Opposition — West Virginia ex rel. Air Pollution Control Commission v. Gorsuch
Supreme Court brief1982
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F I
No. 81-1524 APR 23 1982
—
In the Supreme Court of the Unite =
OCTOBER TERM, 1981
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, PETITIONER
v.
ANNE M. GorsucH, ADMINISTRATOR,
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES CCURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION
Rex E. LEE
Solicitor General
CAROL E. DINKINS
Assistant Attorney General
DONALD W. STEVER, JR.
Attorney
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 633-2217
ROBERT M. PERRY
General Counsel
LypDIA N. WEGMAN
Assistant General Counsel
CATHERINE A. COTTER
Attorney
United States Environmental
Protection Agency
Washington, D.C. 20460
| Office - Supreme
t
f
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the Administrator adequately considered
the potential interstate consequences of his partial
approval of revisions to the West Virginia Clean Air
Act state implementation plan.
(1)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
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Statutes involved .... i 2
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. v. EPA, 572
F.2d 1150, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 ................. 3
Industrial Union Department Vv. American Petro-
leum Institute, 448 U.S. 607 -.......-...-..---.-------+- 7
Portland Cement Association v. Ruckelshaus, 486
| SES eae a serene ee ST 5
Train Vv. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421
US. 60 ....... Fe EN ee Ree ENTE Tree 2,7
Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 ................ 2
Statutes and regulations:
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 553 ......... 7
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 7401 et seq.:
Section 107(a), 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 7407
ID" casinasitatasiinslal tated atinasanindtanunddaieaslaeemin 2
Section 110(a) (2), 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III)
REAR ace nena ee 2,6, 7,9
Section 110(a) (2) (A), 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III)
. | eS aaaenon eee oe 2, 3,8
Section 110(a) (2) (E), 42 U.S.C. (Supp. ITI)
ID Siticcsccccgneceecaecmamiangial 2, 6,7, 8,9
IV
Statutes and regulations—Continued Page
Section 126(a), 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 7426
(a) on
Sections 160-169, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 7470-
EE SS ee
Section 165, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 7475 ........
Section 172, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 7502..........
Section 307(b), 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 7607
(b) 2
Section 307(d), 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 7607
FE 7
Section 307 (d) (1), 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 7607
(d) (1) 7
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29
U.S.C. 651 et seq. ........... acetone 7
40 C.F.R.:
ELS een 3
EE ee 3
EE a 3
Section 50.7 .. 3
Miscellaneous:
44 Fed. Reg. (1979):
ES 4
tw
wn wo
45 Fed. Reg. (1980) :
p. 74478 ... * EN EERE > LOVES eae 5
Ss 5,8
Ju the Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1981
No. 81-1524
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, PETITIONER
v.
ANNE M. GoRSUCH, ADMINISTRATOR,
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORAI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION
OPINION BELOW
The judgment order of the court of appeals (Pet.
App. 20-22) is unreported.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered
on September 22, 1981. A timely petition for rehear-
ing was denied on October 28, 1981. A petition for a
writ of certiorari was filed by the State of West
Virginia on January 18, 1982 (No. 81-1361). The
cross-petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on
February 12, 1982. The jurisdiction of this Court
is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
(1)
STATUTES INVOLVED
Sections 110(a)(2), 126(a), and 307(b) of the
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 7410(a) (2),
7426(a), and 7607(b) are set out at Pet. 3-7.
STATEMENT
1. Under the Clean Air Act, the states are en-
couraged to develop programs to assure attainment
and maintenance of primary and secondary national
ambient air quality standards; the Environmental
Protection Agency assures that such programs meet
the relevant requirements of the Act. See Union
Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976); Train
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60
(1975). While the states have primary responsi-
bility for fashioning plans to meet the federal goals
under Section 107(a), 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 7407
(a), EPA reviews each state plan or revision thereof
to assure that it meets the criteria set forth in Sec-
tion 110(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 7410(a) (2),
and that certain other requirements of the Act are
met. See, e.g., Section 165, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III)
7475.
The basic requirement of the Act is that the plan
provide for attainment and maintenance of the na-
tional primary and secondary ambient air quality
standards. Section 110(a)(2) (A), 42 U.S.C. (Supp.
III) 7410(a)(2)(A). Another important criterion
is that air pollution emissions in one state not pre-
vent attainment and maintenance of national stand-
ards in other states. Section 110(a)(2)(E), 42
U.S.C. (Supp. III) 7410(a) (2) (E).
EPA has established national primary and sec-
ondary ambient air quality standards for sulfur
dioxide (SO.) and also for particulate matter
(TSP). 40 C.F.R. 50.4, 50.5, 50.6, and 50.7. Under
the Act the states must provide for attainment of
the national primary standards by December 31,
1982, and for attainment of the national secondary
standards within a “reasonable time.” Sections 110
(a) (2)(A) and 172, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 7410(a)
(2) (A) and 7502.
2. The computer air quality dispersion model is
the principal means of analysis used to determirie
whether emissions from a single air pollution source
or a group of sources will cause or contribute to a
violation of national ambient air quality standards
or will interfere with the prevention of significant
deterioration (PSD) in a clean air area.’ See C.A.
App. 1461.2 Dispersion models are mathematical
equations used to calculate expected ambient con-
centrations caused by pollution source emissions.
Using actual data, such as a power plant’s fuel char-
acteristics and pertinent meteorological measurements,
the model predicts ambient concentrations of a pol-
lutant for an array of points at various geographic
distances from the plant. See generally Cleveland
Electric Illuminating Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1150,
1160 (Cth Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978).
If the predicted values exceed the standards, the
plant’s emission limit must be made more stringent.
Ibid.
3. On November 9, 1978, the Administrator of
EPA approved, with certain exceptions immaterial
here, a revision of Regulation X of the West Vir-
ginia state implementation plan for sulfur dioxide
1 Requirements respecting clean air areas are set forth in
Sections 160-169 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 7470-7479.
2“C.A. App.” refers to the joint appendix in the court of
appeals.
4
(SO.) emissions. The revision relaxed the emission
limits for several power plants located in West Vir-
ginia, including the Harrison and Mitchell power
plants located within 25 miles (Pet. 10) of the Penn-
sylvania border. The revision permitted the power
plants to burn fuels of a higher sulfur content than
the existing plan provisions permitted. Petitioner
and a citizen group separately sought review of that
action in the Third Circuit; the cases were consoli-
dated as Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. EPA,
Nos. 79-1025, 79-1026. The affected power companies
and the State of West Virginia intervened as re-
spondents. The principal contentions in the consoli-
dated cases involved the adequacy of EPA’s evalua-
tion of the impact of the revisions on air quality in
Pennsylvania and the agency’s PSD analysis (C.A.
App. 1464-1475). Shortly after seeking review in
the court of appeals, petitioner moved to supplement
the administrative record with a series of studies
conducted by EPA on long-range pollutant transport
from the Ohio River basin (i.e., the Ohio River Basin
Energy Study, commonly referred to as “ORBES”’).
At EPA’s request, the court remanded the case for
reconsideration in light of certain defects in the record
concerning the agency’s PSD analysis and in light of
the agency’s failure to explain why certain meteoro-
logical data had not been considered in its dispersion
modeling analysis. On November 7, 1979, EPA again
proposed to approve the revision (44 Fed. Reg.
64439; App. A, infra, la-5ba). The Administrator
noted that modeling had been “performed for re-
ceptors within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania”
and “that emissions from the plants [would] not
prevent attainment of the SO. standards in Penn-
sylvania” (44 Fed. Reg. 64440 (1979); App. A,
infra, 4a).
5
The proposed rule was supported by a “Technical
Analysis” document available to the public as part of
the record, which analyzed interstate SO. impacts.
This analysis indicated that the SO. emissions from
the Harrison and Mitchell plants would have no sig-
nificant impact in Pennsylvania. See C.A. App. 424-
427; App. B, infra, 6a-10a.
On November 10, 1980, EPA issued a final order
approving the West Virginia revisions in part and
disapproving them in part. 45 Fed. Reg. 74478;
Pet. App. 23. Relying on approved modeling
techniques, EPA concluded that emissions from the
Harrison and Mitchell plants would not result in
violations of national primary ambient air quality
standards or PSD requirements. The Administrator
found, however, that emissions from the plants would
result in violations of the secondary standard and
accordingly required the State of West Virginia to
revise its implementation plan to ensure compliance.
45 Fed. Reg. 74479 (1980); Pet. App. 26-27.
The final rule was accompanied by a “Rationale
Document” that discussed the technical issues and
responded to comments submitted by petitioner and
all other interested parties.* C.A. App. 1445-1475.
Eight pages of this document are devoted to respond-
ing to petitioner’s comments (C.A. 1464-1472).* Pe-
titioner criticized EPA’s evaluation of the impact of
8In routine rulemaking cases, EPA commonly sets out its
reasoning in a background or rationale document. See, e.g.,
Portland Cement Association v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375
(D.C. Cir. 1973).
* The reasons that made it inappropriate to use modeling
techniques of the sort used in the Ohio River Basin Study
(“ORBES”) to evaluate the emissions from the Harrison and
Mitchell plants, as petitioner urged, were also discussed. C.A.
App. 1451-1453 ; see also id. at 443-444.
6
the emissions permitted under the revised plan, but
never suggested that EPA had failed to assess inter-
state impacts altogether.
4, Following EPA’s November, 1980 rulemaking,
the Third Circuit established a briefing schedule for
the pending cases. On December 1, 1980, petitioner
filed a new petition in the Third Circuit seeking re-
view of EPA’s November action. No. 80-2722. Pe-
titioner’s principal contentions in the court of appeals
were that (1) EPA had given inadequate considera-
tion to the effects of long-range transport of pollu-
tants into neighboring states; and (2) EPA’s dis-
persion modeling was inadequate.°
The court of appeals rejected petitioner’s argu-
ments and sustained the Administrator’s November,
1980 action (Pet. App. 20-22).
ARGUMENT
Petitioner contends that the Administrator’s partial
approval of the revisions to the West Virginia im-
plementation plan is invalid because the final action
was not accompanied by any explicit statement of
compliance with Section 110(a)(2)(E) of the Act,
42 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 7410(a)(2)(E). According
to petitioner, the absence of explicit findings demon-
strates that EPA has failed to carry out its “duty to
consider the impacts of interstate air pollution under
the Clean Air Act” (Pet. 19). In light of the agency’s
lengthy discussion in the record of interstate im-
pacts, partly in response to petitioner’s comments,
this contention is remarkable.
Section 110(a)(2) of the Clean Air Act sets forth
basic criteria on which EPA’s approval or disap-
5 Petitioner does not appear to raise either of those claims
in this Court.
7
proval of a state implementation plan must rest.
Once a state submits a new or revised implementa-
tion plan to EPA, the Administrator must approve
the plan or the revision unless he finds that it fails
to meet one or more of the Section 110(a)(2) cri-
teria. Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
421 U.S. 60, 79 (1975).° There is no requirement
that the Administrator separately explain how he
concluded that each statutory requirement had been
satisfied.” The administrative record in this case
clearly demonstrates (1) that the Administrator con-
sidered the requirements of Section 110(a) (2) (E)
in the course of the West Virginia rulemaking, and
(2) that the Administrator correctly concluded that
the requirements of that provision were satisfied. In
the notice of proposed rulemaking, the Acting Re-
* The procedural adequacy of the Administrator’s approval
or disapproval of an implementation plan revision is governed
by the informal rulemaking provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 553, rather than by the procedural
provisions of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 7607
(d). See generally 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 7607(d) (1).
7 The plurality opinion in Industrial Union Department Vv.
American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607 (1980), provides
no support for petitioner here. In that case, the plurality
found that because the Secretary of Labor had misconstrued
his authority to promulgate safety standards under the Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (29 U.S.C. 651
et seq.), he had failed to consider whether existing safety
standards exposed workers to “significant risks” of material
harm before promulgating more stringent standards. Here, as
explained in the text, EPA was plainly aware of its responsi-
bility to consider the potential interstate impact of the re-
visions in the West Virginia implementation plan, considered
those potential consequences, and correctly concluded that the
impact on petitioner was insignificant. See, e.g., C.A. App.
424-427, 443-444, 1450-1453, 1464-1472.
gional Administrator stated that the Administrator’s
decision would be “based on whether the amendments
meet the requirements of section 110(a)(2) of the
Clean Air Act * * *” (44 Fed. Reg. 64440 (1979);
App. A, infra, 4a), which on its face would seem to
include the Section 110(a)(2)(E) (2979) require-
ment that the plan not interfere with the attainment
and maintenance of national ambient air quality
standards or PSD criteria in another state. Moreover,
the notice specifically indicated that modeling had
been done for receptors in Pennsylvania; in this case,
the only conceivable purpose for such modeling would
be to evaluate the West Virginia plan for compliance
with Section 110(a)(2)(E). Further, the agency’s
technical support document devotes four pages to an
analysis of the impacts of the emissions from the
Mitchell and Harrison plants on petitioner’s air qual-
ity, concluding that there would be no violations of
national ambient air quality standards (App. B,
infra, 6a-10a).
In the notice of the final rule, the Administrator
expressly stated that the proposed implementation
plan revision would “attain and maintain the pri-
mary SO. NAAQS and to this extent meets the re-
quirements of Section 110(a).” 45 Fed. Reg. 74479
(1980) ; Pet. App. 28.* He also stated that applicable
® Petitioner’s assertion (Pet. 16) that the Administrator's
findings were limited to Section 110(a)(2)(A) is baseless.
The only specific reference in the finai notice to Section
110(a) (2) (A) appears in the Administrator’s discussion of
why he decided to disapprove the revision because it failed
to assure that the national secondary standard would be met
in West Virginia (Pet. App. 26). Similarly, petitioner’s claim
that the Administrator’s disapproval of the revision because
it failed to demonstrate attainment in West Virginia compelled
him to make a separate finding as to petitioner (Pet. 17) is
frivolous. By disapproving the revision, the Administrator
9
PSD increments would not be violated. Ibid. These
determinations were not qualified and were not
limited geographically; there is no basis for as-
suming either that the Administrator failed to con-
sider Section 110(2) (2) (E) or that the impact of the
revisions on PSD in neighboring states had not been
considered.
Finally, petitioner’s comments 2, 4, 5, and 7 (C.A.
App. 1465-1470) all involved the modeling meth-
odology used by EPA to assess impacts of SO. emis-
sions. These included arguments that EPA should
use a new type of long-range transport modeling in
undertaking its interstate impacts analysis. Peti-
tioner’s position was that EPA should perform its
‘interstate impacts analysis by using long-range mod-
eling developed during the Ohio River Basin Energy
Study (“ORBES”) and analyze SO. emissions for
long-range formation of sulfate particles.° EPA re-
sponded that the ORBES modeling was still in the
research stage and was designed to predict transport
from a large number of sources rather than from a
single source.” Instead, EPA evaluated the potential
impact on petitioner using its ordinary SO. modeling
protected petitioner. When West Virginia resubmits the
amended implementation plan to demonstrate that it cured
the defect found by the Administrator, it will have to make a
new Section 110(a)(2) demonstration, on which petitioner
will have an opportunity to comment.
*The long-range modeling studies petitioner relied upon
(C.A. App. 13-36, 741-912) are in the record; in addition, the
agency reviewed the reports submitted by petitioner (C.A.
App. 445, 458-459)
10 EPA also noted that since there were no national ambient
air quality standards for sulfates, the agency had no authority
to take regulatory action based on sulfate measurements.
10
techniques for attainment and PSD analysis (C.A.
App. 362-363).
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be
denied.
Respectfully submitted.
Rex E. LEE
Solicitor General
CAROL E. DINKINS
Assistant Attorney General
DONALD W. STEVER, JR.
Attorney
ROBERT M. PERRY
General Counsel
Lyp1a N. WEGMAN
Assistant General Counsel
CATHERINE A. COTTER
Attorney
United States Environmental
Protection Agency
APRIL 1982
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