Appendix — Couch v. United States

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Appendix

United States Court of Appeals

For the Ninth Cireuit

No. 80-1524

DC No. 80-246-TJH

United States of America,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

V.

Joseph Mark Couch,

Defendant-Appellee.

[Filed May 6, 1982]

MEMORANDUM

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Terry J. Hatter, Jr., District Judge, Presiding

Argued and submitted May 4, 1981

Before: BOOCHEVER and NORRIS, Circuit Judges,

and VOORHEES,* District Judge.

This case requires us to evaluate the border detention

of an individual suspected of carrying illicit drugs within

his body. Joseph Mark Couch was indicted for importation

and possession of cocaine. Prior to trial, he moved to sup-

press x-rays of his abdominal region, and the cocaine

eventually retrieved from his digestive system. The dis-

*The Honorable Donald S. Voorhees, United States District Judge

for the Western District of Washington, sitting by designation.

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trict court granted his suppression motion, finding that

Couch’s airport detention of over nine hours was unreason-

able, and that the affidavits supporting a court-ordered

X-ray examination were insufficient to establish probable

cause. The government appeals the suppression order, and

we reverse.

FACTS

On March 4, 1980, the Drug Enforcement Administration

(DEA) notified agent Donald Souza of the Los Angeles

office of the Customs Service that several people would

be attempting to smuggle cocaine into the United States

from Lima, Peru by concealing the drug in their stomachs.

The DEA received its information from a previously reli-

able confidential informant. One of the individuals men-

tioned in the scheme was the defendant and appellee,

Joseph Couch.

The informant gave a specific description of the smug-

gling scheme. Couch and the other individuals would take

a laxative to clean out their systems, swallow several

capsules of cocaine, and then take a drug that inhibited

the normal digestive process. Once the smugglers reached

their destination, they were to take another laxative and

retrieve the cocaine. The informant also stated that the

trip reservations were made at a Menlo Park, California

travel agency, that the tickets were paid for with cash,

and that the individuals would return to the United States

during the week of March 3, 1980. Finally, the informant

stated that when Couch had been detained by Peruvian

customs officials on an earlier trip in December, 1979, he

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had avoided an x-ray examination by claiming that he had

previously been overexposed to x-rays and feared further

exposure. The informant did not state how the information

was obtained.

Based on this information, Souza notified customs inspec-

tors at Los Angeles International Airport to watch for

the individuals, but did not begin to prepare an affidavit

or take any other steps to secure a warrant. At 7:30 a.m.

on March 5, 1980, Couch and his traveling companion

Robert Ek arrived at the airport and were detained by

DEA agents and customs officials. The officials notified

Souza of the detention by radio, and he proceeded to the

United States Attorney's office to prepare an affidavit to

support a court-ordered x-ray search of Couch and Ek.

The customs ageuts individually informed Couch and Ek

that they were suspected of smuggling narcotics and took

them to a secondary search area. At this point the sus-

pects were separated. The agents searched Couch’s bag-

gage and person but did not find narcotics or any indicia

of smuggling. Couch refused to consent to a voluntary

x-ray examination of his abdominal area, explaining that

he had been previously overexposed to x-rays and felt that

further exposure would be harmful to his health. There-

after Couch was taken to the DEA office in another part

of the airport, and was told he would be detained until

the agents could obtain a court order for an x-ray exam-

ination.

Agents detained Couch in the DEA office from approxi-

mately 9:00 a.m. until 5:00 p.m., when he was handcuffed

and taken to a nearby hospital for x-rays. During this

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period, the DEA agents informed Couch of his Miranda“

rights, but refused several requests for an attorney, inform-

ing Couch that he was not entitled to one.* Couch was

kept under constant surveillance, was not permitted to

make any phone calls, and knew he was not free to leave.

Furthermore, two DEA agents questioned Couch, asking

him several routine questions as well as what he was doing

in Peru and whether he was carrying drugs. During ques-

tioning, Couch explained that his fear of x-rays stemmed

from overexposure during his previous employment at

General Electric and at a hospital. Later in the afternoon,

an investigation indicated that neither employer had any

record of Couch’s employment, but Couch basically stuck

to his story. The agents offered Couch food and water,

which he refused.

During Couch’s detention, Souza and a United States

Attorney worked from 10:00 a.m. until 3:00 p.m. preparing

a three and one-half page affidavit, reciting all of the infor-

mation provided by the confidential informant. The follow-

ing additional information, obtained since Couch’s arrival,

was also included: Couch and Ek had arrived at 7:30 a.m.

on a flight from Peru; the initial search proved negative;

Couch had refused to sabmit to an x-ray for alleged health

reasons; and at 2:30 p.m. a call to the airport confirmed

that Couch had refused any food and had not urinated

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

*In Couch’s declaration in support of the motion to suppress, he

states: “I again asked for an attorney, but agents refused, stating

that I was not entitled to one because I was not under arrest.” The

agents apparently thought that Couch was requesting appointment

of counsel, but Couch asserts that he merely wanted to contact an

attorney.

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or defecated since arrival. At 4:30 p.m., a magistrate issued

a court order authorizing x-rays of Couch and Ek, con-

ducted “in a reasonable manner” by a doctor at a local

hospital.

After Couch was taken from the airport to the hospital,

he was shown the court order and told that he would be

forced to comply if he did not voluntarily submit to the

procedure. Couch again explained his fears about x-ray

exposure and requested an attorney, but signed a consent

form for the x-rays. Several x-rays were taken, which

revealed foreign objects in Couch’s stomach. Couch was

then formally arrested, and transferred to another hospital

for observation. Over the next several days Couch excreted

a total of thirty-six capsules, containing 181.2 grams of

cocaine.

Conch and Ek were indicted for importing cocaine in

violation of 21 U.S.C. 56 952(a) and 960(a)(1), and pos-

sessing cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of

21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Separate trials were scheduled for

the defendants.’ Prior to trial, Couch filed a motion to

suppress all evidence obtained from the detention, and all

evidence from the court order, including the x-rays and

the cocaine. Couch argued that the detention was illegal

because it was, in effect, an arrest without probable cause,

that the affidavit supporting the court order was insuffi-

Ek was tried before District Judge Kelleher, who denied Ek’s

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cient, and that the use of an x-ray examination was

unreasonable. After an evidentiary hearing, District Judge

Hatter granted Couch’s motion in a minute order. The

court did not enter written findings of fact, but the tran-

script of the suppression hearing indicates that the court

based its order on the unreasonable length and nature of

the detention, and the insufficiency of the affidavit. The

government appeals the suppression order to this court

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3731.

I

Reasonableness of the Detention

When entering this country, persons are subject to rou-

tine searches without probable cause. United States v.

Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977); United States v. Perez,

644 F. 2d 1299, 1302 (9th Cir. 1981). Furthermore, the first

United States location at which an international flight

lands is considered the “functional equivalent” of the bor-

der, and the same standards apply as at the actual border.

Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973).

Couch’s flight was non-stop from Lima, Peru to Lws

Angeles International Airport; thus, the initial detention

and search, conducted in a reasonable manner, do not

present any constitutional issues.

Couch argues that his extended detention, between the

time of the initial search and execution of the court-ordered

x-ray examination over nine hours later, was in effect an

arrest requiring probable cause, citing Dunaway v. New

York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979). In Dunaway, a 8 spect was taken

to a police station and questioned about a crime. He made

incriminating statements. The Court held that the deten-

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tion for the purpose of custodial interrogation was illegal

where the police did not have probable cause to arrest. 442

U.S. at 212-13. Dunaway makes it clear that courts must

distinguish between brief investigatory stops based on

reasonable suspicion, and arrests requiring provable cause.

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968).

Although Dunaway is a useful starting point, it does not

directly control the instant case. First, Dunaway stressed

that the objectional feature of the suspect’s detention was

custodial interrogation ; the Court suppressed the suspect's

incriminating statements. 442 U.S. at 216. In the instant

ease, although Couch was asked some questions, the pur-

pose of the detention was to secure a warrant, not to elicit

information. Second, the detention in this case occurred at

the border. Government agents are given coasiderably more

leeway at the border. United States v. Erwin, 625 F. 2d 838,

841 (9th Cir. 1980). We must therefore analyze the nature

of Couch’s detention in light of the border search standards

developed in this circuit.

In United States v. Cameron, 538 F.2d 254 (9th Cir.

1976), this court held a suspect’s slurred speech, needle-

marks and lubricant in the rectal area provided the neces-

sary “clear indication” for a body cavity search, but never-

theless found that the particular search was conducted in

an objectionable manner. Id. at 257-58. In dictum, the court

stated that the Ninth Circuit rule is that warrants are not

required for a body cavity search, but expressed a strong

preference for a warrant. 538 F.2d at 258-59. See 3 W.

LaFave, Search d Seizure § 10.5, at 292-93 (1978). The

court noted that it would be permissible to detain a suspect

while a warrant was obtained. 538 F. 2d at 257 n. 7.

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On the other hand, this court recently held that a two

and one-half hour detention at a Border Patrol check point

was unreasonable, and reversed the resulting narcotics con-

viction. United States v. Perez-Esparza, 609 F. 2d 1284 (9th

Cir. 1979). The court relied heavily on Dunaway, finding

that the suspect was delayed for the purpose of custodial

interrogation, not for the purpose of obtaining a warrant.

Id. at 1287. The Perez-Esparza court also suggested that

its holding was based in part on the fact that the agents

did not have a valid justification to detain the suspects.

Id. at 1287 n.2.* In any event, Perez-Esparza is not on point

because a search at a Border Patrol check point is not the

functional equivalent of a border search. United States v.

Morgan, 501 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir. 1974) (en bane) (per

euriam).

The case closest to the instant case is United States v.

Erwin, 625 F.2d 838 (9th Cir. 1980), which was decided

after Couch’s suppression hearing. In Erwin, airport cus-

toms agents became suspicious of a passenger whose re-

stricted movements and luggage contents indicated body

cavity smuggling. After the suspect refused to submit to a

strip search, she was detained seven hours while a court

order for a strip search and x-ray examination was ob-

tained. Erwin challenged her heroin conviction on the

ground that the seven-hour detention was an illegal arrest

within the meaning of Dunaway and Perez-Esparza. The

Erwin court rejected this argument, holding that the de-

*By contrast, the agents’ justification for detaining Couch in this

case was to preserve the status quo while they obtained a court

9 F

F. Ad at n.7.

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tention while a warrant was obtained was reasonable. /d.

at 841. The court suggested that it would be inconsistent

to express a preference for warrants, as in Cameron, but

to hold that detention pending a warraut was unreason-

able.“

There is an arguable distinction between Erwin and the

circumstances of Couch’s detention. Erwin was detained

only after a search of her luggage revealed items com-

monly used in body cavity smuggling, and her restricted

body movements bolstered the customs agents’ suspicions.

Suspicion focused on Couch before his plane landed. The

cause an informant’s tip rather than the fruits of an air-

port search was the basis for detention, Couch argues that

the agents should have either applied for a warrant before

his arrival, or prepared affidavits ahead of time and ap-

plied for a telephone warrant after the tip was verified

upon his arrival. Fed.R.Crim.P. 41 (e) (2). Couch contends

that the purpose of his extended detention was to obtain

evidence before the warrant was procured, either through

questioning or eventual excretion of the capsules.

We need not reach the issue of whether the defendant could

caused defendant to be detained a considerably shorter period of

time than he would have been detained had the agents chosen the

alternative, but arguably permissible, method of determining what

was in fact within his digestive tract.

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Although detention pending a warrant may be more

reasonable when suspicion arises after arrival, as in Erwin,

we are not prepared to make the constitutional distinction

urged by Couch.“ The reason that the initial search of

Couch did not indicate smuggling was that the ingestion

method does not leave external signs of smuggling. By con-

trast, the method of smuggling used in Erwin often results

in restrictive body movements, items such as condoms and

lubricants in the luggage, and traces of lubricant on the

outside of the body. See United States v. Purvis, 632 F.2d

94, 95 (9th Cir. 1980); Erwin, 625 F.2d at 840; United

States v. Aman, 624 F.2d 911, 912 (9th Cir. 1980). We de-

cline to afford the smuggling method used by Couch more

protection merely because it is more concealable than

Erwin’s method. We find that Erwin controls and the de-

tention here was reasonable.

Moreover, we are not convinced that it would have been

preferable for the agents in this case to apply for the

warrant ahead of time, or arrange for a telephonic war-

rant.’ Prior to Couch’s arrival at the airport, agent Souza

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only had information that Couch would be arriving from

Peru sometime during the week, with cocaine concealed in

his stomach. Souza could not be sure that Couch would

not alter his plans or whether the uncorroborated informa-

tion from the confidential informant would be sufficient to

obtain a court order. After Couch’s arrival, several im-

portant details of the informant’s tip were corroborated,

notably that Couch and Ek had arrived from Peru and

refused x-ray searches for health reasons. In addition, the

agents may have considered that the parties might consent

to an x-ray search, thus obviating the time and effort re-

quired to obtain a court order.

As a final factor in evaluating the reasonableness of the

detention, we consider the customs agents’ denial of Couch’s

specific requests for counsel." We note initially that appli-

cation for a court order is an ex parte proceeding in which

neither the subject of the order nor the subject’s attorney

has a right to participate. United States v. Erwin, 625 F.2d

838, 840 (9th Cir. 1980). Erwin further held that the sus-

pect’s attorney had no right to be present during the

search. Id. Although Couch was not yet charged with a

crime and was not entitled to appointed counsel, under

*Because Couch was not yet formally charged or indicted when

his requests for counsel were denied, b s sixth amendment right to

counsel was not violated. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398

(1977). The record indicates that Couch was not free to leave, and

officials asked him whether he was carrying drugs, thus implicating

Couch’s fifth amendment rights. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436

(1966). See generally Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 298-302

(1980). After requesting counsel, however, Couch did not make any

incriminating statements that led to the discovery of the drugs. Thus

the discovery of the narcotics was not the result of an illegal inter-

rogation. Wong Sun u. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963).

A-12

other circumstances the failure to permit a telephone call

and the denial of the right to consult with retained coun-

sel could be decisive. Here, however, there was little if

anything that counsel could have done to prevent the dis-

covery of the incriminating evidence. We find that the de-

nial of counsel under the circumstances did not render the

detention, which was otherwise permissible under Erwin,

unreasonable. We are not confronted with the question of

admissibility of any statements obtained after Couch re-

quested counsel. Any such issue remains to be resolved if

and when Couch is tried.

We therefore conclude that the district court, which did

not have the benefit of the Erwin decision, clearly erred

in finding that Couch’s detention was unreasonable. In

view of this conclusion, it is unnecessary for us to decide

whether a less deferential standard of review is applicable.

Il

Sufficiency of the Affidavit

A border search may entail several levels of intrusion.

The pat-down search of Couch and the search of his lug-

gage were permissible with only a minimal showing of

suspicion. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619

(1977). See United States v. Perez, 644 F.2d 1299, 1302

(9th Cir. 1981). A “strip search” is only permissible upon

a showing of “real suspicion.” United States v. Rodriguez,

592 F.2d 553, 556 (9th Cir. 1979). A body cavity search

is an even greater intrusion, requiring a “clear indication”

that the suspect is carrying contraband in a body cavity.

United States v. Aman, 624 F.2d 911, 912-913 (9th Cir.

1980). When the government agents have such a clear

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indication, a warrant is preferred but not required.“ Id

Like the court in Aman, we do not find it necesary to deter-

mine which test applies to x-ray searches, because we find

that the agents in this case had a “clear indication” that

Couch was engaged in drug smuggling. As discussed below,

the affidavit in this case meets the requirements of the

probable cause standard for issuance of a search warrant

and this is certainly enough to satisfy the “clear indica-

tion” test.

The adequacy of au informant’s hearsay tip, which was

the basis for the warrant in this case, is judged under

the test of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964).

We recently described the test as follows:

First, the affida it must inform the magistrate of some

of the underlying circumstances that indicate that the

informant’s information is reliable. Second, it must

inform the magistrate of some of the underlying cir-

cumstances from which the officer concluded that the

informant, whose identity need not be disclosed, was

credible.

Untied States v. Whitney, 633 F.2d 902, 905-906 (9th Cir.

1980). The two prongs of the Aguilar test are referred

to as the “basis” and “veracity” prongs. 1 W. LaFave,

Search and Seizure § 3.3, at 501-502 (1978). There is no

question of veracity here; the confidential informant had

supplied reliable tips on at least five previous occasions.

McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 304 (1967). The issue

*Although a warrant or court order is not required, the agents in

this case followed the procedure endorsed in United States v. Aman,

624 F.2d 911, 912-13 (9th Cir. 1980) and United States v. Cameron,

538 F.2d 254, 258-59 (och Cir. 1976), and obtained a court orcler.

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is whether the affidavit adequately disclosed the under-

lying circumstances indicating the informant’s basis of

knowledge.

The district court was apparently concerned that the

affidavit provided no indication of how the informant ob-

tained the information. In granting Couch’s suppression

motion, the court stated that the tip “merely indicated

that there would be some people arriving and nothing

more than that.” The court placed little weight on the

degree of detail in the affidavit, or on the corroborating

circumstances occurring after the tip.

A tip that fails to disclose the basis of an informant’s

information can nevertheless be “verified” by its great

detail. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 416 (1969).

The Spinelli Court suggested that the detail in Draper

v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959), was a “suitable

benchmark.” Jd. In Draper the informant described the

traveling plans and manner of dress of the suspect with

great particularity, and thus the tip was adequate. Id. at

416-17. Similarly, we have held that an affidavit is sufficient

even in the absence of underlying circumstances indicat-

ing reliability, where the criminal activity is described in

sufficient detail. United States v. Fried, 576 F.2d 787, 790

(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 895 (1978). See United

States v. Maher, 645 F.2d 780, 781 (9th Cir. 1981) ; United

States v. Beusch, 596 F.2d 871, 874-75 (9th Cir.- 1979).

The detail in the instant case dealt with both the inno-

cent circumstances of Couch’s trip, and the alleged crim-

inal activity. The informant told customs authorities that

Couch and another white male named Robert [Ek], and

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possibly others, would arrive at Los Angeles International

Airport from Lima, Peru during the week of March 3,

1980. The informant disclosed exactly when and where

the airline tickets were purchased, and provided a detailed

description of the smuggling scheme: the smugglers would

take laxatives to clean out their systems, swallow at least

30 capsules each containing one-half ounce of cocaine, take

a drug to inhibit the normal functioning of their digestive

systems, and take more laxatives once they were through

customs and had reached their United States destination.

The informant also told the agents that Couch had avoided

an X-ray examination on a previous trip in 1979 by telling

Peruvian officials that he had been overexposed to x-rays

and feared further exposure.

In United States v. Larkin, 510 F.2d 13, 15 (9th Cir.

1974), we held that the Aguilar test was not met where

the informant gave a detailed description of a car travel-

ing on a certain highway at a certain time, and alleged that

the car’s occupants were carrying narcotics. But more

recently we made it clear that sufficient detail will cure

an otherwise inadequate disclosure of the basis of the

informant’s knowledge,” by examining the affidavit in a

“commonsense and realistic fashion.” United States v.

Maher, 645 F.2d 780, 782 (9th Cir. 1981), citing United

States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965). Here, the

information provided by the informant more closely approx-

not basis, but its use is well established. 1 W. LaFave, Search C

Seizure f 44 at 544.46 (1978).

A-16

imated the detail in Maher than in Larkin, especially con-

sidering the degree of detail in the criminal allegations

themselves.

Finally, the details provided by the informants were

corroborated by the observations of customs agents, which

were included in the affidavit. Cf. Spinelli v. United States,

393 U.S. 410, 417-18 (1969). The magistrate was informed

that two individuals fitting the description provided by

the informant’s tip had in fact arrived at Los Angeles

International Airport en route from Peru during the week

indicated. The affidavit also stated that as of 2:30 p.m.,

Couch had refused to eat, defecate, or urinate during his

detention. Finally, the affidavit stated that Couch refused

to submit voluntarily to an x-ray examination, claiming

that he had previously been overexposed and feared fur-

ther x-rays for health reasons.

We find that the detail in the informant’s tip was suffi-

cient to establish probable cause.“ This conclusion is bol-

stered by the degree of corroboration evident to the magis-

trate. Nothing occurring after Couch’s arrival suggested

that the informant was wrong. The corroborating circum-

stances, although perhaps innocent in themselves, strength-

ened the informant’s tip and heightened the agents’ jus-

We are aware that in most body cavity search cases, the circum-

stances of the initial pat-down or strip search have provided the

facts necessary for a more intrusive search. See, e. g., United States

v. Purvis, 632 F.2d 94, 95 (9th Cir. 1980) (slow and careful walk,

suspect uncomfortable while sitting); United States v. Aman, 624

F.2d 911, 912 (9th Cir. 1980) (restricted movements, prophylactics

and lubricants in luggage); United States v. Cameron, 538 F.2d 254,

257 (9th Cir. 1976) (needlemarks, slurred speech, lubricant in rectal

area).

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tifiable suspicion of Couch. Couch’s further refusal to

submit to x-rays, and the reasons he advanced, were sus-

picious in light of the other information before the magis-

trate. United States v. Maher, 645 F.2d 780, 782 (9th

Cir. 1981); United States v. Larkin, 510 F.2d 13, 15 (9th

Cir. 1974). The agents were aware that Couch had previ-

ously used the health ploy to avoid x-rays. While the use

of such an excuse may itself be innocent, the likelihood

of an individual giving that specific reason is so remote

as to render Couch’s explanation strong corroboration.

Couch argues that his statement to Peruvian authorities should

not be considered in evaluating the sufficiency of the affidavit, be-

cause customs agent Souza failed to check Couch’s passport, which

apparently did not have a Peruvian stamp for the time period in

question. Couch’s argument is that failure to check the passport cre-

ated a reckless misstatement in the affidavit. Franks v. Delaware,

438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978). It is not clear what weight the district

court gave to this argument in finding the affidavit insufficient. To

the extent that the district court may have disregarded part of the

affidavit of Souza’s alleged misstatement, it was clearly in error.

First, upon receiving word that Couch had arrived, Souza went

straight to the United States Attorney's office, not the airport. Even

if he had asked another agent to check the passport, the lack of a

Peruvian stamp would not have necessarily meant that Couch was

not in Peru on a previous occasion. In addition, Couch admitted

being in Peru during November of 1979. A one month error in the

affidavit cannot be classified as a material misstatement. More im-

portantly, an affiant does not have a duty to verify all of the asser-

tions in an affidavit, especially when there has been no indication

that the information is incorrect. Failure to verify Couch’s previous

presence in Peru was at most negligence, not reckless disregard for

the truth, thus the Franks rationale does not apply. United States o.

Young Buffalo, 591 F.2d 506, 510 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S.

950 (1979). See United States v. Maher, 645 F. 2d 780, 782 (9th Cir.

1981).

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The magistrate was justified in issuing a court order for

the x-ray examination” of Couch.

CONCLUSION

Applying the clearly erroneous standard to the deter-

mination of reasonableness of the detention made by the

district court in its suppression order, we do not reverse

lightly. Nevertheless, we are convinced that the law of this

circuit authorizes border detentions of suspected smugglers

pending the procurement of a warrant or court order. In

addition, we find that the affidavit supplied in this case was

sufficient to support a court order under the probable cause

standard, which would satisfy the warrantless standards

of “real suspicion” or “clear indication” of drug smuggling.

The previously reliable informant’s tip specifically out-

lined the details of the smuggling scheme, and was cor-

roborated by customs agents.

We believe that under the circumstances of this case the

customs agents had enough evidence indicating that drugs

were being smuggled that they could have insisted on ar

x-ray search, or in lieu thereof, detention until Couch’s

stomach contents were emptied, even without a court order.

searches has been accepted by this court. United States v. Aman,

624 F.2d 911, 913 (9th Cir. 1980).

A-19

Securing the order, however, was the preferable approach

and the detention required for that purpose was not un-

reasonable.

For the foregoing reasons, the district court suppression

order is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED for

further proceedings.

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