Petition — Chocallo v. Prokop

in the Supreme Court

Ynjted States

No.

October Term, 1982

HON. WANDA P. CHOCALLO, Administrative

Law Judge,

Petitioner

v.

RUTH PROKOP, Chair; ERSA POSTON, Vice-

Chair; MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD;

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; JAMES CAR-

TER, PRESIDENT; PATRICIA HARRIS, Secre-

tary, Department of Health, Education and Wel-

fare; ANDREW J. YOUNG, Associate Commis-

sioner, Office of Hearings and Appeals, Social

Security Administration, U. S. Dept. of Health,

Education and Welfare; ROBERT L. TRACHTEN-

BERG, Department of Health, Education and Wel-

fare,

Respondents

PETITIONS FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

AND FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THAT

COURT BEFORE JUDGMENT

HONORABLE WANDA P.

CHOCALLO

Pro Se

308 Maple Avenue

Drexel Hill, Pa. 19026

(215) 896-5196

—_—_——

Murrelle Printing Co., Box 100, Sayre, Pa. 18840—(717) 888-2244

Office - “upreme “gu, U.>.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether petitioner, an Administrative Law

Judge appointed by the Secretary of HEW to adjudicate

Social Security cases as his direct delegate, who was not

charged with any offense known to law, is absolutely im-

mune from a removal action under Section 7521 of the

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 USC §7521, based on

the faithful discharge of her judicial obligations according

to her own understanding and conscience and in disregard

of pressures and threats.

2. Whether the constructive discharge by respon-

dents, Office of Hearings and Appeals and the Merit Sys-

tems Protection Board, of petitioner as a permanent Ad-

ministrative Law Judge is void for lack of jurisdiction and

authority and for violating the doctrine of absolute judi-

cial immunity, the Administrative Procedure and Social

Security Acts, Article I, Sections 8 and 9, Article II, Sec-

tion 4, and the First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Ninth Amend-

ments to the Constitution of the United States.

3. Whether Section 7521 of the Administrative Pro-

cedure Act, 5 USC §7521, as well as Civil Service Com-

mission implementing regulations 5 CFR §930.214 et seq.,

is repugnant to the Constitution and void inasmuch as it

constitutes a pure delegation of legislative power, is con-

stitutionally vague in violation of the Fifth Amendment

and is barred by the constitutional prohibitions against

bills of attainder and ex post facto laws.

4, Whether petitioner, who was appointed by a

head of a department under Article II, Section 2, is a civil

i

Questions Presented

officer who can only be removed by impeachment for

and conviction of treason, bribery or other high crimes and

misdemeanors pursuant to Article II, Section 4 of the Con-

stitution of the United States.

5. Whether it was improper for the Court below to

refuse to consider respondents’ discrimination and motiva-

tion where the record shows and petitioner alleged re-

spondents singled her out and retaliated because petitioner

alertly and affir. ,atively responded to expansionist aggres-

sions that obstructed justice and encroached on judicial

independence by petitioning Congress for an investigation

and the District Court, Eastern Dist. of Pa., for appropriate

redress.

6. Whether Social Security Administrative Law

Judges, like other judges, have the right to move forward

with administrative proceedings and conduct their judicial

functions free from interruption, intimidation or harass-

ment and free from pressures, the control and coercive

influences, either direct or indirect, of parties, executive,

legislative and other officials and partisan interests.

7. Whether Appeals Council orcers of June 9, 1977

and November 2, 1977 in the Pearl Taylor case, and HEW

regulations authorizing appeals council, a non-statutory

body in the Office of Hearings and Appeals, to adjudicate

Social Security cases and to review the findings and final

decisions issued by the Secretary after hearing, violate the

Administrative Procedure and Social Security Acts and

the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution and are invalid.

8. Whether the Courts below acted improperly by

“filling in the blanks” to vest respondents OHA and

ii

Questions Presented

MSPB, who did not file an answer, with presumptive ab-

solute immunity to shield them from liability for damages

to petitioner for their failure to observe the clear limitations

on their powers.

9. Whether respondent, President of the United

States, who is mandated by Article II, Section 1 of the

Constitution to see that the laws are faithfully executed,

has a mandatory duty to have expelled from government

those respondents named and other named and unnamed

public officials for having breached their constitutional

and statutory oath, the Code of Ethics for Government

Service, 5 USC §7301, and for obstructing the due course

of justice.

10. Whether the Court below acted improperly by

denying summary judgment for petitioner as a matter of

law and entering summary judgment for respondents.

11. Whether the district court acted improperly in

dismissing petitioner’s complaint as to respondents OHA

and MSPB on the ground of absolute immunity and as to

all respondents on the ground the complaint is vague under

Rule 8, F.R.C.P.

12. Whether the Courts below, who like other de-

partments, are bound by the Constitution, have been un-

faithful to their judicial oath for failing and refusing to pass

on the constitutional and legal questions raised by petition-

er sO as to mandate their supervision and censorship by this

Court and necessitate their ultimate removal from office to

protect the public and each citizen’s interest in the fair

and impartial administration of the Social Security and

Questions Presented

other laws, to insure the integrity of our system of justice,

and to restore confidence in our institutions and in the

ability and willingness of our Courts to administer the

same justice to high officials as would normally apply to

other wrongdoers.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

Brief:

Questions Presented .........0scccccssccccccssscessssesssescecsseess i

ES SS SEN i Re Vv

SEIEE TEIN dasudoncetscleintgisesunmibeabepenitbiltiatmnacesens 2

Fe ERIE PES NSS A SSE SEN Ste SI 2

Constitutional Provisions, Statutes and Regulations

BIND <assibeenseesssbseshseeddncstninbinineebicncsunbstenstedse 2

Statement Of the Case ...............cccesessesses s sesseesvessssseees 3

Reasons for Granting the Writ ...............:ccsseseeeseeee 13

IIEIID *civcsdecthbicosodecasuds Weidibysechabndsdansnbibeutatepoceetend 26

Appendix:

Order Denying Rehearing ...............s0+ + cscseeseeeeees la

Judgment, Court of Appealls ............ccsscessssseceeseeeeeeees 3a

Memorandum Opinion, May 3, 1982 .........:.s0seese 7a

SIIIIIIET «\iedtii i scntetlalainetcanbiaandnan abdhaeeminpedenetgptabandin lla

Memorandum Opinion, Oct. 10, 1980 ............0000008 . 13a

GENIE. sci dencnostvsensividaliingsbecinataldesiaebaibesminatafapennnt 17a

COMTI ..ccccecerevecoccconscccosonsocopensinte ¢ sresenscccouessoenssesie 18a

Memorandum, Opinion and Order, Merit Systems

Protection Board ...........scescsssssccessssssesscessereesees 54a

RRR EGMGD wscnscsscscescoscsceseszonte 4 cnernteneseoscerssenosneions 59a

FetteE CE CAPRIS ...ccccsescsesscessvivercsinscoveccssbevcentoveeveusce 6la

Constitution of the United States ...........seerseeees 67a

Amendments to the Constitution ...........seeseeeees 68a

Vv

Civil Service Commission Regulations ...................... 73a

Administrative Procedure Act .............:.:c0eccessseseeeees 75a

Regulations of Secretary ................0ccescseseesseereeeeeeeees 79a

TABLE OF CITATIONS

CASES:

Accardi v. Shaugnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954) .......... 17

Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 20

gS FR! . . Se ee one 20

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 .........cccccccesseessereseeesenees 19

Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) ....13, 14, 18,21

Califano v. Sanders, 4350 U.S. 99, 97 S.Ct. 980, 51

Tats SE UE EEETED. copcthinteedtticcntasstsetescepseeanientes 17

Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940) .............. 20

Clus v. Brooklyn Eastern Terminal, N.Y., 359 U.S.

231, TD SL. TED (1D5G) ...cecsseccccscesscccccoseseeeee 21

Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277 0..........cccccceeees 20

Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall] 2 ...............ccccccseecseeeceeeeees 16

Ex parte Secombe, 60 U.S. 9 .........ccccccccccsssseeseeeeeenees 24

Giacco v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 ............ccc00e0 20

Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (18035) ............ 14, 16

Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Board of Educ. v.

Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) ...ccccccccccecereresenees 20

Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 55 S.Ct. 579 ...... 15

O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 502, 94 S.Ct. 669

IIPUIE ibenclidliecachasepnsstinaprteenenbdaiembcncebceoetnagnoccctiinn 19

Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 US. 388 ............ 21

Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946) .......... 15

Porter v. Califano, 597 F.2d 770 (5 Cir., 1979) ...... 15

Ricks v. Dist. of Columbia, 414 F.2d 1097 (1968) 20

Schuerer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 40 L.Ed. 2d 90 ..14, 16

US. v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 483 19

US. v. Mowat, 124 US. 30S .........cccccssccoccsoceersecceeees 19

United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) cantecel 16, 17

US. v. United States F. & G. Co., 369 U.S. 506 ...... 18

Wichita R. & L. Co. v. Pub. Utilities Com., 260 US.

48 =~ ae

Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 US. 35 .............. 15

Ybarzro v. City of San Jose, CA Cal., 503 F.2d 1041

(1974) 21

OTHER AUTHORITY:

Maintaining Judicial Independence: A Mandate to

Judges, 66 ABAJ 470 (1980) ..........cccccccceeeseees 25

REGULATIONS:

a Sree vee 3, 16, 17

Ty GD ientscornspenenpeneiennpentitingintpinccraasttiseet 3

OF ee ND ccctctsrrctintonecnennescees's escscesesnesetetioninenet 3

5 CFR 930.221 ........c0000+0 3

20 CFR 404.941 3

SO CR GO BGI ccccscsnccncecnnsensecenmasetinscssssszscsseesnsesses 3

RULE

PED eo TRB © ccierecncsccescessitis é cernttictinistetasenccciscces 3,21

STATUTES:

Administrative Procedure Act

a ee 9

IID TINIE sicdatoctnechetihstdebicliasictrcrasstpesaseaidbices o 8

Social Security Act:

ge ES 7,16

OG a ee ee ae 3, 16,17

Fe OD. cntthnetatetsctcpstpnteesectnertincnsremounin 3

SII TIE sinsasiesichbataningicheeseinninesn tetntennattatassnaiestihes 3

5 ff of eee 20

ER RAS ee 3,17

AS POE cthicttaicintaadiinithetiiinncinnmniignimiiinl 3

Ee wertnittignncernadigiteetnttacnemzanescataminies 3, 16

EE Sith -akeupepincpttecabeedenteiiblaaitsateenes 3, 4, 5, 16, 17,19

gk EERE IRE a es ve 17,19

FSCS CPT eee erenee ue a

Se Ey BOOED» ccercccsnsthitbdidescccictdeenbictticcecdaddadiligncsnes 2

TE EE SD siccniinsciivesindendtnnabiptenscsesmmeiitititindes 2

ae ee ee 3,17

ee ED sirnincinnetnnitinantnsianitinnsstnentstanhilndiiinleced 16

. 2 Ee eer 4

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

SN "Ee ee we 2

Asticbe 1, Section 9 ...........cersccsssecssscssssess 2

BR ED ccsititnrctnctncnipencntmieeniigtinntl 2

Article II, Section 4 ...............0 .2,6, 19

viii

NNN WN

No.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1982

WANDA P. CHOCALLO,

Petitioner

v.

RUTH PROKOFF et al.,

Respondents

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT AND FOR A

WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT

Wanda P. Chocallo, Petitioner, petitions for a writ

of certiorari to review the per curiam judgment of the

United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia

Circuit rendered on February 11, 1982 affirming in part

and remanding the case for proceedings consistent there-

with.

Petitioner also petitions this Court for a writ of cer-

tiorari before judgment to the United States Court of Ap-

peals for the District of Columbia Circuit to review the

decision of the district court entered after remand on May

5, 1982, which was appealed by petitioner to the Circuit

Court on June 1, 1982 (No. 82-1607).

2 Oo Below and seth noe

Involved i

OPINIONS BELOW

The court of appeals opinion was ordered not to

Le printed (App. 3a). The district court’s opinion is not

reported (App. 13a). The district court’s opinion after

remand is not reported (App. 7a). The order of the Merit

Systems Protection Board is reprinted in the Appendix

(54a).

JURISDICTION

The per curiam judgment of the court of appeals was

entered on February 11, 1982. A timely petition for re-

hearing with a suggestion for rehearing en banc was Ge-

nied on April 8, 1982 (App. 1a). The judgment of the

district court on remand was filed May 5, 1982 and an

appeal filed on June 1, 1982 (No. 82-1607). The juris-

diction of this Court is invoked under 28 USC 1254(1)

and 2101 (e).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,

REGULATIONS INVOLVED

The constitutional provisions, statutes and regulations

involved, which are set forth in Appendix 67a, infra, are:

Constitution of the United States:

Article I, Section 8; Article I, Section 9; Article II,

Section 2; Article II, Section 4; Amendment I;

Amendment V; Amendment VI; Amendment VIII.

Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, 3

Regu/ations Involved

Statement of the Case

Statutes of the United States:

5 USC 551; 5 USC 556; 5 USC 554(d); 5 USC 559;

5 USC 706; 5 USC 3105; 5 USC 7521; 42 USC 405

(b) (g) (h).

Regulations:

35 CFR 930.202 (a) ; 5 CFR 930.203; 5 CFR 930.214;

5 CFR 930.221; 20 CFR 404.941; 20 CFR 404.947a.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case presents for review the Circuit Court’s af-

firmation of the denial of summary judgment for petitioner

as a matter of law; entry of summary judgment for respon-

dents without answer, affidavits and hearing; dismissal of

the complaint as to Trachtenberg, Young, Prokop and

Poston, without answer, on the ground of presumptive ab-

solute immunity; remand for district court to furnish rea-

sons for dismissal; and the District Court’s dismissal of the

Complaint for vagueness under F.R.C.P., Rule 8.

Petitionzr filed a complaint against respondents,

governmen’ officials, setting forth several causes of action.

She requests reinstatment as a permanent Administrative

Law Judge appointed by the Secretary of HEW and as-

signed ‘o the Philadelphia field office, Office of Hearings

and Appeals (OHA), Social Security Administration

(S3A), U. S. Department of Health and Human Services

(HHS), with back pay, accrued benefits and damages.

The office formerly was known as the Bureau of Hearings

and Appeals (BHA), SSA, U. S. Department of Health,

4 Statement of the Case

Education and Welfare (HEW). She asks a Merit Sys-

tems Protection Board (MSPB) (formerly CSC) adminis-

trative order be declared void as contrary to her statutory

and constitutional rights, powers, privileges, protections

and due process of law, and be expunged from her records.

She seeks substantial damages for vast invasions of her

statutory and constitutional civil rights by respondents for

failing to observe obvious statutory and constitutional limi-

tations on their powers. She requests Section 7521 of the

Administrative Procedure Act be declared unconstitutional.

Petitioner also seeks a mandatory injunction directing

the President of the United States, who has a constitutional

duty to see that laws are faithfully executed, to have ex-

pelled from government respondents and other named and

unnamed officials for breach of their public trust and the

Cod. of Conduct for Government Employees.

The U. S. Department of Justice, Attorney General’s

office, by ex parte communication directed the United

States Marshall not to serve the writ of summons and com-

plaint issued by the District Court upon respondent Presi-

dent of the United States. This was done in violation of

28 USC §569(b) and 42 USC 1990 and without peti-

tioner’s knowledge and consent. No motion to quash was

filed in behalf of the President.

Petitioner alleges respondents Trachtenberg, Director,

BHA and MSPB, conspired to deprive petitioner of her of-

fice as ALJ in order to cover up obstructions of justice and

in retaliation for opposing and exposing obstructions of

justice and fraud in the John C. Coleman and Pearl Taylor

cases and other unlawful BHA practices. She further al-

leges respondent, BHA, in violation of her Fourth Amend-

ment rights, broke into her locked office, burglarized it,

stole her personal property and ransacked her office in an

Statement of the Case 5

effort to secure incriminating evidence in a case before her,

viz., claimant Pearl Taylor. BHA, in conspiracy with

Community Legal Services, Inc., of Philadelphia (CLS),

and in conspiracy with CSC, invaded her privacy by

covertly soliciting and inducing complaints against her

from lawyers and others; asking her staff to spy on her;

contacting former employers to induce adverse comments;

conducting secret probes and surveillances; spreading

false and vicious rumors about her in furtherance of a

secret removal drive. BHA also unlawfully infringed up-

on her decisional independence, harassed and threatened

her with investigation and removal from office during the

course of administrative proceedings. BHA unlawfully

refused to process a promotion due petitioner by operation

of law; altered and falsified payroll and leave records;

issued false personnel and payroll certification documents;

confiscated her salary check; refused to furnish her with

competent and adequate staff; assigned cases selectively to

her; singled her out for special review of her decisions for

the purpose of manufacturing evidence to effectuate peti-

tioner’s removal.

Petitioner maintains she is still an Administrative

Law Judge. She has not been impeached as required by

Article II, Section 4 of the United States Constitution and

convicted of “treason, bribery, or other high crimes and

misdemeanors.” She has not been removed by the Secre-

tary under Section 7521 of the Administrative Procedure

Act, 5 USC §7521. At noon on March 26, 1980, she was

constructively discharged by being evicted from her office,

without any warning and without official notice. She was

told by BHA management to vacate by 5:00 p.m. Sub-

sequently, the locks on the outer office doors were changed

to bar petitioner’s entry. No removal action was ever

filed by the Secretary, the “agency” as defined by the APA,

6 Statement of the Case

by which petitioner is employed. An ultra vires removal

action was filed by Trachtenberg, Director, BHA, without

statutory authority. His reasons are set forth in his affi-

davit of September 27, 1977, quoted below (A. 226):

“Based primarily on ALJ Chocallo’s action in the

Taylor case, I decided to file a letter of charges against

her. I had been dissatisfied with her conduct in the

Coleman (Mr. ‘Doe’) case and generaily displeased

with her attitude. It was, however, her conduct in

barring Mrs. Taylor’s attorney from further represen-

tation without due process and her defiance of the

Appeals Council’s Order which finally prompted me

to take this action. I considered both acts to be gross

abuses of discretion and in contravention of the law

and regulations.” (Emphasis supplied.)

Respondents, in their appellate brief, stated:

“Ms. Chocallo’s removal came about because she

refused to recognize the lawful hierarchy within the

Social Security Administration.”

Former Social Security Cominissioner James Card-

well, in his April 2, 1976 response to Congress concern-

ing petitioner’s February 29, 1976 request for a congres-

sional inquiry into BHA’s obstructions of justice in the

John C. Coleman case and other unlawful practices, stated

(A. 113):

“The concept of supervision without interference

in the exercise of an AL]’s judgment seems to be the

issue. 1 would note that both Mr. Trachtenberg and

I support the need for AL]’s to accept supervision in

this sense. Beyond that, I do not think I should com-

ment further in light of the plan for the Bureau of

Hearings and Appeals to take the matter to the Civil

Statement of the Case 7

Service Commission.” (Underscoring [italics] sup-

plied.)

A distinction should be made in limine between the

two agencies involved here. BHA is the “agency” whose

cases are adjudicated by ALj’s. Its office manager is the

Director. The Secretary of HEW is the employing “agen-

cy”, within the meaning of the APA, vested with the right

to hire and fire ALJ’s, to whom he directly delegates his

discretionary adjudicatory powers, and whom he assigns

to BHA.

The uncontradicted key facts in the voluminous record

(which also are alleged with particularity in the complaint)

are as follows: Petitioner, Wanda P. Chocallo, was ap-

pointed by the Secretary of HEW on July 24, 1974, as a

hearing examiner under Section 1631 (d) (2) of the Social

Security Act due to her qualifications as a lawyer with over

25 years experience, international lecturer, former law

clerk to a Chief Supreme Court Justice of the State of Penn-

sy! vania, and a subject of The World Who’s Who of Wom-

en. She was a scholarship and honor student who worked

her way through the University of Pennsylvania and

Temple University School of Law. She completed a 4

year evening law course in 2 1/2 years while working full

time.

Petitioner experienced opposition to her appointment

at the outset. She was the sole SSI examiner assigned to

the Philadelphia SSI office, and in addition for almost a

year heard all Delaware and Harrisburg SSI cases. She also

was assigned 40 Baltimore cases. Petitioner was denied an

established office and full complement of staff, etc. Wash-

ington, D.C., with a minimal case load, was provided a full

established office with 3 hearing examiners, 4 hearing as-

sistants and 3 secretaries. In less than 1 year, she had to

move to 3 different locations.

8 Statement of the Case

Trachtenberg was appointed Director, BHA, in 1975

by Commissioner Cardwell to destroy the autonomy of

AL]J’s by fiat. He served at Cardwell’s pleasure. He had

no supervisory authority over ALJ’s. He also acted as

Chairman of Appeals Council, a non-statutory body vested

authority by departmental regulations inconsistent with the

Social Security Act and the APA. He appointed appeals

council members and staff, who served at his pleasure.

Trachtenberg immediately undertook to issue mandatory,

unlawful instructions regarding every detail of an ALJ’s

role under the guise of “auministrative management.” He

encouraged his administrators in charge to assume a super-

visory role over ALJ’s.

Petitioner, on February 29, 1976, petitioned the Secre-

tary, Congress, the President and others to investigate the

detailed and documented charges presented and to initiate

appropriate remedial action and asked MSPB to investigate.

On July 1, 1977, she filed an unprecedented lawsuit

against Trachtenberg, Cardwell, other Bureau officials,

Stein, Bernstein et al. and Community Legal Services, Inc.

of Philadelphia in the District Court, Eastern District of

Pennsylvania. She sought monetary damages and to enjoin

the unlawful practices that chilled the ALJ’s independence.

On July 9, 1977, petitioner received a letter dated

July 5, 1977 from MSPB stating Trachtenberg filed a

“letter of charges” proposing her removal as a Temporary

Administrative Law Judge. In June, 1979, petitioner re-

quested MSPB issue a subpoena on the Regional Chief Ad-

ministrative Law Judge, a defendant in her suit, who in-

formed petitioner Trachtenberg filed the removal action

because petitioner sued him.

Plaintiff’s lawsuit gave rise to other similar actions

filed by other ALJ’s. Suits also were filed by claimants

Statement of the Case i)

who charged Trachtenberg’s practices rendered the hear-

ing process unfair and denied their rights to a fair and im-

partial hearing. At taxpayers’ expense, special counsel

Burton Berkley was hired to defend Trachtenberg in these

and other suits filed against him.

By Act of Congress all SSI hearing examiners were

converted to temporary ALJ’s for a term expiring Decem-

ber 31, 1978, effective April 11, 1977, and were deemed

to have been appointed under Section 3105 of the APA.

Trachtenberg, as a reprisal, unlawfully refused to process

petitioner’s appointment for over 6 months though he had

no discretion in the matter. In January 1978, by further

Act of Congress, all temporary AL]’s were given permanent

status.

The complaint filed by Trachtenberg contains 3

charges. Charge I alleges petitioner violated a lawful order

of Appeals Council of June 9, 1977 in the Pearl Taylor case

by holding a hearing on June 13, 1977. The order [which

was not directed to petitioner and which was unauthorized

and denounced by Taylor] purported to accomplish 4

ultra vires things simultaneously: (1) vacate petitioner’s

interlocutory order; (2) remove the case to AC for hear-

ing; (3) remand the case to the Acting Regional Chief

Administrative Law Judge and (4) order him to reassign

the case to another ALJ. Charge II alleges petitioner

failed to relinquish the Taylor case files when asked to do

so. Charge III states petitioner demonstrated a lack of

judicial temperament that caused Appeals Council to re-

mand three cases (Coleman, Howard and Taylor) to an-

other ALJ because of allegedly unfair hearings. The How-

ard and Coleman cases were heard by petitioner while she

was a hearing examiner appointed under the Social Se-

curity Act. They were heard April 2, 1975 and Decem-

10 Statement of the Case

ber 29, 1975, respectively. All claimants were represented

by CLS.

Petitioner, after a thorough study of the record and

upon hearing testimony, ascertained that claimant Cole-

man while working was collecting supplemental security in-

come. His CLS attorney, Linda Bernstein, thereafter be-

gan to interrupt the proceedings, to instruct claimant not

to answer the judge’s questions, flouted petitioner’s rulings

and was generally obstructive. After the hearing, Bernstein

met with agency officials and attempts were made to obtain

the case files from petitioner and force her out of the case.

The ARCAL]J threatened to have petitioner investigated

and fired for refusing to discuss the Coleman case dehors

the record. Petitioner reported the threats and coercive in-

fluences to Trachtenberg, who threatened her with insub-

ordination. He ordered her to cooperate with the ARCAL]J

and Bernstein; that it was her duty to do so; that she mis-

understood the hearing process. He also attacked her “pro-

ductivity.”

Bernstein flouted and ignored 3 supplementary hear-

ing notices and subpoenas served on her and Coleman. She

demanded an immediate decision. BHA assured her, even

before petitioner’s decision was filed, that it would be re-

viewed by appeals council. Petitioner, under the law, then

had to develop the record from collateral sources. She

discovered Coleman received SSI payments under 3 social

security numbers. Bernstein knew this. Yet, she demanded

increased payments for him claiming spurious exclusions.

Based on the data obtained from collateral sources, peti-

tioner ordered Coleman to repay about $3000 fraudulently

obtained.

In Taylor’s case (heard February 15, 1977), her CLS

attorneys tried to force a change of judge without claim-

ant’s knowledge and consent. Chief CLS attorney Stein

‘he

Statement of the Case il

filed a motion to disqualify petitioner. Such motions may

be granted or denied by the presiding judge and are not

interlocutorily reviewable. Taylor, when told of the motion

by petitioner, repudiated it and her CLS representatives.

She accused Stein of “misusing and abusing her” for their

own “dirty work” and “ambition”. She branded the mo-

tion “stoned politics.” She said she did not want Stein to

represent her. She wanted the hearing postponed so she

could bring in her minister to get to the bottom of things.

She said “black folks have been pushed around, mistreated,

shoved around and done in” that CLS “makes a rag mop

out of you” “they throw you from one place to another” “to

confuse your mind” that “they ought to be ashamed of

themselves.” She said she didn’t know why she had been

suddenly transferred in September 1976 from the neighbor-

hood office, which represented her and where she always

went, to Stein at the main CLS office. Petitioner dis-

cussed the motion to disqualify with Taylor. Taylor

asked that it be dismissed. Claimant during the hearing

decided to obtain other counsel anc asked for a continu-

ance. She did not wish CLS to represent her any longer.

A formal order was issued by petitioner on May 10, 1977

dismissing the motion and excluding Stein from further

participation in the case. Stein, though discharged by

Taylor and excluded from the case, wrote a series of ex

parte letters to various agency officials, in which he un-

authorizedly held himself out as Taylor’s lawyer. He as-

sailed petitioner’s character and competency and demanded

her removal from the case and from office. Taylor knew

nothing about these letters. At her request, a further hear-

ing was set for June 13, 1977. In the interim, several at-

tempts were made by BHA to obtain the Taylor files from

staff. On June 9, 1977, an appeals council

order was issued by Trachtenberg’s subordinates without

her that if she appeared at the caring she would go down

her it was a battle and she would have to choose sides.

She said she did not authorize nor request a change of

judge and would proceed with petitioner. She stated

the way they rule people today” “insisting on what

do”, that “they refused to recognize what I

Taylor stated ARCAL] Gitman met with her and

Stein prior to the February 15th hearing. Gitman told her

petitioner denied 15 similar cases because she was anti-

black, anti-poor and anti those with nervous disorders. He

promised she would be paid benefits if she helped get evi-

dence to remove petitioner. BHA subsequently broke into

petitioner’s locked office, burglarized her files to steal the

Taylor tapes and records and removed petitioner’s personal

Reasons for Granting the Writ 13

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I.

This case is unprecedented. Petitioner is the first

Petitioner constructively lost her position without

equal protection and due process. She was never removed

by the Secretary nor impeached. She was never charged

with any offense known to law. Nor did she violate the law

or do anything to warrant such action.

Petitioner in her assigned Philadelphia BHA office

forded the right to resume her office in BHA and to perform

her duties with the protection of Butz v. Economou, 438

U.S. 478 (1978) , as an “independent” AL] as required by

the APA “free from the control and coercive influences,

either direct or indirect of the executive, legislative or

politics” “free from pressures by the parties or other of-

ficials within the agency.” She wishes to insure the rights

of claimants coming before her to fair and impartial hear-

ings. Other judges are being coerced. They will become

subordinates and not independent decision-makers. Peti-

tioner submits this Court should review this case because

the Court below ignored the body of law developed by this

Court. If the decisions of the Circuit and District Courts

are permitted to stand, the criteria developed by precedents

vg

i4 Reasons for Granting the Writ

of this Court since Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 437

(1803) will, by default, be drained of meaning.

“One policy consideration pervades this case, the pub-

lic interest requires decisions and action to enforce laws for

the protection of the public and its citizens.” Schuerer v.

Rhodes, 416 US. 232, 40 L.Ed. 2d 90. The imperative

public importance not only justifies review by this Court

but a deviation from normal appellate practice so that in-

separable issues may be resolved at once. This Court stated

in Butz: “Adjudications have a serious impact on private

and public rights and must be conducted by independent

AL]’s as required by the APA. The due process and equal

protection clause is, moreover, the only‘security guaranteed

each citizen.”

The integrity of the Court, which is one of the nation’s

choice traditions, cannot be maintained if an ALJ qualified

to sit by all moral and ethical standards, allows herself to

be driven from sitting in judgment on a case and also from

office. It is, therefore, of vital national concern that the

important constitutional issues raised be adjudicated by

this Court.

BHA and MSPB recognized the limitations upon their

power over the ALJ’s decision-making process. The posi-

tion description issued to ALJ's, approved by MSPB, states

AL]J’s possess “full and complete individual independence

of action and decision . . . without review (and) full re-

sponsibility and authority for the conduct of hearitgs and

the disposition of cases.” “The Social Security and Admin-

istrative Procedure Act,” the description continues, “pro-

hibit substantive review and supervision of the (ALJ) in

the performance of his quasi-judicial functions. His deci-

sions may not be reviewed before publication, and after

publication only by the appeals council in certain pre-

scribed circumstances. He is subject only to such admin-

Reasons for Granting the Writ 15

istrative supervision as may be required in the course of

general office management.” (A. 52-55) An Attorney Gen-

eral Opinion to the Secretary of Interior dated January 18,

1977, ruled, after consulting with MSPB, an ALJ’s juris-

diction over a case ends after an appeal is filed from his

decision and an ALJ cannot be disciplined for discharging

adjudicatory functions according to his conscience and un-

. He noted MSPB is the agency charged with

supervision of the AL] program by Congress and “‘has been

looked to by the courts to prevent any devious practice

subersive of the proper independence of ALJ’s.”

This Court held in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339

US. 33, that courts cannot stand aside and rubber stamp

their affirmance of decisions that are repugnant to the Con-

stitution and inconsistent with statutory mandate or that

frustrate the congressional policy underlying a statute.

That is precisely what the courts below did here. They

condoned and contributed to respondents’ usurpation of

sweeping dictorial powers, by summarily and perfunctorily

stripping a judge of her office, her livelihood and reputation

without examining the record and interpreting and apply-

ing the law to the actual facts of record. The APA, 5 USC

706 (2) mandates an independent assessment of a citizen’s

claim of violations of First, Fifth and other constitutional

rights when reveiwing agency decision-making. Whether a

party sues directly under the Constitution or, instead, asks a

federal court to set aside the agency action as contrary to

her constitutional rights under 706 (2) (B) of the APA, the

role of the district court is the same. Norris v. Alabama,

294 US. 587, 55 S.Ct. 579; Pennekamp v. Florida, 328

US. 331 (1946) ; Porter v. Califano, 597 F.2d 770 (5 Cir.,

1979). The District Court should have predicated its cru-

cial First, Fifth and Eighth Amendment judgment on its

own assessment of the record. Instead, it wrongly deferred

16 Reasons for Granting the Writ

to the agency determination by granting the government’s

summary judgment motion without answer, affidavits and

hearing.

The Court below did not apply the controlling tests

to this case. Avoidance was resoried to as an avenue of

escape from the paramount authority of the Federal Con-

stitution. The material mistakes of law are apparent on the

face of the record. Justice David Davis said, in speaking

for this Court in Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall 2:

“No doctrine, involving more pernicious conse-

quences, was ever invented by the wit of man than tiat

any of its provisions can be suspended during any of

the great exigencies of government. Such a doctrine

leads directly to anarchy or despotism. . . . Our fathers

knew that unlimited power was especially hazardous

to freemen.”” (Emphasis supplied.)

Chief Justice Burger declared in Schuerer v. Rhodes,

supra: “Public officials, whether governors * * * or judges,

who fail to make decisions when they are needed * * * do

not faithfully perform the duties of their office.” And in

United States v. Nixon, 418 US. 683 (1974), he said:

“Many decisions of the Court, however, have unequivocally

reaffirmed the holding of Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch

137 (1803), that ‘[i]t is emphatically the province and

duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.’ ”

Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury, denominated those

judges who fail to apply and interpret the law as “immoral”

“worse than solemn mockery” and “equally a crime.”

By statute and regulations, respondents BHA and

MSPB had no right to hire, discharge or interfere in the

employment of an employee such as petitioner. 5 USC 551;

3105; 7521; 5 CFR 930.202 et seq.; 42 USC 405 (1); Sec-

tion 1631 (2) (d) of the SSA. These powers were entrusted

Reasons for Granting the Writ 17

by Congress to the Secretary of HEW, the “agency” within

the meaning of 5 USC 551 and 5 CFR 930.202. The power

to hire and fire is non-delegable. 5 USC 559. Once the

Secretary makes a valid delegation of his adjudicatory pow-

ers to an ALJ, he, himself, as the “agency” cannot divest

the ALJ of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction can only be reasserted

by amending the regulations containing the delegation.

United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Accardi v.

Shaugnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954).

Petitioner’s jurisdiction in the Tavlor case could not

be terminated by the ultra vires Appeais Council order is-

sued at Trachtenberg’s direction. MSPB and the courts are

charged with a knowledge of the law. They impeached a

faithful judge because, allegedly, she disobeyed a “lawful”

order of Appeals Council. Yet they would not rule on the

validity of the order. It was petitioner’s duty to interpret

and apply the law to Appeals Council’s order. She made

her decision with absolute disregard of anticipated personal

consequences. The courts failed to faithfully execute their

obligation.

Other statutory provisions as well barred respondents

BHA and MSPB from doing what they did. 5 USC 7521

(1979 pocket part); 42 USC 405(h) and 18 USC 1505.

The APA, SSA and 18 USC 1505 prohibited respondents

from reviewing petitioner’s dec’ sions. The Social Security

Act, 42 USC 405 (h), forbids “any person, agency or tri-

”, except the district court under 405 (g), from re-

the findings and decision of the Secretary issued

is final and binding on all parties. This

of such decisions cannot be obtained

APA, the Mandamus Act or any other vehicle.

v. Sandors, 430 U.S. 99, 97 S.Ct. 980, 51 L.Ed. 2d

7). Also it is @ well recognized rule that the in-

of the judicial process is best preserved by recog-

i

i

i

:

‘i

i

18 Reasons for Granting the Writ

nizing that judges, as independt decision-makers, have no

obligation to defend themselves in reviewing courts.

The Court below gave an ironic twist to the law. It

sustained Trachtenberg’s fatally defective complaint, which

petitioner challenged, while dismissing petioner’s detailed

complaint on the ground it is vague. This is a classic case

of one law for Athens and another for Rome. The thres-

hold question of jurisdiction, moreover, was totally disre-

garded. The jurisdictional essentials necessary to the valid-

ity of every judgment were lacking. They are, jurisdiction

of parties, jurisdiction of the subject matter and power or

authority to decide the particular matters presented and the

lack of either is fatal to the judgment. The fact that an in-

dispensable party, viz., the Secretary, was lacking alone

was fatal. U.S. v. United States F. & G. Co., 369 U.S. 506.

Under the circumstances of this case, it is clear that sum-

mary judgment should have been entered for petitioner as

a matter of law. The use made of the summary judgment

statute was a perversion of justice and abuse of it.

The agency action was also barred by the doctrines of

constitutional statutory and common law judicial immunity

which petitioner invoked ab initio. Petitioner’s judicial acts

were protected Ly common law judicial immunity. Judges

will be subject to liability only when they acted in the clear

absence of all jurisdiction. Butz, supra. Immunity is an af-

firmative defense and must be pleaded in a responsive

pleading. No responsive pleadings were filed vy respon-

dents. While the district and circuit courts ignored peti-

tioner’s properly pleaded defenses of absolute judicial im-

munity, they assumed the role of triers of fact to confer

presumptive absolute immunity upon Trachtenberg, Young,

Prokop and Poston to shield them from liability. Trachten-

berg and Young were ministerial officers who ignored the

clear statutory limitatiuns on their powers. Prokop and

Reasons for Granting the Writ 19

Poston clearly were absent subject matter and party juris-

diction. What they did was expressly forbidden by law.

The gratuitous vestiture of immunity upon them by the

circuit court sua sponte cannot be sustained under Butz.

Additionally, respondents were engaged in criminal con-

duct proscribed by 18 USC 1505 which barred immunity.

The removal action was filed during the pendency of the

Taylor case. It impeded and obstructed the due course of

justice. This Court declared in O’Shea v. Littleton, 414

U.S. 502, 94 S.Ct. 669 (1974):

“We have never held that the performance of the

duties of judicial, legislative, or executive officers, re-

quires or contemplates the immunization of otherwise

criminal deprivations of constitutional rights. Cf. Ex

parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 25 L.Ed. 676 (1880).

On the contrary, the judicially fashioned doctrine of

official immunity does not reach ‘so far as to immunize

criminal conduct proscribed by an Act of Congress.’ ”

The Circuit and District Courts’ actions cannot be sup-

ported by law.

The court likewise would not rule on petitioner’s

claim that the agency action is void because it is barred by

Article II, Sec. 4 of the Constitution. Petitioner who was

appointed by the head of a department qualifies as a civil

officer within the purview of Article II, Sec. 4. U. S. v.

Germaine, 99 U.S. 483; U. S. v. Mouat, 124 U.S. 303;

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 US. 1. Impeachment for and con-

viction of treason, bribery or other high crimes and mis-

demeanors, as provided under Article II, Sec. 4, is the only

method by which petitioner could be removed from office.

Any other removal of an ALJ appointed by the Secretary

constitutes a bill of attainder.

The Court failed to rule on the constitutionality of

Section 7521 of the APA challenged by petitioner. It was

20 Reasons for Granting the Writ

obliged to do so. Blair v. U.S., 250 US. 273. The statute

is a pure delegation of legislative power and must be de-

clared void. Congress failed to lay down policies and es-

tablish standards. Wichita R. & L. Co. v. Pub. Utilities

Com., 260 U.S. 48. It is also void for vagueness. It

necessitates so much guesswork as to its coverage as to

incur the condemnation of the Fifth Amendment. Giacco

v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399; Anti-Fascist Committee v.

McGrath, 341 U.S. 123; Ricks v. Dist. of Columbia,"414

F.2d 1097 (1968).

The agency action violates the prohibitions against

ex post facto laws contained in Article I, Sec. 9 and is void.

Acts punished must by law of the land be forbidden when

done. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); Cum-

mings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277.

The action is retaliatory and discriminatory as evi-

denced by the record. The Court failed to apply the tests

required by law. Petitioner’s constitutionally protected

conduct was a motivating factor in Trachtenberg’s decision

to have her removed. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of

Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). Petitioner’s deci-

sions were singled out for special review at Trachtenberg’s

direction. None of the almost 1000 decisions issued by her

had been remanded by the district court. No adverse ac-

tions were filed against ALJ’s whose decisions had been

remanded by the courts and appeals council, and who failed

to comply with appeals council’s orders directed to them

personally. It is patent petitioner was denied the equal pro-

tections of the law.

Findings

The agency action likewise is ineffective inasmuch as

it failed to make express findings of fact and conclusions

based upon the evidence as required by 5 USC §557 (c)

Reasons for Granting the Writ 21

and to show the ruling on each finding, conclusion, excep-

tion and omission presented by petitioner. The lack of ex-

press findings et al. cannot be supplied by implication or by

reference. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388;

Butz v. Economou, supra. Nor is the action supported by

substantial evidence.

Petitioner’s request for mandamus relief against the

President has been totally ignored. Those who frustrate the

law undermine the Constitution and individual rights, and

provide uncurbed and unprincipled leadership, must be

punished and held accountable. For the responsible Ameri-

can citizen to remain silent is cowardice and a grievous in-

justice to the proposition that in America the law is su-

preme.

The District Court on remand dismissed petitioner’s

complaint stating it is “vague” and does not conform to

FRCP, Rule 8. The complaint facially does not lack detail.

Mere vagueness or lack of detail is not a ground for a mo-

tion to dismiss. The proper method of attack is a motion

for a more definite statement. Clus v. Brooklyn Eastern

Terminal, N.Y., 359 U.S. 231, 79 S.Ct. 760 (1959) ; Ybar-

ro v. City of San Jose, CA Cal., 503 F.2d 1041 (1974).

The courts below did not deal with these serious con-

siderations that strike at the heart of the independence of

judges and their and their fellow citizens’ inalienable rights.

What occurred here does not lend to principled and fearless

decision-making but tends to the scandal and subversion

of justice.

22 Reasons for Granting the Writ

There is not one shred of evidence in this entire record

to show petitioner has been guilty of some violation of

law which, if legally proved, would justify her impeach-

ment or removal from office. And petitioner is entitled to

every presumption of innocence until and unless such a vio-

lation is charged and proved in a proceeding in which she,

like respondents and other judges and citizens, is accorded

the protection of the safeguards guaranteed by the require-

ments of equal and due process of law. The respect for a

rule of law administered through the equal and due process

of law is the hallmark of judges without which they can-

not keep faith with their profession. Taking away a wom-

an’s right to hold judicial office is imposing a penalty as

severe as a criminal sanction, perhaps more so. Those in

government who must carry the burden of guilt, should

carry the burden of proof.

The practices disclosed by this record are forbidden by

law. The exalted powers of government were used to

punish manufactured crime dictatorially because petitioner

pursued measures to preserve the impartiality and integrity

of the administration of justice under the Social Security

laws. MSPB and the courts below, bent on petitioner’s

defeat, employed distortions, misrepresentations and false-

hoods.

The specter of improper relationship between OHA,

CLS and MSPB hovers throughout this record. Trachten-

berg, through his subordinates, aided CLS attorney Bern-

stein in suppressing and abetting fraud and frustrating the

ends of justice in the Coleman case. Significantly, Bern-

stein openly brags she was recently appointed an ALJ be-

cause she helped Trachtenberg get rid of petitioner. Trach-

tenberg aided CLS attorney Stein, who was fired and con-

demned by Pearl Taylor in obstructing justice in the Taylor

case. The courts below ignored not only the actual facts of

oe

Reasons for Granting the Writ 23

record but the statutorily and constitutionally defined im-

munities protecting petitioner’s conduct. To protect the

wrongdoers, they fashioned judicial phrases, known as

common law absolute immunity, that do not appear any-

where in the Constitution because the framers of that docu-

ment designed it to protect the citizens against tyrants in

government and not vice versa.

To tolerate CLS counsel’s flouting the rulings of a

presiding tribunal, the judicial process would degenerate to

whatever might be the personal whims of counsel on a par-

ticular day. One might as well have counsel wear the robes,

ascend the bench and then make irrevocable rulings while

the trial judge patiently awaits the command of counsel.

The only parties to the Coleman and Taylor proceedings

were claimants and the public, both of whose interests pe-

titioner, acting in behalf of the Secretary, had a dual re-

sponsibility to safeguard. CLS, Trachtenberg as Chairman

of Appeals Council, and his subordinates were not parties

to those proceedings. None of them had legal authority to

do what they did.

It is common knowledge that public officials, counsel

and courts are bound by the law and must fastidiously ob-

serve limitations on their powers. They are required to

follow congressional mandates whether explicit or ascer-

tainable as inherent in underlying policy. This precludes

them from giving effect to their own notions as to what is

wise, just or politic with respect to proceedings within the

jurisdiction of an ALJ. The present record reflects a per-

vasive pattern of evasions and violations of the law. It is

unreasonable to assume respondents merely mistakenly

conclded that the circumstances as conceived by them

warranted the particular actions taken by them. On the

contrary, they deliberately failed to observe the obvious

24 Reasons for Granting the Writ

statutory limitations imposed upon their power and au-

thority.

The obligation of a judge to safeguard public and

private rights with equal protection under the law does not

permit a timorous reluctance to take whatever action is

warranted by the circumstances of a case even when such

action must be directed towards high ranking officials

within the same or coordinate branches of federal govern-

ment. Judges must not be obsequious toadies in their at-

titudes toward recreant high ranking officials. Servile

judges contaminate impartiality and weak characters ought

not to be judges. The people depend upon courageous and

independent judges for decisions and judicial conduct that

will insure society as a whole and its individuals against

those who would undermine and destroy the orderly and

impartial course of justice. The administration of justice

ought not to be made unduly difficult by irresponsible acts

of public officials, lawyers and courts. To allow what oc-

curred here to go unnoticed and uncensored would encour-

age and perpetuate unlimited harassment and intimidation

of the most conscientious judge. It seriously disrupts, hin-

ders and obstructs the orderly, untrammeled and impartial

administration of justice and abrogates the rights and dig-

nity of the trial judge, which must be as scrupulously

guarded and maintained by the judiciary as the rights and

independence of litigants and lawyers. Ex parte Secombe,

60 US. 9.

To reiterate, there is ample precedent for effective

action by a judge to protect his or her independence. Chief

Justice Burger’s Committee on the Judicial Branch must

not represent mere lip service and aggrandizement of pow-

er. In an interview by U. S. News World Report, Inc. on

December 19, 1977, Chief Justice Burger pertinently com-

mented with respect to a bill proposed by Senator Sam

Reasons for Granting the Writ 25

Nunn fer a commission to review charges of misbehavior

by a judge that “it must be used with great caution and

alertness never to impinge on the decisional independence

of federal judges.” He said to subject federal judges to a

suggested reconfirmation proceedings at certain intervals

“would strike at the very heart of the independence of fed-

eral judges.”” Federal Judge Irving F. Kaufman aptly stated

in Maintaining Judicial Independence: A Mandate to

Judges, 66 ABA] 470 (1980) “while the preservation of

independence is a clear mandate to every judge’,

it “can no longer be entrusted to the ad hoc initiatives of

individual judges, lawyers or scholars.”

Like Lech Walesa, whose Polish heritage petitioner

shares, her commitment to freedom and opposition to

tyranny has never been stronger. To a Pole, wherever born,

the Polish sense of freedom, honor and humor cannot be

i

which does not plumb its practices with that gravitational

line must perish.

The goal of our legal system is that each party shall

26 Reasons for Granting the Writ

dents and the courts below just do not measure up to what

every citizen has the right to expect from those given the

special privilege of administering justice. Their interest in

impartiality is pure sophistry. It is only fair that the moral

in one of Aesop’s famous fables, which were used for poli-

tical purposes when the reign of tyrants in Greece made

unveiled speech dangerous, be invoke? here; viz., “The

Two Crabs”, which teaches: “Example is the best precept.”

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the petitions for certio-

rari and for certiorari before judgment should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

WANDA P. CHOCALLO

Pro Se