Opposition — West Virginia ex rel. Air Pollution Control Commission v. Gorsuch

Supreme Court brief1982

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F I

No. 81-1524 APR 23 1982

—

In the Supreme Court of the Unite =

OCTOBER TERM, 1981

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, PETITIONER

v.

ANNE M. GorsucH, ADMINISTRATOR,

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES CCURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

Rex E. LEE

Solicitor General

CAROL E. DINKINS

Assistant Attorney General

DONALD W. STEVER, JR.

Attorney

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

(202) 633-2217

ROBERT M. PERRY

General Counsel

LypDIA N. WEGMAN

Assistant General Counsel

CATHERINE A. COTTER

Attorney

United States Environmental

Protection Agency

Washington, D.C. 20460

| Office - Supreme

t

f

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Administrator adequately considered

the potential interstate consequences of his partial

approval of revisions to the West Virginia Clean Air

Act state implementation plan.

(1)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

EE SSE See een Te 1

p REPEL OE aA Ge TO EEE Far Is 1

Statutes involved .... i 2

TSS EEE Sea Aen Te a OCF MR OY LCN 2

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. v. EPA, 572

F.2d 1150, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 ................. 3

Industrial Union Department Vv. American Petro-

leum Institute, 448 U.S. 607 -.......-...-..---.-------+- 7

Portland Cement Association v. Ruckelshaus, 486

| SES eae a serene ee ST 5

Train Vv. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421

US. 60 ....... Fe EN ee Ree ENTE Tree 2,7

Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 ................ 2

Statutes and regulations:

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 553 ......... 7

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 7401 et seq.:

Section 107(a), 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 7407

ID" casinasitatasiinslal tated atinasanindtanunddaieaslaeemin 2

Section 110(a) (2), 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III)

REAR ace nena ee 2,6, 7,9

Section 110(a) (2) (A), 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III)

. | eS aaaenon eee oe 2, 3,8

Section 110(a) (2) (E), 42 U.S.C. (Supp. ITI)

ID Siticcsccccgneceecaecmamiangial 2, 6,7, 8,9

IV

Statutes and regulations—Continued Page

Section 126(a), 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 7426

(a) on

Sections 160-169, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 7470-

EE SS ee

Section 165, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 7475 ........

Section 172, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 7502..........

Section 307(b), 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 7607

(b) 2

Section 307(d), 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 7607

FE 7

Section 307 (d) (1), 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 7607

(d) (1) 7

Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29

U.S.C. 651 et seq. ........... acetone 7

40 C.F.R.:

ELS een 3

EE ee 3

EE a 3

Section 50.7 .. 3

Miscellaneous:

44 Fed. Reg. (1979):

ES 4

tw

wn wo

45 Fed. Reg. (1980) :

p. 74478 ... * EN EERE > LOVES eae 5

Ss 5,8

Ju the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1981

No. 81-1524

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, PETITIONER

v.

ANNE M. GoRSUCH, ADMINISTRATOR,

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORAI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

OPINION BELOW

The judgment order of the court of appeals (Pet.

App. 20-22) is unreported.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered

on September 22, 1981. A timely petition for rehear-

ing was denied on October 28, 1981. A petition for a

writ of certiorari was filed by the State of West

Virginia on January 18, 1982 (No. 81-1361). The

cross-petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on

February 12, 1982. The jurisdiction of this Court

is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

(1)

STATUTES INVOLVED

Sections 110(a)(2), 126(a), and 307(b) of the

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 7410(a) (2),

7426(a), and 7607(b) are set out at Pet. 3-7.

STATEMENT

1. Under the Clean Air Act, the states are en-

couraged to develop programs to assure attainment

and maintenance of primary and secondary national

ambient air quality standards; the Environmental

Protection Agency assures that such programs meet

the relevant requirements of the Act. See Union

Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976); Train

v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60

(1975). While the states have primary responsi-

bility for fashioning plans to meet the federal goals

under Section 107(a), 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 7407

(a), EPA reviews each state plan or revision thereof

to assure that it meets the criteria set forth in Sec-

tion 110(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 7410(a) (2),

and that certain other requirements of the Act are

met. See, e.g., Section 165, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III)

7475.

The basic requirement of the Act is that the plan

provide for attainment and maintenance of the na-

tional primary and secondary ambient air quality

standards. Section 110(a)(2) (A), 42 U.S.C. (Supp.

III) 7410(a)(2)(A). Another important criterion

is that air pollution emissions in one state not pre-

vent attainment and maintenance of national stand-

ards in other states. Section 110(a)(2)(E), 42

U.S.C. (Supp. III) 7410(a) (2) (E).

EPA has established national primary and sec-

ondary ambient air quality standards for sulfur

dioxide (SO.) and also for particulate matter

(TSP). 40 C.F.R. 50.4, 50.5, 50.6, and 50.7. Under

the Act the states must provide for attainment of

the national primary standards by December 31,

1982, and for attainment of the national secondary

standards within a “reasonable time.” Sections 110

(a) (2)(A) and 172, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 7410(a)

(2) (A) and 7502.

2. The computer air quality dispersion model is

the principal means of analysis used to determirie

whether emissions from a single air pollution source

or a group of sources will cause or contribute to a

violation of national ambient air quality standards

or will interfere with the prevention of significant

deterioration (PSD) in a clean air area.’ See C.A.

App. 1461.2 Dispersion models are mathematical

equations used to calculate expected ambient con-

centrations caused by pollution source emissions.

Using actual data, such as a power plant’s fuel char-

acteristics and pertinent meteorological measurements,

the model predicts ambient concentrations of a pol-

lutant for an array of points at various geographic

distances from the plant. See generally Cleveland

Electric Illuminating Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1150,

1160 (Cth Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978).

If the predicted values exceed the standards, the

plant’s emission limit must be made more stringent.

Ibid.

3. On November 9, 1978, the Administrator of

EPA approved, with certain exceptions immaterial

here, a revision of Regulation X of the West Vir-

ginia state implementation plan for sulfur dioxide

1 Requirements respecting clean air areas are set forth in

Sections 160-169 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 7470-7479.

2“C.A. App.” refers to the joint appendix in the court of

appeals.

4

(SO.) emissions. The revision relaxed the emission

limits for several power plants located in West Vir-

ginia, including the Harrison and Mitchell power

plants located within 25 miles (Pet. 10) of the Penn-

sylvania border. The revision permitted the power

plants to burn fuels of a higher sulfur content than

the existing plan provisions permitted. Petitioner

and a citizen group separately sought review of that

action in the Third Circuit; the cases were consoli-

dated as Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. EPA,

Nos. 79-1025, 79-1026. The affected power companies

and the State of West Virginia intervened as re-

spondents. The principal contentions in the consoli-

dated cases involved the adequacy of EPA’s evalua-

tion of the impact of the revisions on air quality in

Pennsylvania and the agency’s PSD analysis (C.A.

App. 1464-1475). Shortly after seeking review in

the court of appeals, petitioner moved to supplement

the administrative record with a series of studies

conducted by EPA on long-range pollutant transport

from the Ohio River basin (i.e., the Ohio River Basin

Energy Study, commonly referred to as “ORBES”’).

At EPA’s request, the court remanded the case for

reconsideration in light of certain defects in the record

concerning the agency’s PSD analysis and in light of

the agency’s failure to explain why certain meteoro-

logical data had not been considered in its dispersion

modeling analysis. On November 7, 1979, EPA again

proposed to approve the revision (44 Fed. Reg.

64439; App. A, infra, la-5ba). The Administrator

noted that modeling had been “performed for re-

ceptors within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania”

and “that emissions from the plants [would] not

prevent attainment of the SO. standards in Penn-

sylvania” (44 Fed. Reg. 64440 (1979); App. A,

infra, 4a).

5

The proposed rule was supported by a “Technical

Analysis” document available to the public as part of

the record, which analyzed interstate SO. impacts.

This analysis indicated that the SO. emissions from

the Harrison and Mitchell plants would have no sig-

nificant impact in Pennsylvania. See C.A. App. 424-

427; App. B, infra, 6a-10a.

On November 10, 1980, EPA issued a final order

approving the West Virginia revisions in part and

disapproving them in part. 45 Fed. Reg. 74478;

Pet. App. 23. Relying on approved modeling

techniques, EPA concluded that emissions from the

Harrison and Mitchell plants would not result in

violations of national primary ambient air quality

standards or PSD requirements. The Administrator

found, however, that emissions from the plants would

result in violations of the secondary standard and

accordingly required the State of West Virginia to

revise its implementation plan to ensure compliance.

45 Fed. Reg. 74479 (1980); Pet. App. 26-27.

The final rule was accompanied by a “Rationale

Document” that discussed the technical issues and

responded to comments submitted by petitioner and

all other interested parties.* C.A. App. 1445-1475.

Eight pages of this document are devoted to respond-

ing to petitioner’s comments (C.A. 1464-1472).* Pe-

titioner criticized EPA’s evaluation of the impact of

8In routine rulemaking cases, EPA commonly sets out its

reasoning in a background or rationale document. See, e.g.,

Portland Cement Association v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375

(D.C. Cir. 1973).

* The reasons that made it inappropriate to use modeling

techniques of the sort used in the Ohio River Basin Study

(“ORBES”) to evaluate the emissions from the Harrison and

Mitchell plants, as petitioner urged, were also discussed. C.A.

App. 1451-1453 ; see also id. at 443-444.

6

the emissions permitted under the revised plan, but

never suggested that EPA had failed to assess inter-

state impacts altogether.

4, Following EPA’s November, 1980 rulemaking,

the Third Circuit established a briefing schedule for

the pending cases. On December 1, 1980, petitioner

filed a new petition in the Third Circuit seeking re-

view of EPA’s November action. No. 80-2722. Pe-

titioner’s principal contentions in the court of appeals

were that (1) EPA had given inadequate considera-

tion to the effects of long-range transport of pollu-

tants into neighboring states; and (2) EPA’s dis-

persion modeling was inadequate.°

The court of appeals rejected petitioner’s argu-

ments and sustained the Administrator’s November,

1980 action (Pet. App. 20-22).

ARGUMENT

Petitioner contends that the Administrator’s partial

approval of the revisions to the West Virginia im-

plementation plan is invalid because the final action

was not accompanied by any explicit statement of

compliance with Section 110(a)(2)(E) of the Act,

42 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 7410(a)(2)(E). According

to petitioner, the absence of explicit findings demon-

strates that EPA has failed to carry out its “duty to

consider the impacts of interstate air pollution under

the Clean Air Act” (Pet. 19). In light of the agency’s

lengthy discussion in the record of interstate im-

pacts, partly in response to petitioner’s comments,

this contention is remarkable.

Section 110(a)(2) of the Clean Air Act sets forth

basic criteria on which EPA’s approval or disap-

5 Petitioner does not appear to raise either of those claims

in this Court.

7

proval of a state implementation plan must rest.

Once a state submits a new or revised implementa-

tion plan to EPA, the Administrator must approve

the plan or the revision unless he finds that it fails

to meet one or more of the Section 110(a)(2) cri-

teria. Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council,

421 U.S. 60, 79 (1975).° There is no requirement

that the Administrator separately explain how he

concluded that each statutory requirement had been

satisfied.” The administrative record in this case

clearly demonstrates (1) that the Administrator con-

sidered the requirements of Section 110(a) (2) (E)

in the course of the West Virginia rulemaking, and

(2) that the Administrator correctly concluded that

the requirements of that provision were satisfied. In

the notice of proposed rulemaking, the Acting Re-

* The procedural adequacy of the Administrator’s approval

or disapproval of an implementation plan revision is governed

by the informal rulemaking provisions of the Administrative

Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 553, rather than by the procedural

provisions of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 7607

(d). See generally 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 7607(d) (1).

7 The plurality opinion in Industrial Union Department Vv.

American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607 (1980), provides

no support for petitioner here. In that case, the plurality

found that because the Secretary of Labor had misconstrued

his authority to promulgate safety standards under the Oc-

cupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (29 U.S.C. 651

et seq.), he had failed to consider whether existing safety

standards exposed workers to “significant risks” of material

harm before promulgating more stringent standards. Here, as

explained in the text, EPA was plainly aware of its responsi-

bility to consider the potential interstate impact of the re-

visions in the West Virginia implementation plan, considered

those potential consequences, and correctly concluded that the

impact on petitioner was insignificant. See, e.g., C.A. App.

424-427, 443-444, 1450-1453, 1464-1472.

gional Administrator stated that the Administrator’s

decision would be “based on whether the amendments

meet the requirements of section 110(a)(2) of the

Clean Air Act * * *” (44 Fed. Reg. 64440 (1979);

App. A, infra, 4a), which on its face would seem to

include the Section 110(a)(2)(E) (2979) require-

ment that the plan not interfere with the attainment

and maintenance of national ambient air quality

standards or PSD criteria in another state. Moreover,

the notice specifically indicated that modeling had

been done for receptors in Pennsylvania; in this case,

the only conceivable purpose for such modeling would

be to evaluate the West Virginia plan for compliance

with Section 110(a)(2)(E). Further, the agency’s

technical support document devotes four pages to an

analysis of the impacts of the emissions from the

Mitchell and Harrison plants on petitioner’s air qual-

ity, concluding that there would be no violations of

national ambient air quality standards (App. B,

infra, 6a-10a).

In the notice of the final rule, the Administrator

expressly stated that the proposed implementation

plan revision would “attain and maintain the pri-

mary SO. NAAQS and to this extent meets the re-

quirements of Section 110(a).” 45 Fed. Reg. 74479

(1980) ; Pet. App. 28.* He also stated that applicable

® Petitioner’s assertion (Pet. 16) that the Administrator's

findings were limited to Section 110(a)(2)(A) is baseless.

The only specific reference in the finai notice to Section

110(a) (2) (A) appears in the Administrator’s discussion of

why he decided to disapprove the revision because it failed

to assure that the national secondary standard would be met

in West Virginia (Pet. App. 26). Similarly, petitioner’s claim

that the Administrator’s disapproval of the revision because

it failed to demonstrate attainment in West Virginia compelled

him to make a separate finding as to petitioner (Pet. 17) is

frivolous. By disapproving the revision, the Administrator

9

PSD increments would not be violated. Ibid. These

determinations were not qualified and were not

limited geographically; there is no basis for as-

suming either that the Administrator failed to con-

sider Section 110(2) (2) (E) or that the impact of the

revisions on PSD in neighboring states had not been

considered.

Finally, petitioner’s comments 2, 4, 5, and 7 (C.A.

App. 1465-1470) all involved the modeling meth-

odology used by EPA to assess impacts of SO. emis-

sions. These included arguments that EPA should

use a new type of long-range transport modeling in

undertaking its interstate impacts analysis. Peti-

tioner’s position was that EPA should perform its

‘interstate impacts analysis by using long-range mod-

eling developed during the Ohio River Basin Energy

Study (“ORBES”) and analyze SO. emissions for

long-range formation of sulfate particles.° EPA re-

sponded that the ORBES modeling was still in the

research stage and was designed to predict transport

from a large number of sources rather than from a

single source.” Instead, EPA evaluated the potential

impact on petitioner using its ordinary SO. modeling

protected petitioner. When West Virginia resubmits the

amended implementation plan to demonstrate that it cured

the defect found by the Administrator, it will have to make a

new Section 110(a)(2) demonstration, on which petitioner

will have an opportunity to comment.

*The long-range modeling studies petitioner relied upon

(C.A. App. 13-36, 741-912) are in the record; in addition, the

agency reviewed the reports submitted by petitioner (C.A.

App. 445, 458-459)

10 EPA also noted that since there were no national ambient

air quality standards for sulfates, the agency had no authority

to take regulatory action based on sulfate measurements.

10

techniques for attainment and PSD analysis (C.A.

App. 362-363).

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be

denied.

Respectfully submitted.

Rex E. LEE

Solicitor General

CAROL E. DINKINS

Assistant Attorney General

DONALD W. STEVER, JR.

Attorney

ROBERT M. PERRY

General Counsel

Lyp1a N. WEGMAN

Assistant General Counsel

CATHERINE A. COTTER

Attorney

United States Environmental

Protection Agency

APRIL 1982

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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