Appendix — Connecticut v. Ostroski

Supreme Court brief1982

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In The

Supreme Court Of The United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1981

STATE OF CONNECTICUT

Petitioner

RICHARD OSTROSKI

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APPENDIX A

FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT REGARDING

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INQUIRY

JUDGE DALY: Do you want him to sit on the

stand up here and you can pose those?

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MR. OSTROSKI: Yes, sir.

MR. CONNOR: You do not have to testify unless

you wish to.

MR. OSTROSKI: Correct.

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MR. CONNOR: And that you would be treated like

any other witness who has testified.

MR. OSTROSKI: Yes, sir.

MR. CONNOR: Now, what is your wish, do you

wish to testify or remain silent?

MR. OSTROSKI: I wish to testify.

MR. CONNOR: Do Your Honors have any questions

to ask him at this time?

JUDGE DALY: You have thought this over, Mr.

Ostroski, very thoroughly, have you?

MR. OSTROSKI: Yes, I have, sir.

JUDGE DALY: All right. And having thought it

over and discussed the matter thoroughly with Mr.

Connor, you have reached a decision that you have just

enunciated, that you will testify in the case?

MR. OSTROSKI: Yes.

JUDGE DALY: You may call your first witness,

Mr. Connor.

MR. CONNOR: I would call Mr. Richard Ostroski.

Transcript at 830-31.

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APPENDIX C

OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

(as reported in 42 Connecticut Law

Journal, No. 51, pp. 13-16 (1981

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. RICHARD OSTROSKI

BOGDANSKI, C. J., SPEZIALE, PETERS, HEALEY and

ARMENTANO, JS.

Argued April 8 — decision released June 16, 1981

Indictment charging the defendant with the

A MA N

the judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at

Hartford and tried to a three judge court, Parskey,

Daly and Foti, Js.; judgment of guilty and appeal

by the defendant. Remanded with direction.

Joette Katz, assistant public defender, with

whom, on the brief, were Jerrold H. Barnett, public

defender, and Michael Connor, Jr., assistant public

defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Ernest J. Diette, Jr., assistant state’s attorney,

with whom, on the brief, were John M. Bailey,

state’s attorney, and Richard Maloney, assistant

state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).

Per Cuntmm. The defendant was indicted for

the murder of a young woman in her Canton apart-

this court can properly review the admissibility of

the defendant’s incriminating statements and vari-

ous items of physical evidence.

During the night of April 11-12, 1977, a nineteen-

police barracks at Litchfield from a telephone booth

in New Milford. Because the defendant was

unfamiliar with the area, a New Milford police

officer was sent to the defendant’s location. In his

own car the defendant followed the officer to the

New Milford police station. From there the defend-

ant together with his wife and child rode in a state

police car to the Litchfield barracks with a state

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The defense counsel at trial objected to the admis-

sion of the defendant’s statements on fifth amend-

In ruling that the defendant’s Miranda rights

were not violated, the trial court orally stated that

the defendant was under “apparent custodial inter-

rogation.“

When asked- by defense counsel to

* The trial court stated: “On April 16, 1978, [sic] the Defendant

voluntarily came to the Litchfield Barracks with his wife and child,

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apparent custodial interrogation at

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elaborate, the trial court described its finding of

custody in these words: “[I]t is apparent custodial

interrogation, he was given his rights, we focused

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that is what we came down to,

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that the Defendant raised, so we didn't go into

superfluous matters that didn’t seem to bear on this

particular issue.”

The ambiguity of the word “apparent” in the

phrase “apparent custodial interrogation” and the

trial court’s own explanation of its thought pro-

cesses indicate that the “finding” that the defend-

ant was in custody at the time of his April 16, 1977

interview with the state police was merely an hypo-

thesis which the trial court assumed in order to

reach the fifth amendment issue of the protection

of the defendant’s right to remain silent. Whether

and when a person is taken into custody is a ques-

tion of fact. State v. Derrico, Conn. (41 Conn.

L.J., No. 50, pp. 7, 10), cert. denied, 1

101 S. Ct. 789, 66 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1980). It is the

function of the trial court, not this court, to find

facts. Whether or not the defendant was in eustody

is a critical threshold question which must be deter-

mined before we can properly review the claims

made in this appeal. It is, therefore, necessary to

remand this case for a further articulation of the

trial court’s decision on the custody issue.

On appeal the defendant renews his fifth amend-

ment claims and for the first time also claims fourth

amendment violations. He then urges suppression

of his incriminating statements and certain phys-

ical evidence obtained after those violations. The

defendant insists that he was unreasonably seized

without probable cause at the time he left his own

car at New Milford and entered the state police car

for the ride to Litchfield, or at least at the time he

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constitutional right” branch of the exceptional cir-

cumstances doctrine of State v. Evans, 165 Conn.

61, 70, 327 A2d 576 (1973). See Practice Book

out probable cause, a police cruiser was sent to find

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consideration of the fourth amendment right to be

“secure in weir persons . . against unreasonable

searches ar -izures.” U.S. Const., amend. IV.

See United » utes v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554,

100 S. Ct. 1870, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497 (1980); Oregon v.

Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S. Ct. 711, 50 L. Ed.

2d 714 (1977).

The supervision of a case on appeal is in the

Supreme Court. Practice Book § 3096; State v.

McCarthy, 167 Conn. 472, 477, 356 A.2d 165 (1975).

Where “necessary to the proper disposition of the

cause,” this court may “remand the case for a

further articulation of the basis of the trial court’s

decision.” Practice Book §3060D; Powers v.

Powers, Conn. (42 Conn. L.J., No. 33, pp. 12,

13) (1981); Robertson v. Apuzzo, 168 Conn. 671,

337 A.2d 544 (1975), on full hearing, 170 Conn. 367,

370, 365 A.2d 824, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 852, 97

S. Ct. 142, 50 L. Ed. 2d 126 (1976) ; Davis v. P. Gam-

bardella d Son Cheese Corporation, 147 Conn. 365,

367n, 161 A.2d 583 (1960). For the reasons set forth

above, sua sponte we remand this case for further

articulation.

With particular reference to the issue of custody

as it affects the defendant’s fourth and fifth amend-

ment rights, it is ordered that the trial court file a

memorandum of decision articulating the basis for

its ruling which permitted the admission of evi-

dence of the defendant’s inculpatory statements and

also permitted the admission of testimony and phys-

ical evidence resulting from the defendant’s oral

and written consent.

9A

APPENDIX D

OPINION OF TRIAL COURT AFTER REMAND

FOR FURTHER ARTICULATION

(unpublished)

ARTICULATED MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

The Supreme Court Opinion dated June 16, 1981,

has set forth the preliminary details prior to de

fendant’s arrival at the Litchfield barracks.

Defendant had contacted Captain McDonnell

pursuant to a telephone conversation with his mother.

Defendant went upstairs to a room on the second

floor of the barracks along with Captain Thomas

McDonnell of the State Police and Sgt. Stephen

Cudworth of the Canton Police Department. The

interview commenced about 8:15 P.M. on April 16, 1977.

The defendant was advised of his Miranda rights by

Captain McDonnell. Defendant was advised at least

twice that he was not under arrest. Defendant indicated

that he was fully aware of his rights. He had had prior

experience with the police.

Defendant was not handcuffed.

Defendant’s wife, Beverly, and their child were

elsewhere in the barracks.

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Defendant confessed in his wife's presence.

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497, 509 (1980).

None of the aforesaid examples are applicable to our

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OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

(as reported at 186 Conn. 287 (1982))

186 Conn 287 FEBRUARY, 1982 287

Btate v. Ostroski

Srate or Connecticut v. Ricnarp OsTrosxi

Brust, C. J., Perexs, Hav, Akmentawo and Bie.ucn, Js.

The test of whether one is “seized” or taken into custody within the

meaning of the fourth amendment to the United States con-

without probable cause is unreasonable and thus violative of the

fourth amendment.

This court, following the defendant's appeal to it from his conviction

15A

Indictment charging the defendant with the crime

of murder, brought to the Superior Court in the

judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hart-

ford and tried to a three-judge court, Parskey,

Daly and Foti, Js.; judgment of guilty, from which

Joette Katz, assistant public defender, with

whom, on the brief, was Jerrold H. Barnett, public

defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Ernest J. Diette, Jr., assistant state’s attorney,

with whom, on the brief, were John M. Bailey,

state’s attorney, and Richard E. Maloney, assistant

state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).

Sreziare, C. J. During the night of April 11-12,

1977, a nineteen-year-old woman was brutally

stabbed to death. The defendant was indicted for her

murder and after a trial before the court, consisting

of a panel of three judges of the Superior Court, he

was found guilty and sentenced to a prison term of

16A

186 Conn 287 FEBRUARY, 1982 289

State v. Ostroski

not less than twenty-five years nor more than life.

During the trial the court heard evidence and argu-

ment on the defendant's motion to suppress poten-

tial testimony or other evidence that was obtained

in violation of the constitution or laws of the United

States or the State of Connecticut.” The trial court

denied the motion and orally stated that the defend-

ant was under “apparent custodial interrogation.”

We remanded the case for further articulation of

the threshold issue of custody, so that we could

properly review the admissibility of the defendant's

incriminating statements and various items of

physical evidence. State v. Ostroski, Conn. (42

Conn. L. J., No. 51, p. 13) (1981). On remand the

trial court found that the defendant was not in

custody until his formal arrest following his con-

fession. We disagree.

After the murder the defendant was identified by

photograph as one who had been seen in the apart-

ment house of the victim a few days before the

killing. The police left messages with his family

for him to call. On April 16, 1977, when he learned

that Captain McDonnell of the state police wanted

to talk with him, the defendant called the state

police barracks at Litchfield from a telephone

booth in New Milford. Because the defendant was

unfamiliar with the area, a New Milford police

officer was sent to the defendant's location. In his

own car the defendant followed the officer to the

New Milford police station. From there the defend-

ant together with his wife and child rode in a state

police car to the Litchfield barracks with a state

trooper.

Upon arrive] at the Litchfield barracks the defend-

ant was informed that he was not under arrest.

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290 FEBRUARY, 1982 186 Conn 287

State v. Ostroski

Captain McDonnell read aloud from a form listing

the Miranda rights and the defendant read aloud

the portion of the form indicating that he under-

stood those rights and chose not to exercise them.

See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602,

16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). In the course of the ques-

tioning the defendant appeared to discover, and

stated, that he had done the act in a drunken,

drugged state. He made incriminating statements

and authorized an examination of his person and his

property. The interrogation, which commenced at

8:15 p.m., was tape-recorded, and the transcription

of it is a part of the record in this case. As a result

of his confession the defendant was formally

arrested at 11:34 p.m.

On appeal the defendant claims error in the

admission of his confession and various items of

physical evidence.“ Whether the confession and

physical evidence are admissible turns on the

answers to two subsidiary questions: (1) whether

the defendant was “seized” within the meaning of

Derrico, 181 Conn. 151, 157-58, 434 Ad 356, cert.

8.

Ct. 2450, 61 L. Ed. 24 39 (1979), because the instruction on intent

FFF

I ought to say that ordinarily men are presumed to intend the results

which follow their acts.” This issue has been resolved adversely

to the defendant's claim by this court in State v. Stepney, 181 Conn.

268, 435 A.2d 701 (1980), and requires no further consideration.

18A

186 Conn 287 FEBRUARY, 1982 291

State v. Ostroski

S. Ct. 2248, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1979).* Because the

state has conceded that there was no probable cause

to seize the defendant at the time he was taken to the

Litchfield barracks, the only question for this court

is whether the defendant was seized at the time he

was taken there. We conclude that the defendant

was seized at the time he was taken to the Litchfield

barracks and that the trial court erred in admitting

the confession and physical evidence obtained as a

result of the interrogation at the Litchfield barracks

on the night in question, which interrogation vio-

lated the defendant’s fourth amendment protection

against unreasonable seizures.

The test of whether a person has been “seized”

so as to invoke the protection of the fourth amend-

ment has been set out by the Supreme Court of the

United States: “[A] person is ‘seized’ only when by

means of physical force or a show of authority, his

freedom of movement is restrained. . . . As long

as the person to whom questions are put remains

free to disregard the questions and walk away,

there has been no intrusion upon that person’s

liberty or privacy as would under the Constitution

require some particularized and objective justifica-

tion. . We conclude that a person has been ‘seized’

within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only

* It should be noted that it is also necessary that acquisition of

the evidence sought to be suppressed be causally related to the illegal

seizure. State v. Derrico, 181 Conn. 151, 157-58, 434 A.2d 356, cert.

denied, 449 U.S. 1064, 101 8. Ct. 780, 66 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1980). Put

another way, evidence obtained after an illegal arrest or seizure may

422 U.S. 590, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 45 L. Ed. 24 416 (1975); Wong Sun

83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 24 441 (1963).

The state has not argued that there was such an intervening act in

this case and nothing in the record before us suggests that there

was such an intervening act.

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292 FEBRUARY, 1982 186 Conn 287

State v. Ostroski

if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the

incident, a reasonable person would have believed

that he was not free to leave.” United States v.

Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54, 100 S. Ct. 1870,

64 L. Ed. 2d 497 (1980).

Whether there has been such a seizure in an

individual case is a question of fact. State v. Ostro-

ski, Conn. (42 Conn. L. J., No. 51, pp. 13, 14)

(1981). State v. Derrico, 181 Conn. 151, 158, 434

A.2d 356 (1980); State v. Love, 169 Conn. 596,

600, 363 A.2d 1035 (1975). Courts have found

seizure: wher; a defendant “was taken from a

neighbor’s home to a police car, transported to a

police station, and . . . would have been physically

restrained if he had refused to accompany the

officers”; Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212,

99 S. Ct. 2248, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1979); where a

defendant “was separated from his two companions

and placed in one of the police cruisers with a

uniformed officer”; United States v. Blum, 614 F. 2d

537, 540 (6th Cir. 1980); and where “two officers

informed [the defendant], following an hour’s

interrogation, that he was the last person with the

murder weapon before the victim’s death and that

they believed he knew more about the crime than he

had revealed.” State v. Menne, 380 So. 2d 14, 17

(La.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833, 101 S. Ct. 104, 66

L. Ed. 2d 39 (1980).

We conclude that when the facts of this case are

measured by the above standard they constitute a

seizure protected by the fourth amendment. The

evidence is that when t“ defendant called, he asked

to go in “tomorrow” but ne trooper said he “should

come in tonight.” The defendant was not informed

that he could leave at any time. He was told, “you

186 Conn 287 FEBRUARY, 1982 293

State v. Ostroski

realize your [sic] at the State Police. Barracks

okay, it’s not a hotel or anything like that.” On

arrival at the Litchfield barracks, the defendant was

separated from his wife and child. He had no car

in which to leave because his car had been left in

New Milford.

On several occasions the defendant asked to leave.

The defendant said to Captain McDonnell, I'd

really like to get going as soon as possible, I’m

beat.” The police responded not to his request to

leave, but to his reason for asking to leave: “Okay,

doing a lot of driving... 7“ and “Did you do all the

driving or did the wife do some?” The defendant

repeatedly pressed his request to leave. He inter-

rupted his account of his drinking on the day of the

murder with, “I’m not sure, see I’m pretty tired,

you think I can go, I, I, I’m really, I'd like to

terminate this thing cuz ahh any questions I answer,

I prob . . liable to, start fuckin everything up and

telling you I was doing one thing, when I was doing

another cuz I’m tired and I don’t fee! good.” The

police again were unresponsive, addressing only his

reason for asking to leave, that he might say some-

thing incriminating, and assuring him that what he

said was not incriminating: “[T]here’s no crime

against, va know, telling me you were drunk.” Next,

the defendant said, “Can I at least get on the road

pretty soon?”, indicating that he thought his previ-

ous requests to go had been rebuffed, that another

request to go would also be rebuffed, so he would

settle for at least going “pretty soon.” That request

too was deflected with a response that he didn’t need

to go for the reason that he would have to drive

because they would drive him. In response, the

defendant tried yet again: “I want to go back to

my car and then from there I’m gonna go, I'll go

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294 FEBRUARY, 1982 186 Conn 287

State v. Ostroski

home, III go home, crimidy sakes, cuz Im so

tired,” and asked for an answer, “So, what do you

think?” The police, again instead of answering his

question, answered a different question: “I think

you killed this girl Ricky.”

Of course, what counts is not what the defendant

believed, but what a reasonable person would have

believed in view of all the circumstances. It is plain

that a reasonable person would have believed that

he was not free to leave in view of these circum-

stances: where one is summoned now, and “tomor-

row” will not do; where one is separated from one’s

ear and taken in a police car to the police barracks;

where one is dependent on one’s interrogators for

the means to leave; where one’s interrogators refuse

to honor requests to leave; where one’s interro-

gators refuse to honor a request to stop question-

ing; where the response to a request to see one’s

spouse is delayed; where the interrogation lasts

more than three hours; where one’s interrogators

ask one’s consent to search one’s car to take various

physical evidence; where one’s interrogators say,

“T think you killed this girl.” We conclude that in

view of all the circumstances surrounding the inci-

dent, a reasonable person would have believed that

he was not free to leave. United States v. Menden-

hall, supra.

Accordingly, the determination of the trial court

that the defendant was not in custody is clearly

erroneous. See Pandolphe’s Auto Parts, Inc. v. Man-

chester, 181 Conn. 217, 221-22, 435 A.2d 24 (1980);

Stelco Industries, Inc.v.Cohen, Conn. (42 Conn.

L. J., No. 26, pp. 4, 5) (1980); Practice Book § 3060D.

It was error for the court to admit the incriminating

186 Conn 295 FEBRUARY, 1982 295

statements and the physical evidence because they

were the result of an illegal detention, the interroga-

tion at the Litchfield barracks.

There is error, the judgment is set aside and a

new trial is ordered.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

IX F

EXCERPT FROM THE PETITIONER'S BRIEF

BEFORE THE CONNECTICUT SUPREME COURT

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