Petition — American Laundry Press Co. v. Rexrode

Supreme Court brief1982

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In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1982

No.

AMERICAN LAUNDRY PRESS CO.

and its successor corporation,

McGRAW-EDISON COMPANY,

Petitioners,

vs.

OK NYO REXRODE,

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

Byron L. GREGORY

Counsel for Petitioner

Of Counsel:

STEVEN H. Hoerr

Rocer W. WENTHE

McDermott, WiLL & EMERY

111 West Monroe Street

Chicago, Illinois 60603

(312) 372-2000

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

The petitioners, American Laundry Press Co. and its suc-

cessor corporation, McGraw-Edison Company, respectfully

pray that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review the judgment

and opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Tenth Circuit entered in this proceeding on March 12, 1982,

as modified on April 22, 1982 on the following issues:

1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred by determining

the admissibility of evidence in this diversity action under

state law, rather than under the Federal Rules of Evidence.

2. Whether evidence of the compliance of the petitioners’

product with an industry standard was properly excluded by

the Court of Appeals from this strict products liability

action.

3. Whether the prejudicial impact on the jury of the

respondent’s counsel’s repeated references to irrelevant per-

sonal injury claims against the petitioners was merely a

harmless error as the Court of Appeals concluded.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

D i:...

r .

al., Order of J ent on Jury Verdict, No.

78-4207 (D.Kan. June 30, 1980) .............

Rexzrode, et al., v. American Laundry Press Co., et

al., Slip Opinion, No. 80-2217 (10th Cir. Mar.

12, 1982) PEI OT Pe RO RSS «AERC ER ae er

Rexrode, et al. v. American Laundry Press Co., et

al., 674 F.2d 826 (10th Cir. Apr. 22, 1 Pua

r

r oon mg ned

— June 24, 1 United States Distriet

Court for the Distriet of Kansas: Cross-

examination of Mr. Hanson by Mr. Levy ......

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CasEs PAGE

American Employers Insurance Co. v. Carney, 391

ee 10

Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) 9, 12

Fabian v. E. W. Bliss Co., 582 F.2d 1257 (10th Cir.

1 A naar 7

Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965): 9, 13

In re Air Crash Disaster, 526 F.Supp. 226 (N. D. III.

c 9

Johnson v. William ©. Ellis & Sons Iron Works, Inc.,

604 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1979), modified, 609 F.2d

, K 8, 9

Jones v. Hittle Service, Inc., 219 Kan. 627, 549 P. 2d 1383

% ˙ F! daa cous comedies tae 4, 10, 12

McKinnon v. Skil Corp., 638 F. 2d 270 (Ist Cir. 1981) 7, 9

Murphy v. L@J Press Corp., 558 F.2d 407 (8th Cir.

8 v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 598 F. 2d

1284 (3d. Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 917 (1979) 8, 9

Rabon v. Automatic Fasteners, Inc., 672 F. 2d 1231

D ͤéb

Stonehocker v. General Motors Curp., 587 F.2d 151 (4th

..... 7, 8, 9

CONSTITUTION

r Savi edeanwedscvess 5

r . 5

STATUTES

, ͤ cee

r ˙Äu..... Scale sites eee

, A 10

r . 10

2

2

are.

Pub. L. No. 93-959, 88 Stat. 192ᷣ%2

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Administrative Office of the United States Courts,

Annual Report 218 (1975) ᷑ FF

Administrative Office of the United States Courts,

Annual Report 67 (19811777777

F. Frankfurter, The Case of Sacco and Vanzetti: A

Critical Analysis, in The Law as Literature 118

London ed. 1900:

10 Moore’s Federal Practice §§ 35, 575.

In The

Supreme Court of the Anited States

October Term, 1982

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

OPINIONS BELOW

The judgment of the District Court on the jury’s verdict is

reproduced in the Appendix at A-l. The original opinion of

the Court of Appeals is reproduced in the Appendix at A-2;

the modified opinion of the Court of Appeals is reported at

674 F.2d 826 and is reproduced in the Appendix at A-17.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth

Circuit was entered on March 12, 1982. A timely petition for

was denied on April 22, 1982. This petition is

being timely filed. This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked under

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (1976).

4

‘

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an action arising out of injuries suffered by the

respondent while she was operating a laundry press which

had been manufactured by the petitioner American Laundry

Press Company. While this petitioner had sold the laundry

press to the United States government in 1959 and it had

been operated without incident from 1959 to 1977, the re-

spondent nevertheless claimed that some unknown defect of

the press caused the head of the press to close on her hand

while she was operating it in 1977. She brought this action

against the petitioners to recover for her injuries based on

theories of negligence, strict products liability and breach of

warranty.

Through pretrial discovery, the respondent's counsel was

informed of the identity of other individuals who had made

claims that they were injured while operating other laundry

or dry cleaning presses which the petitioners had manufac-

tured. Since many of these claims involved presses which

were substantially dissimilar to the subject laundry press,

the petitioners sought through an in limine motion to bar the

respondent’s counsel from making any reference to these

irrelevant claims before the jury. The district court granted

that motion, in part, and limited the respondent’s counsel to

cross-examination of witnesses about claims against the peti-

tioner of which they had personal knowledge relating to

presses similar to that which respondent had operated.

Nevertheless, throughout the trial, the respondent’s counsel

intentionally referred to these irrelevant claims during his

cross-examination of the petitioners’ witnesses with state-

‘In addition to the parties listed in the caption to this

petition, the United States participated in the district court

as an intervenor to recover on the statutory subrogation

rights ing from its payment of plaintiff’s medical fees.

The United did not participate in the appeal. Peti-

tioner American Laundry Press Co. no longer exists, and

petitioner McGraw-Edison Co. has no domestic affiliates other

than wholly-owned subsidiaries.

0

ments as graphie as the press head was caused suddenly

and without warning to close upon the left hand of the

plaintiff, thereby causing severe and permanent injuries to

his person, including and not limited to the partial amputa-

tion of his left hand.” (A-33).

At trial the respondent offered no reasonable explanation

about why the press head closed on her hand. Her claim

rested principally on her contention that the laundry press

was defective because its design did not conform to prevail-

ing industry standards and government regulations. To sup-

port that contention, the respondent offered as evidence a

standard for laundry presses which had been adopted in 1941

by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and

an Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) regulation

regarding laundry presses, which had been proposed in 1972

but was never adopted, to which the subject press allegedly

failed to conform. The district court admitted both the 1941

ANSI standard and the 1972 OSHA proposal into evidence.

However, the district court excluded from evidence the

ANSI standard for laundry presses which had been adopte

in 1972 to which the subject press conformed, even thou, .

this standard was the successor to the 1941 ANSI standard

upon which the respondent relied. This excluded ANSI

standard had been offered by the petitioners to demonstrate

that the respondent’s interpretation of the 1941 ANSI

standard was incorrect and to show that the subject press

complied with industry standards at the time of the

occurrence.

On June 30, 1980, a verdict in the amount of $750,000 was

returned in favor of the respondent and judgment was en-

tered accordingly. The petitioners’ alternative motions for a

new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict were

denied. The petitioners appealed the entry of the judgment

to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

On March 12, 1982, the Court of Appeals affirmed the

judgment in favor of the respondent. With respect to the

4

exclusion from evidence of the 1972 ANSI standard, the

of Appeals first held that state law, not the Federal

ce, governed the admissibility of the

standard. (A-11 n.17). The Court of Appeals next decided

Hittle Service, Inc., 219 Kan. 627, 549 P.2d 1383 (1976), that

conformance to industry standards was prima facie evidence

that a product was not defective. (A-12). The Court of

Appeals alternatively concluded that the 1972 ANSI

standard nad been properly excluded on the issue of feasibili-

ty of alternate designs because it was irrelevant and possibly

confusing. (A-14).

With respect to the effect of the respondent’s counsel’s

repeated reference to irrelevant personal injury claims

against the petitioners, the Court of Appeals held that these

were harmless errors which were cured by the trial court’s

instruction to the jury that the remarks of counsel are not

evidence.

The petitioners petitioned for a rehearing because, among

other reasons, the Court of Appeals mischaracterized the

Kansas Supreme Gourt’s decision in Jones v. Hittle, supra, as

involving simply a negligence case, not a strict product

liability case. The Court of Appeals denied the petition but

modified its opinion with a cosmetic change in its character-

ization of Jones v. Hittle. (A-27).

4 3 — *

ren ves Le” = * * n

I. THERE IS A CONFLICT AMONG THE CIRCUITS AS TO

WHETHER THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE OR

STATE LAW CONTROLS THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

EVIDENCE IN A DIVERSITY ACTION.

The Court of Appeals concluded that the 1972 ANSI

standard was properly excluded from evidence nder Kanses

law. The Court of Appeals’ misinterpretation of Kansas law

is discussed below. However, regardless of the admissibility

of industry standards under the law of Kansas, the 1972

ANSI standard should have been admitted into evidence

under the governing Federal Rules of Evidence. The Court

of Appeals’ unwillingness to apply the Federal Rules to this

evidentiary issue is contrary to the supremacy clause, U.S.

Const. art. VI. The holding that the admissibility of such

evidence is controlled by state law also conflicts with deci-

sions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third,

Fourth, Fifth and Eighth Circuits holding that the Federal

Rules of Evidence, not the law of the state in which the

federal court sits, control the admissibility of relevant

evidence in a diversity action.

The Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted by Congres-

sional statute, Pub.L. No. 93-959, 88 Stat. 1926, rather than

being issued under the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 28 U.S.C.

§ 2072 (1976), the authority under which this Court promul-

gated the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 10 Moore's

Federal Practice § 35. The authority for the Rules of

Evidence is Article III of the United States Constitution,

which empowers Congress to “ordain and establish” the

lower federal courts and procedures governing them. 10

Moore’s Federal Practice § 57. The applicability and scope of

the Federal Rules of Evidence in a diversity action are

governed by wholly different considerations than those that

apply to rules issued under the Rules Enabling Act. The

reasonable exercise of Congress’ power by the adoption of the

Rules of Evidence supersedes any inconsistent rule of

evidence under state law, without regard to whether it is

>

2

“substantive” or “procedural.” The boundaries of this power,

which have not yet been addressed by this Court, must

encompass at the least the area of admissibility in the federal

courts of evidence that is undisputedly relevant. Therefore,

the Court of Appeals in this case committed reversible error

when it applied the rule it presumed the Kansas courts

would follow rather than following the mandate of Section

402 of the Federal Rules cf Evidence that all relevant

evidence not excluded by other statutes or rules is admissible.

An industry standard which was in effect at the time of

the occurrence and which was the successor to the industry

standard in effect at the time the product was manufactured

is certainly relevant under Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of

Evidence to the respondent’s claim that the product was

defective and unreasonably dangerous. See Murphy v. LG.

Press Corp., 558 F.2d 407 (8th Cir. 1977). Since compliance

with the standard was relevant and not otherwise excluded

by a special statute or rule, the standard and evidence of

compliance with it were also admissible under Rule 402 of

the Federal Rules of Evidence. Thus, if the Federal Rules of

Evidence govern the admissibility of evidence in a diversity

action, then the 1972 ANSI standard was improperly ex-

cluded by the courts below.

The improper exclusion of the 1972 ANSI standard had

two significant adverse effects on the petitioners. First, the

petitioners were denied the opportunity to refute the respon-

dent’s interpretation of the 1941 ANSI standard with the

most persuasive evidence available: the successor standard.

Second, the evidence before the jury conveyed the erroneous

impression that the petitioners’ product did not comply with

industry standards when, in fact, the laundry press did

comply with the industry standard in effect at the time of

the occurrence.

In making the significant determination that the 1972

ANSI standard was not admissible, the Court of Appeals did

not critically evaluate the impact of the Federal Rules of

Evidence in its choice of law. Rather, the Court of Appeals

7

supported its selection of state law solely by reference to its

own decision in Fabian v. E. W. Bliss Co., 582 F.2d 1257 (10th

Cir. 1978). The Fabian decision is noteworthy only because it

is as devoid of supremacy clause analysis as is the Court of

Appeals’ opinion in the instant case. In neither opinion did

the court below explain why it had chosen to ignore the

Federal Rules of Evidence in a diversity action.“

On the other hand, the circuit courts which have acknowl-

edged the existence and validity of the Federal Rules of

Evidence have held ihat the admissibility of evidence in a

diversity action must be determined by those rules. In

Stonehocker v. General Motors Corp., 587 F.2d 151 (4th Cir.

1978), the district court had excluded from evidence federal

safety standards regarding automobile design because the

standards were adopted after both the manufacture of the

subject automobile and the occurrence. The Court of Appeals

reversed that ruling and held that the federal safety stand-

ards were admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.

The Fourth Circuit first noted the possible tension between

the Federal Rules of Evidence and this Court’s decision in

Erie, supra, but concluded that it did not have to resolve that

tension because it found no state law which controlled the

admissibility of such a government regulation. In the ab-

sence of state law, the Court of Appeals tested the admis-

sibility of the safety standards under the Federal Rules of

Evidence and found them to be admissible, even though the

safety standards were adopted after the occurrence in

question.

The decision of the Fourth Circuit in Stonehocker, supra,

conflicts with the decision of the court below on two impor-

*The court below is not alone in this regard. The Court of

Appeals for the First Circuit held in McKinnon v. Skil Corp.,

638 F.2d 270 (Ist Cir. 1981), that the admissibility of an

OSHA safety regulation is to be determined under state law

in a products liability action. As in this case, the court in

McKinnon simply ignored the Federal Rules of Evidence

without explanation.

tant points. First, in the absence of controlling state law, the

court in Stonehocker measured the admissibility of the stand-

ards against the Federal Rules of Evidence, whereas the

court below measured the admissibility of the standards

against what it thought state law would be. Second, the court

in Stonehocker found standards adopted after the occurrence

to be relevant and admissible, whereas the ecurt below found

standards adopted before the occurrence to be irrelevant and

inadmissible.

The supremacy of the Federal Rules of Evidence was also

addressed by the Fifth Cireuit's decision in Johnson v. Wil-

liam C. Ellis d Sons Iron Works, Ind., 604 F.2d 950 (5th Cir.

1979), modified, 609 F.2d 820, 821 (5th Cir. 1980), wherein the

court held that in diversity cases the Federal Rules of

Evidence govern the admissibility of evidence in the federal

courts.” The plaintiff in Johnson sought to have numerous

government codes and industry standards admitted into

evidence. The district court excluded the evidence based

upon the applicable state law. The Court of Appeals found

the district court’s reliance on state law to be improper and

held that the Federal Rules of Evidence, not state law,

controlled the admissibility of those codes and standards.

The Fifth Circuit reaffirmed its decision in Rabon v. Automat-

ic Fasteners, Inc., 627 F.2d 1231 (5th Cir, 1982), wherein it

held that the Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admis-

sibility of OSHA regulations in a diversity action.

Similarly, in Murphy v. LA Press Corp., 558 F.2d 407 (8th

Cir. 1977), the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held

in a strict products liability diversity action involving a

punch press that the admissibility of ANSI standards and

OSHA regulations were to be determined under Rule 402 of

the Federal Rules of Evidence. In Pollard v. Metropolitan Life

Insurance Co., 598 F.2d 1284 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 917

(1979), the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that

in a diversity action to recover benefits under a life insurance

policy, the Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility

of a decedent’s death certificate, coroner’s certificate, and

pathologist’s report. See also In re Air Crash Disaster, 526 F.

Supp. 226 (N. D. III. 1981). The rulings of the circuit éourts in

Stonehocker, Johnson, Murphy, and Pollard are in conflici with

the First and Tenth Circuits’ decisions holding that the

admissibility of evidence of compliance with industry stand-

ards in a diversity action is to be determined under state

law.“

The rulings of the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Cir-

cuits discussed above are based on those courts’ interpretation

of the Court’s decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304

U.S. 64 (1938). As we have shown above, analysis under Erie

appears to be unnecessary in light of the effect of the

supremacy clause on the applicability of the statutory Rules

of Evidence. Even if the analysis followed by the Court in

Erie and in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 US. 460 (1965), were

applicable to whether the Federal Rules of Evidence govern

the admissibility of evidence of a product’s compliance with

industry standards, the same result would obtain. The issue

as to whether such evidence is admissible can only be classi-

fied as one of “procedure.” 10 Moore’s Federal Practice § 57,

at 88. Accordingly, even if the distinction drawn by the

Rules Enabling Act of 1934 were germane, the Federal Rules

of Evidence would govern the admissibility of this type of

evidence.

The conflict between the circuits reflected in Stonehocker,

Johnson, Murphy, and Pollard on one side and the decision of

the court below and Skil on the other side as to the role to be

played by the Federal Rules of Evidence in a diversity action

requires that a writ of certiorari issue to resolve the conflict.

Although the Federal Rules of Evidence expressly left

To the extent the Court of Appeals’ decision is based on its

alternative ground that the 1972 ANSI standard was exclud-

able under Fed. R. Evid. 403 on the issue of feasibility of

alternate designs, it is in further conflict with the decisions

in Stonehocker, Johnson, and Murphy and with its own ruling

that a 1972 OSHA standard that was proposed but never

adopted was admissible.

10

certain evidentiary questions to be resolved under state law

(ag., the existence of a privilege, sc. Fed. R. Evid. 500),

Congress certainly intended that the Federal Rules of

Evidence would be controlling in all other instances. See

Rule 1101 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The plain

objective of the statute is to create a uniform code of evidence

to be used in the federal courts. The extent to which that

uniform code can be enforced should be defined by this Court

so that evidentiary questions such as the one presented here

are not decided inconsistently by the district and circuit

courts.

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS’ INTERPRETATION OF

KANSAS LAW DISREGARDS THE CONTROLLING

DECISION OF THE KANSAS SUPREME COURT

Assuming, arguendo, that the Court of Appeals correctly

concluded that the admissibility of the 1972 ANSI standard

was governed entirely by reference to state law, the court

was then obligated under Erie to apply the !aw of Kansas,

even if it disagreed with the result. American Employers

Insurance Co. v. Carney, 391 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1968). The

Court of Appeals disregarded that obligation here.

The issue of the admissibility of industry standards in a

strict products liability action was addressed by the Kansas

Supreme Court in Jones v. Hittle Service, Inc., 219 Kan. 627,

549 P.2d 1383 (1976). The subject of Jones v. Hittle was a gas

explosion. The plaintiffs in Jones v. Hittle asserted liability

against the defendant on four separate theories; negligence,

strict liability in tort, breach of implied warranty, and ab-

solute liability.

Under the strict products liability claim, the plaintiffs

claimed the product, propane gas, was not sufficiently

odorized and that the absence of odorization “constitutes a

defect in the product so as to impose strict liability in

tort....” Id. at 630, 549 P.2d at 1388. The defendants

showed that the gas had been odorized to the level required

by a state regulation. The Kansas Supreme Court was thus

11

required to determine the relevance of defendants’ products’

compliance with a state regulation to the plaintiffs’ strict

products liability claim.

The Kansas Supreme Court began its analysis of this issue

by stating:

“Although this court has not dealt with compliance

with statutes and regulations as showing due care (or

lack of defect), we have recently considered compliance

with industry standards as bearing on the same

elements.”

Id. at 632, 549 P.2d at 1389 (emphasis added). After review-

ing its prior decision establishing that compliance with in-

dustry standards is evidence of due care in a design

negligence case, the Kansas Supreme Court held:

“We think the same rule should apply to the standard

set by the legislature (or by regulations having the effect

of law) as to those set by an industry. Compliance is

evidence of due care and that the conforming product is not

defective, and may be conclusive in the absence of a

showing of special circumstances.”

Id. at 632, 549 P.2d 1390 (emphasis added). The Kansas

Supreme Court then affirmed the summary judgment entered

against the plaintiff on the strict liability theory.

Despite this holding by the Kansas Supreme Court of the

relevance of a product’s compliance with industry standards

and government regulations to a strict products liability

claim, the Court of Appeals stated in its first opinion that “no

Kansas Court to date has addressed this issue [of the admis-

sibility of industry standards in a strict liability case“ (A-

11 n.17). Because it apparently found no state law on point,

the Court of Appeals conducted its own analysis of the law of

products liability and concluded that “the issu. of manufac-

turer compliance with industry standards is irrelevant to

strict liability analysis.” (A-12).

12

The Court of Appeals attempted to distinguish the Kansas

Supreme Court’s decision in Jones v. Hittle by stating that the

claims raised therein “were founded on negligence and not

strict liability.” (A-12) (emphasis in original). That distinction

is spurious. In Jones v. Hittle, the plaintiff had asserted a

strict products liability claim, the Kansas Supreme Court

affirmed the entry of summary judgment on thai claim, and

the Kansas Supreme Court expressly held: “Compliance

{with industry or government standards] is evidence . . that

the conforming product is not defective, and may be conclu-

sive in the absence of a showing of special circumstances.”

219 Kan. at 632, 549 P.2d at 1390. Thus, in its first opinion,

the court below misconstrued Jones v. Hittle; the only ques-

tion remaining was whether the misconstruction was in-

advertent or intentional.

When the misconstruction was noted in the petition for

rehearing, the Court of Appeals modified its opinion and

acknowledged that Jones v. Hitile involved a strict products

liability claim. However, the Court of Appeals did not alter

its holding that compliance with industry standards is irrele-

vant to a strict products liability claim under Kansas law.

(A-27). This superficial response to the petition for hearing

makes it obvious that the Court of Appeals intentionally

misconstrued Jones v. Hittle.

There is only one plausible explanation for the in-

transigence of the Court of Appeals on this issue: it does not

agree with the willingness of the Kansas Supreme Court to

admit evidence of a product’s compliance with industry

standards. Yet, under Erie, a federal court has no right to

judge the wisdom of state law. It must apply the state law as

it exists. Evidence of the compliance of petitioner’s product

with the 1972 ANSI standard was admissible under Kansas

law as expressed in Jones v. Hitile and the court below

violated Erie by ignoring that state supreme court decision.

This Court’s decision in Erie had two principal objectives:

“discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequi-

table administration of the laws.” Hanna v. Plumer, supra,

13

380 U.S. at 468. The decision below, if it is permitted to

stand, will thwart both objectives. It encourages forum shop-

ping because a plaintiff who is claiming that a product is

defective will file in federal court if the product complies

with an industry standard but will file in state court if the

product does not comply, so as to benefit from the different

interpretations of the state law evidentiary standard that

will be applied. It leads to the inequitable administration of

the laws because in light of the Court of Appeals’ disdain for

both the Federal Rules of Evidence and Kansas law, the

evidence of compliance of a product with industry standards

is admissible in other federal courts and in Kansas state

courts, but not in a federal court in Kansas. There is no

rational basis for such disparate treatment.

The Court of Appeals’ misconstruction of state law and the

conflict among the lower federal courts about the ad-

missibility of evidence in a strict products liability action

reflects the burgeoning products liability litigation in the

federal court system. According to the Annual Reports of

the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States

Courts, the number of product liability suits filed in the

district courts has mushroomed from 1,579 in 1974 to 9,071 in

the year ending June 30, 1981. Administrative Office of the

United States Courts, Annual Report 218 (1975); Administra-

tive Office of the United States Courts, Annual Report 67

(1981). This growth has been fueled, in part, by opinions

such as the decision of the Court of Appeals which induce

plaintiffs to file suit in a district court in an attempt to obtain

a more favorable construction of state law than they would

receive in state court.

In light of the volume of products liability litigation in the

federal courts and the adoption of the Federal Rules of

Evidence, it is important for this Court to define the role of

the federal courts in such litigation. If there is to be a

federal common law of products liability, as the Court of

Appeals’ decision implies, then this Court should establish

the elements of that tort. If stave iaw provides the rules of

14

evidence for such claims, as the decision states, then the

lower federal courts must be reminded of their obligation to

adhere to state law as expressed by the state’s highest appel-

late panel. Finally, if the Federal Rules of Evidence are

applicable to such claims, then this Court must establish the

evidentiary guidelines for those claims.

III. THE DECISION BELOW IS ANTITHETICAL TO THE

FAIR AND ORDERLY ADMINISTRATION OF

JUSTICE.

This case centered on an occurrence for which there was no

plausible explanation, other than the routine activation of

the press, which the respondent denied. Consequently, the

jury was presented with two seemingly innocent par-

ties—the injured respondent and the corporate manufac-

turer. The respondent’s counsel upset this delicate balance

by referring in the presence of the jury during cross-examina-

tion to other claims for serious personal injuries which had

been made against the petitioners. While these other claims

were irrelevant, a fact of which the respondent’s counsel was

aware before he made the comments, the jury was left with

the understanding that the instant case was simply one of a

series of such occurrences. The presumption of innocence to

which the petitioners were entitled had been levelled.

The Court of Appeals held that the remarks by the re-

spondent’s counsel were, at most, harmless error. That hold-

ing was premised on the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that

the respondent’s counsel acted in good faith and its belief

that the district court’s instruction to the jury that the

remarks of counsel were not evidence cured any error. How-

ever, the respondent’s counsel did not act in good faith; even

the respondent conceded that several of the claims to which

her counsel referred during trial were irrelevant. Moreover,

the good faith of the respondent’s counsel is irrelevant be-

cause the prejudicial impact of his remarks on the jury

remains unchanged regardless of his motives.

15

The district court’s instruction to the jury was equally

unavailing. As the court recognized in O’Rear v. Fruehauf

Corp., 554 F.2d 1304, 1309 (5th Cir. 1977):

The cleansing effect of the cautionary instructions in

this case is dubious for, as the trial judge himself ob-

served during the trial, [you can throw a skunk into the

jury box and instruct the jurors not to smell it, but it

doesn’t do any good.“

This candid acknowledgment of the limited usefulness of an

instruction to disregard counsel’s comments parallels an ob-

servation made by Justice Frankfurter:

“Unfortunately the passion and prejudice systematical-

ly instilled during the course of a trial cannot be ex-

oreised by the general, placid language of a charge after

the mischief is done. (Every experienced lawyer knows

that it is idle to ask jurors to dismiss from their memory

what has been deposited in their feelings.)”

F. Frankfurter, The Case of Sacco and Vanzetti: A Critical

Analysis, in The Law as Literature 118 (E. London ed. 1960).

Where, as here, there is a distinct pattern of improper con-

duct which prejudices a jury, the simple instruction that

remarks of counsel are not evidence offers no relief to the

disadvantaged party.

Thus, neither counsel’s intent nor the jury instruction

could negate the feelings aroused by counsel's remarks. The

petitioners were victimized by those feelings. It is funda-

mentally unfair to permit such conduct to taint the delibera-

tions of a jury. The unwillingness of the court below to

remedy the problem was inexcusable.

16

For these reasons, a writ of certiorari should issue to

review the judgment and opinion of the Tenth Cireuit Court

of Appeals.

Respectfully submitted,

Byron L. GREGORY

Counsel for Petitioners

OF COUNSEL:

Sreven H. Hoerr

Rocer W. WENTHE

McDermort, Witt & Emery

111 West Monroe Street

Chicago, I'linois 60603

(312) 372-2000

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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Petition — American Laundry Press Co. v. Rexrode · 459 U.S. 862 | Frix