Opposition — Manchester Environmental Coalition v. Environmental Protection Agency
Supreme Court brief1982
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
FILED
NOV 1 tote
ALEXANDER L. stevas. |
In the Supreme Court of the United States
Octoser Term, 1982
No. 82-247
MANCHESTER ENVIRONMENTAL COALITION AND
MICHAEL DWoRKIN, PETITIONERS
V.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SECOND CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION
Rex E. Lee
Solicitor General
Carot E. DINKINS
, Assistant Attorney General
ANNE S. ALMY
DIANE L. DONLEY
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 633-2217
Ropert M. Perry
Office of General Counsel
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D.C. 20460
—
QUESTION PRESENTED
Petitioner's petition for review of action by the United
States Environmental Protection Agency under the Clean
Air Act was granted only in part, and denied for the most
part. The court of appeals, moreover, rejected all of peti-
tioner’s arguments, and granted relief different from that
sought, ona theory petitioners did not advance. Petitioners’
applications for costs and attorneys fees under Section
307(f) of the Clean Air Act were technically deficient. The
court of appeals denied these applications without issuing
any opinion.
The question presented is: whether the denial of the cost
and fee applications was in these circumstances an abuse of
discretion.
(I)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
PEE ‘voccpedc ncedceccedhendsbedcdessece I
eee esse eee bse 2
EE 2
. ceccd dbcdcnccioccadoensesécépcsoescss 5
resse ess ess Gee eee 10
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Alabama Power Co. v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 1 .... 8
Carpenter v. Andrus, 499 F. Supp. 976 ......... 8
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.,
eee esse eee 6
Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc.
eee eee sees eee 6
Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 33,
cert. granted, No. 82-242 (Oct. 18,
eee eee 5. 8
United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 533. 5
White v. New Hampshire Department of
Employment Security, No. 80-5887
I 9
Statute and rules:
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV)
7401 et seq. :
Sections 171-178, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV)
De ess sees 2
Section 307(f), 42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV)
eee e006 5, 6. 7, 8
IV
Statute and rules—Continued:
Arad.
BE, Cir. BORED .
LAL
2d Cir. R.:
e
eee
08e. ccessescccvseses
eln . eee
6th Cir. R. dꝰ )) eeeeees
L
LL
Page
In the Supreme Court of the Anited States
OcToBer TERM, 1982
No. 82-247
MANCHESTER ENVIRONMENTAL COALITION AND
MICHAEL DwoRKIN, PETITIONERS
V.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SECOND CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION
OPINION BELOW
The court of appeals’ orders: (1) denying petitioners
motion for an award of costs (Pet. App. 51A), (2) denying
petitioners’ motion for an award of attorneys’ fees (Pet.
App. 54A), (3) denying petitioners’ motion for reconsidera-
tion of the foregoing orders (Pet. App. 34A), and (4) reject-
ing petitioners’ suggestion for en banc consideration of the
motion for reconsideration, are not reported. The opinion
of the court of appeals on the merits of the underlying
petition for review (Pet. App. 1 A-32A) is reported at 672
F.2d 998.
2
JURISDICTION
The orders of the court of appeals denying the motions
for awards of costs and attorneys’ fees were entered on April
9, 1982. A motion for reconsideration was denied on May
14, 1982, and en banc consideration was denied on June 15,
1982.' The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on
August 11, 1982.2 The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked
under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
STATEMENT
1. This case arises indirectly from a petition for review
filed by petitioners and the Connecticut Fund for the
Environment challenging the Environmental Protection
Agency’s approval of a revision of the Clean Air Act State
Implementation Plan of the State of Connecticut.“ The
agency conditionally approved the State’s plan for meeting
the requirements of Part D of the Act, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV)
7501-7508, added by 1977 Amendments thereto, and
approved Connecticut's partial withdrawal of its program
for preconstruction review of indirect sources of pollution.
The court of appeals vacated a portion of the conditional
'The motion for reconsideration was filed April 26, 1982 (Pet. App.
34A) and may accordingly have been untimely. See Fed. R. App. P.
40(a). It was nonetheless denied rather than being rejected for filing.
The suggestion for en banc consideration is dated May 13, 1982 — one
day before the denial of the reconsideration request by the panel, and
appears to have been prepared prior to action by the panel upon the
reconsideration request, but was not filed until May 24, 1982. The rules
of the Second Circuit apparently precluded filing of the request for en
banc consideration until the panel had acted. See 2d Cir. R. 27(i).
Alt was accordingly filed within the time allowed by law if the motion
for reconsideration is deemed to have been timely filed. See note |,
supra.
Although the present petitioners and the Connecticut Fund for the
Environment joined in a single petition for review they were permitted
to file separate briefs in the court of appeals.
3
approval of the state plan, on grounds not advocated by
petitioners, and otherwise upheld EPA’s actions (Pet. App.
1A-32A). Judgment was entered on the petition for review
on February |, 1982.
On March 3, 1982, some 30 days after entry of judgment
by the court of appeals, petitioners’ motion for a bill of costs
(Pet. App. 50 A-51A) and motion for attorneys’ fees (Pet.
App. 53A-54A), each dated February 23, 1982, were filed
with the court of appeals. The application for attorneys’ fees
was not supported by a detailed record of attorney time
expended on the case Respondents opposed any award of
attorneys’ fees on the grounds: (1) generally, that an award
of fees is not appropriate in the circumstances of this case,
and (2) that petitioners’ motivation in seeking review of the
agency’s action appeared to be an anticompetitive private
economic interest rather than an interest in advancing the
goals of the Clean Air Act. The government further chal-
lenged the amount of the fee award requested as excessive
on the grounds that: (1) the present petitioners and the
Connecticut Fund for the Environment had both sought
‘Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration (Pet. App. 33 A-49A) states
(id. at 36A, para. 10) that an affidavit dated February 25, 1982
detailed] all background information [petitioners’ counsel deemed]
relevant to an award of attorney's fees and costs.” A copy of that
affidavit is attached to the reconsideration motion (Pet. App. 38A-
43A). We note that petitioners do not indicate when the affidavit in
question was filed, and that the actual motion for attorneys’ fees (Pet.
App. 53A-61 A) neither includes nor contains any reference to such an
affidavit. According to our records, the affidavit in question was not
served until it was included together with a motion for leave to file the
costs and attorneys’ fees motions out-of-time, and a reply to the
government's opposition to the motion for fees, all dated April 5, 1982.
Respondents challenged as inaccurate petitioners’ claims that their
petition for review required the court of appeals to address a matter of
first impression under the Clean Air Act, and that amicus briefs had
been submitted reflecting substantia! public interest in this case. In fact,
no such briefs had been filed.
4
attorneys’ fees without any adjustment reflecting the sub-
stantial overlap between their briefs (see page 2 note 3,
supra),® (2) the petition for review had been sustained only
in part, and in that respect only upona rationale not articu-
lated by petitioners, and (3) neither the hours expended nor
the hourly rate claimed had been properly documented.
(See page 3 note 4, supra). The government opposed the
motion for a bill of costs on the grounds that the motion was
untimely, and noted that the costs claimed should be
réduced to reflect the fact that the petition for review was
only partially successful and to disallow so much of the cost
of postage claimed as was attributable to service mistakenly
effected by petitioners upon counsel from a different case.
Petitioner's reply to the government's opposition (see page
3 note 4, supra) was dated April 5, 1982.’
On April 9, 1982, the court of appeals denied both the
motion for a bill of costs and the motion for an award of
attorneys’ fees without issuing any opinion (Pet. App. 51A,
54A). A motion for reconsideration, filed April 26, 1982,
was denied on May 14, 1982 (Pet. App. 34A), and a sugges-
tion for en banc consideration of the last motion, filed May
24, 1982, was rejected on June 15, 1982 (see page 2 note I,
supra).
The application of the Connecticut Fund for the Environment for
attorneys’ fees remains pending before the Second Circuit; CFE's
separate motion for costs was denied on April 9, 1982.
It is unclear from the record when this reply was received by the
court of appeals. The Clerk of the court of appeals has informed us that
his records indicate that it was received on April 9, 1982 — the very day
the court ruled on the underlying motion. Although we cannot be
certain whether it was received prior to the court's action, it may be
significant that the court of appeals apparently did not act upon peti-
tioners motion for leave to file its applications out-of-time (see page 3
note 4, supra), perhaps because the court had already acted upon the
underlying applications by the time that motion was received.
5
ARGUMENT
The court of appeals did not abuse its discretion in deny-
ing an award of costs or attorneys’ fees in the circumstances
of this case. The disposition of these applications without
an opinion merely settles rights between the parties to this
case and establishes no precedent, much less one of general
importance. Review by this Court accordingly is not
warranted.
1. Petitioner suggests (Pet. 3-7) that review should be
granted in this case to afford guidance to the lower courts in
determining when an award of attorneys’ fees is “appro-
priate” within the meaning of Section 307(f) of the Clean
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV) 7607(f). We agree with peti-
tioners that that question stated in the abstract is an impor-
tant one with significant unsettled aspects. Indeed, the
Court has recently granted our petition for a writ of certio-
rari in Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir.
1982), cert. granted, No. 82-242 (Oct. 18, 1982), which
presents the question whether it can be appropriate to
award fees under Section 307(f) to a party that has not
prevailed upon any aspect of its petition for review, where
the decision of the court of appeals upholds the agency's
action in all respects. But, unlike Gorsuch v. Sierra Club,
this case is an inappropriate vehicle for clarification of the
law, because the court of appeals did not purport to
announce any standard governing the availability of attor-
neys’ fees. For this reason, not only does the decision below
fail to conflict with any decision of this Court or of any
court of appeals, it presents no question to be reviewed by
this Court. See United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 567
n.7 (1980).®
A fortiori this case presents no occasion to afford “guidance [to the
lower courts respecting] calculat{ion] [of] the amount of attorney's fees
to be awarded in any given case (Pet. 7). Petitioners has not suggested
any conflict of authority on this score (see Pet. 7-8) and even if, as
6
2. Nor does the court of appeals’ failure to render an
opinion in this case itself warrant review. None of the
decisions cited by petitioner (Pet. 8) for the proposition that
denial of fees without an explanation is an abuse of discre-
tion treats the statute at issue here, Section 307(f) of the
Clean Air Act. Nor do any of these decisions deal with the
award of fees upon petition for review. Plainly, the necessity
for rendition of findings and conclusions explaining the
disposition of a fee request is much less when the disposition
is not subject to judicial review as of right, for establishing a
record for appellate review is the primary purpose of such
findings. Compare, e. g., Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc.,
526 F.2d 57, 69 (9th Cir. 1975); Johnson v. Georgia High-
way Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717 (Sth Cir. 1974).
Moreover, the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) are not
applicable here.
It may well be that the better practice would have been for
the court of appeals to explain its decision, at least briefly by
an appropriate memorandum. That said, however, we can
see no occasion for further review in this case. First, as is
explained below (pages 7-9), the denial of attorneys’ fees in
this case was not an abuse of discretion. In these circum-
stances, to vacate the order of the court of appeals denying
fees and costs and remand for further proceedings would be
a sterile exercise that would needlessly prolong this litiga-
tion. A case such as this is not a suitable vehicle for estab-
lishing criteria for the disposition of attorneys’ fees applica-
tions without opinion.
Second, the practice of summary disposition without
opinion is regularly employed by the courts of appeals, not
only for ancillary motions, but for disposition of appeals
petitioner suggest, there is some lack of uniformity in the application of
generally agreed upon criteria for computing fees awards, this case, in
which no standard was announced and no fee awarded, sureiy is not an
appropriate ehicle for clarifying the law.
>
upon the merits, in cases where the proper disposition is
deemed clear, no precedent is needed or created, and the
disposition is fact-bound rather than based upon recurring
questions of general importance.“ Such summary disposi-
tions, if not abused, are an acceptable response to the
problem of judicial management created by burgeoning
caseloads. Absent a showing that the practice has been
systematically abused in acting upon applications for award
of attorneys’ fees for legal services rendered upon petition
for review, we suggest that there is no compeliing reason for
this Court to intervene to bar use of this practice.
3. The denial of attorneys’ fees to petitioners’ counsel in
this case entails no abuse of discretion.'° The court of
appeals could properly have determined that no award of
fees or costs is appropriate because the court did not grant
the relief sought by petitioners and rejected each of their
legal arguments.“ Even if petitioners can be said to have
See D.C. Cir. R. 13(c); Ist Cir. R. 14; 2d Cir. R. 0.23; 4th Cir. R. 7(b);
Sth Cir. R. 21; 6th Cir. R. Ad); 8th Cir. R. 14; 9th Cir. R. 21; 10th Cir. R.
17(b); Lith Cir. R. 25.
o The statutory criterion for an award — a judicial determination that
an award is “appropriate” (42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV) 7607(f)) — necessarily
invests the courts of appeal with a degree of discretion. Petitioner does
not suggest that the courts of appeals are totally without discretion in
determining whether fees are to be allowed.
The agency action challenged was the EPA's conditional approval
of Connecticut's State implementation Plan (“SIP”) revisions and its
approval of partial withdrawal of the State indirect source review
program. Petitioners argued that the agency was not authorized to
conditionally approve a SIP revision, and that if so authorized, EPA's
conditional approval of Connecticut's SIP revision was arbitrary and
capricious. They also argued that the conditional approval could not
serve as a predicate authorizing rescission of the indirect source review
program. The court of appeals rejected all of those arguments (Pet.
App. 12A-14A, 17A-25A). Instead, it ruled, essentially sua sponte (id. at
14A-17A), that although the conditional approval of Connecticut's SIP
revisions was authorized and appropriate, it was not sufficient to lift the
prevailed in part in a technical sense, the fact that the
arguments devised by counsel were not responsible for the
result achieved suggests that petitioners need not be
rewarded for contributing substantially to the attainment of
the goals of the Clean Air Act. See Sierra Club v. Gorsuch,
supra, 672 F.2d at 39. Just as the language of Section 307(f)
may permit a party to recover attorneys’ fees in some cir-
cumstances without formally prevailing by securing entry
of a favorable final judgment,'? when a party technically
prevails upon a petition for review without significantly
advancing the goals of the Clean Air Act an award of fees
may be inappropriate. Cf. Carpenter v. Andrus, 499 F.
Supp. 976 (D. Del. 1980) (denying fees to a prevailing
plaintiff under the Endangered Species Act).' In short,
petitioners have not demonstrated that the denial of attor-
neys’ fees and costs to them was inconsistent with the policy
or provisions of the Clean Air Act.
statutory new source construction moratorium imposed by Congress
on States without SIPs consistent with the 1977 Amendments to the
Clean Air Act. Accordingly, the court of appeals vacated only that
portion of the EPA order which purported to suspend the construction
moratorium (id. at 25A). We note that the argument embraced by the
court of appeals was espoused neither by these petitioners, nor by the
Connecticut Fund for the Environment (see page 2 note 2, supra).
'2See our petition in Gorsuch v. Sierra Club, No. 82-242, at 16-19. A
copy of that petition has been served upon counsel for petitioner herein
together with this brief.
In denying an award of fees or costs the court of appeals could also
properly have considered evidence placed before the court by the
government that petitioners’ participation in this litigation was moti-
vated by private economic self-interest, and concluded that such per-
sons need no special incentive to serve as private attorneys general. See
Alabama Power Co. v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 1, 7 n.33 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
9
The court of appeals may also have been moved to deny
petitioners’ applications without opinion because of techni-
cal deficiencies therein. As noted above (page 3 & note 4),
the original motion for attorneys’ fees did not include neces-
sary documentation concerning the time expended. It is not
clear whether the supplemental documentation tardily
supplied reached the court of appeals in a timely manner
(see page 4 & note 7, supra), and it would not have been an
abuse of discretion to decline to reconsider the court's dis-
position in response to a tardy submission. Even after sup-
plementation of their papers, petitioners offered no support
for the hourly rate of compensation claimed — $100 an
hour. Given that petitioners’ contribution to the result
reflected in the court of appeals’ opinion was at best margi-
nal, the defective applications for attorneys’ fees and costs
were properly denied.'* Under the circumstances no recur-
ring question of * importance is presented by that
denial.
We note that petitioners’ motion for a bill of costs was untimely
under Fed. R. App. P. 39(d). The question whether an application for
attorneys’ fees is to be governed by the procedural rules that regulate
applications for conventional taxable costs appears to be open in this
Court. See White v. New Hampshire Department of Employment
Security, No. 80-5887 (Mar. 2, 1982), slip op. 4n.9 A 9 n.17.
10
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.
Rex E. Lee
Solicitor General
Caroi E. DINKINS
Assistant Attorney General
ANNE S. ALMY
Diane L. DonLey
Attorneys
ROBERT M. Perry
Office of General Counsel
Environmental Protection Agency
NOVEMBER 1982
only question directly presented on the record of this case.
DOJ-1982-11
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.