejected . . . the narrow construction of the
1940 Statement . . . based its construction on additional
AAUP documents, including the AAUP-AAC 1925
Conference Statement on Academic Freedom and
Tenure, the AAUP 1976 Recommended Institutional
Regulations on Academic Freedom and Tenure, and
various reports by AAUP investigating committees.
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island .. . relied on
AAUP policy statements to supply “the custom and
usage of the academic community.” Drans v. Providence
College, 383 A.2d 1033, 1038 (1978). . . . the Faculty
Manual at Providence College “made no mention of
retirement for age at a possible ground for the termina-
tion of tenured professors.” Id. at 1036 .. . relied on the
1940 Statement and the AAUP-AAC 1950 Statement on
Retirement as evidence of national norms regarding
academic retirement plans. In both cases, AAUP
documents provided evidence of a common law of the
academic profession, which created implied contractual
conditions allowing colleges rights beyon« the actual
language of their governing documents while assuring
faculty members that these rights must be exercised
within enforceable limitations. See generally Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602 (1972); Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Co., 363 U.S. 574, 579 (1960). Mabey v.
Reagan, 537 F.2d 1036, 1043 (9th Cir. 1976). Many other
courts have also cited AAUP policy statements as guides
to their legal decisions. See, e.g., Adamian v. Jacobsen,
523 F.2d 929, 934 (9th Cir. 1975) (AAUP Advisory Letter);
Cusumano v. Ratchford, 507 F.2d 980, 986 n.14 (8th Cir.
1974) (AAUP Advisory Letter); Bruce v. Board of Regents,
35
414 F. Supp. 559, 567 n.12 (W.D. Mo. 1976) (Statement of
Principles on Leaves of Absence), Stricklin v. Regents of
the University of Wisconsin, 297 F. Supp. 416, 420 (W.D.
Wis. 1969) (Joint Statement on Rights and Freedoms of
Students); Soglin v. Kauffman, 295 F. Supp. 978, 990
(W.D. Wis. (1968) (Statement on the Acadeniic Freedom of
Students).
Amicus AAUP therefore agrees with petitioner that
documents such as the joint AAUP-AAC 1958 Statement
on Procedural Standards in Faculty Dismissal
Proceedings, designed to supplement the 1940 Statement,
should be considered by this Court in construing the
contract between Dr. Skehan and Bloomsburg State
College. Indeed, the 1940 Statement, which was
specifically. referred to in the Bloomsburg Faculty
Handbook, itself applies the same procedural re-
quirements to “dismissal for cause of a teacher previous
to the expiration of a term appointment” as to “termina-
tion for cause of a continuous appointment.” Slip Opinion
at 18 and n. 11. This language provides a strong basis for
remedying the acknowledged illogic of the Bloomsburg ©
Faculty Handbook, Slip Opinion at 17, by finding that
Article 9 applies to dismissals within term of nontenured
where institutional regulations were silent or ambiguous.
""” Judge Wright’s admonition in Browzin that courts
which new AAUP documents are rooted in normative
policy, the intrinsic persuasiveness of an AAUP docu-
ment, and the fit between an AAUP document and the
36
actual facts of a case are among the factors which should
influence a court. Limiting judicial consideration only to
those AAUP documents that have been specifically
included or referenced in the interns! regulations of a
particulur university, as suggested on page 18 of this
development of policy within the academic community
and encourages the very resort to litigation that this
Court, in the instant case and elsewhere, has eloquently
CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed in this brief, amicus AAUP
respectfully urges this Court to grant plaintiff's petition
for rehearing in order to revise its construction of the role
of AAUP policy statements and, if necessary, to alter its
judgment.
Respectfully submitted,
David M. Rabban
American Association of University
2 March 1982 Professors
One Dupont Circle, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036
Attorney for Amicus Curiae
Of Counsel:
Julius G. Getman
Yale Law School
New Haven, Connecticut 06520
Robert A. Gorman
University of Pennsylvania Law School
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19174
37
SPECIAL DAMAGES
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JOSEPH T. SKEHAN,
Plaintiff
vs.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF
BLOOMSBURG STATE COLLEGE,
et al.,
Defendants
: Civil No. 72-644
: (Judge Muir)
ORDER
November 24, 1980
THE BACKGROUND OF THIS ORDER IS AS
FOLLOWS: .
On September 8, 1980, the Plaintiff filed a motion,
accompanied by a brief, for an award of special damages.
The Defendants filed a brief in opposition to the motion
on September 23, 1980. Plainfiff was afforded an
extension to October 21, 1980 in which to file a brief in
reply but chose not to do so. For the reasons that follow,
the Plaintiff's motion will be denied.
Plaintiff's motion argues that the case of Gibson vs.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Pa. , 415
A.2d 80 (1980), constitutes a change in the law warran-
ting a reexamination of the conclusion by this Court and
the Court of Appeals that Skehan’s claims for damages
against the Bloomsburg State College are barred by the
38
Eleventh Amendment. Gibson held that the Act of 1978-
152, creating by statute sovereign immunity for the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and its agencies,
cannot be applied to bar actions that had accrued as of its
effective date.
Under Gibson Skehan’s claims against the
Bloomsburg State College may be cognizable in a state
court. The fact that Pennsylvania may not be able to
assert its sovereign immunity in state court does not
remove the bar of the Eleventh Amendment to the
exercise of this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction over
Skehan’s claims for damages against Bloomsburg State
College. The jurisdictional limitation of the Eleventh
Amendment applies even if Pennsylvania enjoys no
sovereign immunity under state law. Consequently, the
intervening change in Pennsylvania law does not remove
the bar of the Eleventh Amendment.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED THAT:
Plaintiff's motion for an award of special damages is
denied.
MUIR, U.S. District Judge
ENFORCEMENT OF THE JUDGEMENT
OPINION
MUIR, District Judge.
On September 8, 1980 Plaintiff filed a motion to
enforce the Court’s judgment of July 20, 1977 accom-
panied by a brief, affidavit, and exhibits. The Defendants
filed a brief in opposition to the motion on October 1, 1980
and the Plaintiff filed a reply brief on October 23, 1980.
el wa aut ae bi Plaintiff's motion will be
The Court’s Order of July 20, 1977 set forth certain
procedures to be followed in this case. Specifically,
39
re 2 ne ree
A pretermination hearing may, at the option of the President
op Gaseaainnn Gants Cotene te Gale eit o> dame adur Ge
Board of Trustees determines whether or not to renew Skehan’s
employment contract or within 30 days after another final
decision has been reached on the question of renewal or non-
renewal, whichever shall first occur.
12. If no pretermination hearing is conducted within. the time
:
,
:
|
40
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court’s review of the
undisputed facts in this case indicates that the Defen-
dants have done so.
Due process required that the Plaintiff have an
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner. Mathews vs. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
333 (1976). “{T he function of the hearing procedure is to
inform the professor of the grounds for his non-retention
decisions, it satisfies due process.” Chung vs. Park, 514
F.2d 382, 387 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 948 (1975).
The exhibits attached to Plaintiff's affidavit disclose
thai he received written notice of the grounds for
termination. Exhibit 8 to that affidavit is a letter dated
of whom served on the Committee of Professional Affairs
which had concluded that the decision not to renew Dr.
Skehan’s contract was for reasons violative of
41
President. The President will then make the decision on
and what procedural righte he would have. These rights
comport with the requirements of due process. Plaintiff
chose not to participate in the termination hearing
proceedings.
Plaintiff's reply brief argues that he would have
waived his due process claims had he participated in the
termination hearings and cites in support of that
argument Chung vs. Park, 514 F.2d 382 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 948 (1975). The Court has reviewed
Chung and it does not support Plaintiff's argument. That
case held that a person in Plaintiff's position may waive
certain procedural rights by agreeing to others. It does
not hold that the participation in a hearing, without
more, constitutes a waiver of procedural due process.
~ Saatetllt oftatte Ghat te cunien » enw of @e
termination committee’s findings of fact a | ‘ecommen-
dation dated April 10, 1978 shortly after that date. That
report is attached as Exhibit 14 to the Plaintiffs
affidavit. That statement adequately sets forth the
findings of the hearing body. That witnesses were not
placed under oath and that no stenographic record was
kept of the proceedings do not amount to a denial of due
process. Plaintiff's counsel was provided with a tape of
the proceedings and was able to file post hearing briefs.
Plaintiff appears to argue that the fact that different
members of the Attorney General’s Office served in
various capacities to the President of Bloomsburg State
College, the hearing committee, and also served as the
presentor of the charges against Skehan violates due
process. Plaintiff has submitted nothing to indicate that
the three individuals involved in any way influenced the
decision of the hearing cominittee. The fact that all were
employed by the same agency is not sufficient. Moreover,
it is undisputed that the role of the Assistant Attorney
General advising the committee was merely to advise it
on procedural and evidentiary matters subject at all times
to being overruled by the Committee. Moreover, af-
42
fidavits submitted by the Committee’s counsel explain in
detail his actions and show no basis to conclude that
Plaintiff's due process rights were not respected. See
Woodland Nursing Home Corp. vs. Weinberger, 411
F.Supp. 501, 504 (S.D. N.Y. 1976).
Plaintiffs contention that the hearing did not
comply with various state laws relating to the conduct of
hearings and meetings fails to show a violation of due
process. Whether Plaintiff has a right under those laws
which may be enforceable in state court is a matter not
before the Court. Finally, the Court notes that although
Skehan was finally terminated on June 2, 1978, he did not
seek any relief from this Court with respect to the
termination proceedings until the motion to enforce
judgment was filed on September 8, 1980.
Based upon the Court’s view of the undisputed facts
in relation to the termination hearing the Court concludes
that Defendants have complied with the Court’s order of
July 20, 1977 and provided Plaintiff with a hearing that
comported with the requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Consequently, Plaintiff's motion to enforce
judgment will be denied.
An appropriate order will be entered.
MUIR, U.S. District Judge
DATED: December 5, 1980
MOTION TO ALTER/ AMEND
ORDER
February 3, 1981
THE BACKGROUND OF THIS ORDER IS AS
FOLLOWS:
On December 15, 1980 Plaintiff filed a motion to alter
or amend the Court’s order of December 5, 1980 that
denied Plaintiff's motion to enforce the Court’s judgment
of July 20, 1977. A supporting brief was filed on December
the proceedings that were held to comply with due
process. The Court adheres to its position that the
undisputed facts of record show that due process has been
afforded Plaintiff.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED TiIAT:
Plaintiff's motion to alter or amend the Court’s order
of December 5, 1980 is denied.
MUIR, U.S. District Judge
44
No. 78-1719 Denial of Certiorari
No. 78-1719. Joseph T. Skehan, petitioner, v Board of
Trustees of Bloomsburg State College et al.
444 US 832, 62 L Ed 2d 41, 100 S Ct 61.
October 1, 1979. Petition for writ of certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
%
Statement of Questions Presented for Review
1. In damages suits against state bodies under Title 42
U.S.C. § 1983, should federal Courts decide independently
whether such bodies are “persons” able to be sued or should
they accept holdings of state Courts that such bodies are agen-
cies of the state for which it claims sovereign immunity?
2. Are siate colleges or their boards of trustees “persons”
under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983?
3. Was it settled constitutional law before this Court's
decision in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), that
a public college professor's liberty and property interests in a
written contraci providing for specific hearings before non-
renewal, suspension and dismissal, were protected by the due
process clause?
4. Is a college official who denies due process hearings
before termination of employment, required by contract and
the due process clause, immune from suit under Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975), simply because the contract is
~~t adjudicated by a Court before the denial of the hearings?
44a
5. Does Pennsylvania Act No. 1978-152 (House Bill No.
2437) claim sovereign immunity from a claim for damages un-
der Title 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in light of the historic state remedy
of mandamus and the incorporation of state remedies into
§ 1988?
6. May a state annul a vested right of action by one of its
citizens against it by enacting sovereign immunity with
retroactive effect? May it do so with the assistance of the
State’s attorney, who is opposing the citizen in court, but
without notice to the citizen or opportunity for him to be
heard?
7. Where a college faculty member alleges that he was not
renewed and was suspended and dismissed on account of
protected speech and in violation of his right to hearings by
faculty consmittees on the reasons for these actions, should a
federal Court stay its hand until these academic procedures
are completed?
8. Can a subsidiary governmental unit waive a defense of
sovereign immunity by not raising it in the trial Court?
9. Where a defendant is permitted to raise sovereign im-
munity for the first time on plaintiff's appeal, should a piain-
tiff be given the right to amend his complaint and introduce
new evidence on remand?
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For ras Tuarap Crmovir
Nos. 77-2311 and 77-2312
DR. JOSEPH T. SKEHAN
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF BLOOMSBURG STATE
COLLEGE and DR. ROBERT NOSSEN and DR.
CHARLES CARLSON and JOHN PITTENGER, Sx-
perintendent of Education, Commonwealth of Pennsyl-
vania and BLOOMSBURG STATE COLLEGE.
DR. JOSEPH T. SKEHAN,
Appellant in No. 77-2311,
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF BLOOMSBURG
STATE COLLEGE and DR. ROBERT NOSSEN
and DR. CHARLES CARLSON and JOHN PIT-
TENGER, Superintendent of Education, Common -
wealth of Pennsylvania and BLOOMSBURG
STATE COLLEGE,
Appellants in No. 77-3819.
Ow Appma, From ros Unrrep Srares Disrarcr Court
ror THe Miopiz Dwraicr or Panwsyivaniu
(Civ. No. 72-644, M.D. Pa.)
Argued September 29, 1978
Before Surrz, Chief Judge, Hunan, Circwit Judge, and
Lacer*, District Judge.
(Opinion filed December 21, 1978)
of eT Le United States District Court Judge
for
46
Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
Cletus P. Lyman, Esquire
Richard A. Ash, Esquire
Lyman & Ash
Philadelphia, Pa. 19103
Larry Glass, Esquire
Philadelphia, Pa. 19128
Attorneys for Appellant
in No. 77-2311
Howard M. Levinson
Deputy Attorney General
J. Justin Blewitt, Jr.
Deputy Attorney General
Director, Office of Civil Law
Gerald Gornish
Acting Attorney General
Department of Justice
Harrisburg, Pa. 17120
Attorneys for Appellants
in No, 77-2312
OPINION OF THE. COURT
Surrz, Chief Judge.
Plaintiff, Dr. Joseph T. Skehan (appellant in No. 77-
2311), appeals from the following aspects of a final judg-
ment entered by the district court, embodied in three sep-
arate orders and opinions: 1) a denial of Skehan’s motion
for judgment in his behalf on a claim that his contract as a
faculty member of Bloomsburg State College was not re-
newed beyond the 1970-71 academic year for reasons viola-
tive of the first amendment ; 2) a denial of Skehan’s request
for en award of monetary damages from either the College
or the individual defendants as a remedy for the defend-
47
Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
ants’ violation of his due process rights with respect to
both his nonrenewal and his later dismissal from the Col-
lege faculty; 3) a denial of Skehan’s request that he be
awarded equitable relief in the nature of full rei~statement
to the College faculty as a remedy for the defendants’
violations of his constitutional rights; and 4) a denial of
Skehan’s claim for attorney’s fees and expenses.
Defendants, Bloomsburg State College, its Board of
Trustees, Dr. Robert Nossen (President of the College dur-
ing the period in which the events culminating in this law-
suit transpired), Dr. Charles Carlson (acting President of
the College at the time Skehan filed his complaint) and
John Pittenger (Pennsylvania Superintendent of Educa-
tion) (appellants in No. 77-2312), cross-appeal from that
aspect of the district court’s judgment finding that Skehan
was contractually entitled to an ‘‘academic freedom’’ hear-
ing following his nonrenewal and that their failure to pro-
vide him with such a hearing violated his rights under the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Factual Background
The history of this litigation over the course of the
Professor of Economics at Bloomsburg State College in
48
Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
On September 21, 1970, Skehan wrote Nossen a letter
invoking Article 5e of the Statement of Policy for Con-
tinuous Employment and Academic Freedom at Blooms-
burg State College [hereinafter Article 5e]. In that letter
he alleged that the decision not to reappoint him after
1970-71 had been caused by considerations violative of his
academic freedom.' Nossen did not refer Skehan’s letter
to the Committee on Professional Affairs, the College body
charged with initiating proceedings under Article 5e to re-
solve such allegations, nor did Skehan take any further
action to secure an Articie 5e hearing.
Contemporaneous with his invocation of Article 5e, Dr.
Skehan became embroiled in a dispute between the eco-
nomics department and the College’s administration con-
cerning the scheduling of classes. During that dispute
Skehan was warned that his failure to teach his classes as
scheduled by the College would result in the taking of im-
mediate and direct administrative action against him. On
or about October 1, 1970, Dr. Skehan was observed teaching
a course not assigned to him, and on October 9 Dr. Nossen
notified Skehan that he was relieved of all classroom re-
sponsibilities pending a final hearing. Nossen’s letter of
October 9 also demanded of Skehan a ‘‘full and complete
accountability’’ of his actions on campus since the start of
the semester. When Skehan failed to comply with this
1. The Statement of iy Se Continuous Employment and
49
Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
demand, Dr. Nossen informed him that, effective October
17, 1970, he was removed from the College’s payroll, sub-
ject to final approval by the Board of Trustees. That ap-
proval was obtained at the Board’s regularly scheduled
meeting of October 23, 1970.
Skehan filed a complaint in district court on October
10, 1972. He alleged that his suspension and ultimate dis-
missal in the Fall of 1970 were in retaliation for his active
role in campus political issues, and hence were violative of
his rights under the first amendment. He also alleged that
the defendants suspended and dismissed him without com-
plying with the applicable College laws and regulations
governing faculty status, thereby depriving him of that
due process of law guaranteed by the fourteenth amend-
ment. He requested preliminary and permanent injunctive
relief in the nature of reinstatement and an award of at-
torney’s fees.
The district court held a hearing on Skehan’s request
for a preliminary injunction on January 11 and 12, 1973.
Preliminary injunctive relief was denied in an opinion and
order dated January 31, 1973. Skehan v. Board of Trustees
of Bloomsburg State College, 353 F. Supp. 542 (M.D. Pa.
1973). Subsequently, the parties stipulated that a final
hearing could be held on the record developed at the pre-
its opinion on the merits on May 9, 1973. Skehan v. Board
of Trustees of Bloomsburg State College, 358 F. Supp. 430
(M.D. Pa. 1973).
In that opinion, the district court held that Skehan’s
dismissal from the faculty had been a result of his actions
during the scheduling dispute. Thus, his dismissal was
found not to have been violative of the first amendment.
However, the district court did find that Skehan’s dismissal
during the term of his contract entitled him, under the due
process clause, to a prior hearing on the grounds of his
dismissal, and that such a hearing had not been afforded
Skehan by the College.
50
Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
On appeal this Court affirmed both findings with re-
spect to Skehan’s dismissal, but noted that Skehan had also
challenged the constitutionality of the Board of Trustees’
decision not to renew his contract beyond 1970-71. Thus,
this case was remanded to the district court for findings on
the questions whether the nonrenewal decision had been
motivated by the College administration’s disagreement
with Skehan’s stands on campus issues and whether
Article 5e had contractually entitled Skehan to a hearing
on the reasons for his nonrenewal. This Court also directed
the district court to consider whether the College shared in
the sovereign immunity of the Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania so that it would be immune under the eleventh
amendment from Skehan’s claim for damages. We held
that the individual defendants were entitled to absolute
immunity from damages as executive officials exercising
discretionary governmental functions, and indicated that
Skehan might be entitled to an award of attorney’s fees
from the College as a private attorney general vindicating
a public interest. Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Blooms-
burg State College, 501 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1974).
Trial on the issues remanded to the district court was
postponed while Skehan’s petition for writ of certiorari to
the Supreme Court was pending. On May 27, 1975, the
Supreme Court granted his writ, vacated the judgment of
this Court, and remanded the case ‘‘for further considera-
tion in light of Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness
Society, (421 U.S. 240 (1975)], and Wood v. Strickland,
420 U.S. 308 (1975).’’ 421 U.S. 983 (1975). This Court
reviewed the ca * en banc on remand from the Supreme
Court, and addressed itself to three issues respecting the
. relief to which Skehan might be entitled for the defendants’
actions in bringing about his nonrenewal and termination.
Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State College,
538 F.2d 53 (3d Cir. 1976).
First, we noted that Alyeska had overruled the cases
upon which this Court had earlier relied in determining
51
Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
that Skehan, as a ‘‘private attorney general,’’ was entitled
to an award of attorney’s fees. Thus, the attorney’s fees
aspect of the case was remanded to the district court for
findings on pre-litigation obduracy, and for consideration
of an award of fees based on the defendants’ future main-
tenance of this litigation in bad faith. This Court held that
only the latter ground could be the basis of a fee award
against the College given that it was a staie agency for
which the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania claimed sov-
ereign immunity. 538 F.2d at 55-59.
Second, we noted that the Supreme Court had demon-
strated in Wood v. Strickland that this Court’s earlier
holding that the individual defendants were absolutely im-
mune from liability as nonjudicial government officials
performing adjudicatory functions was inappropriate.
Thus, the question of official immunity was remanded to
the district court for findings of fact with respect to the
immunity of each defendant under the test articulated by
the Supreme Court in Wood. Id. 59-62.
Finally, this Court stated that an intervening decision
of the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, Brungard v.
Hartman, 12 Pa. Commw. Ct. 477, 315 A.2d 913 (1974),
holding that state colleges are agencies for which Penn-
sylvania claims sovereign immunity, was dispositive of the
eleventh amendment issue concerning the College’s liability
for damages. Thus, we held that a back pay award could
not be made out of the College’s treasury, and that an
award of attorney’s fees against the College could only be
based on the exception to the American rule for the main-
tenance of litigation in bad faith. 538 F.2d at 62.
In conclusion, this Court reiterated that on remand
the district court was to make findings of fact on th.
nature of the interest created by Article 5e and on whether
the decision not to renew Skehan’s contract beyond 1970-71
lad been impermissibly based on his stands on campus
issues. The Supreme Court denied defendants’ petition
for a writ of certiorari on November 29, 1976. 429 U.S.
979 (1976).
52
Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
It is with this background in mind that we turn to the
parties’ challenges to the district court’s disposition of the
issues remanded to it by this Court.
I. Tas FPmst Amenpment Cram
The district court issued its first opinion after remand
on plaintiff’s and defendants’ cross-motions for judgment
on Skehan’s claim that the decision not to reappoint him
after 1970-71 was for reasons violative of the first amend-
ment. Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State
College, No. 72-644 (M.D. Pa., filed March 24, 1977) (un-
Before meeting those contentions we must address the
did :
renewal decision, and that the question whether that de-
cision was violative of the first amendment was litigated
by the parties at the preliminary injunction hearing held
in January, 1973. In fact, the district court decided n.. to
take additional testimony on the first amendment non-
renewal issue after remand precisely because the parties
had had a full opportunity to pr sent all evidence concern-
ing the reasons which may have motivated the Board’s
decision not to renew Skehan’s contract at that earlier
53
Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
hearing. See Part 1,B infra. Moreover, this Court’s
en banc opinion remanding the first amendment issue to
the district court represents the ‘‘law of the case’’ with
respect to that aspect of Skehan’s claim. We are bound
by the earlier determination of this Court, and thus reject
defendants’ argument, raised at this late date, that the
not have been remanded to the district court.
Part ILA infra.
A. Statute of Limitations
The district court found that Skehan’s nonrenewal
im stated a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Be-
cause § 1983 does not contain its own statute of limitations,
the court turned to Pennsylvania law to determine the pe-
riod of limitations applicable to the most analogous state
law claim. The court held that the six year statute of lim-
itations established by the Act of March 27, 1713, 1 Sm. L.
76, §1, 12 P.S. $31, governed Skehan’s claim, as it gov-
erned the state law claim the court found to be most anal-
ogous to it, namely a claim of wrongful interference with
an employment contract. Defendants argue that thy court
erred in holding the six year period of limitations appli-
cable to Skehan’s claim, contending that the two year period
of limitations established for personal injury actions in the
hs
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55
Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
for bodily injury whereas [plaintiff's] claim is for tortious
interference with his right to contract for the purchase of
a house.’’ Id. (footnote omitted).
In Davis r. Uuited States Steel Supply, 581 F.2d 335
(3d Cir. 1978), this Court reversed a district court decision,
relied upon by the defendants here, that had held the two
year period of limitations in 12 P.S. § 34 applicable to a
cause of action challenging racially Jiscriminatory ew-
ployment practices brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
Relying on Meyers, supra, the Davis Court noted that § 34
is applicable only to actions seeking damages for bodily
injury. 581 F.2d at 339. The Court held that the plain-
tiff’s cause of action in Davis, alleging ‘‘an unlawful
interference with another’s economic rights or in "
Id. 339 (footnote omitted) (emphasis supplied).
The district court properly noted that Skehan’s claim,
mination that 12 P.S. § 31 provides the applicable statute
of limitations for Skehan’s claim, we also rely on the fact
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Opinion of the Third Circuit Court uf Appeals.
issue; was unjust given thet the court applied a test to
the merits of the claim that had been formulated by the
Supreme Court in 1977; was inconsistent with the court’s
decision to allow additional testimony on the defendants’
official immunity defense; caused the court to decide the
issue on a stale record; was inconsistent with the court’s
earlier orders respecting pre-trial discovery; and pre-
vented plaintiff from -producing a great quantity of
It is clear that ‘‘[gJenerally, whether a trial court will
reopen a case to take more testimony is discretionary with
that court.’’ Rochez Brothers, Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d
891, 894 n.6 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 993
(1976). see Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,
401 U.S. 321, 331 (1971). The contention that Skehan
presses most vigorously in arguing that the trial court
abused that discretion in this instance is that by not taking
57
Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
additional testimony on the first amendment claim the dis-
trict court failed to comply with the mandate of this Court
to make findings of fact on the causes of Skehan’s nonre-
newal. To the contrary, however, neither opinion of this
Court specifically instructed the district court to take
further evidence on any issue remanded to it for findings
of fact. In fact, we feel that there was an assumption im-
plicit in those opinions that the trial court need not reopen
the record of this case for further testimony on the first
amendment issue in order to make the required findings.
This Court was fully aware that the parties had stipu-
lated that the district court could hold a final hearing on
the record developed at the preliminary injunction hearing
in January, 1973. See 501 F.2d at 37. Yet, it was only with
respect to the issue of the individual defendants’ official
immunity that this Court indicated that the record might
court in the first instance. See 538 F.2d at 62. Thus, con-
trary to Skehan’s contention that the trial court’s jeriz/
of his motion to take additional testimony was inconsistent
need to reopen the record to the sound discretion of the
trial court. See Rochee Brothers, supra at 894 (failure
Our seope of review on this question is quite limited.
As Professor Moore has stated:
A district court, then, should consider a motion
to take additional testimony in light of all the surround-
ing circumstances and grant or deny it in the interest
of fairness and substantial justice.... [T]he grant
or denial involves an exercise of discretion by the trial
court; and because this court has a feel for the case
58
Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
that an appellate court can seldom have, the trial
OS Ses Sian So SENSES Gy ah Oe
where abuse is clearly shown.
6A Moore’s Federal Practice 159.04 [13] at 36-37 (2d ed.
1974) (footnotes omitted). In Rochez Brothers, supra at
894 n.6, this Court stated that the district court should be
concerned with several factors in deciding whether to re-
open a case, including the burden which would be placed on
the parties and their witnesses, undue prejudice which
might result by a refusal to take new testimony, and con-
siderations of judicial economy.
The district court was clearly concerned with the
burdens placed on the parties and the court system by the
failure of that system to dispose of the dispute in this case
promptly and fairly. That theme is prominent throughout
the court’s numerous pre-trial orders attempting to bring
the parties into court for resolution of the issues remanded
by this Court. Following a final pre-trial conference on
December 1, 1976, the court directed that the parties file
motions for the taking of such additional testimony on those
issues as they deemed advisable. In spite of Skehan’s con-
tention to the contrary, we do not find that the district court
in prior orders had indicated to the parties that there
would be further testimony taken on the first amendment
issue. In its order of January 10, 1977, the court, after
considering all the points raised here by Skehan, save one
that is discussed below; denied his motion to reopen the
record on the first amendment nonrenewal claim. The
court relied on the fact that Skehan had had a full op-
portunity to present evidence on the defendants’ motivation
in declining to renew his contract beyond 1970-71 at the
preliminary injunction hearing; any responsibility for in-
adequacies in that presentation was deemed to rest with
Skehan. Furthermore, the court determined that the real
thrust of Skehan’s request wes to insure that he would
have an opportunity to rebut any evidence offered by the
defendants on the question of their official immanity from
59
Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
an award of damages arising from the alleged first amend-
ment violation. The court offered Skehan the opportunity
to present such rebuttal evidence if the issue of official i im-
munity from liability were to arise.
We believe that the concerns raisca here by Skehan,
and rejected by the distrivi court, do not compel a conclu-
sion that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
his motion to take additional testimony on the first amend-
ment nonrenewal claim. This is not one of the exceptional
cases envisioned in Rochez Brothers, supra at 894-95, in
which a party failed to put into evidence all the necessary
elements of his claim because of a misunderstanding among
the parties and the trial court; nor was the trial court un-
able to make findings of fact on the nonrenewal claim with-
out the proffered testimony. See Pittsburgh Press Club v.
United States, 426 F. Supp. 553, 554 (W.D. Pa. 1977), aff’d
in relevant part, 579 F.2d 751, 755 (3d Cir. 1978). Rather,
as Skehan concedes, at the time of the preliminary injunc-
tion hearing, the district court and the parties probably
considered the question of the College’s motivation in its
nonrenewal of Skehan to be merged with the first amend-
ment challenge to his dismissal. Thus, Skehan did present
evidence with respect to his first amendment activities, and
the College’s reaction to them, relevant to the whole period
of his employment by the College. The district court in
no way hindered him from offering proof that the nonre-
newal decision was motivated by his engaging in conduct
protected by the first amendment. Skehan’s counsel made
a tactical judgment to rest on the record made at the pre-
liminary injunction hearing and, based on that record, the
district court was able to detail Skehan’s campus activism
prior to the nonrenewal decision in the Spring of 1970 in
twelve findings of fact contained in its opinion on the
merits of the first amendment claim, discussed below.
Skehan has presented one contention for the considera-
tion of this Court that, of necessity, he did not present to
the district court prior to its order of January 10, 1977.
60
Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
That contention is that the district court should have re-
versed its order denying his motion to present additional
testimony on the first amendment issue when it became
aware of the change in the law represented by the decision
of the Supreme Court in Mt. Healthy City School District
Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). The
Mt. Healthy decision was issued by the Supreme Court on
January 11, 1977, one day after the district court’s order
denying Skehan’s motion, but prior to the court’s ruling
on the merits of the first amendment claim on March 24,
1977, in which it relied on the test of causation formulated
in Mt. Healthy.
Skehan is correct in his assertion that a change in legal
standards may warrant the reopening of a case where addi-
tional testimony would be pertinent to the change of law.
See 6A Moore’s Federal Practice § 59.04[13] at 36 (2d ed.
1974). In fact, the district court relied on this ground in
deciding to grant the defendants’ request to take additional
testimony on the official immunity defense. However, we
believe that the Mt. Healthy decision did not reflect a ~
change in the law that would warrant the district court’s
reopening of the record in this case to allow Skehan to
present additional testimony on his claim that the defend-
ants’ decision not to reappoint him beyond 1970-71 violated
the first amendment.
Mt. Healthy did not substantially affect the affirmatjve
burden of a plaintiff in Skehan’s position to show by. a
preponderance of the evidence that his first amendment
activities were a substantial or motivating factor in an
adverse employment decision. The standard ‘of proof
adopted in Mt. Healthy is, if anything, more stringent than
the standard applied by the district court in its ruling in
1973 that Skehan had failed to prove he had been termi-
nated for reasons violative of the first amendment, 358 F.
Supp. at 434—a ruling affirmed by this Court, 501 F.2d at
39. To the extent the Mt. Healthy Court adopted a ‘‘new”’
formulation of the test of causation for claims alleging dis-
61
Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
missal from public employment for reasons violative of the
first amendment, the ‘‘new’’ aspect of that formulation was
the Court’s holding that the defendants in such a case must
be afforded an opportunity to rebut a prima facie case of
impermissible motivation by showing by a preponderance
of the evidence that they would have reached the same de-
cision even in the absence of the constitutionally protected
conduct of plaintiff. 429 U.S. at 284-87. Because Skehan
was permitted to adduce all testimony relevant to his first
amendment nonrenewal claim at the preliminary injunction
hearing, and because no evidence pertinent to his affirma-
tive case after Mt. Healthy would not have been equally
pertinent then, we cannot say that Skehan was prejudiced
-by the court’s application of a ‘‘new’’ legal standard to
his first amendment claim.
We conclude that it was not an abuse of discretion for
the district court to have declined to reopen that aspect of
the record of this case dealing with Skehan’s claim that
the College’s decision not to renew his appointment beyond
1970-71 violated the first amendment.
C. The Merits of the First Amendment Claim
The district court found that the evidence adduced by
Skehan at the preliminary injunction hearing failed to
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that his con-
stitutionally protected conduct was a ‘‘substantial’’ or
**motivating’’ factor in the decision of the Board of Trus-
tees to offer him a terminal contract for the 1970-71 aca-
demic year. See Mt. Healthy, supra at 287. Furthermore,
the court went on to find that even if Skehan had met that
initial burden, the defendants had shown by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that Skehan’s contract would not have
been renewed beyond that year even if he had not spoker
out on campus issues. See id. Having concluded that the
court’s findings on Skehan’s failure to meet his initial
burden of proof are not clearly erroneous, we affirm the
court’s judgment on the first amendment nonrenewal issue.
62
Opinion of the Third Circuit Cour: of Appeals.
The district court found as a fact that ‘‘Dr. Skehan
assumed an activist position on many of the issues raised
in the campus community, a position often grating to the
administration of Bloomsburg State College.’’ However,
the court also found:
There is no evidence on the record to establish that the
Board of Trustees based their decision not to renew
Skehan’s contract on his criticism of administrative
policies or his comments on campus issues. Skehan
has shown only that after he spoke out on campus
issues his contract was not renewed. No evidence es-
tablisbing a relationship or nexus between the two
events has been presented.
Unpublished opinion of March 24, 1977, at 14.
Skehan argues that the district court’s finding that
there was no evidence connecting the College’s nonrenewal
decision with his first amendment activities should be set
aside as clearly erroneous. He relies on the following
passage from Dr. Nossen’s letter to him, dated October 9,
1970, informing him that he was being relieved of class-
room responsibilities for his actions during tbe scheduling
dispute, as proof of the nexus the district court found
lacking :
I hardly need remind you that you are, during this
current year, on terminal appointment. You were, at
the time that appointment was offered, advised that
your previous disruptive activities made your presence
on this campus unwelcome, and the hope was expressed
that you would not accept. [emphasis supplied].
Skehan contends that those ‘‘previous disruptive activi-
ties’? must have been a reference to activities protected by
the first amendment and that the foregoing passage proves
that the College’s nonrenewal decision was substantially
motivated by considerations violative of the Constitution.
63
Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
The district court found, however, that the phrase could
have been a reference to Skehan’s refusal to meet his
classes at the appointed times. There was testimony intro-
duced at the preliminary injunction hearing by Skehan’s
department chairman that prior to Skehan’s nonrenewal
he had arranged, without approval and contrary to past
instructions, to have other faculty members take charge of
his classes.
It is also possible that the ‘‘disruptive activities’’
referred to by Dr. Nossen in his letter of October 9 were
the same activities he mentioned in an earlier letter of
June 15, 1970, admitted into evidence at the preliminary
injunction hearing as defendants’ exhibit 12. In that
letter, reaffirming the Board of Trustees’ determination
that Skehan’s appointment for the 1970-71 academic year
was to be a terminal contract, Dr. Nossen stated:
The Board members have expressed deep concern
over your continued failure to cooperate with your
Department Chairman, to meet established depart-
mental deadlines, and to contribute to constructive
departmental operation. Your Chairman has, in
desperation, requested that you no longer attend de-
partmental meetings and that you report, should you
return for 1970-71, to the Dean of Instruction rather
than to him.
Whatever the true meaning of the phrase ‘‘disruptive
activities’ in the October 9 letter might be, we can find
no error in the district court’s determination that Skehan
failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
Dr. Nossen acted to prevent the renewal of Skehan’s con-
tract because of his disagreement with Skehan’s avowed
positions on campus issues. Moreover, there is no evi-
dence that the members of the Board of Trustees were
even aware of Skehan’s first amendment activities at the
time they approved the decision not to renew his contract.
Such a failure of proof requires that we credit the district
64
Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appea's.
court’s evaluation of the testimony and affirm, as not
clearly erroneous, its finding of fact that ‘‘Skehan’s criti-
cism and disagreement with the administration, specifically
Dr. Nossen and the Board of Trustees . . . concerning cer-
tain campus issues . . . was not a motivating or substantial
factor in the decision not to renew his contract of employ-
ment beyond the 1970-1971 year.’’ Unpublished opinion
of March 24, 1977, at 7. See Franklin v. Atkins, 562 F.2d
1188, 1192 (10th Cir. 1977) ; cf. Mazaleski v. Treusdell, 562
F.2d 701, 716 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Mt. Healthy requires that
a dismissed public employee’s first amendment claim be
supported by more than post hoc ergo propter hoc allega-
tions).
Having considered all of Skehan’s arguments perti-
nent to this aspect of his appeal, we concur in the con-
clusion of the district court that Skehan did not establish
that his first amendment activities were a substantial or
motivating factor in the College's decision not to renew
his contract beyond 1970-71. We need not review the
district court’s determination that, even if Skehan had
established a prima facie case of a first amendment viola-
tion, the defendants proved by a preponderance of the
evidence that he would have been offered a terminal con-
tract based on reasons independent of his constitutionally
protected conduct.
Il. Tae Arrtiote 5e Procepura, Dus Process Ciam
On April 14 and 15, 1977, the district court heard
testimony without a jury concerning, inter alia, the nature
of the interest created by Article 5e of the College’s State-
ment of Policy for Continuous Employment and Academic
Freedom, and whether Skehan’s right to a hearing under
Article 5e had been violated by defendant Nossen’s failure
to institute the proceedings called for by that provision
upon receipt of Skehan’s letter of September 21, 1970.
yx. an opinion issued on May 18, 1977, the district court
held that Skehan possessed a contractual right to the
65
Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
procedures set forth in Article 5e, that he had invoked
that right within a reasonable time, and that the College’s
failure te afford Skehan those procedures violated the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Skehan
v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State College, 431
F. Supp. 1379, 1391 (M.D. Pa. 1977).
The defendants’ cross-appeal raises two challenges to
that holding: first, they assert that the district court
should not have considered the Article 5e claim, even
though this Court had specifically instructed that it do so,
because the claim was never raised by Skehan at any stage
of this litigatio.:; second, they contend that Skehan did
not have a contractual right to the procedures set forth
in Article 5e because the College’s Statement of Policy
was not a contract supported by consideration nor one
whose obligations were set forth with sufficient certainty,
because it had not been practical for the College to adhere
to those procedures in Skehan’s case, because Skehan’s
behavior during the scheduling dispute had discharged the
College’s obligation to provide him with an Article 5e
hearing and because Skehan’s letter to President Nossen
was not a proper invocation of Article 5e. If we reverse
the district court’s finding that Skehan was contractually
entitled to the procedures set forth in Article 5e, the
defendants rightly conclude that Skehan would have no
property interest in those procedures rising ‘‘to the level
of a ‘legitimate claim of entitlement’ protected by the
Due Process Clause.’’ Memphis Light, Gas &@ Water
Division v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978).
A. Skehan’s Alleged Failure to Raise the Article 5e Claim
The defendants argue that the district court’s holding
in Skehan’s favor on the procedural due process claim
should be reversed because it was error for the court to
have addressed that issue in the first instance. The dis-
trict court noted in its opinion on this issue that the Article
5e claim was never set forth in Skehan’s complaint, never
66
Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
, 1382. The court also stated its view that
Skehan’s failure to raise the claim in his complaint ran
afoul of the requirement that facts be pleaded with spec-
ificity in civil rights actions, and that the ‘‘creation’’ of
the issue by this Court was inconsistent with our juris-
prudential system. Jd. Nonetheless, the court felt itself
bound by the directions of this Court to fully consider the
issue as though it had been initially raised by Skehan in
his complaint.
Defendants rely on the foregoing observations of the
injunction hearing, we decline to accept the validity of the
district court’s observations. Moreover, in the unanimous
panel opinion of this Court entered on May 3, 1974, we
stated that Skehan had presented a due process claim based
on the College’s failure to provide him with an Article 5e
hearing and that the district court had failed to make find-
ings of fact on that claim. 501 F.2d at 38. Thus, this
Court remanded the case to the district court for findings
‘*as to the nature of the interest created under Pennsyl-
vania law by article 5(e) of the Statement of Policy for
.Continuous Employment and Academic Freedom at Blooms-
burg State College... .’’ Id. 45. In our unanimous
en banc opinion on remand from the Supreme Court, we
again directed that findings be made on the Article 5e issue.
538 F.2d at 63. The defendants did not seek review of the
original order of this Court; their petition for certiorari to
the Supreme Court, filed after the issuance of our opinion
en banc, did not raise the contention they now press that
this Court impermissibly created the Article 5e issue sua
sponte. Thus, even if we were to agree with the defend-
ants’ contention and the district court’s observations, we
would have to rule that this Court’s prior opinions repre-
67
Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
sent the law governing this case with respect to the ques-
tion whether it was permissible to remand the Article 5e
claim to the district court.
B. The Merits of the Article 5e Due Process Claim
The district court held that the College’s Statement
of Policy ‘‘sets forth its purpose in terms that meet the
general requirement that a contract be supported by con-
sideration.’’ 431 F. Supp. at 1388. The court found that
the Statement had been adopted by the College to insure
the more effective services of faculty members, and that
during the period in which it was in effect each faculty
member was given a copy of the Statement at the start of
his term of employment and was asked to acknowledge in
writing his familiarity with its provisions. Jd. 1387-88.
Thus, the court found the Statement to be an integral part
of the contractual structure defining the employment rela-
tionship between the College and its faculty.
The defendants dispute the district court’s characteri-
zation of the Statement as a contract, arguing that under
Pennsylvania law it was not an enforceable agreement, but
rather an ‘‘illusory promise,’’ lacking in certainty with
respect to the nature and extent of the obligations of the
parties thereto. They base this argument on a clause in
that section of the Statement’ preamble labeled “*Pur-
Statement to follow its procedures only when ‘‘practical’’
they argue that it was a promise merely in form.
The district court held, to the contrary, that the
ee een ee tee Seay 00 eae
a factfinder and, hence, its presence in the Statement
not render its provisions unenforceable but rather per-
mitted the College to avoid its obligations only by estab-
lishing that compliance in a given case was impractical.
431 F. Supp. at 1588. We believe the district court’s ruling
68
Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
on this question to be consistent with applicable Penn-
sylvania law. See Kirk v. Brentwood Manor Homes, Inc.,
191 Pa. Super. Ct. 488, 159 A.2d 48, 51 (1960).
The holding of the district court that the College’s
enforceability the maxim ‘‘ ‘id certum est quod certum
reddi potest’ (that is certain which can be made certain)’’
cision. They also defend the merits of their decision,
Findings of fact made by the district court, and sup-
ported by the testimony of President Nossen, belie the
claim that the appropriate officers of the College made a
reasoned determination that emergency conditions caused
by Skehan’s refusal to comply with administrative direc-
tives concerning the scheduling of classes compelled them
not to comply with Article 5e in spite of Skehan’s request
that they do so. Rather, President Nossen did not respond
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69
Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
without reading the Statement, that the College’s Commit-
tee on Professional Affairs was the appropriate body to
initiate such proceedings. 431 F. Supp. at 1385. The dis-
trict court also found that no evidence had been presented
by the defendants in support of their contention that, given
the scheduling dispute, it had been impractical for the
College to implement the procedures of Article 5e in Ske-
han’s case. Jd. 1388. Thus, we find no error in the dis-
trict court’s determination that the defendants did not
establish that proof of impracticality needed to avoid their
contractual obligation to provide Skehan an Article 5e hear-
ing.
now before this Court is that he was contractually entitled
to a hearing into the reasons for his earlier nonrenewal.
He requested such a hearing on September 21, 1970, which
was found by the district court to be a reasonable time to
70
Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
that Skehan’s actions justified their termination of the Col-
lege’s contractual obligations to him until some four weeks
after he had requested an Article 5e hearing. Under such
circumstances we cannot agree that the defendants were
discharged from their contractual obligations with respect
to Skehan’s challenge to his nonrenewal at uny time prior
to the date on which the College itself decided to treat his
contract as terminated. During the interval between Sep-
tember 21 and October 19, 1970, Dr. Nossen made no at-
tempt to set inte motion the procedures of Article 5e. We
agree with the holding of the district court that the College
was not discharged from its obligation to do so by Skehan’s
failure to obey administrative directives during the sched-
uling dispute. We feel supported in this. ruling by the
observation of the district court that the very purpose of
Article 5e would be defeated if the College were permitted
to deny a faculty member a hearing on the causes of his’
nonrenewal whenever it asserted that his failure to perform
his obligations to the College discharged the College’s
obligation to comply with Article 5e. 431 F. Supp. at 1388.
Finally, the defendants contend that it was error for
the district court to hold that Skehan’s letter of September
appropriate method of initiating its procedures, and hold-
Skehan should have submitted a copy of
letter to the Committee; his failure to do so did not
the College’s failure to act upon his: request for a
431 F. Supp. at 1389. We believe that the dis-
court’s decision was amply supported by the terms of
5e and Skehan’s letter. cee
5e provided that the President of the College —
to explain to a nontenured faculty member
HN
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71
Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
the basis of a nonrenewal decision if that faculty member
alleged an infringement of academic freedom. It also
provided that such an allegation ‘‘shall be given pre-
liminary consideration by the Committee on Professional
Affairs ... .’’ See note 1 supra. In his letter to Dr.
Nossen Skehan stated: ‘‘I hereby invoke article 5e .. .
affirming that the decision not to re-appoint me has been
caused by considerations violative of academic freedom.’’
There was testimony given at the preliminary injunction
hearing by a former dean of the College that upon receipt
of Skehan’s letter it would have been the President’s re-
sponsibility to refer the matter to the Committee on Pro-
fessional Affairs. Thus, there is evidence to support the
district court’s implicit holding that, given the ambiguity
in the language of Article 5e, Skehan’s peinted invocation
of its procedures by letter to the President of the College
was an appropriate means to initiate those procedures.
The district court held that Skehan had a property
interest in the procedures of Article 5e and that the failure
of the College to initiate those procedures upon his request
violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. The court’s conclusions are consistent with ap-
plicable Pennsylvania law and with the purpose of the
Statement of Policy to provide a procedural structure to
the College’s employment relationship with its faculty.
The district court’s finding that the College breached its
contractual obligations in Skehan’s case, and hence violated
procedural due process, is amply supported by the record.
Thus, we affirm that aspect of the district court’s jndgment
and proceed to a consideration of whether the relief
awarded Skehan by the district court was appropriate.
Ill. Racer
A. The Present Posture of this Case
In its en banc opinion this Court decided that any
award of back pay to which Skehan was otherwise entitied
72
Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
from the College itself was barred by the eleventh amend-
ment. This holding was based on the decision of the Penn-
sylvania Commonwealth Court in Brungard v. Hartman, 12
Pa. Commw. C(t. 477, 315 A.2d 913 (1974), that state col-
leges are agencies for which Pennsylvania claims sovereign
immunity. The College’s sovereign immunity status under
state law was deemed by this Court to be dispositive of the
eleventh amendment immunity issue as well. 538 F.2d at 62.
This Court did direct the district court to consider an
award of back pay against the individual defendants in this
case; the availability of such an award would depend upon
each defendant’s ability to establish that he acted in good
faith and without malice under the official immunity doc-
trine. The period for which back pay could be awarded
was to depend upon the district court’s findings as to
Skehan’s constitutiona! challenges to his nonrenewal. Thus,
this Court directed that ‘‘[i)f Skehan’s only contract right
expired by its terms at the end of the 1970-71 academic
year, and there was no first amendment violation, a back
pay award . . . covering the 1970-71 period, must be con-
sidered.’’ Jd. 63. On the other hand, ‘‘[i]f either the
article 5(e) claim or the first amendment claim should be
decided in Skehan’s favor, the court should consider the
award of back pay to date against the individual defend-
ants, and also prospective reinstatement . . . at least until
appropriate college termination procedures have taken
place.’’ Id.
We also directed that an award of attorney’s fees be
considered against the individual defendants for bad faith,
vexatious, wanton or oppressive conduct either prior to or
during the course of this litigation, and against the College
for such conduct during this litigation. Subsequent to our
en banc opinion, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Attor-
ney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, and in the proceedings on
remand Skehan based his fee request on that statutory
p-ovision.
73
Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
The district court was not required to consider the
amount of back pay to which Skehan was entitled for the
violations of his right to procedural due process with re-
spect to either the nonrenewal or the termination decision
because Skchan was not successful in the proceedings below
in establishing the liability of any defendant for damages
arising from those violations. He was also unsuccessful in
his effort to recover attorney’s fees because the district
court held that sovereign immunity barred a fee recovery
from the College, and it exercised its discretion under the
Awards Act to deny Skehan an award of fees from the
individual defendants. The court did prospectively rein-
state Skehan to a suspended with pay status at the College,
pending the completion of nonrenewal and termination pro-
ceedings. Various aspects of the district court’s award of
relief and this Court’s instructions with respect to that
award have been raised as grounds of appeal by the parties
here.
B. Sovereign Immunity
In spite of this Court’s holding that Bloomsburg State
College is an entity of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
to which sovereign immunity attaches, Skehan asked the
district court to consider his claim for monetary relief
against the College. In its opinion on the remedial aspects
of this case, filed on July 20, 1977, the district court, deem-
ing itself bound by our earlier holding, refused to entertain
Skehan’s argument that this Court had erred. Skehan v.
Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State College, 436 F.
Supp. 657, 665 (M.D. Pa. 1977). We, too, are bound by the
determination of this Court en banc unless intervening
decisions of the Supreme Court, acts of Congress, or
changes in applicable state law require us to reconsider
our prior holding.
Although Skehan was unable to present any arguments
based on the effects of intervening law on the sovereign
immunity issuc to the district court, he argued before this
74
Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
Court that the cleventh amendment immunity of the Col-
lege has been waived both by the effects of a recent decision
of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and by recent decisions
of the United States Supreme Court. We shall consider
the effects of this intervening decisional law on our earlier
holding that the eleventh amendment bars an award of
monetary relicf against the College in this case. We do so
in the light of the Supreme Court’s admonition that ‘‘ ‘an
appellate court must apply the law in effect at the time it
renders its decision.’’’ Bradley v. School Board of the
City of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 714 (1974), quoting Thorpe
v. Housing Authority of the City of Durham, 393 U.S. 268,
281 (1969).
1. Intervening State Law
We shall first address Skehan’s argument based on
changes in the applicable state law. He contends that the
decision of the Pennsylvenia Supreme Court in Mayle v.
Pennsylvania Department of Highways, — Pa. —, 388 A.2d
709 (1978), entered on July 14, 1978, constituted consent by
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and all its agencies to
be sued in federal court
The eleventh amendment has been construed by the
Supreme Court not to bar an action in federal court against
the state or its officers acting in their official capacities for
prospective injunctive relief from unconstitutional state
actions. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664 (1974) ;
Ea parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Thus, this Court
earlier held that the eleventh amendment presented no im-
pediment to Skehan’s request for prospective reinstatement
as relief for the constitutional violations he established.
538 F.2d at 63. However, Edelman maie it clear that, ab-
sent consent to suit by the state, a federal court may not
award relief against state officers or agencies that consti-
tutes a compensatory money judgment payable out of the
state treasury, even if that relief is labeled as equitable in
nature. 415 U.S. at 666.
75
Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
Skehan does not challenge this Court’s earlier holding
‘that his request for a hack pay awurd from the College is
tthe ttype of retroactive monetary relief proscribed by Edel-
man; rather, he contends that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Gourt waived the Commonwealth’s immunity to such an
ward in the Mayle decision. Although it cannot be gain-
wail that a state may waive its constitutional protection
‘uniler the eleventh amendment, see Edelman, supra at 673,
events subsequent to the decision in Mayle make it clear
tthat Pennsylvania has not consented to the imposition of
tthe type of monetary relief sought by Skehan in this case.
In Mayle a divided Pennsylvania Supreme Court
‘‘abrogated’’ the doctrine of sovereign immunity, whereby
the Commonwealth had previously been immune from lia-
bility arising from the torts of its agents except where a
legislativ< act authorized recovery. — Pa. at — , 388 A.2d
at 709-10. The court held that sovereign immunity in Penn-
¥ivania was a non-constitutional doctrine that had its
wrigins in judicial decisions, and that neither the state
eonstitution nor legislative enactments precluded the court
ffrom abolishing the doctrine it had created and overruling
aillyprior inconsistent opinions. Id. at — - — , 388 A.2d at
718-20.
Skehan argues that although the Mayle opinion did not
im tterms address the applicability of its holding to the
Commonwealth’s eleventh amendment immunity from suits
for damages in federal court, it should be construed to
waive Bloomsburg State’s immunity here because the lan-
guage of Mayle rejects the sovereign immunity doctrine
aud its justifications in broad terms, and because the opin-
‘jon relies in part upon the refusal of the Pennsylvania legis-
lature to ratify the eleventh amendment when it was pro-
posed by Congress in 1794. See — Pa. at — , — , 388 A.2d
aat 712, 718.
The Supreme Court has held that ‘‘[iJn deciding
whether a State has waived its constitutional protection
under the Eleventh Amendmeut, we will find waiver only
76
Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
where stated ‘by the most express language or by such
overwhelming implications from the text as [will] leave
no room for any other reasonable construction.’’’ Edel-
man, supra at 673, quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling
Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909). This rule has been applied
to cases in which a state has consented to suit in its own
courts by statute; consent to a similar suit in the federal
courts has not been inferred absent a clear declaration in
the statutory language that the state intended to waive its
eleventh amendment immunity as well as its sovereign
immunity under state law. See Kennecott Copper Corp. r.
State Tax Commission, 327 U.S. 573, 577 (1946); Ford
Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Indiana, 323 U.S.
459, 465 (1945) ; Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read,
322 U.S. 47, 54 (1944).
We would face an apparently novel application of this
rule were we required to interpret the effect of a state’s
abrogation of its state law sovereign immunity by judicial
decision on its eleventh amendment immunity fron! damage
actions in federal court. See Greenfield v. Vesella, 457
F. Supp. 316, 319-20 (W.D. Pa. 1978) (holding that the de-
cision in Mayle has waived the Commonwealth’s eleventh
amendment immunity). Recent action by the Pennsylvania
legislature has precluded our need to enter this thicket.
On September 28, 1978, the Pennsylvania legislature
enacted House Bill No. 2437, Act No. 1978-152, reaffirming
and preserving sovereign immunity as a bar to claims
brought against the Commonwealth and its agencies, offi-
cials, and employees. See 1978 Pa. Legis. Serv. 629-36.
Section 2 of that Act amends the Judicial Code, Act of
July 9, 1976, P.L. 586, Act No. 142, 42 Pa. C.S.A., by adding
new sections 5110 and 5111, limiting the scope of the Com-
monwealth’s waiver of sovereign immunity to particular
types of actions and limiting recovery to particular types
of damages. Section 5(a) of the Act, eutitled ‘‘Construc-
tion and Application,’’ states the legislature's intent that
the Act ‘‘specifically respond to and prescribe limitations
77
Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
on the decision of Mayle v. Commonwealth ....’’ More-
over, section 5(b)(1) bars any cause of action against the
Commonwealth not permitted under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5110,
regardless of when it arose, unless it would not have been
barred by applicable statutory or decisional law prior to
the Mayle decision. Finally, section 5(e) provides that
‘*[n]othing contained in this act shall be construed to waive
the Commonwealth’s immunity from suit in Federal courts
guaranteed by the eleventh amendment to the United States
Constitution.’’ The Act went into effect on the date of its
enactment, September 28, 1978.
In enacting the foregoing statutory provision the Penn-
sylvania legislature has effectively overruled the decision
of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Mayle. Thus, for
Skehan to prevail in his argument that intervening changes
in Pennsylvania law require us to disregard the earlier
determination of the en bane Court on the sovereign im-
munity issue he would have to demonstrate that state col-
leges like Bloomsburg State are no longer deemed to be
agencies cloaked with the Commonwealth’s sovereign im-
munity. Nothing in the new sovereign immunity statute
suggests such a result and recent decisions of the Pennsyl-
vania Commonwealth Court have reaffirmed the holding of
Brungard v. Hartman to the contrary. See Finkelstein v.
Shippensburg State College, — Pa. Commw. Ct. —, 370
A.2d 1259 (1977) ; Williams v. West Chester State College,
— Pa. Commw. Ct. —, 370 A.2d 744 (1977). Our previous
ruling that Bloomsburg State College cannot be made
liable to Skehan for an award of back pay will not be
disturbed on the ground of intervening changes in appli-
cable state law.
2. Intervening Decisions of the Supreme Court
Skehan also argues that the Supreme Court’s holding
_in Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New
York, — U.S. —, 98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978), that local govern-
mental units may be deemed ‘‘persons’’ within the mean-
78
Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
ing of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 compels the conclusion that § 1983
now must be construed as a valid Congressional waiver
of the states’ eleventh amendment immunity to suits for
damages in federal court. Thus, he requests this Court
to make a determination as to the College’s status as a
‘*person’’ liable to an award of damages under § 1983.
Because we do not believe that the necessary implication
of the Monell decision is an overruling of prior Supreme
Court cases holding that § 1983 does not abrogate the
states’ eleventh amendment sovereign immunity, we find
it unnecessary to make the requested finding as to the
College’s status as a § 1983 ‘‘person.’’
In ruling on Skehan’s argument here it is necessary
to first review recent opinions of the Supreme Court touch-
ing upon the legislative authority of Congress to impose
upon the states consent to being sued in actions otherwise
barred by the eleventh amendment. Parden v. Terminal
Railway Co., 377 U.S. 184 (1964), is the seminal case in
this area. There the Supreme Court held that Alabama
had consented to a suit for damages under the Federal
Employers’ Liability Act brought by an employee of a
state-owned interstate railroad who had sustained injuries
in the scope of his employment. The Court’s holding was
based on the fact that the F.E.L.A. was a congressional
enactment which by its terms authorized suit against a
general class of defendants literally including states and
state instrumentalities, and the fact that Alabama began
to operate an interstate railroad twenty years after the
passage of the Act. See Edelman v. Jordan, supra at 672.
In Edelman, supra, the Court of Appeals had held
that Parden compelled a similar finding of consent to suit
waiving the eleventh amendment. There plaintiffs had
sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for retroactive payment of
welfare benefits allegedly withheld from them by the Iili-
nois Department of Public Aid in violation of applicable
federal laws and the equal protection clause. The Court
of Appeals held, and three dissenters from the Supreme
79
Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
Court’s reversal of that holding agreed, that § 1983 created
a private cause of action to enforce the applicable provi-
sions of the Social Security Act, and that the state’s par-
ticipation in the federally assisted welfare program con-
stituted constructive consent to suits challenging the
state’s failure to comply with the terms of participation
in that program. See Edelman v. Jordax, supra at 688-96
(Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting) ; id. 678-87 (Doug-
las, J., dissenting).
The Court majority disagreed, however, holding that
a federal court’s remedial power under § 1983 was limited
by the eleventh amendment to awarding prospective in-
junctive relief against the state, absent ‘‘the threshold
fact of congressional authorization to sue a class of defend-
ants which literally includes States....’’ Id.672. Section
1983 was held by the Court not to be such an authorization
because it was not deemed to authorize suits against the
states themselves but only against state officers. Id. 675-77.
In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), the
Court was faced with the question whether the eleventh
amendment proscribed Congress’ authorization of suits
for backpay awards brought by employees against state
governmental bodies found to have violated the antidis-
crimination provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. Congress had
amended Title VII to include governmental bodies within
the Act’s definition of employers through passage of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. The Second
Circuit had held that insofar as the amendments to Title
VII authorized a private action for the recovery of dam-
ages against the states they were unconstitutional under
the interpretation of the eleventh amendment adopted by
the Supreme Court in Edelman.
The Supreme Court, in unanimously reversing that
judgment, noted that in Fitzpatrick ‘‘[o]ur analysis
begins where Edelman ended, for in this Title VII case
the ‘threshold fact of congressional authorization,’ .. .
80
Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
to sue the State as employer is clearly present.’’ 427 U.S.
at 452. The Court reiterated that neither the Social Se-
curity Act nor 4 1983 had provided that threshold predicate
to a finding of eleventh amendment waiver in Edelman.
The Court explained that § 1983 had not been read as such
an embodiment of congressional intent to abrogate sover-
eign immunity -because ‘‘it had been held in Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187-191 (1961), to exclude cities and
other municipal corporations from its ambit; that being
the case, it could not have been intended to include States
as parties defendant.’’ 427 U.S. at 452 (emphasis sup-
).
Having found the predicate of congressional authoriza-
tion that was absent in Edelman to be present in Fite-
patrick, the Court went on to hold that Congress’ imposi-
tion of suit against the states in the Title VII amendments
was a valid exercise of its power under §5 of the four-
teenth amendment ‘‘to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions’’ of that amendment:
{We think that the Eleventh Amendment, and the
principle of state sovereignty which it embodies .. .
are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions
of §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In that section
Congress is expressly granted authority to enforce
‘*by appropriate legislation’’ the substantive provi-
sions of the Fourteenth Amendment, which themselves
embody limitations on state authority. We think that
os tan te Medenndis ad by Madpemn dats
legislation’’ for the purpose of enforcing the provi-
sions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for pri-
vate suits against States or state officials which are
81
Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
constitutionally impermissible in other contexts. See
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) ....
427 U.S. at 456 (citations and footnec omitted).
Significantly, in this context of Congress’ exercise of
its enforcement powers under § 5 of the fourteenth amend-
ment, che Court did not even discuss the requirement earlier
expressed in Parden and Edelman that a valid waiver of
the state’s eleventh amendment immunity depends upon its
consent to congressional authorization of damage actions
by private parties against state defendants. See Field,
The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity
Doctrines: Congressional Imposition of Suit Upon the
States, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1203, 1235-37 (1978).
Justices Brennan and Stevens separately concurred in
the Court’s judgment in Fitzpatrick on grounds not ap-
plicable to our discussion here. See 427 U.S. at 457-58
(Brennan, J., concurring); id. 458-60 (Stevens, J., con-
curring).
Skehan’s argument is that the Supreme Court’s de-
cision in Monell last term, overruling Monroe v. Pape, re-
moved any distinction between Edelman and Fitzpatrick
and, in effect, overruled sub silentio the holding in Edelman
that § 1983 was not a congressional authorization of suits
against a class of defendants literally including states.
We need not review here the Supreme Court’s analysis
of the legislative history of § 1983 in Monell that led it to
its conclusion ‘‘that Congress did intend municipalities and
other local government units to be included among those
persons to whom § 1983 applies.*”’ — U.S. at —, 98 8. Ct.
at 2035 (footnote omitted; Court’s emphasis). However,
we should note that the Court also held that ‘‘the language
of § 1983, read against the background of the same legis-
lative history, compels the conclusion that Congress did not
intend municipalities to be held liable unless action pur-
suant to official municipal policy of some nature caused
constitutional tort. [I]n other words, a municipality
not be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat
i
82
Opinion of the Third Circuit Cour: of Appeals.
theory.” Id. at —, 98 S. Ct. at 2036. Rather, the Court
concluded that “‘it is when execution of a government’s
policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by
those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent
official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an
entity is responsible under § 1983.’’ Id. at —, 98 8. Ct. at
2038,
The possible effect of this holding on the eleventh
amendment sovereign immunity doctrine was not addressed
by the Court; the Monell holding was ‘‘limited to local
government units which are not considered part of the
State for Eleventh Amendment purposes.’’ Jd. at —, n.54,
98 S. Ct. at 2035 n.54. In the case before us today we are
confronted with a local government defendant that has
been held to share in the eleventh amendment sovereign
immunity of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. How-
ever, Bloomsburg State College’s status as a person under
$1983 has not been ; reviously determined by this Court
or the district court; up until now subject matter juris-
diction over the College in this case has been affirmed only
under the general federal question jurisdiction of 28 U.S.C.
$1331. See 501 F.2d at 44. If we were to accept Skehan’s
contention that Monell overruled Edelman sub silentio on
the question of § 1983's effect on the state’s eleventh
amendment immunity it might first be necessary to remand
this case to the district court with instructions to determine
the College’s liability as a § 1983 defendant under the
guidelines set forth in Monell. See Norris v. Frame, —
F.2d —, No. 78-1090, slip op. at 5 n.8 (3d Cir., filed Oct. 31,
1978).
Such a remand is unnecessary in this case because,
absent a much clearer statement by the Supreme Court to
the effect that § 1983 must now be construed as waiving the
states’ sovereign immunity from awards of monetary dam-
ages, this Court considers itself bound by the holding of
Edelman to the contrary. We note that of the present
members of the Supreme Court, Justice Brennan has ex-
pressed his view that it is at least an open question whether
83
Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
Edelman has been overruled by Monell. See Hutto v.
Pinney, — US. —, —-—, 98 S. Ct. 2565, 2579-81 (1978)
(Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Powell, joined by the
Chief Justice and Justices White and Rehnquist, has
argued, to the contrary, that the vitality of the Edelman
holding has not been undermined sub silentio by Fitzpatrick
and Monell. See id. — n.6, 98 S. Ct. at 2583 n.6 (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Thus, the con-
clusion that Edelman is no longer good law is certainly not
an inescapable one. We feel that it would be inappropriate
for this Court to hold that Edelman has been overruled by
Monell, an opinion issued only four years later, when such
a result was not even intimated by the authors of the
majority, concurring and dissenting opinions in Monell.
We conclude that Skehan’s argument that the College’s
sovereign immunity has been waived by the congressional
imposition of suits upon the states in § 1983 is precluded
by the Supreme Court’s opinion in Edelman v. Jordan.
Thus, our prior determination that Skehan is not en-
titled to a back pay award against the College because of
its status as an agency of the Commonwealth to which
eleventh amendment sovereign immunity attaches will not
be disturbed.
C. Official Immunity
additional testimony on the question of the defendants’
good faith in failing to comply with Skehan’s request for
an Article 5e hearing and in terminating his employment
with the College without a prior hearing. See Part LB
supra. That the defendants violated procedural due
process with respect to Article 5e has today been affirmed
by this Court, see Part II supra; we earlier affirmed that
the defendants violated procedural due process by terminat-
ing Skehan’s employment during the term of his contract
without a prior hearing, see 501 F.2d at 38.
In its opinion issued on May 18, 1977, the district court
concluded, based on its findings of fact, that defendant
84
Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
Nossen’s actions with respect to both violations of pro-
cedural due process established by Skehan had been taken
in good faith and without malicious intention. The court
also concluded that he had acted in a reasonable manner
and had not violated clearly established constitutional
rights with respect to either denial of due process. 431
F. Supp. at 1391. In its later opinion, entered on July 20,
1977, the court stated that the only individual defendant
from whom Skehan had sought monetary damages was
President Nossen, and because he and the College were
both immune from liability, the court was unable to award
Skehan any relief in the nature of backpay. 436 F. Supp.
at 659. Skehan challenges both the district court’s refusal
te address the question of the liability of each individual
defendant in this case, and its findings and conclusions with
respect to Nossen’s immunity from liability.
Language in this Court’s en banc opinion indicated
our belief that the district court would be required to
consider the availability of the official immunity defense
to each of the individual defendants. For example, we
stated :
The district court will be required to inquire into the
status and responsibility of each individual defendant
and to determine whether, for example, a trustee
should be held responsible for the same level of
knowledge of constitutional rights as a college presi-
dent or a commissioner of education. The determina-
tion may turn on the relative availability to each
defendant of counsel, as well as the relative certainty
of the legal issue, a criterion to which the Wood v.
Strickland Court expressly adverted.
538 F.2d at 62. In the concluding section of our opinion,
summarizing the directions to the district court on remand,
we included an instruction that ‘‘[t]he court should then
make findings of fact with respect to the immunity of each
defendant in conformance with this opinion.’’ Id. 63.
85
Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
Of course, if the district court was correct in its con-
clusion that Skehan was only seeking monetary damages
from one of the individual defendants, then this Court’s
assumption to the contrary could not alter that fact.
On December 1, 1976, the district court issued an
order reducing to writing certain agreements made be-
tween the parties at a pre-trial conference held that day.
Within that order the court stated: ‘‘The parties stipulated
at the final pre-trial conference that the Defendants Pit-
tenger and Carlson are not liable to the Plaintiff for
damages.’’ Skehan has not presented any challenge to
the accuracy of that statement, nor any reason why that
stipulation should not be binding. Thus, there was :\0
error in the district court’s failure to consider the ap-
plicability of the official immunity defense to defendants
Pittenger and Carlson.
Skehan did not name the individual members of the
College’s Board of Trustees as defendants in his complaint.
In his description of the parties therein he identified the
defendant Board of Trustees as ‘‘the official supervisory
body of defendant, Bloomsburg State College.’’ On De-
cember 1, 1976, Skehan filed a motion with the district
court for leave to file an amendment to his complaint
adding the names of the individual members of the Board
to the list of parties defendant. The district court denied
that motion in an order dated December 23, 1976, and
Skehan challenges that order.
The district court held that Skehan’s assumption that
the individual trustees had already been made parties to
this suit, and the fact that they had been made aware of
its institution and progress to date, did not override the
t that they be properly served as parties de-
fendant under Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. In ruling on Skehan’s motion, the court did not
reach the whether the requested amendment would
be barred by the statute of limitations, or whether it might
i under
86 ws
Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
Rather, the sole basis of its decision denying Skehan’s
motion was that ‘‘justice requires that the amendment not
be allowed at this stage of the proceedings,’’ given that
the trustees had not bec previously informed that they
were subject to individ . liability, that portions of the
case had ulready been decided on the merits and that trial
on the remaining portions was about to commence.
Skehan contends that the district court abused its
discretion in denying his motion to add the trustees as
defendants. He argues that basic fairness required the
court to grant his motion because he was not made aware
that he would have to name the trustees as individuals
in order to obtain back pay until this Court raised the
issue of the College’s possible sovereign immunity in its
panel opinion entered on May 3, 1974. See 501 F.2d at
41-43.
Like a motion te reopen the record for the taking of
additional testimony, see Part I,B supra, a Rule 15(a)
motion for leave to amend the pleadings is within the
sound discretion of the trial court. Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Haeeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 330 (1971); Foman
v. Davis, 37 U.S».178, 182 (1962). Although district
courts are required to allow amendments freely under the
terms‘of the Rule, certain factors, such as undne prejudice
to the other party, and undue delay by the movant, have
been found to establish sufficient justification for the
denial of such motions. See 3 Moore’s Federal Practice
7 15.08[4] at 91-94 (2d ed. 1978). Here, the district court
found that the trustees would be prejudiced by their addi-
tion as parties defendant in their individual capacities
because they had not been participants .n the proceedings
that established Skehan’s right to recovery on the pre-
termination hearing claim. Moreover, Skehan’s motion
was not filed until a short time prior to the scheduled date
of trial on his remaining substantive claims. In light of
_the district court’s careful consideration of these factors
we cannot find the court’s denial of Skehan’s motion for
87
Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
leave to add the individual members of the Board of
Trustees as named defendants in his complaint to have
been contrary to the sound exercise of its discretion.
Thus, the district court was correct in its assertion
that Skehan had sought monetary damages from only one
of the ‘ndividual defendants properly served as a party
to this action. The earlier assumption of this Court to
the contrary cannot alter that fact, and, therefore, there
was no error in the court’s failure to consider the ap-
plicability of the official immunity defense to any defendant
other than President Nossen.
This Court directed the district court to make findings
concerning ‘‘whether the defendants met their burden of
establishing (1) that they did not know and reasonably
need not have known that depriving Skehan of a pre-
termination hearing violated due process, and (2) that
they acted without malicious intention to deprive him of
his constitutional rights or cause him to suff-r other
injury.’’ 538 F.2d at 62. Similar findings were to be
made if the district court found for Skehan on his Article
5e claim. Jd. 63. After hearing testimony on this issue
the district court concluded that defendant Nossen had
met his burden of proving both elements of the official
immunity test, as set forth by the Supreme Court in
Wood ». Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975). The court fully
set forth the factual findings it relied upon in reaching
those conclusions.
Our review of the record does not support Skehan’s
contention that the district court’s factual findings should
be set aside as clearly erroneous. In reviewing those find-
ings we must credit the district court’s evaluation of the
testimony, and that testimony clearly supports the court’s
findings that President Nossen did not act with malicious
intent or in knowing violation of Skehan’s constitutional
rights in failing to provide him with either the procedures
set forth in Article 5e or a hearing prior to his termination.
Additionally, we agree with the district court that at
the time these events occurred in the Fall of 1970, défend-
88
Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
ant Nossen did not have reason te know that his actions
would later he held to have violated Skehan’s constitutional
rights. As the district court pointed out, quoting an opinion
of the Seventh Circuit, ‘‘The first definitive holding that a
termination of teachers’ property interests in their em-
ployment contracts with state institutions required due
process hearings was Board of Regents of State Colleges
v. Roth, (408 U.S. 564 (1972)].’’ 431 F. Supp. at 1391,
quoting Hostrop v. Board of Junior College District No.
515, 523 F.2d 569, 578 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
963 (1976). The first definitive holding that Skehan was
contractually entitled, under Pennsylvania law, to the pro-
visions of Article 5e, and that the College’s failure to af-
ford him those procedures violated due process, was the
district court’s opinion in this case on the 5e issue. Para-
phrasing the Supreme Court’s opinion in Wood v. Strick-
land, supra at 321, we cannot say that President Nossen
acted in ‘‘ignorance or disregard of settled, indisputable
law’’ when he terminated Skehan’s employment with the
College without a prior hearing and without having acted
upon his request for an Article 5e hearing.
We agree with the district court’s findings and con-
clusions that defendant Nossen established by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that he was entitled to an official im-
munity defense from Skehan’s claims for monetary
damages arising from either his dismissal from the College
without a prior hearing or his failure to receive the aca-
demic freedom hearing set forth in Article 5e.*
D. Injunctive Relief
The district court issued a final order, unchallenged,
Fn oe oe ene ee
89
Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
suspended with pay status he held at the College on October
15, 1970; the College was ordered to recreate for his case
the procedures of Article 5e; a reconstituted Committee on
Professional Affairs was to conduct the initial investigation
of Skehan’s allegation that his nonrenewai resulted from
considerations violative of his academic freedom ; deadlines
were established for each stage of the nonrenewal proceed-
ings set out in Article 5e and Article 9, see note 1 supra;
and, following a final decision on Skehan’s renewal or non-
renewal, the President of the College was given the option
of holding a pretermination hearing within 30 days—failure
to hold that hearing within the stated time would result in
Skehan’s full reinstatement as a faculty member of the
College. 436 F. Supp. at 668-69.
Skehan contends that he should have been fully rein-
stated as a faculty member of the College pending the
appropriate proceedings. In spite of his assertion to the
contrary, nothing in this Court’s prior opinions in this
case required the district court to order Skehan fully rein-
stated to the position he held at the time prior to his sus-
pension from teaching responsibilities. Rather, in our
opinion en banc this Court directed that the district court
should consider prospective reinstatement as a remedy for
the College’s violation of Skehan’s right to the procedures
set forth in Article 5e ‘‘at least until appropriate college
termination procedures have taken place.’’ 538 F.2d at 63.
We did not instruct the district court that it had to award
Skehan prospective reinstatement as a remedy for the 5e
violation, nor did we define the terms of such reinstatement
with particularity.
The district court determined that Skehan’s reinstate-
ment to the suspenced with pay status he held prior to his
termination from the College’s employment on October 19,
1970, was a grant of equitable relief appropriate to this
case. We believe that the court's order minimized the dis-
ruptive effects that would have resulted at the College had
it required the administration to provide classes for Skehan
90
Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
to teach pending the results of the mandated hearing pro-
ceedings. Additional disruption of scheduling would have
occurred had the College altered its teaching assignments
to accommodate Skehan’s reinstatement only to determine
some months later that its earlier decision to terminate
Skehan’s employment as a faculty member was to be
reaffirmed.
On the other hand, the court’s order enabled Skehan to
return to the College’s payroll pending the proceedings to
which he was entitled and, thus, he was not ‘‘ unduly limited
in his ability to pursue the hearing remedy.’’ 436 F. Supp.
at 664. We belicve that the relief afforded by the district
court presented an equitable accominodation of the interests
of both the College and Dr. Skehan. Noting the admoni-
tion of the Supreme Court that, ‘‘[iJn shaping equity
decrees, the trial court is vested with broad discretionary
power; appellate review is correspondingly narrow,”’’
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 200 (1973), we hold that
the district court’s failure to order the College to provide
Skehan with teaching responsibilities pending his Article
5e and pretermination hearings did not constitute an abuse
of discretion.
Skehan has apprised this Court of proceedings that
have taken place at the College subsequent to the district
court’s order reinstating him to a suspended status. He
argues that this Court should fully reinstate him to his
former position at Bloomsburg State because the College
did not comply with that aspect of the district court’s order
mandating his full reinstatement if no pretermination hear-
ing were held within 30 days of a final decision on the ques-
tion of his renewal or nonrenewal. We believe that any
questions concerning the College’s compliance with the
district court’s final order of July 20, 1977, should be ad-
dressed to that court in the uret instance. Thus, we shall
deny the motion filed by Skehan in this Court for leave to
file a supplemental appendix detailing events that have
transpired at the College subsequent to the district court’s
order.
91
Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
During the proceedings below Skehan based his claim
for an award of attorney’s fees on the provisions of the
Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976,‘ which
had been enacted subsequent to this Court’s en bane opin-
ion. The district court made factual findings, unchallenged
here, that would preclude a fee award based on the alterna-
tive grounds of the defendants’ bad faith either in the pre-
litigation stages of this case or in the pursuit of their de-
fense. See 436 F. Supp. at 663. The court also denied
Skehan’s request for attorney’s fees under the provisions
of the Awards Act. Skehan’s challenge to this aspect of the
district court’s order is governed by the opinion of the
Supreme Court in Hutto v. Finney, — U.S. —, 98 8. Ct.
2565 (1978).
The district court’s ruling denying Skehan’s request
for attorney’s fees under the Awards Act from either de-
fendant Nossen or from the College was multifaceted.
First, the court heid that defendant Nossen was not
personally liable for such an award because Skehan was
not a ‘‘prevailing party’’ vis a vis Nossen. This followed
from the fact that Nossen had established immunity to
Skehan’s claim for damages. 436 F. Supp. at 665. Even
if Nossen’s successful official immunity defense could not
be viewed as preventing Skehan from characterizing him-
self as a prevailing party, the court held that it
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