Joint Appendix — Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB
Supreme Court brief1983
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BILL JOHNSON’S RESTAURANTS, INC.,
Petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
Respondent.
=—
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOINT APPENDIX
LAWRENCE ALLEN KATZ REX E. LEE
Streich, Lang, Weeks & Cardon Solicitor General
A Professional Association Department of Justice
2100 First Interstate Bank Plaza Washington, D.C. 20503
100 West Washington (202) 633-2217
Phoenix, Arizona 85003
(602) 257 Counsel for Respondent
Counsel for Ftitioner
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED MAY 28, 1982
CERTIORARI GRANTED OCTOBER 18, 1982
MINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE. .........0.000ccececveseeseeseees
Depositions Upon Oral Examination and Order .......
State Court’s Temporary Restraining Order ..............
Motion for Protective Order] ................ccccceeeeees
FED. GR, FRCS cocccccccccccccecessscscscsocsnsccosouseseoces
10
19
eB
BE 8
52
Page
PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING BEFORE NLRB
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ............0000000000000000 53
ADDITIONAL DECISIONS AND ORDERS BELOW
The following items were reproduced pursuant to Rule 33.1
at the designated pages of the Petition for Certiorari:
Decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ......... A-3
Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
BBD cecocecocecccccccccncccececenscsocosocenococesescooooooes A-14
Decision of the Administrative Law Judge ............... A-19
DOCKET ENTRY IN THE COURT BELOW
NINTH CIRCUIT’S ORDER [of March 2, 1982, Amending Opinion
and Denying Rehearing]
[Caption deleted]
BEFORE: GOODWIN and CANBY, Circuit Judges and
BYRNE, District Judge*
The opision of this court in Bill Johnson's Restaurants v.
NLRB, 660 F.2d 1335 (9th Cir. 1981) (advance sheets), is modified
as follows:
The full court has been advised of the proposal to amend the
opinion, and of the suggestion for en banc rehearing, and no judge
has objected to the amendment or requested a vote on the suggestion
for rehearing en banc. Fed. R. App. 35(b).
The petition for rehearing is denied, and the suggestion for a
rehearing en banc is rejected.
*The Honorable William M. Byme, United States District Judge for the
Central District of California, sitting by designation.
2
PORTIONS OF THE RECORD BEFORE THE NLRB ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW JUDGE
HANDBILL DISTRIBUTED BY DEMONSTRATORS, SEPT. 22,
1978
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD HAS ISSUED
A COMPLAINT AGAINST THE BIG APPLE RESTAURANT,
3757 E. VAN BUREN STREET, FOR UNFAIR LABOR
PRACTICES.
The complaint was issued as a result of charges filed by Myrland
Helton, a former employee who was fired August 8 after suggesting
to other waitresses they should organize a union. Mrs. Helton had
been an employee of the Big Apple seven and one half years.
Several other waitresses have quit their jobs to join Mrs. Helton in
picketing the restaurant to inform the public of the dispute between
the employees and the restaurant's management. Among the wait-
resses’ complaints are the following:
* Eight hour shifts with no specified breaks.
* No pay for overtime when waitresses were required to remain at
their posts until their last customer’s check had been paid.
* Waitresses threatened with dismissal if they lost any time due to
* Inconsistent management practices.
* Unwarranted sexual advances.
* A filthy restroom for women employees, with no soap, paper
towels or toilet tissue provided.
EMPLOYEES OF BILL JOHNSON’S BIG APPLE FOR JUSTICE
ON THE JOB.
3
COMPLAINT IN BILL JOHNSON’S RESTAURANTS, INC., ET
AL. v. HELTON, ET AL., Maricopa County Superior Court Cause
No. C375470
[Caption deleted]
Plaintiffs, by their attorneys, Streich, Lang, Weeks & Cardon,
P.A., allege for their Complaint:
I. COUNT ONE: WRONGFUL INTERFERENCE WITH
BUSINESS
A. The Parties
1. Corporate Plaintiff. Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc., an
Arizona corporation (hereinafter referred to as ‘‘the Restaurant’’),
is, and at all times relevant herein has been, a corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of the State of Arizona, having
places of business in Phoenix and Mesa, Arizona, including one at
3757 East Van Buren Street, Phoenix, Arizona.
2. Corporate Plaintiff's Business. The corporate plaintiff
herein has been engaged in the business of owning and operating
family restaurants in Arizona for over 20 years. Gross sales in 1977
exceeded four million dollars, and current assets exceed two million
dollars. Approximately 100 persons are employed at the Restaurant’s
Van Buren Street facilities, including about 40 waitresses.
3. Individual Plaintiffs. Johnny Johnson and Rudy Johnson
are members of the family which founded and operates the Restau-
rant, and they are Vice-Presidents of the corporate plaintiff. Don
Kalfas is a shareholder and the General Manager of the corporate
plaintiff. Each of the named plaintiffs is employed by the corporate
plaintiff for the purpose of managing and operating the Restaurant,
and each fulfills those responsibilities on a full-time basis.
4. Named Defendants. The named individual defendants are,
on information and belief, all residents of Arizona. None of the
named defendants is an employee of the Restaurant.
5. Unknown Defendants. John Does I-X and Jane Does I-X
are individuals whose true names and identities are unknown to
B. Mass Picketing and Harrassment
6. Picketing Begins. On Wednesday, September 20, 1978,
from approximately 9:30 A.M. to 2:00 P.M., defendants Myriand
Helton, Cheryl Nichols, Carl Nichols, Carla Marie Scott, Dale
taurant, although no such boycott or strike was in progress.
7. Picketing Continues. On Thursday, September 21, 1978,
from approximately 5:30 P.M. to 8:00 P.M., defendants Myriand
Helton, John Helton, Chery! Nichols, Carl Nichols, and Carla Marie
Scott, together with the Helton’s son and another unidentified child,
engaged in the acts described in paragraph ‘*6"" above
8. Defendants Publish Defamatory Leaflets and Statements.
On Friday, September 22, 1978, from approximately 11:00 P.M.
to 12:30 A.M., defendants Myriand Helton, John Helton, Cheryl
Nichols, Barbara Orr, Lawrence Orr, and Carla Marie Scott, together
with the Heltons’ son and an unidentified man, appeared at the
plaintiffs’ Van Buren Street Restaurant and passed out leaflets to
* employees and customers. One of these leaflets is attached
to the Affidavit of Rudy Johnson, sworn to on September 25, 1978.
The leaflets contained false and outrageous statements, including
misrepresentations of proceedings pending before the National La-
bor Relations Board and accusations that the Restaurant's waitresses
had complained about ‘‘unwarranted sexual advances’’ and about
**a filthy restroom for women employees, with no soap, paper towels
or toilet tissue provided.’’ Additional outrageous and false state-
ments maligning plaintiffs and their business were made orally by
defendants to plaintiffs’ employees and customers and to passersby
and other persons.
9. Interference with Plaintiffs’ Operations. During the pick-
5
clogged the sidewalk in front of the Restaurant, making it incon-
venient or difficult for other persons to pass, have shouted at and
harrassed plaintiffs’ customers, and have blocked ingress to and
egress from the Restaurant. Some of the defendants have also har-
rassed plaintiffs’ employees, in person and by telephone and have,
on at least one occasion, coerced a job applicant into failing to
appear for a scheduled interview at the Restaurant.
10. Restaurant Continues to Operate. Despite the defendants’
activities described above, the plaintiffs have attempted to continue
normal business operations.
11. Potential for Violence. The defendants’ activities de-
plaintiffs’ employees and customers, and the defendants have in-
tomers are concerned about their personal safety. On at least one
occasion, plaintiffs felt it necessary to request assistance from the
Phoenix Police Department and an officer was provided.
C. Damage to Restaurant
12. Plainsiffs Have Suffered Loss of Business. During and as
a result of the defendants’ activities described above, a substantial
number of customers have, after entering the Restaurant parking lot
or premises, departed without dining at the Restaurant. The exact
number of such lost customers is difficult to ascertain, but plaintiffs
believe the number to be in excess of 100.
13. Damage to Reputation. As a result of the defendants’
activities described above, plaintiffs have suffered substantial and
irreparable damage to their reputations and to the goodwill of their
business. Such damage is not readily calculable in money terms.
D. Defendants’ Liability for Unlawful Acts
14. Unlawfulness of Acts. The acts of the defendants, as de-
scribed above, are tortious and unlawful and may be enjoined by
this Court.
15. Defendants’ Participation in the Unlawfui Acts. Unon in-
formation and belief, each of the named individual deteadants has
directed, authorized, encouraged, incited and participated in the
unlawful acts described above.
16. Irreparable Injury. As a result of the unlawful acts of
defendants described above, there is a continuous threat of serious
violence, personal injury and property damage on or near plaintiffs’
premises. Unless restrained, the defendants’ acts create significant
risks of injury to plaintiffs’ employees, to plaintiffs’ business, to
plaintiffs’ property, and to members of the general public. Said
injuries would be substantial and irreparable.
17. Greater Injury to Plaintiffs. As to each and every item
of relief sought herein, far greater injury will be inflicted upon
plaintiffs and upon the public by the refusal to grant the relief sought
than can conceivably be inflicted upon the defendants by the granting
of such relief.
18. No Adequate Remedy at Law. Plaintiffs have no adequate
remedy at law for the injuries inflicted and threatened by the activ-
ities herein complained of.
19. Necessity for Restraint. Upon information and belief, the
unlawful acts complained of herein will continue to be committed
unless restrained.
20. No Prior Application. No prior application for the relief
sought herein or for similar relief has been made to this or any other
court or judge.
Il. COUNT TWO: LIBEL, BUSINESS DISPARAGEMENT
21. Each and every allegation contained in paragraphs **1"’
to ‘*20"" above is realleged and incorporated herein as if fully set
forth.
22. Injury to Business. The leaflets, statements and other de-
rogatory accusations made by defendants as described more fully
above, tend to cause and have caused injury to the plaintiffs’
business.
23. Injury to Individual Plaintiffs. The leaflets, statements and
other derogatory accusations made by defendants, as described more
fully above, have impeached the honesty, integrity and reputation
of the individual plaintiffs.
7
24. Publication by Defendants. The defendants have pub-
lished the aforesaid libelous statements by distributing documents
containing the statements and by repeating the statements orally to
plaintiffs’ employees and customers and to other persons.
25. Falsity of Defendants’ Statements; Defendants’ Malice.
The statements published by the defendants are false and misleading.
Defendants published these statements knowing them to be false or
in reckless disregard of whether they were false. Defendants knew
the statements would injure plaintiffs, and defendants had a mali-
cious intention to cause such injury.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray that this Court:
1. Issue a temporary restraining order and preliminary in-
junction, the same to be made permanent on final judgment:
A.. Restraining and enjoining the defendants and each of
them, their officers, agents and employees, and all persons acting
in concert or participation with them, from, in any manner or by
any means,
(1) Entering upon plaintiffs’ premises, or any por-
tion thereof, for any reason without the express permis-
sion of the officer of plaintiff Restaurant in ~arge of
such premises at the time, and refusing to va: ue plain-
tiffs’ premises when requested to do so by plaintiffs or
their proper agents.
(2) Mass picketing, parading or demonstrating in
proximity to plaintiffs’ premises, provided that defen-
dants shall be allowed, and shall be limited to, a total of
four (4) individuals picketing, parading or demonstrating
in a peaceful manner in proximity to plaintiffs’ premises,
and provided further that any such picketing, parading
or demonstrating shall be conducted exclusively upon
public property and not upon any property whatsoever
owned by plaintiffs.
(3) Interfering in any way with the conduct of plain-
out limitation interfering in any way with the ingress and
egress from plaintiffs’ premises of plaintiffs’ officers
agents, employees, suppliers, customers, business con-
tacts and deliverers of goods.
(4) Engaging in violence, threats of violence, har-
rassment or intimidation of any kind against plaintiffs’
officers, agents, employees, suppliers, customers, busi-
ness contacts or deliverers of goods, whether upon plain-
tiffs’ premises or elsewhere.
(5) Publishing false and misleading statements con-
cerning plaintiffs’ business, officers, agents, employees,
facilities or practices, .acluding but not limited to alle-
gations misrepresenting the nature or substance of the
matter now pending before the National Labor Relations
Board as Case No. 28-CA-4970.
B. Further ordering that defendants named herein, and each
of them, shall forthwith issue proper notice to all others acting in
directions, requests or suggestions to do any of the acts restrained
dants, and each of them, shall be responsible for supervising the
orderly and lawful conduct of any and all persons participating in
any picketing, parading or other demonstrations established or spon-
sored by said defendants in proximity to plaintiffs’ premises, so as
to insure compliance with the order of the Court;
C. Granting such other, further or different relief to which
the plaintiffs may be entitled in the premises.
2. Grant final judgment against defendants and each of them
for compensatory damages in such amount as the Court shall de-
plained of to the date of final hearing.
3. Grant final judgment against defendants, and each of them,
for punitive damages in the amount of $500,000.
4. Grant final judgment against defendants and each of them,
as prayed for herein, with the costs and disbursements of this action,
and provide such other and further relief in law and equity as may
be appropriate in the premises.
DATED this 25th day of September, 1978.
VERIFICATION
STATE OF ARIZONA )
) ss.
County of Maricopa )
RUDY JOHNSON, being duly sworn, deposes and says:
1. I am Vice President of Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc.,
a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of
Arizona, and I am one of the plaintiffs herein.
2. I have read the foregoing Complaint, and the allegations
therein contained are true to my own knowledge except as to those
tions I believe to be true.
Rudy Johnson
RUDY JOHNSON
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 25th day of
September, 1978.
Sharon Lauzier
Notary Public
10
STATE COURT PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME
FOR TAKING DEPOSITIONS UPON ORAL EXAMINATION
AND ORDER
[Caption deleted]
Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys, Streich, Lang,
Weeks & Cardon, P.A., pursuant to the provisions of Rule 30,
Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby respectfully request this
Court’s order shortening the time for the taking of depositions upon
oral examination.
Attached hereto and by this reference incorporated herein is
a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of plaintiffs’
Motion.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 25th day of September,
1978.
STREICH, LANG, WEEKS & CARDON
A Professional Association
2100 First National Bank Plaza
Post Office Box 471
Phoenix, Arizona 85001
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
By Lawrence Allen Katz
Lawrence Allen Katz
Nancy K. Splain
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
with the filing of the instant action, plaintiffs
filed their application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Order
to Show Cause, with affidavits in support thereof, requesting the
Court to issue a Temporary Restraining Order restraining the de-
fendants, and each of them, from trespassing upon plaintiffs’ prem-
ises, mass picketing, interfering with the conduct of plaintiffs’ busi-
ness operations, engaging in violence or harrassment against
plaintiffs, their officers, agents, employees, suppliers, or customers,
and from publishing false and misleading statements concerning
plaintiffs or their business. Plaintiffs have also brought an Order to
Show Cause seeking equivalent relief in the form of a preliminary
injunction. In order to be fully prepared for the Order to Show
Cause, plaintiffs herein respectfully request this Court's order short-
ening time for the taking of depositions.
As the pleadings on file with the Court indicate, none of the
plaintiffs had any prior knowledge of the allegations and complaints
that have been made by the defendants and which resulted in the
actions plaintiffs seek to enjoin. Indeed, plaintiffs first learned of
the complaints upon reading the handbills distributed by the defen-
dants to plaintiffs’ customers and employees. Plaintiffs have en-
deavored prior to the filing of their Complaint to determine as many
facts as possible in order to consider the necessity and propriety of
bringing this action. Nevertheless, because of the serious threat to
the plaintiffs’ business and reputation in the community posed by
the defendants, plaintiffs were forced to act expeditiously and have
been unable to obtain information which is in the possession of the
defendants herein.
Rule 30(6)(3), Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that
the Court may order that depositions be taken within a shorter period
of time than stated in the Rule. In order that plaintiffs be fully
apprised of the conditions and circumstances which resulted in the
actions taken by ail of the defendants and perhaps others, plaintiffs
respectfully request this Court’s order shortening time for the taking
of depositions of those individuals named in notices attached hereto
collectively as Exhibit *‘A,’’ with the understanding that the de-
positions noticed for September 27 and 29, 1978, may be resched-
uled for October 2 and 3, 1978, if those dates are more convenient
to the witnesses that the dates reflected in the attached notices.
DATED this 25th day of September, 1978.
STREICH, LANG, WEEKS & CARDON
A Professional Association
2100 First National Bank Plaza
Post Office Box 471
Phoenix, Arizona 85001
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
On Motion of the plaintiffs,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the time for the taking of
depositions of those individuals named in notices attached hereto
collectively as Exhibit ‘“‘A’’ shall be shortened, and that the de-
positions may be noticed for September 27 and 29, 1978, with the
that the depositions may be rescheduled on October
2 and 3, 1978, if those dates are more convenient to the witnesses
than the dates reflected in the attached notices.
DONE IN OPEN COURT this 25th day of September, 1978.
Marilyn A. Riddel
JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION
[Caption deleted]
TO: MYRLAND R. HELTON; JOHN HELTON; BARBARA
ORR; LAWRENCE ORR; CHERYL NICHOLS; CARL NI-
CHOLS; CARLA MARIE SCOTT; DEBRA MACKIE; DALE
MICHAUD; and JANE DOES I thru X; and JOHN DOES I
thru X.
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the deposition of
MYRLAND HELTON
will be taken upon oral examination pursuant to the Arizona Rules
of Civil Procedure on Wednesday, the 27th dav of September, 1978,
at 1:00 o'clock P.M., at the law offices of STREICH, LANG,
WEEKS & CARDON, P.A., 2100 First National Bank Plaza, 100
West Washington Street, Phoenix, Arizona 85003.
DATED this 25th day of September, 1978.
13
STREICH, LANG, WEEKS & CARDON
A Professional Association
2100 First National Bank Plaza
Post Office Box 471
Phoenix, Arizona 85001
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
By Lawrence Allen Katz
Lawrence Allen Katz
Nancy K. Splain
NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION
[Caption deleted]
TO: MYRLAND R. HELTON; JOHN HELTON; BARBARA
ORR; LAWRENCE ORR; CHERYL NICHOLS; CARL NI-
CHOLS; CARLA MARIE SCOTT; DEBRA MACKIE; DALE
MICHAUD; and JANE DOES I thru X; and JOHN DOES I
thru X.
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the deposition of
JOHN HELTON
will be taken upon oral examination pursuant to the Arizona Rules
of Civil Procedure on Wednesday, the 27th day of September, 1978,
at 3:00 o’clock P.M., at the law offices of STREICH, LANG,
WEEKS & CARDON, P.A., 2100 First National Bank Plaza, 100
14
By Lawrence Allen Katz
Lawrence Allen Katz
Nancy K. Splain
NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION
[Caption deleted]
TO: MYRLAND R. HELTON; JOHN HELTON; BARBARA
ORR; LAWRENCE ORR; CHERYL NICHOLS; CARL NI-
CHOLS; CARLA MARIE SCOTT; DEBRA MACKIE; DALE
MICHAUD; and JANE DOES I thru X; and JOHN DOES I
thru X.
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the deposition of
BARBARA ORR
will be taken upon oral examination pursuant to the Arizona Rules
of C:vil Procedure on Friday, the 29th day of September, 1978, at
9:00 o'clock A.M.., at the law offices of STREICH, LANG, WEEKS
& CARDON, P.A., 2100 First National Bank Plaza, 100 West
Washington Street, Phoenix, Arizona 85003.
DATED this 25th day of September, 1978.
STREICH, LANG, WEEKS & CARDON
A Professional Association
2100 First National Bank Plaza
Post Office Box 471
Phoenix, Arizona 85001
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
By Lawrence Allen Katz
Lawrence Allen Katz
Nancy K. Spiain
15
NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION
[Caption deleted]
TO: MYRLAND R. HELTON; JOHN HELTON; BARBARA
ORR; LAWRENCE ORR; CHERYL NICHOLS; CARL NI-
CHOLS; CARLA MARIE SCOTT; DEBRA MACKIE; DALE
MICHAUD; and JANE DOES I thru X; and JOHN DOES I
thru X.
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the deposition of
LAWRENCE ORR
will be taken upon oral examination pursuant to the Arizona Rules
of Civil Procedure on Friday, the 29th day of September, 1978, at
10:00 o’clock A.M., at the law offices of STREICH, LANG,
WEEKS & CARDON, P.A., 2100 First National Bank Plaza, 100
West Washington Street, Phoenix, Arizona 85003.
DATED this 25th day of September, 1978.
STREICH, LANG, WEEKS & CARDON
A Professional Association
2100 First National Bank Plaza
Post (Office Box 471
Phoenix, Arizona 85001
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
By Lawrence Allen Kutz
Lawrence Allen Katz
Nancy K. Spiain
NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION
[Caption deleted)
TO: MYRLAND R. HELTON; JOHN HELTON; BARBARA
ORR; LAWRENCE ORR; CHERYL NICHOLS; CARL NI-
CHOLS; CARLA MARIE SCOTT; DEBRA MACKIE; DALE
MICHAUD; and JANE DOES | thru X; and JOHN DOES I
thru X.
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the deposition of
DEBRA MACKIE
will be taken upon oral examination pursuant to the Arizona Rules
of Civil Procedure on Friday, the 29th day of September, 1978, at
11:00 o’clock A.M., at the law offices of STREICH, LANG,
WEEKS & CARDON, P.A., 2100 First National Bank Plaza, 100
West Washington Street, Phoenix, Arizona 85003.
DATED this 25th day of September, 1978.
STREICH, LANG, WEEKS & CARDON
A Professional Association
2100 First National Bank Plaza
Post Office Box 471
Phoenix, Arizona 85001
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
By Lawrence Allen Katz
Lawrence Allen Katz
Nancy K. Splain
NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION
(Caption deleted)
TO: MYRLAND R. HELTON; JOHN HELTON; BARBARA
ORR; LAWRENCE ORR; CHERYL NICHOLS; CARL NI-
CHOLS; CARLA MARIE SCOTT; DEBRA MACKIE; DALE
MICHAUD; and JANE DOES I thru X; and JOHN DOES |
thru X.
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the deposition of
CARL NICHOLS
will be taken upon oral examination pursuant to the Arizona Rules
of Civil Procedure on Friday, the 29th day of September, 1978, at
1:00 o’clock P.M.., at the law offices of STREICH, LANG, WEEKS
17
& CARDON, P.A., 2100 First National Bank Plaza, 100 West
Washington Street, Phoenix, Arizona 85003.
DATED this 25th day of September, 1978.
STREICH, LANG, WEEKS & CARDON
A Professional Association
2100 First National Bank Plaza
Post Office Box 471
Phoenix, Arizona $5001
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
By Lawrence Allen Katz
Lawrence Allen Katz
Nancy K. Splain
NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION
[Caption deleted)
TO: MYRLAND R. HELTON; JOHN HELTON; BARBARA
ORR; LAWRENCE ORR; CHERYL NICHOLS; CARL NI-
CHOLS; CARLA MARIE SCOTT; DEBRA MACKIE; DALE
MICHAUD; and JANE DOES I thru X; and JOHN DOES I
thru X.
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the deposition of
CARLA MARIE SCOTT
will be taken upon oral examination pursuant to the Arizona Rules
of Civil Procedure on Friday, the 29th day of September, 1978, at
2:00 o'clock P.M.., at the law offices of STREICH, LANG, WEEKS
& CARDON, P.A., 2100 First National Bank Plaza, 100 West
Washington Street, Phoenix, Arizona 85003.
DATED this 25th day of September, 1978.
STREICH, LANG, WEEKS & CARDON
A Professional Association
2100 First National Bank Plaza
18
Post Office Box 471
Phoenix, Arizona 85001
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
By Lawrence Allen Katz
Lawrence Allen Katz
Nancy K. Splain
NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION
[Caption deleted]
TO: MYRLAND R. HELTON; JOHN HELTON; BARBARA
ORR; LAWRENCE ORR; CHERYL NICHOLS; CARL NI-
CHOLS; CARLA MARIE SCOTT; DEBRA MACKIE; DALE
MICHAUD; and JANE DOES i thru X; and JOHN DOES I
thru X.
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the deposition of
CHERYL NICHOLS
will be taken upon oral examination pursuant to the Arizona Rules
of Civil Procedure on Friday, the 29th day of September, 1978, at
3:00 o’clock P.M.., at the law offices of STREICH, LANG, WEEKS
& CARDON, P.A., 2100 First National Bank Plaza, 100 West
Washington Street ‘“hoenix, Arizona 85003.
DATED this 25th day of September, 1978.
STREICH, LANG, WEEKS & CARDON
A Professional Association
2100 First National Bank Plaza
Post Office Box 471
Phoenix, Arizona 85001
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
By Lawrence Allen Katz
Lawrence Allen Katz
Nancy K. Splain
19
NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION
[Caption deleted]
TO: MYRLAND R. HELTON; JOHN HELTON; BARBARA
ORR; LAWRENCE ORR; CHERYL NICHOLS; CARL NI-
CHOLS; CARLA MARIE SCOTT; DEBRA MACKIE; DALE
MICHAUD; and JANE DOES I thru X; and JOHN DOES I
thru X.
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the deposition of
DALE MICHAUD
will be taken upon oral examination pursuant to the Arizona Rules
of Civil Procedure on Friday, the 29th day of September, 1978, at
4:00 o’clock P.M.., at the law offices of STREICH, LANG, WEEKS
& CARDON, P.A., 2100 First National Bank Plaza, 100 West
Washington Street, Phoenix, Arizona 85003.
DATED this 25th day of September, 1978.
STREICH, LANG, WEEKS & CARDON
A Professional Association
2100 First National Bank Plaza
Post Office Box 471
Phoenix, Arizona 85001
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
By Lawrence Allen Katz
Lawrence Allen Katz
Nancy K. Splain
STATE COURT’S TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
[Caption deleted]
The Court having read the Plaintiffs’ verified Complaint in this
action, together with the Affidavit of Rudy Johnson, the Vice-
President of Plaintiff Restaurant, and the Affidavit of Lawrence A.
Katz, Plaintiffs’ attorney, both of which Affidavits were sworn to
on September 25, 1978, it appears to this Court that this is a proper
case for granting a Temporary Restraining Order; and that, unless
the Temporary Restraining Order requested by Plaintiffs is granted
forthwith, immediate and irreparable injury will result to Plaintiffs
and to Plaintiffs’ business and Plaintiffs’ property located at 3757
East Van Buren Street, Phoenix, Arizona, and to Plaintiffs’ agents
and employees, and to citizens of the State of Arizona, which injury
will include, without limitation:
a. Trespass by Defendants, and each of them and all those
acting in concert with them, on the Plaintiffs’ private
property.
b. Violence, threats of violence, harrassment and intimidation
by Defendants, and each of them, and all those acting in
employees engaged in the performance of their duties, and
against Plaintiffs’ customers.
c. Publication of false and misleading statements about Plain-
tiffs and Plaintiffs’ agents and employees by Defendants,
and each of them, and those acting in concert with them,
directed at Plaintiffs’ agents, employees and customers and
intended to damage Plaintiffs’ reputation and business.
d. Unlawful interference by Defendants, and each of them,
and all those acting in concert with them, by and through
all of the aforesaid methods, with the relationships between
to work for Plaintiffs and between Plaintiffs and their
customers.
e. Breaches of the peace by Defendants, and each of them,
and all those acting in concert with them, and the danger
of injury not only to Plaintiffs’ property and to Plaintiffs’
agents, employees and customers and their property, but
also to innocent bystanders — all in derogation of the rights
and interests of citizens of the State of Arizona.
It further appears to this Court that Plaintiffs have attempted
21
to give notice to Defendants by telephone of Plaintiffs’ request for
the immediate entry of this Temporary Restraining Order.
NOW, THEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, and upon the
Plaintiffs’ verified Complaint and the aforesaid Affidavits of Rudy
Johnson and Lawrence A. Katz,
IT IS ORDERED, that Defendants, and each of them, and all
those acting at their direction or in concert with them, be, and they
hereby are, jointly and severally, restrained and enjoined from each
and every one of the following:
a. Entering upon Plaintiffs’ premises, or any portion thereof,
for any reason without the express permission of the officer
of Plaintiff Restaurant in charge of such premises at the
time, and refusing to vacate Plaintiffs’ premises when re-
quested to do so by Plaintiffs or their proper agents.
b. Mass picketing, parading or demonstrating in proximity
to Plaintiffs’ premises, provided that Defendants shall be
allowed, at any one establishment, and shall be limited to,
a total of four (4) individuals picketing, parading, or dem-
onstrating in a peaceful manner in proximity to Plaintiffs’
premises, and provided further that any such picketing,
parading or demonstrating shall be conducted exclusively
upon public property and not upon any property whatsoever
owned by Plaintiffs.
c. Interfering in any way with the ingress and egress from
Plaintiffs’ premises of Plaintiffs’ officers, agents, employ-
ees, suppliers, customers, business contacts and deliverers
of goods.
d. Engaging in violence, threats of violence, harrassment or
intimidation of any kind against Plaintiffs’ officers, :
. i . . i or de-
no . - — ten ord a ce pal
elsewhere.
FURTHER ORDERED, that the Defendants named herein,
and each of them, shall forthwith issue proper notice to all others
acting in concert with them, publicly withdrawing and rescinding
any orders, directions, requests or suggestions to do any of the acts
restrained and enjoined under the foregoing paragraph of this Tem-
FURTHER ORDERED, that this Temporary Restraining Order
shall be in full force and effect to and including the Sth day of
October, 1978, unless its terms is [sic} extended by this Court or
by stipulation of the parties, or unless it is dissolved prior to said
date.
DONE IN OPEN COURT this 25th day of September, 1978,
at the hour of 12:30 o'clock P.M.
Marilyn A. Riddel
JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
STATE COURT DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO EXPEDITE
[HEARING ON MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER]
[Caption deleted]
Defendants Helton, Nichols and Michaud, by and through their
counsel undersigned, hereby move this Court for an Order Expe-
granted leave to the Plaintiffs to take depositions on October 2 and
3, 1978. Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order relates to those
23
depositions. Accordingly, Defendants request hearing on their Mo-
tion for Protective Order prior to October 2, 1978.
DATED this 28 day of September, 1978.
WARD & CONTRERAS, LTD.
By: David L.
Michael J. Keenan and
David L. Niederdeppe
316 West McDowell Road
Suite 203
Phoenix, Arizona 85003
Attorneys for Defendants Helton,
Nichols and Michaud
ORDER
This Court having heard Defendants’ Motion to Expedite Hear-
ing, and good cause appearing,
IT IS ORDERED that hearing on Defendants’ Motion for Pro-
tective Order shall be heard on the 29 day of September, 1978, at
8:30 A.M.
DONE IN OPEN COURT this 28 day of September, 1978.
Marilyn A. Riddel
The Honorable Marilyn Riddel
Judge of the Superior Court
Copy of the foregoing hand-delivered
this 28 day of September, 1978, to:
Lawrence A. Katz, Esq.
Streich, Lang, Weeks & Cardon
2100 First National Bank Plaza
100 West Washington
Phoenix, Arizona 85003
David L. Niederdeppe
24
STATE COURT DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE
ORDER
[Caption deleted]
Defendants Helton, Nichols and Michaud, by and through their
counsel undersigned, hereby move this Court for its Protective Order
pursuant to Rule 26(c) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure
(hereinafter, A.R.C.P.). Defendants seek such an order limiting the
scope of examination during the course of certain depositions noticed
by Plaintiffs and expedited by this Court under the authority of
A.R.C.P. Rule 30(a). The grounds for such an order are more fully
set forth in the Memorandum accompanying this Motion. The
Court’s attention is respectfully directed to that Memorandum.
DATED this 28 day of September, 1978.
WARD & CONTRERAS, LTD.
By: David L. Niederdeppe
Michael J. Keenan and
David L. Niederdeppe
316 West McDowell Road
Suite 203
Phoenix, Arizona 85003
Attorneys for Defendants
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
The Plaintiifs in this action seek discovery from the Defendants
in the form of oral depositions prior to the expiration of A.R.C.P.
Rule 30(a)’s 30-day time period during which leave of Court must
be obtained. As is noted in the Motion, Plaintiffs have obtained
such leave from the Court prior to the time Defendants obtained
counsel. Plaintiffs requested leave for the early depositions on the
grounds that discovery was needed ‘‘[i}n order to be fully prepared
for the Order to Show Cause. . . .”’ In short, Plaintiffs apparently
feel the need for such discovery to prepare for hearing on their
2s
Application for Preliminary Injunction which is scheduled at the
hour of 9:00 a.m. on October 5, 1978, before this Court.
Defendants move for a Protective Order which would limit the
scope of examination by Plaintiffs during the depositions. The
grounds for that Motion are threefold. First, Defendants submit that
this Court’s jurisdiction to issue injunctive relief is limited. Hence,
the scope of issues at the hearing on Plaintiffs’ Application for
Preliminary Injunction is also limited. Accordingly, the scope of
examination at depositions necessary to prepare for such a hearing
must be limited, as well.
Second, the Defendants submit that by reason of the federal
labor policy, the federal Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C.
§ 552] (hereinafter, ‘‘the FOIA’’), and the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Company,
amas Ol 77-911, (Opinion June 15, 1978) (copy at-
tached), the Defendants have a privilege which limits the scope of
discovery available to the Plaintiffs. Such a privilege exists insofar
as the Plaintiffs seeks to discover information relevant to the unfair
labor practice charges filed by Defendant Myriand R. Helton against
the corporation Plaintiff Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. As noted
below, hearing on the allegations contained in those charges is now
pending at the National Labor Relations Board.*
Finally, certain of the Defendants in this action remain unre-
presented. One of the basic purposes for A.R.C.P. Rule 30(a)'s 30-
day limitation is to allow a Defendant to obtain counsel before
depositions are taken. Depositions of such individuals should be
precluded at the least until they obtain counsel.
Court's Limited Jurisdiction
At the outset, it should be noted that Defendants do not ques-
tion the jurisdiction of this Court to issue injunctive relief in labor-
relations situations where the alleged conduct sought to be enjoined
includes violence and imminent threates to the public order. See
Youngdahl v. Rainfair, 355 U.S. 131 (1957) and Auto Workers v.
Wisconsin Board, 351 U.S. 266 (1956). Defendants believe that the
Plaintiffs make reference in their Complaint to the NLRB charges at Page 8,
limes 3 through 10.
evidence to be developed at the hearing on Plaintiffs’ Application
for Preliminary Injunction will reveal that no such conduct has
occurred. However, in the abstract, this Court would have jurisdic-
tion over such claims of violence and public disruption.
Defendants do question the jurisdiction of this Court to enjoin
the Defendants from the series of acts explicity excluded from such
equitable relief by A.R.S. § 12-1808(B)(1) through (6). Those Sec-
tions provide that a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order issued in a labor relations matter may not prohibit a person
from:
1. Terminating any relation of employment, or from ceasing
to perform any work or labor, or from recommending, advising, or
persuading others by peaceful means so tc do.
2. Attending at or near a house or place where any person
resides or works, or Carries on business, or happens to be, for the
purpose of peacefully obtaining or communicating information, or
of peacefully persuading any person to work or to abstain from
working.
3. Ceasing to patronize or to employ any party to such dispute
or from recommending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful
means to do so.
4. Paying or giving to or withholding from any person engaged
in such dispute any strike benefits or other monies or things of value.
5. Peaceably assembling at any place in a lawful manner and
for lawful purposes.
6. Doing any act or thing which might lawfully be done in
the absence of such dispute by any other party thereto.
Hence, any matter relating to the type of conduct protected b
A.R.S. § 12-1808 is irrelevant to the hearing on Plaintiffs’ Appli-
cation for Injunctive Relief, and so not necessary for preparation
for that hearing. Discovery should be accordingly limited.
Further, the Defendants seriously question the jurisdiction of
this Court to enjoin the conduct which is alleged in Plaintiffs’ Com-
plaint to constitute trade libel or business disparagement. Defendants
submit that injunctive relief will nor lie, because: (1) Plaintiffs have
an adequate remedy at law, and (2) the First Constitutional Amend-
27
ment’s proscriptions concerning fieedom of speech preclude the
type of ‘prior restraint’’ sought by Plaintiffs.
While Plaintiffs could locate no Arizona decisions concerning
the jurisdiction of this Court to enjoin a libel, the vast weight of
American authority is to the effect that equity will nor restrain a
mere libel or slander. This is so, even though the false statement
may injure the Plaintiff in his business, profession or trade. In the
absence of acts of conspiracy, intimidation or coercion, and where
no breach of trust or contract appears, equity will not enjoin a libel
because the party wronged has an adequate remedy at law by an
action for damages or criminal prosecution. Annot., Injunctions as
Related in Cases of Trade Libel, 148 A.L.R. 853 (1944); Robert
E. Hicks Corporation v. National Salesmens’ Trade Association,
19 F.2d 963 (7th Cir., 1927); 43-A, CJ.S., Injunctions, Section
143 (1978). See also Am Jur 2d, Injunctions, Section 137
The authority cited by Plaintiffs in their Memorandum in sup-
port of their Application for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
by Plaintiffs as their quotation of the Corrigan case are to California
law. While the case may express California law, it is not binding
here.
Texas Courts have apparently recognize both sides of the ques-
tion. In Lawrence v. Atwood, 295 S.W. 2d 298 (Tx.Civ.App.,
19 _ ), the Court held that neither the fact that the publication
is being continued or will be continued unless restrained, nor the
fact that such continued publication is and will be injurious to the
libeled party’s business, nor the two together, appear to be sufficient
to render the rule inapplicable. This is in direct contrast to the Texas
authority cited by Plaintiffs.
ln Martin v. Reynolds Metals Company, 224 F.Supp. 978 (D.C.
Ore., 1963), appeal dismissed, 336 F.2d 876 (9th Cir., 1964), aff'd
337 F.2d 780 (9th Cir., 1964), upon which Plaintiffs rely, the Court,
importance of the First Amendment in such cases. The Court stated
that the better-reasoned opinions concerning whether equity would
enjoin trade libel weigh the adequacy of the remedy at law and the
possible encroachment on free speech rights which might result
from the injunction. In labor relations matters, free speech is clearly
the favored aspect.
The policy of the federal labor law has always been to en-
courage debate. Indeed, in Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88
(1941), the Supreme Court stated that, **. . . the dissemination of
information concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded
as within the area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the
Constitution."”
Further, in Letter Carriers, Old Dominion Branch, 496 v.
Austin, 418 U.S. 264, (1974), the Court held that the policy of the
federal law is to favor uninhibited, robust and wide-open debate in
labor disputes. The Court stated that the **. . . free-wheeling use
of the written and spoken word . . .”’ had been expressly fostered
by the Congress in the national labor law, and approved by the
National Labor Relations Board. Hence, in labor relations matters,
the element of free speech would raise the Constitutional objections
to injunctive relief to a higher plane than they would be accorded
in other actions. Defendants submit that even in those jurisdictions
where alleged trade libels may be enjoined, the free speech aspect
fostered and encouraged by the national labor policy would preclude
injunctive relief. From the foregoing, it is clear that this Court has
no jurisdiction to issue an order enjoining allegedly libelous state-
ments. The Court has apparently agreed in the refusal to temporarily
restrain the handbilling. Hearing on Plaintiffs’ application for Pre-
liminary Injunction should be limited to those matters over which
enter its Order so limiting the scope of examination at the scheduled
Under this approach, Plaintiffs would be free to inquire into
the alleged acts of the Defendants over which this Court could exert
its injunctive jurisdiction, if those actions were shown; i.e., violence
or imminent threats of public disorder. Plaintiffs would also be free
to renotice the depositions of Defendants after the expiration of the
30-day requirement of A.R.C.P. Rule 30(a), with respect to the
damage aspects of the libel allegations. Depositions taken at that
time would do no violence to the policy of A.R.C.P. Rule 30(a).
That policy is noted in Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure, Section 2104, with respect to the leave-of-Court re-
quirement of Rule 30(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
**Most Courts have thought that leave should be granted only when
some unusual circumstances or conditions existed that would be
likely to prejudice the party if he were compelled to wait the required
time.’’ Since the only prejudice which could conceivably inhere to
the Plaintiffs in this matier relates to the allegations over which the
Court could properly exercise jurisdiction. The scope of the ex-
amination in depositions authorized because of that hearing should
be limited to those matters.
Federal Labor Law Privileges
As is noted above, Plaintiffs’ Complaint makes reference to
an unfair labor practice charge filed at the National Labor Relations
Board by Defendant Myriand R. Helton against the corporate Plain-
tiff. After its investigation, the National Labor Relations Board
issued a Complaint against Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc., alleging
violation of the National Labor Relations Act. Hearing on the al-
legations set forth in that Complaint is set for December 7, 1978.
In connection with the NLRB investigation of the charges made
by Defendant Helton, certain of the Defendants here presented evi-
dence to NLRB agents. Defendants believe that the federal labor
policy givesn them a privilege with respect to evidence supporting
the unfair labor practice charge, and request the Court to so limit
discovery. If such an order does not issue, the Plaintiff will be able
to do violence to the federal policy by obtaining indirectly what it
could not get directly.
Section 6 of the National Labor Relations Act provides that
the National Labor Relations Board may make rules and regulations
necessary to carry out the provisions of the Act [29 U.S.C. § 156].
Historically, the NLRB has provided little pre-hearing discovery in
unfair labor practice proceedings. The reasons for the Board's gen-
eral refusal to make discovery available to parties charged with
unfair labor practices is that employers or, in some cases, Union,
will coerce or intimidate employees and others who have given
Statements in an effort to make them change their testimony or to
not testify at all. As noted by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Robbins
Tire & Rubber Co., supra., this special dangeer flowing from pre-
hearing discovery in NLRB proceedings has been recognized by the
Courts for many years. See NLRB v. Vap.~ Blast Manufacturing
Co., 287 F.2d 402, 407 (7th Cir., 19 ___ ); cert. denied 368 U.S.
823 (1961).
The FOIA would make state:nents given to the Labor Board
discoverable were it not for Section 7(A) of the Act, which provides
that disclosure is not required of ‘‘investigatory records compiled
for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the pro-
duction of such records would interfere with enforcement proceed-
ings.”’ In NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber, supra., the Supreme
Court held that witness statements in pending unfair labor practice
proceedings are exempt from FOIA disclosure, at least until com-
pletion of the NLRB’ s hearing . The Court so held because the release
of such statements necessarily would involve the kind of harm that
Congress believed would constitute an ‘‘interference’’ with NLRB
enforcement proceedings —- that of giving a party litigant earlier
and greater access to the NLRB’s case than he would otherwise
have.
If ¢ Plaintiffs are allowed to examine the Defendants here
with respect to knowledge in their possession which relates to the
unfair labor practice charges, the Plaintiff will have been able to
obtain by indirect means that which it could not obtain by direct
means. Defendants submit that the historical labor policy and Ex-
emption 7(A) of the FOIA, as construed by the Court in NLRB v.
Robbins Tire & Rubber, supra., establish, for the purposes of this
action, a privilege on the part of the Defendant which is as broad
as the subject matter of the unfair labor practice Complaint itself.
A copy of that Complaint is attached to this Memorandum.
As is noted above, such a privilege must remain in effect ar
least until completion of the NLRB’s hearing. Until such time, the
privilege as set forth above should operate to preclude the Plaintiff
in this action (which is the Charged Party in the unfair labor practice
proceeding) from obtaining discovery of matters relevant to that
Labor Board matter. Defendants request this Court to enter its Order
limiting the scope of discovery prior to the hearing to preclude
inquiry into the matters set forth in the unfair labor practice
Complaint
Defendants Without Counsel
Certain Defendants in this action remain unrepresented. As is
noted by Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Section
31
2104, Rule 30(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (like in
substance to the Arizona Rules) allows a certain time period before
depositions may be taken. One of the reasons for this time period
is to assure the Defendants of an opportunity to retain counsel and
inform themselves as to the nature of the suit. With such reasons
behind the 30-day requirement of Rule 30(a), the Court’s Protective
Order should preclude Plaintiffs from deposing any of those De-
fendants who remain unrepresented in this action.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants request this Court
to issue its Protective Order in accos ance with the authorities out-
lined above.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28 day of September,
1978.
WARD & CONTRERAS, LTD.
By: David L.
Michael J. Keenan and
David L. Niederdeppe
316 West McDowell
Suite 203
Phoenix, Arizona 85003
Attorneys for Defendants
Helton, Nichols and Michaud
Copy of the foregoing hand-delivered
this 28 day of September, 1978 to:
Lawrence A. Katz, Esq.
Streich, Lang, Weeks, & Cardon
2100 First National Bank Plaza
100 West Washington
Phoenix, Arizona 85003
David L. Niederdeppe
32
PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE STATE
COURT JUDGE ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PROTEC-
TIVE ORDER
[Pages 6-21]
MR. NIEDERDEPPE [Attorney for State Court Defendants):
Your Honor, if you had a chance to review the Motion for Protective
Order which was filed I won't go into a great deal on that, other
than to note that it is our belief that the underlying purposes of this
lawsuit are two-fold.
First, to chill the exerc’se of defendants of their First Amend-
Act, Section 7, which gives them the right to engage in concerted
activity for their benefit.
Secondarily, we believe to procure the kind of discovery which
the National Labor Relations Board would not allow to the plaintifis
in that pending action. And, our Response, our Motion speaks to
both of those issues.
It is our belief that the Court has no jurisdiction to issue an
injunction which would prohibit or restrain the exercise by these
defendants of First Amendment Rights.
If that is so, then the hearing on the Order to Show Cause is
likewise limited. Since the plaintiffs in this action seek discovery
to prepare for that hearing, we feel that the scope of discovery
should be so limited.
Now, we feel that Rule 30 and its 30 day requirement would
preclude the taking of depositions which would delve into other
areas for that time period, because a trial may be pending on these
allegations two years from now as to the damage aspect.
With respect to the injunction aspect of the allegation, we feel
the scope should be at this time limited.
With respect to the second major thrust of the Motion for
Protective Order, which is the position that the National Labor policy
is to preclude this kind of discovery. I would note that the plaintiff's
Response states that they have no desire to ask for the statements
given by the individuals to the National Labor Relations Board.
33
However, if they are allowed to delve into the same area by way
of deposition, the same result would be accomplished.
The plaintiffs state that the Robbins Tire and Rubber case, the
case which was attached and the Freedom of Information Act speak
only to those statements. That is true. However, the policy of the
National Labor Relations Board has historically been to preclude
discovery in these kinds of proceedings. That policy, in conjunction
with the Robbins case and with the Freedom of Information Act
Exception 7A, we believe give to those — these defendants, rather,
a privilege until after the hearing to refuse to answer questions
related to that particular proceedings.
One final note, I would — I don’t have other copies of this
case. I have come across a case which speaks to this type of situation
and holds that an injunction is not a proper remedy for libel and
one of the statements made in this case is that, ‘‘Statements de-
scribing unsanitary working conditions and alleging a lack of morals
of supervisory personnel of an employer did not constitute a trade
libel which would justify an injunction.’’
That statement seems to speak to exactly the situation in this
case.
The case is Montgomery Ward vs. Department Store Employ-
ees of America. The citation is 400 Illinois 38, 79 Northeastern
Reporter 2d 46. And, 1 “ham pha. ay laa
THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
Mr. Katz?
MR. KATZ [Attorney for Plaintiff Restaurant): Your Honor,
on approximately 20 hours notice what we have received is a thinly
disguised Motion for Summary Judgment. I think the Motion is
premature and inappropriate.
The defendants have attacked the merits of this case and they
have sought ww appeal from this Court’s prior order.
As far as the issues they have raised in their brief, I do not
believe there is any genuine dispute as to the Court's right to enjoin
non-peaceful picketing and other massed assemblage.
34
The complaint before the Court seeks to enjoin non-peaceful
activities.
The facts indicating whether or not the activities, which are
complained of as having occurred in the past and as having been
threatened to continue, those facts will be brought out at the hearing
appropriately and the discovery is for the purpose of bringing out
such facts.
Part of the action is, of course, a libel action also and as to
that the defendants have raised claims of Constitutional issues of
free speech and prior restraint First Amendment Rights. That is
merely a smoke screen. There is no Constitutional Right to libel
another person.
We are not seeking to limit or restrain in a prior fashion. We
are seeking an injunction against a leaflet which has already been
distributed. We are seeking to have it no longer distributed.
As far as the privilege they have alleged, Linn vs. United Plant
Guard Workers points out, I think, on page 56 of the Supreme Court
decision that there is no right to libel anyone else. There is no
privilege under the Constitution.
As far as the Robbins case in the U.S. Supreme Court, that
was a suit by employer under the Freedom of Information Act to
compel the National Labor Relations Board to release certain state-
ments they had obtained. They are not a party. We seek to release
no such statements.
All we seek to do is, in normal discovery, is to ask the de-
fendants for the facts behind the leaflets they distributed. We want
to go through each and every fact in the leaflet and ask them, ‘“Why
did you make this accusation? What facts do you have to believe
the accusation is true?’’
We need that discovery in order to prepare for this proceeding
if there is a question as to whether the Court has the right to issue
preliminary relief. Part of the answer to that question will depend
upon the facts that come out through discovery.
I would assume that the Court’s decision as to whether to issue
a preliminary injunctive relief might vary from case to case, de-
pending on each fact situation.
35
All we want to do is get the facts necessary and supply the
information to this Court.
Thank you, Your Honor. Nothing else.
THE COURT: Mr. Niederdeppe?
MR. NIEDERDEPPE: If I may respond briefly.
This Motion for Protective Order has been described as a thinly
disguised or camouflaged Motion for Summary Judgment.
There is no seeking an order ending this action. There is no
facts upon which we rely, at this stage, that the Court could decide,
as a matter of law, that this action should be decided in the defen-
dants’ favor.
As I read the pleadings, I think the pleadings probably state
a cause of action for the elements alleged. We haven't sought to
block that.
With respect to the allegation in that complaint of mass pickets
or violence, we concur if that kind of conduct occurred it may
certainly be enjoined by this Court. Aad, the plaintiffs are certainly
with respect to those allegations.
We do feel that this Court may not enjoin the First Amendment
Rights of these individuals and that, therefore, is not relevant to the
hearing on the Order to Show Cause and the 30 day requirement
of Rule 30A should be accorded the defendants on that point.
Finally, | would just note, and I pointed this out in the Motion,
to the strong policy of the Labor Act encouraging freedom of speech,
the line of cases from Thornhill vs. Alabama through the Linn case,
which makes reference to that and to a later case which qualified
Linn, which is Old Dominion Branch Number 496 of the Letter
Carriers vs. Austin. It’s a Supreme Court case and I don’t have the
citation. I think I may have cited it in the Motion.
That case holds that the Federal Labor laws favor an unin-
hibited, robust and wide open debate in these type of labor disputes.
That’s exactly what occurred here. We feel the Court can’t
enjoin that kind of activity.
MR. KATZ: One further point?
36
THE COURT: Surely.
MR. KATZ: Defendants have expressed concern as to how we
will utilize whatever we discover in these depositions. The issue,
of course, before the Court is, will the discovery be relevant to this
proceeding? If it is relevant to this proceeding, then the fact that
it might be relevant to some other proceeding in some other forum
is immaterial.
The only issue that is presented before you today is whether
what we seek to ask in discovery is relevant to the proceedings
before you now. We submit that it is.
THE COURT: Mr. Niederdeppe, it is your motion, you are
entitled to the last word if you would like to have it.
MR. NIEDERDEPPE: I think I must say something.
With respect to the allegations of the complaint respecting
libel, we concur that investigation, by way of deposition, interrog-
atories, or whatever methods under the discovery rules is proper
with respect to libel. We are asking for the 30 day requirement of
Rule 30A to be prepared.
We think such short notice where depositions are being taken
four, five days after the complaint is filed if the issues on the hearing
of temporary restraining order are limited, the discovery which is
needed should be limited. That is all we are saying.
We are saying, with respect to the matters material to the labor
case, the National Labor Relations Board case, that there is a
We are not denying that it may have relevance here. We are
saying that until that hearing is held, the labor policy, the Freedom
of Information Act and the Robbins case give these defendants that
privilege.
THE COURT: If I read the complaint, or whatever the doc-
ument is, from the NLRB, entitled that was attached to your Motion,
the allegation made is that this young lady was fired because she
was attempting to organize union activity. That is what came through
in that complaint. I think that is what the hearing in December is
going to involve.
MR. NIEDERDEPPE: That’s correct.
37
THE COURT: That issue, that she was fired for that reason
and thus subject to the NLRB and some disciplinary action or some
The issues in this matter, as I see them are quite different and
it will be the ruling of this Court denying the Motion for Protective
Order. However, the allegations regarding union organizing and the
statements made to any investigators in that case may not be inquired
into. But, certainly the allegations regarding the other matters in the
pamphlet may be inquired into.
MR. KATZ: May I seek clarification, Your Honor?
THE COURT: Yes.
which we would like to inquire into.
One of the statements in the pamphlet is that Miss Helton was
fired when she suggested to the waitresses that they should organize
a union. That statement is similar to the statement that was made
in the Linn case.
If I may refer Your Honor to that case. Reading from the
pamphlet, the leaflet that was issued by the union in that case the
following quotations appeared in that leaflet, ‘“The men in Saginaw
were deprived of their right to vote in three NLRB elections. Their
in 1959. These Pinkertoa guards were robbed of any pay increases.
The Pinkerton managers were lying to us all the time the contract
was in effect.’’
It goes a little further but I am stopping there.
Many of the allegations had been the subject of unfair labor
practice charges before the Board, but I assume, since the U.S.
Supreme Court said that a libel action in state court would properly
lie, based on those allegations, that there would be no denial of
discovery into the truth or falsity into those allegations.
We seek to ask questions regarding the truth or falsity of all
the accusations made in the leaflet, regardless of whether or not
those accusations appear in some other forum. That does not appear
to us to be material to this particular case.
THE COURT: Your memorandum seemed to indicate that it
38
was the unwarranted sexual advances and a filthy restroom that you
wished to inquire into and not the allegations regarding the NLRB
proceeding.
MR. KATZ: If I may refer Your Honor to line 10 on page 2
of the memorandum. Part of the libelous statement is the defendants’
have accused the plaintiffs of violating the law. They have accused
us of discharging the defendant, Miss Helton, because she suggested
to the waitresses they should organize a union. That is a violation
of law and that is so perceived by our customers.
We believe Miss Helton made the statement knowing it to be
false, making it with the intention of injuring us in our business and
was done so maliciously.
Had she not distributed that pamphlet, had she kep’ her charges
to the appropriate federal agency there might not have been a libel
question, because she would be privileged to file the charges with
the agency.
Having made the particular statement public, we have a right
to defend and protect our reputation by asking the facts, why she
made the statements to a public agency as opposed to some other
forum.
MR. NIEDERDEPPE: I would merely point out that Linn vs.
United Plant Guard Workers to which the plaintiffs have reference
was a case which was not involving an injunction prior to the Board
It involved an action for damages which, of necessity, would
be sometime later than the hearing.
All we are asking in terms of the labor privilege is what the
Labor Board would give us, these individuals, that is to preclude
discovery until the time of hearing, December 7th.
We are not asking that they never be able to try the issues,
that is not the question.
THE COURT: Do you agree, pending the hearing, no more
dissemation [sic] of that statement will be made?
MR. NIEDERDEPPE: I am sorry?
‘THE COURT: Do you likewise agree that prior, pending the
39
hearing in December, that your clients will no longer dissemate [sic]
that statement publicly?
MR. NIEDERDEPPE: With respect to the National Labor
Relations Board?
THE COURT: You betcha.
MR. NIEDERDEPPE: Would that be one of the conditions of
the Court’s order?
THE COURT: I am asking.
MR. NIEDERDEPPE: I am just saying we don’t see that it
would be of necessity.
THE COURT: The Motion for Protective Order then is denied
as to these three sets of defendants. Those are the only ones to
whom the ruling goes.
The other orders remain in full force and effect.
MR. KATZ: Is there then, Your Honor, any limitation on
the —? )
THE COURT: There is not, so long as it is relevant to the
allegations made in this complaint.
It will be my ruiing that if any witness, other than one of these
parties, were asked about statements made to the NLRB, or that
these parties were asked about statements made to the NLRB in-
vestigators that that would not be a proper question, but you may
question them regarding the statements made publicly in Maricopa
County, and the basis for those statements.
MR. K.ATZ: I understand. Thank you, Your Honor.
MR. NIEDERDEPPE: May I clarify?
I take it you have denied in totality the Motion for Protective
Order?
THE COURT: I have.
MR. NIEDERDEPPE: So, if the plaintiffs in this matter delve
into areas which are relevant to the Labor Board's complaint, in
other words, whether or not this individual was fired for her union
activity that is not protected?
40
THE COURT: The ruling is that the plaintiffs may inquire
about any of the allegations made in this complaint.
They may not inquire as to what statements were made to
NLRB investigators. That’s not an allegation here that they falsely
told an NLRB investigator something. That’s not why we are here.
And, they may not inquire or the answer may be refused as to what
statements were made to NLRB people in that case by whom or
who made the statements.
They may inquire as to the statements made in Maricopa
County in this dissemination as to any matters regarding that state-
ment, who they were made to, what the basis for it is, what facts
they have to sustain the statements made in that publication in
Maricopa County.
MR. NIEDERDEPPE: Thank you, Your Honor.
MR. KATZ: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Yes, indeed. Have a good day.
We will stand in recess.
(Whereupon, the above proceedings were terminated.)
I, BRIDGET BRITTAN, Official Court Reporter herein do
hereby certify that the foregoing 20 pages constitute a full, true and
accurate transcript of the proceedings had in this matter on Septem-
ber 29, 1978, all done to the best of my skill and ability.
DATED this 29th day of September, 1978.
Bridget Brittan
BRIDGET BRITTAN
Official Court Reporter
STATE COURT DEFENDANTS’ ANSWER AND COUNTER-
CLAIM
[Caption deleted]
Defendants, for their Answer to Plaintiffs’ Complaint, admit,
deny and allege as follows:
41
Defendants admit the allegations of Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of
the Complaint.
Answering Paragraph 4 of the Plaintiffs’ Complaint, Defen-
dants admit that they are residents of the State of Arizona. However,
Defendants deny, generally and specifically, each and every addi-
tional allegation of Paragraph 4.
Answering Paragraph 6 of the Complaint, Defendants admit
that they picketed on the public sidewalk in front of Plaintiffs’ Van
poem tape ag age Sap Seema a hr
among other 1
until the dispute had been halted. Such conduct is clearly permitted
under A.R.S. § 12-1808. Defendants deny each and every additional
allegation of Paragraph 6.
IV
Answering Paragraph 7 of the Complaint, Defendants admit
that they picketed on the public sidewalk at the Van Buren Sweet
restaurant on September 21, 1978; that the Defendants named in
Paragraph 7 were present for all or part uf such picketing activity.
Further, Defendants incorporate their Answer to Paragraph 6 of the
Complaint by reference herein, and they expressly deny each and
every allegation not specifically admitted in their response to Par-
agraphs 6 and 7.
Vv
Answering Paragraph 8 of the Complaint, Defendants admit
that those Defendants named in Paragraph 8 of the Complaint did
picket and distribute a limited number of handbills (Exhibit A to
42
Affidavit of Rudy Johnson) at public sidewalks in front of the Plain-
tiffs’ Van Buren Street Restaurant. Defendants deny, all and sin-
gular, each and every additional allegation of Paragraph 8.
VI
Defendants deny, all and singular, each and every allegation
contained in Paragraphs 5, 9, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and
20 of the Complaiut.
vil
Answering Paragraphs 10 and 12 of the Complaint, Defendants
are without sufficient knowledge with which to form a belief as to
the truth or falsity of the allegations contained therein, and therefore
Defendants deny the same.
Count I] — Libel Business Disparagement
I
Answering Count II of the Complaint, Defendants adopt by
reference and incorporate herein all of the admissions, denials, and
allegations set forth in their Answer to Count | of the Complaint.
Defendants deny, all and singular, each and every allegation
contained in Paragraphs 22 through 25 of the Complaint.
Defendants deny each and every allegation of Plaintiffs’ Com-
plaint not specifically admitted or denied herein.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
Defendants allege that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted.
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act [29 U.S.C. § 157],
Sections 4 and 7 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act [29 U.S.C. § 104 and
§ 107], and Section 12-1808 of the Arizona Revised Statutes, they
WHEREFORE, Defendants respectfully request that the Com-
Order issued on September 25, 1978 be dissolved, that the Order
Myriand R. Helton, John Helton, Barbara Orr, Lawrence Orr,
Cheryl Nichols, Carl Nichols, Carla Marie Scott, Debra Mackie,
and Dale Michaud, hereinafter Counterclaimants, for their coun-
terclaims allege as follows:
ad
Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc., an Arizona corporation;
Johnny Johnson and Jane Doe Johnson, his wife; Rudy Johnson and
Jane Doe Johnson, his wife; Don Kalfas and Marilyn Kalfas, his
wife; Loginna Jean Johnson and John Doe Johnson, her husband;
Sherry Surgeon and John Doe Sturgeon, her husband; Dina Cam-
eron and John Doe Cameron, her husband; Suzy Gay and John Doe
Gay, her husband, a/k/a Lenny Walters; John Does I through X and
Jane Does I through X, individuals whose names and identities are
unknown at this time and who will be named after their identities
become known, were at all times pertinent to this complaint acting
for themselves individually and for and on behalf of all other
Counterdefendants, hereinafter ‘‘the Family.’’ Each of the husband-
wife Defendants constitutes a single marital community.
Counterclaimants and Counterdefendants are residents of the
State of Arizona or are presently existing corporations duly qualified
and licensed to do business in Arizona; and the unlawful actions
which are the basis of this complaint were perpetrated by ‘‘the
Family’’ in Arizona.
On or about August 8, 1978, Myriand Ruth Helton was dis-
charged from her employment at the Big Apple East, a restaurant
where she had been employed as a waitress for seven and one-half
years by ‘‘the Family.”’
IV
Mrs. Helton, prior to her discharge, had been actively engaged
in activities protected by federal law; to wit: discussing the forming
of a union with fellow employees. Determining this to be the cause
of her discharge by “‘the Family,’’ Mrs. Helton filed a charge with
the National Labor Relations Board (The Board). The Board issued
a Complaint on September 20, 1978, alleging that Mrs. Helton had
been terminated because of her union activities.
45
\
Fellow employees of Mrs. Helton were told by ‘‘the Family"’
to inform Mrs. Helton’s customers that ‘‘she had quit work to return
to school.’’ Mrs. Helton’s fellow employees were told that Mrs.
Helton was discharged for not complying with company regulations.
v.
By mid-September, 1978, the fellow employees of Mrs. Helton
had become aware of what company regulations Mrs. Helton was
alleged to have violated. These company regulations were as fol-
lows: (a) employees were not to chew gum while working;
(b) employees were not to use the company phone for private use;
(c) employees were to call in on a designated off-work day of each
week referred to as a ‘‘call day’’ fifteen minutes prior to their shift.
vol
Mrs. Helton’s fellow employees knew of their own knowledge
that Mrs. Helton had not violated any of the aforementioned com-
pany policies prior to her discharge. They believed, as well, that
the company regulations dealing with private use of the company
phone and calling in on a call day had been countermanded by the
immediate supervisor of Mrs. Helton’s shift, the breakfast shift, and
that no one on the breakfast shift felt obliged to comply with any
of these regulations.
Vil
On September 18, 1978, believing that Mrs. Helton was dis-
charged for union activities rather than the reasons given by the
management, and knowing that ‘‘the Family’’ refused reinstatement,
the majority of Mrs. Helton’s work shift walked off the job in her
support.
IX
On September 29, 1978, Defendants and Counterclaimants
began picketing at the Big Apple East.
46
xX
Shortly after the picketing began, Counterdefendant Sherry
Sturgeon, a member of management, approached the picketers and
confronted them with foul and abusive language, threats and obscene
hand signs. She told Counterclaimants that it was the intention of
**the Family’’ to ‘‘make you pay for this.”’
xl
Picketing continued on September 21, 1978 and September
22, 1978. Picketing did not exceed five hours on any of these days.
On these three occasions, and on every occasion since, Counter-
claimants have conducted themselves in a manner beyond reproach.
Counterclaimants have never crowded the sidewalks in front of the
restaurant or made it difficult for pedestrians to pass. Counter-
claimants have not shouted at, harassed, or threatened employees
of the restaurant or its customers or potential customers. At no time
have the picketers blocked ingress or egress from the restaurant.
On Friday, September 22, 1978, Counterclaimants distributed
several handbills to passers-by listing their grievances. Counter-
claimants knew of their own knowledge and belief that everything
contained in the leaflet was true. They distributed these leaflets in
an effort to educate the public as to what abuses they and others
had suffered at the hands of *‘the Family’ in the hope that doing
so would aid in preventing such abuses in the future.
At all times relevant hereto, ‘‘the Family’’ was aware of the
facts set forth in Paragraph XI preceding this paragraph. They were
aware as well of the truthfulness of the statements set forth in the
handbills distributed by the picketers. Yet, on September 25, 1978,
“the Family’ caused to be filed in the Superior Court of the State
of Arizona, Maricopa County, the lawsuit of which this Counter-
claim has become a part demanding punitive damages of One half
Million Dollars ($500,000) plus compensatory damages, claiming
that statements set forth in the leaflets distributed by Counter-
Counterclaimants believe this litigation is and was an attempt
by “‘the Family’’ to use the Court system to harass, intimidate,
terrorize and break down Counterclaimants. It appeared to be the
attitude of ‘‘the Family’’ that its former employees could not afford
or would not seek legal counsel and therefore would be manipulated
terclaimants have suffered ridicule, emotional distress, limited em-
Counterdefendants’ actions constitute a willful and deliberate
abuse of process and a malicious prosecution designed to restrain
Counterclaimants in the exercise of rights guaranteed under the
Constitution and law of the State of Arizona and of the United
States.
WHEREFORE, for this obvious and malicious abuse of pro-
cess, Counterclaimants pray Judgment in an amount of compen-
satory damages to be proven at trial, plus exemplary damages in
the sum of Two Million Dollars ($2,000,000), together with Coun-
terclaimants’ costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees.
48
COUNTERCLAIM I
Each and every allegation contained in Paragraph | through
XVI above is hereby realleged and incorporated herein as if fully
set forth.
Xvi
On October 25, 1978, ‘*the Family’’ sought and received from
the Superior Court a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction which hindered and limited Counterclaimants in exer-
cising their civil rights and more specifically, those rights granted
by Amendment I to the United States Constitution and A.R.S. Con-
stitution Article 2, § 6, and § 12-1808 of the Arizona Revised
Statutes.
Xvi
limited the number of Counterclaimants who could picket at any
one restaurant location at any given time. This meant, of course,
that when four Counterclaimants were exercising their freedom of
speech by picketing and/or handbilling in front of the Counter-
defendants’ Big Apple East restaurant, the other five Counterclai-
mants could not exercise their freedom of speech at this location
and therefore were deprived of the same.
XIX
Although ‘‘the Family’ spend several days prior to September
25, 1978, in the preparation of its litigation and request for Tem-
porary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, *‘the Family’’
did not notice in any way, shape or form the majority of Counter-
claimants that a Temporary Restraining Order hearing was to take
place and gave no more than one hour and ten minutes notice to the
two Counterclaimants it did notice. The two Counterclaimants who
were noticed of the hearing were noticed by telephone.
49
XX
In presenting its request for a Temporary Restraining Order
and Preliminary Injunction to the Court, “‘the Family’’ knew or
should have known that the picketing was peaceful, the handbills
truthful and the conduct free of any violence, threats of violence,
or obstruction of ingress and egress from the restaurant.
XXI
By wrongfully securing a Temporary Restraining Order against
Counterclaimants, Counterdefendants have interfered with and re-
strained Counterclaimants in the exercise of rights granted under
law; they have subjected Counterclaimants to ridicule; they have
limited Counterclaimants’ future employment opportunities, and
they have forced Counterclaimants to pay substantial attorneys’ fees
and Court costs. Counterclaimants cannot ascertain at this time the
extent of their compensatory damages except that they have incurred
costs and attorneys’ fees to date in excess of Four Thousand Dollars
($4,000).
XxIl
Further, Counterdefendants’ actions were willful, malicious,
and conscious efforts designed to secure a wrongful Injunction.
WHEREFORE, Counterclaimants pray that they be awarded
compensatory damages to be proven at trial, plus the sum of Two
Million Dollars ($2,000,000) as and for exemplary damages, and
costs and attorneys’ fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01.
COUNTERCLAIM III
Each and every allegation contained in Paragraphs | through
XXII is realleged as if fully set forth.
XXIil
Since on or about August 8, 1978, Counterdefendants have
slandered and published numerous libelous statements regarding the
actions and motives of Counterclaimants. These libelous statements
include a letter distributed by Counterdefendants to employees on
50
or about September 25, 1978. A true and correct copy of said
publication is attached hereto as Exhibit A. [Exhibit omitted. }
XXIV
Counterdefendants knew the statements made in the slanderous
and libelous publication were untrue anc the statements were made
with reckless disregard for their truth. Further, Counterdefendants’
XXV
As a result of the libel and slander perpetrated by the Coun-
terdefendants, Counterclaimants have been subjected to ridicule,
humiliation, loss of employment opportunities and damage to their
reputations. Counterclaimants are unable at this time to ascertain
the amounts of damages which they have suffered as a result of
Counterdefendants’ libelous and slanderous statements.
WHEREFORE, Counterclaimants pray Judgment in an amount
of compensatory damages to be proven at trial, for exemplary dam-
ages in the amount of Two Million Dollars ($2,000,000) and for
all costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees and for such other relief as
to the Court appears just and proper in the premises.
WARD & CONTRERAS, LTD.
By: Michael J. Keenan
Michael J. Keenan
316 West McDowell Road
Suite 203
Phoenix, Arizona 85003
Attorneys for Defendants and
Counterclaimants
Copy of the foregoing delivered
this 13 day of November, 1978, to:
County of Maricopa )
WITNESSETH, the undersigned, for and on behalf of the
Counter-claimants, being first duly sworn, verifies that she has read
the foregoing Counterclaim, verifies that the account which is the
basis of this Complaint is just and true, and that all facts stated
herein are true and correct.
Myriand R. Helton
Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 13th day of
November, 1978.
My Commission Expires: 10-5-79
Gayle M. Weber
Notary Public
52
STATE COURT’S MINUTE ENTRY RE PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION, NOV. 16, 1978
[Caption deleted]
12:05 p.m. Order to Show Cause. Plaintiff represented by
counsel, Lawrence A. Katz. Defendants are represented by counsel,
Michael J. Keenan.
Court reporter, Bridget Brittan, is present.
Plaintiff's case:
Rudy Johnson is sworn and testifies.
Plaintiff's Exhibits 1, 2, 3 and 4 are marked for identification
and received in evidence — photographs.
Sherry Sturgeon is sworn and testifies.
Marilyn Kalfas is sworn and testifies.
Lois Williams is sworn and testifies.
George P. Bolen is sworn and testifies.
Ruth Helton is sworn and testifies.
Plaintiff rests.
Defendant’s counsel moves that the Temporary Restraining
Order be dissolved, the Order to Show Cause quashed and the
Application for Preliminary Injunction denied.
Based on the evidence presented, the Court finds there is in-
sufficient evidence that would warrant the issuance of a Preliminary
Injunction.
Ordered denying Request for Preliminary Injunction and dis-
solving the Temporary Restraining Order.
53
PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING BEFORE NLRB
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
(Pages 33-1)
MICHAEL KEENAN
was called as a witness by and on behalf of the General Counsel
and having been first duly sworn on oath, was examined and testified
as follows, to-wit:
THE WITNESS: Your Honor, may I make a preliminary state-
ment before I begin to testify?
JUDGE JENSON: All right. Give us your name and your
address, first, please.
THE WITNESS: My name is Michael J. Keenan. My address
is 316 West McDowell Road, Phoenix, Arizona.
Your Honor, I’m here pursuant to a subpoena. I, as you know,
am representing the charging party and others in Superior Court
proceedings. I haven't at this point entered an appearance in the
Board case, nor do I intend to. My particular problem, of course,
with this case is that there’s going to be a greal deal of interplay
between my testimony and having to refuse *> answer questions
because of the attorney client priviledge, and i /ant to make it clear
on the record that my clients have not waived the attorney client
priviledge and to the extent I answer questions which in my judgment
are not priviledged, it’s not my intention nor should it be construed
that any of these answers constitute a waiver of the attorney client
priviledge.
MR. PETTIBONE [Attorney for Board): Your Honor, I would
like to apologize to the Court for calling Mr. Keenan to the stand,
out of turn chronologically. However, he as he previously stated has
to be before the Ninth Circuit in Los Angeles tomorrow and is
leaving for there this afternoon. So, I beg your permission to let
him testify first.
JUDGE JENSON: Go ahead.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. PETTIBONE:
Q. Mr. Keenan, what is your occupation?
A. I'm an attorney.
Sa
Q. Do you know a Myriand R. Helton?
A. Yes, I do. I’m representing Mrs. Helton in connection with
a Superior Court lawsuit.
Q. 1s that Superior Court in the State of Arizona?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. Maricopa County?
A. Yes.
Q. When did you first meet Mrs. Helton.
A. I believe it was the Tuesday, the 26th of September, in the
Q. This year?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Okay. Can you please tell us why she came to you?
A. She was refeired to me by a client to — for the purpose
of securing our firm to handle the Superior Court action which at
that point consisted of a Temporary Restraining Order which had
been issued by the Court on the 25th and a damage action, liable
[sic] action which was part of the same proceedings.
Q. Did your firm agree to represent her?
A. Yes, we did on that day agree to represent Mrs. Helton
and subsequently we undertook to represent all nine (9) of the
defendants in that lawsuit.
Q. At the time Mrs. Helton — or at the time you agreed
represent Mrs. Helton, can you please tel] us what, at that time,
was the status of the lawsuit, in addition to the TRO?
A. Well, the restraining order had been granted with some
modifications by Judge Rudell [sic] on the previous day, Monday
morning I believe. That would have been September 25, 1978. And,
of course, no appearances had been entered by any counsel and |
believe a hearing was set on the Temporary Restraining Order for
the following week, I think it was October Sth, although I'm not
certain of the date.
Q. You say a hearing was set on the Temporary Restraining
Order.
55
A. Application for Preliminary Injunction.
Q. Thank you. At the time Mrs. Helton visited you at your
offices were depositions scheduled?
A. Yes, they were. At the time Mr. Katz secured the Tem-
porary Restraining Order, | believe he also got the Judge to sign an
Order expediting discovery and he had set depositions for the after-
noon of Wednesday the 27th and the morning and afternoon of
Friday, the 29th. Again, all these dates are "78 unless | indicate
otherwise.
Q. Okay, and you said Mr. Katz, is that the same Mr. Katz
that is here?
A. Larry Katz who was representing the company and who
filed along with Nancy Splain the lawsuit and other papers.
Q. And is that the same Mr. Katz who's here today repre-
senting the Respondent?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. Were the depositions held as scheduled at that point?
A. No, they were not. The Order had, I don’t recall the exact
words, but some alternative dates for the scheduling depositions,
and October 2nd and 3rd, I believe which would have been the
following Monday and Tuesday. | called Mr. Katz on the 27th and
advised him I was representing the Heltons and | believe at that
Q. Would you please tell us who said what during that phone
conversation?
A. Well, as I recall there two conversations between Mr. Katz
and I and | think there was a third conversation between Mr. Nied-
erdeppe and my office and Mr. Katz. The first one, I believe, Larry
may have called me and said | understand you're representing the
Helton’s. I don’t remember who called whom. And, I don’t re-
member too much of the conversation — too many of the specifics.
I do remember the topics we discussed. One of which was the of
course, the setting of the depositions, we also discussed the kinds
of questions he was going to ask in the depositions. Mrs. Helton
had advised me that a Complaint had been issued in connection with
the first of the cases, I don’t know the number off hand, but the
883 case. And, I was concerned that he was going to use — during
the course of the deposition to get into some of the matters that were
the subject of testimony of Mrs. Helton and some of the others in
the 883 case. So, we had a discussion about what he believed was
relevant to the liable [sic] lawsuit particularly in relation to one
paragraph of the hanovil] which had been distributed by Mrs. Helton
and the other picketers. And, I think that the language was something
to the effect that Ruth Helton had been terminated by the Big Apple
Restaurant, Bill Johnson’s Inc., on August the 8th after she had
talked to other waitresses about forming a union. Larry and | had
a fundemental difference as to what that paragraph meant. | told
him that I didn’t think there would be any problem with his asking
questions about the sequence of events, mainly that Mrs. Helton
had talked to people about forming a union prior to August the 8th
and thereafter she was fired, but he said that the word after should
be construed as because and that for that reason he felt it was relevant
to go into the facts Mrs. Helton relied upon in determining that she
had been fired for union activity. I told him at that point that |
thought we would probably be filing a Protective Order Motion to
limit the testimony of Mrs. Helton and others. I think all nine (9)
of the defendants at that point had been scheduled for
And, in fact, on Friday the 27th or 29th of September, two (2) of
the depositions had been taken, Barbara Orr and Larry Orr, but the
problem didn’t really materialize there because Barbara Orr had
terminated her employment several months before these events gave
rise to the 883 case.
Q. In your disucssion with Mr. Katz on the phone, you tes-
tified that you discussed the scheduling of depositions. Did you
discuss the scheduling of Mrs. Helton’s deposition?
A. Well, yeah. I believe Larry wanted because of scheduling
problems and primarily he indicated scheduling problems, he wanted
to get Ruth Helton’s deposition out of the way first thing Friday.
I think he also indicated that after taking Mrs. Helton’s deposition,
there may not be need to take all nine of the defendants’ depositions.
And, I think I responded that because we were concerned about the
scope of the examination, we might be filing a Protective Order
57
Motion and we'd need the additional time. So, I think we then,
during one of these two conversations set a deposition schedule for
everyone but the Orrs who had shown up on Friday, beginning on
Monday morning with Mrs. Helton at 9:00 o’clock and Mr. Helton
thereafter, and I forget the sequence after that.
Q. How about the second conversation, could you tell us
briefly what that involved?
A. Well, I think we closed the first conversation with our
discussion about whether or not we would try to limit the scope of
his discovery, and he said he would write down the questions and
call me back and let me know what questions he anticipated to ask.
He did call me back, probably forty-five (45) minutes later, and he
read me several questions. I can’t remember the specifics of the
questions, but they were all framed around the idea what facts did
you rely upon in making the statement on the leaflet that you had
been discharged because of union actvities, or after having talked
about union activities. After he read those questions, | said that in
my judgment that we would probably be moving to get a Protective
Order from Judge Rudell [sic] to limit the discovery, because I felt
that he was kind of using a back door approach to get —
MR. KATZ: Objection to any testimony about why Mr. Keenan
took certain actions and what his legal reasons were for those actions.
I think it’s irrelevant to this proceeding.
JUDGE JENSON: I'll overrule.
BY MR. PETTIBONE:
Q. Mr. Keenan, was the — a Motion for Protective Order
filed by your office?
A. Yes, it was. At that point, I asked Dave Neiderdeppe who's
an associate in our firm to prepare the papers and take care of the
argument or the Motion. We discussed the types of questions, Mr.
Katz was asking, and | think that Dave then called Larry Katz and
discussed the questions once again to see whether or not there was
any prospect of limiting the questioning without our going after a
Protective Order and Motion.
Q. Do you recall] when the Motion was filed?
A. I think it was filed either Wednesday, the 27th of September
or Thursday the 28th. I know the hearing was set for Friday morning
at 8:30 on the 29th of September.
JUDGE JENSON: What Order are you talking about?
MR. PETTIBONE: It’s the — Motion, I may have said Order,
I’m sorry. The Motion for Protective Order. Your Honor, with your
permission, I'd like to raise those calendars to get a better view of
what days occur when.
JUDGE JENSON: Okay.
BY MR. PETTIBONE:
Q. Mr. Keenan, as a result of the filing of the Motion for
Protective Order, what happened?
A. Well, Judge Rudell [sic] essentially denied our Motion and
agreed with Mc. Katz’s theory that the types of questions relating
to the facts upon which Mrs. Helton relied in contending that she
was discharged for union activity was relevant to the lawsuit because
it had been mentioned on the allegedly liabless [sic] handbill.
Q. Did she make her ruling after a hearing?
A. Well, after oral argument, yes. The Motion was filed and
the hearing was expedited and then Mr. Katz and Mr.
argued before Judge Rudell [sic] on Friday morning the 29th at 8:30
a.m., I think.
Q. Okay, was Mrs. Helton’s deposition taken?
A. Yes, it was taken, before I go on I might say that the Judge
also ordered in addition to agreeing with Mr. Katz’s theory, she
entered an Order that Mr. Katz was not permitted to go into the
substance of any statements given to the NLRB. Mrs. Helton’s
deposition, in answer to your question, was eventually taken. It was
taken about 9:00 a.m. on Monday the 2nd of August, or October.
Q. Were there any other depositions taken at that day?
A. Yes, there were. There were two (2) additional depositions
taken that afternoon, John Helton and — was the next in order and
Johnny Johnson, who’s an official of Bill Johnson's restaurants
deposition was also taken that day.
Q. Okay, who is John Helton?
A. John Helton is Ruth Helton’s husband. He was also named
as a defendant in the civil court lawsuit.
Q. Other than the depositions of the Orrs which you previously
mentioned, were the depositions of any other named defendants
taken before that of Mrs. Helton?
A. No, they weren't. I believe they were scheduled for the
afternoon of the 2nd and the morning of the 3rd because we still
had the October Sth hearing date to contend with and we were trying
to get the depositions taken.
Q. During the taking of Mrs. Helton’s deposition, was she
asked to respond to questions regarding her union activities?
A. Yes, I believe she was.
Q. Can you tell us what happened after her deposition was
taken?
A. Well, the deposition was completed probably somewhere
between 11:30 and noon, and we decided to postpone the other
depositions until after the noon hour. At that point, I think Mr. Kaiz
asked me to step into his office. He wanted to talk to me, and we
discussed and I think, attorney client priviledge, Your Honor, would
prohibit me from talking about the substance of the conversation,
but one of the topics a — was a possible settlement.
Q. Okay. During the discussion was the taking of the re-
maining depositions also discussed?
A. Yes, it was. We at that point, began talking about putting
off the October Sth hearing.
Q. That's the hearing I assume on the Preliminary Injunction?
A. Yeah, and rescheduling the depositions to some time prior
to the new hearing date.
Q. Was the hearing postponed?
A. It was after we had — I had agreed to convey the settlement
offer to my clients and we determined that we'd need more time
than the three (3) days which we had. So, we agreed to stipulate
to continue the Restraining Order as modified by Judge Rudell [sic],
in effect, until, I believe it was the 14th of October, I don’t know
if I’m clear on that date.
Q. Do you recall, was that hearing on the request for a Pre-
liminary Injunction postponed once or more than once?
A. It was poscponed twice by stipulation and once by the Court
because of scheduling problems. It was postponed twice by stipu-
lation between Mr. Katz and myself, and on both of those occasions
we agreed to extend the TRO as modified, Restraining Order.
Q. And, were the depositions rescheduled?
A. Yes, they were. They were finally — I can’t recall exactly
when they were taken. Some were never taken. There were a couple
of — at least one of the defendants deposition was never taken
because she moved to New York. I believe they were taken the 10th
of November and the 13th of November, because by this time we
reset the hearing for the second time to the 14th of November.
Q. Which of the defendants had moved to New York?
A. Debby Makey had to go back for surgery and she’s still
in New York as I understand it.
Q. During the depositions of the other defendants, were they
asked questions about any union activities of Ruth Helton?
A. Yes, they were, I believe. I'm sure they were. In fact,
Miss Splain and I — Miss Splain took several of the depositions
and we each made a statement on the record as to what we believed
the admissability of that sort of testimony was and in light of Judge
Rudell’s [sic] Order. And, I think that’s all a matter of record. Those
statements were all made on the record at the depositions.
MR. PETTIBONE: Your Honor, may I approach the witness?
JUDGE JENSON: Of course.
BY MR. PETTIBONE:
Q. Mr. Keenan, I’m going to hand you a rather large accu-
mulation of documents. Have you seen that before?
JUDGE JENSON: Show a copy to Mr. Katz.
MR. PETTIBONE: I’m sorry, Your Honor.
A. Yes, I have had an opportunity to look these over before
the hearing. I’ve seen everything except the index of General Coun-
sel’s Exhibit 2.
61
Q. That's the top page?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay, and are all of the documents contained therein your
papers filed by the parties in the State Court action or Orders or
transcripts of proceedings before the Court?
A. Yes, I believe that Exhibit h is — I’m not sure whether
it’s a complete transcript of the deposition of Mrs. Helton, but I
— there are several depositions and I can’t say for certain that these
are complete. I didn’t look through them. But, with that qualifi-
cation, I believe all of these papers were either filed with the Court
or by the Court or transcripts of proceedings related to those — to
the Court action.
MR. PETTIBONE: Your Honor, at this time I move for the
introduction of General Counsel’s 2 to — 2(a) through 2(j) into
evidence.
JUDGE JENSON: Now, what is it? These are the State Court
proceedings?
JUDGE JENSON: Any objections?
MR. KATZ: Yes, we do have objection in part. Items (a)
through (e) on the list and item (i) are not objected to. (a) through
(e) and (i) are not objected to. We object to item (f) as irrelevant
for the counsel — for the General Counsel to introduce the Motion
and the supporting memorandum of the defendants in the case has
no bearing on any issues related to the restaurant’s bringing of the
bringing the lawsuit. It would be just a self-serving document to
present to this Court. And, of course, they haven't presented the
documents filed by the restaurant only those filed by the defendants.
So, it’s irrelevant and it’s only partial, and therefore it’s objection-
able on both grounds. Item (g) is also irrelevant. The transcript of
proceedings on the Motion for Protective Order doesn’t have any
relevance to the issue before this Court now which was the respon-
dent’s intent and purpose in bringing the lawsuit initially and finally
on — excuse me, not finally, next to finally, Item (h) copies of
pertinent portions of the transcripts, I think it’s objectionable not
to submit the entire transcript but just to select portions chosen, I
62
assume, with a particular purpose in mind, presents an incomplete
picture and is therefore objectionable. Finally, now, Item (j) we also
feel is irrelevant, what the Court did several months after the bring-
ing of the lawsuit in terms of the Preliminary Injunction, has no
bearing on the issues before this Court including whether the Re-
spondent, the restaurant had a reasonable basis for bringing the suit
at the time it was filed. We would ask that (a) through (e) and (i)
be left attached to the Exhibit and that the objectionable sections
of this Exhibit be removed.
MR. PETTIBONE: Your Honor, would you care for a
response?
JUDGE JENSON: Yes.
MR. PETTIBONE: First of all General Counsel’s Exhibit 2(f),
Respondent has objected on the basis of relevancy. The Defendant's
memorandum of points and authorities, which | believe is objec-
tionable primarily too. He has offered for picture of completeness
to show the Respondent’s to show the reasons for the Respondent's
thereto, which is included thereto in the exhibit. That is included
in Exhibit 2(f). 2(f) although it’s helpful, it isn’t completely un-
SO ee ee ee
to, which is why Defendant’s memorandum was included.
JUDGE JENSON: Well, do you intend to introduce certain
documents with respect to the Court proceedings, too.
MR. KATZ: I can’t answer that at this time, Your Honor, until
I see what they present.
JUDGE JENSON: Well, this is about an inch thick and I
haven't had a chance to read it yet.
MR. PETTIBONE: Your Honor, would you like me to respond
to the other items as well?
JUDGE JENSON: Okay.
has objected to as irrelevant. That is a copy of the transcript of
proceedings on the Motion for Protective Order. It is very relevant.
It is the General Counsel’s position, that that transcript reveals the
basis for the Respondent’s claim that the handbill was liabless(sic]}.
And, also reveals that the claim was frivolous and a sham and only
63
a means of obtaining discovery of the General Counsel’s case, Case
number 4970. Argument of counsel there for the Respondent reveals
the true motive. And, that’s why General Counsel has included that
in the Exhibit.
With respect to (h), —
JUDGE JENSON: Before you go on, off of (g), am I getting,
do I just have a poor copy here or is this thin paper?
MR. PETTIBONE: It’s thin paper, Your Honor. The bold
faceprint is the print on that page and what's printing through is the
print on behind pages.
JUDGE JENSON: All right, go ahead.
MR. PETTIBONE: With respect to General Counsel's Exhibit
2(h), I believe Respondent objected that the — objected to the fact
that only portions of the depositions included. I did that because I
didn’t want to go through the trouble of photocopying the entire
thing, and including them and make an overwhelming document.
If Respondent wishes to introduce the remaining portions of those
depositions, I would have no objection.
With respect to Exhibit 2 — I believe that takes us to Exhibit
2(j), I offered that only for completeness, that is what the Judge did
with the hearing for the Preliminary Injunction. | just thought it
would help in giving us a complete picture, for that reason I thought
it was relevant.
JUDGE JENSON: Well, the only thing that really bothers me
about it, is (h) copies of what you consider the pertinent portions
of the transcripts. The rest, of course, I haven't looked at it. I don’t
know whether it’s relevant or whether it isn’t. But sometime I would
have to read it to find out if it is or isn’t relevant, but for the purposes
of going on with the hearing now, I’m going to receive all but (h)
and at such time as I do have an opportunity to go through this, I'll
have to determine whether the rest of it is relevant or not. I don’t
know right now. So, I guess you'll just have to trust me to make
such a determination.
MR. PETTIBONE: Your Honor, may we go off the record for
a minute?
JUDGE JENSON: Wait a minute. Now, so far as (h) goes, the
64
transcript of the depositions, | would assume the two (2) of you can
come to some agreement on that. Is what is in here pertinent or is
it not and is there other pertinent material. You two can discuss that
off the record.
MR. PETTIBONE: Your Honor, are we still on the record?
JUDGE JENSON: Yes.
MR. PETTIBONE: As I said before, if Respondent wishes to
introduce the remaining portions, we would have no objection.
JUDGE JENSON: Well, let’s see if you can’t come to an
agreement with respect to (h). (h) is not received at this point, it’s
reserved.
(The documents previously marked as
2(a) through 2(j) for identification were
received in evidence, except 2(h), which
was rejected.)
[Pages 52-57]
CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. KATZ [Attorney for Restaurant):
Q. Michael, may I call you Michael? Do you recognize that
document?
A.[By Michael Keenan] Yes, I do. I am told that this is the
handbill which was distributed on a couple of days in September,
I believe the 22nd was the first day, and also for a short time as I
understand it on the 26th of September.
Q. Is this an accurate copy of that document?
A. Yes, this is the — this is an accurate copy of the copy
which was attached to your Complaint.
MR. KATZ: We'd like to offer that in evidence as Respon-
dent’s Exhibit | or 3 or whatever.
JUDGE JENSON: Respondent's 1.
(The document previously referred to
was marked as Respondent's Exhibit No.
1 for identification.)
JUDGE JENSON: Any objection?
MR. PETTIBONE: No objection, Your Honor.
JUDGE JENSON: Received.
(The document previously marked as
Respondent’s Exhibit No. 1 for identi-
fication was received in evidence.)
BY MR. KATZ:
Q. You say that this document was attached to the Complaint
that was filed in the State Court proceedings?
A. Yes, it was.
Q. Were you present during most of the depositions that were
taken by Respondent in connection with that State Court proceeding?
A. I believe I was present during all of the depositions.
Q. And, was this leaflet the subject of questions asked during
the depositions?
A. Yes, I think the leaflet was the subject of questions asked
of all the witnesses on both sides, and they were numerous as I
recall. They were probably twelve (12) to thirteen (13) depositions
taken.
Q. Now, the second paragraph in Respondent’s Exhibit 1,
refers to Miss Helton’s discharge. Were the questions asked during
the deposition about Miss Helton’s discharge in reference to this
paragraph? In Respondent’s Exhibit 1?
A. Well, as you know, they were in reference to your con-
struction of the paragraph which I strongly disagreed throughout the
proceedings, namely that the word after should be replaced by the
word, before on line 3 of the second paragraph.
Q. Okay, Did you also take depositions?
A. I did.
Q. And, do you recall how many you took?
A. I believe I took four (4) of them.
Q. Do you remember whose depositions you took?
A. John Johnson, Rudy Johnson, Don Kalfas and Suzie Gay,
I believe those were the only ones.
Q. During those depositions, did you ask questions which
were calculated to determine whether they had any knowledge of
Miss Helton’s union activities?
A. I asked questions after first making a preliminary statement
that because I was unsure of what Judge Rudell’s [sic] Order in-
dicated and because | was — because of your construction of this
paragraph, | was put in the position of having to defend it in the
liable [sic] actions, that I would go into that area, yes. I don’t think
I asked it of all of them, just a couple.
MR. KATZ: Your Honor, I'd like to move that Mr. Keenan's
testimony is non-responsive to the question, that | just asked and
also should be stricken. And, I'd ask that he respond to the specific
question that was asked.
JUDGE JENSON: I thought he did.
MR. KATZ: I didn’t ask him what his reasons were for asking
questions, I asked whether he asked the questions or not.
JUDGE JENSON: Well, denied. Go ahead.
BY MR. KATZ:
Q. Referring you to General Counsel’s Exhibit No. 2, Item
(g) is a transcript of proceedings on the Motion for Protective Order
before Judge Rudell [sic).
JUDGE JENSON: Which one now?
MR. KATZ: Item (g) in Exhibit No. 2.
BY MR. KATZ:
Q. Of that two (2) pages of that transcript include provisions
setting forth the Judge's ruling and begin on page 19, line 6, where
the Judge begins by saying, ‘*It will be my ruling,’ and that con-
tinues on to line 14, and then the Judge begins again on line 25,
and says, ‘“The ruling is as follows,’’ and then it goes over to the
next page line 15. I ask that you read that ruling for a moment to
refresh your recollection. Is that transcript a faithful reproduction
of the Judge’s ruling as you remember it?
67
A. Well, as I testified earlier, | wasn’t present at this hearing.
David Neiderdeppe was — it’s an accurate transcription of the
transcript I read several weeks ago.
Q. All right. When you participated in the depositions, and
I believe you testified that you were in each of the depositions that
Respondents took.
A. I believe so.
Q. Did the Respondents comply with that ruling of the Judge?
MR. PETTIBONE: Objection, Your Honor. He’s asking Mr.
Keenan to make a conclusion — to draw a legal conclusion. As Mr.
Keenan has stated, the parties are in disagreement as to whether the
questions posed by Respondent’s counsel in those depositions were
within the Order. Mr. Keenan has already testified to that, and for
Mr. Katz to ask him now, whether or not the questions the Re-
spondent complied is not only asking for a legal conclusion, but
asking a question that’s been asked and answered.
JUDGE JENSON: Wait a minute. He’s expressed an opinion
as to whether he has complied or not, now I'll permit it. Go ahead.
I don’t know what value it’s going to be but let’s find out. Overruled.
A. Will you repeat the question, please?
Q. The question is, during those depositions in which you
participated, did the Respondents in this matter comply with the
Judge’s Order as it appears in pages 19 and 20 of the transcript?
A. I'll preface that by saying that the Order of Judge Rudell’s
{sic] is unclear now as it was the first time I read it, and I’m not
sure exactly what she was saying. Both Mr. Katz and Miss Splain
did generally proceed [sic] any questions relating to what | consid-
ered material relevant to the 883 case by indicating that it wasn’t
their intention to get into the NLRB proceedings or any statements
given. However, in my opinion, the questions which were asked
thereafter did just that. And, the best way I can answer your question
about Judge Rudell’s (sic) Order is as I read the Order the questions
did go into matters which were subject of testimony at the NLRB
and I think I made that comment prior to answers to questions having
been given.
Q. Well, Judge Rudell’s [sic] Order states that on page 20 line
2, they may not inquire as to what statements were made to NLRB
investigators. Did the restaurant’s counsel in depositions ask about
what statement were made to the NLRB investigators?
A. No, but they both counsel did ask questions after | indicated
that certain statements had been made to the NLRB
I believe. That’s my recollection. And, I might point out, I guess
these aren’t a matter of record, but the it’s my opinion that both
parties made very special efforts to put on the record, during the
their positions concerning the applicability of Judge
Rudell’s [sic] Order to certain questions.
[Pages 61-63)
THEREUPON,
MRYLAND [sic] R. HELTON
was called as a witness by and on behalf of the General Counsel
and after having been sworn on oath, was examined and testified
as follows, to-wit:
JUDGE JENSON: Your name and home address please.
THE WITNESS: Mryland [sic] Ruth Helton, 1634 West An-
dorra Drive, Phoenix.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. PETTIBONE:
Q. Mrs. Helton, do you have any nicknames?
A. Yes, by [sic] nickname is **Bird’’.
JUDGE JENSON: You're going to have to talk louder.
[By Mr. Pettibone, Attorney for Board]
Q. Were you ever employed by Bill Johnson’s Restaurants?
[By Ruth Helton)
A. Yes, I was.
Q. Where?
A. At 3757 East Van Buren.
Q. Is that in Phoenix?
A. Yes.
Q. And, when were you first employed there?
A. I think it was the second month, the second day of "72,
I think.
Q. And until when were you employed there?
A. Until the 8th of August, 1978.
Q. Why was August 8, 1978 your last day?
A. I was fired.
[Pages 92-101]
Q.[By Mr. Pettibone, Attorney for Board] Calling your atten-
tion to September 20th of this year, what did you do that day?
A.[By Ruth Helton] We picketed the Big Apple.
Q. All right. Who was we?
A. Me, and Dale Michaud and Chery! Nichols and Car! Ni-
chols was there and Carla Marie Scott — guess Johnny Helton was
there for about fifteen (15) minutes.
Q. Okay, and you said the Big Apple, where?
A. The Big Apple Restaurant on 3757 East Van Buren.
Q. Had you picketed the restaurant before?
A. No, we hadn’t.
Q. Had you picketed any of the other Bill Johnsons restaurants
before?
70
A. No.
Q. Did you picket on other days?
A. Yes, we did.
Q. What did the sign say that you carried on any of the days
you picketed? Or that any of the picketers carried that you can
It said, boycott the Big Apple, Big Apple Little Manage-
ment, Big Apple rotten to its employees, Support your local wait-
ress, Boycott Big Apple, Big Apple unfair to waitresses, Big Apple
Prejudice, Unfair Labor Practice, it said the Big Apple has been
accused unfair labor practice, Complaint Number and gave the Com-
Q. Do you know why that was on the sign?
A. Yes, because it’s what they printed and — in a letter that
they passed out to the employees after I was fired.
Q. How many different signs were there do you recall
A. There was five (5) and then we turned one of them over
With whom?
Sherry Sturgeon, and she’s the day supervisor.
And, where was that conversation?
It was on the sidewalk in front of the restaurant.
You were picketing at the time?
Yes, we were.
Okay, can you please tell us how that conversation arose?
. We was — we had been there about fifteen (15) minutes
afer we estived. I think it was around 9:00 or 9:15, it was about
>O>L>O PO:
71
the time that she came on. And, this truck had stopped just inside
the driveway and it asked us what we was doing. We told him we
was boycotting the Big Apple. And, he said he had been there earlier
that day and hadn't saw us and we —
Q. Who's he — I'm sorry to interrupt, who's he?
A. — the customer.
Q. Is that the fellow in the truck?
A. Right.
Q. All right. Please continue.
A. Okay, and we told him if he wanted to talk, park his truck
and come back and talk to us. And, before he had a chance to pull
away, Sherry came out and said don’t block my fuckin driveways
and we said we're not blocking your driveways and she said, and
get the fuck off my property. And, I said I’m not on your property,
but if it will make you happy, you know, we've been walking across
the driveways, not stopping and then walking back, and | said, if
it will make you happy we'll stay right here in front and not cross
the driveways. And, she said, you might think you're funny, but
I intend to have the last laugh. And, she said, I will get even with
you for what you're doing to us. And, I said, don’t threaten us,
Sherry. And then, she walked across and she had a paper and she
said to Debby Makey, who the hell are you. And Debby said, I'm
Debby Makey, I used to work here. And then she said to Dale, and
who are you. And, Dale told her her name and she said, you're
going to all pay for this. And, she said, and Debby, you and Dale
as my witness, Ruth i'l] get even with you if it’s the last thing I do.
And I do intend to have the last laugh. And, I just told her don’t
threaten us again. And, she started back across the parking lot. And,
she stopped about half way across and looked back, and she said,
is these your right names, I think is what she said. And, I said yeah,
and there’s some more coming down, do you want their names too.
And, she said, no this will be enough. And, then she went on inside.
Q. Were you laughing at the time?
A. No, I wasn’t laughing. I was scared.
Q. I'm sorry I didn’t hear you?
A. I said, she scared me.
72
Q. Okay, you testified that you had been walking across the
driveways, and you had been walking on the sidewalk. Does the
sidewalk continue across that driveway?
A. Yes.
Q. How many driveways are there there?
A. Two (2).
Q. Okay, and when you walked across the driveway, did you
walk across on the sidewalk or off the sidewalk?
A. On the sidewalk.
Q. On the days that you picketed the Bill Johnsons by the way
did you picket other Bill Johnson's restaurants besides this one?
A. After, yes we did.
JUDGE JENSON: Let me ask one here. On the time that you
picketed on September 18th that you related here, were you
handbilling?
THE WITNESS: Well, I think first it was the 20th, no we
didn’t handbill.
And did you handbill on any occasions after that?
The 22nd and the next following Tuesday.
Q. Okay, and have there been any other occasions that you
handbilled that you can recall?
A. Since — I’m not sure which day we had the hearing on
the TRO, but we did two (2) days after that.
Q. About when, what month?
>Ooreorere
7
73
A. It was in November.
Q. And, you say the hearing of the TRO, is that when did
you first find out about the TRO?
A. TRO?
Q. Yes.
A. I found out about it Monday, the 25th of September.
Q. And, when you say the hearing on the TRO, you're re-
ferring to that date?
A. No, I'm talking about after we went to Court on it, which
was in November.
Q. Okay. Ruth, I’m going to show you Respondent’s Exhibit
No. 1 and ask you is that a copy of the handbill that you distributed?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. Thank you. You testified that you picketed on the 20th.
Did you picket on the 21st? Of September?
A. Yes.
How about the 22nd?
Yes.
How about the 23rd?
No.
How about the 24th?
No, not on the weekend.
Q. Okay, how about the 25th?
A. No, we didn’t picket that day either.
Q. Why not?
A. We got sued that day.
Q. How did you find out about the sued?
A. Larry Katz called me at home. Okay, first Carla had called.
Q. Carla who?
A. Carla Marie Scott.
>O>O >
74
Q. Okay, about what time did she call you?
A. It was about — I think about ten till eleven.
Q. Okay, what time did Larry Katz call you?
A. I think it was about ten after eleven somewhere around
there.
Q. Okay, why don’t you tell us what he said to you. Excuse
me, yes, on the phone. Go ahead.
A. Well, he said that there was going to be a hearing in Judge
Rudell’s [sic] Court and he gave me the courtroom and the number
or whatever, and I think he asked me if I had a pen and was writing
it down and I said, no wait a minute, I'll get one, and | got one.
Did he say when that hearing was?
He said it was for 12:00 o'clock.
What day?
That day.
Please continue.
. And, I think that’s when I said, is that today, and he said,
yes. And, I said something about what would happen if I couldn't
make it, and he said, could I get a hold of my husband and could
he make it. That he was a defendant in it too.
Q.. Who said that?
A. Mr. Katz.
Q. Okay, please continue.
A. And then he said, did I want to know who the defendants
were. And, I said, yeah, okay. So, he read them off the nine (9)
defendants, Barbara Orr, Larry Orr and I guess — when he read
off all of the defendants, I recognized them as being the ones that
picketed but I didn’t say anything and he said, anything else. And,
I said you shouldn’t be scaring those girls like that. And, he said,
aren’t you. And, —
Q. Was that in response to your statement that come right
after in time?
A. Yeah.
zrororo
75
Q. And, what was that again?
A. Aren’t you.
Q. What else was said?
A. I said, no. And, he said, any more questions, and he said
do you think you could get a hold of your husband and I said, yes,
I think I can. And, he said thank you very much and he hung up.
Q. Okay, did you attend the hearing at 12:00 that day that he
Q. Why not?
A. Cause I just got out of the shower. My hair was wet and
it’s like a forty-five (45) minute drive almost to downtown from
where I live on 19th Avenue, and there was no way I| could have
made it.
Q. I assume then that the courthouse is downtown?
A. Pardon?
Q. I assume that the courthouse is downtown?
A. Yeah, the one that he gave me. I think it was on Jefferson
or one of those streets.
MR. PETTIBONE: Your Honor, I would ask if the Respon-
dent’s counsel will stipulate that this is the Ruth Helton named in
JUDGE JENSON: If this is the what?
MR. PETTIBONE: The Ruth Helton named in the civil com-
plaint, and also it’s the Ruth Helton named — whose deposition is
included — well, it’s not in evidence yet. If it is eventually in
evidence, it is the same Ruth Helton whose deposition is included
in General Counsel's 2.
MR. KATZ: Yeah.
JUDGE JENSON: All right fine. Is your deposition here in
total or it is?
MR. PETTIBONE: It’s the portions, Your Honor. Of (h). Your
Honor, I have no further questions of Mrs. Helton at this time.
76
[Page 103]
CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. KATZ [Attorney for Restaurant):
[Pages 131-38]
Q.[By Mr. Katz, Attorney for Restaurant] Okay. Let’s go to
September 20th now, which is of course, after you were terminated,
September 20, 1978. On that day you began your picketing and
your demonstrations in front of the restaurant, correct?
A.[By Ruth Helton] Correct.
Q. Do you remember how many of you were engaged in the
picketing on that day, September 20th?
A. What do you mean by engaged in the picketing? How
many was there?
Q. How many were in the demonstration? How many of you
participated?
A. There was me and Carla Marie Scott, and Dale Michaud,
and Debby Makey and Cheyri Nichols and Carl Nichols, and John
Helton.
Q. For some period of time, at least, you were crossing the
restaurant’s driveways, were you not, walking back and forth on
the sidewalk?
A. Yes, we were.
Q. And, there was some period of time also, was there not,
when you were talking to customers who were driving in and out
of the driveways? You would talk to them as they drove in and out,
is that correct?
A. We said, hi, you know.
Q. You testified that on one occasion there was a truck in the
entrance way in the driveway, and you were talking to the driver
when Sherry Sturgeon came out of the restaurant.
A. He wasn’t actually in the entrance way. He was over to
the side of the entrance way.
77
Q. Well, was he in the driveway to the parking lot?
A. Yes.
Q. And, you were talking to him while he was in that
driveway?
A. One of us was. I’m not sure if it was me or Dale.
Q. Were you and Dale both standing next to the truck at that
time?
A. We were standing at that end of the sidewalk but we wasn’t
standing next to the truck.
Q. Anybody else besides you or Dale?
A. Debby was there, but I think she was back up the other
end.
Q. On any other occasion on September 20th did you talk to
customers who were going in and out of the driveways?
A. As they went in and out, you mean talk to them by what
we — you mean by talk to them we said hi to them. We told them
to park the car, come over and talk to us and a couple of them did.
We did talk to them as they went in and out.
Q. How many of you had signs?
A. Five (5).
Q. Did you observe any of the demonstrators waving those
signs in any fashion in front of people who were driving out or in
the driveway?
A. No, I didn’t.
Q. Did you observe any of the demonstrators lowering their
signs as people would come into the driveway?
A. Only if they asked to read it.
Q. Did that occur from time to time?
A. Every once in a while someone would say, what does it
say, and they’d hold it down so they could read it.
Q. And, these might be people coming in the driveway, these
people you're talking about.
78
A. Yeah.
Q. You also continued to do picketing on September 21st,
correct?
A. Yes.
Q. You engaged in the same kind of activities you've just
described that took place on the 20th?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you remember an incident on September 21st when
one of the demonstrators yelled Uncle Tom to one of the persons
coming out of the restaurant?
A. Yes.
Q. Could you describe that incident? What took place?
A. I was at the other end of the sidewalk. You want me to
describe it from the beginning?
Q. From the beginning of that particular incident, yes.
A. A lady came up and said something to Carl and my husband
and they said let me see the list you have, and as I started over that
way, a lady said she didn’t want to see any damn list and she went
on into the restaurant. And, I said, what was that all about, and
they said, she just said that she didn’t think the Big Apple was
prejudice. And, then a couple of minutes later, she came to the front
door and she had her little black busboy and I understand her to
say, does this look like prejudice to you. And, one of the girls yelled
Uncle Tom.
Q. And, who was that who yelled Uncle Tom?
A. I think it was Cheryl Nichols.
Q. Was she one of the defendants subsequently in the lawsuit?
A. Yes, she was.
Q. On September 22nd, you also engaged in picketing right?
A. Yes, we did.
. And, on September 22nd you began distributing the leaflets
that has been introduced as Respondent’s Exhibit 1?
A. Yes.
©
79
Q. Do you know roughly how many of those leaflets you
A. I’m not sure. I think we took about a hundred (100). We
may have passed out eighty (80) or ninety (90) I’m not sure.
Q. And, you distributed that leaflet on subsequent occasions,
also?
A. Tuesday morning for an hour.
Q. Which was after the lawsuit was filed?
A. Yes, it was.
Q. And, in fact you distributed that leaflet again, just a few
weeks ago, or several days ago?
A. Yes.
Q. The incident you described which — with Sherry Sturgeon
according to your testimony she said among other things, I'll have
the last laugh. You'll all pay for this, and so forth. Other than the
demonstrators, was there anyone around who might have heard her
make those statements?
A. No, there was only three (3) of us there at the time.
Q. Other than that one particular incident, did you ever speak
to Sherry Sturgeon again during your demonstrations?
A. No, I didn’t.
Q. Did any other representative of maneqement or agent of
management make any similar statements or quote, threats, unquote,
to you? Similar to the one made by Sherry Sturgeon?
A. No.
Q. That was the only occasion on which it happened?
A. To me, yes.
Q. You testified that you got notification from me that a hear-
ing was going to be held in Judge Rudell’s [sic] Courtroom at about
12:00 o’clock on, I forget the day it was — November 5, I believe?
A. Correct.
Q. How —
MR. PETTIBONE: Objection, Your Honor. That’s not what
the testimony was. September 25th.
BY MR. KATZ:
Q. I'm sorry, September 25th. You received a telephone call
from me telling you that the hearing was going to be held at 12:00
o'clock. You said before you received the phone call from me, you
got a call from Carla Scott. Did she tell you that she had been
notified? By me, about the lawsuit?
A. She said she had to go to Court, yes.
Q. Did she tell you she’d been notified by me?
A. Yes.
Q. And, did she say anything about the conversation I had
with her?
A. Just that it was something about a TR something and she
didn’t really know what it was and she didn’t really know what was
going on.
Q. All right. But other than that, she didn’t say anything about
my conversation with her?
A. I don’t think so.
Q. Okay. You did not appear at that hearing on the 25th did
you?
A. No, I didn’t.
Q. But your husband was there, was he not?
A. Yes, he was.
Q. Do you know who else was there?
MR. PETTIBONE: Objection, Your Honor. She wasn’t there,
how does she know?
MR. KATZ: Well, the witness has not said that she doesn’t
know. If she doesn’t know, well, she can say that. But, I presume
she’s —
JUDGE JENSON: Well, he asked do you know who else was
there, and then I suppose we'll find out how she know. Okay.
A. I know who they said was there.
81
Q. Did John tell you he was there?
A. Yes, he told me.
Q. And, did he tell you who else was there?
A. He told me that Carla Marie Scott and Debby Makey was
there.
(Pages 215-16]
THEREUPON,
DALE MICHAUD
was called as a witness by and on behalf of the General Counsel,
and after having been duly sworn on oath, was examined and tes-
tified as follows, to-wit:
JUDGE JENSON: Give your name, spell your last name and
give us your home address.
THE WITNESS: Dale Michaud, M-I-C-H-A-U-D 1816 North
Staton Street.
JUDGE JENSON: All right off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
JUDGE JENSON: Back on the record.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. PETTIBONE:
Dale, have you ever worked for Bill Johnsons Restaurants?
Yes.
Where?
Down on Van Buren.
Is that at 3757 East Van Buren?
Yes.
Q. Starting when?
A. I think it was in February of °78.
Q. Until when?
FOP OPO
A. Till September of "78.
Q. Do you remember what day in September?
A. The 18th, I think.
Q. In what capacity did you work?
A. Waitress.
[Pages 227-230]
Q.[By Mr. Pettibone, Attorney for Board] Calling your atten-
tion to September 20th, of this year. What did you do that day?
A.[By Dale Michaud] Picketed.
Q. Who's we?
A. It was Debby Makey, Cheryl Nichols, Carla Scott, Ruth
Helton and myself.
Q. Did all of those people that you mentioned picket in —
at the same time during the day?
A. No.
Q. Where did you picket that day?
A. The Big Apple on Van Buren.
Q. Okay, and you had picketed a Bill Johnsons Restaurant
before?
A. No.
Q. That day, did you have any conversations with any Bill
Johnsons supervisor?
Q. When was that?
A. it was about half hour after we were out there picketing.
Q. About what time of day is that?
A. 9:30.
Q. Which supervisor did you have a conversation with?
A. Sherry Johnson.
Q. And, who was picketing at that time?
A. There was Debby Makey, Ruth Helton and myself.
Was anyone else present during that conversation?
Two (2) customers. We were talking to.
Where were they?
They were in the driveway.
Were they standing there?
. No, they had a truck. They were parked in the driveway.
. Can you tell us what was said in that conversation?
. Well, we were talking to the customers and Sherry came
up behind us and told us that we weren't supposed to be blocking
her driveway, so we turned around and walked away. And, then she
followed us and she says, —
Q. Go ahead tell us exactly what she said.
A. She said, what the fuck are you guys doing. So, we didn’t
say nothing to her and she says, you fuckin guys think you're funny.
And, she looked at Ruth and she told Ruth that she was going to
pay for what she was doing to her, what Ruth was doing to them
and I told her, I said, well, Sherry you don’t have to swear at us.
And, she looked at Debby because she thought Debby Makey had
said that, and she said, who the hell are you. And, Debby told her
and she said — she pointed at Debby and | and she said, you two
are my witnesses for what’s going to happen. Then she said she'd
get the last laugh.
. Who'd she say that to?
. To all of us, I guess.
Q
A
Q. Did she say what was going to happen?
A
Q
A.
POP OPO PO
. No, she didn’t.
. What happened after that?
She turned around and walked away, and then she gave
us the finger and walked inside the building.
Q. When you say gave us the finger, what do you mean? You
don’t have to show us, but what do you mean?
A. Well, she put her middle finger up.
Q. Okay, and where was she at the time?
A. She was in the middle of the parking lot.
is the Dale Michaud named in the civil complaint and whose de-
position was also taken in that case?
BY MR. PETTIBONE:
Q. Have you seen the civil complaint filed against you and
other defendants?
A. Yes.
q. By Bill Johnsons Restaurants?
A. Yes.
Q. When you saw that complaint for the first time, did you
have a reaction to it?
A. Yes.
Q. What was your reaction?
A. I was really scared and I didn’t really know what was going
on. And, I just thought I'd go to jail or something.
[Pages 239-40]
Q.[By Mr. Katz, Attorney for Restaurant] Were you aware
that the handbill, Respondent’s Exhibit 1 which I am now showing
you, which the Judge is giving you a copy of, were you aware that
this was going to be distributed on September 22nd?
A.[By Dale Michaud) Well, Ruth had called me on the phone
and she told me the things we had marked down and I agreed to
them, like you know when they were going to be distributed.
Q. Had you ever been the object of unwarranted sexual
advances?
A. No, but I had heard.
Q. The question was whether you have ever been the object?
A. No.
Q. All right, and did you tell Ruth that?
A. Yes. .
(Pages 247-48]
CHERYL NICHOLS
was called as a witness by and on behalf of the General Counsel
and after having been duly sworn on oath was examined and testified
as follows, to-wit:
JUDGE JENSON: Your name?
THE WITNESS: Cheryl Nichols.
JUDGE JENSON: And, spell your name for us.
THE WITNESS: C-H-E-R-Y-L, N-I-C-H-O-L-S.
JUDGE JENSON: And, your home address, please.
THE WITNESS: 15601 North 19th Avenue.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. PETTIBONE:
. Cheryl, have you ever worked for Bill Johnsons restaurants?
Yes, I have.
Where?
On East Van Buren.
That’s 3757 East Van Buren?
Yes, it is.
In what capacity did you work there?
I was a waitress.
[Pages ~*9-60]
Q.[By Mr. Pettibone, Attorney for F wd] Calling your atten-
tion to September 20th of this year, wha «id you do that day?
A.[By Cheryl Nichols] I picketed the restaurant.
Q. What restaurant?
POP OPO ?PO
A. On East Van Buren.
Q. Bill Johnsons restaurant?
A. Yes.
Q. The one you used to work?
A. Right.
Q. Did you picket alone?
A. No, I did not.
Q. Who did you picket with?
A. Carla Scott, Dale Michaud, Ruth Helton, Debby Makey
and my husband, Carl.
Q. Were you there all day?
. I was there — I believe I arrived at around 11:00 o'clock.
. Had you picketed a Bill Johnsons restaurant before?
is the Cheryl Nichols named as the defen*ant in the lawsuit?
MR. KATZ: This is the Cheryl Nichols.
MR. PETTIBONE: All right.
[Pages 299-304}
CARL NICHOLS
was called as a witness by and on behalf of the General Counsel
and after having been first duly sworn on oath, was examined and
testified as follows, to-wit:
JUDGE JENSON: Give us your name, spell your name and
your home address, please.
THE WITNESS: My name is Carl Nichols, N-I-C-H-O-L-S.
I live at 15601 North 19th Avenue, Space Number 164. That's
Phoenix, Arizona.
87
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. PETTIBONE:
Q. Carl, are you related to Chery! Nichols?
A. Yes, sir. I am her husband.
Q. And, calling your attention to September 20th of this year,
what did you do that day?
A. I was involved in a picket in front of Bill Johnsons Res-
taurant on East Van Buren.
Q. Is that at 3757 East Van Buren?
A. Yes.
Q. Were you alone?
A. No, I was not.
JUDGE JENSON: Are you an employee or have you been an
employee of the — Big Apple, is that what it is?
THE WITNESS: No, sir.
BY MR. PETTIBONE:
Q. Who else was with you when you were picketing?
A. Ruth Helton, my wife, Cheryl, Dale Michaud, Debby
Makey and Carla Scott.
Q. Did you and Cheyrl [sic] arrive there together that day?
A. Yes, we did.
Q. Had you picketed a Bill Johnsons restaurant before?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you picket any Bill Johnsons restaurant on any sub-
sequent occasions? That is later occasions?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know some of the Bill Johnson supervisors?
A. Yes, sir. I do.
Q. Have you had any conversations with any Bill Johnson
supervisor, excuse me, on that day did you have any conversations
with any Bill Johnson supervisor about the picketing?
A. Yes, sir, I did.
Q. With whom did you have the conversation?
A. With Jean Johnson.
When? 7
It was approximately 3:30 in the afternoon.
Where were you?
I was in the living room of my house.
And, how did she happen to talk to you. That is was she
No, she talked to me over the telephone.
Who called who?
Jean called me.
Okay, would you please relate to us that conversation?
it to me and said there is a lady that would like to talk to you. And,
I asked her who it was, and she said, she didn’t know. I answered
the phone and the voice identified themselves as Jean Johnson. And,
she asked how I was doing. I said fine. And, she said, why were
we out in front of her restaurant that day. And, I said because of
Ruth’s firing and the girls felt that they weren't being treated fairly.
And, —
Q. Do you recall anything else in that conversation?
A. Yes, she said I’ve always been fair to all of my girls.
Q. Okay, what was said after that if you recall?
A. I said I don’t believe it’s you that they’re upset with. And,
she said, who are they upset with, then. And, I said with Johnny
Johnson and some of the other managers. And, she asked why. And,
I told her because of the way Johnny conducted the July 25th meeting
of 1978. And, I then told her that he told the girls that if he didn’t
like the earings they wore that he could fire them. And, that he
referred to them as peons.
FOP OP ~OPOPO
Q. In telling this to Jean Johnson, did you say when Johany
Johnson supposedly made this remark?
A. I'm sorry, could you repeat the question?
Q. Yes. In telling that to Jean Johnson, in telling her what
Johnny Johnson had said, did you tell her when he supposedly made
that remark?
A. Yes, I told her it was at the meeting on July 25th.
Q. Do you recall anything else said in that conversation?
A. Yes, we — she said that she would hate to see us lose that
new home we bought, on one occasion. She said that she would
sure hate to see — excuse me. She said that she would hate to see
us get hurt by all of this. She said that twice during the conversation.
She also said that she was going to take over management of the
restaurant.
Q. Did she mention your wife in that conversation?
A. Yes, I believe she did.
Q. Do you recall in what context your wife’s name was
mentioned?
A. I believe she said that she felt she was a very sweet girl.
Q. Did she mention Ruth Helton in that conversation?
A. Yes, she did.
MR. KATZ: Your Honor, I think that the last several questions
have been leading questions. I think that general Counsel should
ask what was said in the conversation by whom to whom and not
lead the witness down every subject that was in the conversation
or not in.
MR. PETTIBONE: Your Honor, I asked a number of that type
of question, what was said and | think I’ve adequately exhausted
the witness’s recollection on that.
JUDGE JENSON: Overruled, go ahead.
BY MR. PETTIBONE:
Q. What was said about Ruth Helton?
A. She said that Ruth had nothing to worry about. That her
husband could support her.
JUDGE JENSON: Well, how did the subject of Ruth come
up?
THE WITNESS: When she said that she would — I believe
when she said that she would hate to see us get hurt by all of this.
JUDGE JENSON: Go ahead.
BY MR. PETTIBONE:
Q. Do you recall anything else during that conversation?
A. Not at the present time, no.
Q. Do you recall what preceded the remark about your house?
A. No, I do not.
Q. Can you tell us if that was in the beginning or the end of
the conversation or the middle?
A. It was in the middle of the conversation, as | remember.
MR. PETTIBONE: Will you stipulate that this Carl Nichols
is the same Carl Nichols in the civil suit as named defendant whose
deposition was also taken?
MR. KATZ: Yes, I will.
MR. PETTIBONE: Okay, that’s very kind of you.
[Pages 306-09]
Q.[By Mr. Katz, Attorney for Restaurant] Was the conver-
sation cordial?
A.[By Carl Nichols] Yes, it was.
Q. Pleasant and friendly?
A. She seemed slightly upset when she was first talking to me
but as the conversation went on she seemed to be calming down a
little bit.
Q. From the whole tone of the conversation did you get the
idea that she was trying to smooth over things and hopefully get
91
any kind of demonstrations or whatever to diminish against the
restaurant?
A. Yes.
Q. Did she express concern for how the situation might effect
you and Cheryl?
A. No, except for the fact that she said she would hate to see
us get hurt, by all of this.
Q. Did you understand that concern as expressed in that state-
ment to be genuine concern?
A. I'm not sure how she meant it.
Q. How did you think she did?
A. I had mixed feelings about it.
Q. Well, I mean did you go on and say, oh, sure common
[sic], you don’t mean that, you’re just trying to get us. Or, did the
conversation proceed in an more pleasant fashion?
A. The conversation proceeded, yes, in a pleasant fashion.
[Pages 317-18]
THEREUPON,
CARLA SCOTT
was called as a witness by and on behalf of the General Counsel,
and after having been duly sworr on oath was examined and testified
as follows, to-wit:
JUDGE JENSON: Your name, spell your name for us and
your home address, please.
THE WITNESS: My name is Carla Scott, C-A-R-L-A
S-C-O-T-T. My address is 1050 North 46th Street, D43.
JUDGE JENSON: Keep your voice up, Miss Scott so we can
all hear you.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. PETTIBONE:
Q. Carla, have you ever worked for Bill Johnson's Restau-
rants, Inc.?
Q.[By Mr. Pettibone, Attorney for Board] Calling your at-
tention to September 20th of this year, what did you do on that day?
A.[By Carla Scott] We started boycotting the Big Apple
>OPOrOPrPOrO PO?
Yes, I have.
Where?
It was on the east side, on Van Buren.
Is that at 3757 East Van Buren?
. Yes, it is.
. When did you first start working there?
It was in August of "77.
And, when did you last work there?
September of 78.
Do you recall what day in September?
The 18th.
In what capacity did you work there?
As a waitress.
(Pages 328-30)
Restaurant.
Q.
you do?
A
>O>O>?>0
When you say boycotting what do you mean? What did
We carried signs on the sidewalk there.
Okay, the sidewalk where?
In front of Bill Johnsons.
The same one we’ve been talking about?
Right.
Okay, and who is we?
Debby Makey, Cheryl Nichols, Cheryl did not come until
later, Dale Michaud, Ruth Helton and I.
Q.
About what time of day did you start to, as you say, boycott
the Big Apple?
93
A. We started at 8:00 o'clock.
Q. And, at the time — well, strike that. Had you ever picketed
a Bill Johnson’s Restaurant before?
A. No.
Q. Were you — did you stay at that restaurant during the
entire time other people were there as far as you know?
A. Yes. Except for one time I left for about an hour.
Q. Okay, do you recall when you left?
A. I believe it was around 9:00 o'clock.
Q. Did you picket any Bill Johnson’s restaurants prior to this
day?
A. No.
Q. And, have you picketed any Bill Johnson’s restaurants after
that day?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you do anything besides picket on any of those days?
A. We handed out handbills.
Q. Okay, do you recall approximately how many times you
did that?
A. I believe it was two (2) times, two (2) or three (3) times.
[Pages 338—40]
Q.[By Mr. Katz, Attorney for Restaurant] Do you remember
when the lawsuit was filed in State Court by the restaurant against
those who demonstrated?
A.[By Carla Scott] Yes. I don’t remember what day it was,
no.
Q. Do you recall being notified?
A. Yes.
Q. Being notified before the first hearing in that lawsuit that
it was going to be a hearing?
A. Yes.
94
Q. Do you remember who notified you?
A. You did, I believe.
Q. By me, you mean Larry Katz, attorney for the Respondent,
A. Right.
Q. And, was there anything particular about that conversation
that stays in your mind?
A. Just that I was to be at court at 12:00 o'clock for the hearing
or what —
Q. Was I courteous and polite during the conversation?
A. Yes.
Q. Was there any indication in the conversation that | was
trying to frighten you or anything like that?
A. Not really.
Q. Okay. Did you then call Ruth Helton after that conversation
with me?
A. Yes.
And, you told her what had happened?
Yes.
Did you appear at that hearing?
Yes.
Q. And, did you testify at that hearing?
A. Yes.
Q. And, that was the only period in which Judge Rudell [sic]
was deciding whether or not she was going to grant a Temporary
Restraining Order against certain aspects of the conduct of the dem-
onstrators, right?
A. Right.
Q. And, who else was at that hearing for the defendants?
A. Debby Makey, and John Helton.
Q. John Helton is Ruth Helton’s husband?
> OP?
A. Right.
A. And, did they all testify?
A. Yes.
Q. And, in fact a Temporary Restraining Order was issued
by the Judge after that, was it not?
A. Yes.
[Pages 663-64)
LOIS WILLIAMS
was called as a witness by and on behalf of the Respondent
and having been duly sworn on oath, was examined and testified
as follows, to-wit:
JUDGE JENSON: Be seated, and state your name, please?
THE WITNESS: Lois Williams.
JUDGE JENSON: Your home address, please?
THE WITNESS: 2825 East Cara.
JUDGE JENSON: Go ahead.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. KATZ:
Q. Miss Williams, are you now or have you been related to
Rudy Johnson, one of the owners of the Big Apple Restaurant?
A. Yes, I was.
Q. And, what was the relationship?
A. I wes his wife.
Q. Now, we've used the names Lois Johuson and Lois Wil-
liams interchangeably in this hearing in the past. We'll refer to you
as Lois Williams? Okay?
A. Okay.
Q. Are you currently employed?
A. Yes, I am.
Q. And, by whom are you employed?
A. Bill Johnson's Restaurants.
Q. Howlong have you been working for the restaurant now?
A. Approximately ten (10) years.
Q. Are you in a supervisory or managerial capacity?
A. Yes, I am.
[Pages 679-84)
Q.[By Mr. Katz, Attorney for Restaurant] Do you remember
when the picketing began in front of the Big Apple Restaurant?
A.[By Lois Williams] I believe it was approximately Septem-
ber 20th.
Q. And, did you observe the picketing?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Would you tell us what you observed on September 20th
with regard to the picketing and demonstrations?
A. I observed the girls walking in front, tipping their signs
in front of cars. Cars had to stop because they couldn't — they had
to stop in order to read the signs and they would move the signs.
I observed them going into the driveway to discuss — to talk to
people ix cars. | observed a delivery truck that had to stop because
a car was stopped in front of it.
Q. All right, now let me ask you to be a little more specific
about the whos and the whens and so forth. Who did you see
participating in the picketing and the demonstrating on September
20th?
A. Ruth Helton, Carla Scott, Debra Mackay, Dale Michaud
and Cheryl Nichols arrived later.
Q. All right. Was there any males involved in the picketing?
A. Yes, sir. Carl Nichols and for a brief time, John Helton.
97
Q. Now, you described the picketers dipping their signs in
front of cars coming into the driveway. Who did you observe doing
that and on how many occasions? On September 20th?
A. I observed Ruth doing it, probably —
Q. Who?
A. Ruth.
Q. Ruth Helton.
A. Ruth Helton doing it twice and probably Carla doing it
twice.
Q. You described a delivery truck that had to stop before it
go into the driveway, could you be a little more specific about that
incident? What caused the truck to stop and what you observed?
A. There was a car stopped in the west driveway. I don’t
remember what type of a delivery truck. I believe it vas linen, but
the car was stopped in the driveway. There wasn’t any way for the
delivery truck to get around the car. They were talking to the driver
of the vehicle and the delivery truck could not get into the driveway,
until they were through talking and the car moved.
Q. About how long did that take?
A. Oh, maybe two (2) or three (3) minutes.
Q. All right. Based on your personal knowledge, would you
in front of your restaurant on Van Buren?
A. Well, it’s very heavy.
Q. It’s very heavy with what?
A. Traffic and pedistrian.
Q. Why is it heavy with pedistrian traffic there? Does it have
something to do with the area? Would you describe the area?
A. Yes, we are right next door to the Ramada Inn. The Ramada
Inn Executive Offices are across the street, which constitute a lot
of foot traffic. It — the restaurant is set between numerous motels.
There’s a Ramada Inn on one side. The Arizona Palms on the other.
And, other smaller hotels along Van Buren. The tourists or even
not tourists, a lot of people that work for us or have worked for us
in the past, lived in these places. Don’t have vehicles and will walk
along the sidewalk.
Q. You have two (2) driveways, leading to the restaurant, do
you not?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How much sidewalk space is there between the two (2)
driveways, do you know approximately?
A. Sixty (60) feet.
Q. Sixty (60) feet worth. Are there any kind of greenery or
shrubs along the side, the sidewalks?
A. Yes, there are. There’s the Van Buren beautification plan
they put in there are trees and shrubs between the edge of our
property, the sidewalk and the street.
Q. Now, in coming and going from work, you drive in and
out of those driveways, right?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Do those shrubs and trees effect driver’s ability to see the
streets at all?
A. Yes, they do.
Q. Did it effect your ability did you observe that?
A. Yes, it does.
Q. In what way?
A. The manner in which the trees are placed forces you to
— if you’re leaving from the west driveway, you have to pull out
alr’ st into traffic to be able to see around the trees, which puts you
just right on the edge of traffic to where you're blocking — actually
you're blocking the sidewalk but enable (sic) to see. Also, on the
other side, is the Ramada Inn that has a very large bogenvia [sic],
I believe it is, and you have to pull out a little farther to see in the
other direction.
Q. All right, now when you have driven in or out of those
driveways, is your ability to see up and down the street effected at
all by pedestrians on the sidewalk?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. In what way is it affected?
A. Well, it’s obstructed if there’s pedestrians you know, the
little bit of leeway you have for the shrubbery then if a pedestrian
is there also, then it is obstructed that much more.
Q. Now, you know a lawsuit was filed by the restaurant on
or about September 25, 19787
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Did you participate at all in the decision to file that lawsuit?
A. No, I did not.
MR. KATZ: That’s all for me, Your Honor.
CROSS EXAMINATION
[Pages 690-92]
Q.[By Mr. Pettibone, Attorney for Board] We testified to hav-
ing seen vehicles stopped in the driveway —
A.[By Lois Williams] Yes, sir
Q. And the pickets talking to the occupants of vehicles.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Such vehicles parked in the driveway. Did you see any of
those vehicles actually stopped?
Yes, sir.
How many?
Ah, four, approximately.
And the occupants then talked with the pickets?
Yes, sir
. At the time you were making your observations and were
watching the pickets Rudo [sic] Johnson was watching the pickets
as well, was he not?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And he was out in front near the sidewalk watching the
pickets, was he not?
a i a
A. Yes, sir.
Q. That was the entire time you were watching he was also
watching, is that correct?
A. I believe so, except he was also watching during the lunch
hour when I was busy inside the restaurant.
Q. You testified that the girls were out in front, walking in
front. I assume you mean on the sidewalk.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Could you tell if customers were reading the signs when
the girls were dipping them?
A. Yes.
Q. I take it that the signs as they were being carried by the
girls would have been higher than the roof of the vehicles unless
they were dipped, is that true?
A. Yes, sir.
JUDGE JENSON: When you speak of dipping, you mean they
were holding the sign up vertically and then they just lowered it
vertically?
THE WITNESS: No, sir. They would — the cars would pull
in the driveway. They would tip them towards the cars.
JUDGE JENSON: Towards the cars, or over the cars, or what?
THE WITNESS: On occasion towards the cars to where the
drive would be — there would be no way that the driver could not
read the sign. Occasionally they would put them down so low that
the cars would have to stop.
BY MR. PETTIBONE:
Q. It’s your testimony that those signs were placed on occasion
in front of those cars?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How many times?
A. Maybe two (2), thr-e (3) times.
Q. Who did it, who was the picket?
101
A. I believe Ruth Helton did it on one occasion with the
delivery truck. That’s why the delivery truck could not get in. That’s
why I specifically remember that incident.
Q. It wasn’t in front of the delivery truck was it?
A. No, it was in front of a car that was in front of the delivery
truck.
Q. All right, What other picket?
A. Cheryl Nichols, on the opposite end.
[Pages 702-03)
SHERRY STURGEON
was called as a witness by and on behalf of the Respondent
and having been duly sworn on oath, was examined and testified
as follows, to-wit:
JUDGE JENSON: Be seated. Your name, please and your
home address.
THE WITNESS: Sherry Sturgeon, 8205 North Second Drive.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. KATZ:
Q. Sherry, what is your current employment?
What is my employment?
Yes.
I’m employed at Bill Johnson’s Big Apple.
In what capacity?
Manager.
Are you a member of the Johnson family?
Yes, I am.
> OF? OO? © Pp
102
(Pages 712-16]
Q.[By Mr. Katz, Attorney for Restaurant] Do you remember
when the picketing began in front of the Big Apple Restaurant
eastside?
A.[By Sherry Sturgeon] It was September —
Q. There’s a calendar there if you need help to refreshen your
recollection.
It was September the 20th wasn’t it.
Is that when you believe it was?
Yeah.
Did you observe the picketing going on?
Yeah.
When was the first time you observed picketing?
. Well, one of the waitresses were coming on duty and one
of the girls drawed it to my attention. She said what is going on out
front. And, I said I don’t know, has there been an accident? And,
so I got up and looked out the window and I noticed the three (3)
Q. And, what did you do?
A. I came back and called Larry Katz.
Q. That’s me.
A. Right.
Q. And, you and I talked on the phone about it?
A. Right.
Q. And, what did you do then? During or after our phone
conversation with respect to the picketing?
A. I went out to read what the signs said and to find out who
the three (3) girls were because I didn’t recognize one of them.
Q. Why did you do that?
A. At your request.
Q. And, what did you observe when you went out there?
POP OP OP
A. They had a car blocking the driveway.
Q. Can you be a little more specific about who the they was
A. Dale Michaud, Debby Mackay and Ruth Helton were all
three (3) standing and there was a car stopped right in the middle
of the driveway. And, they were talking to the man inside the car.
And, what did you do?
I went over there and told them to get out of the driveway.
Did you nse profane language?
Yes, I did.
Did you swear?
Yes, I did.
Q. What was your reaction when you saw them in the drive-
way talking to the truck driver?
A. Well, it made me mad because they had the driveway
blocked and they had a sign that said we were unfair management.
Q. Was there a further exchange between yourself and the
picketers at the same time?
A. Yes, we had a talk.
Q. Do you remember what was said by whom and to who?
A. Well, when they started walking away from the car, you
know. I told them they could picket all they wanted to, just to say
— don’t block the driveway. They started moving out of the drive-
way in front of the building on the sidewalk. And, Ruth was holding
that sign out, sort of waving it back and forth, like some horse in
a parade grinning from ear to ear. And, it made me mad. And, I
told her she thought she was so funny, we would see who would
have the last laugh.
Q. Did you make any statement with regard to getting even
with Ruth?
A. No.
Q. You don’t remember that?
A. No.
rPOoPOPO
104
Q. Did you talk to the picketers again on any subsequent days
of picketing?
A. Not, that was the only day I talked to them.
. Did you see them picket later that day also? On the 20th.
. Just that day.
. Did you see them picket on the 21st?
No.
Did you see them picket on the 22nd of September?
No, the 20th was the only day I saw them.
Q. That was the only confrontation of any kind you had with
the picketers
A. Yes.
Q. Did you participate at all in the decision to file a lawsuit
against the demonstrators on September 25th?
A. No.
Q. You didn’t have any participation in that decision at all?
A. No.
rPOPOP?PeO
[Pages 725-26]
RUDY JOHNSON
was called as a witness by and on behalf of the Respondent and
having been duly sworn on oath was examined and testified as
follows, to-wit:
JUDGE JENSON: Your name and home address please?
THE WITNESS: My name is Rudy Johnson, 6825 North 8th
Avenue.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. KATZ:
Q. Rudy, what is your position and responsibility with the Big
Apple Restaurant?
105
A. I'm the Executive Vice President and in charge of the
whole operation really.
And, how big is your operation?
Ss liiey 0 Sikh ets ented 0D eagle
And, how many different restaurants?
Four (4).
What kind of a cliexelle do you get at these restaurants?
2>O>e
A. Mostly families, lot of tourists, lot of foot traffic, lot of
locals, everybody in general. The restaurant is very successful.
Q. How many Johnson family members are there who partic-
ipate in the management of the restaurants?
A. There’s me, my brother, my two (2) sisters and my mother,
and Don Kalfus is a shareholder.
Q. He’s not a member of the Johnson family?
A. No.
Q. You and your brother Johnny and Don Kalfus are the only
male members of the group in management?
A. That’s right.
Q. As far as ownership and management?
A. Owner managers, yes. .
[Pages 741-50]
Q.[By Mr. Katz, Attorney for Restaurant] Now, on September
20, 1978, did you observe persons picketing and demonstrating
outside your premises on the east side?
A.[By Rudy Johnson] Yes, I did.
Q. How did you first become aware that such activity was
going on?
A. My younger sister, Sherry, called me at home approxi-
mately 9:30 in the morning. I arrived shortly after 10:00, probably
10:15, 10:20.
Q. What did you observe when you arrived?
A. The people walking up in front of the restaurant with signs.
You want the names of the people?
Q. Please.
A. Well, there was Ruth Helton, Dale Michaud, Debra
Mackay, Carla Scott. Ruth’s husband was there for a short period
of time and I believe Cheryl’s husband was there for a short period
of time. I don’t know exactly.
Q. How many of them were carrying signs?
A. There was about five (5) signs total, I think.
Q. Do you remember what any of the signs said?
A. Big Apple prejudiced, Big Apple rotten to its employees,
Big Apple, small management, support your local waitresses, boy-
cott, boycott this establishment, somthing [sic] along those lines.
Q. And, did you personally watch the picketers for any period
of time on September 20th?
A. I watched them the whole time, after I got there until they
left.
Q. And, what did you observe with respect to the picketing?
What kind of conduct did you observe?
A. Well, I had called a policeman earlier in the morning to
advise them of their rights.
Q. For the policeman to advise the picketers of their rights?
A. Yes, because my sister had told me she had a confrontation
with them in the driveway earlier. And, from the time I watched
them until 2:00 o’clock it was — they had their signs on about six
(6) foot poles and they would stand at the edge of the driveways
and the signs had things wrote on both sides of them. They would
lower their signs down for a person to read the sign and they would
flip it over so they could read both sides. Telling people to pull in
the parking lot and come and talk to them. Other than that, they
Q. Did you observe any impact on traffic?
A. Well, it was awfully hard to get in the driveway on different
107
occasions, yes. The cars would slow down to read the signs and if
a car was right behind them, then the would stop in the street and
wait for the person to be able to
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