Amicus Brief — Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.

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4 No. 81-2159

< IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1981

BILL M. SILKWOOD, Administrator of the Estate

of KAREN G. SILKWOOD, Deceased

Appellant

Vv.

KERR -MCGEE CORPORATION and KERR~-MCGEE NUCLEAR

CORPORATION,

Appellees

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT

OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

MOTION OF THE STATE OF WISCONSIN AND ACCOMPANYING

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE IN OPPOSITION TO

BRIEF OF SOLICITOR GENERAL

For the State of Wyoming For the State of Wisconsin

HON. A.G. MCCLINTOCK HON. BRONSON C. LAFOLLETTE*

Attorney General Attorney General

MR. BRUCE SALZBURG MR. CARL SINDERBRAND

Dpty. Atty. General Asst. Attorney General

Off. of Atty. Gen. Department of Justice

State Capitol 123 W.Washington Ave.

Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002 Madison, Wisconsin 53702

(608) 266-1221

Por the State of North Carolina

HON. RUFUS EDMISTEN

Attorney General

MS. JO ANNE SANFORD

Spec. + Atty. General

off. of Attorney General

P.O. Bon 629

Raleigh, Werth Carolina 27602 *Counsel of Record

No. 81-2159

IN THE

SUPKEME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1981

BILL M. SILKWOOD, Administrator of the

Estate of Karen G. Silkwood, Deceased

Appellant

Vv.

KERR-MCGEE CORPORATION, a Delaware

Corporation and KERR-McGEE NUCLEAR

CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation

Appellees

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE STATE AMICUS

CURIAE BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO BRIEF OF

SOLICITOR GENERAL

Pursuant to Rule 36 of the Rules of the

Supreme Court, movant respectfully re-

quests leave to file the accompanying

brief amicus curiae in opposition to the

brief of the Solicitor General herein.

The brief of the Solicitor General

raises substantial questions concerning

the power of the states to enforce laws of

general application pursuant to trad-

itional police powers, for protection of

public health and safety. The States

amici on the acompanying brief seek to

present for the consideration of the court

views responsive to the points made by the

Solicitor General on the profoundly

important questions of federalism raised

in this matter.

Respectfully submitted,

For the State of Wisconsin

HON. BRONSON C. LAFOLLETTE*

Attorney General

MR. CARL SINDERBRAND

Asst. Attorney General

Department of Justice

123 W.Washington Ave.

Madison, Wisconsin 53702

(608) 266-1221

* Counsel of Record

No. 81-2159

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1981

BILL M. SILKWOOD, Administrator of the

Estate of Karen G. Silkwood, Deceased

Appellant

Vv.

KERR-MCGEE CORPORATION, a Delaware

Corporation and KERR-MCGEE NUCLEAR

CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation

Appellees

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE IN OPPOSITION

TO BRIEF OF SOLICITOR GENERAL

SUMMARY AND INTEREST OF AMICI

In response to this Court's Order of

October 4, 1982, the Solictor General of

the United States filed herein an amicus

curiae brief dated November, 1982 present-

ing the views of the United States regard-

ing the federal preemption of state law

ordered by the court below, Silkwood v.

Rerr-MeGee Corporation, 667 F.2d 908

—

2

(10th Cir. 1981). The Solicitor General's

brief, which supports the 10th Circuit's

decision to reverse a jury's award of puni-

tive damages under Oklahoma's exemplary

damages statute, 23 Okla. Stat. 9,

represents an endorsement by the U.S. Jus-

tice Department of a major and

unprecedented undermining of traditional

states’ rights. Few decisions have so

seriously encroached upon the authority of

state and local governments to provide

health and safety protection for their

citizens. The decision below, if not

reversed, will leave states powerless to

meaningfully protect their citizens

against reckless and life threatening

mishandling of radioactive materials. The

States joined herein submit this brief

pursuant to Rule 36 of the Rules of the

Supreme Court, in response to the too

facile arguments and analysis of the

Solicitor General. Amici consider this

case to frame important issues of

federalism in which each of the states is

interested. Amici support appellant's

request that this case be given plenary

review so that the decision of the Court

of Appeals may be reversed.

ARGUMENT

Contrary to the assertions of the

Solicitor General at pages 12 and 13 of

his brief, Congress has never expressly

precluded state regulation of hazardous

radioactive materials, nor expressly with-

held any authority from the states pur-

suant to Section 274(k) of the Atomic

Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. 2021(k).

This view was confirmed by the Eighth

Circuit in Northern States Power Co. v.

Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (1971) aff'd

mem. 405 U.S. 1035 (1972), which held,

4

"no provision of the Atomic Energy Act

expressly declares that the federal

government shall have the sole and exclu-

sive authority to reguiate radiation

emissions from nuclear power plants.” 447

F.2d at 1147.

In evaluating the preemptive effect of

Section 274(k), the Northern States

Power court applied several detailed cri-

teria, 447 F.2d at 1146-1167. On the

basis of these criteria, the court deter-

mined that a state regulation which limit-

ed the release to the environment of radio-

active wastes from nuclear power plants by

setting emissions standards lower than

those fixed by the Nuclear Regulatory Com-

mission (NRC) had been implicitly preempt-

ed by Congress.

The conclusion of the Northern States

Power court is not questioned here. What

is questioned, however, is the expansion

5

by the court below of the Northern States

Power holding beyond anything ever envis-

ioned by Congress- specifically, its con-

Clusion that the Atomic Energy Act pre-

empts the very narrow authority tradition-

ally vested in the states to provide

health and safety protections for their

citizens through common law or statutory

tort remedies. As conclusively shown by

the State amici in their brief filed on

July 17, 1982 in support of appellant's

jurisdictional statement ("States'

Brief"), Congress did not expressly or

impliedly intend such broad preemptive

effect, nor does there exist an unavoid-

able conflict between the state and fed-

eral law to force a conclusion that the

two laws cannot constitutionally stand to-

gether.

Both the Court of Appeals and the Soli-

citor General rely heavily on Northern

States Power to support preemption of the

- _~ —

6

Oklahoma punitive damages statute at issue

here. This reliance is entirely mis-

placed.

To begin with, federal policy toward

nuclear power has changed dramatically

since this Court reviewed Northern States

Power in 1972. Congress has in fact

substantially overruled the case by pas-

sing the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977,

42 U.S.C. 7401 et seg, which explicit-

ly returns to state and local governments

the power to regulate radiation hazards as-

sociated with radioactive air emissions.

Moreover, since Northern States Power,

Congress has significantly changed the

federal government's policy toward nuclear

power, eliminating one of the Eighth

Circuit's principle justifications for

preempting the Minnesota statute.

Specifically, Congress has now articulated

a policy not to promote nuclear power or

favor it over other energy forms. See,

7

States’ Brief at 14-15. In 1974 Congress

abolished the Atomic Energy Commission and

created the NRC to focus exclusively on

regulating nuclear power for the purpose

of protecting the public health and

safety. The development and promotional

functions of the AEC were shifted to an en-

tirely new governmental body created under

an entirely new act of Congress. Under the

new statutory scheme, nuclear power is not

to be favored over other forms of energy.

Thus, the court below is plainly wrong to

advance the theory, perhaps valid at one

time, that a “strong federal interest in

atomic energy development," 667 F.2d at

922, now requires preemption of the state

tort remedy at issue in this case.

Additionally, the facts of Northern

States Power are explicitly distinguish-

able from those in the instant case. Most

importantly, the Minnesota statute at

issue in MSP regulated conduct related

:

7

—

8

to the operation of a nuclear power plant.

It was precisely this type of state law

-one regulating operation of a plant-

which was found by the court to trigger

the implicit preemptive effect of Section

274(k). It is one thing for a court to

find implicit preemption under Section

274(k) of a state statute which directly

regulates the operation of nuclear power

plants - a function broadly served by a

federal agency, the NRC. It is quite an-

other thing, however, for a court to pre-

clude a state from enforcing its own gener-

ally-applicable exemplary damages statute

merely because it is applied to conduct

which is also subject to federal regula-

tion. A tort remedy is plainly not equi-

valent to a “regulation.” It is invoked

only to remedy actual injury, not to pre-

vent predicted harm. indeed, even in in-

9

tion is less clear, this Court has always

accorded special deference to state tort

laws in protecting them from federal pre-

emption. See, States" Brief at 43-50.

Notably, Congress has never expressed an

intent that the Atomic Energy Act preempt

state tort remedies, particularly where in-

dividuals are injured by intentional or

reckless handling of radioactive materials

by a company licensed under the Act. Nor

does the overall statutory scheme of the

Act mandate such a conclusion. Section

274(k) itself is merely a "servings clause”

which by its language preserves no exclu-

sive authority to the federal government,

but rather limits encroachment on state

authority, if any, which the regulatory

scheme may otherwise suggest. Moreover,

other portions of the Act contain language

indicating that Congress did not intend

the federal government's authority to be

exclusive in the regulation of nuclear

———ee

10

energy, or in the provision of remedies

for radiation injuries. See, 42 U.S.C.

2021(a)(1)&(2), (g), (i).

When the issue of state tort remedies

arose during Congress' consideration of

the Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. 2210,

Congress stated categorically that it

intended states to apply their owr tort

laws in determining liability in nuclear

litigation. See, H.R. Rep. No. 2043 and

S. Rep. No. 1605, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 9

(1966). Further, Congress made no distinc-

tion between the particular form of dam-

ages which were to be available to a liti-

gant seeking relief under state tort law

for radiation injuries. But as noted in

the States' Brief at 28, Price-Anderson

lacks materiality to resolution of issues

in this case, since an “extraordinary

nuclear occurrence" (ENO) is a prerequi-

site for coverage. State tort law rela-

ll

ting to radiation injuries from "“iesser

events," or non-ENO's such as the instant

case clearly is, was intended by Congress

to remain entirely unaffected by Price-And-

erson. H.R. Rep. No. 2043, supra, at ll.

Both the Court of Appeals and the Solic-

itor General make curious use of this seem-

ingly clear expression of Congressional in-

tent to support their conclusion. that

first, Price-Anderson's statutory ceiling

on damages recoverable by private lLiti-

gants against a private nuclear facility

liable for causing an ENO is somehow incon-

sistent with the allowance of punitive dam-

ages, and second, that the same is true

for lesser events entirely outside the pur-

view of the Act. See, Solicitor Gener-

al's Brief, at 15; 667 F.2d at 922. Both

suggest that Congress’ failure to discuss

punitive damages in the legislative his-

tory necessarily evidences its belief that

such damages are inappropriate remedies

Py

12

under Price-Anderson. Id. This is not

only wrong, but it conflicts with a long

line of Supreme Court rulings that have

erected a strong presumption against pre-

emption of state laws enacted pursuant to

the states' police powers, particularly

those laws that protect public health and

safety. See, States' Brief at 40-43.

The issue here is not whether Congress ex-

pressly authorized the application of

punitive damages, a: the Solicitor General

suggests, but whether it expressly or im-

pliedly preempted them.

To arrive at the derivative conclusion

that Congress did not intend the use of

punitive damages for non-ENO events out-

side the purview of Price-Anderson, the So-

licitor General first simply registers sup-

port for a distorted reading by the court

below of the word “compensating,” used in

Duke Power Co. v. Environmental Study

Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 93 (1978). The

13

court below incorrectly interpreted the Su-

preme Court's mere observation in Duke

Power that Price-Anderson compensated

victims of ENO's, to be a declaration on

its part that only compensatory and not

punitive damages were to be available

for such incidents. The Solicitor General

then baldly asserts that punitive damages

should be unavailable for non-ENO's as

well. See, States" Brief at 27-29.

This conclusion lacks any reasoned basis

whatsoever, and is in fact inconsistent

with the express intent of Congress to

retain all state tort remedies as a basis

for liability in radiation claims not

declared to be ENO's.

The Solicitor General also suggests that

Congress’ "rejection of an Atomic Energy

Commission: proposal that the government

{insurance fund] not be liable ‘for loss

or damage caused by bad faith, willful

misconduct or gross negligence‘ on

14

the part of the [insured] licensee,"

cannot be considered evidence that

Congress affirmatively contemplated the

availability of punitive damages’ since

that rejection was meant “not in order to

allow punitive damages, but in order to

assure compensation in all cases."

Solicitor General's Brief at 15. Clearly,

the more logical interpretation is that

the proposal was rejected to insure full

recovery of damages in all cases. by

specifically allowing for insurance

coverage of punitive damages. The

legislative history of the Act clearly

shows that Congress contemplated the avail-

ability of “willful” damages, which equal-

ly clearly implies that Congress did not

intend preemption of punitive damages.

See, S. Rep. 2298, 84th Cong., 2d Sess.

8 (1956); States’ Brief 27.

The Solicitor General's use of Dean

Cavers’ statement to buttress his argument

15

is particularly odd since both of Dean

Cavers’ suggestions were rejected by Con-

gress. Solicitor General's Brief at 15-16,

footnote 19. The Solicitor General's

final comment, id., that somehow the NRC

itself assumes that punitive damages are

unavailable remedies because NRC licensees

can raise "federal preemption" as a

defense against punitive damage claims,

stretches his argument to absurd propor-

tions. If the NRC believed that punitive

damages were legally prohibited, it would

have simply said so in its regulations.

The Solicitor General also alludes in

several instances to an alleged inconsis-

tency or conflict between the Atomic

Energy Act and the Oklahoma exemplary dam-

ages statute which would mandate pre-

emption of the state law. The State

amici have already conclusively shown

this not to be the case. States' Brief at

9-22. Both state and federal efforts pur-

16

sue the common purpose of protecting

public health and safety by deterring harm-

ful conduct. The Oklahoma law does not in-

terfere with accomplishment of the federal

objectives in any way. Only if the pur-

pose of NRC regulation was to promote the

private nuclear power industry by immuniz-

ing from liability its acts which reckless-

ly and willfully injure the public, could

the Oklahoma statute interfere with the

federal scheme. Needless to say, Congress

has not established such a policy.

The Solicitor Geneval presents for the

Court's consideration the hypothetical

case whereby a state agency would levy a

fine against appellees for violating state

law punishing the reckless and wanton

infliction of physical injury by means of

diverted radioactive materials. The Solic-

itor General, citing no authority in sup-

port, asserts that “there is no doubt

that its action would be preempted by the

ae

17

Atomic Energy Act." Solicitor General's

Brief at 14. He then leaps to the conclu-

sion that "[l]Jike a civil fine, the award

of ... punitive damages here directly con-

flicts with the exclusive authority given

the NRC to regulate the health and safety

hazards associated with plutonium and pro-

duction facilities.” Id.

As to his first premise, which has never

been considered by this or any other

court, there is of course considerable

doubt whether such a state enforcement

action would be preempted. If a state

chose to prosecute for manslaughter and

sought a sizable fine against a corpora-

tion for recklessly causing the fatal con-

tamination of one of its citizens by radio-

active materials, or alternatively imposed

a civil fine in similar circumstances,

only by some vast expansion of preemption

doctrine heretofore contemplated only by

the Solicitor General and certainly not by

al

18

Congress, could such an exercise of tradi-

tional state power be held impliedly or ex-

pressly preempted by Congress. As to his

derivative conclusion, the Solicitor Gener-

al ignores entirely the distinction which

Congress and the courts have historically

made between regulation on the one hand,

and tort remedies on the other, to which

they have always accorded special defer-

ence. See , States’ Brief at 43-50. In

short, the Solicitor General is simply

wrong both in his general premise and in

his derivative conclusion.

As the Solicitor General demonstrates,

the NRC has promulgated a number of feder-

al regulations aimed at advancing the in-

terests of the public health and safety.

Solicitor General's Brief at 12-13.:+ The

fact remains, however, that these regula-

tions do not even purport to be comprehen-

sive. They provide no tort remedies

because the Atomic Energy Act does not

19

create a private damages action for radia-

tion injuries. Far from expressing any

desire that federal regulation be the ex-

clusive means of meeting tort liability

problems, Congress has indicated just the

opposite intent. Certainly where the fed-

eral government has failed to effectively

exercise its powers to protect the public,

such as by providing adequate remedies to

those injured by NRC licensees, the states

must be able to exercise their own concur-

rent police powers to provide such effec-

tive remedies. In this case, the jury

found, upon listening to the evidence,

that Oklahoma's exemplary damages statute

appropriately remedied an injury which the

federal government did not.

Nowhere in the Atomic Energy Act or its

legislative history has Congress ever

20

suggested an intent that the Oklahoma

statute should not be enforced. For the

courts to rule this statute preempted in

the absence of some clear indication from

Congress would amount to an unwarranted

attack on the traditional rights of the

states to protect the health and safety of

their citizens.

Respectfully submitted,

For the State of Wisconsin

HON. BRONSON C. LAFOLLETTE*

Attorney General

MR. CARL SINDERBRAND

Asst. Attorney General

Department of Justice

123 W.Washington Ave.

Madison, Wisconsin 53702

(608) 266-1221

Por the State of North Carolina

HON. RUFUS EDMISTEN

Attorney General

MS. JO ANNE SANFORD

Spec. Dpty. Atty. General

Off. of the Attorney General

P.O. Box 629

Raleigh, North Carolina 27602

*Counsel of Record

For the State of Wyomi ng

HON. A.G. McCLINTOCK

Attorney General

Cheyenne , Wyoming 82002

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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