Petition — ALABAMA v. JOHN R. R. DANIELS (No. 81-1397)

81-1397 riren |

JAN 25 1982

NO. eenieeees MEBEXANDER —

CLERK

—

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1981

STATE OF ALABAMA,

PETITIONER

V.

JOHN RONALD DANIELS,

RESPONDENT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

SUPREME COURT AND COURT OF CRIMINAL

APPEALS OF ALABAMA

CHARLES A. GRADDICK

ALABAMA ATTORNEY GENERAL

EDWARD E. CARNES

ASSISTANT ALABAMA ATTORNEY

GENERAL

HELEN P. NELSON

ASSISTANT ALABAMA ATTORNEY

GENERAL

COUNSEL OF RECORD

250 Administrative Building

64 North Union Street

Montgomery, Alabama 36130

(205) 834-5150

COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

Does Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625

(1980), require the reversal of all

Alabama pre-Beck capital convictions

including those in which there was ab-

solutely no evidentiary basis for a

lesser included offense instruction?

PARTIES

The caption contains the names of

all parties to the proceedings in the

courts below.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

QUESTION PRESENTED.....eeeeeeeeeee 1

PRE Bie ccc eee becereoeceeee|ccoeees i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES... .-ceeeeeees

OPINIONS BELOW. eoeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee

JURISDICTION. eoeeeee eee eeveeeeevneeeeeane

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Bees 6 oe recdéocococcoceseee

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

4 Ry, : Serr er ee ee

STATEMENT 9F THE CASE......

THE FACTS CONCERNING

THE CRiMmc ccescccccccccccecese

THE STATE TRIAL AND

APPELLATE COURT

PROCEEDINGS eseeeeeeeeeeeeveeeeneee

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT. eeeeeeeneeeeveene

;\ -\| 4 | errr Tree eTTeriT

I.

THE DECISION IN BECK

V. ALABAMA, 447 U.S.

, DOES NOT

MANDATE THE AUTO-

MATIC REVERSAL OF ALL

PRE-BECK CAPITAL CON-

VICTIONS. (REASON

FOR GRANTING THE

WRIT - CONFLICT WITH

BECK V. ALABAMA, 447

iv

1

2

11

1

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONT. 'D)

PAGE

II. REVERSING THIS CASE

FOR A NEW TRIAL

CREATES THE UNCON-

STITUTIONAL RISK OF

AN ARBITRARY AND

CAPRICIOUS VERDICT.

(REASON FOR GRANT-

ING THE WRIT -

CONFLICT WITH FUR-

MAN V. GEORGIA, 408

eS. ) AND

ROBERTS V. LOUIS-

. . 5

[ 1 9 7 6) ) eeeneeeaeeeeeeeeeee 1 7

CONCLUS ION. eeeseeoeeeeeeveeeeeeeeeeenene 23

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE. eeeeeeeeeee 25

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES PAGE

Beck v. Ata ame

65 L. Ed. 2d

392, 100 S. Ct.

2382, (1980),

on remand,

Ala., 396 So.

2d 645 (1981) ccccccccccccccccell

Beck v. State,

Ala., 396 So.

2d 645 (1980) -ccccccccccccccceal

Berra v. United States,

i ene

Bracewell v. State,

Ala., ~ So.

Bracewell v. State,

Ae, O-

2d 130 (1981) -cccccccccccccceed

Britton v. Evans,

cpcebs seeeebeoeeseere

Chavers v. State,

Ala., 361 So.

2d 1106 (1978) ccccccccccccceeelO

Daniels v. State,

Ala. Cr. App.,

he. ae

CTF8B1 ) ccccccccccccccccccccceeed

Daniels v. State,

‘Ala., So.

2d (CT 9B1) eee cece cree e eee eB

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT. 'D)

CASES PAGE

Fulghum v. State,

291 Ala. 71

277 So. 2d 776

C1IDTS) ccccccccccccccccccccccceal

Furman v. Georgra

33 L. Ed. 2d

346, 92 S. Ct.

2726 C1DTZ) ccccccccccccceccceelh™

Golston v. State,

~ 57 Ala. App.

623, 330 So. 2d

446 C1975) ccccccccccccccccceccsl

Gregg v. peorRet,

49 L. Ed. 2d.

859, 96 S. Ct.

2909 C1976) cccccccccvccccccccel®

Harvest v. State,

Ala. Cr. App.,

342 So. 2d 1369

CIDTT) ccccccccccccccccccccccceal

Hopper v. Evans, :

. > o . 3954 cece acdeeseoete

Keeble v. United States,

th es: Sa a

Pate v. State,

Ala., So.

24d Ss (May 8,

FORT Fads bb ce ccccctcccesccesseene

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT. 'D)

CASES PAGE

Ritter v. State,

Ala., So.

2d (Dec.

50, VEO esd Chetctccccceseces 12

Roberts v. Louisiana,

49 L. Ed. 2d.

974, 96 S. Ct.

3001 C1976) cccccccccccccecees 17

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

United States Constitution,

Fourteenth Amendment.......+. 2

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Code of Alabama 1975,

tle a -11-1 -

13-11-9 (formerly 1975

Alabama Acts, No. 213)....++- 2

United States Code,

tle , ) 2

NO.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1982

STATE OF ALABAMA,

PETITIONER

V.

JOHN RONALD DANIELS,

RESPONDENT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

SUPREME COURT AND COURT OF CRIMINAL

APPEALS OF ALABAMA

BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

‘OPINIONS BELOW

1. The opinion of the Court of

Criminal Appeals of Alabama, not as yet

reported, appears in Appendix A.

2. The opinion of the Supreme

Court of Alabama, not as yet reported,

appears in Appendix B.

JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of this Court is

based on 28 U.S.C. § 1257. The order

of the Supreme Court of Alabama denying

certiorari was issued December 11,

1981, and this petition is filed within

sixty (60) days of said date.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Fourteenth Amendment to _ the

United States Constitution, which pro-

vides:

"..-nor shall any State de-

prive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without

due process of law..."

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

1975 Alabama Acts, No. 213, codi-

fied as Code of Alabama 1975, Title 13,

$§ 13-11-1 through 13-11-9, the same

being voluminous is reproduced in Ap-

pendix C.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

THE FACTS CONCERNING THE CRIME

Between 5:00 and 6:30 p.m. on

January 2, 1977, near the Theodore-

Dawes Exit on Interstate 10 in Mobile

County, nineteen-year-old Ricky Brune

and fifteen-year-old Cheryl Moore were

found dead. (R. pp. 286-287) Their

deaths resulted from multiple gunshot

wounds in the back from a_ .38 caliber

pistol and a sixteen-gauge shotgun.

(R. pp. 382-389) The time of death was

fixed at between 4:15 and 6:15. (R. p.

380) The fatal shots were fired from

inside the car from the rear seat. (R.

p- 398) At around 5:00 p.m., an unoc-

cupied Ford had been spotted parked at

the exit with the motor running. (R.

pp. 289-291)

Daniels and his partner, Philip

Wayne Tomlin, had arrived in Mobile

from Houston, Texas, at Randy and Danny

Shanks’ trailer the night before be-

tween 11:30 and 12:00 p.m. The Shanks

were Tomlin's brothers-in-law. Tomlin

introduced Daniels and told the Shanks

“they had to come to Mobile to kill the

guy that killed his brother." (R. pp.

418-422, 504) Tomlin's brother had been

killed on November 25, 1975, as a re-

sult of an accidental shotgun discharge

which involved Ricky Brune. (R. pp.

294-296)

Randy Shanks rented a room at the

Eight Days Inn for Daniels and Tomlin.

(R. p. 422) Daniels and Tomlin showed

the Shanks a .38 caliber pistol and .44

caliber pistol and a disassembled gun.

(R. p. 423) Tomlin asked Danny Shanks

if he would take them te New Orleans

the next day in his car. (R. pp. 442,

504) Shanks told him no. (R. pp. 443,

504) Tomlin was driving his sister's

1968 Ford. (R. pp. 440, 513) Daniels

and Tomlin had flown from Houston to

New Orleans and Tomlin's father picked

them up there and brought them to

Mobile.

Tomlin's sister's 1968 Ford was

found abandoned at the New Orleans

International Airport on January 30,

1977. (R. p. 601) Inside the automo-

bile was found a parking lot ticket

from an automatic dispenser at the air-

port parking lot. According to the

ticket the automobile had entered the

parking lot on January 2, 1977 at 8:08

p.m. The driving time from Mobile

to the New Orleans International Air-

port is two and a half hours. (R. p.

600)

Eastern Airlines flight 569 from

New Orleans to Houston departed at 9:40

p-m. on January 2, 1977. (R. p. 343)

At the time of his arrest in Houston,

Texas, Daniels had a suitcase attached

to which was a baggage check which in-

dicated that the suitcase had been

checked on Eastern Airlines’ Flight

569, New Orleans to Houston. Inside

the suitcase were three 16 gauge shot-

gun shells. (R. pp. 574-575)

Melvin Tuberville knew Daniels

from cell 308 in the county jail. He

testified about a conversation with

Daniels about his case, wherein Daniels

said that “him and Tomlin had killed

this boy and girl ««t on _ the inter-

state...at Theodore Dawes Road." (R.

p- 305)

The defense was alibi. Daniels

denied that he was in Mobile, Alabama,

on January 1-2, 1977. (R. pp. 685-

687)

THE STATE TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURT

PROCEEDINGS

The Respondent, John Ronald

Daniels, was indicted by the Grand Jury

of Mobile County, Alabama, for capital

murder in April of § 41978. His

plea was one of not guilty. (R. pp.

1-3) The Respondent was convicted and

sentenced to death. (R. p. 39 and pp.

70-73)

Appeal was taken to. the Alabama

Court of Criminal Appeals wherein the

Respondent raised the issue of the pre-

clusion clause. The issue of the pre-

clusion of consideration of lesser in-

cluded offenses had also been raised in

the trial court by way of a Motion to

Quash Due To Unconstitutionality of Act

Number 213. (R. pp. 4-8) On August 4,

1981, the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals issued the following order:

"The judgment of the convic-

tion is reversed and the

cause remanded for a new

trial on authority of Beck v.

Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 100

S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392

(1980), on remand, Ala., 396

So. 2d 645 (1981), and Ritter

Ve State, Ala.S.C. No. 77-798

(Ms. May 8, 1981), Ala.Cr.

App., 1 Div. 837 (Ms. June

23, 1981), July 7, 1981, Mo-

tion for State of Mandate

Denied by Ala.S.C.

REVERSED AND REMANDED."

(Daniels v. State, Ala. Cr. App.-, __

So. 2d __—ss—s« (1981) [Appendix A])

The State of Alabama presented the

question raised herein to the Supreme

Court of Alabama by a netition for writ

of certiorari which on December 11,

1981, issued the following order:

"Petition for Writ of Certio-

rari denied. No opinion."

(Daniels v. State, Ala.,

So. 2d (1981) [Appendix

B)) pica

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625

(1980), held that it was unconstitu-

tional to prevent a capital jury from

considering a lesser included offense

verdict which is supported by the evi-

dence at trial. In Beck there was evi-

dence to support lesser offense in-

structions which would have been given

had it not been for the preclusion

clause. In the instant case, however,

there was no evidentiary basis for les-

ser offense instructions. The jury

would not have received any lesser

offense instruction even if the pre-

clusion clause had not existed.

The Court of Criminal Appeals and

the Supreme Court of Alabama have held

in this case and others that all pre-

Beck cases must be retried regardless

of the impact of the preclusion clause

struck down in Beck. See Ritter v.

State, Ala., 403 So. 2d 154 (1981) and

CAle., ._.. Se. 26... (Dec. 1, 198%)

and Bracewell v. State, Ala., __ So.

2d ss (June 19, 1981) (unreported) and

Ala., 401 So. 2d 130 (1981). The in-

terpretation of the Beck decision by

the Alabama appellate courts is incor-

rect in that this Honorable Court's de-

10

cision in Beck does not mandate retrial

in every case without regard to _ the

evidence. On June 22, 1981, this

Honorable Court granted certiorari in

Hooper v. Evans, 80-1714, to decide

whether the Beck decision requires re-

versals of all pre-Beck capital con-

victions including those for which

there was no evidentiary basis for

lesser offense instructions. Britton

v. Evans, 49 LW 3954.

Remanding this case for a new

trial creates the risk of an arbitrary

and capricious verdict such as was con-

demmned in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.

238, 33 L. Ed. 2d 346, 92 S. Ct. 2726

[1972] and Roberts v. Louisiana,428

U.S. 325, 49 L. Ed. 2d 974, 96 S.Ct.

3001 (1976). This risk is unnecessary

because there is a procedure, remand-

ment, by which Respondent's rights can

be fully protected without unconstitu-

tional risk. Pate v. State, Ala.,

So. 2d __ ‘May 8, 1981).

11

ARGUMENT

I.

THE DECISION IN’ BECK V.

ALABAMA 447 U.S. 625 (1980),

DOES NOT MANDATE THE AUTOMA-

TIC REVERSAL OF ALL PRE-BECK

CAPITAL CONVICTIONS. (REASON

FOR GRANTING THE WRIT -

CONFLICT WITH BECK V.

ALABAMA, 447 U.S. 625 [T980])

In Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625,

(1980), this Court held that it was un-

constitutional to impose a_ sentence of

death on a defendant when the evidence

at his trial would have supported a

lesser included wnon-capital offense

verdict which the jury was not permit-

ted to consider. In the Beck case,

there was evidence to support a lesser

offense instruction and the jury which

convicted Beck would have received such

an instruction if the statutory preclu-

sion clause had not operated to prevent

it. This Court carefully limited its

grant of certiorari as is clear from

the language in the first paragraph of

12

the opinion wherein this Honorable

Court expressed the limitation as fol-

lows:

"We granted certiorari to de-

cide the following question:

""May a sentence of death

constitutionally be imposed

after a jury verdict of guilt

of a capital offense, when

the jury was not permitted to

consider a verdict of guilt

of a lesser included non-

capital offense, and when the

evidence would have supported

— a verdict?’ 444 U.S.

"We now hold that the death

penalty may not be _ imposed

under these circumstances."

447 U.S. at 627

The Beck rule has been applied in

Ritter v. State, Ala., 403 So. 2d 154

(1981), a case in which there is no

evidence of lesser included offenses.

In Ritter the Alabama Supreme Court re-

versed, on authority of Beck, the con-

viction of a defendant who had pleaded

guilty to the capital offense, who had

in fact admitted his guilt and demanded

13

the death penalty. The Court wrote, in

denying rehearing in Ritter:

"We believe this result is

compelled by the decision of

the Supreme Court of the

United States in Beck and is

consistent with the interpre-

tation of that decision

reached by the Court of

Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

in Evans v. Britton, 639 F.

2d 221 (March 19, 1981) (Pen-

ding on certiorari in this

Honorable Court), which in-

volved Ritter's partner in

this crime."

A pattern was established for all

pre-Beck cases by the decision in

Ritter. This Honorable Court's deci-

sion in Beck was interpreted as requir-

ing automatic retrials.

On December 11, 1981, the

Alabama Supreme Court wrote:

"The United States Supreme

Court has remanded this case

to this Court for further

consideration in light of

Reed v. State, Ala., ([MS.

June 12, T98T] So. 2d

(1981), extended on rehearing

(August 28, 1981), motion for

clarification denied (October

7, 1981).

14

"On June 12, 1981, this Court

extended its initial opinion

in the present case to ex-

plain that our reversal and

remand was compelled by the

decision of the United States

Supreme Court in Beck vy.

Alabama, [447] U.S. é

TOO S. Ct. 2382, 65 L. Ed. 2d

392 (1980), and Beck v.

State, Ala., 396 So.

), and was "consistent

with the interpretation of

that decision" reached by the

Fifth a rh) in Evans v.

Britton, F. 2d [22T]

[March 19, 1981] (1981). We

adopt our previous opinion

and now unequivocally hold

that our previous opinion in

this case was based upon fed-

eral constitutional grounds,

not state law grounds. More-

over, our opinion in Reed v.

State, supra, rather than

altering our previous deci-

sion in this case explained

further why we felt compelled

by federal constitutional

considerations to reverse the

conviction in this case."

(Ritter v. State [S.: Ce.

Ala., Dec. TT, 1981} Ds *

2d)

The issue, therefore, is whether

thie Honorable Court's decision in Beck

mandates retrial in every case without

regard to the evidence. The Petitioner

15

respectfully submits that automatic re-

trial is not so mandated.

There was no evidence at Respon-

dent's trial to support any lesser in-

cluded offense instruction. The evi-

dence presented two choices for the

jury. Either the Respondent partici-

pated in the killing of the two victims

in Mobile, Alabama, or the Respondent

was in Texas. Consequently, the pre-

clusion clause had no impact on this

case.

The Alabama statute, before the

severance of the preclusion clause, re-

quired that juries choose between guilt

of the capital offense or acquittal,

even if the evidence suggested a middle

verdict. Had the preclusion clause

never existed, however, this case would

still have presented the Respondent's

jury with the same two choices. The

possibility of a verdict of guilty of a

16

lesser included offense was precluded

by the evidence. The Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals and the Supreme Court

of Alabama have decided this issue in a

manner in conflict with this Honorable

Court's opinion in Beck. Petitioner

submits that this Honorable Court did

not mandate automatic reversal for

cases which could not have been affect-

ed in any way by the preclusion clause.

Certiorari was granted by this

Honorable Court on June 22, 1981, to

decide among other issues, whether the

Beck decision mandates the reversal of

all pre-Beck capital convictions in-

cluding those for which there was no

lesser included offense predicate.

Hopper v. Evans, 80-1714, sub. nom.

Britton v. Evans, 49 LW 3954.

17

Il.

REVERSING THIS CASE FOR A NEW

TRIAL CREATES THE UNCONSTITU-

TIONAL RISK OF AN ARBITRARY

AND CAPRICIOUS VERDICT.

(REASON FOR GRANTING THE

WRIT - CONFLICT WITH FURMAN

V. GEORGIA, 408 U.S. 238

(1972) ~~ ~6AND ROBERTS iV«

LOUISIANA, 428 U.S.

TI976J)

Reversing cases like the instant

case on authority of Beck creates the

possibility that on retrial the jury

will be permitted to consider lesser

included offenses even if the evidence

is a carbon copy of that presented at

the first trial. This creates’ the

possibility of arbitrary and capricious

verdicts contrary to the evidence.

Procedures which needlessly create such

possibilities were condemned in Furman

v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 33 L. Ed. 2d

346, 92 S. Ct. 2726 (1972) and again in

Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 49

L. Ed. 2d 974, 96 S. Ct. 3001 (1976).

In the instant case the conclusive

and uncontradicted evidence was that

18

the crime was capital murder. The jury

may well have believed Respondent's

alibi and acquitted him, but they could

not have convicted him under the evi-

dence of anything other than that of a

capital crime. Furthermore, Daniels

has never proven, or even alleged, that

his failure to present lesser offense

evidence was caused by the existence of

the preclusion clause. He was not pre-

vented from presenting lesser offense

evidence and putting forth the defense

that he was due to be acquitted of the

capital charge because he was guilty of

only a lesser offense. Daniels was

not, therefore, harmed or prejudiced in

any way by the existence of the pre-

clusion clause; his due process rights

were not violated. Consequently, his

conviction should not be set aside.

No defendant has the right to jury

instructions on lesser included

19

offenses where there is no evidence

which supports such lesser included of-

fenses. What is given to a defendant

in a capital case by the Constitution

is the right to jury instructions on

those lesser included offenses for

which the evidence would support a ver-

dict. Beck v. Alabama, supra; Gregg

v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,160-163, 215-

216 49 L. Ed. 2d 859, 96 S. Ct. 2909

(1976).

The language of the Court itself

in Beck shows that the holding in that

case was limited to those cases where

there was a basis in the evidence for

instructions on lesser included of-

fenses. In addition, the precedents

relied on for so limiting the Court's

ruling also require that some eviden-

tiary predicate exist before a lesser

included offense jury instruction must

be given. E.g-, Keeble _v. United

States, 412 U.S. 205, 208 (1973); Berra

20

v. United States, 351 U.S. 131, 134

(1956).

The test used in Alabama for de-

termining if a defendant is due jury

instructions on lesser included of-

fenses is whether “there is any reason-

able theory from the evidence which

would support the position.” Fulghum

v. State, 291 Ala. 71, 277 So. 2d 776,

890 (1973), Accord, Chavers v. State,

Ala., 361 So. 2d 1106 (1978). It fol-

lows that a defendant is not entitled

to jury instructions on lesser included

offenses where there is no evidence to

support a conviction for such an of-

fense. E.g., Fulghum, supra, Harvest

v. State, Ala. Cr. App., 342 So. 2d

1369, (1977); Golston v. State, 57 Ala.

App. 623, 330 So. 2d 446 (1975)

It is this test, whether there is

any reasonable theory from the evidence

to support a lesser included offense

21

instruction, which must first be ap-

plied to the facts in the instant case

before a remand for retrial is ordered.

The fact that the instant case is a

capital case does not make this test

inapplicable as the Alabama Supreme

Court in Beck v. State, Ala. 396 So.

2d 645, 657 (1981) (on remand), held

that:

"Absent the 14 words which

constitute the preclusion

clause, the long established

Alabama statutory and common

law rule will apply so that

juries in capital cases will

be instructed on any lesser

included offenses supported

by the evidence...."

Nothing in the Constitution re-

quires that a court in a capital case

charge the jury on lesser included

offenses when there is no evidence to

support a conviction for such an of-

fense.

There is available an alternative

procedure which avoids the risk of ar-

bitrary and capricious verdicts while

22

guaranteeing the accused full protec-

tion from even any theoretical adverse

effects of the preclusion clause.

The alternative to an automatic

new trial is a hearing in the trial

court on the issue of the effect of the

preclusion clause on the original

trial. There is recent precedent for

such a hearing in the alternative to @

new trial. In Pate v. State, Ala.,

So. 2d (May 8, 1981), the Alabama

Supreme Court found that the trial

court erred in not reviewing pre-trial

witness statements but did not order a

new trial unless it appeared that the

error had affected the original trial.

In Pate the cause was remanded to the

trial court for such determination.

Since this remandment procedure is

available, it should, under the deci-

sions of this Honorable Court, be pur-

sued rather than the automatic granting

of a new trial.

23

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the Petitioner, the

State of Alabama, respectfully submits

that the decisions and opinions of the

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals and

the Supreme Court of Alabama in this

case present conflicts with the prior

decisions and opinions of this Honor-

able Court. For this reason, the Peti-

tioner prays that this Honorable Court

will issue the writ of certiorari and

review the decisions and opinions of

the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

and the Supreme Court of Alabama and

upon such review will reverse the deci-

sions of said Courts granting a new

trial to the Respondent.

Respectfully submitted,

CHARLES A ceo

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ALABAMA

f dusted é. Casts

ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL

OF ALABAMA

24

Asm ?: Wshs ou

ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL OF

ALABAMA

COUNSEL OF RECORD

25

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Helen P. Nelson, an Assistant

Attorney General anda member of the

Bar of the Supreme Court of the United

States and one of the Attorneys for the

State of Alabama, Petitioner, do hereby

certify that oon this 21 day of

January, 1982, I did serve the requi-

site number of copies of the foregoing

on the Attorneys for John Ronald

Daniels, Respondent, by mailing same to

them, first class postage prepaid and

addressed as follows:

lonorable Thomas M. Haas

255 St. Francis Street

Mobile, Alabama 36602

‘Honorable James M. Byrd

255 St. Francis Street

Mobile, Alabama 36602

qu +p Utdsou

ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL

ADDRESS OF COUNSEL:

Office of the Attorney General

250 Administrative Building

64 N. Union Street

Montgomery, Alabama 36130