Appendix — Couch v. United States
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Appendix
United States Court of Appeals
For the Ninth Cireuit
No. 80-1524
DC No. 80-246-TJH
United States of America,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
V.
Joseph Mark Couch,
Defendant-Appellee.
[Filed May 6, 1982]
MEMORANDUM
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Terry J. Hatter, Jr., District Judge, Presiding
Argued and submitted May 4, 1981
Before: BOOCHEVER and NORRIS, Circuit Judges,
and VOORHEES,* District Judge.
This case requires us to evaluate the border detention
of an individual suspected of carrying illicit drugs within
his body. Joseph Mark Couch was indicted for importation
and possession of cocaine. Prior to trial, he moved to sup-
press x-rays of his abdominal region, and the cocaine
eventually retrieved from his digestive system. The dis-
*The Honorable Donald S. Voorhees, United States District Judge
for the Western District of Washington, sitting by designation.
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trict court granted his suppression motion, finding that
Couch’s airport detention of over nine hours was unreason-
able, and that the affidavits supporting a court-ordered
X-ray examination were insufficient to establish probable
cause. The government appeals the suppression order, and
we reverse.
FACTS
On March 4, 1980, the Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) notified agent Donald Souza of the Los Angeles
office of the Customs Service that several people would
be attempting to smuggle cocaine into the United States
from Lima, Peru by concealing the drug in their stomachs.
The DEA received its information from a previously reli-
able confidential informant. One of the individuals men-
tioned in the scheme was the defendant and appellee,
Joseph Couch.
The informant gave a specific description of the smug-
gling scheme. Couch and the other individuals would take
a laxative to clean out their systems, swallow several
capsules of cocaine, and then take a drug that inhibited
the normal digestive process. Once the smugglers reached
their destination, they were to take another laxative and
retrieve the cocaine. The informant also stated that the
trip reservations were made at a Menlo Park, California
travel agency, that the tickets were paid for with cash,
and that the individuals would return to the United States
during the week of March 3, 1980. Finally, the informant
stated that when Couch had been detained by Peruvian
customs officials on an earlier trip in December, 1979, he
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had avoided an x-ray examination by claiming that he had
previously been overexposed to x-rays and feared further
exposure. The informant did not state how the information
was obtained.
Based on this information, Souza notified customs inspec-
tors at Los Angeles International Airport to watch for
the individuals, but did not begin to prepare an affidavit
or take any other steps to secure a warrant. At 7:30 a.m.
on March 5, 1980, Couch and his traveling companion
Robert Ek arrived at the airport and were detained by
DEA agents and customs officials. The officials notified
Souza of the detention by radio, and he proceeded to the
United States Attorney's office to prepare an affidavit to
support a court-ordered x-ray search of Couch and Ek.
The customs ageuts individually informed Couch and Ek
that they were suspected of smuggling narcotics and took
them to a secondary search area. At this point the sus-
pects were separated. The agents searched Couch’s bag-
gage and person but did not find narcotics or any indicia
of smuggling. Couch refused to consent to a voluntary
x-ray examination of his abdominal area, explaining that
he had been previously overexposed to x-rays and felt that
further exposure would be harmful to his health. There-
after Couch was taken to the DEA office in another part
of the airport, and was told he would be detained until
the agents could obtain a court order for an x-ray exam-
ination.
Agents detained Couch in the DEA office from approxi-
mately 9:00 a.m. until 5:00 p.m., when he was handcuffed
and taken to a nearby hospital for x-rays. During this
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period, the DEA agents informed Couch of his Miranda“
rights, but refused several requests for an attorney, inform-
ing Couch that he was not entitled to one.* Couch was
kept under constant surveillance, was not permitted to
make any phone calls, and knew he was not free to leave.
Furthermore, two DEA agents questioned Couch, asking
him several routine questions as well as what he was doing
in Peru and whether he was carrying drugs. During ques-
tioning, Couch explained that his fear of x-rays stemmed
from overexposure during his previous employment at
General Electric and at a hospital. Later in the afternoon,
an investigation indicated that neither employer had any
record of Couch’s employment, but Couch basically stuck
to his story. The agents offered Couch food and water,
which he refused.
During Couch’s detention, Souza and a United States
Attorney worked from 10:00 a.m. until 3:00 p.m. preparing
a three and one-half page affidavit, reciting all of the infor-
mation provided by the confidential informant. The follow-
ing additional information, obtained since Couch’s arrival,
was also included: Couch and Ek had arrived at 7:30 a.m.
on a flight from Peru; the initial search proved negative;
Couch had refused to sabmit to an x-ray for alleged health
reasons; and at 2:30 p.m. a call to the airport confirmed
that Couch had refused any food and had not urinated
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
*In Couch’s declaration in support of the motion to suppress, he
states: “I again asked for an attorney, but agents refused, stating
that I was not entitled to one because I was not under arrest.” The
agents apparently thought that Couch was requesting appointment
of counsel, but Couch asserts that he merely wanted to contact an
attorney.
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or defecated since arrival. At 4:30 p.m., a magistrate issued
a court order authorizing x-rays of Couch and Ek, con-
ducted “in a reasonable manner” by a doctor at a local
hospital.
After Couch was taken from the airport to the hospital,
he was shown the court order and told that he would be
forced to comply if he did not voluntarily submit to the
procedure. Couch again explained his fears about x-ray
exposure and requested an attorney, but signed a consent
form for the x-rays. Several x-rays were taken, which
revealed foreign objects in Couch’s stomach. Couch was
then formally arrested, and transferred to another hospital
for observation. Over the next several days Couch excreted
a total of thirty-six capsules, containing 181.2 grams of
cocaine.
Conch and Ek were indicted for importing cocaine in
violation of 21 U.S.C. 56 952(a) and 960(a)(1), and pos-
sessing cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Separate trials were scheduled for
the defendants.’ Prior to trial, Couch filed a motion to
suppress all evidence obtained from the detention, and all
evidence from the court order, including the x-rays and
the cocaine. Couch argued that the detention was illegal
because it was, in effect, an arrest without probable cause,
that the affidavit supporting the court order was insuffi-
Ek was tried before District Judge Kelleher, who denied Ek’s
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cient, and that the use of an x-ray examination was
unreasonable. After an evidentiary hearing, District Judge
Hatter granted Couch’s motion in a minute order. The
court did not enter written findings of fact, but the tran-
script of the suppression hearing indicates that the court
based its order on the unreasonable length and nature of
the detention, and the insufficiency of the affidavit. The
government appeals the suppression order to this court
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3731.
I
Reasonableness of the Detention
When entering this country, persons are subject to rou-
tine searches without probable cause. United States v.
Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977); United States v. Perez,
644 F. 2d 1299, 1302 (9th Cir. 1981). Furthermore, the first
United States location at which an international flight
lands is considered the “functional equivalent” of the bor-
der, and the same standards apply as at the actual border.
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973).
Couch’s flight was non-stop from Lima, Peru to Lws
Angeles International Airport; thus, the initial detention
and search, conducted in a reasonable manner, do not
present any constitutional issues.
Couch argues that his extended detention, between the
time of the initial search and execution of the court-ordered
x-ray examination over nine hours later, was in effect an
arrest requiring probable cause, citing Dunaway v. New
York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979). In Dunaway, a 8 spect was taken
to a police station and questioned about a crime. He made
incriminating statements. The Court held that the deten-
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tion for the purpose of custodial interrogation was illegal
where the police did not have probable cause to arrest. 442
U.S. at 212-13. Dunaway makes it clear that courts must
distinguish between brief investigatory stops based on
reasonable suspicion, and arrests requiring provable cause.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968).
Although Dunaway is a useful starting point, it does not
directly control the instant case. First, Dunaway stressed
that the objectional feature of the suspect’s detention was
custodial interrogation ; the Court suppressed the suspect's
incriminating statements. 442 U.S. at 216. In the instant
ease, although Couch was asked some questions, the pur-
pose of the detention was to secure a warrant, not to elicit
information. Second, the detention in this case occurred at
the border. Government agents are given coasiderably more
leeway at the border. United States v. Erwin, 625 F. 2d 838,
841 (9th Cir. 1980). We must therefore analyze the nature
of Couch’s detention in light of the border search standards
developed in this circuit.
In United States v. Cameron, 538 F.2d 254 (9th Cir.
1976), this court held a suspect’s slurred speech, needle-
marks and lubricant in the rectal area provided the neces-
sary “clear indication” for a body cavity search, but never-
theless found that the particular search was conducted in
an objectionable manner. Id. at 257-58. In dictum, the court
stated that the Ninth Circuit rule is that warrants are not
required for a body cavity search, but expressed a strong
preference for a warrant. 538 F.2d at 258-59. See 3 W.
LaFave, Search d Seizure § 10.5, at 292-93 (1978). The
court noted that it would be permissible to detain a suspect
while a warrant was obtained. 538 F. 2d at 257 n. 7.
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On the other hand, this court recently held that a two
and one-half hour detention at a Border Patrol check point
was unreasonable, and reversed the resulting narcotics con-
viction. United States v. Perez-Esparza, 609 F. 2d 1284 (9th
Cir. 1979). The court relied heavily on Dunaway, finding
that the suspect was delayed for the purpose of custodial
interrogation, not for the purpose of obtaining a warrant.
Id. at 1287. The Perez-Esparza court also suggested that
its holding was based in part on the fact that the agents
did not have a valid justification to detain the suspects.
Id. at 1287 n.2.* In any event, Perez-Esparza is not on point
because a search at a Border Patrol check point is not the
functional equivalent of a border search. United States v.
Morgan, 501 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir. 1974) (en bane) (per
euriam).
The case closest to the instant case is United States v.
Erwin, 625 F.2d 838 (9th Cir. 1980), which was decided
after Couch’s suppression hearing. In Erwin, airport cus-
toms agents became suspicious of a passenger whose re-
stricted movements and luggage contents indicated body
cavity smuggling. After the suspect refused to submit to a
strip search, she was detained seven hours while a court
order for a strip search and x-ray examination was ob-
tained. Erwin challenged her heroin conviction on the
ground that the seven-hour detention was an illegal arrest
within the meaning of Dunaway and Perez-Esparza. The
Erwin court rejected this argument, holding that the de-
*By contrast, the agents’ justification for detaining Couch in this
case was to preserve the status quo while they obtained a court
9 F
F. Ad at n.7.
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tention while a warrant was obtained was reasonable. /d.
at 841. The court suggested that it would be inconsistent
to express a preference for warrants, as in Cameron, but
to hold that detention pending a warraut was unreason-
able.“
There is an arguable distinction between Erwin and the
circumstances of Couch’s detention. Erwin was detained
only after a search of her luggage revealed items com-
monly used in body cavity smuggling, and her restricted
body movements bolstered the customs agents’ suspicions.
Suspicion focused on Couch before his plane landed. The
cause an informant’s tip rather than the fruits of an air-
port search was the basis for detention, Couch argues that
the agents should have either applied for a warrant before
his arrival, or prepared affidavits ahead of time and ap-
plied for a telephone warrant after the tip was verified
upon his arrival. Fed.R.Crim.P. 41 (e) (2). Couch contends
that the purpose of his extended detention was to obtain
evidence before the warrant was procured, either through
questioning or eventual excretion of the capsules.
We need not reach the issue of whether the defendant could
caused defendant to be detained a considerably shorter period of
time than he would have been detained had the agents chosen the
alternative, but arguably permissible, method of determining what
was in fact within his digestive tract.
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Although detention pending a warrant may be more
reasonable when suspicion arises after arrival, as in Erwin,
we are not prepared to make the constitutional distinction
urged by Couch.“ The reason that the initial search of
Couch did not indicate smuggling was that the ingestion
method does not leave external signs of smuggling. By con-
trast, the method of smuggling used in Erwin often results
in restrictive body movements, items such as condoms and
lubricants in the luggage, and traces of lubricant on the
outside of the body. See United States v. Purvis, 632 F.2d
94, 95 (9th Cir. 1980); Erwin, 625 F.2d at 840; United
States v. Aman, 624 F.2d 911, 912 (9th Cir. 1980). We de-
cline to afford the smuggling method used by Couch more
protection merely because it is more concealable than
Erwin’s method. We find that Erwin controls and the de-
tention here was reasonable.
Moreover, we are not convinced that it would have been
preferable for the agents in this case to apply for the
warrant ahead of time, or arrange for a telephonic war-
rant.’ Prior to Couch’s arrival at the airport, agent Souza
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only had information that Couch would be arriving from
Peru sometime during the week, with cocaine concealed in
his stomach. Souza could not be sure that Couch would
not alter his plans or whether the uncorroborated informa-
tion from the confidential informant would be sufficient to
obtain a court order. After Couch’s arrival, several im-
portant details of the informant’s tip were corroborated,
notably that Couch and Ek had arrived from Peru and
refused x-ray searches for health reasons. In addition, the
agents may have considered that the parties might consent
to an x-ray search, thus obviating the time and effort re-
quired to obtain a court order.
As a final factor in evaluating the reasonableness of the
detention, we consider the customs agents’ denial of Couch’s
specific requests for counsel." We note initially that appli-
cation for a court order is an ex parte proceeding in which
neither the subject of the order nor the subject’s attorney
has a right to participate. United States v. Erwin, 625 F.2d
838, 840 (9th Cir. 1980). Erwin further held that the sus-
pect’s attorney had no right to be present during the
search. Id. Although Couch was not yet charged with a
crime and was not entitled to appointed counsel, under
*Because Couch was not yet formally charged or indicted when
his requests for counsel were denied, b s sixth amendment right to
counsel was not violated. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398
(1977). The record indicates that Couch was not free to leave, and
officials asked him whether he was carrying drugs, thus implicating
Couch’s fifth amendment rights. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966). See generally Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 298-302
(1980). After requesting counsel, however, Couch did not make any
incriminating statements that led to the discovery of the drugs. Thus
the discovery of the narcotics was not the result of an illegal inter-
rogation. Wong Sun u. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963).
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other circumstances the failure to permit a telephone call
and the denial of the right to consult with retained coun-
sel could be decisive. Here, however, there was little if
anything that counsel could have done to prevent the dis-
covery of the incriminating evidence. We find that the de-
nial of counsel under the circumstances did not render the
detention, which was otherwise permissible under Erwin,
unreasonable. We are not confronted with the question of
admissibility of any statements obtained after Couch re-
quested counsel. Any such issue remains to be resolved if
and when Couch is tried.
We therefore conclude that the district court, which did
not have the benefit of the Erwin decision, clearly erred
in finding that Couch’s detention was unreasonable. In
view of this conclusion, it is unnecessary for us to decide
whether a less deferential standard of review is applicable.
Il
Sufficiency of the Affidavit
A border search may entail several levels of intrusion.
The pat-down search of Couch and the search of his lug-
gage were permissible with only a minimal showing of
suspicion. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619
(1977). See United States v. Perez, 644 F.2d 1299, 1302
(9th Cir. 1981). A “strip search” is only permissible upon
a showing of “real suspicion.” United States v. Rodriguez,
592 F.2d 553, 556 (9th Cir. 1979). A body cavity search
is an even greater intrusion, requiring a “clear indication”
that the suspect is carrying contraband in a body cavity.
United States v. Aman, 624 F.2d 911, 912-913 (9th Cir.
1980). When the government agents have such a clear
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indication, a warrant is preferred but not required.“ Id
Like the court in Aman, we do not find it necesary to deter-
mine which test applies to x-ray searches, because we find
that the agents in this case had a “clear indication” that
Couch was engaged in drug smuggling. As discussed below,
the affidavit in this case meets the requirements of the
probable cause standard for issuance of a search warrant
and this is certainly enough to satisfy the “clear indica-
tion” test.
The adequacy of au informant’s hearsay tip, which was
the basis for the warrant in this case, is judged under
the test of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964).
We recently described the test as follows:
First, the affida it must inform the magistrate of some
of the underlying circumstances that indicate that the
informant’s information is reliable. Second, it must
inform the magistrate of some of the underlying cir-
cumstances from which the officer concluded that the
informant, whose identity need not be disclosed, was
credible.
Untied States v. Whitney, 633 F.2d 902, 905-906 (9th Cir.
1980). The two prongs of the Aguilar test are referred
to as the “basis” and “veracity” prongs. 1 W. LaFave,
Search and Seizure § 3.3, at 501-502 (1978). There is no
question of veracity here; the confidential informant had
supplied reliable tips on at least five previous occasions.
McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 304 (1967). The issue
*Although a warrant or court order is not required, the agents in
this case followed the procedure endorsed in United States v. Aman,
624 F.2d 911, 912-13 (9th Cir. 1980) and United States v. Cameron,
538 F.2d 254, 258-59 (och Cir. 1976), and obtained a court orcler.
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is whether the affidavit adequately disclosed the under-
lying circumstances indicating the informant’s basis of
knowledge.
The district court was apparently concerned that the
affidavit provided no indication of how the informant ob-
tained the information. In granting Couch’s suppression
motion, the court stated that the tip “merely indicated
that there would be some people arriving and nothing
more than that.” The court placed little weight on the
degree of detail in the affidavit, or on the corroborating
circumstances occurring after the tip.
A tip that fails to disclose the basis of an informant’s
information can nevertheless be “verified” by its great
detail. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 416 (1969).
The Spinelli Court suggested that the detail in Draper
v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959), was a “suitable
benchmark.” Jd. In Draper the informant described the
traveling plans and manner of dress of the suspect with
great particularity, and thus the tip was adequate. Id. at
416-17. Similarly, we have held that an affidavit is sufficient
even in the absence of underlying circumstances indicat-
ing reliability, where the criminal activity is described in
sufficient detail. United States v. Fried, 576 F.2d 787, 790
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 895 (1978). See United
States v. Maher, 645 F.2d 780, 781 (9th Cir. 1981) ; United
States v. Beusch, 596 F.2d 871, 874-75 (9th Cir.- 1979).
The detail in the instant case dealt with both the inno-
cent circumstances of Couch’s trip, and the alleged crim-
inal activity. The informant told customs authorities that
Couch and another white male named Robert [Ek], and
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possibly others, would arrive at Los Angeles International
Airport from Lima, Peru during the week of March 3,
1980. The informant disclosed exactly when and where
the airline tickets were purchased, and provided a detailed
description of the smuggling scheme: the smugglers would
take laxatives to clean out their systems, swallow at least
30 capsules each containing one-half ounce of cocaine, take
a drug to inhibit the normal functioning of their digestive
systems, and take more laxatives once they were through
customs and had reached their United States destination.
The informant also told the agents that Couch had avoided
an X-ray examination on a previous trip in 1979 by telling
Peruvian officials that he had been overexposed to x-rays
and feared further exposure.
In United States v. Larkin, 510 F.2d 13, 15 (9th Cir.
1974), we held that the Aguilar test was not met where
the informant gave a detailed description of a car travel-
ing on a certain highway at a certain time, and alleged that
the car’s occupants were carrying narcotics. But more
recently we made it clear that sufficient detail will cure
an otherwise inadequate disclosure of the basis of the
informant’s knowledge,” by examining the affidavit in a
“commonsense and realistic fashion.” United States v.
Maher, 645 F.2d 780, 782 (9th Cir. 1981), citing United
States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965). Here, the
information provided by the informant more closely approx-
not basis, but its use is well established. 1 W. LaFave, Search C
Seizure f 44 at 544.46 (1978).
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imated the detail in Maher than in Larkin, especially con-
sidering the degree of detail in the criminal allegations
themselves.
Finally, the details provided by the informants were
corroborated by the observations of customs agents, which
were included in the affidavit. Cf. Spinelli v. United States,
393 U.S. 410, 417-18 (1969). The magistrate was informed
that two individuals fitting the description provided by
the informant’s tip had in fact arrived at Los Angeles
International Airport en route from Peru during the week
indicated. The affidavit also stated that as of 2:30 p.m.,
Couch had refused to eat, defecate, or urinate during his
detention. Finally, the affidavit stated that Couch refused
to submit voluntarily to an x-ray examination, claiming
that he had previously been overexposed and feared fur-
ther x-rays for health reasons.
We find that the detail in the informant’s tip was suffi-
cient to establish probable cause.“ This conclusion is bol-
stered by the degree of corroboration evident to the magis-
trate. Nothing occurring after Couch’s arrival suggested
that the informant was wrong. The corroborating circum-
stances, although perhaps innocent in themselves, strength-
ened the informant’s tip and heightened the agents’ jus-
We are aware that in most body cavity search cases, the circum-
stances of the initial pat-down or strip search have provided the
facts necessary for a more intrusive search. See, e. g., United States
v. Purvis, 632 F.2d 94, 95 (9th Cir. 1980) (slow and careful walk,
suspect uncomfortable while sitting); United States v. Aman, 624
F.2d 911, 912 (9th Cir. 1980) (restricted movements, prophylactics
and lubricants in luggage); United States v. Cameron, 538 F.2d 254,
257 (9th Cir. 1976) (needlemarks, slurred speech, lubricant in rectal
area).
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tifiable suspicion of Couch. Couch’s further refusal to
submit to x-rays, and the reasons he advanced, were sus-
picious in light of the other information before the magis-
trate. United States v. Maher, 645 F.2d 780, 782 (9th
Cir. 1981); United States v. Larkin, 510 F.2d 13, 15 (9th
Cir. 1974). The agents were aware that Couch had previ-
ously used the health ploy to avoid x-rays. While the use
of such an excuse may itself be innocent, the likelihood
of an individual giving that specific reason is so remote
as to render Couch’s explanation strong corroboration.
Couch argues that his statement to Peruvian authorities should
not be considered in evaluating the sufficiency of the affidavit, be-
cause customs agent Souza failed to check Couch’s passport, which
apparently did not have a Peruvian stamp for the time period in
question. Couch’s argument is that failure to check the passport cre-
ated a reckless misstatement in the affidavit. Franks v. Delaware,
438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978). It is not clear what weight the district
court gave to this argument in finding the affidavit insufficient. To
the extent that the district court may have disregarded part of the
affidavit of Souza’s alleged misstatement, it was clearly in error.
First, upon receiving word that Couch had arrived, Souza went
straight to the United States Attorney's office, not the airport. Even
if he had asked another agent to check the passport, the lack of a
Peruvian stamp would not have necessarily meant that Couch was
not in Peru on a previous occasion. In addition, Couch admitted
being in Peru during November of 1979. A one month error in the
affidavit cannot be classified as a material misstatement. More im-
portantly, an affiant does not have a duty to verify all of the asser-
tions in an affidavit, especially when there has been no indication
that the information is incorrect. Failure to verify Couch’s previous
presence in Peru was at most negligence, not reckless disregard for
the truth, thus the Franks rationale does not apply. United States o.
Young Buffalo, 591 F.2d 506, 510 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
950 (1979). See United States v. Maher, 645 F. 2d 780, 782 (9th Cir.
1981).
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The magistrate was justified in issuing a court order for
the x-ray examination” of Couch.
CONCLUSION
Applying the clearly erroneous standard to the deter-
mination of reasonableness of the detention made by the
district court in its suppression order, we do not reverse
lightly. Nevertheless, we are convinced that the law of this
circuit authorizes border detentions of suspected smugglers
pending the procurement of a warrant or court order. In
addition, we find that the affidavit supplied in this case was
sufficient to support a court order under the probable cause
standard, which would satisfy the warrantless standards
of “real suspicion” or “clear indication” of drug smuggling.
The previously reliable informant’s tip specifically out-
lined the details of the smuggling scheme, and was cor-
roborated by customs agents.
We believe that under the circumstances of this case the
customs agents had enough evidence indicating that drugs
were being smuggled that they could have insisted on ar
x-ray search, or in lieu thereof, detention until Couch’s
stomach contents were emptied, even without a court order.
searches has been accepted by this court. United States v. Aman,
624 F.2d 911, 913 (9th Cir. 1980).
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Securing the order, however, was the preferable approach
and the detention required for that purpose was not un-
reasonable.
For the foregoing reasons, the district court suppression
order is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED for
further proceedings.
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