Opposition — Manchester Environmental Coalition v. Environmental Protection Agency

Supreme Court brief1982

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

FILED

NOV 1 tote

ALEXANDER L. stevas. |

In the Supreme Court of the United States

Octoser Term, 1982

No. 82-247

MANCHESTER ENVIRONMENTAL COALITION AND

MICHAEL DWoRKIN, PETITIONERS

V.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE SECOND CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION

Rex E. Lee

Solicitor General

Carot E. DINKINS

, Assistant Attorney General

ANNE S. ALMY

DIANE L. DONLEY

Attorneys

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

(202) 633-2217

Ropert M. Perry

Office of General Counsel

Environmental Protection Agency

Washington, D.C. 20460

—

QUESTION PRESENTED

Petitioner's petition for review of action by the United

States Environmental Protection Agency under the Clean

Air Act was granted only in part, and denied for the most

part. The court of appeals, moreover, rejected all of peti-

tioner’s arguments, and granted relief different from that

sought, ona theory petitioners did not advance. Petitioners’

applications for costs and attorneys fees under Section

307(f) of the Clean Air Act were technically deficient. The

court of appeals denied these applications without issuing

any opinion.

The question presented is: whether the denial of the cost

and fee applications was in these circumstances an abuse of

discretion.

(I)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

PEE ‘voccpedc ncedceccedhendsbedcdessece I

eee esse eee bse 2

EE 2

. ceccd dbcdcnccioccadoensesécépcsoescss 5

resse ess ess Gee eee 10

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Alabama Power Co. v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 1 .... 8

Carpenter v. Andrus, 499 F. Supp. 976 ......... 8

Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.,

eee esse eee 6

Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc.

eee eee sees eee 6

Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 33,

cert. granted, No. 82-242 (Oct. 18,

eee eee 5. 8

United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 533. 5

White v. New Hampshire Department of

Employment Security, No. 80-5887

I 9

Statute and rules:

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV)

7401 et seq. :

Sections 171-178, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV)

De ess sees 2

Section 307(f), 42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV)

eee e006 5, 6. 7, 8

IV

Statute and rules—Continued:

Arad.

BE, Cir. BORED .

LAL

2d Cir. R.:

e

eee

08e. ccessescccvseses

eln . eee

6th Cir. R. dꝰ )) eeeeees

L

LL

Page

In the Supreme Court of the Anited States

OcToBer TERM, 1982

No. 82-247

MANCHESTER ENVIRONMENTAL COALITION AND

MICHAEL DwoRKIN, PETITIONERS

V.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE SECOND CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION

OPINION BELOW

The court of appeals’ orders: (1) denying petitioners

motion for an award of costs (Pet. App. 51A), (2) denying

petitioners’ motion for an award of attorneys’ fees (Pet.

App. 54A), (3) denying petitioners’ motion for reconsidera-

tion of the foregoing orders (Pet. App. 34A), and (4) reject-

ing petitioners’ suggestion for en banc consideration of the

motion for reconsideration, are not reported. The opinion

of the court of appeals on the merits of the underlying

petition for review (Pet. App. 1 A-32A) is reported at 672

F.2d 998.

2

JURISDICTION

The orders of the court of appeals denying the motions

for awards of costs and attorneys’ fees were entered on April

9, 1982. A motion for reconsideration was denied on May

14, 1982, and en banc consideration was denied on June 15,

1982.' The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on

August 11, 1982.2 The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked

under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATEMENT

1. This case arises indirectly from a petition for review

filed by petitioners and the Connecticut Fund for the

Environment challenging the Environmental Protection

Agency’s approval of a revision of the Clean Air Act State

Implementation Plan of the State of Connecticut.“ The

agency conditionally approved the State’s plan for meeting

the requirements of Part D of the Act, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV)

7501-7508, added by 1977 Amendments thereto, and

approved Connecticut's partial withdrawal of its program

for preconstruction review of indirect sources of pollution.

The court of appeals vacated a portion of the conditional

'The motion for reconsideration was filed April 26, 1982 (Pet. App.

34A) and may accordingly have been untimely. See Fed. R. App. P.

40(a). It was nonetheless denied rather than being rejected for filing.

The suggestion for en banc consideration is dated May 13, 1982 — one

day before the denial of the reconsideration request by the panel, and

appears to have been prepared prior to action by the panel upon the

reconsideration request, but was not filed until May 24, 1982. The rules

of the Second Circuit apparently precluded filing of the request for en

banc consideration until the panel had acted. See 2d Cir. R. 27(i).

Alt was accordingly filed within the time allowed by law if the motion

for reconsideration is deemed to have been timely filed. See note |,

supra.

Although the present petitioners and the Connecticut Fund for the

Environment joined in a single petition for review they were permitted

to file separate briefs in the court of appeals.

3

approval of the state plan, on grounds not advocated by

petitioners, and otherwise upheld EPA’s actions (Pet. App.

1A-32A). Judgment was entered on the petition for review

on February |, 1982.

On March 3, 1982, some 30 days after entry of judgment

by the court of appeals, petitioners’ motion for a bill of costs

(Pet. App. 50 A-51A) and motion for attorneys’ fees (Pet.

App. 53A-54A), each dated February 23, 1982, were filed

with the court of appeals. The application for attorneys’ fees

was not supported by a detailed record of attorney time

expended on the case Respondents opposed any award of

attorneys’ fees on the grounds: (1) generally, that an award

of fees is not appropriate in the circumstances of this case,

and (2) that petitioners’ motivation in seeking review of the

agency’s action appeared to be an anticompetitive private

economic interest rather than an interest in advancing the

goals of the Clean Air Act. The government further chal-

lenged the amount of the fee award requested as excessive

on the grounds that: (1) the present petitioners and the

Connecticut Fund for the Environment had both sought

‘Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration (Pet. App. 33 A-49A) states

(id. at 36A, para. 10) that an affidavit dated February 25, 1982

detailed] all background information [petitioners’ counsel deemed]

relevant to an award of attorney's fees and costs.” A copy of that

affidavit is attached to the reconsideration motion (Pet. App. 38A-

43A). We note that petitioners do not indicate when the affidavit in

question was filed, and that the actual motion for attorneys’ fees (Pet.

App. 53A-61 A) neither includes nor contains any reference to such an

affidavit. According to our records, the affidavit in question was not

served until it was included together with a motion for leave to file the

costs and attorneys’ fees motions out-of-time, and a reply to the

government's opposition to the motion for fees, all dated April 5, 1982.

Respondents challenged as inaccurate petitioners’ claims that their

petition for review required the court of appeals to address a matter of

first impression under the Clean Air Act, and that amicus briefs had

been submitted reflecting substantia! public interest in this case. In fact,

no such briefs had been filed.

4

attorneys’ fees without any adjustment reflecting the sub-

stantial overlap between their briefs (see page 2 note 3,

supra),® (2) the petition for review had been sustained only

in part, and in that respect only upona rationale not articu-

lated by petitioners, and (3) neither the hours expended nor

the hourly rate claimed had been properly documented.

(See page 3 note 4, supra). The government opposed the

motion for a bill of costs on the grounds that the motion was

untimely, and noted that the costs claimed should be

réduced to reflect the fact that the petition for review was

only partially successful and to disallow so much of the cost

of postage claimed as was attributable to service mistakenly

effected by petitioners upon counsel from a different case.

Petitioner's reply to the government's opposition (see page

3 note 4, supra) was dated April 5, 1982.’

On April 9, 1982, the court of appeals denied both the

motion for a bill of costs and the motion for an award of

attorneys’ fees without issuing any opinion (Pet. App. 51A,

54A). A motion for reconsideration, filed April 26, 1982,

was denied on May 14, 1982 (Pet. App. 34A), and a sugges-

tion for en banc consideration of the last motion, filed May

24, 1982, was rejected on June 15, 1982 (see page 2 note I,

supra).

The application of the Connecticut Fund for the Environment for

attorneys’ fees remains pending before the Second Circuit; CFE's

separate motion for costs was denied on April 9, 1982.

It is unclear from the record when this reply was received by the

court of appeals. The Clerk of the court of appeals has informed us that

his records indicate that it was received on April 9, 1982 — the very day

the court ruled on the underlying motion. Although we cannot be

certain whether it was received prior to the court's action, it may be

significant that the court of appeals apparently did not act upon peti-

tioners motion for leave to file its applications out-of-time (see page 3

note 4, supra), perhaps because the court had already acted upon the

underlying applications by the time that motion was received.

5

ARGUMENT

The court of appeals did not abuse its discretion in deny-

ing an award of costs or attorneys’ fees in the circumstances

of this case. The disposition of these applications without

an opinion merely settles rights between the parties to this

case and establishes no precedent, much less one of general

importance. Review by this Court accordingly is not

warranted.

1. Petitioner suggests (Pet. 3-7) that review should be

granted in this case to afford guidance to the lower courts in

determining when an award of attorneys’ fees is “appro-

priate” within the meaning of Section 307(f) of the Clean

Air Act, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV) 7607(f). We agree with peti-

tioners that that question stated in the abstract is an impor-

tant one with significant unsettled aspects. Indeed, the

Court has recently granted our petition for a writ of certio-

rari in Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir.

1982), cert. granted, No. 82-242 (Oct. 18, 1982), which

presents the question whether it can be appropriate to

award fees under Section 307(f) to a party that has not

prevailed upon any aspect of its petition for review, where

the decision of the court of appeals upholds the agency's

action in all respects. But, unlike Gorsuch v. Sierra Club,

this case is an inappropriate vehicle for clarification of the

law, because the court of appeals did not purport to

announce any standard governing the availability of attor-

neys’ fees. For this reason, not only does the decision below

fail to conflict with any decision of this Court or of any

court of appeals, it presents no question to be reviewed by

this Court. See United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 567

n.7 (1980).®

A fortiori this case presents no occasion to afford “guidance [to the

lower courts respecting] calculat{ion] [of] the amount of attorney's fees

to be awarded in any given case (Pet. 7). Petitioners has not suggested

any conflict of authority on this score (see Pet. 7-8) and even if, as

6

2. Nor does the court of appeals’ failure to render an

opinion in this case itself warrant review. None of the

decisions cited by petitioner (Pet. 8) for the proposition that

denial of fees without an explanation is an abuse of discre-

tion treats the statute at issue here, Section 307(f) of the

Clean Air Act. Nor do any of these decisions deal with the

award of fees upon petition for review. Plainly, the necessity

for rendition of findings and conclusions explaining the

disposition of a fee request is much less when the disposition

is not subject to judicial review as of right, for establishing a

record for appellate review is the primary purpose of such

findings. Compare, e. g., Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc.,

526 F.2d 57, 69 (9th Cir. 1975); Johnson v. Georgia High-

way Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717 (Sth Cir. 1974).

Moreover, the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) are not

applicable here.

It may well be that the better practice would have been for

the court of appeals to explain its decision, at least briefly by

an appropriate memorandum. That said, however, we can

see no occasion for further review in this case. First, as is

explained below (pages 7-9), the denial of attorneys’ fees in

this case was not an abuse of discretion. In these circum-

stances, to vacate the order of the court of appeals denying

fees and costs and remand for further proceedings would be

a sterile exercise that would needlessly prolong this litiga-

tion. A case such as this is not a suitable vehicle for estab-

lishing criteria for the disposition of attorneys’ fees applica-

tions without opinion.

Second, the practice of summary disposition without

opinion is regularly employed by the courts of appeals, not

only for ancillary motions, but for disposition of appeals

petitioner suggest, there is some lack of uniformity in the application of

generally agreed upon criteria for computing fees awards, this case, in

which no standard was announced and no fee awarded, sureiy is not an

appropriate ehicle for clarifying the law.

>

upon the merits, in cases where the proper disposition is

deemed clear, no precedent is needed or created, and the

disposition is fact-bound rather than based upon recurring

questions of general importance.“ Such summary disposi-

tions, if not abused, are an acceptable response to the

problem of judicial management created by burgeoning

caseloads. Absent a showing that the practice has been

systematically abused in acting upon applications for award

of attorneys’ fees for legal services rendered upon petition

for review, we suggest that there is no compeliing reason for

this Court to intervene to bar use of this practice.

3. The denial of attorneys’ fees to petitioners’ counsel in

this case entails no abuse of discretion.'° The court of

appeals could properly have determined that no award of

fees or costs is appropriate because the court did not grant

the relief sought by petitioners and rejected each of their

legal arguments.“ Even if petitioners can be said to have

See D.C. Cir. R. 13(c); Ist Cir. R. 14; 2d Cir. R. 0.23; 4th Cir. R. 7(b);

Sth Cir. R. 21; 6th Cir. R. Ad); 8th Cir. R. 14; 9th Cir. R. 21; 10th Cir. R.

17(b); Lith Cir. R. 25.

o The statutory criterion for an award — a judicial determination that

an award is “appropriate” (42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV) 7607(f)) — necessarily

invests the courts of appeal with a degree of discretion. Petitioner does

not suggest that the courts of appeals are totally without discretion in

determining whether fees are to be allowed.

The agency action challenged was the EPA's conditional approval

of Connecticut's State implementation Plan (“SIP”) revisions and its

approval of partial withdrawal of the State indirect source review

program. Petitioners argued that the agency was not authorized to

conditionally approve a SIP revision, and that if so authorized, EPA's

conditional approval of Connecticut's SIP revision was arbitrary and

capricious. They also argued that the conditional approval could not

serve as a predicate authorizing rescission of the indirect source review

program. The court of appeals rejected all of those arguments (Pet.

App. 12A-14A, 17A-25A). Instead, it ruled, essentially sua sponte (id. at

14A-17A), that although the conditional approval of Connecticut's SIP

revisions was authorized and appropriate, it was not sufficient to lift the

prevailed in part in a technical sense, the fact that the

arguments devised by counsel were not responsible for the

result achieved suggests that petitioners need not be

rewarded for contributing substantially to the attainment of

the goals of the Clean Air Act. See Sierra Club v. Gorsuch,

supra, 672 F.2d at 39. Just as the language of Section 307(f)

may permit a party to recover attorneys’ fees in some cir-

cumstances without formally prevailing by securing entry

of a favorable final judgment,'? when a party technically

prevails upon a petition for review without significantly

advancing the goals of the Clean Air Act an award of fees

may be inappropriate. Cf. Carpenter v. Andrus, 499 F.

Supp. 976 (D. Del. 1980) (denying fees to a prevailing

plaintiff under the Endangered Species Act).' In short,

petitioners have not demonstrated that the denial of attor-

neys’ fees and costs to them was inconsistent with the policy

or provisions of the Clean Air Act.

statutory new source construction moratorium imposed by Congress

on States without SIPs consistent with the 1977 Amendments to the

Clean Air Act. Accordingly, the court of appeals vacated only that

portion of the EPA order which purported to suspend the construction

moratorium (id. at 25A). We note that the argument embraced by the

court of appeals was espoused neither by these petitioners, nor by the

Connecticut Fund for the Environment (see page 2 note 2, supra).

'2See our petition in Gorsuch v. Sierra Club, No. 82-242, at 16-19. A

copy of that petition has been served upon counsel for petitioner herein

together with this brief.

In denying an award of fees or costs the court of appeals could also

properly have considered evidence placed before the court by the

government that petitioners’ participation in this litigation was moti-

vated by private economic self-interest, and concluded that such per-

sons need no special incentive to serve as private attorneys general. See

Alabama Power Co. v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 1, 7 n.33 (D.C. Cir. 1982).

9

The court of appeals may also have been moved to deny

petitioners’ applications without opinion because of techni-

cal deficiencies therein. As noted above (page 3 & note 4),

the original motion for attorneys’ fees did not include neces-

sary documentation concerning the time expended. It is not

clear whether the supplemental documentation tardily

supplied reached the court of appeals in a timely manner

(see page 4 & note 7, supra), and it would not have been an

abuse of discretion to decline to reconsider the court's dis-

position in response to a tardy submission. Even after sup-

plementation of their papers, petitioners offered no support

for the hourly rate of compensation claimed — $100 an

hour. Given that petitioners’ contribution to the result

reflected in the court of appeals’ opinion was at best margi-

nal, the defective applications for attorneys’ fees and costs

were properly denied.'* Under the circumstances no recur-

ring question of * importance is presented by that

denial.

We note that petitioners’ motion for a bill of costs was untimely

under Fed. R. App. P. 39(d). The question whether an application for

attorneys’ fees is to be governed by the procedural rules that regulate

applications for conventional taxable costs appears to be open in this

Court. See White v. New Hampshire Department of Employment

Security, No. 80-5887 (Mar. 2, 1982), slip op. 4n.9 A 9 n.17.

10

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

Rex E. Lee

Solicitor General

Caroi E. DINKINS

Assistant Attorney General

ANNE S. ALMY

Diane L. DonLey

Attorneys

ROBERT M. Perry

Office of General Counsel

Environmental Protection Agency

NOVEMBER 1982

only question directly presented on the record of this case.

DOJ-1982-11

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.