Joint Appendix — Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB

Supreme Court brief1983

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BILL JOHNSON’S RESTAURANTS, INC.,

Petitioner,

vs.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

Respondent.

=—

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOINT APPENDIX

LAWRENCE ALLEN KATZ REX E. LEE

Streich, Lang, Weeks & Cardon Solicitor General

A Professional Association Department of Justice

2100 First Interstate Bank Plaza Washington, D.C. 20503

100 West Washington (202) 633-2217

Phoenix, Arizona 85003

(602) 257 Counsel for Respondent

Counsel for Ftitioner

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED MAY 28, 1982

CERTIORARI GRANTED OCTOBER 18, 1982

MINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE. .........0.000ccececveseeseeseees

Depositions Upon Oral Examination and Order .......

State Court’s Temporary Restraining Order ..............

Motion for Protective Order] ................ccccceeeeees

FED. GR, FRCS cocccccccccccccecessscscscsocsnsccosouseseoces

10

19

eB

BE 8

52

Page

PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING BEFORE NLRB

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ............0000000000000000 53

ADDITIONAL DECISIONS AND ORDERS BELOW

The following items were reproduced pursuant to Rule 33.1

at the designated pages of the Petition for Certiorari:

Decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ......... A-3

Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations

BBD cecocecocecccccccccncccececenscsocosocenococesescooooooes A-14

Decision of the Administrative Law Judge ............... A-19

DOCKET ENTRY IN THE COURT BELOW

NINTH CIRCUIT’S ORDER [of March 2, 1982, Amending Opinion

and Denying Rehearing]

[Caption deleted]

BEFORE: GOODWIN and CANBY, Circuit Judges and

BYRNE, District Judge*

The opision of this court in Bill Johnson's Restaurants v.

NLRB, 660 F.2d 1335 (9th Cir. 1981) (advance sheets), is modified

as follows:

The full court has been advised of the proposal to amend the

opinion, and of the suggestion for en banc rehearing, and no judge

has objected to the amendment or requested a vote on the suggestion

for rehearing en banc. Fed. R. App. 35(b).

The petition for rehearing is denied, and the suggestion for a

rehearing en banc is rejected.

*The Honorable William M. Byme, United States District Judge for the

Central District of California, sitting by designation.

2

PORTIONS OF THE RECORD BEFORE THE NLRB ADMINIS-

TRATIVE LAW JUDGE

HANDBILL DISTRIBUTED BY DEMONSTRATORS, SEPT. 22,

1978

THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD HAS ISSUED

A COMPLAINT AGAINST THE BIG APPLE RESTAURANT,

3757 E. VAN BUREN STREET, FOR UNFAIR LABOR

PRACTICES.

The complaint was issued as a result of charges filed by Myrland

Helton, a former employee who was fired August 8 after suggesting

to other waitresses they should organize a union. Mrs. Helton had

been an employee of the Big Apple seven and one half years.

Several other waitresses have quit their jobs to join Mrs. Helton in

picketing the restaurant to inform the public of the dispute between

the employees and the restaurant's management. Among the wait-

resses’ complaints are the following:

* Eight hour shifts with no specified breaks.

* No pay for overtime when waitresses were required to remain at

their posts until their last customer’s check had been paid.

* Waitresses threatened with dismissal if they lost any time due to

* Inconsistent management practices.

* Unwarranted sexual advances.

* A filthy restroom for women employees, with no soap, paper

towels or toilet tissue provided.

EMPLOYEES OF BILL JOHNSON’S BIG APPLE FOR JUSTICE

ON THE JOB.

3

COMPLAINT IN BILL JOHNSON’S RESTAURANTS, INC., ET

AL. v. HELTON, ET AL., Maricopa County Superior Court Cause

No. C375470

[Caption deleted]

Plaintiffs, by their attorneys, Streich, Lang, Weeks & Cardon,

P.A., allege for their Complaint:

I. COUNT ONE: WRONGFUL INTERFERENCE WITH

BUSINESS

A. The Parties

1. Corporate Plaintiff. Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc., an

Arizona corporation (hereinafter referred to as ‘‘the Restaurant’’),

is, and at all times relevant herein has been, a corporation duly

organized and existing under the laws of the State of Arizona, having

places of business in Phoenix and Mesa, Arizona, including one at

3757 East Van Buren Street, Phoenix, Arizona.

2. Corporate Plaintiff's Business. The corporate plaintiff

herein has been engaged in the business of owning and operating

family restaurants in Arizona for over 20 years. Gross sales in 1977

exceeded four million dollars, and current assets exceed two million

dollars. Approximately 100 persons are employed at the Restaurant’s

Van Buren Street facilities, including about 40 waitresses.

3. Individual Plaintiffs. Johnny Johnson and Rudy Johnson

are members of the family which founded and operates the Restau-

rant, and they are Vice-Presidents of the corporate plaintiff. Don

Kalfas is a shareholder and the General Manager of the corporate

plaintiff. Each of the named plaintiffs is employed by the corporate

plaintiff for the purpose of managing and operating the Restaurant,

and each fulfills those responsibilities on a full-time basis.

4. Named Defendants. The named individual defendants are,

on information and belief, all residents of Arizona. None of the

named defendants is an employee of the Restaurant.

5. Unknown Defendants. John Does I-X and Jane Does I-X

are individuals whose true names and identities are unknown to

B. Mass Picketing and Harrassment

6. Picketing Begins. On Wednesday, September 20, 1978,

from approximately 9:30 A.M. to 2:00 P.M., defendants Myriand

Helton, Cheryl Nichols, Carl Nichols, Carla Marie Scott, Dale

taurant, although no such boycott or strike was in progress.

7. Picketing Continues. On Thursday, September 21, 1978,

from approximately 5:30 P.M. to 8:00 P.M., defendants Myriand

Helton, John Helton, Chery! Nichols, Carl Nichols, and Carla Marie

Scott, together with the Helton’s son and another unidentified child,

engaged in the acts described in paragraph ‘*6"" above

8. Defendants Publish Defamatory Leaflets and Statements.

On Friday, September 22, 1978, from approximately 11:00 P.M.

to 12:30 A.M., defendants Myriand Helton, John Helton, Cheryl

Nichols, Barbara Orr, Lawrence Orr, and Carla Marie Scott, together

with the Heltons’ son and an unidentified man, appeared at the

plaintiffs’ Van Buren Street Restaurant and passed out leaflets to

* employees and customers. One of these leaflets is attached

to the Affidavit of Rudy Johnson, sworn to on September 25, 1978.

The leaflets contained false and outrageous statements, including

misrepresentations of proceedings pending before the National La-

bor Relations Board and accusations that the Restaurant's waitresses

had complained about ‘‘unwarranted sexual advances’’ and about

**a filthy restroom for women employees, with no soap, paper towels

or toilet tissue provided.’’ Additional outrageous and false state-

ments maligning plaintiffs and their business were made orally by

defendants to plaintiffs’ employees and customers and to passersby

and other persons.

9. Interference with Plaintiffs’ Operations. During the pick-

5

clogged the sidewalk in front of the Restaurant, making it incon-

venient or difficult for other persons to pass, have shouted at and

harrassed plaintiffs’ customers, and have blocked ingress to and

egress from the Restaurant. Some of the defendants have also har-

rassed plaintiffs’ employees, in person and by telephone and have,

on at least one occasion, coerced a job applicant into failing to

appear for a scheduled interview at the Restaurant.

10. Restaurant Continues to Operate. Despite the defendants’

activities described above, the plaintiffs have attempted to continue

normal business operations.

11. Potential for Violence. The defendants’ activities de-

plaintiffs’ employees and customers, and the defendants have in-

tomers are concerned about their personal safety. On at least one

occasion, plaintiffs felt it necessary to request assistance from the

Phoenix Police Department and an officer was provided.

C. Damage to Restaurant

12. Plainsiffs Have Suffered Loss of Business. During and as

a result of the defendants’ activities described above, a substantial

number of customers have, after entering the Restaurant parking lot

or premises, departed without dining at the Restaurant. The exact

number of such lost customers is difficult to ascertain, but plaintiffs

believe the number to be in excess of 100.

13. Damage to Reputation. As a result of the defendants’

activities described above, plaintiffs have suffered substantial and

irreparable damage to their reputations and to the goodwill of their

business. Such damage is not readily calculable in money terms.

D. Defendants’ Liability for Unlawful Acts

14. Unlawfulness of Acts. The acts of the defendants, as de-

scribed above, are tortious and unlawful and may be enjoined by

this Court.

15. Defendants’ Participation in the Unlawfui Acts. Unon in-

formation and belief, each of the named individual deteadants has

directed, authorized, encouraged, incited and participated in the

unlawful acts described above.

16. Irreparable Injury. As a result of the unlawful acts of

defendants described above, there is a continuous threat of serious

violence, personal injury and property damage on or near plaintiffs’

premises. Unless restrained, the defendants’ acts create significant

risks of injury to plaintiffs’ employees, to plaintiffs’ business, to

plaintiffs’ property, and to members of the general public. Said

injuries would be substantial and irreparable.

17. Greater Injury to Plaintiffs. As to each and every item

of relief sought herein, far greater injury will be inflicted upon

plaintiffs and upon the public by the refusal to grant the relief sought

than can conceivably be inflicted upon the defendants by the granting

of such relief.

18. No Adequate Remedy at Law. Plaintiffs have no adequate

remedy at law for the injuries inflicted and threatened by the activ-

ities herein complained of.

19. Necessity for Restraint. Upon information and belief, the

unlawful acts complained of herein will continue to be committed

unless restrained.

20. No Prior Application. No prior application for the relief

sought herein or for similar relief has been made to this or any other

court or judge.

Il. COUNT TWO: LIBEL, BUSINESS DISPARAGEMENT

21. Each and every allegation contained in paragraphs **1"’

to ‘*20"" above is realleged and incorporated herein as if fully set

forth.

22. Injury to Business. The leaflets, statements and other de-

rogatory accusations made by defendants as described more fully

above, tend to cause and have caused injury to the plaintiffs’

business.

23. Injury to Individual Plaintiffs. The leaflets, statements and

other derogatory accusations made by defendants, as described more

fully above, have impeached the honesty, integrity and reputation

of the individual plaintiffs.

7

24. Publication by Defendants. The defendants have pub-

lished the aforesaid libelous statements by distributing documents

containing the statements and by repeating the statements orally to

plaintiffs’ employees and customers and to other persons.

25. Falsity of Defendants’ Statements; Defendants’ Malice.

The statements published by the defendants are false and misleading.

Defendants published these statements knowing them to be false or

in reckless disregard of whether they were false. Defendants knew

the statements would injure plaintiffs, and defendants had a mali-

cious intention to cause such injury.

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray that this Court:

1. Issue a temporary restraining order and preliminary in-

junction, the same to be made permanent on final judgment:

A.. Restraining and enjoining the defendants and each of

them, their officers, agents and employees, and all persons acting

in concert or participation with them, from, in any manner or by

any means,

(1) Entering upon plaintiffs’ premises, or any por-

tion thereof, for any reason without the express permis-

sion of the officer of plaintiff Restaurant in ~arge of

such premises at the time, and refusing to va: ue plain-

tiffs’ premises when requested to do so by plaintiffs or

their proper agents.

(2) Mass picketing, parading or demonstrating in

proximity to plaintiffs’ premises, provided that defen-

dants shall be allowed, and shall be limited to, a total of

four (4) individuals picketing, parading or demonstrating

in a peaceful manner in proximity to plaintiffs’ premises,

and provided further that any such picketing, parading

or demonstrating shall be conducted exclusively upon

public property and not upon any property whatsoever

owned by plaintiffs.

(3) Interfering in any way with the conduct of plain-

out limitation interfering in any way with the ingress and

egress from plaintiffs’ premises of plaintiffs’ officers

agents, employees, suppliers, customers, business con-

tacts and deliverers of goods.

(4) Engaging in violence, threats of violence, har-

rassment or intimidation of any kind against plaintiffs’

officers, agents, employees, suppliers, customers, busi-

ness contacts or deliverers of goods, whether upon plain-

tiffs’ premises or elsewhere.

(5) Publishing false and misleading statements con-

cerning plaintiffs’ business, officers, agents, employees,

facilities or practices, .acluding but not limited to alle-

gations misrepresenting the nature or substance of the

matter now pending before the National Labor Relations

Board as Case No. 28-CA-4970.

B. Further ordering that defendants named herein, and each

of them, shall forthwith issue proper notice to all others acting in

directions, requests or suggestions to do any of the acts restrained

dants, and each of them, shall be responsible for supervising the

orderly and lawful conduct of any and all persons participating in

any picketing, parading or other demonstrations established or spon-

sored by said defendants in proximity to plaintiffs’ premises, so as

to insure compliance with the order of the Court;

C. Granting such other, further or different relief to which

the plaintiffs may be entitled in the premises.

2. Grant final judgment against defendants and each of them

for compensatory damages in such amount as the Court shall de-

plained of to the date of final hearing.

3. Grant final judgment against defendants, and each of them,

for punitive damages in the amount of $500,000.

4. Grant final judgment against defendants and each of them,

as prayed for herein, with the costs and disbursements of this action,

and provide such other and further relief in law and equity as may

be appropriate in the premises.

DATED this 25th day of September, 1978.

VERIFICATION

STATE OF ARIZONA )

) ss.

County of Maricopa )

RUDY JOHNSON, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

1. I am Vice President of Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc.,

a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of

Arizona, and I am one of the plaintiffs herein.

2. I have read the foregoing Complaint, and the allegations

therein contained are true to my own knowledge except as to those

tions I believe to be true.

Rudy Johnson

RUDY JOHNSON

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 25th day of

September, 1978.

Sharon Lauzier

Notary Public

10

STATE COURT PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME

FOR TAKING DEPOSITIONS UPON ORAL EXAMINATION

AND ORDER

[Caption deleted]

Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys, Streich, Lang,

Weeks & Cardon, P.A., pursuant to the provisions of Rule 30,

Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby respectfully request this

Court’s order shortening the time for the taking of depositions upon

oral examination.

Attached hereto and by this reference incorporated herein is

a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of plaintiffs’

Motion.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 25th day of September,

1978.

STREICH, LANG, WEEKS & CARDON

A Professional Association

2100 First National Bank Plaza

Post Office Box 471

Phoenix, Arizona 85001

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

By Lawrence Allen Katz

Lawrence Allen Katz

Nancy K. Splain

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

with the filing of the instant action, plaintiffs

filed their application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Order

to Show Cause, with affidavits in support thereof, requesting the

Court to issue a Temporary Restraining Order restraining the de-

fendants, and each of them, from trespassing upon plaintiffs’ prem-

ises, mass picketing, interfering with the conduct of plaintiffs’ busi-

ness operations, engaging in violence or harrassment against

plaintiffs, their officers, agents, employees, suppliers, or customers,

and from publishing false and misleading statements concerning

plaintiffs or their business. Plaintiffs have also brought an Order to

Show Cause seeking equivalent relief in the form of a preliminary

injunction. In order to be fully prepared for the Order to Show

Cause, plaintiffs herein respectfully request this Court's order short-

ening time for the taking of depositions.

As the pleadings on file with the Court indicate, none of the

plaintiffs had any prior knowledge of the allegations and complaints

that have been made by the defendants and which resulted in the

actions plaintiffs seek to enjoin. Indeed, plaintiffs first learned of

the complaints upon reading the handbills distributed by the defen-

dants to plaintiffs’ customers and employees. Plaintiffs have en-

deavored prior to the filing of their Complaint to determine as many

facts as possible in order to consider the necessity and propriety of

bringing this action. Nevertheless, because of the serious threat to

the plaintiffs’ business and reputation in the community posed by

the defendants, plaintiffs were forced to act expeditiously and have

been unable to obtain information which is in the possession of the

defendants herein.

Rule 30(6)(3), Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that

the Court may order that depositions be taken within a shorter period

of time than stated in the Rule. In order that plaintiffs be fully

apprised of the conditions and circumstances which resulted in the

actions taken by ail of the defendants and perhaps others, plaintiffs

respectfully request this Court’s order shortening time for the taking

of depositions of those individuals named in notices attached hereto

collectively as Exhibit *‘A,’’ with the understanding that the de-

positions noticed for September 27 and 29, 1978, may be resched-

uled for October 2 and 3, 1978, if those dates are more convenient

to the witnesses that the dates reflected in the attached notices.

DATED this 25th day of September, 1978.

STREICH, LANG, WEEKS & CARDON

A Professional Association

2100 First National Bank Plaza

Post Office Box 471

Phoenix, Arizona 85001

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

On Motion of the plaintiffs,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the time for the taking of

depositions of those individuals named in notices attached hereto

collectively as Exhibit ‘“‘A’’ shall be shortened, and that the de-

positions may be noticed for September 27 and 29, 1978, with the

that the depositions may be rescheduled on October

2 and 3, 1978, if those dates are more convenient to the witnesses

than the dates reflected in the attached notices.

DONE IN OPEN COURT this 25th day of September, 1978.

Marilyn A. Riddel

JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION

[Caption deleted]

TO: MYRLAND R. HELTON; JOHN HELTON; BARBARA

ORR; LAWRENCE ORR; CHERYL NICHOLS; CARL NI-

CHOLS; CARLA MARIE SCOTT; DEBRA MACKIE; DALE

MICHAUD; and JANE DOES I thru X; and JOHN DOES I

thru X.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the deposition of

MYRLAND HELTON

will be taken upon oral examination pursuant to the Arizona Rules

of Civil Procedure on Wednesday, the 27th dav of September, 1978,

at 1:00 o'clock P.M., at the law offices of STREICH, LANG,

WEEKS & CARDON, P.A., 2100 First National Bank Plaza, 100

West Washington Street, Phoenix, Arizona 85003.

DATED this 25th day of September, 1978.

13

STREICH, LANG, WEEKS & CARDON

A Professional Association

2100 First National Bank Plaza

Post Office Box 471

Phoenix, Arizona 85001

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

By Lawrence Allen Katz

Lawrence Allen Katz

Nancy K. Splain

NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION

[Caption deleted]

TO: MYRLAND R. HELTON; JOHN HELTON; BARBARA

ORR; LAWRENCE ORR; CHERYL NICHOLS; CARL NI-

CHOLS; CARLA MARIE SCOTT; DEBRA MACKIE; DALE

MICHAUD; and JANE DOES I thru X; and JOHN DOES I

thru X.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the deposition of

JOHN HELTON

will be taken upon oral examination pursuant to the Arizona Rules

of Civil Procedure on Wednesday, the 27th day of September, 1978,

at 3:00 o’clock P.M., at the law offices of STREICH, LANG,

WEEKS & CARDON, P.A., 2100 First National Bank Plaza, 100

14

By Lawrence Allen Katz

Lawrence Allen Katz

Nancy K. Splain

NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION

[Caption deleted]

TO: MYRLAND R. HELTON; JOHN HELTON; BARBARA

ORR; LAWRENCE ORR; CHERYL NICHOLS; CARL NI-

CHOLS; CARLA MARIE SCOTT; DEBRA MACKIE; DALE

MICHAUD; and JANE DOES I thru X; and JOHN DOES I

thru X.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the deposition of

BARBARA ORR

will be taken upon oral examination pursuant to the Arizona Rules

of C:vil Procedure on Friday, the 29th day of September, 1978, at

9:00 o'clock A.M.., at the law offices of STREICH, LANG, WEEKS

& CARDON, P.A., 2100 First National Bank Plaza, 100 West

Washington Street, Phoenix, Arizona 85003.

DATED this 25th day of September, 1978.

STREICH, LANG, WEEKS & CARDON

A Professional Association

2100 First National Bank Plaza

Post Office Box 471

Phoenix, Arizona 85001

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

By Lawrence Allen Katz

Lawrence Allen Katz

Nancy K. Spiain

15

NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION

[Caption deleted]

TO: MYRLAND R. HELTON; JOHN HELTON; BARBARA

ORR; LAWRENCE ORR; CHERYL NICHOLS; CARL NI-

CHOLS; CARLA MARIE SCOTT; DEBRA MACKIE; DALE

MICHAUD; and JANE DOES I thru X; and JOHN DOES I

thru X.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the deposition of

LAWRENCE ORR

will be taken upon oral examination pursuant to the Arizona Rules

of Civil Procedure on Friday, the 29th day of September, 1978, at

10:00 o’clock A.M., at the law offices of STREICH, LANG,

WEEKS & CARDON, P.A., 2100 First National Bank Plaza, 100

West Washington Street, Phoenix, Arizona 85003.

DATED this 25th day of September, 1978.

STREICH, LANG, WEEKS & CARDON

A Professional Association

2100 First National Bank Plaza

Post (Office Box 471

Phoenix, Arizona 85001

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

By Lawrence Allen Kutz

Lawrence Allen Katz

Nancy K. Spiain

NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION

[Caption deleted)

TO: MYRLAND R. HELTON; JOHN HELTON; BARBARA

ORR; LAWRENCE ORR; CHERYL NICHOLS; CARL NI-

CHOLS; CARLA MARIE SCOTT; DEBRA MACKIE; DALE

MICHAUD; and JANE DOES | thru X; and JOHN DOES I

thru X.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the deposition of

DEBRA MACKIE

will be taken upon oral examination pursuant to the Arizona Rules

of Civil Procedure on Friday, the 29th day of September, 1978, at

11:00 o’clock A.M., at the law offices of STREICH, LANG,

WEEKS & CARDON, P.A., 2100 First National Bank Plaza, 100

West Washington Street, Phoenix, Arizona 85003.

DATED this 25th day of September, 1978.

STREICH, LANG, WEEKS & CARDON

A Professional Association

2100 First National Bank Plaza

Post Office Box 471

Phoenix, Arizona 85001

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

By Lawrence Allen Katz

Lawrence Allen Katz

Nancy K. Splain

NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION

(Caption deleted)

TO: MYRLAND R. HELTON; JOHN HELTON; BARBARA

ORR; LAWRENCE ORR; CHERYL NICHOLS; CARL NI-

CHOLS; CARLA MARIE SCOTT; DEBRA MACKIE; DALE

MICHAUD; and JANE DOES I thru X; and JOHN DOES |

thru X.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the deposition of

CARL NICHOLS

will be taken upon oral examination pursuant to the Arizona Rules

of Civil Procedure on Friday, the 29th day of September, 1978, at

1:00 o’clock P.M.., at the law offices of STREICH, LANG, WEEKS

17

& CARDON, P.A., 2100 First National Bank Plaza, 100 West

Washington Street, Phoenix, Arizona 85003.

DATED this 25th day of September, 1978.

STREICH, LANG, WEEKS & CARDON

A Professional Association

2100 First National Bank Plaza

Post Office Box 471

Phoenix, Arizona $5001

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

By Lawrence Allen Katz

Lawrence Allen Katz

Nancy K. Splain

NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION

[Caption deleted)

TO: MYRLAND R. HELTON; JOHN HELTON; BARBARA

ORR; LAWRENCE ORR; CHERYL NICHOLS; CARL NI-

CHOLS; CARLA MARIE SCOTT; DEBRA MACKIE; DALE

MICHAUD; and JANE DOES I thru X; and JOHN DOES I

thru X.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the deposition of

CARLA MARIE SCOTT

will be taken upon oral examination pursuant to the Arizona Rules

of Civil Procedure on Friday, the 29th day of September, 1978, at

2:00 o'clock P.M.., at the law offices of STREICH, LANG, WEEKS

& CARDON, P.A., 2100 First National Bank Plaza, 100 West

Washington Street, Phoenix, Arizona 85003.

DATED this 25th day of September, 1978.

STREICH, LANG, WEEKS & CARDON

A Professional Association

2100 First National Bank Plaza

18

Post Office Box 471

Phoenix, Arizona 85001

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

By Lawrence Allen Katz

Lawrence Allen Katz

Nancy K. Splain

NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION

[Caption deleted]

TO: MYRLAND R. HELTON; JOHN HELTON; BARBARA

ORR; LAWRENCE ORR; CHERYL NICHOLS; CARL NI-

CHOLS; CARLA MARIE SCOTT; DEBRA MACKIE; DALE

MICHAUD; and JANE DOES i thru X; and JOHN DOES I

thru X.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the deposition of

CHERYL NICHOLS

will be taken upon oral examination pursuant to the Arizona Rules

of Civil Procedure on Friday, the 29th day of September, 1978, at

3:00 o’clock P.M.., at the law offices of STREICH, LANG, WEEKS

& CARDON, P.A., 2100 First National Bank Plaza, 100 West

Washington Street ‘“hoenix, Arizona 85003.

DATED this 25th day of September, 1978.

STREICH, LANG, WEEKS & CARDON

A Professional Association

2100 First National Bank Plaza

Post Office Box 471

Phoenix, Arizona 85001

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

By Lawrence Allen Katz

Lawrence Allen Katz

Nancy K. Splain

19

NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION

[Caption deleted]

TO: MYRLAND R. HELTON; JOHN HELTON; BARBARA

ORR; LAWRENCE ORR; CHERYL NICHOLS; CARL NI-

CHOLS; CARLA MARIE SCOTT; DEBRA MACKIE; DALE

MICHAUD; and JANE DOES I thru X; and JOHN DOES I

thru X.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the deposition of

DALE MICHAUD

will be taken upon oral examination pursuant to the Arizona Rules

of Civil Procedure on Friday, the 29th day of September, 1978, at

4:00 o’clock P.M.., at the law offices of STREICH, LANG, WEEKS

& CARDON, P.A., 2100 First National Bank Plaza, 100 West

Washington Street, Phoenix, Arizona 85003.

DATED this 25th day of September, 1978.

STREICH, LANG, WEEKS & CARDON

A Professional Association

2100 First National Bank Plaza

Post Office Box 471

Phoenix, Arizona 85001

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

By Lawrence Allen Katz

Lawrence Allen Katz

Nancy K. Splain

STATE COURT’S TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

[Caption deleted]

The Court having read the Plaintiffs’ verified Complaint in this

action, together with the Affidavit of Rudy Johnson, the Vice-

President of Plaintiff Restaurant, and the Affidavit of Lawrence A.

Katz, Plaintiffs’ attorney, both of which Affidavits were sworn to

on September 25, 1978, it appears to this Court that this is a proper

case for granting a Temporary Restraining Order; and that, unless

the Temporary Restraining Order requested by Plaintiffs is granted

forthwith, immediate and irreparable injury will result to Plaintiffs

and to Plaintiffs’ business and Plaintiffs’ property located at 3757

East Van Buren Street, Phoenix, Arizona, and to Plaintiffs’ agents

and employees, and to citizens of the State of Arizona, which injury

will include, without limitation:

a. Trespass by Defendants, and each of them and all those

acting in concert with them, on the Plaintiffs’ private

property.

b. Violence, threats of violence, harrassment and intimidation

by Defendants, and each of them, and all those acting in

employees engaged in the performance of their duties, and

against Plaintiffs’ customers.

c. Publication of false and misleading statements about Plain-

tiffs and Plaintiffs’ agents and employees by Defendants,

and each of them, and those acting in concert with them,

directed at Plaintiffs’ agents, employees and customers and

intended to damage Plaintiffs’ reputation and business.

d. Unlawful interference by Defendants, and each of them,

and all those acting in concert with them, by and through

all of the aforesaid methods, with the relationships between

to work for Plaintiffs and between Plaintiffs and their

customers.

e. Breaches of the peace by Defendants, and each of them,

and all those acting in concert with them, and the danger

of injury not only to Plaintiffs’ property and to Plaintiffs’

agents, employees and customers and their property, but

also to innocent bystanders — all in derogation of the rights

and interests of citizens of the State of Arizona.

It further appears to this Court that Plaintiffs have attempted

21

to give notice to Defendants by telephone of Plaintiffs’ request for

the immediate entry of this Temporary Restraining Order.

NOW, THEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, and upon the

Plaintiffs’ verified Complaint and the aforesaid Affidavits of Rudy

Johnson and Lawrence A. Katz,

IT IS ORDERED, that Defendants, and each of them, and all

those acting at their direction or in concert with them, be, and they

hereby are, jointly and severally, restrained and enjoined from each

and every one of the following:

a. Entering upon Plaintiffs’ premises, or any portion thereof,

for any reason without the express permission of the officer

of Plaintiff Restaurant in charge of such premises at the

time, and refusing to vacate Plaintiffs’ premises when re-

quested to do so by Plaintiffs or their proper agents.

b. Mass picketing, parading or demonstrating in proximity

to Plaintiffs’ premises, provided that Defendants shall be

allowed, at any one establishment, and shall be limited to,

a total of four (4) individuals picketing, parading, or dem-

onstrating in a peaceful manner in proximity to Plaintiffs’

premises, and provided further that any such picketing,

parading or demonstrating shall be conducted exclusively

upon public property and not upon any property whatsoever

owned by Plaintiffs.

c. Interfering in any way with the ingress and egress from

Plaintiffs’ premises of Plaintiffs’ officers, agents, employ-

ees, suppliers, customers, business contacts and deliverers

of goods.

d. Engaging in violence, threats of violence, harrassment or

intimidation of any kind against Plaintiffs’ officers, :

. i . . i or de-

no . - — ten ord a ce pal

elsewhere.

FURTHER ORDERED, that the Defendants named herein,

and each of them, shall forthwith issue proper notice to all others

acting in concert with them, publicly withdrawing and rescinding

any orders, directions, requests or suggestions to do any of the acts

restrained and enjoined under the foregoing paragraph of this Tem-

FURTHER ORDERED, that this Temporary Restraining Order

shall be in full force and effect to and including the Sth day of

October, 1978, unless its terms is [sic} extended by this Court or

by stipulation of the parties, or unless it is dissolved prior to said

date.

DONE IN OPEN COURT this 25th day of September, 1978,

at the hour of 12:30 o'clock P.M.

Marilyn A. Riddel

JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

STATE COURT DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO EXPEDITE

[HEARING ON MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER]

[Caption deleted]

Defendants Helton, Nichols and Michaud, by and through their

counsel undersigned, hereby move this Court for an Order Expe-

granted leave to the Plaintiffs to take depositions on October 2 and

3, 1978. Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order relates to those

23

depositions. Accordingly, Defendants request hearing on their Mo-

tion for Protective Order prior to October 2, 1978.

DATED this 28 day of September, 1978.

WARD & CONTRERAS, LTD.

By: David L.

Michael J. Keenan and

David L. Niederdeppe

316 West McDowell Road

Suite 203

Phoenix, Arizona 85003

Attorneys for Defendants Helton,

Nichols and Michaud

ORDER

This Court having heard Defendants’ Motion to Expedite Hear-

ing, and good cause appearing,

IT IS ORDERED that hearing on Defendants’ Motion for Pro-

tective Order shall be heard on the 29 day of September, 1978, at

8:30 A.M.

DONE IN OPEN COURT this 28 day of September, 1978.

Marilyn A. Riddel

The Honorable Marilyn Riddel

Judge of the Superior Court

Copy of the foregoing hand-delivered

this 28 day of September, 1978, to:

Lawrence A. Katz, Esq.

Streich, Lang, Weeks & Cardon

2100 First National Bank Plaza

100 West Washington

Phoenix, Arizona 85003

David L. Niederdeppe

24

STATE COURT DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE

ORDER

[Caption deleted]

Defendants Helton, Nichols and Michaud, by and through their

counsel undersigned, hereby move this Court for its Protective Order

pursuant to Rule 26(c) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure

(hereinafter, A.R.C.P.). Defendants seek such an order limiting the

scope of examination during the course of certain depositions noticed

by Plaintiffs and expedited by this Court under the authority of

A.R.C.P. Rule 30(a). The grounds for such an order are more fully

set forth in the Memorandum accompanying this Motion. The

Court’s attention is respectfully directed to that Memorandum.

DATED this 28 day of September, 1978.

WARD & CONTRERAS, LTD.

By: David L. Niederdeppe

Michael J. Keenan and

David L. Niederdeppe

316 West McDowell Road

Suite 203

Phoenix, Arizona 85003

Attorneys for Defendants

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

The Plaintiifs in this action seek discovery from the Defendants

in the form of oral depositions prior to the expiration of A.R.C.P.

Rule 30(a)’s 30-day time period during which leave of Court must

be obtained. As is noted in the Motion, Plaintiffs have obtained

such leave from the Court prior to the time Defendants obtained

counsel. Plaintiffs requested leave for the early depositions on the

grounds that discovery was needed ‘‘[i}n order to be fully prepared

for the Order to Show Cause. . . .”’ In short, Plaintiffs apparently

feel the need for such discovery to prepare for hearing on their

2s

Application for Preliminary Injunction which is scheduled at the

hour of 9:00 a.m. on October 5, 1978, before this Court.

Defendants move for a Protective Order which would limit the

scope of examination by Plaintiffs during the depositions. The

grounds for that Motion are threefold. First, Defendants submit that

this Court’s jurisdiction to issue injunctive relief is limited. Hence,

the scope of issues at the hearing on Plaintiffs’ Application for

Preliminary Injunction is also limited. Accordingly, the scope of

examination at depositions necessary to prepare for such a hearing

must be limited, as well.

Second, the Defendants submit that by reason of the federal

labor policy, the federal Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C.

§ 552] (hereinafter, ‘‘the FOIA’’), and the decision of the United

States Supreme Court in NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Company,

amas Ol 77-911, (Opinion June 15, 1978) (copy at-

tached), the Defendants have a privilege which limits the scope of

discovery available to the Plaintiffs. Such a privilege exists insofar

as the Plaintiffs seeks to discover information relevant to the unfair

labor practice charges filed by Defendant Myriand R. Helton against

the corporation Plaintiff Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. As noted

below, hearing on the allegations contained in those charges is now

pending at the National Labor Relations Board.*

Finally, certain of the Defendants in this action remain unre-

presented. One of the basic purposes for A.R.C.P. Rule 30(a)'s 30-

day limitation is to allow a Defendant to obtain counsel before

depositions are taken. Depositions of such individuals should be

precluded at the least until they obtain counsel.

Court's Limited Jurisdiction

At the outset, it should be noted that Defendants do not ques-

tion the jurisdiction of this Court to issue injunctive relief in labor-

relations situations where the alleged conduct sought to be enjoined

includes violence and imminent threates to the public order. See

Youngdahl v. Rainfair, 355 U.S. 131 (1957) and Auto Workers v.

Wisconsin Board, 351 U.S. 266 (1956). Defendants believe that the

Plaintiffs make reference in their Complaint to the NLRB charges at Page 8,

limes 3 through 10.

evidence to be developed at the hearing on Plaintiffs’ Application

for Preliminary Injunction will reveal that no such conduct has

occurred. However, in the abstract, this Court would have jurisdic-

tion over such claims of violence and public disruption.

Defendants do question the jurisdiction of this Court to enjoin

the Defendants from the series of acts explicity excluded from such

equitable relief by A.R.S. § 12-1808(B)(1) through (6). Those Sec-

tions provide that a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining

order issued in a labor relations matter may not prohibit a person

from:

1. Terminating any relation of employment, or from ceasing

to perform any work or labor, or from recommending, advising, or

persuading others by peaceful means so tc do.

2. Attending at or near a house or place where any person

resides or works, or Carries on business, or happens to be, for the

purpose of peacefully obtaining or communicating information, or

of peacefully persuading any person to work or to abstain from

working.

3. Ceasing to patronize or to employ any party to such dispute

or from recommending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful

means to do so.

4. Paying or giving to or withholding from any person engaged

in such dispute any strike benefits or other monies or things of value.

5. Peaceably assembling at any place in a lawful manner and

for lawful purposes.

6. Doing any act or thing which might lawfully be done in

the absence of such dispute by any other party thereto.

Hence, any matter relating to the type of conduct protected b

A.R.S. § 12-1808 is irrelevant to the hearing on Plaintiffs’ Appli-

cation for Injunctive Relief, and so not necessary for preparation

for that hearing. Discovery should be accordingly limited.

Further, the Defendants seriously question the jurisdiction of

this Court to enjoin the conduct which is alleged in Plaintiffs’ Com-

plaint to constitute trade libel or business disparagement. Defendants

submit that injunctive relief will nor lie, because: (1) Plaintiffs have

an adequate remedy at law, and (2) the First Constitutional Amend-

27

ment’s proscriptions concerning fieedom of speech preclude the

type of ‘prior restraint’’ sought by Plaintiffs.

While Plaintiffs could locate no Arizona decisions concerning

the jurisdiction of this Court to enjoin a libel, the vast weight of

American authority is to the effect that equity will nor restrain a

mere libel or slander. This is so, even though the false statement

may injure the Plaintiff in his business, profession or trade. In the

absence of acts of conspiracy, intimidation or coercion, and where

no breach of trust or contract appears, equity will not enjoin a libel

because the party wronged has an adequate remedy at law by an

action for damages or criminal prosecution. Annot., Injunctions as

Related in Cases of Trade Libel, 148 A.L.R. 853 (1944); Robert

E. Hicks Corporation v. National Salesmens’ Trade Association,

19 F.2d 963 (7th Cir., 1927); 43-A, CJ.S., Injunctions, Section

143 (1978). See also Am Jur 2d, Injunctions, Section 137

The authority cited by Plaintiffs in their Memorandum in sup-

port of their Application for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary

by Plaintiffs as their quotation of the Corrigan case are to California

law. While the case may express California law, it is not binding

here.

Texas Courts have apparently recognize both sides of the ques-

tion. In Lawrence v. Atwood, 295 S.W. 2d 298 (Tx.Civ.App.,

19 _ ), the Court held that neither the fact that the publication

is being continued or will be continued unless restrained, nor the

fact that such continued publication is and will be injurious to the

libeled party’s business, nor the two together, appear to be sufficient

to render the rule inapplicable. This is in direct contrast to the Texas

authority cited by Plaintiffs.

ln Martin v. Reynolds Metals Company, 224 F.Supp. 978 (D.C.

Ore., 1963), appeal dismissed, 336 F.2d 876 (9th Cir., 1964), aff'd

337 F.2d 780 (9th Cir., 1964), upon which Plaintiffs rely, the Court,

importance of the First Amendment in such cases. The Court stated

that the better-reasoned opinions concerning whether equity would

enjoin trade libel weigh the adequacy of the remedy at law and the

possible encroachment on free speech rights which might result

from the injunction. In labor relations matters, free speech is clearly

the favored aspect.

The policy of the federal labor law has always been to en-

courage debate. Indeed, in Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88

(1941), the Supreme Court stated that, **. . . the dissemination of

information concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded

as within the area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the

Constitution."”

Further, in Letter Carriers, Old Dominion Branch, 496 v.

Austin, 418 U.S. 264, (1974), the Court held that the policy of the

federal law is to favor uninhibited, robust and wide-open debate in

labor disputes. The Court stated that the **. . . free-wheeling use

of the written and spoken word . . .”’ had been expressly fostered

by the Congress in the national labor law, and approved by the

National Labor Relations Board. Hence, in labor relations matters,

the element of free speech would raise the Constitutional objections

to injunctive relief to a higher plane than they would be accorded

in other actions. Defendants submit that even in those jurisdictions

where alleged trade libels may be enjoined, the free speech aspect

fostered and encouraged by the national labor policy would preclude

injunctive relief. From the foregoing, it is clear that this Court has

no jurisdiction to issue an order enjoining allegedly libelous state-

ments. The Court has apparently agreed in the refusal to temporarily

restrain the handbilling. Hearing on Plaintiffs’ application for Pre-

liminary Injunction should be limited to those matters over which

enter its Order so limiting the scope of examination at the scheduled

Under this approach, Plaintiffs would be free to inquire into

the alleged acts of the Defendants over which this Court could exert

its injunctive jurisdiction, if those actions were shown; i.e., violence

or imminent threats of public disorder. Plaintiffs would also be free

to renotice the depositions of Defendants after the expiration of the

30-day requirement of A.R.C.P. Rule 30(a), with respect to the

damage aspects of the libel allegations. Depositions taken at that

time would do no violence to the policy of A.R.C.P. Rule 30(a).

That policy is noted in Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and

Procedure, Section 2104, with respect to the leave-of-Court re-

quirement of Rule 30(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:

**Most Courts have thought that leave should be granted only when

some unusual circumstances or conditions existed that would be

likely to prejudice the party if he were compelled to wait the required

time.’’ Since the only prejudice which could conceivably inhere to

the Plaintiffs in this matier relates to the allegations over which the

Court could properly exercise jurisdiction. The scope of the ex-

amination in depositions authorized because of that hearing should

be limited to those matters.

Federal Labor Law Privileges

As is noted above, Plaintiffs’ Complaint makes reference to

an unfair labor practice charge filed at the National Labor Relations

Board by Defendant Myriand R. Helton against the corporate Plain-

tiff. After its investigation, the National Labor Relations Board

issued a Complaint against Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc., alleging

violation of the National Labor Relations Act. Hearing on the al-

legations set forth in that Complaint is set for December 7, 1978.

In connection with the NLRB investigation of the charges made

by Defendant Helton, certain of the Defendants here presented evi-

dence to NLRB agents. Defendants believe that the federal labor

policy givesn them a privilege with respect to evidence supporting

the unfair labor practice charge, and request the Court to so limit

discovery. If such an order does not issue, the Plaintiff will be able

to do violence to the federal policy by obtaining indirectly what it

could not get directly.

Section 6 of the National Labor Relations Act provides that

the National Labor Relations Board may make rules and regulations

necessary to carry out the provisions of the Act [29 U.S.C. § 156].

Historically, the NLRB has provided little pre-hearing discovery in

unfair labor practice proceedings. The reasons for the Board's gen-

eral refusal to make discovery available to parties charged with

unfair labor practices is that employers or, in some cases, Union,

will coerce or intimidate employees and others who have given

Statements in an effort to make them change their testimony or to

not testify at all. As noted by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Robbins

Tire & Rubber Co., supra., this special dangeer flowing from pre-

hearing discovery in NLRB proceedings has been recognized by the

Courts for many years. See NLRB v. Vap.~ Blast Manufacturing

Co., 287 F.2d 402, 407 (7th Cir., 19 ___ ); cert. denied 368 U.S.

823 (1961).

The FOIA would make state:nents given to the Labor Board

discoverable were it not for Section 7(A) of the Act, which provides

that disclosure is not required of ‘‘investigatory records compiled

for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the pro-

duction of such records would interfere with enforcement proceed-

ings.”’ In NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber, supra., the Supreme

Court held that witness statements in pending unfair labor practice

proceedings are exempt from FOIA disclosure, at least until com-

pletion of the NLRB’ s hearing . The Court so held because the release

of such statements necessarily would involve the kind of harm that

Congress believed would constitute an ‘‘interference’’ with NLRB

enforcement proceedings —- that of giving a party litigant earlier

and greater access to the NLRB’s case than he would otherwise

have.

If ¢ Plaintiffs are allowed to examine the Defendants here

with respect to knowledge in their possession which relates to the

unfair labor practice charges, the Plaintiff will have been able to

obtain by indirect means that which it could not obtain by direct

means. Defendants submit that the historical labor policy and Ex-

emption 7(A) of the FOIA, as construed by the Court in NLRB v.

Robbins Tire & Rubber, supra., establish, for the purposes of this

action, a privilege on the part of the Defendant which is as broad

as the subject matter of the unfair labor practice Complaint itself.

A copy of that Complaint is attached to this Memorandum.

As is noted above, such a privilege must remain in effect ar

least until completion of the NLRB’s hearing. Until such time, the

privilege as set forth above should operate to preclude the Plaintiff

in this action (which is the Charged Party in the unfair labor practice

proceeding) from obtaining discovery of matters relevant to that

Labor Board matter. Defendants request this Court to enter its Order

limiting the scope of discovery prior to the hearing to preclude

inquiry into the matters set forth in the unfair labor practice

Complaint

Defendants Without Counsel

Certain Defendants in this action remain unrepresented. As is

noted by Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Section

31

2104, Rule 30(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (like in

substance to the Arizona Rules) allows a certain time period before

depositions may be taken. One of the reasons for this time period

is to assure the Defendants of an opportunity to retain counsel and

inform themselves as to the nature of the suit. With such reasons

behind the 30-day requirement of Rule 30(a), the Court’s Protective

Order should preclude Plaintiffs from deposing any of those De-

fendants who remain unrepresented in this action.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants request this Court

to issue its Protective Order in accos ance with the authorities out-

lined above.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28 day of September,

1978.

WARD & CONTRERAS, LTD.

By: David L.

Michael J. Keenan and

David L. Niederdeppe

316 West McDowell

Suite 203

Phoenix, Arizona 85003

Attorneys for Defendants

Helton, Nichols and Michaud

Copy of the foregoing hand-delivered

this 28 day of September, 1978 to:

Lawrence A. Katz, Esq.

Streich, Lang, Weeks, & Cardon

2100 First National Bank Plaza

100 West Washington

Phoenix, Arizona 85003

David L. Niederdeppe

32

PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE STATE

COURT JUDGE ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PROTEC-

TIVE ORDER

[Pages 6-21]

MR. NIEDERDEPPE [Attorney for State Court Defendants):

Your Honor, if you had a chance to review the Motion for Protective

Order which was filed I won't go into a great deal on that, other

than to note that it is our belief that the underlying purposes of this

lawsuit are two-fold.

First, to chill the exerc’se of defendants of their First Amend-

Act, Section 7, which gives them the right to engage in concerted

activity for their benefit.

Secondarily, we believe to procure the kind of discovery which

the National Labor Relations Board would not allow to the plaintifis

in that pending action. And, our Response, our Motion speaks to

both of those issues.

It is our belief that the Court has no jurisdiction to issue an

injunction which would prohibit or restrain the exercise by these

defendants of First Amendment Rights.

If that is so, then the hearing on the Order to Show Cause is

likewise limited. Since the plaintiffs in this action seek discovery

to prepare for that hearing, we feel that the scope of discovery

should be so limited.

Now, we feel that Rule 30 and its 30 day requirement would

preclude the taking of depositions which would delve into other

areas for that time period, because a trial may be pending on these

allegations two years from now as to the damage aspect.

With respect to the injunction aspect of the allegation, we feel

the scope should be at this time limited.

With respect to the second major thrust of the Motion for

Protective Order, which is the position that the National Labor policy

is to preclude this kind of discovery. I would note that the plaintiff's

Response states that they have no desire to ask for the statements

given by the individuals to the National Labor Relations Board.

33

However, if they are allowed to delve into the same area by way

of deposition, the same result would be accomplished.

The plaintiffs state that the Robbins Tire and Rubber case, the

case which was attached and the Freedom of Information Act speak

only to those statements. That is true. However, the policy of the

National Labor Relations Board has historically been to preclude

discovery in these kinds of proceedings. That policy, in conjunction

with the Robbins case and with the Freedom of Information Act

Exception 7A, we believe give to those — these defendants, rather,

a privilege until after the hearing to refuse to answer questions

related to that particular proceedings.

One final note, I would — I don’t have other copies of this

case. I have come across a case which speaks to this type of situation

and holds that an injunction is not a proper remedy for libel and

one of the statements made in this case is that, ‘‘Statements de-

scribing unsanitary working conditions and alleging a lack of morals

of supervisory personnel of an employer did not constitute a trade

libel which would justify an injunction.’’

That statement seems to speak to exactly the situation in this

case.

The case is Montgomery Ward vs. Department Store Employ-

ees of America. The citation is 400 Illinois 38, 79 Northeastern

Reporter 2d 46. And, 1 “ham pha. ay laa

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Mr. Katz?

MR. KATZ [Attorney for Plaintiff Restaurant): Your Honor,

on approximately 20 hours notice what we have received is a thinly

disguised Motion for Summary Judgment. I think the Motion is

premature and inappropriate.

The defendants have attacked the merits of this case and they

have sought ww appeal from this Court’s prior order.

As far as the issues they have raised in their brief, I do not

believe there is any genuine dispute as to the Court's right to enjoin

non-peaceful picketing and other massed assemblage.

34

The complaint before the Court seeks to enjoin non-peaceful

activities.

The facts indicating whether or not the activities, which are

complained of as having occurred in the past and as having been

threatened to continue, those facts will be brought out at the hearing

appropriately and the discovery is for the purpose of bringing out

such facts.

Part of the action is, of course, a libel action also and as to

that the defendants have raised claims of Constitutional issues of

free speech and prior restraint First Amendment Rights. That is

merely a smoke screen. There is no Constitutional Right to libel

another person.

We are not seeking to limit or restrain in a prior fashion. We

are seeking an injunction against a leaflet which has already been

distributed. We are seeking to have it no longer distributed.

As far as the privilege they have alleged, Linn vs. United Plant

Guard Workers points out, I think, on page 56 of the Supreme Court

decision that there is no right to libel anyone else. There is no

privilege under the Constitution.

As far as the Robbins case in the U.S. Supreme Court, that

was a suit by employer under the Freedom of Information Act to

compel the National Labor Relations Board to release certain state-

ments they had obtained. They are not a party. We seek to release

no such statements.

All we seek to do is, in normal discovery, is to ask the de-

fendants for the facts behind the leaflets they distributed. We want

to go through each and every fact in the leaflet and ask them, ‘“Why

did you make this accusation? What facts do you have to believe

the accusation is true?’’

We need that discovery in order to prepare for this proceeding

if there is a question as to whether the Court has the right to issue

preliminary relief. Part of the answer to that question will depend

upon the facts that come out through discovery.

I would assume that the Court’s decision as to whether to issue

a preliminary injunctive relief might vary from case to case, de-

pending on each fact situation.

35

All we want to do is get the facts necessary and supply the

information to this Court.

Thank you, Your Honor. Nothing else.

THE COURT: Mr. Niederdeppe?

MR. NIEDERDEPPE: If I may respond briefly.

This Motion for Protective Order has been described as a thinly

disguised or camouflaged Motion for Summary Judgment.

There is no seeking an order ending this action. There is no

facts upon which we rely, at this stage, that the Court could decide,

as a matter of law, that this action should be decided in the defen-

dants’ favor.

As I read the pleadings, I think the pleadings probably state

a cause of action for the elements alleged. We haven't sought to

block that.

With respect to the allegation in that complaint of mass pickets

or violence, we concur if that kind of conduct occurred it may

certainly be enjoined by this Court. Aad, the plaintiffs are certainly

with respect to those allegations.

We do feel that this Court may not enjoin the First Amendment

Rights of these individuals and that, therefore, is not relevant to the

hearing on the Order to Show Cause and the 30 day requirement

of Rule 30A should be accorded the defendants on that point.

Finally, | would just note, and I pointed this out in the Motion,

to the strong policy of the Labor Act encouraging freedom of speech,

the line of cases from Thornhill vs. Alabama through the Linn case,

which makes reference to that and to a later case which qualified

Linn, which is Old Dominion Branch Number 496 of the Letter

Carriers vs. Austin. It’s a Supreme Court case and I don’t have the

citation. I think I may have cited it in the Motion.

That case holds that the Federal Labor laws favor an unin-

hibited, robust and wide open debate in these type of labor disputes.

That’s exactly what occurred here. We feel the Court can’t

enjoin that kind of activity.

MR. KATZ: One further point?

36

THE COURT: Surely.

MR. KATZ: Defendants have expressed concern as to how we

will utilize whatever we discover in these depositions. The issue,

of course, before the Court is, will the discovery be relevant to this

proceeding? If it is relevant to this proceeding, then the fact that

it might be relevant to some other proceeding in some other forum

is immaterial.

The only issue that is presented before you today is whether

what we seek to ask in discovery is relevant to the proceedings

before you now. We submit that it is.

THE COURT: Mr. Niederdeppe, it is your motion, you are

entitled to the last word if you would like to have it.

MR. NIEDERDEPPE: I think I must say something.

With respect to the allegations of the complaint respecting

libel, we concur that investigation, by way of deposition, interrog-

atories, or whatever methods under the discovery rules is proper

with respect to libel. We are asking for the 30 day requirement of

Rule 30A to be prepared.

We think such short notice where depositions are being taken

four, five days after the complaint is filed if the issues on the hearing

of temporary restraining order are limited, the discovery which is

needed should be limited. That is all we are saying.

We are saying, with respect to the matters material to the labor

case, the National Labor Relations Board case, that there is a

We are not denying that it may have relevance here. We are

saying that until that hearing is held, the labor policy, the Freedom

of Information Act and the Robbins case give these defendants that

privilege.

THE COURT: If I read the complaint, or whatever the doc-

ument is, from the NLRB, entitled that was attached to your Motion,

the allegation made is that this young lady was fired because she

was attempting to organize union activity. That is what came through

in that complaint. I think that is what the hearing in December is

going to involve.

MR. NIEDERDEPPE: That’s correct.

37

THE COURT: That issue, that she was fired for that reason

and thus subject to the NLRB and some disciplinary action or some

The issues in this matter, as I see them are quite different and

it will be the ruling of this Court denying the Motion for Protective

Order. However, the allegations regarding union organizing and the

statements made to any investigators in that case may not be inquired

into. But, certainly the allegations regarding the other matters in the

pamphlet may be inquired into.

MR. KATZ: May I seek clarification, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

which we would like to inquire into.

One of the statements in the pamphlet is that Miss Helton was

fired when she suggested to the waitresses that they should organize

a union. That statement is similar to the statement that was made

in the Linn case.

If I may refer Your Honor to that case. Reading from the

pamphlet, the leaflet that was issued by the union in that case the

following quotations appeared in that leaflet, ‘“The men in Saginaw

were deprived of their right to vote in three NLRB elections. Their

in 1959. These Pinkertoa guards were robbed of any pay increases.

The Pinkerton managers were lying to us all the time the contract

was in effect.’’

It goes a little further but I am stopping there.

Many of the allegations had been the subject of unfair labor

practice charges before the Board, but I assume, since the U.S.

Supreme Court said that a libel action in state court would properly

lie, based on those allegations, that there would be no denial of

discovery into the truth or falsity into those allegations.

We seek to ask questions regarding the truth or falsity of all

the accusations made in the leaflet, regardless of whether or not

those accusations appear in some other forum. That does not appear

to us to be material to this particular case.

THE COURT: Your memorandum seemed to indicate that it

38

was the unwarranted sexual advances and a filthy restroom that you

wished to inquire into and not the allegations regarding the NLRB

proceeding.

MR. KATZ: If I may refer Your Honor to line 10 on page 2

of the memorandum. Part of the libelous statement is the defendants’

have accused the plaintiffs of violating the law. They have accused

us of discharging the defendant, Miss Helton, because she suggested

to the waitresses they should organize a union. That is a violation

of law and that is so perceived by our customers.

We believe Miss Helton made the statement knowing it to be

false, making it with the intention of injuring us in our business and

was done so maliciously.

Had she not distributed that pamphlet, had she kep’ her charges

to the appropriate federal agency there might not have been a libel

question, because she would be privileged to file the charges with

the agency.

Having made the particular statement public, we have a right

to defend and protect our reputation by asking the facts, why she

made the statements to a public agency as opposed to some other

forum.

MR. NIEDERDEPPE: I would merely point out that Linn vs.

United Plant Guard Workers to which the plaintiffs have reference

was a case which was not involving an injunction prior to the Board

It involved an action for damages which, of necessity, would

be sometime later than the hearing.

All we are asking in terms of the labor privilege is what the

Labor Board would give us, these individuals, that is to preclude

discovery until the time of hearing, December 7th.

We are not asking that they never be able to try the issues,

that is not the question.

THE COURT: Do you agree, pending the hearing, no more

dissemation [sic] of that statement will be made?

MR. NIEDERDEPPE: I am sorry?

‘THE COURT: Do you likewise agree that prior, pending the

39

hearing in December, that your clients will no longer dissemate [sic]

that statement publicly?

MR. NIEDERDEPPE: With respect to the National Labor

Relations Board?

THE COURT: You betcha.

MR. NIEDERDEPPE: Would that be one of the conditions of

the Court’s order?

THE COURT: I am asking.

MR. NIEDERDEPPE: I am just saying we don’t see that it

would be of necessity.

THE COURT: The Motion for Protective Order then is denied

as to these three sets of defendants. Those are the only ones to

whom the ruling goes.

The other orders remain in full force and effect.

MR. KATZ: Is there then, Your Honor, any limitation on

the —? )

THE COURT: There is not, so long as it is relevant to the

allegations made in this complaint.

It will be my ruiing that if any witness, other than one of these

parties, were asked about statements made to the NLRB, or that

these parties were asked about statements made to the NLRB in-

vestigators that that would not be a proper question, but you may

question them regarding the statements made publicly in Maricopa

County, and the basis for those statements.

MR. K.ATZ: I understand. Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. NIEDERDEPPE: May I clarify?

I take it you have denied in totality the Motion for Protective

Order?

THE COURT: I have.

MR. NIEDERDEPPE: So, if the plaintiffs in this matter delve

into areas which are relevant to the Labor Board's complaint, in

other words, whether or not this individual was fired for her union

activity that is not protected?

40

THE COURT: The ruling is that the plaintiffs may inquire

about any of the allegations made in this complaint.

They may not inquire as to what statements were made to

NLRB investigators. That’s not an allegation here that they falsely

told an NLRB investigator something. That’s not why we are here.

And, they may not inquire or the answer may be refused as to what

statements were made to NLRB people in that case by whom or

who made the statements.

They may inquire as to the statements made in Maricopa

County in this dissemination as to any matters regarding that state-

ment, who they were made to, what the basis for it is, what facts

they have to sustain the statements made in that publication in

Maricopa County.

MR. NIEDERDEPPE: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. KATZ: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes, indeed. Have a good day.

We will stand in recess.

(Whereupon, the above proceedings were terminated.)

I, BRIDGET BRITTAN, Official Court Reporter herein do

hereby certify that the foregoing 20 pages constitute a full, true and

accurate transcript of the proceedings had in this matter on Septem-

ber 29, 1978, all done to the best of my skill and ability.

DATED this 29th day of September, 1978.

Bridget Brittan

BRIDGET BRITTAN

Official Court Reporter

STATE COURT DEFENDANTS’ ANSWER AND COUNTER-

CLAIM

[Caption deleted]

Defendants, for their Answer to Plaintiffs’ Complaint, admit,

deny and allege as follows:

41

Defendants admit the allegations of Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of

the Complaint.

Answering Paragraph 4 of the Plaintiffs’ Complaint, Defen-

dants admit that they are residents of the State of Arizona. However,

Defendants deny, generally and specifically, each and every addi-

tional allegation of Paragraph 4.

Answering Paragraph 6 of the Complaint, Defendants admit

that they picketed on the public sidewalk in front of Plaintiffs’ Van

poem tape ag age Sap Seema a hr

among other 1

until the dispute had been halted. Such conduct is clearly permitted

under A.R.S. § 12-1808. Defendants deny each and every additional

allegation of Paragraph 6.

IV

Answering Paragraph 7 of the Complaint, Defendants admit

that they picketed on the public sidewalk at the Van Buren Sweet

restaurant on September 21, 1978; that the Defendants named in

Paragraph 7 were present for all or part uf such picketing activity.

Further, Defendants incorporate their Answer to Paragraph 6 of the

Complaint by reference herein, and they expressly deny each and

every allegation not specifically admitted in their response to Par-

agraphs 6 and 7.

Vv

Answering Paragraph 8 of the Complaint, Defendants admit

that those Defendants named in Paragraph 8 of the Complaint did

picket and distribute a limited number of handbills (Exhibit A to

42

Affidavit of Rudy Johnson) at public sidewalks in front of the Plain-

tiffs’ Van Buren Street Restaurant. Defendants deny, all and sin-

gular, each and every additional allegation of Paragraph 8.

VI

Defendants deny, all and singular, each and every allegation

contained in Paragraphs 5, 9, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and

20 of the Complaiut.

vil

Answering Paragraphs 10 and 12 of the Complaint, Defendants

are without sufficient knowledge with which to form a belief as to

the truth or falsity of the allegations contained therein, and therefore

Defendants deny the same.

Count I] — Libel Business Disparagement

I

Answering Count II of the Complaint, Defendants adopt by

reference and incorporate herein all of the admissions, denials, and

allegations set forth in their Answer to Count | of the Complaint.

Defendants deny, all and singular, each and every allegation

contained in Paragraphs 22 through 25 of the Complaint.

Defendants deny each and every allegation of Plaintiffs’ Com-

plaint not specifically admitted or denied herein.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

Defendants allege that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted.

Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act [29 U.S.C. § 157],

Sections 4 and 7 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act [29 U.S.C. § 104 and

§ 107], and Section 12-1808 of the Arizona Revised Statutes, they

WHEREFORE, Defendants respectfully request that the Com-

Order issued on September 25, 1978 be dissolved, that the Order

Myriand R. Helton, John Helton, Barbara Orr, Lawrence Orr,

Cheryl Nichols, Carl Nichols, Carla Marie Scott, Debra Mackie,

and Dale Michaud, hereinafter Counterclaimants, for their coun-

terclaims allege as follows:

ad

Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc., an Arizona corporation;

Johnny Johnson and Jane Doe Johnson, his wife; Rudy Johnson and

Jane Doe Johnson, his wife; Don Kalfas and Marilyn Kalfas, his

wife; Loginna Jean Johnson and John Doe Johnson, her husband;

Sherry Surgeon and John Doe Sturgeon, her husband; Dina Cam-

eron and John Doe Cameron, her husband; Suzy Gay and John Doe

Gay, her husband, a/k/a Lenny Walters; John Does I through X and

Jane Does I through X, individuals whose names and identities are

unknown at this time and who will be named after their identities

become known, were at all times pertinent to this complaint acting

for themselves individually and for and on behalf of all other

Counterdefendants, hereinafter ‘‘the Family.’’ Each of the husband-

wife Defendants constitutes a single marital community.

Counterclaimants and Counterdefendants are residents of the

State of Arizona or are presently existing corporations duly qualified

and licensed to do business in Arizona; and the unlawful actions

which are the basis of this complaint were perpetrated by ‘‘the

Family’’ in Arizona.

On or about August 8, 1978, Myriand Ruth Helton was dis-

charged from her employment at the Big Apple East, a restaurant

where she had been employed as a waitress for seven and one-half

years by ‘‘the Family.”’

IV

Mrs. Helton, prior to her discharge, had been actively engaged

in activities protected by federal law; to wit: discussing the forming

of a union with fellow employees. Determining this to be the cause

of her discharge by “‘the Family,’’ Mrs. Helton filed a charge with

the National Labor Relations Board (The Board). The Board issued

a Complaint on September 20, 1978, alleging that Mrs. Helton had

been terminated because of her union activities.

45

\

Fellow employees of Mrs. Helton were told by ‘‘the Family"’

to inform Mrs. Helton’s customers that ‘‘she had quit work to return

to school.’’ Mrs. Helton’s fellow employees were told that Mrs.

Helton was discharged for not complying with company regulations.

v.

By mid-September, 1978, the fellow employees of Mrs. Helton

had become aware of what company regulations Mrs. Helton was

alleged to have violated. These company regulations were as fol-

lows: (a) employees were not to chew gum while working;

(b) employees were not to use the company phone for private use;

(c) employees were to call in on a designated off-work day of each

week referred to as a ‘‘call day’’ fifteen minutes prior to their shift.

vol

Mrs. Helton’s fellow employees knew of their own knowledge

that Mrs. Helton had not violated any of the aforementioned com-

pany policies prior to her discharge. They believed, as well, that

the company regulations dealing with private use of the company

phone and calling in on a call day had been countermanded by the

immediate supervisor of Mrs. Helton’s shift, the breakfast shift, and

that no one on the breakfast shift felt obliged to comply with any

of these regulations.

Vil

On September 18, 1978, believing that Mrs. Helton was dis-

charged for union activities rather than the reasons given by the

management, and knowing that ‘‘the Family’’ refused reinstatement,

the majority of Mrs. Helton’s work shift walked off the job in her

support.

IX

On September 29, 1978, Defendants and Counterclaimants

began picketing at the Big Apple East.

46

xX

Shortly after the picketing began, Counterdefendant Sherry

Sturgeon, a member of management, approached the picketers and

confronted them with foul and abusive language, threats and obscene

hand signs. She told Counterclaimants that it was the intention of

**the Family’’ to ‘‘make you pay for this.”’

xl

Picketing continued on September 21, 1978 and September

22, 1978. Picketing did not exceed five hours on any of these days.

On these three occasions, and on every occasion since, Counter-

claimants have conducted themselves in a manner beyond reproach.

Counterclaimants have never crowded the sidewalks in front of the

restaurant or made it difficult for pedestrians to pass. Counter-

claimants have not shouted at, harassed, or threatened employees

of the restaurant or its customers or potential customers. At no time

have the picketers blocked ingress or egress from the restaurant.

On Friday, September 22, 1978, Counterclaimants distributed

several handbills to passers-by listing their grievances. Counter-

claimants knew of their own knowledge and belief that everything

contained in the leaflet was true. They distributed these leaflets in

an effort to educate the public as to what abuses they and others

had suffered at the hands of *‘the Family’ in the hope that doing

so would aid in preventing such abuses in the future.

At all times relevant hereto, ‘‘the Family’’ was aware of the

facts set forth in Paragraph XI preceding this paragraph. They were

aware as well of the truthfulness of the statements set forth in the

handbills distributed by the picketers. Yet, on September 25, 1978,

“the Family’ caused to be filed in the Superior Court of the State

of Arizona, Maricopa County, the lawsuit of which this Counter-

claim has become a part demanding punitive damages of One half

Million Dollars ($500,000) plus compensatory damages, claiming

that statements set forth in the leaflets distributed by Counter-

Counterclaimants believe this litigation is and was an attempt

by “‘the Family’’ to use the Court system to harass, intimidate,

terrorize and break down Counterclaimants. It appeared to be the

attitude of ‘‘the Family’’ that its former employees could not afford

or would not seek legal counsel and therefore would be manipulated

terclaimants have suffered ridicule, emotional distress, limited em-

Counterdefendants’ actions constitute a willful and deliberate

abuse of process and a malicious prosecution designed to restrain

Counterclaimants in the exercise of rights guaranteed under the

Constitution and law of the State of Arizona and of the United

States.

WHEREFORE, for this obvious and malicious abuse of pro-

cess, Counterclaimants pray Judgment in an amount of compen-

satory damages to be proven at trial, plus exemplary damages in

the sum of Two Million Dollars ($2,000,000), together with Coun-

terclaimants’ costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees.

48

COUNTERCLAIM I

Each and every allegation contained in Paragraph | through

XVI above is hereby realleged and incorporated herein as if fully

set forth.

Xvi

On October 25, 1978, ‘*the Family’’ sought and received from

the Superior Court a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary

Injunction which hindered and limited Counterclaimants in exer-

cising their civil rights and more specifically, those rights granted

by Amendment I to the United States Constitution and A.R.S. Con-

stitution Article 2, § 6, and § 12-1808 of the Arizona Revised

Statutes.

Xvi

limited the number of Counterclaimants who could picket at any

one restaurant location at any given time. This meant, of course,

that when four Counterclaimants were exercising their freedom of

speech by picketing and/or handbilling in front of the Counter-

defendants’ Big Apple East restaurant, the other five Counterclai-

mants could not exercise their freedom of speech at this location

and therefore were deprived of the same.

XIX

Although ‘‘the Family’ spend several days prior to September

25, 1978, in the preparation of its litigation and request for Tem-

porary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, *‘the Family’’

did not notice in any way, shape or form the majority of Counter-

claimants that a Temporary Restraining Order hearing was to take

place and gave no more than one hour and ten minutes notice to the

two Counterclaimants it did notice. The two Counterclaimants who

were noticed of the hearing were noticed by telephone.

49

XX

In presenting its request for a Temporary Restraining Order

and Preliminary Injunction to the Court, “‘the Family’’ knew or

should have known that the picketing was peaceful, the handbills

truthful and the conduct free of any violence, threats of violence,

or obstruction of ingress and egress from the restaurant.

XXI

By wrongfully securing a Temporary Restraining Order against

Counterclaimants, Counterdefendants have interfered with and re-

strained Counterclaimants in the exercise of rights granted under

law; they have subjected Counterclaimants to ridicule; they have

limited Counterclaimants’ future employment opportunities, and

they have forced Counterclaimants to pay substantial attorneys’ fees

and Court costs. Counterclaimants cannot ascertain at this time the

extent of their compensatory damages except that they have incurred

costs and attorneys’ fees to date in excess of Four Thousand Dollars

($4,000).

XxIl

Further, Counterdefendants’ actions were willful, malicious,

and conscious efforts designed to secure a wrongful Injunction.

WHEREFORE, Counterclaimants pray that they be awarded

compensatory damages to be proven at trial, plus the sum of Two

Million Dollars ($2,000,000) as and for exemplary damages, and

costs and attorneys’ fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01.

COUNTERCLAIM III

Each and every allegation contained in Paragraphs | through

XXII is realleged as if fully set forth.

XXIil

Since on or about August 8, 1978, Counterdefendants have

slandered and published numerous libelous statements regarding the

actions and motives of Counterclaimants. These libelous statements

include a letter distributed by Counterdefendants to employees on

50

or about September 25, 1978. A true and correct copy of said

publication is attached hereto as Exhibit A. [Exhibit omitted. }

XXIV

Counterdefendants knew the statements made in the slanderous

and libelous publication were untrue anc the statements were made

with reckless disregard for their truth. Further, Counterdefendants’

XXV

As a result of the libel and slander perpetrated by the Coun-

terdefendants, Counterclaimants have been subjected to ridicule,

humiliation, loss of employment opportunities and damage to their

reputations. Counterclaimants are unable at this time to ascertain

the amounts of damages which they have suffered as a result of

Counterdefendants’ libelous and slanderous statements.

WHEREFORE, Counterclaimants pray Judgment in an amount

of compensatory damages to be proven at trial, for exemplary dam-

ages in the amount of Two Million Dollars ($2,000,000) and for

all costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees and for such other relief as

to the Court appears just and proper in the premises.

WARD & CONTRERAS, LTD.

By: Michael J. Keenan

Michael J. Keenan

316 West McDowell Road

Suite 203

Phoenix, Arizona 85003

Attorneys for Defendants and

Counterclaimants

Copy of the foregoing delivered

this 13 day of November, 1978, to:

County of Maricopa )

WITNESSETH, the undersigned, for and on behalf of the

Counter-claimants, being first duly sworn, verifies that she has read

the foregoing Counterclaim, verifies that the account which is the

basis of this Complaint is just and true, and that all facts stated

herein are true and correct.

Myriand R. Helton

Affiant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 13th day of

November, 1978.

My Commission Expires: 10-5-79

Gayle M. Weber

Notary Public

52

STATE COURT’S MINUTE ENTRY RE PRELIMINARY

INJUNCTION, NOV. 16, 1978

[Caption deleted]

12:05 p.m. Order to Show Cause. Plaintiff represented by

counsel, Lawrence A. Katz. Defendants are represented by counsel,

Michael J. Keenan.

Court reporter, Bridget Brittan, is present.

Plaintiff's case:

Rudy Johnson is sworn and testifies.

Plaintiff's Exhibits 1, 2, 3 and 4 are marked for identification

and received in evidence — photographs.

Sherry Sturgeon is sworn and testifies.

Marilyn Kalfas is sworn and testifies.

Lois Williams is sworn and testifies.

George P. Bolen is sworn and testifies.

Ruth Helton is sworn and testifies.

Plaintiff rests.

Defendant’s counsel moves that the Temporary Restraining

Order be dissolved, the Order to Show Cause quashed and the

Application for Preliminary Injunction denied.

Based on the evidence presented, the Court finds there is in-

sufficient evidence that would warrant the issuance of a Preliminary

Injunction.

Ordered denying Request for Preliminary Injunction and dis-

solving the Temporary Restraining Order.

53

PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING BEFORE NLRB

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE

(Pages 33-1)

MICHAEL KEENAN

was called as a witness by and on behalf of the General Counsel

and having been first duly sworn on oath, was examined and testified

as follows, to-wit:

THE WITNESS: Your Honor, may I make a preliminary state-

ment before I begin to testify?

JUDGE JENSON: All right. Give us your name and your

address, first, please.

THE WITNESS: My name is Michael J. Keenan. My address

is 316 West McDowell Road, Phoenix, Arizona.

Your Honor, I’m here pursuant to a subpoena. I, as you know,

am representing the charging party and others in Superior Court

proceedings. I haven't at this point entered an appearance in the

Board case, nor do I intend to. My particular problem, of course,

with this case is that there’s going to be a greal deal of interplay

between my testimony and having to refuse *> answer questions

because of the attorney client priviledge, and i /ant to make it clear

on the record that my clients have not waived the attorney client

priviledge and to the extent I answer questions which in my judgment

are not priviledged, it’s not my intention nor should it be construed

that any of these answers constitute a waiver of the attorney client

priviledge.

MR. PETTIBONE [Attorney for Board): Your Honor, I would

like to apologize to the Court for calling Mr. Keenan to the stand,

out of turn chronologically. However, he as he previously stated has

to be before the Ninth Circuit in Los Angeles tomorrow and is

leaving for there this afternoon. So, I beg your permission to let

him testify first.

JUDGE JENSON: Go ahead.

DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. PETTIBONE:

Q. Mr. Keenan, what is your occupation?

A. I'm an attorney.

Sa

Q. Do you know a Myriand R. Helton?

A. Yes, I do. I’m representing Mrs. Helton in connection with

a Superior Court lawsuit.

Q. 1s that Superior Court in the State of Arizona?

A. Yes, it is.

Q. Maricopa County?

A. Yes.

Q. When did you first meet Mrs. Helton.

A. I believe it was the Tuesday, the 26th of September, in the

Q. This year?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay. Can you please tell us why she came to you?

A. She was refeired to me by a client to — for the purpose

of securing our firm to handle the Superior Court action which at

that point consisted of a Temporary Restraining Order which had

been issued by the Court on the 25th and a damage action, liable

[sic] action which was part of the same proceedings.

Q. Did your firm agree to represent her?

A. Yes, we did on that day agree to represent Mrs. Helton

and subsequently we undertook to represent all nine (9) of the

defendants in that lawsuit.

Q. At the time Mrs. Helton — or at the time you agreed

represent Mrs. Helton, can you please tel] us what, at that time,

was the status of the lawsuit, in addition to the TRO?

A. Well, the restraining order had been granted with some

modifications by Judge Rudell [sic] on the previous day, Monday

morning I believe. That would have been September 25, 1978. And,

of course, no appearances had been entered by any counsel and |

believe a hearing was set on the Temporary Restraining Order for

the following week, I think it was October Sth, although I'm not

certain of the date.

Q. You say a hearing was set on the Temporary Restraining

Order.

55

A. Application for Preliminary Injunction.

Q. Thank you. At the time Mrs. Helton visited you at your

offices were depositions scheduled?

A. Yes, they were. At the time Mr. Katz secured the Tem-

porary Restraining Order, | believe he also got the Judge to sign an

Order expediting discovery and he had set depositions for the after-

noon of Wednesday the 27th and the morning and afternoon of

Friday, the 29th. Again, all these dates are "78 unless | indicate

otherwise.

Q. Okay, and you said Mr. Katz, is that the same Mr. Katz

that is here?

A. Larry Katz who was representing the company and who

filed along with Nancy Splain the lawsuit and other papers.

Q. And is that the same Mr. Katz who's here today repre-

senting the Respondent?

A. Yes, it is.

Q. Were the depositions held as scheduled at that point?

A. No, they were not. The Order had, I don’t recall the exact

words, but some alternative dates for the scheduling depositions,

and October 2nd and 3rd, I believe which would have been the

following Monday and Tuesday. | called Mr. Katz on the 27th and

advised him I was representing the Heltons and | believe at that

Q. Would you please tell us who said what during that phone

conversation?

A. Well, as I recall there two conversations between Mr. Katz

and I and | think there was a third conversation between Mr. Nied-

erdeppe and my office and Mr. Katz. The first one, I believe, Larry

may have called me and said | understand you're representing the

Helton’s. I don’t remember who called whom. And, I don’t re-

member too much of the conversation — too many of the specifics.

I do remember the topics we discussed. One of which was the of

course, the setting of the depositions, we also discussed the kinds

of questions he was going to ask in the depositions. Mrs. Helton

had advised me that a Complaint had been issued in connection with

the first of the cases, I don’t know the number off hand, but the

883 case. And, I was concerned that he was going to use — during

the course of the deposition to get into some of the matters that were

the subject of testimony of Mrs. Helton and some of the others in

the 883 case. So, we had a discussion about what he believed was

relevant to the liable [sic] lawsuit particularly in relation to one

paragraph of the hanovil] which had been distributed by Mrs. Helton

and the other picketers. And, I think that the language was something

to the effect that Ruth Helton had been terminated by the Big Apple

Restaurant, Bill Johnson’s Inc., on August the 8th after she had

talked to other waitresses about forming a union. Larry and | had

a fundemental difference as to what that paragraph meant. | told

him that I didn’t think there would be any problem with his asking

questions about the sequence of events, mainly that Mrs. Helton

had talked to people about forming a union prior to August the 8th

and thereafter she was fired, but he said that the word after should

be construed as because and that for that reason he felt it was relevant

to go into the facts Mrs. Helton relied upon in determining that she

had been fired for union activity. I told him at that point that |

thought we would probably be filing a Protective Order Motion to

limit the testimony of Mrs. Helton and others. I think all nine (9)

of the defendants at that point had been scheduled for

And, in fact, on Friday the 27th or 29th of September, two (2) of

the depositions had been taken, Barbara Orr and Larry Orr, but the

problem didn’t really materialize there because Barbara Orr had

terminated her employment several months before these events gave

rise to the 883 case.

Q. In your disucssion with Mr. Katz on the phone, you tes-

tified that you discussed the scheduling of depositions. Did you

discuss the scheduling of Mrs. Helton’s deposition?

A. Well, yeah. I believe Larry wanted because of scheduling

problems and primarily he indicated scheduling problems, he wanted

to get Ruth Helton’s deposition out of the way first thing Friday.

I think he also indicated that after taking Mrs. Helton’s deposition,

there may not be need to take all nine of the defendants’ depositions.

And, I think I responded that because we were concerned about the

scope of the examination, we might be filing a Protective Order

57

Motion and we'd need the additional time. So, I think we then,

during one of these two conversations set a deposition schedule for

everyone but the Orrs who had shown up on Friday, beginning on

Monday morning with Mrs. Helton at 9:00 o’clock and Mr. Helton

thereafter, and I forget the sequence after that.

Q. How about the second conversation, could you tell us

briefly what that involved?

A. Well, I think we closed the first conversation with our

discussion about whether or not we would try to limit the scope of

his discovery, and he said he would write down the questions and

call me back and let me know what questions he anticipated to ask.

He did call me back, probably forty-five (45) minutes later, and he

read me several questions. I can’t remember the specifics of the

questions, but they were all framed around the idea what facts did

you rely upon in making the statement on the leaflet that you had

been discharged because of union actvities, or after having talked

about union activities. After he read those questions, | said that in

my judgment that we would probably be moving to get a Protective

Order from Judge Rudell [sic] to limit the discovery, because I felt

that he was kind of using a back door approach to get —

MR. KATZ: Objection to any testimony about why Mr. Keenan

took certain actions and what his legal reasons were for those actions.

I think it’s irrelevant to this proceeding.

JUDGE JENSON: I'll overrule.

BY MR. PETTIBONE:

Q. Mr. Keenan, was the — a Motion for Protective Order

filed by your office?

A. Yes, it was. At that point, I asked Dave Neiderdeppe who's

an associate in our firm to prepare the papers and take care of the

argument or the Motion. We discussed the types of questions, Mr.

Katz was asking, and | think that Dave then called Larry Katz and

discussed the questions once again to see whether or not there was

any prospect of limiting the questioning without our going after a

Protective Order and Motion.

Q. Do you recall] when the Motion was filed?

A. I think it was filed either Wednesday, the 27th of September

or Thursday the 28th. I know the hearing was set for Friday morning

at 8:30 on the 29th of September.

JUDGE JENSON: What Order are you talking about?

MR. PETTIBONE: It’s the — Motion, I may have said Order,

I’m sorry. The Motion for Protective Order. Your Honor, with your

permission, I'd like to raise those calendars to get a better view of

what days occur when.

JUDGE JENSON: Okay.

BY MR. PETTIBONE:

Q. Mr. Keenan, as a result of the filing of the Motion for

Protective Order, what happened?

A. Well, Judge Rudell [sic] essentially denied our Motion and

agreed with Mc. Katz’s theory that the types of questions relating

to the facts upon which Mrs. Helton relied in contending that she

was discharged for union activity was relevant to the lawsuit because

it had been mentioned on the allegedly liabless [sic] handbill.

Q. Did she make her ruling after a hearing?

A. Well, after oral argument, yes. The Motion was filed and

the hearing was expedited and then Mr. Katz and Mr.

argued before Judge Rudell [sic] on Friday morning the 29th at 8:30

a.m., I think.

Q. Okay, was Mrs. Helton’s deposition taken?

A. Yes, it was taken, before I go on I might say that the Judge

also ordered in addition to agreeing with Mr. Katz’s theory, she

entered an Order that Mr. Katz was not permitted to go into the

substance of any statements given to the NLRB. Mrs. Helton’s

deposition, in answer to your question, was eventually taken. It was

taken about 9:00 a.m. on Monday the 2nd of August, or October.

Q. Were there any other depositions taken at that day?

A. Yes, there were. There were two (2) additional depositions

taken that afternoon, John Helton and — was the next in order and

Johnny Johnson, who’s an official of Bill Johnson's restaurants

deposition was also taken that day.

Q. Okay, who is John Helton?

A. John Helton is Ruth Helton’s husband. He was also named

as a defendant in the civil court lawsuit.

Q. Other than the depositions of the Orrs which you previously

mentioned, were the depositions of any other named defendants

taken before that of Mrs. Helton?

A. No, they weren't. I believe they were scheduled for the

afternoon of the 2nd and the morning of the 3rd because we still

had the October Sth hearing date to contend with and we were trying

to get the depositions taken.

Q. During the taking of Mrs. Helton’s deposition, was she

asked to respond to questions regarding her union activities?

A. Yes, I believe she was.

Q. Can you tell us what happened after her deposition was

taken?

A. Well, the deposition was completed probably somewhere

between 11:30 and noon, and we decided to postpone the other

depositions until after the noon hour. At that point, I think Mr. Kaiz

asked me to step into his office. He wanted to talk to me, and we

discussed and I think, attorney client priviledge, Your Honor, would

prohibit me from talking about the substance of the conversation,

but one of the topics a — was a possible settlement.

Q. Okay. During the discussion was the taking of the re-

maining depositions also discussed?

A. Yes, it was. We at that point, began talking about putting

off the October Sth hearing.

Q. That's the hearing I assume on the Preliminary Injunction?

A. Yeah, and rescheduling the depositions to some time prior

to the new hearing date.

Q. Was the hearing postponed?

A. It was after we had — I had agreed to convey the settlement

offer to my clients and we determined that we'd need more time

than the three (3) days which we had. So, we agreed to stipulate

to continue the Restraining Order as modified by Judge Rudell [sic],

in effect, until, I believe it was the 14th of October, I don’t know

if I’m clear on that date.

Q. Do you recall, was that hearing on the request for a Pre-

liminary Injunction postponed once or more than once?

A. It was poscponed twice by stipulation and once by the Court

because of scheduling problems. It was postponed twice by stipu-

lation between Mr. Katz and myself, and on both of those occasions

we agreed to extend the TRO as modified, Restraining Order.

Q. And, were the depositions rescheduled?

A. Yes, they were. They were finally — I can’t recall exactly

when they were taken. Some were never taken. There were a couple

of — at least one of the defendants deposition was never taken

because she moved to New York. I believe they were taken the 10th

of November and the 13th of November, because by this time we

reset the hearing for the second time to the 14th of November.

Q. Which of the defendants had moved to New York?

A. Debby Makey had to go back for surgery and she’s still

in New York as I understand it.

Q. During the depositions of the other defendants, were they

asked questions about any union activities of Ruth Helton?

A. Yes, they were, I believe. I'm sure they were. In fact,

Miss Splain and I — Miss Splain took several of the depositions

and we each made a statement on the record as to what we believed

the admissability of that sort of testimony was and in light of Judge

Rudell’s [sic] Order. And, I think that’s all a matter of record. Those

statements were all made on the record at the depositions.

MR. PETTIBONE: Your Honor, may I approach the witness?

JUDGE JENSON: Of course.

BY MR. PETTIBONE:

Q. Mr. Keenan, I’m going to hand you a rather large accu-

mulation of documents. Have you seen that before?

JUDGE JENSON: Show a copy to Mr. Katz.

MR. PETTIBONE: I’m sorry, Your Honor.

A. Yes, I have had an opportunity to look these over before

the hearing. I’ve seen everything except the index of General Coun-

sel’s Exhibit 2.

61

Q. That's the top page?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay, and are all of the documents contained therein your

papers filed by the parties in the State Court action or Orders or

transcripts of proceedings before the Court?

A. Yes, I believe that Exhibit h is — I’m not sure whether

it’s a complete transcript of the deposition of Mrs. Helton, but I

— there are several depositions and I can’t say for certain that these

are complete. I didn’t look through them. But, with that qualifi-

cation, I believe all of these papers were either filed with the Court

or by the Court or transcripts of proceedings related to those — to

the Court action.

MR. PETTIBONE: Your Honor, at this time I move for the

introduction of General Counsel’s 2 to — 2(a) through 2(j) into

evidence.

JUDGE JENSON: Now, what is it? These are the State Court

proceedings?

JUDGE JENSON: Any objections?

MR. KATZ: Yes, we do have objection in part. Items (a)

through (e) on the list and item (i) are not objected to. (a) through

(e) and (i) are not objected to. We object to item (f) as irrelevant

for the counsel — for the General Counsel to introduce the Motion

and the supporting memorandum of the defendants in the case has

no bearing on any issues related to the restaurant’s bringing of the

bringing the lawsuit. It would be just a self-serving document to

present to this Court. And, of course, they haven't presented the

documents filed by the restaurant only those filed by the defendants.

So, it’s irrelevant and it’s only partial, and therefore it’s objection-

able on both grounds. Item (g) is also irrelevant. The transcript of

proceedings on the Motion for Protective Order doesn’t have any

relevance to the issue before this Court now which was the respon-

dent’s intent and purpose in bringing the lawsuit initially and finally

on — excuse me, not finally, next to finally, Item (h) copies of

pertinent portions of the transcripts, I think it’s objectionable not

to submit the entire transcript but just to select portions chosen, I

62

assume, with a particular purpose in mind, presents an incomplete

picture and is therefore objectionable. Finally, now, Item (j) we also

feel is irrelevant, what the Court did several months after the bring-

ing of the lawsuit in terms of the Preliminary Injunction, has no

bearing on the issues before this Court including whether the Re-

spondent, the restaurant had a reasonable basis for bringing the suit

at the time it was filed. We would ask that (a) through (e) and (i)

be left attached to the Exhibit and that the objectionable sections

of this Exhibit be removed.

MR. PETTIBONE: Your Honor, would you care for a

response?

JUDGE JENSON: Yes.

MR. PETTIBONE: First of all General Counsel’s Exhibit 2(f),

Respondent has objected on the basis of relevancy. The Defendant's

memorandum of points and authorities, which | believe is objec-

tionable primarily too. He has offered for picture of completeness

to show the Respondent’s to show the reasons for the Respondent's

thereto, which is included thereto in the exhibit. That is included

in Exhibit 2(f). 2(f) although it’s helpful, it isn’t completely un-

SO ee ee ee

to, which is why Defendant’s memorandum was included.

JUDGE JENSON: Well, do you intend to introduce certain

documents with respect to the Court proceedings, too.

MR. KATZ: I can’t answer that at this time, Your Honor, until

I see what they present.

JUDGE JENSON: Well, this is about an inch thick and I

haven't had a chance to read it yet.

MR. PETTIBONE: Your Honor, would you like me to respond

to the other items as well?

JUDGE JENSON: Okay.

has objected to as irrelevant. That is a copy of the transcript of

proceedings on the Motion for Protective Order. It is very relevant.

It is the General Counsel’s position, that that transcript reveals the

basis for the Respondent’s claim that the handbill was liabless(sic]}.

And, also reveals that the claim was frivolous and a sham and only

63

a means of obtaining discovery of the General Counsel’s case, Case

number 4970. Argument of counsel there for the Respondent reveals

the true motive. And, that’s why General Counsel has included that

in the Exhibit.

With respect to (h), —

JUDGE JENSON: Before you go on, off of (g), am I getting,

do I just have a poor copy here or is this thin paper?

MR. PETTIBONE: It’s thin paper, Your Honor. The bold

faceprint is the print on that page and what's printing through is the

print on behind pages.

JUDGE JENSON: All right, go ahead.

MR. PETTIBONE: With respect to General Counsel's Exhibit

2(h), I believe Respondent objected that the — objected to the fact

that only portions of the depositions included. I did that because I

didn’t want to go through the trouble of photocopying the entire

thing, and including them and make an overwhelming document.

If Respondent wishes to introduce the remaining portions of those

depositions, I would have no objection.

With respect to Exhibit 2 — I believe that takes us to Exhibit

2(j), I offered that only for completeness, that is what the Judge did

with the hearing for the Preliminary Injunction. | just thought it

would help in giving us a complete picture, for that reason I thought

it was relevant.

JUDGE JENSON: Well, the only thing that really bothers me

about it, is (h) copies of what you consider the pertinent portions

of the transcripts. The rest, of course, I haven't looked at it. I don’t

know whether it’s relevant or whether it isn’t. But sometime I would

have to read it to find out if it is or isn’t relevant, but for the purposes

of going on with the hearing now, I’m going to receive all but (h)

and at such time as I do have an opportunity to go through this, I'll

have to determine whether the rest of it is relevant or not. I don’t

know right now. So, I guess you'll just have to trust me to make

such a determination.

MR. PETTIBONE: Your Honor, may we go off the record for

a minute?

JUDGE JENSON: Wait a minute. Now, so far as (h) goes, the

64

transcript of the depositions, | would assume the two (2) of you can

come to some agreement on that. Is what is in here pertinent or is

it not and is there other pertinent material. You two can discuss that

off the record.

MR. PETTIBONE: Your Honor, are we still on the record?

JUDGE JENSON: Yes.

MR. PETTIBONE: As I said before, if Respondent wishes to

introduce the remaining portions, we would have no objection.

JUDGE JENSON: Well, let’s see if you can’t come to an

agreement with respect to (h). (h) is not received at this point, it’s

reserved.

(The documents previously marked as

2(a) through 2(j) for identification were

received in evidence, except 2(h), which

was rejected.)

[Pages 52-57]

CROSS EXAMINATION

BY MR. KATZ [Attorney for Restaurant):

Q. Michael, may I call you Michael? Do you recognize that

document?

A.[By Michael Keenan] Yes, I do. I am told that this is the

handbill which was distributed on a couple of days in September,

I believe the 22nd was the first day, and also for a short time as I

understand it on the 26th of September.

Q. Is this an accurate copy of that document?

A. Yes, this is the — this is an accurate copy of the copy

which was attached to your Complaint.

MR. KATZ: We'd like to offer that in evidence as Respon-

dent’s Exhibit | or 3 or whatever.

JUDGE JENSON: Respondent's 1.

(The document previously referred to

was marked as Respondent's Exhibit No.

1 for identification.)

JUDGE JENSON: Any objection?

MR. PETTIBONE: No objection, Your Honor.

JUDGE JENSON: Received.

(The document previously marked as

Respondent’s Exhibit No. 1 for identi-

fication was received in evidence.)

BY MR. KATZ:

Q. You say that this document was attached to the Complaint

that was filed in the State Court proceedings?

A. Yes, it was.

Q. Were you present during most of the depositions that were

taken by Respondent in connection with that State Court proceeding?

A. I believe I was present during all of the depositions.

Q. And, was this leaflet the subject of questions asked during

the depositions?

A. Yes, I think the leaflet was the subject of questions asked

of all the witnesses on both sides, and they were numerous as I

recall. They were probably twelve (12) to thirteen (13) depositions

taken.

Q. Now, the second paragraph in Respondent’s Exhibit 1,

refers to Miss Helton’s discharge. Were the questions asked during

the deposition about Miss Helton’s discharge in reference to this

paragraph? In Respondent’s Exhibit 1?

A. Well, as you know, they were in reference to your con-

struction of the paragraph which I strongly disagreed throughout the

proceedings, namely that the word after should be replaced by the

word, before on line 3 of the second paragraph.

Q. Okay, Did you also take depositions?

A. I did.

Q. And, do you recall how many you took?

A. I believe I took four (4) of them.

Q. Do you remember whose depositions you took?

A. John Johnson, Rudy Johnson, Don Kalfas and Suzie Gay,

I believe those were the only ones.

Q. During those depositions, did you ask questions which

were calculated to determine whether they had any knowledge of

Miss Helton’s union activities?

A. I asked questions after first making a preliminary statement

that because I was unsure of what Judge Rudell’s [sic] Order in-

dicated and because | was — because of your construction of this

paragraph, | was put in the position of having to defend it in the

liable [sic] actions, that I would go into that area, yes. I don’t think

I asked it of all of them, just a couple.

MR. KATZ: Your Honor, I'd like to move that Mr. Keenan's

testimony is non-responsive to the question, that | just asked and

also should be stricken. And, I'd ask that he respond to the specific

question that was asked.

JUDGE JENSON: I thought he did.

MR. KATZ: I didn’t ask him what his reasons were for asking

questions, I asked whether he asked the questions or not.

JUDGE JENSON: Well, denied. Go ahead.

BY MR. KATZ:

Q. Referring you to General Counsel’s Exhibit No. 2, Item

(g) is a transcript of proceedings on the Motion for Protective Order

before Judge Rudell [sic).

JUDGE JENSON: Which one now?

MR. KATZ: Item (g) in Exhibit No. 2.

BY MR. KATZ:

Q. Of that two (2) pages of that transcript include provisions

setting forth the Judge's ruling and begin on page 19, line 6, where

the Judge begins by saying, ‘*It will be my ruling,’ and that con-

tinues on to line 14, and then the Judge begins again on line 25,

and says, ‘“The ruling is as follows,’’ and then it goes over to the

next page line 15. I ask that you read that ruling for a moment to

refresh your recollection. Is that transcript a faithful reproduction

of the Judge’s ruling as you remember it?

67

A. Well, as I testified earlier, | wasn’t present at this hearing.

David Neiderdeppe was — it’s an accurate transcription of the

transcript I read several weeks ago.

Q. All right. When you participated in the depositions, and

I believe you testified that you were in each of the depositions that

Respondents took.

A. I believe so.

Q. Did the Respondents comply with that ruling of the Judge?

MR. PETTIBONE: Objection, Your Honor. He’s asking Mr.

Keenan to make a conclusion — to draw a legal conclusion. As Mr.

Keenan has stated, the parties are in disagreement as to whether the

questions posed by Respondent’s counsel in those depositions were

within the Order. Mr. Keenan has already testified to that, and for

Mr. Katz to ask him now, whether or not the questions the Re-

spondent complied is not only asking for a legal conclusion, but

asking a question that’s been asked and answered.

JUDGE JENSON: Wait a minute. He’s expressed an opinion

as to whether he has complied or not, now I'll permit it. Go ahead.

I don’t know what value it’s going to be but let’s find out. Overruled.

A. Will you repeat the question, please?

Q. The question is, during those depositions in which you

participated, did the Respondents in this matter comply with the

Judge’s Order as it appears in pages 19 and 20 of the transcript?

A. I'll preface that by saying that the Order of Judge Rudell’s

{sic] is unclear now as it was the first time I read it, and I’m not

sure exactly what she was saying. Both Mr. Katz and Miss Splain

did generally proceed [sic] any questions relating to what | consid-

ered material relevant to the 883 case by indicating that it wasn’t

their intention to get into the NLRB proceedings or any statements

given. However, in my opinion, the questions which were asked

thereafter did just that. And, the best way I can answer your question

about Judge Rudell’s (sic) Order is as I read the Order the questions

did go into matters which were subject of testimony at the NLRB

and I think I made that comment prior to answers to questions having

been given.

Q. Well, Judge Rudell’s [sic] Order states that on page 20 line

2, they may not inquire as to what statements were made to NLRB

investigators. Did the restaurant’s counsel in depositions ask about

what statement were made to the NLRB investigators?

A. No, but they both counsel did ask questions after | indicated

that certain statements had been made to the NLRB

I believe. That’s my recollection. And, I might point out, I guess

these aren’t a matter of record, but the it’s my opinion that both

parties made very special efforts to put on the record, during the

their positions concerning the applicability of Judge

Rudell’s [sic] Order to certain questions.

[Pages 61-63)

THEREUPON,

MRYLAND [sic] R. HELTON

was called as a witness by and on behalf of the General Counsel

and after having been sworn on oath, was examined and testified

as follows, to-wit:

JUDGE JENSON: Your name and home address please.

THE WITNESS: Mryland [sic] Ruth Helton, 1634 West An-

dorra Drive, Phoenix.

DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. PETTIBONE:

Q. Mrs. Helton, do you have any nicknames?

A. Yes, by [sic] nickname is **Bird’’.

JUDGE JENSON: You're going to have to talk louder.

[By Mr. Pettibone, Attorney for Board]

Q. Were you ever employed by Bill Johnson’s Restaurants?

[By Ruth Helton)

A. Yes, I was.

Q. Where?

A. At 3757 East Van Buren.

Q. Is that in Phoenix?

A. Yes.

Q. And, when were you first employed there?

A. I think it was the second month, the second day of "72,

I think.

Q. And until when were you employed there?

A. Until the 8th of August, 1978.

Q. Why was August 8, 1978 your last day?

A. I was fired.

[Pages 92-101]

Q.[By Mr. Pettibone, Attorney for Board] Calling your atten-

tion to September 20th of this year, what did you do that day?

A.[By Ruth Helton] We picketed the Big Apple.

Q. All right. Who was we?

A. Me, and Dale Michaud and Chery! Nichols and Car! Ni-

chols was there and Carla Marie Scott — guess Johnny Helton was

there for about fifteen (15) minutes.

Q. Okay, and you said the Big Apple, where?

A. The Big Apple Restaurant on 3757 East Van Buren.

Q. Had you picketed the restaurant before?

A. No, we hadn’t.

Q. Had you picketed any of the other Bill Johnsons restaurants

before?

70

A. No.

Q. Did you picket on other days?

A. Yes, we did.

Q. What did the sign say that you carried on any of the days

you picketed? Or that any of the picketers carried that you can

It said, boycott the Big Apple, Big Apple Little Manage-

ment, Big Apple rotten to its employees, Support your local wait-

ress, Boycott Big Apple, Big Apple unfair to waitresses, Big Apple

Prejudice, Unfair Labor Practice, it said the Big Apple has been

accused unfair labor practice, Complaint Number and gave the Com-

Q. Do you know why that was on the sign?

A. Yes, because it’s what they printed and — in a letter that

they passed out to the employees after I was fired.

Q. How many different signs were there do you recall

A. There was five (5) and then we turned one of them over

With whom?

Sherry Sturgeon, and she’s the day supervisor.

And, where was that conversation?

It was on the sidewalk in front of the restaurant.

You were picketing at the time?

Yes, we were.

Okay, can you please tell us how that conversation arose?

. We was — we had been there about fifteen (15) minutes

afer we estived. I think it was around 9:00 or 9:15, it was about

>O>L>O PO:

71

the time that she came on. And, this truck had stopped just inside

the driveway and it asked us what we was doing. We told him we

was boycotting the Big Apple. And, he said he had been there earlier

that day and hadn't saw us and we —

Q. Who's he — I'm sorry to interrupt, who's he?

A. — the customer.

Q. Is that the fellow in the truck?

A. Right.

Q. All right. Please continue.

A. Okay, and we told him if he wanted to talk, park his truck

and come back and talk to us. And, before he had a chance to pull

away, Sherry came out and said don’t block my fuckin driveways

and we said we're not blocking your driveways and she said, and

get the fuck off my property. And, I said I’m not on your property,

but if it will make you happy, you know, we've been walking across

the driveways, not stopping and then walking back, and | said, if

it will make you happy we'll stay right here in front and not cross

the driveways. And, she said, you might think you're funny, but

I intend to have the last laugh. And, she said, I will get even with

you for what you're doing to us. And, I said, don’t threaten us,

Sherry. And then, she walked across and she had a paper and she

said to Debby Makey, who the hell are you. And Debby said, I'm

Debby Makey, I used to work here. And then she said to Dale, and

who are you. And, Dale told her her name and she said, you're

going to all pay for this. And, she said, and Debby, you and Dale

as my witness, Ruth i'l] get even with you if it’s the last thing I do.

And I do intend to have the last laugh. And, I just told her don’t

threaten us again. And, she started back across the parking lot. And,

she stopped about half way across and looked back, and she said,

is these your right names, I think is what she said. And, I said yeah,

and there’s some more coming down, do you want their names too.

And, she said, no this will be enough. And, then she went on inside.

Q. Were you laughing at the time?

A. No, I wasn’t laughing. I was scared.

Q. I'm sorry I didn’t hear you?

A. I said, she scared me.

72

Q. Okay, you testified that you had been walking across the

driveways, and you had been walking on the sidewalk. Does the

sidewalk continue across that driveway?

A. Yes.

Q. How many driveways are there there?

A. Two (2).

Q. Okay, and when you walked across the driveway, did you

walk across on the sidewalk or off the sidewalk?

A. On the sidewalk.

Q. On the days that you picketed the Bill Johnsons by the way

did you picket other Bill Johnson's restaurants besides this one?

A. After, yes we did.

JUDGE JENSON: Let me ask one here. On the time that you

picketed on September 18th that you related here, were you

handbilling?

THE WITNESS: Well, I think first it was the 20th, no we

didn’t handbill.

And did you handbill on any occasions after that?

The 22nd and the next following Tuesday.

Q. Okay, and have there been any other occasions that you

handbilled that you can recall?

A. Since — I’m not sure which day we had the hearing on

the TRO, but we did two (2) days after that.

Q. About when, what month?

>Ooreorere

7

73

A. It was in November.

Q. And, you say the hearing of the TRO, is that when did

you first find out about the TRO?

A. TRO?

Q. Yes.

A. I found out about it Monday, the 25th of September.

Q. And, when you say the hearing on the TRO, you're re-

ferring to that date?

A. No, I'm talking about after we went to Court on it, which

was in November.

Q. Okay. Ruth, I’m going to show you Respondent’s Exhibit

No. 1 and ask you is that a copy of the handbill that you distributed?

A. Yes, it is.

Q. Thank you. You testified that you picketed on the 20th.

Did you picket on the 21st? Of September?

A. Yes.

How about the 22nd?

Yes.

How about the 23rd?

No.

How about the 24th?

No, not on the weekend.

Q. Okay, how about the 25th?

A. No, we didn’t picket that day either.

Q. Why not?

A. We got sued that day.

Q. How did you find out about the sued?

A. Larry Katz called me at home. Okay, first Carla had called.

Q. Carla who?

A. Carla Marie Scott.

>O>O >

74

Q. Okay, about what time did she call you?

A. It was about — I think about ten till eleven.

Q. Okay, what time did Larry Katz call you?

A. I think it was about ten after eleven somewhere around

there.

Q. Okay, why don’t you tell us what he said to you. Excuse

me, yes, on the phone. Go ahead.

A. Well, he said that there was going to be a hearing in Judge

Rudell’s [sic] Court and he gave me the courtroom and the number

or whatever, and I think he asked me if I had a pen and was writing

it down and I said, no wait a minute, I'll get one, and | got one.

Did he say when that hearing was?

He said it was for 12:00 o'clock.

What day?

That day.

Please continue.

. And, I think that’s when I said, is that today, and he said,

yes. And, I said something about what would happen if I couldn't

make it, and he said, could I get a hold of my husband and could

he make it. That he was a defendant in it too.

Q.. Who said that?

A. Mr. Katz.

Q. Okay, please continue.

A. And then he said, did I want to know who the defendants

were. And, I said, yeah, okay. So, he read them off the nine (9)

defendants, Barbara Orr, Larry Orr and I guess — when he read

off all of the defendants, I recognized them as being the ones that

picketed but I didn’t say anything and he said, anything else. And,

I said you shouldn’t be scaring those girls like that. And, he said,

aren’t you. And, —

Q. Was that in response to your statement that come right

after in time?

A. Yeah.

zrororo

75

Q. And, what was that again?

A. Aren’t you.

Q. What else was said?

A. I said, no. And, he said, any more questions, and he said

do you think you could get a hold of your husband and I said, yes,

I think I can. And, he said thank you very much and he hung up.

Q. Okay, did you attend the hearing at 12:00 that day that he

Q. Why not?

A. Cause I just got out of the shower. My hair was wet and

it’s like a forty-five (45) minute drive almost to downtown from

where I live on 19th Avenue, and there was no way I| could have

made it.

Q. I assume then that the courthouse is downtown?

A. Pardon?

Q. I assume that the courthouse is downtown?

A. Yeah, the one that he gave me. I think it was on Jefferson

or one of those streets.

MR. PETTIBONE: Your Honor, I would ask if the Respon-

dent’s counsel will stipulate that this is the Ruth Helton named in

JUDGE JENSON: If this is the what?

MR. PETTIBONE: The Ruth Helton named in the civil com-

plaint, and also it’s the Ruth Helton named — whose deposition is

included — well, it’s not in evidence yet. If it is eventually in

evidence, it is the same Ruth Helton whose deposition is included

in General Counsel's 2.

MR. KATZ: Yeah.

JUDGE JENSON: All right fine. Is your deposition here in

total or it is?

MR. PETTIBONE: It’s the portions, Your Honor. Of (h). Your

Honor, I have no further questions of Mrs. Helton at this time.

76

[Page 103]

CROSS EXAMINATION

BY MR. KATZ [Attorney for Restaurant):

[Pages 131-38]

Q.[By Mr. Katz, Attorney for Restaurant] Okay. Let’s go to

September 20th now, which is of course, after you were terminated,

September 20, 1978. On that day you began your picketing and

your demonstrations in front of the restaurant, correct?

A.[By Ruth Helton] Correct.

Q. Do you remember how many of you were engaged in the

picketing on that day, September 20th?

A. What do you mean by engaged in the picketing? How

many was there?

Q. How many were in the demonstration? How many of you

participated?

A. There was me and Carla Marie Scott, and Dale Michaud,

and Debby Makey and Cheyri Nichols and Carl Nichols, and John

Helton.

Q. For some period of time, at least, you were crossing the

restaurant’s driveways, were you not, walking back and forth on

the sidewalk?

A. Yes, we were.

Q. And, there was some period of time also, was there not,

when you were talking to customers who were driving in and out

of the driveways? You would talk to them as they drove in and out,

is that correct?

A. We said, hi, you know.

Q. You testified that on one occasion there was a truck in the

entrance way in the driveway, and you were talking to the driver

when Sherry Sturgeon came out of the restaurant.

A. He wasn’t actually in the entrance way. He was over to

the side of the entrance way.

77

Q. Well, was he in the driveway to the parking lot?

A. Yes.

Q. And, you were talking to him while he was in that

driveway?

A. One of us was. I’m not sure if it was me or Dale.

Q. Were you and Dale both standing next to the truck at that

time?

A. We were standing at that end of the sidewalk but we wasn’t

standing next to the truck.

Q. Anybody else besides you or Dale?

A. Debby was there, but I think she was back up the other

end.

Q. On any other occasion on September 20th did you talk to

customers who were going in and out of the driveways?

A. As they went in and out, you mean talk to them by what

we — you mean by talk to them we said hi to them. We told them

to park the car, come over and talk to us and a couple of them did.

We did talk to them as they went in and out.

Q. How many of you had signs?

A. Five (5).

Q. Did you observe any of the demonstrators waving those

signs in any fashion in front of people who were driving out or in

the driveway?

A. No, I didn’t.

Q. Did you observe any of the demonstrators lowering their

signs as people would come into the driveway?

A. Only if they asked to read it.

Q. Did that occur from time to time?

A. Every once in a while someone would say, what does it

say, and they’d hold it down so they could read it.

Q. And, these might be people coming in the driveway, these

people you're talking about.

78

A. Yeah.

Q. You also continued to do picketing on September 21st,

correct?

A. Yes.

Q. You engaged in the same kind of activities you've just

described that took place on the 20th?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you remember an incident on September 21st when

one of the demonstrators yelled Uncle Tom to one of the persons

coming out of the restaurant?

A. Yes.

Q. Could you describe that incident? What took place?

A. I was at the other end of the sidewalk. You want me to

describe it from the beginning?

Q. From the beginning of that particular incident, yes.

A. A lady came up and said something to Carl and my husband

and they said let me see the list you have, and as I started over that

way, a lady said she didn’t want to see any damn list and she went

on into the restaurant. And, I said, what was that all about, and

they said, she just said that she didn’t think the Big Apple was

prejudice. And, then a couple of minutes later, she came to the front

door and she had her little black busboy and I understand her to

say, does this look like prejudice to you. And, one of the girls yelled

Uncle Tom.

Q. And, who was that who yelled Uncle Tom?

A. I think it was Cheryl Nichols.

Q. Was she one of the defendants subsequently in the lawsuit?

A. Yes, she was.

Q. On September 22nd, you also engaged in picketing right?

A. Yes, we did.

. And, on September 22nd you began distributing the leaflets

that has been introduced as Respondent’s Exhibit 1?

A. Yes.

©

79

Q. Do you know roughly how many of those leaflets you

A. I’m not sure. I think we took about a hundred (100). We

may have passed out eighty (80) or ninety (90) I’m not sure.

Q. And, you distributed that leaflet on subsequent occasions,

also?

A. Tuesday morning for an hour.

Q. Which was after the lawsuit was filed?

A. Yes, it was.

Q. And, in fact you distributed that leaflet again, just a few

weeks ago, or several days ago?

A. Yes.

Q. The incident you described which — with Sherry Sturgeon

according to your testimony she said among other things, I'll have

the last laugh. You'll all pay for this, and so forth. Other than the

demonstrators, was there anyone around who might have heard her

make those statements?

A. No, there was only three (3) of us there at the time.

Q. Other than that one particular incident, did you ever speak

to Sherry Sturgeon again during your demonstrations?

A. No, I didn’t.

Q. Did any other representative of maneqement or agent of

management make any similar statements or quote, threats, unquote,

to you? Similar to the one made by Sherry Sturgeon?

A. No.

Q. That was the only occasion on which it happened?

A. To me, yes.

Q. You testified that you got notification from me that a hear-

ing was going to be held in Judge Rudell’s [sic] Courtroom at about

12:00 o’clock on, I forget the day it was — November 5, I believe?

A. Correct.

Q. How —

MR. PETTIBONE: Objection, Your Honor. That’s not what

the testimony was. September 25th.

BY MR. KATZ:

Q. I'm sorry, September 25th. You received a telephone call

from me telling you that the hearing was going to be held at 12:00

o'clock. You said before you received the phone call from me, you

got a call from Carla Scott. Did she tell you that she had been

notified? By me, about the lawsuit?

A. She said she had to go to Court, yes.

Q. Did she tell you she’d been notified by me?

A. Yes.

Q. And, did she say anything about the conversation I had

with her?

A. Just that it was something about a TR something and she

didn’t really know what it was and she didn’t really know what was

going on.

Q. All right. But other than that, she didn’t say anything about

my conversation with her?

A. I don’t think so.

Q. Okay. You did not appear at that hearing on the 25th did

you?

A. No, I didn’t.

Q. But your husband was there, was he not?

A. Yes, he was.

Q. Do you know who else was there?

MR. PETTIBONE: Objection, Your Honor. She wasn’t there,

how does she know?

MR. KATZ: Well, the witness has not said that she doesn’t

know. If she doesn’t know, well, she can say that. But, I presume

she’s —

JUDGE JENSON: Well, he asked do you know who else was

there, and then I suppose we'll find out how she know. Okay.

A. I know who they said was there.

81

Q. Did John tell you he was there?

A. Yes, he told me.

Q. And, did he tell you who else was there?

A. He told me that Carla Marie Scott and Debby Makey was

there.

(Pages 215-16]

THEREUPON,

DALE MICHAUD

was called as a witness by and on behalf of the General Counsel,

and after having been duly sworn on oath, was examined and tes-

tified as follows, to-wit:

JUDGE JENSON: Give your name, spell your last name and

give us your home address.

THE WITNESS: Dale Michaud, M-I-C-H-A-U-D 1816 North

Staton Street.

JUDGE JENSON: All right off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

JUDGE JENSON: Back on the record.

DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. PETTIBONE:

Dale, have you ever worked for Bill Johnsons Restaurants?

Yes.

Where?

Down on Van Buren.

Is that at 3757 East Van Buren?

Yes.

Q. Starting when?

A. I think it was in February of °78.

Q. Until when?

FOP OPO

A. Till September of "78.

Q. Do you remember what day in September?

A. The 18th, I think.

Q. In what capacity did you work?

A. Waitress.

[Pages 227-230]

Q.[By Mr. Pettibone, Attorney for Board] Calling your atten-

tion to September 20th, of this year. What did you do that day?

A.[By Dale Michaud] Picketed.

Q. Who's we?

A. It was Debby Makey, Cheryl Nichols, Carla Scott, Ruth

Helton and myself.

Q. Did all of those people that you mentioned picket in —

at the same time during the day?

A. No.

Q. Where did you picket that day?

A. The Big Apple on Van Buren.

Q. Okay, and you had picketed a Bill Johnsons Restaurant

before?

A. No.

Q. That day, did you have any conversations with any Bill

Johnsons supervisor?

Q. When was that?

A. it was about half hour after we were out there picketing.

Q. About what time of day is that?

A. 9:30.

Q. Which supervisor did you have a conversation with?

A. Sherry Johnson.

Q. And, who was picketing at that time?

A. There was Debby Makey, Ruth Helton and myself.

Was anyone else present during that conversation?

Two (2) customers. We were talking to.

Where were they?

They were in the driveway.

Were they standing there?

. No, they had a truck. They were parked in the driveway.

. Can you tell us what was said in that conversation?

. Well, we were talking to the customers and Sherry came

up behind us and told us that we weren't supposed to be blocking

her driveway, so we turned around and walked away. And, then she

followed us and she says, —

Q. Go ahead tell us exactly what she said.

A. She said, what the fuck are you guys doing. So, we didn’t

say nothing to her and she says, you fuckin guys think you're funny.

And, she looked at Ruth and she told Ruth that she was going to

pay for what she was doing to her, what Ruth was doing to them

and I told her, I said, well, Sherry you don’t have to swear at us.

And, she looked at Debby because she thought Debby Makey had

said that, and she said, who the hell are you. And, Debby told her

and she said — she pointed at Debby and | and she said, you two

are my witnesses for what’s going to happen. Then she said she'd

get the last laugh.

. Who'd she say that to?

. To all of us, I guess.

Q

A

Q. Did she say what was going to happen?

A

Q

A.

POP OPO PO

. No, she didn’t.

. What happened after that?

She turned around and walked away, and then she gave

us the finger and walked inside the building.

Q. When you say gave us the finger, what do you mean? You

don’t have to show us, but what do you mean?

A. Well, she put her middle finger up.

Q. Okay, and where was she at the time?

A. She was in the middle of the parking lot.

is the Dale Michaud named in the civil complaint and whose de-

position was also taken in that case?

BY MR. PETTIBONE:

Q. Have you seen the civil complaint filed against you and

other defendants?

A. Yes.

q. By Bill Johnsons Restaurants?

A. Yes.

Q. When you saw that complaint for the first time, did you

have a reaction to it?

A. Yes.

Q. What was your reaction?

A. I was really scared and I didn’t really know what was going

on. And, I just thought I'd go to jail or something.

[Pages 239-40]

Q.[By Mr. Katz, Attorney for Restaurant] Were you aware

that the handbill, Respondent’s Exhibit 1 which I am now showing

you, which the Judge is giving you a copy of, were you aware that

this was going to be distributed on September 22nd?

A.[By Dale Michaud) Well, Ruth had called me on the phone

and she told me the things we had marked down and I agreed to

them, like you know when they were going to be distributed.

Q. Had you ever been the object of unwarranted sexual

advances?

A. No, but I had heard.

Q. The question was whether you have ever been the object?

A. No.

Q. All right, and did you tell Ruth that?

A. Yes. .

(Pages 247-48]

CHERYL NICHOLS

was called as a witness by and on behalf of the General Counsel

and after having been duly sworn on oath was examined and testified

as follows, to-wit:

JUDGE JENSON: Your name?

THE WITNESS: Cheryl Nichols.

JUDGE JENSON: And, spell your name for us.

THE WITNESS: C-H-E-R-Y-L, N-I-C-H-O-L-S.

JUDGE JENSON: And, your home address, please.

THE WITNESS: 15601 North 19th Avenue.

DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. PETTIBONE:

. Cheryl, have you ever worked for Bill Johnsons restaurants?

Yes, I have.

Where?

On East Van Buren.

That’s 3757 East Van Buren?

Yes, it is.

In what capacity did you work there?

I was a waitress.

[Pages ~*9-60]

Q.[By Mr. Pettibone, Attorney for F wd] Calling your atten-

tion to September 20th of this year, wha «id you do that day?

A.[By Cheryl Nichols] I picketed the restaurant.

Q. What restaurant?

POP OPO ?PO

A. On East Van Buren.

Q. Bill Johnsons restaurant?

A. Yes.

Q. The one you used to work?

A. Right.

Q. Did you picket alone?

A. No, I did not.

Q. Who did you picket with?

A. Carla Scott, Dale Michaud, Ruth Helton, Debby Makey

and my husband, Carl.

Q. Were you there all day?

. I was there — I believe I arrived at around 11:00 o'clock.

. Had you picketed a Bill Johnsons restaurant before?

is the Cheryl Nichols named as the defen*ant in the lawsuit?

MR. KATZ: This is the Cheryl Nichols.

MR. PETTIBONE: All right.

[Pages 299-304}

CARL NICHOLS

was called as a witness by and on behalf of the General Counsel

and after having been first duly sworn on oath, was examined and

testified as follows, to-wit:

JUDGE JENSON: Give us your name, spell your name and

your home address, please.

THE WITNESS: My name is Carl Nichols, N-I-C-H-O-L-S.

I live at 15601 North 19th Avenue, Space Number 164. That's

Phoenix, Arizona.

87

DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. PETTIBONE:

Q. Carl, are you related to Chery! Nichols?

A. Yes, sir. I am her husband.

Q. And, calling your attention to September 20th of this year,

what did you do that day?

A. I was involved in a picket in front of Bill Johnsons Res-

taurant on East Van Buren.

Q. Is that at 3757 East Van Buren?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you alone?

A. No, I was not.

JUDGE JENSON: Are you an employee or have you been an

employee of the — Big Apple, is that what it is?

THE WITNESS: No, sir.

BY MR. PETTIBONE:

Q. Who else was with you when you were picketing?

A. Ruth Helton, my wife, Cheryl, Dale Michaud, Debby

Makey and Carla Scott.

Q. Did you and Cheyrl [sic] arrive there together that day?

A. Yes, we did.

Q. Had you picketed a Bill Johnsons restaurant before?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you picket any Bill Johnsons restaurant on any sub-

sequent occasions? That is later occasions?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you know some of the Bill Johnson supervisors?

A. Yes, sir. I do.

Q. Have you had any conversations with any Bill Johnson

supervisor, excuse me, on that day did you have any conversations

with any Bill Johnson supervisor about the picketing?

A. Yes, sir, I did.

Q. With whom did you have the conversation?

A. With Jean Johnson.

When? 7

It was approximately 3:30 in the afternoon.

Where were you?

I was in the living room of my house.

And, how did she happen to talk to you. That is was she

No, she talked to me over the telephone.

Who called who?

Jean called me.

Okay, would you please relate to us that conversation?

it to me and said there is a lady that would like to talk to you. And,

I asked her who it was, and she said, she didn’t know. I answered

the phone and the voice identified themselves as Jean Johnson. And,

she asked how I was doing. I said fine. And, she said, why were

we out in front of her restaurant that day. And, I said because of

Ruth’s firing and the girls felt that they weren't being treated fairly.

And, —

Q. Do you recall anything else in that conversation?

A. Yes, she said I’ve always been fair to all of my girls.

Q. Okay, what was said after that if you recall?

A. I said I don’t believe it’s you that they’re upset with. And,

she said, who are they upset with, then. And, I said with Johnny

Johnson and some of the other managers. And, she asked why. And,

I told her because of the way Johnny conducted the July 25th meeting

of 1978. And, I then told her that he told the girls that if he didn’t

like the earings they wore that he could fire them. And, that he

referred to them as peons.

FOP OP ~OPOPO

Q. In telling this to Jean Johnson, did you say when Johany

Johnson supposedly made this remark?

A. I'm sorry, could you repeat the question?

Q. Yes. In telling that to Jean Johnson, in telling her what

Johnny Johnson had said, did you tell her when he supposedly made

that remark?

A. Yes, I told her it was at the meeting on July 25th.

Q. Do you recall anything else said in that conversation?

A. Yes, we — she said that she would hate to see us lose that

new home we bought, on one occasion. She said that she would

sure hate to see — excuse me. She said that she would hate to see

us get hurt by all of this. She said that twice during the conversation.

She also said that she was going to take over management of the

restaurant.

Q. Did she mention your wife in that conversation?

A. Yes, I believe she did.

Q. Do you recall in what context your wife’s name was

mentioned?

A. I believe she said that she felt she was a very sweet girl.

Q. Did she mention Ruth Helton in that conversation?

A. Yes, she did.

MR. KATZ: Your Honor, I think that the last several questions

have been leading questions. I think that general Counsel should

ask what was said in the conversation by whom to whom and not

lead the witness down every subject that was in the conversation

or not in.

MR. PETTIBONE: Your Honor, I asked a number of that type

of question, what was said and | think I’ve adequately exhausted

the witness’s recollection on that.

JUDGE JENSON: Overruled, go ahead.

BY MR. PETTIBONE:

Q. What was said about Ruth Helton?

A. She said that Ruth had nothing to worry about. That her

husband could support her.

JUDGE JENSON: Well, how did the subject of Ruth come

up?

THE WITNESS: When she said that she would — I believe

when she said that she would hate to see us get hurt by all of this.

JUDGE JENSON: Go ahead.

BY MR. PETTIBONE:

Q. Do you recall anything else during that conversation?

A. Not at the present time, no.

Q. Do you recall what preceded the remark about your house?

A. No, I do not.

Q. Can you tell us if that was in the beginning or the end of

the conversation or the middle?

A. It was in the middle of the conversation, as | remember.

MR. PETTIBONE: Will you stipulate that this Carl Nichols

is the same Carl Nichols in the civil suit as named defendant whose

deposition was also taken?

MR. KATZ: Yes, I will.

MR. PETTIBONE: Okay, that’s very kind of you.

[Pages 306-09]

Q.[By Mr. Katz, Attorney for Restaurant] Was the conver-

sation cordial?

A.[By Carl Nichols] Yes, it was.

Q. Pleasant and friendly?

A. She seemed slightly upset when she was first talking to me

but as the conversation went on she seemed to be calming down a

little bit.

Q. From the whole tone of the conversation did you get the

idea that she was trying to smooth over things and hopefully get

91

any kind of demonstrations or whatever to diminish against the

restaurant?

A. Yes.

Q. Did she express concern for how the situation might effect

you and Cheryl?

A. No, except for the fact that she said she would hate to see

us get hurt, by all of this.

Q. Did you understand that concern as expressed in that state-

ment to be genuine concern?

A. I'm not sure how she meant it.

Q. How did you think she did?

A. I had mixed feelings about it.

Q. Well, I mean did you go on and say, oh, sure common

[sic], you don’t mean that, you’re just trying to get us. Or, did the

conversation proceed in an more pleasant fashion?

A. The conversation proceeded, yes, in a pleasant fashion.

[Pages 317-18]

THEREUPON,

CARLA SCOTT

was called as a witness by and on behalf of the General Counsel,

and after having been duly sworr on oath was examined and testified

as follows, to-wit:

JUDGE JENSON: Your name, spell your name for us and

your home address, please.

THE WITNESS: My name is Carla Scott, C-A-R-L-A

S-C-O-T-T. My address is 1050 North 46th Street, D43.

JUDGE JENSON: Keep your voice up, Miss Scott so we can

all hear you.

DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. PETTIBONE:

Q. Carla, have you ever worked for Bill Johnson's Restau-

rants, Inc.?

Q.[By Mr. Pettibone, Attorney for Board] Calling your at-

tention to September 20th of this year, what did you do on that day?

A.[By Carla Scott] We started boycotting the Big Apple

>OPOrOPrPOrO PO?

Yes, I have.

Where?

It was on the east side, on Van Buren.

Is that at 3757 East Van Buren?

. Yes, it is.

. When did you first start working there?

It was in August of "77.

And, when did you last work there?

September of 78.

Do you recall what day in September?

The 18th.

In what capacity did you work there?

As a waitress.

(Pages 328-30)

Restaurant.

Q.

you do?

A

>O>O>?>0

When you say boycotting what do you mean? What did

We carried signs on the sidewalk there.

Okay, the sidewalk where?

In front of Bill Johnsons.

The same one we’ve been talking about?

Right.

Okay, and who is we?

Debby Makey, Cheryl Nichols, Cheryl did not come until

later, Dale Michaud, Ruth Helton and I.

Q.

About what time of day did you start to, as you say, boycott

the Big Apple?

93

A. We started at 8:00 o'clock.

Q. And, at the time — well, strike that. Had you ever picketed

a Bill Johnson’s Restaurant before?

A. No.

Q. Were you — did you stay at that restaurant during the

entire time other people were there as far as you know?

A. Yes. Except for one time I left for about an hour.

Q. Okay, do you recall when you left?

A. I believe it was around 9:00 o'clock.

Q. Did you picket any Bill Johnson’s restaurants prior to this

day?

A. No.

Q. And, have you picketed any Bill Johnson’s restaurants after

that day?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you do anything besides picket on any of those days?

A. We handed out handbills.

Q. Okay, do you recall approximately how many times you

did that?

A. I believe it was two (2) times, two (2) or three (3) times.

[Pages 338—40]

Q.[By Mr. Katz, Attorney for Restaurant] Do you remember

when the lawsuit was filed in State Court by the restaurant against

those who demonstrated?

A.[By Carla Scott] Yes. I don’t remember what day it was,

no.

Q. Do you recall being notified?

A. Yes.

Q. Being notified before the first hearing in that lawsuit that

it was going to be a hearing?

A. Yes.

94

Q. Do you remember who notified you?

A. You did, I believe.

Q. By me, you mean Larry Katz, attorney for the Respondent,

A. Right.

Q. And, was there anything particular about that conversation

that stays in your mind?

A. Just that I was to be at court at 12:00 o'clock for the hearing

or what —

Q. Was I courteous and polite during the conversation?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there any indication in the conversation that | was

trying to frighten you or anything like that?

A. Not really.

Q. Okay. Did you then call Ruth Helton after that conversation

with me?

A. Yes.

And, you told her what had happened?

Yes.

Did you appear at that hearing?

Yes.

Q. And, did you testify at that hearing?

A. Yes.

Q. And, that was the only period in which Judge Rudell [sic]

was deciding whether or not she was going to grant a Temporary

Restraining Order against certain aspects of the conduct of the dem-

onstrators, right?

A. Right.

Q. And, who else was at that hearing for the defendants?

A. Debby Makey, and John Helton.

Q. John Helton is Ruth Helton’s husband?

> OP?

A. Right.

A. And, did they all testify?

A. Yes.

Q. And, in fact a Temporary Restraining Order was issued

by the Judge after that, was it not?

A. Yes.

[Pages 663-64)

LOIS WILLIAMS

was called as a witness by and on behalf of the Respondent

and having been duly sworn on oath, was examined and testified

as follows, to-wit:

JUDGE JENSON: Be seated, and state your name, please?

THE WITNESS: Lois Williams.

JUDGE JENSON: Your home address, please?

THE WITNESS: 2825 East Cara.

JUDGE JENSON: Go ahead.

DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. KATZ:

Q. Miss Williams, are you now or have you been related to

Rudy Johnson, one of the owners of the Big Apple Restaurant?

A. Yes, I was.

Q. And, what was the relationship?

A. I wes his wife.

Q. Now, we've used the names Lois Johuson and Lois Wil-

liams interchangeably in this hearing in the past. We'll refer to you

as Lois Williams? Okay?

A. Okay.

Q. Are you currently employed?

A. Yes, I am.

Q. And, by whom are you employed?

A. Bill Johnson's Restaurants.

Q. Howlong have you been working for the restaurant now?

A. Approximately ten (10) years.

Q. Are you in a supervisory or managerial capacity?

A. Yes, I am.

[Pages 679-84)

Q.[By Mr. Katz, Attorney for Restaurant] Do you remember

when the picketing began in front of the Big Apple Restaurant?

A.[By Lois Williams] I believe it was approximately Septem-

ber 20th.

Q. And, did you observe the picketing?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Would you tell us what you observed on September 20th

with regard to the picketing and demonstrations?

A. I observed the girls walking in front, tipping their signs

in front of cars. Cars had to stop because they couldn't — they had

to stop in order to read the signs and they would move the signs.

I observed them going into the driveway to discuss — to talk to

people ix cars. | observed a delivery truck that had to stop because

a car was stopped in front of it.

Q. All right, now let me ask you to be a little more specific

about the whos and the whens and so forth. Who did you see

participating in the picketing and the demonstrating on September

20th?

A. Ruth Helton, Carla Scott, Debra Mackay, Dale Michaud

and Cheryl Nichols arrived later.

Q. All right. Was there any males involved in the picketing?

A. Yes, sir. Carl Nichols and for a brief time, John Helton.

97

Q. Now, you described the picketers dipping their signs in

front of cars coming into the driveway. Who did you observe doing

that and on how many occasions? On September 20th?

A. I observed Ruth doing it, probably —

Q. Who?

A. Ruth.

Q. Ruth Helton.

A. Ruth Helton doing it twice and probably Carla doing it

twice.

Q. You described a delivery truck that had to stop before it

go into the driveway, could you be a little more specific about that

incident? What caused the truck to stop and what you observed?

A. There was a car stopped in the west driveway. I don’t

remember what type of a delivery truck. I believe it vas linen, but

the car was stopped in the driveway. There wasn’t any way for the

delivery truck to get around the car. They were talking to the driver

of the vehicle and the delivery truck could not get into the driveway,

until they were through talking and the car moved.

Q. About how long did that take?

A. Oh, maybe two (2) or three (3) minutes.

Q. All right. Based on your personal knowledge, would you

in front of your restaurant on Van Buren?

A. Well, it’s very heavy.

Q. It’s very heavy with what?

A. Traffic and pedistrian.

Q. Why is it heavy with pedistrian traffic there? Does it have

something to do with the area? Would you describe the area?

A. Yes, we are right next door to the Ramada Inn. The Ramada

Inn Executive Offices are across the street, which constitute a lot

of foot traffic. It — the restaurant is set between numerous motels.

There’s a Ramada Inn on one side. The Arizona Palms on the other.

And, other smaller hotels along Van Buren. The tourists or even

not tourists, a lot of people that work for us or have worked for us

in the past, lived in these places. Don’t have vehicles and will walk

along the sidewalk.

Q. You have two (2) driveways, leading to the restaurant, do

you not?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How much sidewalk space is there between the two (2)

driveways, do you know approximately?

A. Sixty (60) feet.

Q. Sixty (60) feet worth. Are there any kind of greenery or

shrubs along the side, the sidewalks?

A. Yes, there are. There’s the Van Buren beautification plan

they put in there are trees and shrubs between the edge of our

property, the sidewalk and the street.

Q. Now, in coming and going from work, you drive in and

out of those driveways, right?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. Do those shrubs and trees effect driver’s ability to see the

streets at all?

A. Yes, they do.

Q. Did it effect your ability did you observe that?

A. Yes, it does.

Q. In what way?

A. The manner in which the trees are placed forces you to

— if you’re leaving from the west driveway, you have to pull out

alr’ st into traffic to be able to see around the trees, which puts you

just right on the edge of traffic to where you're blocking — actually

you're blocking the sidewalk but enable (sic) to see. Also, on the

other side, is the Ramada Inn that has a very large bogenvia [sic],

I believe it is, and you have to pull out a little farther to see in the

other direction.

Q. All right, now when you have driven in or out of those

driveways, is your ability to see up and down the street effected at

all by pedestrians on the sidewalk?

A. Yes, it is.

Q. In what way is it affected?

A. Well, it’s obstructed if there’s pedestrians you know, the

little bit of leeway you have for the shrubbery then if a pedestrian

is there also, then it is obstructed that much more.

Q. Now, you know a lawsuit was filed by the restaurant on

or about September 25, 19787

A. Yes, I do.

Q. Did you participate at all in the decision to file that lawsuit?

A. No, I did not.

MR. KATZ: That’s all for me, Your Honor.

CROSS EXAMINATION

[Pages 690-92]

Q.[By Mr. Pettibone, Attorney for Board] We testified to hav-

ing seen vehicles stopped in the driveway —

A.[By Lois Williams] Yes, sir

Q. And the pickets talking to the occupants of vehicles.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Such vehicles parked in the driveway. Did you see any of

those vehicles actually stopped?

Yes, sir.

How many?

Ah, four, approximately.

And the occupants then talked with the pickets?

Yes, sir

. At the time you were making your observations and were

watching the pickets Rudo [sic] Johnson was watching the pickets

as well, was he not?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And he was out in front near the sidewalk watching the

pickets, was he not?

a i a

A. Yes, sir.

Q. That was the entire time you were watching he was also

watching, is that correct?

A. I believe so, except he was also watching during the lunch

hour when I was busy inside the restaurant.

Q. You testified that the girls were out in front, walking in

front. I assume you mean on the sidewalk.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Could you tell if customers were reading the signs when

the girls were dipping them?

A. Yes.

Q. I take it that the signs as they were being carried by the

girls would have been higher than the roof of the vehicles unless

they were dipped, is that true?

A. Yes, sir.

JUDGE JENSON: When you speak of dipping, you mean they

were holding the sign up vertically and then they just lowered it

vertically?

THE WITNESS: No, sir. They would — the cars would pull

in the driveway. They would tip them towards the cars.

JUDGE JENSON: Towards the cars, or over the cars, or what?

THE WITNESS: On occasion towards the cars to where the

drive would be — there would be no way that the driver could not

read the sign. Occasionally they would put them down so low that

the cars would have to stop.

BY MR. PETTIBONE:

Q. It’s your testimony that those signs were placed on occasion

in front of those cars?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How many times?

A. Maybe two (2), thr-e (3) times.

Q. Who did it, who was the picket?

101

A. I believe Ruth Helton did it on one occasion with the

delivery truck. That’s why the delivery truck could not get in. That’s

why I specifically remember that incident.

Q. It wasn’t in front of the delivery truck was it?

A. No, it was in front of a car that was in front of the delivery

truck.

Q. All right, What other picket?

A. Cheryl Nichols, on the opposite end.

[Pages 702-03)

SHERRY STURGEON

was called as a witness by and on behalf of the Respondent

and having been duly sworn on oath, was examined and testified

as follows, to-wit:

JUDGE JENSON: Be seated. Your name, please and your

home address.

THE WITNESS: Sherry Sturgeon, 8205 North Second Drive.

DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. KATZ:

Q. Sherry, what is your current employment?

What is my employment?

Yes.

I’m employed at Bill Johnson’s Big Apple.

In what capacity?

Manager.

Are you a member of the Johnson family?

Yes, I am.

> OF? OO? © Pp

102

(Pages 712-16]

Q.[By Mr. Katz, Attorney for Restaurant] Do you remember

when the picketing began in front of the Big Apple Restaurant

eastside?

A.[By Sherry Sturgeon] It was September —

Q. There’s a calendar there if you need help to refreshen your

recollection.

It was September the 20th wasn’t it.

Is that when you believe it was?

Yeah.

Did you observe the picketing going on?

Yeah.

When was the first time you observed picketing?

. Well, one of the waitresses were coming on duty and one

of the girls drawed it to my attention. She said what is going on out

front. And, I said I don’t know, has there been an accident? And,

so I got up and looked out the window and I noticed the three (3)

Q. And, what did you do?

A. I came back and called Larry Katz.

Q. That’s me.

A. Right.

Q. And, you and I talked on the phone about it?

A. Right.

Q. And, what did you do then? During or after our phone

conversation with respect to the picketing?

A. I went out to read what the signs said and to find out who

the three (3) girls were because I didn’t recognize one of them.

Q. Why did you do that?

A. At your request.

Q. And, what did you observe when you went out there?

POP OP OP

A. They had a car blocking the driveway.

Q. Can you be a little more specific about who the they was

A. Dale Michaud, Debby Mackay and Ruth Helton were all

three (3) standing and there was a car stopped right in the middle

of the driveway. And, they were talking to the man inside the car.

And, what did you do?

I went over there and told them to get out of the driveway.

Did you nse profane language?

Yes, I did.

Did you swear?

Yes, I did.

Q. What was your reaction when you saw them in the drive-

way talking to the truck driver?

A. Well, it made me mad because they had the driveway

blocked and they had a sign that said we were unfair management.

Q. Was there a further exchange between yourself and the

picketers at the same time?

A. Yes, we had a talk.

Q. Do you remember what was said by whom and to who?

A. Well, when they started walking away from the car, you

know. I told them they could picket all they wanted to, just to say

— don’t block the driveway. They started moving out of the drive-

way in front of the building on the sidewalk. And, Ruth was holding

that sign out, sort of waving it back and forth, like some horse in

a parade grinning from ear to ear. And, it made me mad. And, I

told her she thought she was so funny, we would see who would

have the last laugh.

Q. Did you make any statement with regard to getting even

with Ruth?

A. No.

Q. You don’t remember that?

A. No.

rPOoPOPO

104

Q. Did you talk to the picketers again on any subsequent days

of picketing?

A. Not, that was the only day I talked to them.

. Did you see them picket later that day also? On the 20th.

. Just that day.

. Did you see them picket on the 21st?

No.

Did you see them picket on the 22nd of September?

No, the 20th was the only day I saw them.

Q. That was the only confrontation of any kind you had with

the picketers

A. Yes.

Q. Did you participate at all in the decision to file a lawsuit

against the demonstrators on September 25th?

A. No.

Q. You didn’t have any participation in that decision at all?

A. No.

rPOPOP?PeO

[Pages 725-26]

RUDY JOHNSON

was called as a witness by and on behalf of the Respondent and

having been duly sworn on oath was examined and testified as

follows, to-wit:

JUDGE JENSON: Your name and home address please?

THE WITNESS: My name is Rudy Johnson, 6825 North 8th

Avenue.

DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. KATZ:

Q. Rudy, what is your position and responsibility with the Big

Apple Restaurant?

105

A. I'm the Executive Vice President and in charge of the

whole operation really.

And, how big is your operation?

Ss liiey 0 Sikh ets ented 0D eagle

And, how many different restaurants?

Four (4).

What kind of a cliexelle do you get at these restaurants?

2>O>e

A. Mostly families, lot of tourists, lot of foot traffic, lot of

locals, everybody in general. The restaurant is very successful.

Q. How many Johnson family members are there who partic-

ipate in the management of the restaurants?

A. There’s me, my brother, my two (2) sisters and my mother,

and Don Kalfus is a shareholder.

Q. He’s not a member of the Johnson family?

A. No.

Q. You and your brother Johnny and Don Kalfus are the only

male members of the group in management?

A. That’s right.

Q. As far as ownership and management?

A. Owner managers, yes. .

[Pages 741-50]

Q.[By Mr. Katz, Attorney for Restaurant] Now, on September

20, 1978, did you observe persons picketing and demonstrating

outside your premises on the east side?

A.[By Rudy Johnson] Yes, I did.

Q. How did you first become aware that such activity was

going on?

A. My younger sister, Sherry, called me at home approxi-

mately 9:30 in the morning. I arrived shortly after 10:00, probably

10:15, 10:20.

Q. What did you observe when you arrived?

A. The people walking up in front of the restaurant with signs.

You want the names of the people?

Q. Please.

A. Well, there was Ruth Helton, Dale Michaud, Debra

Mackay, Carla Scott. Ruth’s husband was there for a short period

of time and I believe Cheryl’s husband was there for a short period

of time. I don’t know exactly.

Q. How many of them were carrying signs?

A. There was about five (5) signs total, I think.

Q. Do you remember what any of the signs said?

A. Big Apple prejudiced, Big Apple rotten to its employees,

Big Apple, small management, support your local waitresses, boy-

cott, boycott this establishment, somthing [sic] along those lines.

Q. And, did you personally watch the picketers for any period

of time on September 20th?

A. I watched them the whole time, after I got there until they

left.

Q. And, what did you observe with respect to the picketing?

What kind of conduct did you observe?

A. Well, I had called a policeman earlier in the morning to

advise them of their rights.

Q. For the policeman to advise the picketers of their rights?

A. Yes, because my sister had told me she had a confrontation

with them in the driveway earlier. And, from the time I watched

them until 2:00 o’clock it was — they had their signs on about six

(6) foot poles and they would stand at the edge of the driveways

and the signs had things wrote on both sides of them. They would

lower their signs down for a person to read the sign and they would

flip it over so they could read both sides. Telling people to pull in

the parking lot and come and talk to them. Other than that, they

Q. Did you observe any impact on traffic?

A. Well, it was awfully hard to get in the driveway on different

107

occasions, yes. The cars would slow down to read the signs and if

a car was right behind them, then the would stop in the street and

wait for the person to be able to

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