Record and brief — Shanahan v. United States
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Toney
81-1763
Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
MAR 23 1982
No. ALEXANDER L. STEVAS
CLERK
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1981
TIMOTHY J. SHANAHAN, III,
Petitioner
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Jeffrey M. Miller, Esquire
NASUTI & MILLER
1325 Spruce Street
Philadelphia, PA 19107
(215) 545-8488
Attorney for Petitioner
Timothy J. Shanahan, III
TWE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, 10th & SPRING GARDEN STREETS, PHILA, PA. 19123 (215) 236-2000
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether separate convictions and sentences im-
posed upon Pe.itioner for both unlawful transportation
of goods stolen from an interstate shipment and posses-
sion of those same goods under 18 U.S.C. §659 and
2314 are multiplicitous and thus violative of the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
2. Whether the prosecutor’s remarks to the jury
during the Government’s case-in-chief regarding the
availability of certain evidence to the defense, and the
suggestion that the defense introduce the evidence, con-
stituted an impermissible shifting of the burden of proof
in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
3. Whether the Sixth Amendment's protection of
the attorney-client relationship from governmental in-
trusion should be extended to a pre-indictment target of
a Grand Jury Investigation where the Government
knows that said target is represented by counsel, but
nevertheless utilizes an undercover agent who renders
legal advice to the target and inquires into the defenses,
tactics and strategies discussed by the target and his at-
torney in relation to the case.
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
The caption of the case contains the names of the
parties to the proceeding in this Court.
SPP Ff PF
10.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ee). kc ce eben ee eens i
Parties to the Proceeding ................ ii
I, a Moa 5's so vd v0 9.08 0 0 086 1
Statement of Jurisdiction ................ 2
Constitutional Provisions Involved ......... 2
IEE > Wes Ca Wow Powe t ed diecee 2
oS bn na 5 wie he6'a O% 3
Reasons for Allowance of the Writ of Certiorari 7
1. The Court of Appeals Below has Rendered a
Decision in Conflict with Applicable Deci-
sions of this Court and in Conflict with De-
cisions of Other Federal Courts of Appeals 7
2. The Court of Appeals has Rendered a Deci-
sion in Conflict with the Applicable Deci-
ss sn ook cee denen s ees 11
3. The Circumstances of this Case Present a
Serious Question as to Whether Certain
Sixth Amendment Protections Currently Af-
forded Only to Individuals After Indictment
Should be Extended to Pre-Indictment Tar-
gets of Federal Grand Jury Investigations . 14
NG CA Ca dian psc 0 6s 906 Ws w¥s 17
Appendices:
ih oda» «on 6:<hinied Ane eed 4 Al
I Gee ss. sss a bh's 2eas:ne ne A3
ead. awe wos ge meetin A7
RR A EE ee en A8
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Page
Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81 (1955) ....... 8
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) ... 11,12,13
Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415 (1959). 7,8,10
In Re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957) ............ 14
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) .......... 14
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) 15,16
United States v. Chaney, 446 F.2d 571 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 993 (1971) ......... 12
United States v. Cianciulli, 482 F. Supp. 585 (E.D.
Pa. 1979), affd mem., 624 F.2d 1091 (3d Cir.
EE RENE RS CO a ae a a 12
United States v. Dansker, 537 F.2d 40 (3d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977) ... 12
United States v. DiGeronimo, 598 F.2d 746 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886 (1979) ..... 7,9
United States v. Gaddis, 424 U.S. 544 (1976) ... 7
United States v. Garber, 626 F.2d 1144 (3d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1079
RT ee Men 6 bald. 4 Aw 08 KA 7,8,9,10
United States v. Gilbert, 553 F.2d 990 (5th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 913 (1978) .... 7
United States v. Guiliano, 383 F.2d 30 (3d Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1055 (1968) ... 13
United States v. Heithaus, 377 F.2d 484 (3d Cir.
CG sc OEMOMS. seb wee buts ee et 13
United States v. Levy, 577 F.2d 200 (3d Cir. 1978). 15
United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361 (1981) .. 15
United States v. Waller, 607 F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1979) 12
Statutes
18 U.S.C. §659
18 U.S.C. §2314
No.
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1981
TIMOTHY J. SHANAHAN, III,
Petitioner
Vv.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respon ‘ent
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
OPINIONS BELOW
A copy of the Judgment Order of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit dated February 2,
1982 is contained in Appendix A. A copy of the Judg-
ment Order of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania dated April 23, 1981 is
contained in Appendix B. A copy of the Judgment of Ac-
quittal by the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Pennsylvania dated April 1C, 1981 for
Counts 2, 5, 8, 13, 14, and 19 of the Indictment is in-
cluded in Appendix C. These Judgment Orders are as
yet unreported.
2
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit sought to be reviewed was entered
and dated February 2, 1982. The jurisdiction of this
Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §1254(1).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, Amendment Five
No person shal} be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any
person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be de-
prived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, Amendment Six
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury
of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed, which district shall have been pre-
viously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the na-
ture and cause of the accusations; to be confronted with
the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the as-
sistance of counsel for his defense.
STATUTES INVOLVED
18 U.S.C. §659
18 U.S.C. §2314
The pertinent text of these statutes is set forth in
Appendix D.
3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a petition for certiorari arising from the fol-
lowing facts. On March 12, 1981, Petitioner was found
guilty in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, after trial by a jury, of violating
18 U.S.C. §§2(a), 371, 549, 659 and 2314. These stat-
utes proscribe aiding and abetting, conspiracy, the re-
moval of goods from Customs custody and control, the
possession and transportation of stolen goods which con-
stitute interstate or foreign commerce, and the interstate
of stolen goods, respectively.
On March 24, 1981, Petitioner moved for a new trial
and judgment of acquittal under Rules 29 and 33 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The District Court
ruled that the Government presented insufficient evi-
dence to prove the illegal removal of goods from Cus-
toms custody and control as mandated by 18 U.S.C.
§549. Accordingly, the District Court dismissed Counts
2, 5, 8, 13, 14, and 19 of the 21 count Indictment. Peti-
tioner’s remaining motions were denied.
Petitioner was sentenced on April 23, 1981. The
District Court imposed concurrent two year terms of im-
prisonment on each of the remaining 15 counts of the
Indictment and a $70,000 fine.’ Imposition of sentence
was stayed pending appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit.
On January 8, 1982, the Court of Appeals requested
counsel to submit a letter to the court commenting on
the issue of multiplicitous convictions and the impact of
United States v. Garber, 626 F.2d 1144 (3d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1079 (1981) on Petitioner’s case.
The question came up because Petitioner was involved
in seven transactions involving transportation and pos-
session of goods stolen from interstate commerce. For
1. The District Court levied a $10,000 fine on each of Counts
1, 3, 6, 11, 15, and 17, and a $5,000 fine on each of Counts 9 and 21.
4
each of these seven transactions, Petitioner was con-
victed of both unlawful transportation and possession of
the goods in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§2314 and 659.”
Petitioner responded to the court’s request on January
12, 1982.
On February 2, 1982, the Court of Appeals entered
judgment affirming Petitioner’s convictions. On Febru-
ary 14, 1982, Petitioner filed a motion to stay issuance of
the court’s mandate pending application to this Court for
writ of certiorari. The court below granted the motion on
February 23, 1982 and entered an order staying the
mandate to March 25, 1982.
The narrative of events in this case begins in Febru-
ary, 1977, when Bernard Gilbert and Thomas McNellis,
Sr., unlawfully agreed to remove and sell cocoa products
from the Packer Avenue Marine Terminal (PMT), a
marine storage facility located in Philadelphia, Pennsyl-
vania. Gilbert was then a Clerk at PMT responsible for
the discharge of cargo from incoming vessels. McNellis
was the Operations Manager for Shanahan Motor Lines,
a trucking concern owned by Petitioner. Beginning in
January or February, 1977, Gilbert and McNellis
engaged in the unauthorized removal, transportation
and sale of cocoa products from PMT.
In the Spring of 1977, McNellis, fearing that Peti-
tioner would learn of his illicit activities, advised
Petitioner that he and Gilbert bad been engaged in the
legitimate removal and sale of pier overages from PMT
during Petitioner’s absence. Petitioner agreed to meet
with Gilbert and McNellis to discuss a three party busi-
ness arrangement.
2. Counts 3 and 4 of the Indictment relate to the transaction of
June 15, 1977. Counts 6 and 7 relate to the transaction of Septem-
ber 20, 1977. Counts 9 and 10 refer to a transaction on September
30, 1977. Counts 11 and 12 refer to October 1, 1977. Counts 15 and
16 refer to December 15, 1977. Counts 17 and 18 relate to the trans-
action of December 20, 1977, and Counts 20 and 21 concern a
transaction on September 27, 1978.
5
In May or June of 1977, an agreement was reached
whereby Gilbert would inform McNellis when overages
were available and McNellis would arrange for their
removal to Petitioner’s warehouse in Camden, New Jer-
sey. Petitioner would then locate prospective buyers for
the goods and consummate the sales.
Between June, 1977 and September, 1978, Peti-
tioner, Gilbert, and McNellis actually engaged in seven
transactions involving cocoa products, coffee beans and
tobacco.
In September, 1979, Gilbert and McNellis were
charged in a federal criminal indictment with 17 viola-
tions of federal statutes concerning theft of goods from
interstate commerce, removal from Customs custody,
obstruction of justice, and aiding and abetting. Both Gil-
bert and McNellis entered guilty pleas and agreed to
cooperate with the Government in its investigation in
return for two year sentences.
A 21 count indictment was returned against Peti-
tioner on October 15, 1980. On January 22, 1981, the
Grand Jury returned a Superseding Indictment against
Petitioner. The District Court dismissed the origirial
Indictment on February 2, 1981. Trial commenced on
March 4, 1981. The basis for federal jurisdiction of the
District Court was 28 U.S.C. §1291.
Discovery revealed that during its investigation of
this case, the Government directed an attorney, one
Richard Brown, to secretly tape record a conversation
with Petitioner although United States Customs, the in-
vestigative agency, had been expressly advised by Peti-
tioner’s counsel at the time, Anthony Caiazzo, Esquire,
to refrain from any direct contact with Petitioner. (P.T.
2/26/81, 117-124).* This tape was made while Petitioner
was the target of a Federal Grand Jury Investigation.
3. P.T. refers to the transcript of the pre-trial hearing. It is fol-
lowed by the date of the hearing and the relevant pages of the tran-
script. T. refers to transcripts of the trial. It is followed by the date
and relevant page number.
6
The informer inquired into the strategy, tactics and
intentions of Petitioner and his counsel and further of-
fered legal advice to Petitioner with respect to the Grand
Jury and a potential defense. (P.T. 2/26/81, 60-100). The
contents of this taped discussion were directly commu-
nicated to Customs officials. (P.T. 2/26/81, 73-74).
At pre-trial hearings, the attorney-informer
admitted that he had penetrated Petitioner’s attorney-cli-
ent relationship. (P.T. 2/26/81, 77). While the District
Court refused to suppress the tape on Sixth Amendment
grounds, it observed that the circumstances in which
the tape was made caused the court great concern and
presented a very close question. (P.T. 2/27/81, 57, 93).
In light of these facts, the Government chose not to
introduce the tape at trial. However, the Government did
elicit testimony from Brown about the tape. Following
Petitioner’s cross-examination, in which Brown reaf-
firmed that he was acting under Government direction
and that the Government possessed the tape, the prose-
cutor rose from his seat, flipped the tape in the air and
stated in open court:
“Your Honor, I would make the tape available for
Mr. Miller (defense counsel) to play if he sees fit. I
have nothing further.” (T. 3/7/81, 455).
During trial and on appeal, Petitioner argued that
the prosecutor’s actions and remarks were highly im-
proper and amounted to an impermissible shifting of the
burden of proof in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s
due process guarantee and the privilege against self-in-
crimination requiring a mistrial. Both courts rejected the
argument.
7
REASONS FOR ALLOWANCE
OF THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI
1. The Court of Appeals Below has Rendered a Decision in
Conflict with Applicable Decisions of this Court and in
Conflict with Decisions of Other Federal Courts of
Appeals.
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment is designed to prote.t a defendant in a criminal
case from multiple punishments for the same offense.
Petitioner respectfully submits that this right was vio-
lated in his case because the convictions and sentences
imposed by the District Court and affirmed on appeal
under 18 U.S.C. §§2314 and 659 for both possession
and transportation of goods stolen from an interstate
shipment were multiplicitous.
To date, there are no cases dealing precisely with
the construction of these statutes where separate con-
victions and sentences are imposed for transportation
and possession. However, there are a number of cases
decided by this Court and others under §659 and similar
statutes holding that convictions for both theft and pos-
session of the same goods are multiplicitous. Heflin v.
United States, 358 U.S. 415 (1959); United States v.
Gaddis, 424 U.S. 544 (1976); United States v. Gilbert,
553 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 913
(1978); United States v. DiGeronimo, 598 F.2d 746 (2d
Cir. ), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886 (1979); United States v.
Garber, 626 F.2d 1144 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1079 (1981). Petitioner respectfully submits that
these cases, and United States v. Garber, supra, in par-
ticular, apply with equal force to the case at bar, and that
the imposition of separate convictions by the District
Court, affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, are in fatal conflict with the Third Circuit opin-
ion in Garber. The convictions and sentences on the
transportation charges should therefore be reversed.
8
In United States v. Garber, 626 F.2d 1144 (3d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1079 (1981), the defen-
dants were convicted under 18 U.S.C. §659 of both
stealing copper cathrodes from a foreign shipment and
possessing those same cathrodes. On appeal, the Third
Circuit vacated the conviction and sentence under the
possession charge, holding that an individual could not
be convicted of both theft from a foreign shipment and
receipt or possession of the same goods from the same
shipment under §659.
The reasoning of the court followed guidelines es-
tablished by this Court in Bell v. United States, 349 U.S.
81 (1955) and Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415
(1959), which held that, in the absence of clear and un-
ambiguous congressional intent to the contrary, it is er-
ror to impose separate punishments on multiple aspects
of the same offense. Since it was clear that stealing and
possession were in fact different facets of the same act,
the question was whether the legislative history of §659
revealed a clear intent to punish each aspect separately.
Failing to find any such intent, the court concluded that
it was error to impose multiple convictions.
In addition to provisions for unlawful taking and
possession, §659 also has a provision against transporta-
tion of stolen goods in interstate commerce.* Petitioner
stands convicted under Counts 9, 10, 20 and 21 of the
Indictment with unlawful transportation and possession
under §659. These charges involve two separate trans-
actions. In each instance, the charges arise from the
same transaction and involve the same products.°®
4. Paragraph seven of the statute provides:
“The carrying or transporting of any such (stolen) money,
freight, express, baggage, goods, or chattels in interstate or for-
eign commerce, knowing the same to have been stolen, shall
constitute a separate offense and subject the offender to the
penalties under this section for unlawful taking . . .”
5. Count 9 charges that on or about September 30, 1977, Peti-
tioner transported or caused to be transported from New Jersey to
9
Therefore, transportation and possession charges in this
case are in fact multiple aspects of the same offense. The
question, as in Garber, is whether Petitioner can be sen-
tenced separately under those circumstances.
Section §659 specifically provides that, with respect
to sentencing, transportation under the statute must be
treated as an unlawful taking. Therefore, the convictions
on Counts 9 and 10 for transportation and possession are
equivalent, for purposes of sentencing, to convictions for
unlawful taking and possession. This brings the Garber
case into action. Since the court could not have imposed
multiple sentences for unlawful taking and possession
under Garber, it could not rightfully impose multiple
sentences for transportation and possession for the same
reasons. To do so was plain error.
In each of the remaining five transactions which
gave rise to this case, Petitioner was convicted of unlaw-
ful possession under 18 U.S.C. §659 and unlawful trans-
portation under 18 U.S.C. §2314. In relation to the
counts charging transportation under §2314 instead of
§659, it Petitioner’s position that the conduct pro-
scribed by both statutes is the same, i.e.; transporting
stolen goods in interstate or foreign commerce knowing
the same to have been stolen. Therefore, the Govern-
ment could not avoid the consequences of Garber by
simply charging transportation under a different section
of Title 18. See, e.g., United States v. DiGeromino, 598
F.2d 746 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886 (1979)
where the court ruled that convictions for theft under 18
Pennsylvania, certain tobacco products which he knew to be stolen
from interstate commerce. Count 10 charges that Petitioner unlaw-
fully possessed those same products on the same date. Count 20
charges that on September 27, 1978, Petitioner transported or
caused to be transported from New Jersey to Pennsylvania certain
coffee products which he knew to be stolen from interstate com-
merce. Count 21 charges that Petitioner unlawfully possessed those
same coffee products on the same date.
10
U.S.C. §1951 and 659 were multiplicitous because the
conduct proscribed under both statutes was functionally
equivalent.
Even if this Court should decide that Congress did
intend to provide for multiple convictions under §659
when a defendant is charged with both possession and
transportation under that statute, the fact remains that
there is no such provision where only possession is
charged under §659 and transportation is charged under
§2314.
There is no language in the legislative history of ei-
ther statute, and no cases exist, which would indicate
that when possession is charged under §659 and trans-
portation is charged under §2314, a defendant should be
treated as if he were convicted of both offenses under
§659 alone.
This Court has determined that when multiple con-
victions and sentences are not clearly intended by Con-
gress, the issue is to be resolved in favor of leniety:
“We resolve an ambiguity in favor of leniety when
required to determine the intent of Congress in
punishing multiple aspects of the same criminal
act.” Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 419
(1959).
For each of the transactions involved in this case, trans-
portation and possession constituted different facets of
the particular transaction. They were as much multiple
aspects of the same offense as theft and possession were
in Garber. The fact that the various aspects of Petition-
er’s conduct in each transaction were charged under dif-
ferent statutes does not change the cohesive nature of
the conduct itself.
Since there is no evidence of congressional intent to
impose multiple convictions in this situation, the stan-
dard pronounced in Heflin, supra, and adopted in
Garber, must apply. From this it is clear that the convic-
tions and sentences imposed for transportation under
11
§2314 must be reversed even if the Court should affirm
the transportation convictions under §659.
2. The Court of Appeals has Rendered a Decision in Con-
flict with the Applicable Decisions of this Court.
As described in the Statement of the Case, supra,
the Government chose not to play the “Brown tape” at
trial. However, it did elicit testimony from Brown as to
the making and general contents of the tape. Following
cross-examination, in which Brown affirmed that he was
acting under Government direction, the prosecutor
flipped the tape in the air and challenged Petitioner, be-
fore the jury, to play the tape if he saw fit.
Petitioner respectfully submits that the prosecutor's
words and actions resulted in an impermissible shifting
of the burden of proof in contravention of the Fifth
Amendment’s due process guarantee and privilege
against self-incrimination. The Government’s impermis-
sible conduct fits squarely within the doctrine an-
nounced by this Court in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S.
609 (1965). Therefore, the refusal of the District Court
to grant Petitioner’s motion for a new trial, affirmed by
the Court of Appeals below, is in conflict with the spirit
and purpose of Griffin.
In Griffin, this Court held:
“(T]he Fifth Amendment, in its direct application to
the Federal Government, and in its bearing on the
States by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment, for-
bids either comment by the prosecutor on the
accused’s silence or instructions by the court that
such silence is evidence of guilt.” Griffin v. Califor-
~ , supra, at 615.
The yrosecutor’s remarks can only be construed as a
challenge to the defense to come forward and produce
evidence. Where the law prohibits a prosecutor’s com-
12
menting on an accused’s failure to testify, a prosecutor’s
unsolicited speech to the jury, in which the accused is
issued a clear and unequivocal challenge to produce evi-
dence, must surely be condemned.
An alternate standard applies in determining
whether a prosecutor’s remarks constitute a deprivation
of due process so as to warrant reversal of the conviction.
The first question is whether the natural and necessary
effect of the prosecutor’s remarks is to comment on the
accused's failure to testify. The second is whether the
prosecutor’s remarks were intended as a comment on
the accused’s failure to testify. If the natural and neces-
sary effect of the prosecutor’s remarks is to comment on
the accused's failure to testify, or if the remark was in-
tentionally made, then the Griffin prohibition has been
violated. United States v. Chaney, 446 F.2d 571, 576 (3d
Cir.) cert. denied, 404 U.S. 993 (1971); United States v.
Dansker, 537 F.2d 40, 63 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1038 (1977); United States v. Waller, 607 F.2d
49, 50 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Cianciulli, 482 F.
Supp. 585, 590 (E.D. Pa. 1979), affd mem., 624 F.2d
1091 (3d Cir. 1980).
The natural and necessary effect of the Govern-
ment’s challenge in this case was to place Petitioner in a
“Catch-22” situation. Regardless of whether Petitioner
responded by action or inaction, the resolution of this
conflict necessarily violated his Fifth Amendment
rights. If, as happened, Petitioner chose not to introduce
the tape recording, the jury must infer that the “Brown
tape” contained highly incriminating evidence. On the
other hand, if Petitioner responded to the Government's
dare by playing the tape, then the accused would have
been effectively coerced into going forward and produc-
ing evidence. Where, as here, the improper conduct oc-
curred during the Government's case-in-chief, Peti-
tioner chose not to testify in his own defense, and the
impropriety involved Petitioner’s own words as pre-
served on a tape recording, the sole effect of the prosec -
13
tor’s conduct was an unconstitutional shifting of the
burden of proof.
Furthermore, the prosecutor’s remark was not in-
nocuous or unintentional. He rose from his seat, flipped
the tape in the air and offered it to Petitioner before the
jury, knowing very well that the Government had not
played it for fear of creating a prejudice which almost
certainly would have caused reversal of the case on ap-
peal. Such conduct was a deliberate and calculated chal-
lenge to the defense to play the tape instead.
A prosecutor’s remark, although improper, is not
generally held to constitute a violation of the Griffin rule
where other witnesses are availabie to rebut or negate
the Government evidence. United States v. Heithaus,
377 F.2d 484, 486 (3d Cir. 1967); United States v.
Giuliano, 383 F.2d 30, 34 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 1055 (1968). The “sole witness” rule is a judi-
cially created exception to the Griffin prohibition.
Where, as in this case, the Griffin violation concerned
Petitioner’s tape recorded statements, it defies reason to
conclude that the prosecutor’s conduct was amenable to
rebuttal or negation by a witness other than Petitioner
himself.
In this case, tape recordings were the crucial evi-
dence in obtaining Petitioner’s conviction. The Govern-
ment’s case hinged upon the jury’s hearing of numerous
tapes. Prior to Brown’s testimony and the prosecutor’s
improper remarks, the jury had listened to eight hours of
incriminating tape recordings over a two day period. In
the context of Petitioner’s trial, where the central focus
of the entire proceeding was tape re_rdings, Petitioner
suffered extraordinary prejudice as a result of the pros-
ecutor’s challenge. The case should therefore have been
reversed.
14
3. The Circumstances of this Case Present a Serious Ques-
tion as to Whether Certain Sixth Amendment Protections
Currently Afforded only to Individuals after Indictment
Should be Extended to Pre-Indictment Targets of Federal
Grand Jury Investigations.
At the outset, Petitioner acknowledges that at the
present time the target of a grand jury investigation does
not have an absolute right to counsel. In Re Groban, 352
U.S. 330, 333 (1957); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682,
688 (1972).
Nevertheless, Petitioner respectfully submits that
the Sixth Amendment protection of the attorney-client
relationship against governmental penetration should be
extended to a pre-indictment intrusion where the cir-
cumstances of the case demonstrate that (1) had said in-
trusion occurred after indictment, it would have war-
ranted dismissal of the indictment or reversal of the
conviction, and (2) the pre-indictment intrusion directly
contravened counsel’s express notice to the Government
not to contact his client and resulted in prejudice to the
defendant by effecting the course of the investigation
and subsequent trial.
When the “Brown tape,” heretofore described in Pe-
titioner’s Statement of the Case, was recorded, both
Brown and the Government were aware of three critical
factors: (1) Petitioner was the target of a Grand Jury In-
vestigation into the theft of goods from PMT; (2) Peti-
tioner was represented by Anthony Caiazzo, an attorney,
in connection with the Grand Jury Investigation, and (3)
Anthony Caiazzo, Esquire had expressly and unequivo-
cally forbidden the Government to communicate directly
with Petitioner. Yet Brown, who was acting as a Govern-
ment agent, was never advised to refrain from
discussing matters involving the relationship between
Petitioner and his attorney, or to avoid offering legal ad-
vice to Petitioner.
15
At trial, the Government elicited testimony from
Brown about the making and existence of the tape.
Inasmuch as the jury had already been exposed to other
numerous incriminating tapes of Petitioner, the obvious
inference was that the Brown tape contained incriminat-
ing evidence. The problem was compounded, as dis-
cussed in Argument 2 above, by the prosecutor's chal-
lenge to Petitioner in open court to play the tape.
Petitioner submits that under these circumstances,
it is clear that had an attorney-client intrusion occurred
after indictment, it would have amounted to a violation
under Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964),
and more recently under United States v. Levy, 577 F.2d
200 (3d Cir. 1978) where the Third Circuit held:
“We think that the injury into prejudice must stop
at the point where attorney-client confidence are ac-
tually disclosed to the government enforcement
agencies responsible for investigating and prosecut-
ing the case . . . [a] Sixth Amendment violation
would be found where, as here, defense strategy
was actually disclosed . . .” Id. at 209, 210.
Even under this Court’s decision in United States v.
Morrison, 449 U.S. 361 (1981), the existence of “demon-
strable prejudice or a substantial threat thereof” would
have been established because the contents of the tape
were directly communicated to the Government during
its investigation and formed part of its case against Peti-
tioner. The adverse impact of such conduct on the fair-
ness of the proceedings leading to Petitioner’s conviction
is obvious.
It is Petitioner’s contention that where, as in this
case, the target of a Grand Jury Investigation is rep-
resented by counsel in connection with the investiga-
tion, and the Government is aware that the individual is
so represented and has been expressly forbidden to com-
municate with the individual without counsel’s consent,
then the Sixth Amendment protections afforded a “sus-
16
pect” or criminal defendant should extend to the target
of a Grand Jury Investigation. To hold otherwise, sanc-
tions the Government’s commission of a Massiah viola-
tion by depriving the pre-indictment victim of any
means of relief.
Surely, the contents of the “Brown tape” evidence
the Government’s defiant and improper penetration of
Petitioner’s attorney-client relationship. Because the vio-
lation occurred at the pre-indictment stage of the instant
proceedings, the Government’s wrongful conduct af-
fected the entire proceeding thereafter. The Govern-
ment’s knowledge of Petitioner and his attorney’s plans,
strategies and tactics affected the progress of the investi-
gation, the obtaining of the Indictment and the conduct
of the trial itself. Therefore, an even stronger case for re-
lief is presented here than in the post-indictment situa-
tion.
In cenclusion, Petitioner respectfully submits that
unless ths Honorable Court is willing to recognize that
the kind of intrusion which occurred in this case can
and does prejudicially effect the entire course of pro-
ceedings to follow just as severely as if it had occurred
after indictment, a “target” in Petitioner’s position will
be incapable of combating the impact of such improper
conduct upon his constitutional right to a fair trial. For
these reasons, Petitioner maintains that either the in-
dictment should be dismissed, as requested by Petitioner
before trial, or the conviction should be reversed.
17
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner respectfully re-
quests that a Writ of Certiorari should be issued to re-
view the decision of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit in this case.
Respectfully submitted,
Jeffrey M. Miller, Esquire
Attorney for Petitioner
Timothy J. Shanahan, III
xIpueddy
APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 81-1744
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
TIMOTHY J. SHANAHAN, III,
Appellant
(D.C. Crim. No. 80-00338-01)
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Submitted Under Third Circuit Rule 12(6)
February 1, 1981
Before: GIBBONS, WEIS AND GARTH, Circuit Judges
JUDGMENT ORDER
Timothy J. Shanahan, III appeals from a judgment
of sentence imposed following a jury verdict that he vio-
lated 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 659 and 2314. He contends:
1. That there is insufficient evidence that the
stolen goods were moving in or as a part of an
interstate or foreign shipment;
2. That a statement by the prosecutor in the pres-
ence of the jury about the availability to the de-
A-1
A-2
fense of the “Brown” tapes impermissibly shiited
the burden to the defendant;
3. That the district court permitted improper cross-
examination of a character witness;
4. That it was a violation of the sixth amendment
right to assistance of counsel or of due process
for a government informant to engage defendant
in an inculpatory pre-indictment conversation;
5. That the district court erred in failing to charge
that making the “Gilbert” tapes violated Penn-
sylvania law.
These contentions lack merit.
Itis ORDERED and ADJ U DGED that the
judgment of the district court is affirmed.
BY THE COURT,
Circuit Judge
Attest:
Sally Mrvos, Clerk *
Dated: February 2, 1982
A-3
APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CR 80-00338—01
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
TIMOTHY J. SHANAHAN, III
Judgment and Probation/Commitment Order
Defendant appeared April 23, 1981 with counsel
Jeffrey M. Miller, Esquire
Verdict of Guilty.
Defendant has been convicted as charged of the
offense(s) of Aiding and abetting; Conspiracy; Posses-
sion and interstate transportation of goods stolen from
interstate and foreign shipment; Interstate transporta-
tion of stolen property in violation of Title 18, United
States Code, Sections 2(a), 371, 659 at 2314.
The court asked whether defendant had anything to
say why judgment should not be prononuced. Because
no sufficient cause to the contrary was shown, or ap-
peared to the court, the court adjudged the defendant
guilty as charged and convicted and ordered that: The
defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the At-
torney General or his authorized representative for im-
prisonment for a period of TWO (2) YEARS and shall
pay a fine in the sum of TEN THOUSAND DOLLAKS
($10,000) as to Count I.
A-4
As to Count III, the defendant is hereby committed
to the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized
representative for imprisonment for a period of TWO (2)
YEARS, concurrent with Count I, and in addition, shall
pay a fine in the sum of TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS
($10,000).
As to Count IV, the defendant is hereby committed
to the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized
representative for imprisonment for a period of TWO (2)
YEARS, concurrent with Count I.
As to Count VI, the defendant is hereby committed
to the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized
representative for imprisonment for a period of TWO (2)
YEARS, concurrent with Count I and shall pay a fine in
the sum of TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS ($10,000).
As to Count VII, the defendant is hereby committed
to the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized
representative for imprisonment for a period of TWO (2)
YEARS, concurrent with Count I.
As to Count IX, the defendant is hereby committed
to the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized
representative for imprisonment for a period of TWO (2)
YEARS, concurrent with Count I and shall pay a fine in
the sum cf FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($5,000).
As to Count X, the defendant is hereby committed to
the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized
representative for imprisonment for a period of TWO (2)
YEARS, concurrent with Count I.
As to Count XI, the defendant is hereby committed
to the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized
representative for imprisonment for a period of TWO (2)
YEARS, concurrent with sentence imposed on Count I
and shall pay a fine in the sum of TEN THOUSAND
DOLLARS ($10,000).
As to Count XII, the defendant is hereby committed
to the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized
representative for imprisonment for a period of TWO (2)
YEARS, concurrent with sentence imposed on Count I.
A-5
As to Count XV, the defendant is hereby committed
to the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized
representative for imprisonment for a period of TWO (2)
YEARS, concurrent with Count I and shall pay a fine in
the sum of TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS ($10,000).
As to Count XVI, the defendant is hereby committed
to the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized
representative for imprisonment for a period of TWO (2)
YEARS, concurrent with Count I.
As to Count XVII, the defendant is hereby commit-
ted to the custody of the Attorney General or his autho-
rized representative for imprisonment for a period of
TWO (2) YEARS, concurrent with-Count I and shall pay
a fine in the sum of TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS
($10,000).
As to Count XVIII, the defendant is hereby commit-
ted to the custody of the Attorney General or his author-
ized representative for imprisonment for a period of
TWO (2) YEARS, concurrent with Count I.
As to Count XX, the defendant is hereby committed
to the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized
representative for imprisonment for a period of TWO (2)
YEARS, concurrent with Count I.
As to Count XXI, the defendant is hereby committed
to the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized
representative for imprisonment for a period of TWO (2)
YEARS, concurrent with Count I and shall pay a fine in
the sum of FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($5,000).
In addition to the special conditions of probation im-
posed above, it is hereby ordered that the general condi-
tions of probation set out on the reverse side of this judg-
ment be imposed. The Court may change the conditions
of probation, reduce or extend the period of probation,
and at anytime during the probation period or within a
maximum probation period of five years permitted by
law, may issue a warrant and revoke probation for a vio-
lation occurring during the probation period.
A-6
carte gl The court orders commitment to the custody of the
DATION: Attorney General and recommends, Eglin Air Force
Base, Florida.
All sentences of imprisonment are imposed pursu-
ant to 1S U.S.C. §4205(b)(2).
Donald W. VanArtsdalen J.
Dated: April 23, 1981
A-7
APPENDIX C
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA :
vs. : Criminal No.
TIMOTHY J. SHANAHAN, III: 80-00338—01
JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL/NOT GUILTY
AND NOW, this 10th day of April, 1981, came the
attorney for the Government and the defendant being
present with counsel, and
& The Court having granted the defendant’s motion for
judgment of acquittal as to Counts 2, 5, 8, 13, 14 and 19
2 A jury has been waived, and the Court has found the
defendant not guilty as to
(1) The jury has returned its verdict, finding the defen-
dant not guilty as to
AND IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Judg-
ment in accordance with the above finding is hereby en-
tered pursuant to Rule 32(b), Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
BY THE COURT:
Donald W. VanArtsdalen J.
xc: U.S. Marshal
Probation Office
Counsel
DATE BY
WHOM
Crl 4/78
A-8
APPENDIX D
The United States Code, Act of June 25, 1948,
C.645, 62 Stat. 729; As Amended Oct. 14, 1966, Pub. L.
89-654, §1(a)-(d), 80 Stat. 904, 18 U.S.C. §659 provides
in pertinent part:
§ 659. Interstate or foreign shipments by carrier; State
prosecutions
Whoever embezzles, steals, or unlawfully takes,
carries away, or conceals, or by fraud or deception ob-
tains from any pipeline system, railroad car, wagon,
motortruck, or other vehicle, or from any tank or storage
facility, station, station house, platform or depot or from
any steamboat, vessel, or wharf, or from any aircraft, air
terminal, airport, aircraft terminal or air navigation fa-
cility with intent to convert to his own use any goods or
chattels moving as or which are a part of or which con-
stitute an interstate or foreign shipment of freight, ex-
press, or other property; or
Whoever buys or receives or has in his possession
any such goods or chattels, knowing the same to have
been embezzled or stolen; or
Whoever embezzies, steals, or unlawfully takes,
carries away, or by fraud or deception obtains with intent
to convert to his own use any baggage which shall have
come into the possession of any common carrier for
transportation in interstate or foreign commerce or
breaks into, steals, takes, carries away, or conceals any
of the contents of such baggage, or buys, receives, or has
in his possession any such baggage or any article there-
from of whatever nature, knowing the same to have
been embezzled or stolen; or
Whoever embezzles, steals, or unlawfully takes by
any fraudulent device, scheme, or game, from any
railroad car, bus, vehicle, steamboat, vessel, or aircraft
operated by any common carrier moving in interstate or
A-9
foreign commerce or from any passenger thereon any
money, baggage, goods, or chattels, or whoever buys, re-
ceives, or has in his possession any such money, bag-
gage, goods, or chattels, knowing the same to have been
embezzled or stolen—
Shall in each case be fined not more than $5,000 or
imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; but if the
amount or value of such money, baggage, goods or chat-
tels does not exceed $100, he shall be fined not more
than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or
both.
The offense shall be deemed to have been commit-
ted not only in the district where the violation first oc-
curred, but also in any district in which the defendant
may have taken or been in possession of the said money,
baggage, goods, or chattels.
The carrying or transporting of any such money,
freight, express, baggage, goods, or chattels in interstate
or foreign commerce, knowing the same to have been
stolen, shall constitute a separate offense and subject
the offender to the penalties under this section for un-
lawful taking, and the offense shall be deemed to have
been committed in any district into which such money,
freight, express, baggage, goods, or chattels shall have
been removed or into which the same shall have been
brought by such offender.
The United States Code, Act of June 25, 1948,
c.645, 62 Stat. 806; As Amended Sept. 28, 1968, Pub.L.
90-535, 82 Stat. 885, 18 U.S.C. §2314:
§ 2314. Transportation of stolen goods, securities, mon-
eys, fratidulent State tax stamps, or articles used
in counterfeiting
Whoever transports in interstate or foreign com-
merce any goods, wares, merchandise, securities or
A-10
money, of the value of $5,000 or more, knowing the
same to have been stolen, converted or taken by fraud;
or
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any
scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or
property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, rep-
resentations, or promises, transports or causes to be
transported, or induces any person to travel in, or to be
transported in interstate commerce in the execution or
concealment of a scheme or artifice to defraud that per-
son of money or property having a value of $5,000 or
more; or
Whoever, with unlawful or fraudulent intent, trans-
ports in interstate or foreign commerce any falsely made,
forged, altered, or counterfeited securities or tax stamps,
knowing the same to have been falsely made, forged, al-
tered, or counterfeited; or
Whoever, with unlawful or fraudulent intent, trans-
ports in interstate or foreign commerce any traveler’s
check bearing a forged countersignature; or
Whoever, with unlawful or fraudulent intent, trans-
* ports in interstate or foreign commerce, any tool, imple-
ment, or thing used or fitted to be used in falsely mak-
ing, forging, altering, or counterfeiting any security or
tax stamps, or any part thereof—
Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned
not more than ten years, or both.
This section shall not apply to any falsely made,
forged, altered, counterfeited or spurious representation
of an obligation or other security of the United States, or
of an obligation, bond, certificate, security, treasury
note, bill, promise to pay or bank note issued by any for-
eign government or by a bank or corporation of any for-
eign country.
vowisoddg
ree
MAY 14 1999
In the Dueptces Court of the Hui ALEXENDER <! STEVAS.
OcTOBER TERM, 1981
No. 81-1763
Timotny J. SHANAHAN, III, PETITIONER
Vv.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE THIRD CIRCUIT
MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES
IN OPPOSITION
Rex E. Lee
Solicitor General
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 633-2217
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 .........
Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S.415 ......
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 ..........++-
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 ........
United States v. Gaddis, 424 U.S. 544 ......
United States v. Garber, 626 F. 2d 1144,
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1079 ..............
United States v. Gray, 565 F. 2d 881 .......
Constitution and statutes:
United States Constitution:
Fifth Amendment .............seeee0e
OB UB. 2 ccccccesccwccccccccccccccvecs
PUB, BIE ccccccccccsscvccccscccccees
WD WB. GOP ow ccwcccnccccccccccccccccces
WD ULB, ZBIG: cess cesisccccccccccvccces
Iu the Supreme Court of the United States
OcTOBER TERM, 1981
No. 81-1763
TrmoTny J. SHANAHAN, III, PETITIONER
V.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE THIRD CIRCUIT
MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES
IN OPPOSITION
Petitioner contends (1) that he cannot properly be con-
victed and sentenced for both possession and transporta-
tion of the same stolen goods, (2) that the prosecutor
improperly commented on his decision not to testify, and
(3) that a pre-indictment conversation with a government
informant outside the presence of his lawyer violated his
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
1. After a jury trial in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, petitioner was
convicted on seven counts of possessing goods stolen from
an interstate or foreign shipment, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
659 (Counts 4, 7, 10, 12, 16, 18, and 21); two counts of
transporting in interstate commerce goods stolen from an
interstate or foreign shipment, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 659
and 2 (Counts 9 and 20); five counts of transporting stolen
2
goods in interstate commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
2314 and 2 (Counts 3, 6, 11, 15, and 17); and one count of
conspiring to commit those offenses, in violation of 18
U.S.C. 371 (Count 1). He was sentenced to concurrent
two-year terms of imprisonment on each count. In addition,
he was fined $10,000 on each of Counts 1, 3, 6, 11, 1Sand 17,
and $5,000 on each of Counts 9 and 21. The court of appeals
affirmed by judgment order (Pet. App. Al-A2).
The evidence adduced at trial showed that petitioner was
the president of Shanahan Motor Lines, a trucking com-
pany engaged in the transportation and sale of “overages”
(dock accumulations) from marine terminals to salvage
companies. S.A. la-4a.' Beginning in June 1978, petitioner
and two associates engaged in a scheme to steal “overages”
from the Packer Avenue Marine Terminal (PAMT) in Phi-
ladelphia. Pursuant to this scheme, the chief clerk at PAMT
would identify goods to be stolen, and petitioner’s opera-
tions manager would arrange for the transportation of the
designated goods to petitioner's warehouse. Petitioner then
managed the ultimate sale of the goods. Petitioner kept 50%
of the proceeds from the sales, with the other participants in
the scheme receiving 25% each. S.A. Sa-8a. In all, petitioner
and his associates engaged in seven separate transactions
involving the theft and sale of “overages.”
2. Petitioner contends (Pet. 7-11) that he cannot be con-
victed and sentenced for both possession and transporta-
tion of the same stolen goods. This claim plainly does not
“S.A.” refers to the government's supplemental appendix in the
court of appeals.
2Petitioner failed to raise the issue on appeal. The court of appeals,
however, requested both sides to address the issue by letter after oral
argument in t! is case.
3
merit review under the concurrent sentence doctrine.’ In
any event, it is without merit.
Petitioner relies on several cases, including a decision of
the court below, which hold that convictions for theft and
receipt or possession of the same goods are improper.
United States v. Gaddis, 424 U.S. 544 (1976); Heflin v.
United States, 358 U.S. 415 (1959); United States v.
Garber, 626 F. 2d 1144 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1079 (1981). Here, however, petitioner was not convicted
for theft and possession of the same goods, but for their
possession and interstate transportation. With regard to
two of the transportations, petitioner was charged with
unlawful transportation and possession under 18 U.S.C.
659 (Counts 9 and 20). Congress has expressly provided in
Section 659 that the transportation of goods in interstate or
foreign commerce “shall constitute a separate offense” from
the other offenses under that statute. 18 U.S.C. 659.
Accordingly, at least in relation to those two transactions,
petitioner’s possession and transportation convictions are
not multiplicitous. The unlawful transportation count for
the remaining five transactions was charged under 18
U.S.C. 2314 instead of Section 659 (Counts 3, 6, 11, 1S and
17). In light of the clear congressional intent expressed in
Section 659 that transportation of goods stolen from an
interstate or foreign shipment constitutes a crime separate
from possession, however, it could make no possible differ-
ence whether the unlawful transportation was charged
3Petitioner was sentenced to concurrent two-year prison terms on
sees aad eatimemastianteaned otto exeieadines de
possession count or the transportation count—relating to each of the
seven transactions in this case. Petitioner's conviction and sentencing
for both possession and transportation therefore did not increase in any
manner the clearly permissible severity of his punishment, nor is there
any realistic possibility that petitioner could suffer adverse collateral
consequences us a result of the additional convictions.
4
under Section 659 or Section 2314. In either case, Congress
has proscribed separate crimes that can be separately
charged, tried, and punished.
3. During the investigation of this case, Richard Brown,
who had earlier purchased stolen commodities from peti-
tioner, secretly recorded a conversation with petitioner at
the government’s request (App. 23 1a-232a).* The tape of the
conversation was made available to petitioner as a part of
discovery months prior to trial (S.A. 13a-15a). At trial, the
government elected not to play the tape and so notified the
defense (S.A. 16a-17a). Without objection, the government
had Brown summarize the recorded conversation in his trial
testimony. During cross-examination of Brown, defense
counsel established that the government and not Brown had
possession of the tape (S.A. 20a). In an implicit attempt to
suggest that the government was suppressing the tape,
defense counsel then asked Brown (ibid.): “If [the tape] is
going to be played by anybody, you can't play it?” At the
conclusion of redirect examination, the prosecutor stated,
“Your Honor, I would make the tape available to [defense
counsel] to play if he sees fit” (App. 244a). Relying on
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), petitioner con-
tends (Pet. 11-13) that the prosecutor's statement somehow
shifted the burden of proof by violating his privilege against
self-incrimination.
In Griffin, this Court held that the Fifth Amendment
prohibits prosecutorial and judicial comment that a de-
fendant’s decision mot to testify may be evidence of guilt.
Here, however, there was mo comment, direct or indirect, on
petitioner’s failure to testify. Rathe-, the obvious purpose of
the prosecutor’s statement was to make the tape available to
the defense to use in any further cross-examination of
“App.” refers to petitioner's appendix in the court of appeals.
5
Brown. Further, the offer to make the tape available was a
legitimate response to defense counsel's implicit and false
suggestion that the government was suppressing the tape.°
4. Petitioner contends (Pet. 14-16) that his tape-recorded
conversation with Brown outside the presence of his lawyer
at a time when the government knew that he was repre-
sented by an attorney in connection with an ongoing grand
jury investigation violated his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. But, as this Court stated in Kirby v. Illinois, 406
U.S. 682, 688 (1972), “{iJn a line of constitutional cases * * *
it has been firmly established that a person's Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel attaches only at or
after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been
initiated against him.” In the face of this authority, petition-
er’s attempt to have the right to counsel extended to the
pre-indictment investigative activity of the government
must fail. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 n.4
(1980).¢
Petitioner finally argues that Brown, an attorney, im-
properly gave him legal advice during the tape-recorded
conversation and that, as a result of the conversation, the
government learned of the “plans, strategies and tactics” of
the defense (Pet. 16). During the conversation there was
5Contrary to petitioner's repeated assertions (Pet. 6, 11, 13), there is
nothing in the record to indicate that counsel for the government
flipped the tape recording into the air while speaking. Indeed, in his
brief before the Third Circuit, government counsel denied petitioner's
allegation of such conduct (Br. for Appellee at 8 n.2).
*Petitioner objects (Pet. 14) that the government precipitated his
conversation with Brown despite the fact that his lawyex “had expressly
and unequivocally forbidden the Government to communicate directly
with [him].” Under Kirby, however, petitioner's lawyer had no author-
ity to prevent the government from communicating with petitioner, and
adoption of such a rule would unduly intrude upon the legitimate
investigative authority of the government. See United States v. Gray,
565 F. 2d 881, 891 (Sth Cir. 1978).
6
some discussion of the grand jury’s subpoena power (App.
66a), of petitioner's options before the grand jury (App.
99a-101a), of possible defenses available to petitioner (App.
67a-68a), and of the advisability of retaining a large New
York law firm to delay the proceedings (App. 69a). Peti-
tioner also related the advice his attorney gave him regard-
ing the dangers >f perjury (App. 83a-84a). There is no
suggestion in the record, however, that Brown initiated any
of these discussions. Indeed, Brown testified that the discus-
sions were initiated by petitioner (S.A. 24a). Brown further
testified that he had no intention to “feed” information to
petitioner's attorney and that everything he told petitioner
was true (S.A. 25a). Moreover, there was no revelation
during the conversation of anything that could remotely be
characterized as “trial strategy.” In the absence of any over-
reaching by the government or any prejudice to petitioner,
there is simply no basis for dismissing this indictment.
It is therefore respectfully submitted that the petition for
a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Rex E. Lee
Solicitor General
May 1982
DOJ-1962-05
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.