Record and brief — Shanahan v. United States

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81-1763

Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

MAR 23 1982

No. ALEXANDER L. STEVAS

CLERK

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1981

TIMOTHY J. SHANAHAN, III,

Petitioner

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Jeffrey M. Miller, Esquire

NASUTI & MILLER

1325 Spruce Street

Philadelphia, PA 19107

(215) 545-8488

Attorney for Petitioner

Timothy J. Shanahan, III

TWE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, 10th & SPRING GARDEN STREETS, PHILA, PA. 19123 (215) 236-2000

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether separate convictions and sentences im-

posed upon Pe.itioner for both unlawful transportation

of goods stolen from an interstate shipment and posses-

sion of those same goods under 18 U.S.C. §659 and

2314 are multiplicitous and thus violative of the Double

Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

2. Whether the prosecutor’s remarks to the jury

during the Government’s case-in-chief regarding the

availability of certain evidence to the defense, and the

suggestion that the defense introduce the evidence, con-

stituted an impermissible shifting of the burden of proof

in violation of the Fifth Amendment.

3. Whether the Sixth Amendment's protection of

the attorney-client relationship from governmental in-

trusion should be extended to a pre-indictment target of

a Grand Jury Investigation where the Government

knows that said target is represented by counsel, but

nevertheless utilizes an undercover agent who renders

legal advice to the target and inquires into the defenses,

tactics and strategies discussed by the target and his at-

torney in relation to the case.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

The caption of the case contains the names of the

parties to the proceeding in this Court.

SPP Ff PF

10.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ee). kc ce eben ee eens i

Parties to the Proceeding ................ ii

I, a Moa 5's so vd v0 9.08 0 0 086 1

Statement of Jurisdiction ................ 2

Constitutional Provisions Involved ......... 2

IEE > Wes Ca Wow Powe t ed diecee 2

oS bn na 5 wie he6'a O% 3

Reasons for Allowance of the Writ of Certiorari 7

1. The Court of Appeals Below has Rendered a

Decision in Conflict with Applicable Deci-

sions of this Court and in Conflict with De-

cisions of Other Federal Courts of Appeals 7

2. The Court of Appeals has Rendered a Deci-

sion in Conflict with the Applicable Deci-

ss sn ook cee denen s ees 11

3. The Circumstances of this Case Present a

Serious Question as to Whether Certain

Sixth Amendment Protections Currently Af-

forded Only to Individuals After Indictment

Should be Extended to Pre-Indictment Tar-

gets of Federal Grand Jury Investigations . 14

NG CA Ca dian psc 0 6s 906 Ws w¥s 17

Appendices:

ih oda» «on 6:<hinied Ane eed 4 Al

I Gee ss. sss a bh's 2eas:ne ne A3

ead. awe wos ge meetin A7

RR A EE ee en A8

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page

Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81 (1955) ....... 8

Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) ... 11,12,13

Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415 (1959). 7,8,10

In Re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957) ............ 14

Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) .......... 14

Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) 15,16

United States v. Chaney, 446 F.2d 571 (3d Cir.),

cert. denied, 404 U.S. 993 (1971) ......... 12

United States v. Cianciulli, 482 F. Supp. 585 (E.D.

Pa. 1979), affd mem., 624 F.2d 1091 (3d Cir.

EE RENE RS CO a ae a a 12

United States v. Dansker, 537 F.2d 40 (3d Cir.

1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977) ... 12

United States v. DiGeronimo, 598 F.2d 746 (2d

Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886 (1979) ..... 7,9

United States v. Gaddis, 424 U.S. 544 (1976) ... 7

United States v. Garber, 626 F.2d 1144 (3d Cir.

1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1079

RT ee Men 6 bald. 4 Aw 08 KA 7,8,9,10

United States v. Gilbert, 553 F.2d 990 (5th Cir.

1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 913 (1978) .... 7

United States v. Guiliano, 383 F.2d 30 (3d Cir.

1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1055 (1968) ... 13

United States v. Heithaus, 377 F.2d 484 (3d Cir.

CG sc OEMOMS. seb wee buts ee et 13

United States v. Levy, 577 F.2d 200 (3d Cir. 1978). 15

United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361 (1981) .. 15

United States v. Waller, 607 F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1979) 12

Statutes

18 U.S.C. §659

18 U.S.C. §2314

No.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1981

TIMOTHY J. SHANAHAN, III,

Petitioner

Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respon ‘ent

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

OPINIONS BELOW

A copy of the Judgment Order of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit dated February 2,

1982 is contained in Appendix A. A copy of the Judg-

ment Order of the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Pennsylvania dated April 23, 1981 is

contained in Appendix B. A copy of the Judgment of Ac-

quittal by the United States District Court for the East-

ern District of Pennsylvania dated April 1C, 1981 for

Counts 2, 5, 8, 13, 14, and 19 of the Indictment is in-

cluded in Appendix C. These Judgment Orders are as

yet unreported.

2

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit sought to be reviewed was entered

and dated February 2, 1982. The jurisdiction of this

Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, Amendment Five

No person shal} be held to answer for a capital, or

otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or

indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in

the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual

service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any

person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in

jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any

criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be de-

prived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of

law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,

without just compensation.

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, Amendment Six

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy

the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury

of the State and district wherein the crime shall have

been committed, which district shall have been pre-

viously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the na-

ture and cause of the accusations; to be confronted with

the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process

for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the as-

sistance of counsel for his defense.

STATUTES INVOLVED

18 U.S.C. §659

18 U.S.C. §2314

The pertinent text of these statutes is set forth in

Appendix D.

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is a petition for certiorari arising from the fol-

lowing facts. On March 12, 1981, Petitioner was found

guilty in the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Pennsylvania, after trial by a jury, of violating

18 U.S.C. §§2(a), 371, 549, 659 and 2314. These stat-

utes proscribe aiding and abetting, conspiracy, the re-

moval of goods from Customs custody and control, the

possession and transportation of stolen goods which con-

stitute interstate or foreign commerce, and the interstate

of stolen goods, respectively.

On March 24, 1981, Petitioner moved for a new trial

and judgment of acquittal under Rules 29 and 33 of the

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The District Court

ruled that the Government presented insufficient evi-

dence to prove the illegal removal of goods from Cus-

toms custody and control as mandated by 18 U.S.C.

§549. Accordingly, the District Court dismissed Counts

2, 5, 8, 13, 14, and 19 of the 21 count Indictment. Peti-

tioner’s remaining motions were denied.

Petitioner was sentenced on April 23, 1981. The

District Court imposed concurrent two year terms of im-

prisonment on each of the remaining 15 counts of the

Indictment and a $70,000 fine.’ Imposition of sentence

was stayed pending appeal to the United States Court of

Appeals for the Third Circuit.

On January 8, 1982, the Court of Appeals requested

counsel to submit a letter to the court commenting on

the issue of multiplicitous convictions and the impact of

United States v. Garber, 626 F.2d 1144 (3d Cir. 1980),

cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1079 (1981) on Petitioner’s case.

The question came up because Petitioner was involved

in seven transactions involving transportation and pos-

session of goods stolen from interstate commerce. For

1. The District Court levied a $10,000 fine on each of Counts

1, 3, 6, 11, 15, and 17, and a $5,000 fine on each of Counts 9 and 21.

4

each of these seven transactions, Petitioner was con-

victed of both unlawful transportation and possession of

the goods in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§2314 and 659.”

Petitioner responded to the court’s request on January

12, 1982.

On February 2, 1982, the Court of Appeals entered

judgment affirming Petitioner’s convictions. On Febru-

ary 14, 1982, Petitioner filed a motion to stay issuance of

the court’s mandate pending application to this Court for

writ of certiorari. The court below granted the motion on

February 23, 1982 and entered an order staying the

mandate to March 25, 1982.

The narrative of events in this case begins in Febru-

ary, 1977, when Bernard Gilbert and Thomas McNellis,

Sr., unlawfully agreed to remove and sell cocoa products

from the Packer Avenue Marine Terminal (PMT), a

marine storage facility located in Philadelphia, Pennsyl-

vania. Gilbert was then a Clerk at PMT responsible for

the discharge of cargo from incoming vessels. McNellis

was the Operations Manager for Shanahan Motor Lines,

a trucking concern owned by Petitioner. Beginning in

January or February, 1977, Gilbert and McNellis

engaged in the unauthorized removal, transportation

and sale of cocoa products from PMT.

In the Spring of 1977, McNellis, fearing that Peti-

tioner would learn of his illicit activities, advised

Petitioner that he and Gilbert bad been engaged in the

legitimate removal and sale of pier overages from PMT

during Petitioner’s absence. Petitioner agreed to meet

with Gilbert and McNellis to discuss a three party busi-

ness arrangement.

2. Counts 3 and 4 of the Indictment relate to the transaction of

June 15, 1977. Counts 6 and 7 relate to the transaction of Septem-

ber 20, 1977. Counts 9 and 10 refer to a transaction on September

30, 1977. Counts 11 and 12 refer to October 1, 1977. Counts 15 and

16 refer to December 15, 1977. Counts 17 and 18 relate to the trans-

action of December 20, 1977, and Counts 20 and 21 concern a

transaction on September 27, 1978.

5

In May or June of 1977, an agreement was reached

whereby Gilbert would inform McNellis when overages

were available and McNellis would arrange for their

removal to Petitioner’s warehouse in Camden, New Jer-

sey. Petitioner would then locate prospective buyers for

the goods and consummate the sales.

Between June, 1977 and September, 1978, Peti-

tioner, Gilbert, and McNellis actually engaged in seven

transactions involving cocoa products, coffee beans and

tobacco.

In September, 1979, Gilbert and McNellis were

charged in a federal criminal indictment with 17 viola-

tions of federal statutes concerning theft of goods from

interstate commerce, removal from Customs custody,

obstruction of justice, and aiding and abetting. Both Gil-

bert and McNellis entered guilty pleas and agreed to

cooperate with the Government in its investigation in

return for two year sentences.

A 21 count indictment was returned against Peti-

tioner on October 15, 1980. On January 22, 1981, the

Grand Jury returned a Superseding Indictment against

Petitioner. The District Court dismissed the origirial

Indictment on February 2, 1981. Trial commenced on

March 4, 1981. The basis for federal jurisdiction of the

District Court was 28 U.S.C. §1291.

Discovery revealed that during its investigation of

this case, the Government directed an attorney, one

Richard Brown, to secretly tape record a conversation

with Petitioner although United States Customs, the in-

vestigative agency, had been expressly advised by Peti-

tioner’s counsel at the time, Anthony Caiazzo, Esquire,

to refrain from any direct contact with Petitioner. (P.T.

2/26/81, 117-124).* This tape was made while Petitioner

was the target of a Federal Grand Jury Investigation.

3. P.T. refers to the transcript of the pre-trial hearing. It is fol-

lowed by the date of the hearing and the relevant pages of the tran-

script. T. refers to transcripts of the trial. It is followed by the date

and relevant page number.

6

The informer inquired into the strategy, tactics and

intentions of Petitioner and his counsel and further of-

fered legal advice to Petitioner with respect to the Grand

Jury and a potential defense. (P.T. 2/26/81, 60-100). The

contents of this taped discussion were directly commu-

nicated to Customs officials. (P.T. 2/26/81, 73-74).

At pre-trial hearings, the attorney-informer

admitted that he had penetrated Petitioner’s attorney-cli-

ent relationship. (P.T. 2/26/81, 77). While the District

Court refused to suppress the tape on Sixth Amendment

grounds, it observed that the circumstances in which

the tape was made caused the court great concern and

presented a very close question. (P.T. 2/27/81, 57, 93).

In light of these facts, the Government chose not to

introduce the tape at trial. However, the Government did

elicit testimony from Brown about the tape. Following

Petitioner’s cross-examination, in which Brown reaf-

firmed that he was acting under Government direction

and that the Government possessed the tape, the prose-

cutor rose from his seat, flipped the tape in the air and

stated in open court:

“Your Honor, I would make the tape available for

Mr. Miller (defense counsel) to play if he sees fit. I

have nothing further.” (T. 3/7/81, 455).

During trial and on appeal, Petitioner argued that

the prosecutor’s actions and remarks were highly im-

proper and amounted to an impermissible shifting of the

burden of proof in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s

due process guarantee and the privilege against self-in-

crimination requiring a mistrial. Both courts rejected the

argument.

7

REASONS FOR ALLOWANCE

OF THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI

1. The Court of Appeals Below has Rendered a Decision in

Conflict with Applicable Decisions of this Court and in

Conflict with Decisions of Other Federal Courts of

Appeals.

The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amend-

ment is designed to prote.t a defendant in a criminal

case from multiple punishments for the same offense.

Petitioner respectfully submits that this right was vio-

lated in his case because the convictions and sentences

imposed by the District Court and affirmed on appeal

under 18 U.S.C. §§2314 and 659 for both possession

and transportation of goods stolen from an interstate

shipment were multiplicitous.

To date, there are no cases dealing precisely with

the construction of these statutes where separate con-

victions and sentences are imposed for transportation

and possession. However, there are a number of cases

decided by this Court and others under §659 and similar

statutes holding that convictions for both theft and pos-

session of the same goods are multiplicitous. Heflin v.

United States, 358 U.S. 415 (1959); United States v.

Gaddis, 424 U.S. 544 (1976); United States v. Gilbert,

553 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 913

(1978); United States v. DiGeronimo, 598 F.2d 746 (2d

Cir. ), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886 (1979); United States v.

Garber, 626 F.2d 1144 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449

U.S. 1079 (1981). Petitioner respectfully submits that

these cases, and United States v. Garber, supra, in par-

ticular, apply with equal force to the case at bar, and that

the imposition of separate convictions by the District

Court, affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Third

Circuit, are in fatal conflict with the Third Circuit opin-

ion in Garber. The convictions and sentences on the

transportation charges should therefore be reversed.

8

In United States v. Garber, 626 F.2d 1144 (3d Cir.

1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1079 (1981), the defen-

dants were convicted under 18 U.S.C. §659 of both

stealing copper cathrodes from a foreign shipment and

possessing those same cathrodes. On appeal, the Third

Circuit vacated the conviction and sentence under the

possession charge, holding that an individual could not

be convicted of both theft from a foreign shipment and

receipt or possession of the same goods from the same

shipment under §659.

The reasoning of the court followed guidelines es-

tablished by this Court in Bell v. United States, 349 U.S.

81 (1955) and Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415

(1959), which held that, in the absence of clear and un-

ambiguous congressional intent to the contrary, it is er-

ror to impose separate punishments on multiple aspects

of the same offense. Since it was clear that stealing and

possession were in fact different facets of the same act,

the question was whether the legislative history of §659

revealed a clear intent to punish each aspect separately.

Failing to find any such intent, the court concluded that

it was error to impose multiple convictions.

In addition to provisions for unlawful taking and

possession, §659 also has a provision against transporta-

tion of stolen goods in interstate commerce.* Petitioner

stands convicted under Counts 9, 10, 20 and 21 of the

Indictment with unlawful transportation and possession

under §659. These charges involve two separate trans-

actions. In each instance, the charges arise from the

same transaction and involve the same products.°®

4. Paragraph seven of the statute provides:

“The carrying or transporting of any such (stolen) money,

freight, express, baggage, goods, or chattels in interstate or for-

eign commerce, knowing the same to have been stolen, shall

constitute a separate offense and subject the offender to the

penalties under this section for unlawful taking . . .”

5. Count 9 charges that on or about September 30, 1977, Peti-

tioner transported or caused to be transported from New Jersey to

9

Therefore, transportation and possession charges in this

case are in fact multiple aspects of the same offense. The

question, as in Garber, is whether Petitioner can be sen-

tenced separately under those circumstances.

Section §659 specifically provides that, with respect

to sentencing, transportation under the statute must be

treated as an unlawful taking. Therefore, the convictions

on Counts 9 and 10 for transportation and possession are

equivalent, for purposes of sentencing, to convictions for

unlawful taking and possession. This brings the Garber

case into action. Since the court could not have imposed

multiple sentences for unlawful taking and possession

under Garber, it could not rightfully impose multiple

sentences for transportation and possession for the same

reasons. To do so was plain error.

In each of the remaining five transactions which

gave rise to this case, Petitioner was convicted of unlaw-

ful possession under 18 U.S.C. §659 and unlawful trans-

portation under 18 U.S.C. §2314. In relation to the

counts charging transportation under §2314 instead of

§659, it Petitioner’s position that the conduct pro-

scribed by both statutes is the same, i.e.; transporting

stolen goods in interstate or foreign commerce knowing

the same to have been stolen. Therefore, the Govern-

ment could not avoid the consequences of Garber by

simply charging transportation under a different section

of Title 18. See, e.g., United States v. DiGeromino, 598

F.2d 746 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886 (1979)

where the court ruled that convictions for theft under 18

Pennsylvania, certain tobacco products which he knew to be stolen

from interstate commerce. Count 10 charges that Petitioner unlaw-

fully possessed those same products on the same date. Count 20

charges that on September 27, 1978, Petitioner transported or

caused to be transported from New Jersey to Pennsylvania certain

coffee products which he knew to be stolen from interstate com-

merce. Count 21 charges that Petitioner unlawfully possessed those

same coffee products on the same date.

10

U.S.C. §1951 and 659 were multiplicitous because the

conduct proscribed under both statutes was functionally

equivalent.

Even if this Court should decide that Congress did

intend to provide for multiple convictions under §659

when a defendant is charged with both possession and

transportation under that statute, the fact remains that

there is no such provision where only possession is

charged under §659 and transportation is charged under

§2314.

There is no language in the legislative history of ei-

ther statute, and no cases exist, which would indicate

that when possession is charged under §659 and trans-

portation is charged under §2314, a defendant should be

treated as if he were convicted of both offenses under

§659 alone.

This Court has determined that when multiple con-

victions and sentences are not clearly intended by Con-

gress, the issue is to be resolved in favor of leniety:

“We resolve an ambiguity in favor of leniety when

required to determine the intent of Congress in

punishing multiple aspects of the same criminal

act.” Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 419

(1959).

For each of the transactions involved in this case, trans-

portation and possession constituted different facets of

the particular transaction. They were as much multiple

aspects of the same offense as theft and possession were

in Garber. The fact that the various aspects of Petition-

er’s conduct in each transaction were charged under dif-

ferent statutes does not change the cohesive nature of

the conduct itself.

Since there is no evidence of congressional intent to

impose multiple convictions in this situation, the stan-

dard pronounced in Heflin, supra, and adopted in

Garber, must apply. From this it is clear that the convic-

tions and sentences imposed for transportation under

11

§2314 must be reversed even if the Court should affirm

the transportation convictions under §659.

2. The Court of Appeals has Rendered a Decision in Con-

flict with the Applicable Decisions of this Court.

As described in the Statement of the Case, supra,

the Government chose not to play the “Brown tape” at

trial. However, it did elicit testimony from Brown as to

the making and general contents of the tape. Following

cross-examination, in which Brown affirmed that he was

acting under Government direction, the prosecutor

flipped the tape in the air and challenged Petitioner, be-

fore the jury, to play the tape if he saw fit.

Petitioner respectfully submits that the prosecutor's

words and actions resulted in an impermissible shifting

of the burden of proof in contravention of the Fifth

Amendment’s due process guarantee and privilege

against self-incrimination. The Government’s impermis-

sible conduct fits squarely within the doctrine an-

nounced by this Court in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S.

609 (1965). Therefore, the refusal of the District Court

to grant Petitioner’s motion for a new trial, affirmed by

the Court of Appeals below, is in conflict with the spirit

and purpose of Griffin.

In Griffin, this Court held:

“(T]he Fifth Amendment, in its direct application to

the Federal Government, and in its bearing on the

States by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment, for-

bids either comment by the prosecutor on the

accused’s silence or instructions by the court that

such silence is evidence of guilt.” Griffin v. Califor-

~ , supra, at 615.

The yrosecutor’s remarks can only be construed as a

challenge to the defense to come forward and produce

evidence. Where the law prohibits a prosecutor’s com-

12

menting on an accused’s failure to testify, a prosecutor’s

unsolicited speech to the jury, in which the accused is

issued a clear and unequivocal challenge to produce evi-

dence, must surely be condemned.

An alternate standard applies in determining

whether a prosecutor’s remarks constitute a deprivation

of due process so as to warrant reversal of the conviction.

The first question is whether the natural and necessary

effect of the prosecutor’s remarks is to comment on the

accused's failure to testify. The second is whether the

prosecutor’s remarks were intended as a comment on

the accused’s failure to testify. If the natural and neces-

sary effect of the prosecutor’s remarks is to comment on

the accused's failure to testify, or if the remark was in-

tentionally made, then the Griffin prohibition has been

violated. United States v. Chaney, 446 F.2d 571, 576 (3d

Cir.) cert. denied, 404 U.S. 993 (1971); United States v.

Dansker, 537 F.2d 40, 63 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,

429 U.S. 1038 (1977); United States v. Waller, 607 F.2d

49, 50 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Cianciulli, 482 F.

Supp. 585, 590 (E.D. Pa. 1979), affd mem., 624 F.2d

1091 (3d Cir. 1980).

The natural and necessary effect of the Govern-

ment’s challenge in this case was to place Petitioner in a

“Catch-22” situation. Regardless of whether Petitioner

responded by action or inaction, the resolution of this

conflict necessarily violated his Fifth Amendment

rights. If, as happened, Petitioner chose not to introduce

the tape recording, the jury must infer that the “Brown

tape” contained highly incriminating evidence. On the

other hand, if Petitioner responded to the Government's

dare by playing the tape, then the accused would have

been effectively coerced into going forward and produc-

ing evidence. Where, as here, the improper conduct oc-

curred during the Government's case-in-chief, Peti-

tioner chose not to testify in his own defense, and the

impropriety involved Petitioner’s own words as pre-

served on a tape recording, the sole effect of the prosec -

13

tor’s conduct was an unconstitutional shifting of the

burden of proof.

Furthermore, the prosecutor’s remark was not in-

nocuous or unintentional. He rose from his seat, flipped

the tape in the air and offered it to Petitioner before the

jury, knowing very well that the Government had not

played it for fear of creating a prejudice which almost

certainly would have caused reversal of the case on ap-

peal. Such conduct was a deliberate and calculated chal-

lenge to the defense to play the tape instead.

A prosecutor’s remark, although improper, is not

generally held to constitute a violation of the Griffin rule

where other witnesses are availabie to rebut or negate

the Government evidence. United States v. Heithaus,

377 F.2d 484, 486 (3d Cir. 1967); United States v.

Giuliano, 383 F.2d 30, 34 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied,

389 U.S. 1055 (1968). The “sole witness” rule is a judi-

cially created exception to the Griffin prohibition.

Where, as in this case, the Griffin violation concerned

Petitioner’s tape recorded statements, it defies reason to

conclude that the prosecutor’s conduct was amenable to

rebuttal or negation by a witness other than Petitioner

himself.

In this case, tape recordings were the crucial evi-

dence in obtaining Petitioner’s conviction. The Govern-

ment’s case hinged upon the jury’s hearing of numerous

tapes. Prior to Brown’s testimony and the prosecutor’s

improper remarks, the jury had listened to eight hours of

incriminating tape recordings over a two day period. In

the context of Petitioner’s trial, where the central focus

of the entire proceeding was tape re_rdings, Petitioner

suffered extraordinary prejudice as a result of the pros-

ecutor’s challenge. The case should therefore have been

reversed.

14

3. The Circumstances of this Case Present a Serious Ques-

tion as to Whether Certain Sixth Amendment Protections

Currently Afforded only to Individuals after Indictment

Should be Extended to Pre-Indictment Targets of Federal

Grand Jury Investigations.

At the outset, Petitioner acknowledges that at the

present time the target of a grand jury investigation does

not have an absolute right to counsel. In Re Groban, 352

U.S. 330, 333 (1957); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682,

688 (1972).

Nevertheless, Petitioner respectfully submits that

the Sixth Amendment protection of the attorney-client

relationship against governmental penetration should be

extended to a pre-indictment intrusion where the cir-

cumstances of the case demonstrate that (1) had said in-

trusion occurred after indictment, it would have war-

ranted dismissal of the indictment or reversal of the

conviction, and (2) the pre-indictment intrusion directly

contravened counsel’s express notice to the Government

not to contact his client and resulted in prejudice to the

defendant by effecting the course of the investigation

and subsequent trial.

When the “Brown tape,” heretofore described in Pe-

titioner’s Statement of the Case, was recorded, both

Brown and the Government were aware of three critical

factors: (1) Petitioner was the target of a Grand Jury In-

vestigation into the theft of goods from PMT; (2) Peti-

tioner was represented by Anthony Caiazzo, an attorney,

in connection with the Grand Jury Investigation, and (3)

Anthony Caiazzo, Esquire had expressly and unequivo-

cally forbidden the Government to communicate directly

with Petitioner. Yet Brown, who was acting as a Govern-

ment agent, was never advised to refrain from

discussing matters involving the relationship between

Petitioner and his attorney, or to avoid offering legal ad-

vice to Petitioner.

15

At trial, the Government elicited testimony from

Brown about the making and existence of the tape.

Inasmuch as the jury had already been exposed to other

numerous incriminating tapes of Petitioner, the obvious

inference was that the Brown tape contained incriminat-

ing evidence. The problem was compounded, as dis-

cussed in Argument 2 above, by the prosecutor's chal-

lenge to Petitioner in open court to play the tape.

Petitioner submits that under these circumstances,

it is clear that had an attorney-client intrusion occurred

after indictment, it would have amounted to a violation

under Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964),

and more recently under United States v. Levy, 577 F.2d

200 (3d Cir. 1978) where the Third Circuit held:

“We think that the injury into prejudice must stop

at the point where attorney-client confidence are ac-

tually disclosed to the government enforcement

agencies responsible for investigating and prosecut-

ing the case . . . [a] Sixth Amendment violation

would be found where, as here, defense strategy

was actually disclosed . . .” Id. at 209, 210.

Even under this Court’s decision in United States v.

Morrison, 449 U.S. 361 (1981), the existence of “demon-

strable prejudice or a substantial threat thereof” would

have been established because the contents of the tape

were directly communicated to the Government during

its investigation and formed part of its case against Peti-

tioner. The adverse impact of such conduct on the fair-

ness of the proceedings leading to Petitioner’s conviction

is obvious.

It is Petitioner’s contention that where, as in this

case, the target of a Grand Jury Investigation is rep-

resented by counsel in connection with the investiga-

tion, and the Government is aware that the individual is

so represented and has been expressly forbidden to com-

municate with the individual without counsel’s consent,

then the Sixth Amendment protections afforded a “sus-

16

pect” or criminal defendant should extend to the target

of a Grand Jury Investigation. To hold otherwise, sanc-

tions the Government’s commission of a Massiah viola-

tion by depriving the pre-indictment victim of any

means of relief.

Surely, the contents of the “Brown tape” evidence

the Government’s defiant and improper penetration of

Petitioner’s attorney-client relationship. Because the vio-

lation occurred at the pre-indictment stage of the instant

proceedings, the Government’s wrongful conduct af-

fected the entire proceeding thereafter. The Govern-

ment’s knowledge of Petitioner and his attorney’s plans,

strategies and tactics affected the progress of the investi-

gation, the obtaining of the Indictment and the conduct

of the trial itself. Therefore, an even stronger case for re-

lief is presented here than in the post-indictment situa-

tion.

In cenclusion, Petitioner respectfully submits that

unless ths Honorable Court is willing to recognize that

the kind of intrusion which occurred in this case can

and does prejudicially effect the entire course of pro-

ceedings to follow just as severely as if it had occurred

after indictment, a “target” in Petitioner’s position will

be incapable of combating the impact of such improper

conduct upon his constitutional right to a fair trial. For

these reasons, Petitioner maintains that either the in-

dictment should be dismissed, as requested by Petitioner

before trial, or the conviction should be reversed.

17

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner respectfully re-

quests that a Writ of Certiorari should be issued to re-

view the decision of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit in this case.

Respectfully submitted,

Jeffrey M. Miller, Esquire

Attorney for Petitioner

Timothy J. Shanahan, III

xIpueddy

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 81-1744

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

TIMOTHY J. SHANAHAN, III,

Appellant

(D.C. Crim. No. 80-00338-01)

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Submitted Under Third Circuit Rule 12(6)

February 1, 1981

Before: GIBBONS, WEIS AND GARTH, Circuit Judges

JUDGMENT ORDER

Timothy J. Shanahan, III appeals from a judgment

of sentence imposed following a jury verdict that he vio-

lated 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 659 and 2314. He contends:

1. That there is insufficient evidence that the

stolen goods were moving in or as a part of an

interstate or foreign shipment;

2. That a statement by the prosecutor in the pres-

ence of the jury about the availability to the de-

A-1

A-2

fense of the “Brown” tapes impermissibly shiited

the burden to the defendant;

3. That the district court permitted improper cross-

examination of a character witness;

4. That it was a violation of the sixth amendment

right to assistance of counsel or of due process

for a government informant to engage defendant

in an inculpatory pre-indictment conversation;

5. That the district court erred in failing to charge

that making the “Gilbert” tapes violated Penn-

sylvania law.

These contentions lack merit.

Itis ORDERED and ADJ U DGED that the

judgment of the district court is affirmed.

BY THE COURT,

Circuit Judge

Attest:

Sally Mrvos, Clerk *

Dated: February 2, 1982

A-3

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CR 80-00338—01

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

TIMOTHY J. SHANAHAN, III

Judgment and Probation/Commitment Order

Defendant appeared April 23, 1981 with counsel

Jeffrey M. Miller, Esquire

Verdict of Guilty.

Defendant has been convicted as charged of the

offense(s) of Aiding and abetting; Conspiracy; Posses-

sion and interstate transportation of goods stolen from

interstate and foreign shipment; Interstate transporta-

tion of stolen property in violation of Title 18, United

States Code, Sections 2(a), 371, 659 at 2314.

The court asked whether defendant had anything to

say why judgment should not be prononuced. Because

no sufficient cause to the contrary was shown, or ap-

peared to the court, the court adjudged the defendant

guilty as charged and convicted and ordered that: The

defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the At-

torney General or his authorized representative for im-

prisonment for a period of TWO (2) YEARS and shall

pay a fine in the sum of TEN THOUSAND DOLLAKS

($10,000) as to Count I.

A-4

As to Count III, the defendant is hereby committed

to the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized

representative for imprisonment for a period of TWO (2)

YEARS, concurrent with Count I, and in addition, shall

pay a fine in the sum of TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS

($10,000).

As to Count IV, the defendant is hereby committed

to the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized

representative for imprisonment for a period of TWO (2)

YEARS, concurrent with Count I.

As to Count VI, the defendant is hereby committed

to the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized

representative for imprisonment for a period of TWO (2)

YEARS, concurrent with Count I and shall pay a fine in

the sum of TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS ($10,000).

As to Count VII, the defendant is hereby committed

to the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized

representative for imprisonment for a period of TWO (2)

YEARS, concurrent with Count I.

As to Count IX, the defendant is hereby committed

to the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized

representative for imprisonment for a period of TWO (2)

YEARS, concurrent with Count I and shall pay a fine in

the sum cf FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($5,000).

As to Count X, the defendant is hereby committed to

the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized

representative for imprisonment for a period of TWO (2)

YEARS, concurrent with Count I.

As to Count XI, the defendant is hereby committed

to the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized

representative for imprisonment for a period of TWO (2)

YEARS, concurrent with sentence imposed on Count I

and shall pay a fine in the sum of TEN THOUSAND

DOLLARS ($10,000).

As to Count XII, the defendant is hereby committed

to the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized

representative for imprisonment for a period of TWO (2)

YEARS, concurrent with sentence imposed on Count I.

A-5

As to Count XV, the defendant is hereby committed

to the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized

representative for imprisonment for a period of TWO (2)

YEARS, concurrent with Count I and shall pay a fine in

the sum of TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS ($10,000).

As to Count XVI, the defendant is hereby committed

to the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized

representative for imprisonment for a period of TWO (2)

YEARS, concurrent with Count I.

As to Count XVII, the defendant is hereby commit-

ted to the custody of the Attorney General or his autho-

rized representative for imprisonment for a period of

TWO (2) YEARS, concurrent with-Count I and shall pay

a fine in the sum of TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS

($10,000).

As to Count XVIII, the defendant is hereby commit-

ted to the custody of the Attorney General or his author-

ized representative for imprisonment for a period of

TWO (2) YEARS, concurrent with Count I.

As to Count XX, the defendant is hereby committed

to the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized

representative for imprisonment for a period of TWO (2)

YEARS, concurrent with Count I.

As to Count XXI, the defendant is hereby committed

to the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized

representative for imprisonment for a period of TWO (2)

YEARS, concurrent with Count I and shall pay a fine in

the sum of FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($5,000).

In addition to the special conditions of probation im-

posed above, it is hereby ordered that the general condi-

tions of probation set out on the reverse side of this judg-

ment be imposed. The Court may change the conditions

of probation, reduce or extend the period of probation,

and at anytime during the probation period or within a

maximum probation period of five years permitted by

law, may issue a warrant and revoke probation for a vio-

lation occurring during the probation period.

A-6

carte gl The court orders commitment to the custody of the

DATION: Attorney General and recommends, Eglin Air Force

Base, Florida.

All sentences of imprisonment are imposed pursu-

ant to 1S U.S.C. §4205(b)(2).

Donald W. VanArtsdalen J.

Dated: April 23, 1981

A-7

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA :

vs. : Criminal No.

TIMOTHY J. SHANAHAN, III: 80-00338—01

JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL/NOT GUILTY

AND NOW, this 10th day of April, 1981, came the

attorney for the Government and the defendant being

present with counsel, and

& The Court having granted the defendant’s motion for

judgment of acquittal as to Counts 2, 5, 8, 13, 14 and 19

2 A jury has been waived, and the Court has found the

defendant not guilty as to

(1) The jury has returned its verdict, finding the defen-

dant not guilty as to

AND IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Judg-

ment in accordance with the above finding is hereby en-

tered pursuant to Rule 32(b), Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure.

BY THE COURT:

Donald W. VanArtsdalen J.

xc: U.S. Marshal

Probation Office

Counsel

DATE BY

WHOM

Crl 4/78

A-8

APPENDIX D

The United States Code, Act of June 25, 1948,

C.645, 62 Stat. 729; As Amended Oct. 14, 1966, Pub. L.

89-654, §1(a)-(d), 80 Stat. 904, 18 U.S.C. §659 provides

in pertinent part:

§ 659. Interstate or foreign shipments by carrier; State

prosecutions

Whoever embezzles, steals, or unlawfully takes,

carries away, or conceals, or by fraud or deception ob-

tains from any pipeline system, railroad car, wagon,

motortruck, or other vehicle, or from any tank or storage

facility, station, station house, platform or depot or from

any steamboat, vessel, or wharf, or from any aircraft, air

terminal, airport, aircraft terminal or air navigation fa-

cility with intent to convert to his own use any goods or

chattels moving as or which are a part of or which con-

stitute an interstate or foreign shipment of freight, ex-

press, or other property; or

Whoever buys or receives or has in his possession

any such goods or chattels, knowing the same to have

been embezzled or stolen; or

Whoever embezzies, steals, or unlawfully takes,

carries away, or by fraud or deception obtains with intent

to convert to his own use any baggage which shall have

come into the possession of any common carrier for

transportation in interstate or foreign commerce or

breaks into, steals, takes, carries away, or conceals any

of the contents of such baggage, or buys, receives, or has

in his possession any such baggage or any article there-

from of whatever nature, knowing the same to have

been embezzled or stolen; or

Whoever embezzles, steals, or unlawfully takes by

any fraudulent device, scheme, or game, from any

railroad car, bus, vehicle, steamboat, vessel, or aircraft

operated by any common carrier moving in interstate or

A-9

foreign commerce or from any passenger thereon any

money, baggage, goods, or chattels, or whoever buys, re-

ceives, or has in his possession any such money, bag-

gage, goods, or chattels, knowing the same to have been

embezzled or stolen—

Shall in each case be fined not more than $5,000 or

imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; but if the

amount or value of such money, baggage, goods or chat-

tels does not exceed $100, he shall be fined not more

than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or

both.

The offense shall be deemed to have been commit-

ted not only in the district where the violation first oc-

curred, but also in any district in which the defendant

may have taken or been in possession of the said money,

baggage, goods, or chattels.

The carrying or transporting of any such money,

freight, express, baggage, goods, or chattels in interstate

or foreign commerce, knowing the same to have been

stolen, shall constitute a separate offense and subject

the offender to the penalties under this section for un-

lawful taking, and the offense shall be deemed to have

been committed in any district into which such money,

freight, express, baggage, goods, or chattels shall have

been removed or into which the same shall have been

brought by such offender.

The United States Code, Act of June 25, 1948,

c.645, 62 Stat. 806; As Amended Sept. 28, 1968, Pub.L.

90-535, 82 Stat. 885, 18 U.S.C. §2314:

§ 2314. Transportation of stolen goods, securities, mon-

eys, fratidulent State tax stamps, or articles used

in counterfeiting

Whoever transports in interstate or foreign com-

merce any goods, wares, merchandise, securities or

A-10

money, of the value of $5,000 or more, knowing the

same to have been stolen, converted or taken by fraud;

or

Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any

scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or

property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, rep-

resentations, or promises, transports or causes to be

transported, or induces any person to travel in, or to be

transported in interstate commerce in the execution or

concealment of a scheme or artifice to defraud that per-

son of money or property having a value of $5,000 or

more; or

Whoever, with unlawful or fraudulent intent, trans-

ports in interstate or foreign commerce any falsely made,

forged, altered, or counterfeited securities or tax stamps,

knowing the same to have been falsely made, forged, al-

tered, or counterfeited; or

Whoever, with unlawful or fraudulent intent, trans-

ports in interstate or foreign commerce any traveler’s

check bearing a forged countersignature; or

Whoever, with unlawful or fraudulent intent, trans-

* ports in interstate or foreign commerce, any tool, imple-

ment, or thing used or fitted to be used in falsely mak-

ing, forging, altering, or counterfeiting any security or

tax stamps, or any part thereof—

Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned

not more than ten years, or both.

This section shall not apply to any falsely made,

forged, altered, counterfeited or spurious representation

of an obligation or other security of the United States, or

of an obligation, bond, certificate, security, treasury

note, bill, promise to pay or bank note issued by any for-

eign government or by a bank or corporation of any for-

eign country.

vowisoddg

ree

MAY 14 1999

In the Dueptces Court of the Hui ALEXENDER <! STEVAS.

OcTOBER TERM, 1981

No. 81-1763

Timotny J. SHANAHAN, III, PETITIONER

Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE THIRD CIRCUIT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES

IN OPPOSITION

Rex E. Lee

Solicitor General

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

(202) 633-2217

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 .........

Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S.415 ......

Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 ..........++-

Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 ........

United States v. Gaddis, 424 U.S. 544 ......

United States v. Garber, 626 F. 2d 1144,

cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1079 ..............

United States v. Gray, 565 F. 2d 881 .......

Constitution and statutes:

United States Constitution:

Fifth Amendment .............seeee0e

OB UB. 2 ccccccesccwccccccccccccccvecs

PUB, BIE ccccccccccsscvccccscccccees

WD WB. GOP ow ccwcccnccccccccccccccccces

WD ULB, ZBIG: cess cesisccccccccccvccces

Iu the Supreme Court of the United States

OcTOBER TERM, 1981

No. 81-1763

TrmoTny J. SHANAHAN, III, PETITIONER

V.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE THIRD CIRCUIT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES

IN OPPOSITION

Petitioner contends (1) that he cannot properly be con-

victed and sentenced for both possession and transporta-

tion of the same stolen goods, (2) that the prosecutor

improperly commented on his decision not to testify, and

(3) that a pre-indictment conversation with a government

informant outside the presence of his lawyer violated his

Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

1. After a jury trial in the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, petitioner was

convicted on seven counts of possessing goods stolen from

an interstate or foreign shipment, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

659 (Counts 4, 7, 10, 12, 16, 18, and 21); two counts of

transporting in interstate commerce goods stolen from an

interstate or foreign shipment, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 659

and 2 (Counts 9 and 20); five counts of transporting stolen

2

goods in interstate commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

2314 and 2 (Counts 3, 6, 11, 15, and 17); and one count of

conspiring to commit those offenses, in violation of 18

U.S.C. 371 (Count 1). He was sentenced to concurrent

two-year terms of imprisonment on each count. In addition,

he was fined $10,000 on each of Counts 1, 3, 6, 11, 1Sand 17,

and $5,000 on each of Counts 9 and 21. The court of appeals

affirmed by judgment order (Pet. App. Al-A2).

The evidence adduced at trial showed that petitioner was

the president of Shanahan Motor Lines, a trucking com-

pany engaged in the transportation and sale of “overages”

(dock accumulations) from marine terminals to salvage

companies. S.A. la-4a.' Beginning in June 1978, petitioner

and two associates engaged in a scheme to steal “overages”

from the Packer Avenue Marine Terminal (PAMT) in Phi-

ladelphia. Pursuant to this scheme, the chief clerk at PAMT

would identify goods to be stolen, and petitioner’s opera-

tions manager would arrange for the transportation of the

designated goods to petitioner's warehouse. Petitioner then

managed the ultimate sale of the goods. Petitioner kept 50%

of the proceeds from the sales, with the other participants in

the scheme receiving 25% each. S.A. Sa-8a. In all, petitioner

and his associates engaged in seven separate transactions

involving the theft and sale of “overages.”

2. Petitioner contends (Pet. 7-11) that he cannot be con-

victed and sentenced for both possession and transporta-

tion of the same stolen goods. This claim plainly does not

“S.A.” refers to the government's supplemental appendix in the

court of appeals.

2Petitioner failed to raise the issue on appeal. The court of appeals,

however, requested both sides to address the issue by letter after oral

argument in t! is case.

3

merit review under the concurrent sentence doctrine.’ In

any event, it is without merit.

Petitioner relies on several cases, including a decision of

the court below, which hold that convictions for theft and

receipt or possession of the same goods are improper.

United States v. Gaddis, 424 U.S. 544 (1976); Heflin v.

United States, 358 U.S. 415 (1959); United States v.

Garber, 626 F. 2d 1144 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.

1079 (1981). Here, however, petitioner was not convicted

for theft and possession of the same goods, but for their

possession and interstate transportation. With regard to

two of the transportations, petitioner was charged with

unlawful transportation and possession under 18 U.S.C.

659 (Counts 9 and 20). Congress has expressly provided in

Section 659 that the transportation of goods in interstate or

foreign commerce “shall constitute a separate offense” from

the other offenses under that statute. 18 U.S.C. 659.

Accordingly, at least in relation to those two transactions,

petitioner’s possession and transportation convictions are

not multiplicitous. The unlawful transportation count for

the remaining five transactions was charged under 18

U.S.C. 2314 instead of Section 659 (Counts 3, 6, 11, 1S and

17). In light of the clear congressional intent expressed in

Section 659 that transportation of goods stolen from an

interstate or foreign shipment constitutes a crime separate

from possession, however, it could make no possible differ-

ence whether the unlawful transportation was charged

3Petitioner was sentenced to concurrent two-year prison terms on

sees aad eatimemastianteaned otto exeieadines de

possession count or the transportation count—relating to each of the

seven transactions in this case. Petitioner's conviction and sentencing

for both possession and transportation therefore did not increase in any

manner the clearly permissible severity of his punishment, nor is there

any realistic possibility that petitioner could suffer adverse collateral

consequences us a result of the additional convictions.

4

under Section 659 or Section 2314. In either case, Congress

has proscribed separate crimes that can be separately

charged, tried, and punished.

3. During the investigation of this case, Richard Brown,

who had earlier purchased stolen commodities from peti-

tioner, secretly recorded a conversation with petitioner at

the government’s request (App. 23 1a-232a).* The tape of the

conversation was made available to petitioner as a part of

discovery months prior to trial (S.A. 13a-15a). At trial, the

government elected not to play the tape and so notified the

defense (S.A. 16a-17a). Without objection, the government

had Brown summarize the recorded conversation in his trial

testimony. During cross-examination of Brown, defense

counsel established that the government and not Brown had

possession of the tape (S.A. 20a). In an implicit attempt to

suggest that the government was suppressing the tape,

defense counsel then asked Brown (ibid.): “If [the tape] is

going to be played by anybody, you can't play it?” At the

conclusion of redirect examination, the prosecutor stated,

“Your Honor, I would make the tape available to [defense

counsel] to play if he sees fit” (App. 244a). Relying on

Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), petitioner con-

tends (Pet. 11-13) that the prosecutor's statement somehow

shifted the burden of proof by violating his privilege against

self-incrimination.

In Griffin, this Court held that the Fifth Amendment

prohibits prosecutorial and judicial comment that a de-

fendant’s decision mot to testify may be evidence of guilt.

Here, however, there was mo comment, direct or indirect, on

petitioner’s failure to testify. Rathe-, the obvious purpose of

the prosecutor’s statement was to make the tape available to

the defense to use in any further cross-examination of

“App.” refers to petitioner's appendix in the court of appeals.

5

Brown. Further, the offer to make the tape available was a

legitimate response to defense counsel's implicit and false

suggestion that the government was suppressing the tape.°

4. Petitioner contends (Pet. 14-16) that his tape-recorded

conversation with Brown outside the presence of his lawyer

at a time when the government knew that he was repre-

sented by an attorney in connection with an ongoing grand

jury investigation violated his Sixth Amendment right to

counsel. But, as this Court stated in Kirby v. Illinois, 406

U.S. 682, 688 (1972), “{iJn a line of constitutional cases * * *

it has been firmly established that a person's Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel attaches only at or

after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been

initiated against him.” In the face of this authority, petition-

er’s attempt to have the right to counsel extended to the

pre-indictment investigative activity of the government

must fail. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 n.4

(1980).¢

Petitioner finally argues that Brown, an attorney, im-

properly gave him legal advice during the tape-recorded

conversation and that, as a result of the conversation, the

government learned of the “plans, strategies and tactics” of

the defense (Pet. 16). During the conversation there was

5Contrary to petitioner's repeated assertions (Pet. 6, 11, 13), there is

nothing in the record to indicate that counsel for the government

flipped the tape recording into the air while speaking. Indeed, in his

brief before the Third Circuit, government counsel denied petitioner's

allegation of such conduct (Br. for Appellee at 8 n.2).

*Petitioner objects (Pet. 14) that the government precipitated his

conversation with Brown despite the fact that his lawyex “had expressly

and unequivocally forbidden the Government to communicate directly

with [him].” Under Kirby, however, petitioner's lawyer had no author-

ity to prevent the government from communicating with petitioner, and

adoption of such a rule would unduly intrude upon the legitimate

investigative authority of the government. See United States v. Gray,

565 F. 2d 881, 891 (Sth Cir. 1978).

6

some discussion of the grand jury’s subpoena power (App.

66a), of petitioner's options before the grand jury (App.

99a-101a), of possible defenses available to petitioner (App.

67a-68a), and of the advisability of retaining a large New

York law firm to delay the proceedings (App. 69a). Peti-

tioner also related the advice his attorney gave him regard-

ing the dangers >f perjury (App. 83a-84a). There is no

suggestion in the record, however, that Brown initiated any

of these discussions. Indeed, Brown testified that the discus-

sions were initiated by petitioner (S.A. 24a). Brown further

testified that he had no intention to “feed” information to

petitioner's attorney and that everything he told petitioner

was true (S.A. 25a). Moreover, there was no revelation

during the conversation of anything that could remotely be

characterized as “trial strategy.” In the absence of any over-

reaching by the government or any prejudice to petitioner,

there is simply no basis for dismissing this indictment.

It is therefore respectfully submitted that the petition for

a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Rex E. Lee

Solicitor General

May 1982

DOJ-1962-05

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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