Appendix — Swift Agricultural Chemicals Corp. v. Farmland Industries, Inc.
Supreme Court brief1982
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Text
— 8288
FILED
No.
ALEXANDER tL. STEVAS,
CLERK
In the
Supreme Court of the United States
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
APPENDIX A la
APPENDIX B 18a
APPENDIX C oo.ccceccsssesveee. 44a
APPENDIX D — 96a
APPENDIX E ...... — - 1
=
APPENDIX A
11351] SWIFT AGRICULTURAL CHEMICALS COR-
PORATION, Delaware corporation,
Plaintiff- Appellant,
v.
FARMLAND INDUSTRIES, INC., a Kansas corpora-
tion and Farmers Chemical Company, a Kansas corpora-
tion,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 80-2089.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
March 25, 1982.
Patent holder brought action claiming that defendant
wilfully infringed patent which pertained to production
of liquid ammonium polyphosphate fertilizer from wet
phosphoric acid. The United States District Court for
the District of Kansas, Dale E. Saffels, J., 499 F.Supp.
1295, held that patent was invalid, and patent holder
appealed. The Court of Appeals held that patent No.
3,464,808, was invalid as level of ordinary skill in area
was sufficient that particulars of patent process were
obvious at time of its creation.
Affirmed.
Patents — 328(2)
Patent No. 3,464,808, a process patent which pertained
to production of liquid ammonium polyphosphate fer-
tilizer from wet process phosphoric acid, was invalid
as level of ordinary skill in area was sufficient so that
particular patent process were obvious at time of its
creation. 35 U.S. C. A. 102, 103.
8888
John W. Hofeldt, Haight, Hofeldt, Davis & Jambor,
Chicago, III. (Rolf O. Stadheim, Haight, Hofeldt, Davis
& Jambor, Chicago, III., and John E. Wilkinson, Topeka,
Kan., with him on the brief), for plaintiff-appellant.
Warren N. Williams, Schmidt, Johnson, Hovey &
Williams, Kansas City, Mo. (John M. Collins, Schmidt,
Johnson, Hovey & Williams, Joseph A. Crites, Kansas
City, Mo., and J. Donald Lysaught, Kansas City, Kan
with him on the brief), for defendants-appellees.
Before OW at and DOYLE, Circuit Judges, and
G. .
PER CURIAM.
The appeal herein is from a judgment entered by the
United States District Court [1352] Judge of the District
of Kansas which dismissed a complaint which charged
patent infringement. This action was brought by Swift
icultural Chemicals Corp. against Farmland Indus-
des, Inc., the appéllee herein, and Farmers Chemical
Co., a subsidiary of the Farmland corporation. The charge
was that Farmland willfully infringed the patent of
Swift No. 3,464,808, which was referred to as the 808 or
Kearns patent. This is a process patent which pertains
to the production of liquid ammonium polyphosphate fer-
tilizer from a wet process phosphoric acid.
The trial court ruled that the patent was invalid. The
crucial question in the case is whether the trial court
*Honorable Robert L. Kunzi Judge of the United
States Court of Claims, sitting by designation.
The Honorable Robert L. K tll Raglan
ments in the above entitled case.
subsequent to the arguments and before the within
recor fo he arguments and before te win pn
L. Kunzig passed away, on February 21, 1982. Thus,
he did not vat on — „ —.— within opinion.
members ve in
accordance with 28 U.S.C. Section 46(d). 9
ion i error i
invalid the claims other than those which were in
were in issue.) A third issue is whether the court
in holding that Farmland avoided infringement based
on its argument that (a) it used superphosphorio acid
r
more than one second.
In support of its claim that the trial court reached out
and adjudicated claims that were not in issue, it is pointed
out that the post-trial submissions of Swift charged
Farmland with willful infringement in claims 1, 2 and
patent which discloses a method for making liquid am-
monium polyphosphate fertilizer (referred to as APP.)
The fertilizer contains substantial amounts of nitrogen
and phosphorous, elements essential to plant nutrients.
The fertilizers are often sold in solid granulated form.
However, liquid fertilizers appear to be preferred because
of the ease of application in soluble form and its ready
availability to plants. But the liquid is not free of prob-
lems, as we will discuss.
APP, as the substance is commonly called, is ordinarily
made by the combination of phosphoric acid with am.
monia. What is referred to as the ordinary “wet process”
or orthophosphoric’ acid is low in phosphorus pentoxide.
The formula for this is P.Os. It tends to contain substan-
tial amounts of impurities which occur in the phosphate
rock from which the acid is made. These impurities are
The orthophosphoric aci
id significant
amount of water hydrated to the acid. Se
acid is heated to ive off the water a point is reached’
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merized form. Those phosphates sequester impurities in
solution and form stable compounds that do not precipi-
tate out of solution when the acid is neutralized with
ammonia. One of the weaknesses of this approach is its
high cost. Ordinarily wet process orthophosphorie acid
[1353] is cheaper and so most efforts have been directed
There is no dearth of prior art. All of the patents
deseribe a method which seeks to use the ingredients
so as to avoid the sludge problem.
Discussion of Kearns Patent
The Kearns patent, which is the patent in suit, de-
scribes the use of a pipe shaped jet reactor
**
ing with water to form a liquid APP fertilizer. Thus,
the orthophosphoric acid utilized in this process contains
54%-68% P. O, The process utilizes heat energy provided
during the reaction for the purpose of simultaneously
neutralizing and molecularly dehydrating the acid. At
least 20% of the acids orthophosphates are converted to
polyphosphates during the reaction and the resulting
product has self-sequestered properties. The impurities
present in the acid remain in solution in the APP instead
of precipitating out in the form of gelatinous sludge.
This process has been employed by Swift since 1967.
Its commercial success has not been extensive. The prob-
lems with the product limit its usefulness. Nevertheless,
Swift has prevailed in at least one infringement action
involving the Kearns patent. Its adversary was Usamex,
Inc. See Swift Chemical Co. v. Usamex Fertilizers Co.,
Inc., 197 US.Q. 10 (E.D.La. 1977) (Usamex I); Swift
Co. v. Usamex Fertilizers Co., Inc., 490 F. Su
1343 (E. D. La. 1980) (Usamex II), 47 d, 646 F.2d 1
(5th Cir. 1981).
The time span in which the chemicals come together
is disputed. Swift employs a steam residence’ calculation
for determining the mixing time of the acid and ammonia
and, as noted, calculates residence time at less than
one second. Farmland measures the time that the APP
melt“ itself remains in the reactor, resulting in a melt
residence time greater than three seconds.
The length of the trial was approximately eight Jays.
At its completion the trial court ruled in favor of the
defendants, concluding that the Kearns patent was neither
valid nor infringed by Farmland. The opinion of the
district judge is reported at 499 F.Supp. 1295 (D. Kan
1980).
* For an explanation of the steam residence calculation
see infra pp. 1357-1358.
»The “melt” is the product formed where the ammonia
and phosphoric acid combine.
nasil tis
On the subject of validity, the ruling of the trial court
was.that the patent was anticipated by prior art ond
that it was obvious. Before issuance of the Kearns patent
several other inventors had patented or applied for
patents in processes similar to the 808 patent. The court
focused in particular on methods developed by Young,
Getsinzer and Lutz and Rubio.
The trial court also ruled that even if the Kearns
patent were valid, the Farmland process did not infringe
upon it because the process used by Farmland utilized
superphosphoric acid (68% P.,.) instead of the wet
process orthophosphorie acid 54%-60% P.O; which was
called for by the Kearns patent. Further, the court con-
tinued, the doctrine of file wrapper estoppel was capable
of preventing Swift from claiming that a process in-
volving superphosphoric acid infringed upon the Kearns
process.
During patent prosecution Kearns had represented to
the patent office that the process was distinguishable
from the prior art because it utilized ordinary phosphoric
rather than superphosphoric acid. To be noted is the
fact that the Farmland process entails a residence time
of more than one second. The court found Farmland’s
melt residence method for caleuating residence [1354]
time scientifically more valid than Swift’s steam residence
formula. Based on this difference there was no showing
of infringement.
Swift has advanced five prior art processes which it
seeks to distinguish from the Kearns method; these in-
clude the following: 1) Young, U.S. patent No. 3,044,851;
2) Lutz and Rubio, Patent Application Serial Number
352,764; 3) Hignett, U.S. Patent No. 3,171,733; 4) Bookey,
U.S. Patent No. 3,375,063; and 5) Getsinger, U.S. Patent
No. 3,382,059. These are briefly described below.
The two most relevant inventions to our inquiry are
the Young patent and the Lutz and Rubio application.
The latter failed to receive a patent; the patent office
— 74 —
declared and interference and awarded the patent to
Bookey. Lute v. Bookey, 170 U.S. P.. 594 (Patent Board
of Interference 1971).
The Young Patent, filed 6/9/61, patented 7/17/62
In February 1957 Dr. Young, a chemist with a Ph.D.,
was employed by the Union Oil Company. He had entered
with a good many inventions to his credit. He personally
made a sketch of APP reactor apparatus, which was in
fact built and operated. This sketch depicts a continuous
tubular pipe apparatus and method wherein ammonia
and preheated merchant grade phosphoric acid are simul-
taneously injected into the pipe and produce APP by a
simultaneous neutralization and molecular dehydration
reaction; self-sequestering APP melt is then quenched
with water to yield a self-sequestering liquid fertilizer
product. In the Young process wet phosphoric acid is
first heated in a pressurized tank to dehydrate and con-
centrate it. The acid is then cooled and reacted with
ammonia to produce a self-sequestering liquid fertilizer.
The trial court found and concluded that the Young
method anticipated the current patent even with Young’s
recital of two steps instead of only one, because the
nature of Young’s method was fundamentally the same
as that of Kearns. The lower court found further that
using Swift’s method of calculating residence time the
Young process established a residence time of less than
one second.
The Young patent heats the wet process acid (35-55%
P:0s) prior to the addition of ammonia. The i
of ammonia can be brought about either during or after
the heating process. If ammonia is added during the
heating, it is a one step process because the exothermic
heat of reaction further concentrates the acid; if added
after, it is two steps. The heated acid is concentrated
so that up to 40% of the acid is in the acyelie poly-
phosphate form. This heating drives off water and vola-
tile impurities.
53
The patent was summarized by the trial court as
af
“5. The Young patent, 3,044,851, discloses a process
that is materially identical to that described in the
Kearns patent in suit, No. 3,464,808, in that it dis-
Getsinger filed 7/2/64, patented 5/7/68.
The trial court considered the Getsinger process to be
“materially identical” to Kearns. Getsinger uses wet
process acid with a P.O; content of between 30-54%.
The acid is put in a scruber vessel and partially neutral-
ized with ammonia at a temperature between 250-350
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72%-85% or “super H. PO. (electric furnace acid) or
wet process of 65% 75% is used. Apparently, the process
is marked by no pre-heating. This has been called a three-
then cooling equipment and finally through a screen.
The Hignett process has an agitator in the reactor vessel.
Though the Hignett process has general similarity to
the Swift process, it is much less similar than the methods
of Young, Getsinger and Lutz and Rubio.
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When a vessel is used agitation is to occur. A
time of one hour was utilized in one of the patent's
examples.
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time. However, Young and Lutz-Rubio have a residence
time comparable to that of Kearns using the Kearns
Final Analysis
From a consideration of the Kearns patent in relation
to the others, we have concluded that Kearns’ use of
residence time is no more than a descriptive analysis of
goes on when the ammonia and acid are allowed
at one end of the pipe to create the melt and
and then uninhibitedly flow out the other end of
along with any unreacted ammonia. The par-
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Kearns hypothesis is incorrect. However, it doesn't
matter in considering the present problem. How the
process works is of importance. Whether the inventor
knows the theory is unimportant.
Deposition evidence at trial was that, based on Kearns’
method of calculating residence time, Young, Getsinger
and Lutz came up with a figure not greatly dissimilar
to the Kearns calculation. Apart from this restrospective
use of Kearns’ residence time formula, the record con-
tains a memo dated February 11, 1964 prepared at Dorr-
Oliver, Inc., Lutz’s employer, where a pipe reactor test
for APP melt occurred using a residence time of a frac-
tion of a second. Because the pipe reactor of the Kearns
process involves a “plug flow” wherein the reactants
are headed in the same direction, and the Kearns patent
does not teach any mechanically induced mixing, agita-
tion or hindering the melt from leaving the pipe of its
own accord, then, at least as to the Young and Lutz
processes, their residence measurements appear credible,
for both of these prior methods use similar pipe reactors,
temperature ranges, and types of acid.
We finally consider the ability to sequester or hold in
suspension, the impurities present in the wet process
acid. This is a crucial feature to the successful storage
and application of APP fertilizer. The sequestration is
best accomplished when the phosphoric acid is dehy-
drated to the point where acyciic polyphosphate forma-
tion occurs. The wet process acid is almost exclusively
orthophosphate when manufactured. Kearns claimed that
his process would achieve at least a twenty percent con-
version of the phosphate in the melt product to the non-
orthophosphate form. The prior art evidenced by Hig-
nett, Getsinger, Young and Bookey contains this desired
sequestration ability and the required polyphosphate
formation is well known. The Young patent and the
Lutz and Rubio application, the most similar processes
to the Kearns method, teach that their processes will
C
Under the Graham discussion, we have examined the
content of the prior art and the Kearns patent and made
the crucial comparisons. We find, as did the district
court, that considering the overlap among the prior art,
the gaps where Kearns has altered the prior art in
some fresh way are few and insignificant to the end
product of self-sequestering APP fertilizer. We agree
with the district court that because of the similarity be-
tween the prior art and the Kearns patent and the ex-
tensive research in this area, the level of ordinary skill
in this area was sufficient so that the particulars of the
Kearns process were obvious at the time of its creation.
have not tried this case de novo on appeal, for such is
nlite Lif
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
15 n 11
499 F. Supp. 1295
[1295] SWIFT AGRICULTURAL CHEMICALS COR-
PORATION, A Delaware Corporation, Plaintiff,
V.
FARMLAND INDUSTRIES, INC., A Kansas Corpora
tion, and Farmers Chemical Company, A Kansas Corpo-
ration, Defendants,
Civ. A. No. 784153.
United States District Court, D. Kansas.
Sept. 15, 1980.
11296 MEMORANDUM & ORDER
SAFFELS, District Judge.
This is a patent infringement action brought pursuant
to the Patent Statute, 35 U.S.C. § 1, et seg. Plaintiff in
this action, Swift Agricultural Chemicals Corporation
(hereafter Swift) owns a patent for a process in which:
“Phosphoric acid having P:0; content of between
about 55%-65% is reacted with ammonia under con-
ditions that simultaneously neutralize and molecular-
ly dehydrate the acid whereby at least 20% of the
orthophosphate is converted to non-orthophosphate
(polyphosphate) and the resulting ammonium poly-
phosphate possesses self-sequestering properties.
The process, officially designated as U. S. Letters Pat-
ent No. 3,464,808, was invented by one Tommy Carter
ee Exhibit No. 1, Kearns Patent, Col. 1, 11.
13-19.
— 19a —
Kearns, a former. employee of Swift, and will be referred
to as the ser, 1000, A detailed todmtoal”explesation
nada, generally make such intensive use of their tillable
ts
Such fertilizers may be in either solid or liquid form,
and, in addition to their obvious advantages, tend to
share certain negative characteristics. These include a
high cost of manufacture (traditionally attributed to the
necessity of using top-grade phosphoric acid in the man-
ufacturing process), as well as a certain difficulty in ap-
plication, caused by the tendency of chemical impurities
present in the fertilizer to precipitate into a gelatinous
sludge that clogs [1297] storage tanks and applicator
nozzles. The process embodied in the 808 patent is an
attempt to resolve the problems usually attendant to the
manufacture of synthetic fertilizer, since it is designed
to produce in a relatively inexpensive manner a rich
product bearing the capacity to hold in suspension, or
sequester, those chemical impurities which would other-
wise coagulate to make application more difficult. Plain-
tiff claims that defendants have infringed the 808 or
Kearns patent by the unauthorized use of the process
described in the patent.
mmer
discovery by both parties. The parties introduced a very
large number of documents into evidence. The case in-
volves only two essential questions: whether the patent
is valid; and, if so, whether it has been infringed. These
questions, along with related issues, are discussed below.
— 2a —
Pindings of Fact. and Conclusions of Law are separately
stated.
L THE VALIDITY OF THE KEARNS PATENT
A. ANTICIPATION BY PRIOR ART
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Defendants argue that plaintiff’s patent has
ticipated in at least three separate instances.
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vessel No. 6 of the patent, at a preferred temperature
of 400°-500° F.
_ * Defendants’ Exhibit A-3, Young Patent, Col. 13, 11.
* Defendants’ Exhibit C-3.
patent contemplates a tank rather then a jet re-
actor is not a cognizable defense of patentability, since
„method rather than equipment is of crucial impor-
tance in a process patent. Leesona Corp. v. United States,
supra. And simply because reactor vessel No. 6 is not
necessarily depicted as a pipe or “‘jet’’ reactor does
not mean that such a device would be unsuitable to the
Getsinger invention, since the claims of a patent general-
ly are not strictly limited to a device described in the
specifications or depicted in a drawing. Arnold Pipe
Rentals Co. v. Engineering E ises, Inc., 350 F.2d
(5th 1965); Ziegler v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,
The fact that the Getsinger patent utilizes two vessels
which is crucial to the 808 patent occurs in reactor ves-
A third area of dispute between the parties as to the
Getsinger patent concerns the residence time attributable
to the process. The Getsinger patent states that the re-
it would seem clear that there could have been no anti-
cipation of Kearns by Getsinger. The Getsinger patent,
however, defines “retention’’ time in terms of the period
Id, at Col. 10, 11. 73-75.
phate, superheated steam and unreacted ammonia,
is in the reactor at temperatures of between about
450° F. and about 650° F.“
Plaintiff calculates this time period in the following
manner :
The internal volume of the reactor pipe is
rr.
product, principally steam and melt, are determined,
and the former is divided by the latter to give the
residence time.
In analyzing that work which they consider to have
been anticipatory of the Kearns patent, defendants have
Satie ae aden aoe he the
[1299] patent. Graham v. Joh Deore Coy 388, US. 1
36, 86 S. Ct. 684, 703, 15 L.Ed2d 545 (1966). Plaintiff
eontends that crucial elements such as a method for cal-
Id.; tion of J. G. Getsinger, Defendants Ex-
hibit M, I A. HI. Pp. 22 24 and Val I. p. 0.
Defendants Exhibit T-21, Answer to Interrogatory
No. 25.
* Defendants’ Exhibit U-21, p. 3.
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“A person shall be entitled to a patent unless
* Defendants’ Exhibit A, B-1 and C-1.
* Defendants’ Exhibit X-22.
„(g) before the applicant’s invention thereof the
n
had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it.
[1300] ‘This language has been interpreted to mean
that an abandonment is irrelevant unless it occurred
„before the applicant's invention.“ Allen v. W. I.
Brady Co., 508 F.2d 64, 67 (7th Cir. 1974). In this case,
it is clear that the abandonment of the Lutz application
did not occur until after the Kearns process was pat-
ented. When this fact is considered in conjunction with
the technical similarities which characterize the Lutz ap-
plication and the Kearns patent, it is indeed reasonable
to conclude that the Lutz application constituted antici-
patory prior art with regard to the Kearns patent.
B. OBVIOUSNESS
If it is assumed, in spite of the foregoing discussion,
that the Kearns patent is vital enough to withstand an
attack on its validity based upon the concept of anticipa-
tion, the patent must still contend with the doctrine of
obviousness. The pertinent section of the patent statute,
35 U.S.C. § 103, states in part as follows:
“A patent may not be obtained. if the differ-
ences between the subject matter sought to be pat-
ented and the prior art are such that the subject
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the
time the invention was made to a person having or-
dinary skill in the art to which said subject matter
pertains... .”’
Defendants submit that the 808 patent fails the test
of obviousness for the reason that it is an ineffective
“combination”? patent. A combination patent is one
which draws together in a new format elements from
separate, older inventions. In order for such a combi-
nation of prior art to be patentable, it must be syner-
gistic, that is, resulting] in an effect greater than the
— 27a —
sum of the several effects taken separately. Auder-
son’s-Black Rock v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57, 61, 90
S.Ct. 305, 308, 24 L.Ed.2d 258 (1969); see also, Sakraida
v. Ag Pro, Inc., ae gt wp page treme By very
784 (1976); Great A , P Tea Co. v. Supermarket we
340 U.S. 147, 71 S.Ct. 127, 95 L.Ed. 162 (1950).
question of obviousness is to be determined by the ap-
plication of a three-step analysis:
1. What is the scope and content of the prior art?
2. What differences exist between the prior art and
the claims at issue?
3. What is the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent
art?
See Graham v. John Deere Co., supra, 383 U.S. at 17,
86 S. Ct. at 693. Our previous discussion on the issue of
anticipation should be helpful to our analysis of these
points.
The prior art in this case is characterized by the
Young and Getsinger patents, as well as the Lutz appli-
cation. As we have seen, both the Young patent and the
Lutz application depict a pipe“ or jet reactor, and
although the Getsinger patent does not literally describe
such a vessel, it is not therefore precluded from the
adoption of such a device. Arnold Pipe Rentals Co. v.
Engineering Enterprises, Inc., swpra. There can be no
reasonable dispute as to the fact that essentially the
same chemical reaction takes place in all three of these
rere
times in question, measured by the standard of
patent. fall within a one-second limit. Each of
sential) claims of the Kearns patent, then, are to be
found in the
prior art.
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Finally, what was the level
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Court that the method or process claimed by Kearns
ithin the knowledge of the average artisan in the
field, a conclusion which mandates a finding that the
Kearns patent is invalid for obviousness. See Concrete
Appliances Co. v. Gomery, 269 U.. 177, 46 S.Ct. 42, 70
L.Ed. 222 (1925); Novo Industrial Corp. v. Standard
Screw Co., 374 F.2d 824 (7th Cir. 1967).
Il. INFRINGEMENT
Assuming arguendo that the Kearns patent is valid,
points in response to plaintiff’s charge: first, that de-
fendants’ process is to be distinguished from that of
plaintiff upon the ground that the former utilizes super-
phosphoric acid, while the latter restricts itself to the
use of phosphoric acid; second, that the residence time
of defendants’ process is greatly in excess of that
claimed by the 808 patent; and, third, that plaintiff is
to assert a claim of infringement in this action
by operation of the legal doctrine of file wrapper estop-
pel.
A. SUPERPHOSPHORIC ACID
The record in this case is replete with seemingly end-
less discourses on the mening of the terms ‘‘phospho-
rie“ and ‘“‘superphosphoric’’ acid, and on the question
of whether or not the residence time of defendants’ pro-
cess exceeds one second. To the uninitiated, such dis-
cussions would appear to have as much relevance as a
debate among medieval philosophers upon the question
many angels can fit on the head of a pin. In a
case such as this, however, such evidently trivial points
take on far-reaching significance,
phoric acid is made by further evaporation of 54%
P.O; phosphoric acid to about 70% P. O.. Superphos-
phorie acid, having a large percentage of its phos-
phate in the non-ortho form of which a large por-
tion is in the pyro form, can be neutralized with
ammonia in aqueous solutions without the metal ion
impurities precipitating. However, superphosphoric
acid is a premium chemical as [1302] large amounts
of free and molecularly combined water must be
evaporated from regular phosphoric acid. Further-
more, when superphosphoric acid is reacted with am-
monia, the reaction is quite exothermic and heat
must be subtracted from the system? [Emphasis
supplied. }
The patent goes on to declare that:
Still another object of this invention is the elimi-
nation of the costly step of making superphosphoric
acid in producing a non-precipitating liquid ammo-
' sium phosphate fertilieer. (Emphasis supplied.
ae Exhibit 1, Col. 2, 11. 42-57 (emphasis sup-
Id., Col. 3, 11, 13-16 (emphasis supplied).
*
Furthermore, throughout the patent, Kearns used the
adjective phosphorie to describe the acid used in his
process. Thus, the Abstract of the Disclosure states:
“Phosphoric acid having P.O, content of between
about 55%-65% is reacted with ammonia .. .’™
[Emphasis supplied.
And when listing the objects of the patent, Kearns
claims :
A further object of this invention is to provide
a method whereby liquid ammonium polyphosphates
of analysis higher than 10-34-0, and derived from
ee ne [Emphasis sup-
Finally, claim one of the patent declares:
A process for preparing ammonium polyphos-
phates having self-sequestering properties compris-
ing: e
actor; supplying a stream of phosphoric acid .. .’™
{Empbasis supplied. |
Apart from any considerations of estoppel, a matter
which will be dealt with below, the most reasonable con-
clusion to be reached from all of this is that Kearns
drew a definite distinction between “phosphoric’’ and
“superphosphoric”’ acid, and that having made such a
distinction, he wished to make it clear that his process
was designed to utilize phosphoric acid. Since that is the
case, defendants infringe the ‘806 patent only if they
teo use phosphoric acid.
How is ‘‘superphosphoric’’ acid to be defined The
evidence on the point is conflicting in this case. The
1 Id., ., Col. 1, 11. 13-14 (emphasis supplied).
Id., Col. 3, 11. 9-12 (emphasis supplied).
Id., Col. 8, 11. 15-18 (emphasis supplied).
The starting acid used by defendants therefore
pears to fit the superphosphorie“ definition, at least
as to polyphosphate content. What of the P.O; level of
the acid? Looking to the Kearns patent, once again, we
find that superphosphoric acid is defined as having a
P.O; content of about 70%.’ The evidence as to the
e term “about 70%’’ is naturally onfliet-
sense approach. [1303] Plaintiff has cited defendants’
acid as having a P.0; content of 68%.” This is docu-
mented by defendants’ company records, introduced in
* Defendants’ Exhibit F; Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1, Col. 3,
11. 25-27.
* Testimony of Ra 3 , 11. 17-18;
Testimony of W. E. Rushton, Tr. p. 382 11. 14
*Plaintiff's Exhibit 25.
* Plaintiff’s Post-Trial Reply Brief, p. 9.
* Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1, Col. 2, 11. 46-48.
* Plaintiff’s Post-Trial Reply Brief, p. 9.
117
B. RESIDENCE TIME
is 7270
112 F 111 11 Hf
ai Petpet: 25 123
Hoh bagi phy
$3233 lial Pu ee
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PTTL (SHEEN TA
steam involved. One looks in vain for such a formula.
Secondly, although plaintiff now maintains that its defi-
nition of residence time has always been based on the
time required for adequate mixing of the reactants, and
that the residence period of the steam is simply the
best measure of that time, such a distinction, if there
be any, has not been made apparent to the Court.
7 F
when the question of residence time was the
ry, plaintiff's counsel persistently developed
theme that its method of measurement was correct,
according to its theory the melt was entrained
and traveled at the same speed. Such an
is only directed at refuting a contrary position
defendants; it does nothing to establish that
dence time is actually to be measured in terms of
the time necessary to adequately mix the reactants. Fi-
nally, plaintiff has been sharply critical of certain tests
made by defendants’ expert witness, Dr. Busot. Plain-
declared the tests to be inaccurate and unscien-
tests, conducted by Dr. Busot in order to de-
termine the residence time of the melt in defendants’
apparatus, showed generally that the residence time of
defendants’ process is longer than one second. But, al-
though plaintiff has criticized the method, assumptions
and conclusions of Dr. Busot, the fact remains that de-
fendants are the only parties in this suit to have con-
any tests relevant to the issues in the case. To
the knowledge of the Court, plaintiff conducted no such
tests of either defendants’ or its own equipment. Plain-
tiff’s only evidence on the question of residence time
consisted of calculations made by one of its experts, with-
out the benefit of any actual experimentation.
The Court has previously concluded, on the issue of
the validity of the Kearns patent, that more than one
viable method of measuring residence time is available
here. We believe that the same conclusion is applicable
to the question of infringement as well. Defendants’ pro-
cess does not infringe the 808 patent, because the resi-
4811
1
5
Fs
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Hil
1135
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8 8
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at
— 882 —
dence time of the ammonium phosphate melt is more
than one second. Defendants’ experimental evidence as
to residence time indeed may [1304] have been scientifi.
cally weak; plaintiff, however, offered no experimental
evidence to refute that of defendants, and the * *
i ar
guments of plaintiff’s counsel or the testimony of plain-
tiff’s expert witness, grounded as that testimony was
upon abstract calculation and theory.
C. FILE WRAPPER ESTOPPEL
The doctrine of file wrapper estoppel may be stated in
the following manner: x
. . . the essence of the doctrine is that a patentee
may not expand his allowed claims by interpretation
to embrace features which he disclaimed in order to
overcome objections by the Patent Office on the basis
of prior art disclosures. ... ’’ McCullough Tool Co.
v. Well Surveys, Inc., 343 F. 2d 381, 403 (10th Cir.
1965).
File wrapper estoppel may arise from an applicant’s
conduct, including arguments made to the Patent Office,
during the prosecution of his patent application. CMI
Corp. v. Metropolitan Enterprises, Inc., 534 F.2d 874
(10th Cir. 1976). The doctrine comes into play in any
situation in which the patentee, as a consequence of the
fact that the accused process does not read directly upon
Sas ahalones off the. patel te, talk, to Ooveed ta tale ab Oe
doctrine of equivalents, an accused process may infringe
in spite of the fact that it does not read literally upon
the patent in suit, if it can be shown that it does the
same work as the patented invention in substantially the
same way and accomplishes the same result.
Plaintiff 's position on the question of file wrapper es-
toppel is that the doctrine has no application in_ this
case. Plaintiff holds firmly to the argument that:
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Id., Col. 1.
Id., Col. 3.
™ Defendants’ Exhibit R-21A, Cols. 3 and 6.
(C.C.P.A. 1978). [Emphasis supplied.)
See also, CMI Corp. v. Metropolitan Enterprises, Inc.,
supra.
7... Antes geomet tora
invalid, but also that even if it were valid there would
be no infringement of it by defendants’ process. The
™ Defendants’ Exhibit R-21B, Cols. 1 and 4.
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THE
14411
IV. — OF FACT and CONCLUSIONS OF
A. FINDINGS OF FACT
1. This Court has jurisdiction over this action for
t of a United States Patent, under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338(a), and venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. 4 1400(a).
2. Plaintiff Swift Agricultural Chemicals Corporation
(now known as Estech General Chemicals Corporation)
IA en ee ee Pee Soe oe
business in Chicago, IIlinois.
3. Defendant Farmland Industries, Inc. is a Kansas
corporation having its principal place of business in
Kansas City, Missouri.
4. Defendant Farmers Chemical Company, a wholly
owned subsidiary of Farmland, is a Kansas corporation
having its principal place of business in Joplin, Missouri.
5. The Young patent, No. 3,044,851, discloses a pro-
cess that is materially identical to that described in the
Kearns patent in suit, No. 3,464,808, in that it discloses
a continuous reaction between phosphoric acid and am-
monia, in a tubular reactor, at a temperature of between
450° F and 650° F, with a residence time of less than
one second, involving simultaneous neutralization and
—éla—
7. The application of Lutz and Rubio, Serial No.
352,764, discloses a process that is materially identical
ing — 1
times rele-
L 8 = oe
ction, Thay letloks that tho chs anthonn io the COA
prior to the filing of the Kearns application, had suffi-
cient knowledge of his art to enable him to combine all
of the limitations claimed in the 808 patent.
9. The Kearns patent in suit disclaims the use of
ric acid as a starting acid, and makes clear
that said starting acid is composed of phosphoric acid.
One of the advantages claimed for the 808 patent is
stated to be the elimination of the expensive step of
making superphosphoric acid in the production of liquid
fertilizer.
10. The Kearns patent in suit claims a residence time
for the reactants in the reactor of less than one second.
The patent does not disclose how its contact period or
residence time of less than one second is to be measured.
[1307 11. As a result of statements in the patent
- l P
13. The method by which defendants measure the
residence time of the reactants in their process is based
on the notion that the products of the reaction move at
different speeds relative to each other. Defendants have
dence time of defendants’ process is more than one
second.
14. No evidence was introduced in this case which
would show that the method of measuring residence time
used by defendants in connection with their own reactor
was inappropriate to the reaction in question, or that
such method was unavailable to engineers, chemists,
physicists, patent attorneys and others skilled in the art
at the time of or prior to the filing of the Kearns ap-
plication.
15. Defendants utilized a definition of residence time
developed by plaintiff to measure the residence time of
certain other analogous processes for the manufacture
of ammonium phosphate fertilizer. There was no show-
cists, patent attorneys and others skilled in the art at
the time of the development of the analogous prior art
processes.
16. Defendants’ use of superphosphoric acid 1
side the scope of the claims found in the Kearns patent,
8
17. The residence time of the defendants’ process,
since it exceeds one second in duration, is beyond the
scope of the claims of the Kearns patent.
B. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Plaintiff is estopped to assert that the claims of
U.S. Patent No. 3,464,808 are broad enough to
encom-
pass the use of superphosphoric acid, swing to represen-
tations made to the Patent Office during the prosecution
of the application.
2. By reason of anticipation by the prior art, pur-
suant to 35 U.S.C. 5 102, all of the claims of U.S. Pat-
ent No. 3,464,808 are invalid.
3. By reason of obviousness, pursuant to 35 U.S.C.
§ 103, all of the claims of U.S. Patent No. 3,464,808 are
invalid.
4. If U.S. Patent No. 3,464,808 was a valid patent,
it is not infringed by defendants’ commercial processes,
in view of the fact that the residence time of the chemical
reaction in defendants’ commercial processes is more
than one second in duration, and therefore exceeds the
residence time claimed for U.S. Patent No. 3,464,808.
5. If U.S. Patent No. 3,464,808 was a valid patent, it
is not infringed by defendants’ commercial processes,
in view of the fact that defendants’ commercial processes
use superphosphoric acid, whereas U.S. Patent No. 3,464,-
808 is limited to the use of phosphoric acid.
Counsel for defendants are directed to prepare, cir-
aa ee
flect this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
[10] 197 USPQ 10
District Court, E. D. Louisiana
Swift Chemical Company
v.
Usamex Fertilizers, Inc., et al.
No. 74-46 Decided Oct. 7, 1977
{12] Sear, District Judge.
This is an action for infringement of U.S. Patent 3,
464,808 (hereinafter referred to as the 808 patent), en-
titled ‘‘Manufacture of Ammonium Polyphosphate from
Wet Process Phosphoric Acid’’ owned by plaintiff Swift
Agricultural Chemical Company (Swift). Defendants
Usamex Fertilizers, Inc. (Usamex) and Fertilizantes
Fosfatados Mexicanos, S.A. (FFM) have denied infringe-
ment and have asserted as affirmative defenses, that the
patent is invalid on various grounds, and is unenforce-
able by reason of alleged fraud on the part cf plaintiff
during prosecution of the application which resulted in
the patent.
By counterclaim, and as affirmative defenses, defen-
dants further assert that the 808 patent is unenforce-
able because plaintiff has misused it as part of a plan
to illegally restrain trade in interstate commerce, and
has thereby or otherwise violated the antitrust laws of
the United States. Trial of these issues has been severed
and stayed pending determination of the infringement,
validity and fraud issues.
—
I. Jurisdiction
The suit arises under the patent laws of the United
States, 28 U.S.C 1338, and venue is proper in the East-
ern District of Louisiana.
monium polyphosphate (‘‘APP’’) made by the process
e eee e eee ge
II. The Patent
The invention of the 808 patent was made by Tomm
Gund of the Ugdd: Sustiiear —
* Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1.
the method involves a direct ammoniation of orthophos-
phorie acid in such a manner that the exothermic heat
of the reaction supplies the energy requirements to
molecularly dehydrate the acid, i.e., convert a substan-
tial portion of the orthophosphates to polyphosphates
without formation of appreciable quantities of highly in-
soluble iron tripolyphosphates and metaphosphates.
IV. The Basic Technology Involved
Fertilizer is normally characterized by an N-P-K anal-
ysis, i. e., the percentages of nitrogen, phosphorous (ex-
pressed as P,O;) and potassium (expressed as K.0) con-
tained in it. The 808 patent concerns the combining of
the first two of these plant nutrients. For example, the
nominal 10-34-0 product referred to in the patent would
contain about 10% nitrogen and about 34% phosphate.
The source of the nitrogen is ammonia (NH,). The
source of the phosphate is phosphoric acid (H. PO,).
Phosphoric acid is commercially available in three
forms. Each is derived from phosphate rock mined in
various locations throughout the world. The degree of
concentration of acid solution in each is normally ex-
pressed in terms of its phosphorous pentoxide (5.050
content.
The phosphate rock from which phosphoric acid is de-
rived contains impurities. These impurities inelude rela-
tively large amounts of iron oxide or its hydrates, as
well as aluminum and other metal salts and oxides. Total
i
E
f
ic
ail
He
nace is
T
virtually no metal impurities. It is very expensive and
— 47a —
this fact has deterred its use in the manufacture of fer-
tilizers.*
The second and third forms of industrial phosphoric
acid are produced by the so-called wet process“ meth-
od. Ordinary or merchant grade “wet process acid’’ is
usually concentrated to a P.O, content of about 54% of
the solution. By further concentration, through evapora-
tion of free water from the solution, the P:0, content
may be raised up to about 68%.
In the second form of industria) phosphoric acid,
wherein the wet process acid is concentrated to a P. 0.
content of about 54% to about 58%, the phosphates are
substantially in the non-polymerized or ortho form, and
there is little if any non-ortho or polyphosphate forma-
tion. Such acid is sometimes referred to as “orthophos-
phorie acid’’ and, because it is the least expensive of
the three forms, it is a desirable source of phosphorous
for the fertilizer industry.“
In the third form of industrial phosphorie acid, wet
process acid is subjected to high heat sufficient to eva-
porate water which is molecularly combined with the
acid. After such molecular dehydration, the P.O, con-
tent will be about 70% higher. And as a result of the
molecular dehydration, a substantial proportion of the
orthophosphates will polymerize or be converted into the
non-ortho or polyphosphate form. This acid is referred
to as superphosphorie acid’’. It is expensive.“
In wet process acid, whether orthophosphoric or super-
phosphoric acid, some of the metal impurities which erig-
inated in the phosphate rock remain dissolved in the
strongly acidic solution. So long as the acidity is main-
tained and the impurities remain in solution, they pre-
sent no significant problem. When wet process acid
* Uncontested fact 18.
: Uncontested facts 14-17.
Id.
a liquid plant food, however, the solubility of impurities
‘as iron and aluminum compounds is affected and
potential are presented. In neutral or near
neutral m, the iron and aluminum impurities tend
to come out of solution and form a gelatinous, sludge-
like precipitate. This precipitate will settle and clog the
c
the fertilizer solution.“
The desirability of liquid fertilizers, as opposed to
dry granulated products, has long been recognized. The
advantages of liquid fertilizers include (a) ease of dis-
tribution and application to crop lands through conven-
tional pumping and spraying methods, (b) better homo-
geneity of plant nutrients within the fertilizer product,
(e) elimination of difficulties due to dust and caking
which are characteristic of dry products, (d) more effi-
cient application to roots and foliage of the crop, (e) im-
proved solubility and availability to the plant, (f) im-
proved capability for blending with other fertilizer and
i chemicals such as micronutrients, pesticides
and herbicides, and (g) higher crop yields.“
The advantages of liquid over dry fertilizers could
not be fully realized unless the fertilizer solutions were
substantially free of gelatinous sludge-like precipitates
such as are formed by iron and aluminum impurities.
Moreover, the analysis of the fertilizer solutions should
be high, i.e., at least 10% nitrogen and 34% phosphorus,
and the cost of the liquid mixtures should be competi-
* Plaintiff’s Exhibits 3, 8, 22, 23, 27, 76; Testimony of
Raymond L. Waters. |
.* Plaintiff’s Exhibits 8, (3-4), 124 (627-628), 215 (19-
20) 5 Testimony of Raymond L. Waters and Everett N.
— 8a —
tive with comparable high analysis dry fertilizer mix-
precipi
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), which instituted a
National Fertilizer Development Center at Muscle
Shoals, Alabama in 1964. Between 1964 and 1968, TVA’s
efforts were confined to developing a two stage process
first described in U.S. Patent No. 3,382,059 issued to
J. G. Getsinger* (hereinafter referred to as the Getsinger
patent). The Getsinger patent describes a process
which wet process phosphoric acid is concentrated
ene eee SS ee eee
reacted with ammonia in a second stage tank. The com-
mercial development of the Getsinger process rocess was ham-
pered by the failure to effectively eliminate from the
process the formation of undesirable insoluble iron and
aluminum polyphosphate compounds.’
The 808 patent in suit developed by Kearns purports
to solve the problems of the TVA process. Its objectives
are:
2
. . . to produce an ammonium polyphosphate which
possesses metal iron sequestering ability when dis-
solved in an aqueous system.“
2 „ „ production of ammonium polyphosphate
* Plaintiff’s Exhibits 3, 8, 22, 23, 24, 80, 126, 127, 128A.
* Defendants’ exhibit 34.
* Plaintiff’s exhibits 126-128.
. the elimination of the costly step of making
superphosphoric acid in producing a non-precipita-
ting liquid ammonium phosphate fertilizer.’’”
The process is defined in the patent claims:
1. A process for preparing ammonium polyphos-
phates having r properties comprising :
content of between about 50% and about 69% to
said jet reactor and contracting said stream of am-
monia with said stream of phosphoric acid in said
reactor at temperatures of between about 450°F.
and about 650°F. for a period of less than one second
to form molten droplets of ammonium polyphos-
phate.
at The method of claim 1 wherein the droplets of
molten ammonium polyphosphate are subsequently
quenched.
**3. The process of claim 1 wherein the P. O, con-
tent of the acid is between about 60% and about
62%.’’
4. The process of claim 1 wherein at least 50%
of the orthophosphate in the acid is converted to
nonorthophosphate.
115 Tue process of the patent in suit enables the direct
ammoniation of wet process, orthophosphorie acid to
produce, in a single and virtually instantaneous reaction,
molten ammonium polyphosphate which when quenched
in water forms a stable high analysis fertilizer solution
having self-sequestering properties and which is free
from insoluble polyphosphate compounds such as iron
| and metaphosphate. The apparatus re-
quired to carry out the patented process is relatively
simple and inexpensive, and has long been known and
readily available to those working in the field.
„ Plaintiff’s exhibit 2, col. 3, lines 1-16.
“Td. (Col. 8, lines 14-41).
A signifies... feature of the process is that the am-
monia and phosphoric acid are contacted in a reactor at
a temperature of from about 450°F. to 650°F. for a
e
formation of undesirable insoluble iron and alumninum
polyphosphate compounds.
In order to provide for such extremely brief residence
time at high temperature, the patent requires the use of
an elongated, open-ended pipe in which to contact the
ammonia and phosphoric acid as opposed, for example,
to a tank or other such reaction vessel. The patent des-
cribes the reaction pipe as a jet or jet reactor’’, and
the process is sometimes referred to as a jet process
Kearns filed his application for the patent in suit on
August 18, 1965, and it was issued on September 2, 1969.
In 1967-68, Swift introduced on the market its high
analysis liquid ammonium polyphosphate fertilizer prod-
ucts and since that time, has successfully operated the
process at plants in Memphis, Tennessee, Mt. Pulaski,
4 Uncle Sam, Louisiana and, currently, at Bartow,
orida.”
The first description of the Kearns-Swift process of the
N
ber, 1967, when a Swift patent corresponding to
Kearns U.S. application was published in France.” —
oriptions of the process were first published in the United
States in the July, 1968 issue of Chemical Abstracts and
in September, 1968, in a TVA publication entitled Fer-
* Plaintiff’s exhibits 9, 11; testimony of Raymond L.
Waters.
* Plaintiff’s exhibit 12.
the intermediate step of ucing superphosphoric acid
and was monitoring the search efforts at TVA.“
In October, 1968, representatives of Ferguson attended
— to that described in the "808 patent.”
“ Uncontested fact 41; plaintiff’s exhibits 12, 15, 16.
“ Plaintiff's exhibits 127, 128.
“ Plaintiff’s exhibits 17, 18.
* Plaintiff’s exhibits 205, 211.
“ Plaintiff's exhibit 128.
” Plaintiff’s exhibit 20.
1
*
f
4
:
HME
i
17
4
1
F
5
In the initial stages of its production of the Poly Aetor
Phase IV process, it was Ferguson's intention to grant
licenses for use of the process to customers who purchased
Ferguson equipment. During the summer of 1969, how-
ever, these plans were abandoned. Ferguson became
aware of Swift’s French patent and, upon inquiry, learned
that the 808 patent was about to issue. Rather than
compete with Swift, Ferguson decided to sell outright
whatever rights it had to the process and the pending
Schenewerk patent.“ By November, 1969, Ferguson and
” Plaintiff’s exhibits 22, 23, 26, 27, 206, 210.
* Plaintiff’s exhibits 25, 28, 210, 221.
* Plaintiff’s exhibits 31, 93, 205, 208.
* Plaintiff’s exhibit 203.
* Plaintiff’s exhibits 34, 35.
* Plaintiff’s exhibits 32, 36, 206.
FFM were actively negotiating the sale of the process
and the pending patent application.“ Having been ad-
vised by Ferguson of the existence of the 808 patent,
FFM attempted through the employment of patent coun-
sel to determine whether the Ferguson process would
infringe it.”
While potential infringement was being investigated,
FFM proceeded with its plans to buy the process and
Having obtained a legal opinion that the PolyActor
Phase IV process would not infringe the Swift patent,
FFM proceeded with the purchase of the plant scale
equipment that Ferguson was erecting at Atchison, Kan-
sas and the Schenewerk patent application for $85,500.00
conditioned only on the success of the performance tests
at the Atchison plant.” To manufacture and market the
liquid fertilizer product, FFM formed Usamex as a wholly
owned United States subsidiary.” A site for the new
plant at St. Rose, Louisiana was chosen and Burns was
* Uncontested fact 47.
‘ * Plaintiff’s exhibits 40-44, 4649; defendants’ exhibit
* Plaintiff’s exhibits 53-56, 61-63, 66.
* Plaintiff’s exhibits 53, 61.
Plaintiff's exhibits 57-60.
.
f
He
25
|
ils
a3
equipment
rn to Usamex in exchange for Usamex’s com-
By January, 1971, the equiment was installed
t at St. Rose.“
11 Usamex abandoned the prosecution of
patent“ and a second application, similar
Schenewerk application, was filed in the name of
V. B * The Burns’ application was permitted
issued as U.S. Patent No. 3,734,708 on May 22 1973."
y March, 1971, the Burns process was in operation at
the St. Rose plant and has been used to manufacture
liquid fertilizer at the plant up to the present time.”
II
115
tt
F
|
ati :
V. Plaintiff’s Contentions
Swift contends that defendants use the steps of its
patented process in the production of a high analysis,
self-sequestering, liquid APP product, and thus operate
in substantially the same manner to obtain the same re-
sult as that disclosed and claimed by the 808 patent in
suit.
Swift further contends that defendants’ infringement
is willful, that defendants were aware of the patent at
the inception of infringement, and that defendants’ mod-
ification of its original jet reactor, by changing the posi-
tioning of the inlet tubes, was subterfuge.
Finally, Swift contends that Usamex and FFM are
joint tort feasors in the infringement, and jointly liable.
* Plaintiff’s exhibit 66.
* Plaintiff’s exhibits 58, 64, 65, 78, 81, 82.
* Plaintiff’s exhibit 89.
* Plaintiff’s exhibits 3, 4.
* Plaintiff’s exhibit 3.
„ Plaintiff’s exhibits 82, 87, 90, 203.
VI. Infringement
A. Literal Infringement and the Doctrine of Equive-
(17) Defendants do not contest the fact that the pro-
cess used at St. Rose is the same as that described in
the 808 patent.“ In the process at St. Rose, wet
cess phosphorie acid having a POs content of about 60%
|
is reacted with ammonia under conditions that
11
it
ui
5
i
i
5
St. Rose process employs the process steps reci
claims 1-4 of the 808 patent in suit. The ammonia
supplied to the closed end of the reactor pipe, the 60%
P.O; phosphoric acid is supplied to the same end, acid
and i
1
* K
polyphosphate melt in the reactor was longer than one
dants withdrew this defense and did not call a second
witness who also observed the ex parte test run.
„ Uncontested facts 19, 31.
* See note 40 supra.
“ Uncontested facts 21-29.
versal Film Mfg. Co., 1917, 37 S.Ct. 416, 418. The claims
of the patent in suit must therefore first be considered.
Claim 1 of the 808 patent describes the apparatus in
which Phosphoric acid and ammonia are contacted as &
“jet reactor.” There is, however, no pictorial representa-
tion of the device referred to, and the patent specifica-
tion must be looked to for further guidance. There are
two references to reactors in the specification. The first
that “the reaction is carried out in a jet reac-
tor such as that described in the U.S. application of T. C.
Kearns, S.N. 444,595, the disclosure of which is hereby
incorporated by reference.“ The patent application in-
ed by reference, now designated U.S. Patent No.
3,419,373," discloses a method of producing monoam-
monium phosphate, a solid fertilizer. The claims of that
patent describe the process reaction as occurring in a
“reaction zone.“ Also contained in the patent is a
pictorial representation“ of what the specification refers
to interchangeably as “a two fluid reactor,“ “a jet type
“ Plaintiff’s exhibit 6.
* Plaintiff’s exhibit 1 (col. 1, lines 47-50).
Id.
“Td. (col. 7, line 34).
“See Appendix A.
“ Plaintiff’s exhibit 6 (col. 3, line 34).
1
reactor, a two fluid nozzle jet-type reactor, “and a
“jet reactor The drawing shows a reactor (herein-
inafter the MAP reactor) consisting of a pipe with in-
lets for phosphoric acid and ammonia. The acid, H. PO.,
is fed into the pipe through a large inlet and the am-
monia NH:, is supplied through a smaller inlet con-
tained inside the larger inlet. At the point where both
chemicals are contacted in the reactor, they are mixed
by means of a vane having blades which impart a cen-
trifugal motion to the wid stream.
The second referee to a reactor in the 808 patent
specification describes the reactor more fully:
“The apparatus used may comprise an elongated
reactor pipe having a diameter less than its length
and generally uniform in cross section, said reactor
having an inlet end and outlet end. Inlet tubes are
provided at the inlet end of the pipe for feeding
ammonia and wet process acid into the pipe. These
inlet tubes are connected to a source of supply ex-
terior to the pipe. The inlet tubes can be positioned
in spaced apart relationship if desired or positioned
concentrically, one within the other. Usually, the
inlet tube is merely an open end tube but orifices
can be provided if desired, to obtain finer dissemina-
tion [18] of reactants. Also the inlet tube can be
provided with a plurality of spaced openings, i.e., a
manifold type.
One embodiment of an apparatus used to carry
out the process for production of ammonium poly-
phosphates comprises a two fluid jet-type reactor set
forth in the above-mentioned Kearns application.
Specifically, this jet reactor consists in most cases
of about 8 feet of ½ inch alloy 31688 pipe for the
phosphoric acid. The gaseous ammonia enters the
‘Id. (col. 3, line 56).
“Id. (col. 3, line 60).
“Id. (col. 4, line 31).
3
in a 1/8 inch pipe positioned inside the %
pipe. The length of the pipe was varied from
16 feet but no significant change in product was
Defendants argue that the explicit incorporation by ref-
erenc of the MAP reactor in the 808 specification nec-
essarily limits the scope of the 808 patent to a pro-
using that reactor.“ Defendants contend that, ex-
cept for th the reference to the MAP reactor, nothing in the
specification provides “clear support and antecedent basis
. 8o that the meaning of the terms in the claims may
be ascertainable by reference to the deseription.“ They
argue, therefore, that the meaning of “jet reactor” must
under the rules AH construction be limited to the MAP
patent. I disagree.
A careful reading of the 808 patent specification dem-
onstrates that although the MAP reactor is the preferred
with which to carry out the disclosed process,
it is not the only one. The passage of the specification
which first refers to the MAP reactor states that the
process is to be carried out in a jet reactor “such as”
the MAP reactor. Further along in the specification, the
MAP reactor is termed “one embodiment” of the ap-
* Plaintiff’s exhibit 1 (col. 4, lines 25-46).
* Defendants’ expert witnesses, Richard A. Wahl and
Robert Gottschalk, testified that the scope of the 808
patent was absolutely limited by the patent specification
to the MAP reactor. It was the opinion of men that
the description of a 8 with inlet tubes spaced
either concentrically or * * apart relationship at
column 4, lines 25-46 of specification referred not to
a “jet reactor”, but to to reactor. In
808 specification de-
scribed two reactors. Defendants’ other expert, Robert
r e
4, lines 25-46 of the specification did refer
* Patent Office Rule of Practice 75(d).
to a “jet
paratus. These references clearly indi that the MAP
reactor is not the only epparatus which may be used,
an needed.
38
f
7228 ag
Hitt
pees
1115
42
ait
5 7
a
115
155
bodiment of the jet reactor” mentioned in
1. The claims of a patent need not be limited solely
described in the specification or depicted in a
Ziegler v. Phillips Petroleum Company, 5 Cir.
F. 2d 858, 177 USPQ 481; Arnold Pipe Rentals,
v. Engineering Enterprises, Inc., 5 Cir. 1965, 350
885 146 USPQ 622; Penn Yan Boats, Inc. v. Sea
Boats, Inc., S.D.Fla. 1972, 359 F.Supp. 948, 175
260 affirmed, 5 Cir. 479 F.2d 1328, 178 USPQ 577,
denied, 94 S. Ct. 66, 179 USPQ 322.
Viewed against this background, therefore, the term
“jet reactor” as used in the 808 patent is descriptive
of a broad category of pipe reactors into which the re-
actants are introduced at great velocity, or “jetted.” To
limit its meaning solely to an apparatus such as the
MAP reactor as urged by defendants would place a re-
stviction on the patent not required by the claims or
specifications.
Even if I were to adopt the restrictive construction of
the 808 patent urged by defendants, I believe infringe-
ment would still exist under the judicially created doc-
trine of equivalents. Graver Tank Company v.
Air Products Company, 1950, 70 S.Ct. 854, 85
328; Laser Alignment, Inc. v. Woodruff & Sons, Inc.,
7 Cir. 1974, 491 F.2d 866, 180 USPQ 609; Ziegler v. Phil-
„See Appendix A.
3
1
— 6la —
lips Petroleum Company, 5 Cir. 1973, 483 F.2d 858, 177
USPQ 481; Phillips Petroleum Company v. Sid Richard-
son Carbon & Gasoline Company, 5 Cir. 1969, 416 F.2d
10, 168 USPQ 141; Great Lakes Carbon Corporation v.
Continental Oil Company, W.D.La. 1963, 219 F.Supp. 468,
138 USPQ 613, affirmed, 5 Cir., 345 F.3d 145, 149 USPQ
513, cert. denied, 86 S.Ct. 241, 147 USPQ 540.
The infringement of a process patent cannot be avoided
merely by making some minor variation in the apparatus
used. Smith v. Snow, 1935, 55 S.Ct. 279, 24 [19] USPQ
26; CMI Corporation v. Metropolitan Enterprises, Ine.,
10 ‘Cir. 1976, 934 F. 2d 874, 189 USPQ 770; Phillips Petro-
leum Company v. Sid Richardson Carbon & Gasoline
Company, supra. Defendants do not contest the fact that
the St. Rose process operates in the same manner under
the same ph~sical laws to produce the same result as the
808 patent. Rather, defendants argue that the crucial
difference between the two lies in the substitution of a
conventional tee reactor for the MAP reactor. The evi-
dence, however, is overwhelming that it makes no dif-
ference in the process whether a MAP reactor or a tee
reactor is used.“ The only requirement is that the reactor
used be of a type which will allow the short residence
time necessary to make the process work; i.e., one where
the reactants enter, and the reaction product exits,
at high velocity. I find that the MAP reactor and the
conventional tee reactor are equivalent apparatus and I
reject the defense based upon the substitution of the tee
reactor.
B. File Wrapper Estoppel
Defendants’ second defense to infringement rests on
another judicially created doctrine, file wrapper estoppel:
Research carried out by Ferguson and FFM demon-
oe oe De Se tiff’s exhibits 43, 45-49, 51,
1 2 * be supplied by the fact that
“|
1
“An invention is construed not only in the light of its
claim [and specification] but also with reference to its
file wrapper or prosecution history in the Patent Office.”
v. Phillips Petroleum Company, supra, 483 F.2d
at 870, 177 USPQ 488-489. Under the doctrine a patentee
who amends or otherwise limits his claims in response
to the objections of the patent office is estopped from
later re-asserting them. Ziegler v. Phillips Petroleum
Company, supra; Rosen v. Kahlenberg, supra. Defendants
claims of | the doctrine is applicable here to restrict the
of the 808 patent to the use of the MAP reactor.
agree that file wrapper estoppel is applicable here
to a hore abe extent, I find that it does not negate defen-
dants’ infringement.
The 808 file wrapper“ reveals that a series of amend-
ments to the application were made in response to ob-
jections of the Patent Office The original claims“ (claims
1 through 6) failed to specify any particular type of re-
action apparatus. Claims 1 through 3 and 6 speak only of
“reacting” phosphoric acid and ammonia, while claims
4 and 5 refer to a “reaction zone.” Compared to a prior
patent claims 1, 2 and 6 were rejected for lack of
novelty” and claims 3 through 5 were rejected for ob-
viousness.” In response to the rejection, Kearns’ patent
attorney filed an amendment which cancelled claims 1
through 6 and substituted new claims 7 through 12.
Claims 7 and 9 again refer only to “reacting” the acid
and ammonia, while claims 8 and 11 refer to a “restricted
reaction zone.” The term “jet reactor” appears for the
first time in claim 12. The remarks to the amendment con-
tain the following explanation:
Generally speaking, the reaction is carried out in
a jet reactor, not a reaction vessel of the Hignett
type. The jet reactor may be of the type disclosed
* Plaintiff’s exhibit 2.
“Id. (pages 15-16).
"35 U.S.C. 5102.
85 U.S.C. $103.
in Serial No. 444,595, which application was recently
been allowed and which disclosure has been incor-
. by reference at page 5 of the instant specifi-
In rejecting these new claims, the patent examined stated:
Claims 9-12 are rejected as unpatentable over Get-
singer under 35 U.S.C. 103. Getsinger discloses a
method similar to the one claimed except for the
limitations on the size and shape of the reaction
zone and the step of propelling the reaction product
through space. The size and shape of the reaction
zone are apparatus limitations and do not patentably
distinguish the process claims from the reference.”
In response to this objection a second amendment to
the application was filed. In this amendment, there is
no mention of a “jet reactor,” but new claims 13 and 14
state that the reaction occurs in a “restricted reaction
zone.“ In his remarks in support of the amendment,
Kearns’ attorney refers to the “instant pipe reactor’
Shortly after this second amendment was filed, the ap-
plicant filed a supplemental amendment“ containing new
claim 20, which became claim 1 of the patent. In sup-
port of the use of the term “jet reactor” in the claim,
the remarks to the supplemental amendment state that
the “[bJasis for the language jet reactor is [20] found
at page 5, lines 26-28.” Page 5, lines 26-28 reads: It Ihe
reaction is carried out in a jet reactor such as that dis-
closed in U.S. Application of T. C. Kearns, S.N. 444,595,
the disclosure of which is hereby incorporated by ref-
erence.”
„ Plaintiff’s exhibit 2 (page 26).
Id. (pages 27-28).
Id. (page 30-31).
Id. page 37).
“Id. (pages 39-43).
be
They argue that the file wrapper shows the limita-
in
iz
.
5
in
MAP reactor as a basis for the use of the term “jet
reactor” in claim 20 (claim 1 of the patent). In short,
they argue that the process “sold” to the Patent Office
was one carried out with the MAP reactor and that
Swift, having given up claim to a process using any re-
action apparatus other than the MAP reactor, is now
estopped from asserting that the 808 process could in-
clude the use of another type of reactor.
File wrapper estoppel does preclude Swift from arguing
that the scope of the 808 patent is broad enough to
encompass the use of the with any reactor
other than a “jet reactor.” As defendants observe the re-
acting step in the 808 process was progressively limited
from the general “reacting” to the more restrictive “re-
acting in a jet reactor.” Moreover, this narrowing of the
claim does appear indeed to have been undertaken in re-
sponse to the objections of the Patent Office that the
808 process was unpatentable over prior patents which
involved the use of tank or column reactors. Swift is
estopped from arguing that its patent cover the use of
these rs.
“ Defendants’ experts, Wahl and Gottschalk, testified
hierarchy of reactors can be classified in the
Reactor
Tank Reactor Pipe Reactor Column Reactor
) Jet Tee
Reactor Reactor
—
“See defendants’ exhibit 71.
in the 808 patent— a jet reactor—from the type used
Hignett— a tank reactor.” Furthermore, the
states that the jet reactor may be of the type disclosed
in the MAP patent application. This language merely
indicates that the MAP reactor is one of several possi-
ble embodiments of the “jet reactor;” nowhere does the
This statement TI. tes lope seed he
t
“ Plaintiff’s exhibit 2 (page 26). |
“U.S. Patent No. 3,171,733. Defendants’ exhibit 10.
kalte ss Gl ay Les ae Ps oe
1 % iu Ae
In ee ee ey
lb e e
all gests 3212735825 git Hels
11 ! 1411 epg 1 le
ib e e
ages e
ee e nGagl
227817175 Hyp, l e
satel ll lt
firmed, 5 Cir. 441, F 2a 631, cert. denied, 92 S.Ct. 288
An inducer of infringement under $271(b), must aid
the infringement. Ingersoll-Rand Company v.
International Corporation, S. D. Fla. 1976, 420
I find that FFM is liable under either theory. The evi.
dence is that FFM, from the time of its initial investiga-
of the Poly Actor Phase IV process to the time this
HK
Tom V. Burns, a consultan r
the Atchinson, Kansas pilot plant under instruetions to
observe the operation and take an active role in further
development of the process.“ Ferguson became aware that
its process might infringe the 808 patent and, rather
than face the possibility of litigation, decided to sell
the process outright to a buyer who would agree to
undertake the defense of the PolyActor Phase IV pro-
cess.” From the moment that FFM first expressed in-
terest in the process all information from the attorney
prosecuting the Schenewerk patent application was di-
rected to the attention of FFM, its chief executive officer
J. R. Zerbst, and its technical director Ronald Fogg.”
“ Plaintiff's exhibits 31, 93, 205, 208.
“ Plaintiff’s exhibits 34, 35, 203, 211.
* Plaintiff’s exhibits 32, 36, 206.
* Plaintiff's exhibits 41, 43, 44.
at A
F
the a
had evolved into two separate processes. Pro-
original Schenewerk process, utilized a “vapor
reactor.” Process B utilized a conventional tee reae-
Because Swift owned a major customer of FFM,
preferred to avoid litigation with Swift over
process.” Zerbst requested and obtained a report
Robert E. Isner, the attorney prosecuting the Schene-
application, stating that Process A might infringe
patent but that Process B would not.“
After obtaining Isner’s opinion, FFM joined with
APCO Farm Chemicals, Inc. to form AMEX Fertilizers,
a shell corporation set up merely to hold the pat-
ent on the Actor Phase IV process.“ AMEX agreed
the process from Ferguson.“ Thereafter, an agree-
ment was entered into by AMEX, APCO, FFM and
Ferguson“ specifying that AMEX would sell the rights
to the Ferguson process to APCO, which would then
grant the right to manufacture the equipment used in
the process to Ferguson. By the same instruments, FFM
agreed not to take action in conflict with Ferguson’s
rights. However, APCO Farm Chemicals was subsequently
sold by its parent company becoming Jon-T Chemical
the joint venture and formed Usamex. Zerbst became
Usamex’s president and the company’s board of direc-
tors was comprised entirely of FFM officers and direc-
tors.“ The agreement between Ferguson and Jon-T (as
APCO’s successor) was terminated” and FFM sold to
111
F
a
4215
* Plaintiff's exhibits 47-51.
* Plaintiff's exhibits 48, 49.
™ Plaintiff’s exhibit 201.
* Plaintiff's exhibit 53.
* Plaintiff’s exhibit 55.
* Plaintiff's exhibits 57, 59, 60.
* Plaintiff's exhibit 62.
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5 215 11747 at
1 8 FE Besscea i;
inl 1 AUT
VII. 808 Patent’s Validity and Enforceability
To determine whether defendants have infringed the
patent in suit, the patent’s validity was assumed. I now
examine that assumption in addition to defendants’ charge
that the patent is unenforceable because it was obtained
by fraud on the Patent Office.
” Plaintiff's exhibit 64.
* Plaintiff’s exhibit 58.
* Plaintiff’s exhibit 81.
* Plaintiff’s exhibits 205, 208.
* Plaintiff's exhibits 66, 93, 99-101.
— 70 —
A. Validity of the Patent
“A patent shall be presumed valid . The burden
of establishing the invalidity of a patent or any claim
thereof shall rest on the party asserting it.” 35 35 USC.
$282. The presumption of validity “may be rebutted only
by a quantum of proof—whether it be called clear and
burden.” Harrington Manufacturing Company v. White,
supra, 475 F.2d at 794, 177 USPQ at 293.
Defendants attack the validity of the 808 patent on
two grounds. The first is the requirement of 35 U.S.C.
$103 that a patented invention not be obvious to a per-
son having “ordinary skill in the art.” The second is
that the claims of a patent point out distinctly and with
particularity what the patentee regards as his inven-
tion. 35 U.S.C. 6112.
1. Obviousness
Under 5 103, the scope and content of the prior
art are to be determined; differences between the
prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascer-
tained; and the level of ordinary skill in the per-
tinent art resolved. Against this background, the
obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter
is determined. Such secondary considerations as
commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs,
failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light
to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the
subject matter sought to be patented. As indicia
of obviousness or nonobviousness, these inquiries
may have relevancy.
Graham v. John Deere Company of Kansas City, 1966,
86 S.Ct. 684, 148 USPQ 459, 467.
Before examining the prior art cited by defendants,
it will be helpful to narrow the search by ascertaining
. Rather, Swift claims to have found solation to
a problem which had been the subject of extensive re-
search for a number of years, ie., how to make high
which phosphoric acid with a P.O, content of between
54% and 68% is reacted with ammonia at a temperature
of between 450°F. and 650°F. for a period of less than
one second. Swift claims that the prescribed temperature
range and residence time are critical in order to produce
a high analysis, self-sequestering liquid fertilizer from
phosphoric acid of the concentration noted. The focus of
the examination of the prior art must be on these two
variables.
[23] Defendants cite a number of patents and a 1964
TVA demonstration of a direct APP process in support
of their contention that the 808 patent is invalid for ob-
viousness. Each of these must be examined in turn.
U.S. Patent No. 2,755,176" (the Pearce patent) is a
process and apparatus patent for the manufacture of dry
fertilizer. The process disclosed consists of three steps,
only one of which is relevant here. That step involves
the reaction of an acid (which may be phosphoric acid)
with ammonia in a 30 to 6 inch tee mixer and the pro-
pulsion by steam of the reaction product down a 10 foot
pipe connected to the mixer. According to this patent,
the fertilizer product and steam “may move through the
lines at speeds approaching 500 feet per second.“ Be-
* Plaintiff’s exhibit 7(d).
solution of between 45% and 55% P. 0.
271111
Es.
ret
i
281
Tue
14“.
en
Lake zl
Nr TIA
water vapor or steam. ‘‘Usually about 15 seconds
Geen Goan te ths tabs to ital.” Anvitiling to
patent specification, these last two steps (partial
771
re patent disclosing a method for the production of
therein rapidly and intimately mixing them at a tempera-
ture in the range from 55°F to about 125°F .. .”’ a high
analysis liquid fertilizer results without the formation of
precipitates. The patent specifies, however, that the tem-
perature ‘‘can go only a very little above 100°F when
* Plaintiff’s exhibit 7(e).
“ Defendants’ exhibit 26.
—73e—
stability for long periods is desired.’’ A sample of ferti-
lizer produced at a reaction temperature of 116°F. was
stable, i. e., the impurities remained sequestered, for about
In regard to the residence time of the
product within the reactor, the patent states: “We have
K
i
at
ring
7A ny ange — a oe 8 ap
centration of the wet process acid before reaction with
P
sure to a temperature of between 120°C and 400°C
[248°F. and 752°F.] to convert about 50% of orthophos-
phates in the acid to polyphosphates. The concentrated
acid is cooled ad then introduced into a pipe where it is
reacted with ammonia. As an alternative method, the
patent suggests a method which seems strikingly similar
to the 808 process.
If desired, the ammonium phosphate can be pre-
pared from the acid during or immediately after the
plies a portion of the heat to concentrate the acid.
To describe this alternative process more clearly, the pat-
tent refers to figure no. 8 in the specification,” which
depicts a pipe reactor into i
f
i:
a
* Plaintiff’s exhibit 7(g).
“See Appendix D.
3
through the other end of the pipe and is quenched with
water. The residence time of the reaction product in the
pips is uot epecified.
“U.S. Patent No. 3,171,733" and No. 3,288,752” (the Hig-
* patents) disclose a [24] method of producing liquid
r dry fertilizer from superphosphoric or highly con-
* wet process phosphoric acid. The process dis-
closed involves the reaction of the acid with ammonia
in a tank reactor with agitation “at elevated tempera-
tures and pressures. The pressures range between 10
and 1000 pounds per square inch.
The temperature in reactor 3 [a tank reactor]
may be maintained in the range from about 325° to
475°, with the preferred temperature range being
from about 350°F. Depending upon temperature and
other variables, the retention time in reactor vessel
3 may range from about 10 minutes to 3 hours, the
preferred retention time being in the range from
about 1 to 1.5 hours. We have found that increasing
the retention time increases the degree sf ammonia-
tion of the product.
It is apparent that there are several combinations
of pressure, temperature and retention time which
may be used to obtain a given degree of ammonia-
tion. To obtain the highest degree of ammoniation
high pressure, low temperature and long retention
time should be used.
U.S. Patent No. 3,375,063" (the Bookey patent) dis-
closes a method of producing dry fertilizer by reacting
wet process phosphoric acid and ammonia in a column
reactor. Ammonia gas and phosphoric acid containing be-
* Defendants’ exhibit 10.
* Defendants’ exhibit 33.
* Defendants’ exhibit 11.
—
tween 45% and 56% P.O; are fed into a column reactor
containing ammonium polyphosphate maintained at be-
tween 170°C and 250°C [338°F. and 482°F.]. The ferti-
lizer product is withdrawn from the bottom of the reac-
tor. The patent claims fail to specify a residence time
for the process, but in example 1, wheree 50% wet process
acid was reacted with ammonia at about 170°C [338°F.],
the residence time was one hour.
US. Patent No. 3,382,059" (the Getsinger patent), de-
action is used to concentrate the acid and convert ortho-
phosphates into polyphosphates. By using the heat of
reaction to concentrate the acid, this patent claims that
the previously required separate step of concentrating
said wed process phosphoric acid up to the range of su-
per phosphoric acid is entirely eliminated.“
Further, I have found that, in carrying out my
process for the manufacture of liquid . . . fertilizers
by the ammoniation of wet process phosphoric acid,
I can utilize the free heat of ammoniation of evapo-
rate water and thereby condense the acid rather than
require the use of expensive heat from fuel. My proc-
ess accomplishes the two functions of ammoniation
and concentration simultaneously instead of using two
Separate processes.
The Getsinger process utilizes three variables: tempera-
ture, retention time and pressure. The limits and prefer-
red ranges for these variables are listed in the patent
* Defendants’ exhibit 9.
* Plaintiff’s exhibit 128A.
n: Temperature limits are 300°F. to 600°F.,
1 — range of 400 F. to 500 F.; reten-
limits are 1 to 180 minutes, with a prefer.
with
site tiene
red range of 2 to 30 minutes; the pressure limits are 5 to
1
1
tay
th
rh
the amount of impurities (particularly iron and alumi-
Nee
1
ranged between 425°F. and 470.
Defendants argue that, in light of these patents, it was
obvious for Kearns to use a reaction temperature of be-
tween 450°F. and 650°F. and a residence time of less
than one second. They contend that the use of this tem-
perature range and residence time were disclosed in these
other patents and that Kearns’ accomplishment was mere-
ly to put together what others had already discovered.
While I agree that Kearns temperature range and resi-
dence time were used by others, I do not agree that it
was obvious for Kearns to combine the two variables
in the manner that he did to produce the results that he
achieved.
The prior art did teach that longer reaction residence
times were inimical to the effective sequestration of met-
~ “ Defendants’ exhibit 9; see also defendants’ exhibit 34.
“ Plaintiff’s exhibit 128A (page 40).
disagree. The Pearce patent involved only the produc-
of solid, not liquid, fertilizers. Moreover, none of the
3 5
i
:
i
|
;
application in 1952 and the patent issued
. Eight years later, however, Getsinger and TVA
115
N
K
b
i
J
to 30 minutes. Others working in the field were
r away from using residence times of
. The Hignett patent advised increasing
ion time to increase the degree of ammoniati
iplin patent ‘‘found that the reaction is
. - — 3
.
it
32
+
Bh
8
l
J
dif
tele
apparently placed no importance at all on
the residence time, for neither of them a
of times.” Only Kerley, whose patent application was
filed in 1955, used a residence time even close to one
second. That patent specified that “[u]sually about 15
seconds residence time in the tube is sufficient.”
Only after TVA had obtained a copy of Swift’s French
patent on the Kearns process in 1968 did its focus switch
See pean Se. ae b Nr
produot eee ten foot pipe reactor at
approaching 500 fect per second.” 3
i
BES E.
ils
1
tis
35
Hi
1
Ho
15
fi
in
‘|
1
i};
1121 l EL
beet 1 Hur 1
aE 115
ied Hae
11 ley Lea fil +
ayia .
7 tele 85 i! ii; 7 22
111 HAE 14871 i
rae 1411110 fil
product in which the impurities are effectively sequester-
ed. For example, in a 1970 publication, TVA reported
the following:
[26] P
Test Tee reactor content, % of
No. temp., F. total P. O.
230-4 412 27
237-4 446 41
237-3 456 45
238-1 465 as”
Id. (pages 9-10).
11 an
110
17
bigiats
4539982033
1 fal if
1 ite 7
112711
1 i
i i ii il if
saad
Nees 1110
ape
22 1872 ots
He e
:
ap
11 5
an
1
a
1275
112271 ele
1
f
given by TVA that retention times
might be critical to the success of the process was con-
versatili
conn, TVA reported that “moet of the potential problems
cess, TVA
tained in the 1968 demonstration booklet.“ By this time,
A eat
Plaintiff’s exhibits 66, 70, 208, 215.
‘“* Plaintiff’s exhibit 128C.
Id. (page 54).
Id. (page 57).
Id. (page 71).
4
F
é
i
i
il
il
achieved only after the original Schenewerk process
— Sp bate SG Se eG eS Cee
i
6
228
itt
17
f
i
i
5
f
l
38
2. Indefiniteness
The second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 5112 provides:
The specification shall conclude with one or more
claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claim-
ing the subject mutter which the application regards
as his invention. A claim may be written in inde-
pendent or dependent form, and if in dependent
form, it shall be construed to include all the limita-
tions of the claim incorporated by reference into
the dependent claim.
Defendants contend that the claime of the 808 patent
are not set out with the specificity required by $112, and,
therefore, that the patent is invalid for indefinitences.
They argue that the claims are indefinite in two
first, the type of reactor to be used, and second, the time
the reactants remain in the reactor.
a. Type of Reactor
Defendants argue that the use of the term “jet reactor”
in claim 1 of the 808 patent is vague and ambiguous
* Plaintiff’s exhibits 208, 213, 215. Burns’ initial re-
to FFM on the plant scale operation at Atchinson
rere
™ Plaintiff’s exhibits 68-70, 75-77, 204A, 204B. 206, 213.
specification for a definition. Looking pets be go may on
they contend that the only definition re is the in-
corporation by reference of the MAP reactor. Therefore,
if, as I have found supra, the term “jet reactor” was
not intended to be limited solely to the MAP reactor,
failure to explicitly state this fact makes the use of the
term indefinite.
This argument is based on a false assumption. Con-
the reactor may have concentrically ge Baw inlet tubes,
use of
descriptive term “jet” is well established in the art
pipe reactors used to manufacture ammonium polyphos-
ee nee oe ee eee
therefore, is not so vague and ambiguous that one with
ordinary skill in the art of the manufacture of ammonium
polyphosphate fertilizer would be uncertain of the scope
of the patent.
b. Time in the Reactor
Defendants’ argue that the phrase ‘‘contacting said
stream of ammonia with said stream of phosphoric acid
. . for a period of less than one second” is unclear be-
cause the reaction of ammonia and phosphoric acid occurs
instantaneously. “In other words, in all the prior art pro-
— 3a —
cesses for the production of ammonium polyphosphates,
the ammonia and phosphoric acid always are in contact
for less than one second which is all the time needed to
complete reaction. How then does the defined contacting
time distinguish the claimed process from contacting time
of the prior art!
I find this argument to be totally without merit. It is
true that the reaction of a molecule ammonia with a
molecule of phosphoric acid can be considered to occur
instantaneously."* Prior art reveals, however, that the
“contacting” of the reactants for a period of less than
one second refers not to the speed of the molecular reac-
tion, but to the time reqiured to adequately mix the
reactants. For example, the Getsinger patent specifies a
retention time of 1 to 180 minutes in order to assure a
complete reaction between the ammonia and phosphoric
acid. The Kerley patent, which utilizes a tee reactor
that allows better mixing of the reactants in a shorter
period of time, specifies a residence time within the
reactor of only 15 seconds. Certainly, defendants do not
contend that these patents are invalid because they do
not define “retention time” or “residence time”. The ex-
tremely short residence time specified in the 808 patent
is one of the grounds upon which it is distinguished
from the prior art in the field of manufacturing liquid
ammonium polyphosphate fertilizers. The 808 patent
avoids the problem of unsequestered solids in the fer-
tilizer product caused by overheating by retaining the
product in the reactor for less than one second. Clearly,
the length of the retention or residence time wtihin the
reactor is a variable which was recognized in the prior
art and a valid basis for distinguishing the 808 patent.
J conclude, therefore, that the phrase “contacting said
stream of ammonia with said stream of phosphoric acid
for a period of less than one second” is sufficiently
™ Defendants’ Post-Trial Brief, page 81.
™* Testimony of Everett N. Mortenson.
3
definite to allow one with ordinary skill in the art of
manufacturing liquid ammonium polyphosphate fertilizers
to carry out the process disclosed in the patent without
undue experimentation. See Ansul Co. v. Uniroyal, Inc.,
2 Cir. 1971, 448 F. 2d 872, 169 USPQ 759, cert. denied,
92 S.Ct. 680, 172 USPQ 257.
B. Fraud on the Patent Office
Defendants charge that, in its prosecution of the 808
patent, Swift committed fraud on the Patent Office by
willfully withholding relevant prior art from the examiner,
in particular, by failure to cite the Pearce patent. If the
charge were substantiated, the patent would be invalid
and unenforceable. Park v. Motorola, Inc., 5 Cir. 1975,
524 F.2d 518, 188 USPQ 225; Beckman Instruments, Inc.
v. Chemtronies, Inc., 5 Cir. 1970, 439 F.2d 1369, 165
USPQ 355. I find, however, that defendants have failed
in their proof.
An applicant for a patent has an “uncompromising
duty” to disclose to the Patent Office all prior art which
the applicant has reason to believe may be material to
the patentability of his invention. Precision Instrument
Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machine Co., 1945,
65 S.Ct. 993. While the type of misconduct before the
Patent Office which will constitute fraud varies with the
facts of each case, there must be “some element of wrong-
fulness, willfulness, or bad faith .. .” Park v. Motorola,
Inc., supra, 524 F.2d at 535, 188 USPQ at 238-239.
Furthermore, it must be established that the patent
would not have issued but for the wrongful conduct.
Eltra Corp. v. Basic, Inc., N.D. Ohio 1977, 193 USPQ
426. Finally, the fraud must be established by clear
unequivocal and convincing evidence. Schnadig. Corp.
v. Gaines Mfg. Co., Inc., 6 Cir. 1974, 494 F.2d 383, 181
USPQ 417.
It is undisputed that Swift had knowledge of the Pearce
patent and did not cite it as prior art to the Patent
Office. The existence of fraud which would invalidate the
8
:
2.
reactor of less than one second. Defendants contend that,
because Pearce is the sole example of prior art which
involves the reaction of ammonia and phosphoric acid
in a pipe reactor for a period of less than one second,
ite relevance and materiality to the Patent Office’s con-
sideration of the patent in suit is undeniable. While I
agree that the Pearce patent is relevant to the 808 patent,
I find that Swifts’ failure to disclose the patent during
the prosecution of the 808 patent was not material to the
decision of the Patent Office to grant the 808 patent.
The relevance of Pearce to the 808 patent is clear
from the discussion of both patents on the issue of
obviousness. Both patents deal with the reaction of am-
monia and phosphoric acid in a pipe reactor to produce
fertilizer. Moreover, one of the factors upon which the
808 patent relies to distinguish it from the prior art, a
residence time within the reactor of less than one second,
is also disclosed in Pearce. I believe, therefore, that it
should have been cited to the Patent Office by Swift.
At the same time, however, I find that the failure of
Swift to cite the Pearce patent, had no material effect
on the decision of the Patent Office to grant the 808
patent because, even in light of Pearce, I find that the
808 patent is patentable over the prior art.
Apart from the issue of materiality, I find no evidence
that Swift’s failure to cite Pearce was motivated by an
“element of wrongfulness, willfulness, or bad faith.” For
example, in Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Chemtronies,
r
the evidence in that case demonstrated that, although
the patentee recognized that a prior invention seriously
threatened the patentability of its own invention, it not
only failed to disclose the prior invention, but made
affirmative representations to the Patent Office that there
had been no previous inventions displaying the prop-
erties that the patented invention had in common with
the earlier invention. Here, the evidence at most shows
only that Swift failed to cite a prior patent which it
should have cited. While such conduct is not to be con-
doned, where it has no material effect on the decision
of the Patent Office and has not been shown to have
been done willfully or in bad faith, it does not constitute
grounds for invalidating the patent. Parker v. Motorola,
Inc., supra; Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Chemtronics,
Inc., supra.
IX. Increased Damages And Attorneys’ Fees
A. Increased Damages
The award of damages for patent infringement is
governed by 35 U.S.C. 5284:
Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award
able royalty for the use made of the invention by
ringer, together with interests and costs as
— 20a —
The court may receive expert testimony as an aid
Although the issue of quantum has not yet been tried,
Swift urges the entry of a finding which would support
ran Sale Oe eee eee we
whatever damages are ultimately assessed
Damages may be increased under 6284 * senate
discretion where the infringement is found to be inten-
tional, willful and deliberate. Dow Chemical Co. v.
Chemical Cleaning, Inc., 5 Cir. 1970, 434 F.2d 1212, 167
USPQ 513, cert. denied, 91 S. Ct. 1621, 169 CSPQ 528.
The burden of proving conduct that would justify the
imposition of increased damages is on plaintiff. Colum-
bia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Zenith Radio Corp., N.D.
III. 1975, 391 F.Supp. 780, 185 USPQ 662.
Swift contends that infringement of the 808 patent
was willful and intentional. Swift charges that FFM
agreed, through its subsidiary, AMEX, to purchase the
process before investigating infringement. Then, in or-
der to obtain a legal opinion of noninfringement, FFM
decided to use a tee reactor with opposed inlet tubes
rather than a reactor with concentric inlets. To obtain
the opinion, Swift claims that FFM led Robert Isner,
the patent attorney, to believe that the reactor was not
an elongated pipe, as described in the 808 patent and
that the residence time in the reactor was more than
one second. Therefore, Isner’s opinion of [30] nonin-
fringement was based upon misrepresentations by FFM.
a
FFM to admit, in the face of overwhelming evidence,
that it directed and controlled the infringing activities
of Usamex at St. 1 and defendants’ failure to ful-
fill their promise to produce considerable evidence at
pas in support of their convention that the 808 pat-
invalid and unenforceable.
hes I believe there is some evidence to support Swift’s
position that the infringement was intentional and will-
ful, I find that Swift has failed to show such bad faith
as would justify increasing the damages. Clearly, defen-
dants’ infringement was intentional in the sense that
they were aware that their attempt to distinguish their
process solely on the basis of the positioning of the re-
actor inlets was precarious. While defendants’ position
regarding the infringement issue was weak, I believe the
issues concerning the validity of the patent, especially
the question of obviousness, were open to debate. The
evidence of defendants’ conduct in connection with Is-
ner’s opinion of noninfringement also falls short of sup-
porting a finding of bad faith. The evidence does show
that FFM was anxious to obtain Isner’s opinion so that
it could present it to Swift and that when it was ob-
tained, little was done to ensure that it was correct.
However, I fail to find evidence which demonstrates that
FFM deliberately misrepresented the facts to Isner.
Swift’s complaints concerning defendants’ interjection
of a new and baseless defense at trial, their refusal to
admit, in response to pre-trial requests for admissions,
that FFM controlled the infringing activities of Usamex,
and their failure to produce considerable evidence regard-
ing the validity and enforceability of the patent in suit
do not go to the issue of increased damages. They may,
however, support other remedies, such as the awarding
of cost; under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
gage aa of attorney fees under 35 U.S.C. 5285,
— 91a —
B. Attorney Fees
“The court in exception cases may award reasonable
attorney fees to the prevailing party.“ 35 U.S.C. $285.
Swift contends that this is an ‘‘exceptional case’’ which
justifies the award of fees.
While the imposition of increased damages under 4284
and the award of attorney fees under §285 do not raise
identical questions, Livesay Window Co. v. Livesay In-
dustries, 5 Cir. 1958, 251 F.2d 469, 116 USPQ 167, the
considerations underlying both remedies are similar. At-
torney fees can be assessed only upon a finding of un-
fairness, bad faith, or inequitable or unconscionable con-
duct. Unifiow Mfg. Co. v. King-Seeley Thermos Co., 6
Cir. 1970, 428 F.2d 335, 166 USPQ 70, cert. denied, 91
S.Ct. 245, 167 USPQ 705; Purer & Co. v. Aktiebolaget
Adde, 9 Cir. 1969, 410 F.2d 871, 161 USPQ 270, cert.
denied, 90 S. Ct. 90, 163 USPQ 704. Furthermore, the
offending conduct must be such that it would be grossly
unfair for the prevailing party to bear the burden of its
own attorney fees. Purer & Co. v. Aktiebolaget Adde,
supra. The award of attorney fees in patent litigation
is the exception, not the rule. Uniflow Mfg. Co. v. King-
Seeley Thermos Co., supra; Borden, Inc. v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp., S. D. Tex. 1974, 381 F.Supp. 1178, 182
USPQ 472.
I believe that this case is an “exceptional’’ one which
supports assessment of attorney fees against defendants.
Although the evidence does not clearly show that defen-
dants’ infringement of the 808 patent was deliberate
and in bad faith, it does establish some degree of in-
equitable conduct on their part.
First, defendants attempt at mid-trial to interject a
new defense which was not listed in the pre-trial order
was, at the least, unfair. The defense was based on an
ex parte experiment made by defendants’ witnesses,
F Mustian testi-
lessly [31] wasted the time of both plaintiff and the
X. Findings of Fact And Conclusions Of Law
A. Findings of Fact
disputed.
2. The process used by Usamex at St. Rose, Louisiana
is identical to the disclosed by claims 1-4 of U.S.
Patent No. and amounts to an infringement of
cg ghey a gee MRA A
teed in the manufacture of ammonium polyphosphate from
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— — — IL
liquid ammonium polyphosphate fertilizer.
8. Although both a reactor residence time of less
one second and a reaction temperature range of
to 650°F. were variables known in the prior art,
fe 42 yy ih
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3. Swift is not estopped to
BAS
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2. Claims 1-4 of the 808 patent are directly infringed
by operation at the Usamex plant located at St. Rose,
1. Jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. 61338 and venue
per 35 U.S.C. §271(a).
B. Conclusions of Law
is proper in the Eastern District of Louisiana.
“3
to a person having ordinary skill i
pertains. 35 U.S.C. 5103.
10. During the prosecution of the 808 patent, the
- applicant did not perpetrate fraud on the Patent Office.
II. Because plaintiff failed to show that defendants’
infringement of the 808 patent was willful, deliberate
and in bad faith this is not an appropriate case in which
to increase plaintiff’s damages under 35 U.S.C. $284.
12. Plaintiff has shown that this is an exceptional
ease under 35 U.S.C. $285 and plaintiff will be awarded
reasonable attorney fees in accordance with that section
of the Patent Laws.
490 F.Supp. 1343
SWIFT CHEMICAL COMPANY
[1843]
vs.
USAMEX FERTILIZERS, INC. et al.
79-812 “G”.
June 6, 1980.
E. D. Louisiana.
United States District Court,
Civ. A. Nos. 74-76 “G
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I. Background
r
Kearns, who was employed in fertilizer
and development by Swift. The patent discloses a method
of producing a liquid ammonium polyphosphate fertilizer
Sueat te medion samen onl Geb chamhade aaa
7
Rec. Doc. No. 226. The — — inion is 9
Chemical Co. v. Usamex Fertilizers, Inc., et al.,
“eo 10 (E.D.La. 1977).
the
acid are sequestered or held in solution, in-
of precipitating out in the form of
prise that would hinder subsequent storege and handling
the liquid fertilizer product. More cone Bn bo oy the
—— involves a direct ammoniation of orthophosphorie
acid in such a manner that the exothermic heat of the
reaction supplies the energy requirements to molecularly
dehydrate the acid, i. e., convert a substantial portion
the orthophosphates to polyphosphates [1346] without
formation of appreciable quantities of highly insoluble
iron tripolyphosphates and metaphosphates.’
‘Kearns filed his application for the patent-in-suit on
August 8, 1965, and it was issued on September 2, 1969.
ne
—
actor; supplying a stream of phosphorie acid having
P.O, content of between about 54% and about 68%
to said jet reactor; and contacting said stream of
erer
reactor at temperatures of between about 450° F.
and about F. for a period of less than one
second to form moiten droplets of ammonium -
phosphate.
2. The method of claim 1 wherein the droplets
of molten ammonium polyphosphate are subsequently
quenched.
Rec Doe. No. 226 at 2; 197 ny at 13. The basic
technology involvel in the in Ree.Doe.
No. 226 at 2-9; 197 U.S. P.Q. a Ar
3. The process of claim 1 wherein the P.O, con-
tent of acid is between about 60% and about 62%.
4. The s of claim 1 wherein at least 50%
of the orthophosphate in the acid is converted to
nonorthophosphate.* —
A significant feature of the process is that the ammonia
and phosphoric acid are contacted in a reactor at a
temperature of from about 450° F. to 650° F. for a
duration of less than one second, after which the re-
action product is quenched or cooled. Such rapid re-
action at a high temperature, referred to as “residence
time,” was found by Kearns to produce a molten am-
monium polyphosphate (melt) in which a high per-
centage of the phosphate was in the non-ortho form,
yet with little or no formation of undesirable insoluble
iron and aluminum polyphosphate compounds.“
To provide for such extremely brief residence time
at high temperature, the patent requires the use of an.
elongated, open-ended pipe in which to contact the am-
monia and phosphoric acid, as opposed, for example,
to a tank or other such reaction vessel. The patent
describes the reaction pipe as a “jet” or “jet reactor,”
and the process is sometimes referred to as a “jet pro-
cess.“
The accused process employed by Usamex at its plant
in St. Rose, Louisiana by March 1971 involved a 12-ft
reactor pipe and was described in U.S. Letters Patent
No. 3,734,708 (hereinafter referred to as the 708 or
Burns patent), issued May 22, 1973 to Tom V. Burns,
an FFM employee.“ By July 1975, Usamex was employ-
ing a process for manufacturing liquid fertilizer gen-
— 226 at 5 and n.11; 197 U.S. P.. at 14 and
n.11.
Rec. Doc. No. 226 at 6; 197 U.S. P. O. at 15.
Id.
Rec. Doc. No. 226 at 9; 197 U.S. P. O. at 16.
erally described in U.S. Letters Patent No. 3,998,140
(hereinafter referred to as the 140 or Burns and Ortega
patent).“
II. Stipulated Facts
In the development of the Kearns process, which cul-
minated in the issuance of Swift's ‘808 patent, the melt
was observed as being suspended in steam and exiting
the reactor at a high velocity.“ Although neither the
Kearns ‘808 patent, the Burns ‘708 patent, nor the Burns
and Ortega 140 patent contains a statement that the
When Usamex first began developing its process for
the production of liquid ammonium polyphosphate, resi-
dence time in its 12-ft reactor was caleulated on the
basis of steam residence time. The actual flow char-
steam oc: melt exiting the reactor. It was assumed that
the melt traveled through the pipe at the same speed
as the steam. Burns did not [1347] know of any way
of determining residence time except by calculating steam
residence time, and was unaware that radioactive ma-
terial tests could be performed to determine the residence
time of the steam or melt. He did not spend a great
deal of time trying to find another way to calculate the
time.“ Caleulating steam residence time was a
orn convenient, and practical way to determine resi-
time; it was convenient for evaluating plant de-
sign and indicating retention time for purposes of poly-
phosphate conversion.”
Ree. Doc. No. 337, Stipulation No. 10.
Id. No. 4.
Id. Nos. 3, 5, 7.
“Id. No. 14.
Id. Nos. 11, 12, 15.
11
dence time of the liquid melt in its reactor pipes in the
design and development of its 12-ft and 33-ft processes.“
In preparation for the 1976 trial, Everett M. Morten-
son, Swift’s expert, calculated the residence time of the
the reactor at the same velocity as the steam; that
reaction created a froth that was carried along with a
large volume of steam and gushed through the pipe at a
relatively high velocity, sweeping everything out of the
reactor in a jet stream or gush of fluid, steam, and melt,
and discharging it in the form of droplets of melt; and
that the steam would represent about 98-99% of the
total volume of the material going through the Usamex
reactor.” The residence time of melt suspended in steam
in a pipe reactor is approximately that of the steam.“ Dr.
Id. Nos. 11, 12, 15.
Id. No. 13.
Id. No. 18.
Id. No. 16.
— 102a —
Graham Wallis, another Swift expert, testified that the
flow regime in a reactor of peculiar geometry, such as
Usamex’s, must be determined by actual tests, and that
caleulations would give clues, but are “very dangerous”
in attempting to determine the actual flow regime.”
The possibility that the liquid (melt) and gas (steam)
phases might separate in the Usamex reactor, and that
melt residence time might be greater than one second,
first was considered and investigated by Usamex’s ex-
perts, W. R. Mustian, Jr. and A. V. Slack, in March
1976, which was eight months prior to trial and three
months prior to submission of the pre-trial order. Usa-
mex hired both men to help prepare its defense to the
infringement allegation, and they were listed as “will
call” witnesses.“ Shortly before their March 1976 tests,
Mustian asked Usamex’s patent counsel, Walter Gillis,
whether the question of noninfringement due to a dif-
ferent residence time had been explored; Gillis said it
had. Gillis testified that “all the information we had
was that everything blew through the reactor because
of the generation of the steam,” and that when counsel
previously asked the client whether the residence time
might be increased to avoid infringement, the techni-
cal advice was that was not feasible. Gillis said that prior
to spring 1976, he “never dreamed” that the steam and
melt might separate in the reactor. He said the March
[1348] tests and the question of residence time were
under “constant discussion” up to the time of trial.”
Usamex admits its three March 1976 tests were crude
and not conducted under normal operating conditions
of the Usamex process, but contends they attempted to
simulate normal operating conditions. Usamex’s counsel
decided to stand on the opinion of Mustian and Slack
“that maybe there was phase separation confirmed, and
* Id. No. 19.
"Id. No. 22.
"Id. No. 23.
—108a —
that the tests, insofar as they were relevant to that
issue, confirmed it. They certainly did not preclude us
from introducing evidence of the opinion they had before
the tests.” Usamex did not include its theory of phase
separation and longer residence time in the pre-trial
order, and did not inform Swift of those theories until
ten days before trial. Swift first learned of the tests when
Mustian testified at trial. When Swift questioned the
theories and tests on cross-examination, defendants made
a tactical decision to withdraw the phase separation/
residence time noninfringement defense. They did not call
Slack to testify about the March 1976 tests, or Ronald
Fogg, FFM technical director, to testify about a melt
withdrawal he observed in Usamex’s reactor in 1971
and his opinions based on it.”
In October 1977, I found in favor of Swift, holding
the 808 patent valid, enforceable, and infringed by de-
fendants.“ I determined that Usamexs’ phase separation/
residence time defense was “obviously groundless,” and
its tardy assertion and subsequent withdrawal was one
of the bases upon which I awarded Swift attorney’s
fees.“ After entry of my judgment order of December
19, 1977, permanently enjoining defendants from further
infringement, and ordering an accounting to determine
damages, defendants moved to suspend the injunction
pending appeal. They did not inform Swift or the Court
that they had been employing the 33-ft reactor for sev-
eral months. I granted the motion and suspended the
injunction after defendants posted a $900,000 bond.” By
that time, defendants had spent $600,000 for attorney’s
and consultant’s fees and disbursements in preparation
kor the 1976 trial.“
„Id. Nos. 24, 25, 26, 27.
* Rec. Doc. No. 226.
* Id. at 35; 197 U.S. P.. at 30-31.
„Rec. Doc. No. 337, Stipulation Nos. 29, 30.
* Id. No. 28.
In late 1977, Mustian, then Usamex’s manager of pro-
er er ay gg cart cade Sng
of Usamex’s Assumption of a Position of Non-
t,“ recommending that competent experts be
confirm his phase separation/residence time
Usamex
to court to prove that neither the
process infringed Swift’s patent.”
rt was completed, defendants had de-
e friendly” in accordance with my find-
approached Swift to obtain a license under its
settle past infringement damages, costs,
Hosen gr hg fees. At the same time, Usamex intended
for another way to contest infringement, but
so inform Swift or the Court. Usamex took a
a Deh os Meee SOO Me tee Gan Ge
consent. The judgment awarded Swift dam-
on Usamex’s sales of the fertilizer prior to
1, 1978. Part of the sales included fertilizer pro-
since October 1977 using the 33-ft reactor, al-
Swift did not know it, nor did it know that
Usamex intended to continue using the 33-ft reactor
under the license.“
In April and May 1978, Mustian wrote a second re-
port entitled “A Review In Re Swift v. Usamez.” One
of its stated purposes was “to provide bases for de-
termining the merits of actions to be considered lead-
ing to termination and reversal of the penalties as-
Usamex.“ In July 1978, defendants con-
patent [1349] counsel for advice concerning
payment of royalties to Swift, and the attorneys ad-
vised that at least one impeccable technical expert should
be consulted to prove their position of noninfringement.”
Id. Nos. 31, 32, 33.
* Id. Nos. 34, 35, 36, 37.
* Id. No. 39.
Id. No. 40.
70
3528
48 15
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Hi bl
16
In January 1979, Usamex made its quarterly royalty
payment covering the use of its process (in which Usamex
denies the validity of the tests, the conclusions drawn,
and their relevancy to these matters:
(a) The melt and steam produced in the Usamex re-
actors separate and do not flow through the reactors at
the same speed;
(b) Conversion to non-ortho polyphosphates is higher
at the end of the 33-ft reactor than at any preceding
test location ;
Id. Nos. 41, 42, 44.
Id. Nos. 43, 45, 47, 48.
— 106a —
at a egy ey ean
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— 107a —
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—— (5) and (6
another subsection, Rule 60(b)(6) cannot
for relief. Transit Cas. Co. v. }
F.2d 788 (Sth Cir. 1971). In this case, the ground
which relief is sought is contained in Rule 600(b) (2).
A motion for a new trial under Rule 60(b)(2) is an
extraordinary motion, and the requirements of the rule
must be [1351] strictly met. Ag Pro, Inc. v. Sakraida,
512 F.2d 141, 143 (5th Cir. 1975). The motion may not
be granted unless: (1) the new evi was discovered
following the trial; (2) the evidence is not merely eumu-
patent
and (2) does not appear to be disputed; however, I must
determine whether Usamex satisfies (3), (4) and (5).
A. Due Diligence
The cases cited by defendants where courts found due
diligence to discover new evidence simply are not very
helpful, as this is the type of determination that neces-
sarily turns on the facts in a particular case. For exam-
ee ee a Soe
atl fn
bull
12 ER
l f
ony 35 25
10 60 a i
7224 25
ie f
A 465 He
11173 F 145
SHH
i
1175
aT
1131
532
1
1121141
3813
1110
i
Te
1
Rec. Doc. No. 339 at 9.
— ita —
Even if Usamex exercised due diligence, its motion
for relief from judgment must be denied if it fails to
prove its newly discovered evidence is material. and is
such that a new trial would probably produce a: new
B. Materiality of evidence and question whether new
nr
produce a new result
Since Usamex does not now reurge the invalidity of
Swift’s patent, the only question here is, assuming the
new scientific evidence of Usamex on its yo “gare is
[1352] valid, does the process infringe the Swift patent?
brei,
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or no formation of
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a le
N is particularly incongruous for Usamex to assert
that the residence times specified in the Swift patent and
the prior art are melt residence times, when it alleges in
its Rule (60(b) motion that no one knew of a way to ac
curately measure melt residence time. Indeed, Usamex
did not develop evidence of phase separation and a longer
melt residence time until late 1978 and early 1979, when
it ‘was attempting to avoid this court’s previous finding
of infringement. The new evidence has had no practical
use, as Usamex’s processes were perfected based on cal-
culations of steam residence time.
In deciding whether an accused device or composition
infringes a valid patent, resort is had in the first instance
to the words of the claim, and “[ijf accused matter falls
clearly within the claim, infringement is made out and
that is the end of it. Graver Tank d Mfg. Co. v. Linde
Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607, 70 S.Ct. 854, 855,
man Kodak Co., 616 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir. 1980). “In con-
sidering literal infringement, the patent’s claims must be
read in connection with [the] patent’s specification and
its file history, and the claims of [the] patent cannot be
given a construction broader than the teachings expressed
in the patent. Studiengesellschaft Kohle, supra, at 1324.
Accord, Marvin Glass d Assoc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
448 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1971). The 808 patent teaches that
favorable results can be obtained in the manufacture of
liquid ammonium polyphosphate when a stream of am-
monia and a stream of phosphoric acid having P.O; con-
tent of between about 54% and 68% are supplied to a
jet reactor and contacted at temperatures of 450°—650° F.
for less than one second. Because this is the process em-
ployed by Usamex, it literally infringes the 808 patent.
Even if the actual flow pattern and melt residence time
in the Usamex reactor were considered in determining
infringement, and it was found that there is phase separ-
ation and # more than one second melt residence time,
under the judicially created doctrine of equivalents, in-
from inventions that perform substantially the same
function in substantially the same way to obtain the same
result. Graver Tank, supra, 339 U.S. at 43, 70 S.Ct. at
13; Studiengesellschaft Kohle, supra, at 1324. What
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Ps
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result as the Swift patented process. At
evidence would show that Swift was ignorant
ical laws at work inside the Usamex reactor,
even inside its own reactor, and could not accurately
termine the melt residence time by calculating tl
residence time. Yet the processes accomplish
r
time is determined according to the calculated steam
residence time. In perfecting both its 12-ft and 33-ft
processes, Usamex determined residence time according
to the calculated steam residence time.
Furthermore, a party cannot avoid a finding of infringe-
ment by relying on tests not known to the art at the
time of the application for the patent. In an infringement
action, Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. v. Texon, Inc., 268 F.2d
839 (Ist Cir. 1959), the court held that a test not recog-
nized at the date of the patent application cannot be used
either to limit or extend the scope of the patent, as the
patent must be interpreted in light of the skill of the art
to which it pertains at the date of application. Id. at 842.
The patent-in-suit was for a method of produci
setting resin impregnated cellulose fibre web
terial. The claim element at issue called for a web, mois-
ture content of ‘‘about 4% to 8%,’’ which the district
11 5
127171
its
court construed as an absolute limitation. The patent was
silent as to any test for determining the claimed range
of water content; however, the court found that the
Karl Fischer test was the most accurate test, and it re-
lir
li
1
.
* 177
Bil
sulting from the process in question, by a person
skilled in the art to which the application pertained.
This is an objective standard and does not depend
on the subjective intent of the inventor. Moreover,
it does not cause the patent to mean one thing at the
time of its issuance and another at some later date
upon the discovery of a more accurate test.
Raybestos-Manhattan, supra, at 842.
Usamex cites Helene Curtis Industries v. Sales Affilt-
ates, 233 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1956), in support of its posi-
tion that post-application tesis may be considered. There,
plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that defendant’s
patent for a chemical composition suitable for permanent
hair waving was invalid. The defendant’s patent speci-
fied mercaptan as a waving agent, and the Second Circuit
construed the patent as teaching that a mercaptan pH
ceiling of 10 was a critical limitation, because with a
higher pH, hair destruction or injury might occur before
@ satisfactory wave was obtained. At trial, plaintiff of-
fered tests using the “direct application’’ method of hair
the prior art. But in determining the existence or
nonexistence of such physical phenomena as demon-
strate a critical advance over the prior art, we think
the court is entitled to such aid as derives from any
relevant technique,—even one not developed until af-
ter the invention at issue.
Helene Curtis, swpra, at 154-55. Its holding however, was
at 155. The language in Helene Curtis relied on by Uses
mex not only is dicta, but also addresses an issue not
[1355] disputed here. In this case, the validity of the
Swift patent, and hence the criticality of the less
one second residence time, is not challenged. Only
manner in which the residence time is determined is dis-
puted.
The record is clear that the test for determining resi-
other way to calculate residence time, but did not pro-
duce a convincing test. Their idea was not revived until
— 118a —
chemical and radioactive tracer tests were not perfected
until late 1978 and early 1979. In the interim, Usamex
designed, built, and utilized its 33-ft reactor, alhough a
test for calculatiny melt residence time still had not been
performed. Usamex concedes that such tests were un-
known to those working in the art: [The [new] evi-
dence . . . relates to two sampling techniques which were
previously unheard of in the field of fertilizer manufac-
turing and which took months to develop, successfully
run, and obtain complete results from.“ Consequently,
Usamex’s new evidence of melt residence time is legally
irrelevant, as reliance on it would “cause the patent to
mean one thing at the time of its issuance and another
at some later date.’’ Raybestos-Manhattan, swpra, at 842.
Usamex not only has failed to prove it exercised due
diligence in discovering its new evidence, but the evi-
dence, even if admitted at a new trial and found to be
credible, would not produce a different result, because
it is legally immaterial. Accordingly, Usamex’s Rule
60(b)(2) motion for relief from judgment is DENIED.
V. Declaratory Judgment Action
Just prior to the issuance of the October 1977 opinion
on the validity of the 808 patent and Usamex’s infringe-
ment through use of its 12-ft reactor, Usamex constructed
and began operating a 33-ft reactor. Subsequently, the
parties settled the amount of damage and attorney’s fees
Usamex was to pay Swift under the judgment on liabili-
ty, and a final consent judgment was entered March 3,
1978. The settlement included payments for periods when
Usamex produced fertilizer using not only the 12-ft reac-
tor, but also the 33-ft reactor, although Usamex did not
inform Swift or the court of the existence and operation
of the 33-ft reactor until many months later. The parties
also entered into a license agreement, which provided
that Usamex agreed to pay Swift a specified royalty for
* Rec.Doc.No. 269 at 7.
— 11932 —
ammonium polyphosphate Usamex manr‘actured and sold
under Swift’s Patent Rights,’’ and and that Swift md
use,
and process claimed and any process which by ap-
plication of the Doctrine of Equivalents comes with-
in the claims of U.S. Patent No. 3,464,808."
After Usamex obtained its new evidence of phase sepa-
ration and a longer melt residence time, it sought a de-
claratory judgment that its process employing the the 39-
Ar
mise and settlement, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.
A. The Settlement of Retrospective Damages
Ordinarily, compromises of disputed claims are favored
by the courts. Williams v. First Nat’l Bank, 216 U.S. 582,
30 S.Ct. 441, 54 L.Ed. 625 (1910). Where the parties, aet-
ing in good faith, settle a controversy, the courts will
enforce the compromise without regard to what the re-
sult might, or would, have been, had the parties [1356]
chosen to litigate rather than settle. Hennessy v. Bacon,
137 U.S. 78, 11 S.Ct. 17, 34 L.Ed. 605 (1890). Accord, J.
Kahn d Co. v. Clark, 178 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1949). Settle-
ments generally are viewed as binding, final, and as con-
clusive of rights as a judgment. Thomas v. State of Lou-
isiana, 534 F.2d 613 (5th Cir. 1976).
mann te te dnnn Gennes Oat die aml un Os
manner except in good faith in settling the amount of
damages and attorney’s fees owed by Usamex following
the finding of infringement. If either party acted in less
than good faith, it was Usamex, which did not reveal
License Agreement following Rec. Doc. No. 341.
1251145 362333
e
— 120
33-ft
—
is .
if 1. nae 2713
e
1312 int AT
— the jelisial determination of valid:
ity and infringement and the entry of a final judgment
Hise e spurte eHAy
Hitt; PP orig = 111147
Ht Hi i 10 i! i ii
A
ak l
e
tet i i
be identical to that in
y —4 Talcott, Inc. v. ace Da
(Sth Cir. 1971). The colla
10
ui 21
1181171 if
Tie eee
kin ‘| it Tate We
11231 313214 235 ae:
Te THE i ag
yet ee
%
e
111 181
i PH
1477
11
1
te
Wale
Corp., 474 F.2d 1391 (2d Cir. 1973); Wallace Clark 4
Co., Inc. v. Acheson Industries, Inc., 532 F.2d 846 (2d
Cir. 1976); see also Warner-J enkinson Co. v. Allied Chem.
ve
Although the Fifth Circuit, as other courts, has rec-
ognized that ‘‘[p]ublic policy, explicated in Lear, com-
mands us not to accord monopolies by contract,’’ Kaspar,
supra, at 542, the concerns of Lear are not present in
ithe 1
it
—
e
li
differences
ills
2893
Fault
325
— 125a —
APPENDIX E
646 F. 2d 1121
SWIFT CHEMICAL COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
USAMEX FERTILIZERS, INC., et al.,
Defendants-Appellants.
USAMEX FERTILIZERS, INC., et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
SWIFT AGRICULTURAL CHEMICAL
CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 80-3560.
United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
Unit A
April 28, 1981.
Before THORNBERRY, COLEMAN and AINS-
WORTH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Affirmed on the basis of the opinion of
Morey L. Sear, 490 F.Supp. 1343 (E.D.La.1980).
AFFIRMED.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.