Record and brief — Goldstein v. Garrity

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whe; IN THE ALEXANDER L. STEVAS.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED stares CUERK

HOSPITAL AND INSTITUTIONAL

BUILDERS CO.

PHILIP GOLOSTEIN, NEW YORK CITY

DEPARTMENT OF BUILDINGS and NEW YORK

CITY BOARD OF STANDARDS AND APPEALS,

Petitioners,

Vv.

JAMES L. GARRITY, Trustee of Debtor,

Respondent.

ALLEN G. SCHWARTZ

Corporation Counsel of

the City of New York

Attorney for Petitioners

100 Church Street

New York, N.Y. 10007

(212) 566-4337

(212) 566-4159

LEONARD KOERNER,

' JUDAH DICK,

JOSEPH I. LAUER,

MARVIN B. MITZNER,

of Counsel

l. Whether a bankruptcy court has

subject matter jurisdiction to enjoin

enforcement of police and regulatory powers of a

governmental agency on any grounds?

2. Whether the automatic stay of

Bankruptcy Rule 12-43 applies to bar enforcement

of police and regulatory powers? .

3. Whether a certificate of

occupancy is "property" of the debtor within the

constructive custody of the bankruptcy court?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Jurisdictional Statement........ssseeees

Statement of the Case.....csscccsecesees

Reasons for Granting the Writ...........

APPENDIX A.

Opinion of the Court of Appeals.........

APPENDIX 8.

Opinion of the District Court...........

APPENDIX C.

Opinion of the Bankruptcy Court.........

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES

Pages

zn ae mt Madison Industries Inrc.,

. Ir. eeeneeeeaeeaeaeaee 32

Gills v. California, 293 U.S. 62

eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 32

Palmer v. Massachusetts,

35 U.S. 79 vg 28-29

Smith v. New York State Liquor

>. I. pyle es 16

State of Missouri v. United States

T. ; U.S. Sup. Ct. October

Term, Docket No. Eereaeedccaocdsocococee 24-27

State of Ohio v. Mansfield Tire and

eee

Sn 27

STATUTES AND RULES

P.L. 95-S9B, SOC. 4038)... .cccccccccces 20

Ps Beiekbascbdeccccccctcccccccce | =6M

ER, eR kictddccccccccpsescicccce 5

es SONMalcicacehascccessccopecee 27

Bankruptcy Act Of 1898......ccccececccees 9,

Bankruptcy Code, Sec. SE2ecccccccccces 13, 16

Bankruptcy Rule DEiinbusecoéécode 9, 15,18

New York City Zoning Resolution.... 8, 21-22

New York City Pe Pevcdeacccceosee 1,11,14

TREATISES

3 Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and

PRUs cd ctdccccocsuccocccececcee 9, 31

* * &

STATEMENT

Tne petitioners, Philip Goldstein

(the Borough Superintendent of Staten Island of

the New York City Department of Buildings), the

New York City Department of Buildings, and the

New York City Board of Standards and Appeals,*

* The New York City Board of Standards and

Appeals (BSA) is a local quasi-judicial tribunal

with jurisdiction, inter alia, to determine

whether the zoning regulations have oeen

violated and is authorized to revoke a

certificate of occupancy if it finds that a

building cannot legally be used for the purpose

set forth in the certificate (N.Y. City Charter

Sec. 645(b)(3)(e)). BSA has yet to consider any

of the zoning issues mentioned herein by reason

of tne injunction.

seek a writ of certiorari to review an order of

the United States Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit entered on August 17, 1981; no

motion for rehearing was filed.

The Second Circuit, by a divided

panel, reversed an order of the United States

District Court that dissolved a Bankruptcy Court

injunction barring the Department of Buildings

from proceeding with its application before the

Board of Standards and Appeals to revoke a

Certificate of Occupancy for use of a facility

owned by the Debtor as a nursing home. The

Second Circuit held that the Gankruptcy Court

had jurisdiction to enjoin the City from

enforcing its zoning laws, but that = such

jurisdiction should be exercised only if a

finding of “bad faith" enforcement is made by

the court, and remanded the case to the District

Court to determine the issue of bad faith.

Pending such determination, petitioners have

been enjoined from enforcing applicable laws.

The opinion of the Circuit Court below conflicts

with this Court's rationale in Palmer v.

Massachusetts, 308 U.S. 79 (1939), and with

decisions of the Third, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth

and Ninth Circuits.*

*See cases cited on pages 26-27, 32 infra.

OPINIONS BELOW

On August 17, 1981, the United States

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit filed an

order and opinion (as yet unreported) reversing

the order of United States District Judge LEVAL

which reversed an injunction order issued oy

Bankruptcy Judge GALGAY, permanently enjoining

tne City from taking any action to revoke a

certificate of occupancy issued in 1973 to use a

certain facility owned by the Debtor as a

nursing home.

Tne Circuit Court's Opinion was

published at 658 F.2d. 39 and is reproduced at

Appendix A. The Opinion of tne District Court

was publisned in 9 8.R. (West's) 948, and is

reproduced at Appendix 8. Tne Opinion of the

Bankruptcy Court is reproduced at Appendix C.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

The judgment of the Court of Appeals

was entered on August 17, 1981. Title 28 U.S.C.

§1254(1) authorizes this Court to review cases

in the courts of appeal "by a writ of certiorari

upon the petition of any party to any civil or

criminal case, before or after rendition of

judgment or decree."

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

(1)

Debtor's sole assef is a parcel of

Teal property located at 1000 Targee Street,

Staten Island, New York, which is improved poy a

structure built to be used as a nursing home.

Tne home was built by an affiliated predecessor

in title from 1969 to 1973, pursuant to approval

of State and City health authorities.

Construction of a nursing home at that time did

mot require a variance or special permit under

the then-existing zoning laws of the City of New

York.

Upon completion of construction in

1973, a final Certificate of Occupancy (C.0.)

was issued by the City Department of Buildings,

which certificate evidenced that the building

met building code requirements and that the use

thereof as a nursing home was legal at the time.

The nursing home was never opened because the

New York State Public Health Council declined to

give the home “establishment approval" due to an

excess of nursing homes in Staten Island.

In early 1974, the City amended its

Zoning Resolution to prohibit construction of

nursing nomes in certain designated residential

areas, including the area of Staten Island in

which 1000 Targee Street is located, without

first obtaining a Special Permit from the City

Planning Commission. Special Permits are not

granted as a matter of right, but may be granted

only if the proposed development meets certain

stated standards. The permit may also be

conditioned upon provision of appropriate

safeguards, such as off-street parking and

Telated improvements, which the City Planning

Commission finds will minimize the adverse impact

of the development on tne character of the

surrounding area.

Under the Zoning Resolution, an

amendment barring use of a facility already in

existence renders such facility a nonconforming

use, which use may nevertheless legally continue

to operate for so long as the structure exists

and the use is uninterrupted. If, however, a

legal nonconforming use is discontinued for two

years or more, it is deemed abandoned and may no

longer be lawfully used for such nonconforming

purpose, irrespective of the existence of a

valid C.0. (See, Zoning Resolution, §§ 12-10,

52-61, pp. 21-22 infra.)

It is undisputed that from 1974, when

the use of the premises as a nursing home became

nonconforming, until 1980, the premises were not

used for any purpose. In the view of petitioners

Goldstein and Department of Buildings, this

nonuse for a period of six (6) years constituted

an abandonment of the nonconforming use by

operation of law.*

In 1975, debtor had acquired title to

the property. In June 1977, the mortgagee

commenced foreclosure on its mortgage and

entered a judgment of foreclosure. Just before

the date scheduled for the sale, the deptor

filed a petition for a real property arrangement

under Chapter XII of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 USC

§§601-926, obtaining an automatic stay of

foreclosure by virtue of Bankruptcy Rule 12-43.

ve Telief against the violation of a

ordinance may be ae oe oe 3a

ty against an

cee wy gage of the - Ae a C. 0.

Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning,

55<22.

In March 1978, the trustee obtained

the agreement of the State Department of Health

that establishment approval for a nursing home

may be granted to a religious group which can

demonstrate a need for a nursing home for its

adnerents. The Trustee then entered into a

contract to sell the facility to Beth Rifka, a

Hassidic Jewish organization, conditioned upon

Beth Rifka's ability to obtain all necessary

licenses and certificates. Beth Rifka obtained

such approval in September 1980, and commenced

operations in March 1981, during the pendency of

this litigation.

Prior to April 1980, community groups

opposed to the nursing home called the attention

of petitioner Goldstein to a possible violation

of zoning regulations by use of the facility as

a nursing home based upon the abandorment of the

facility by two years of non-use. Goldstein,

after consultation witn his superiors in the New

York City Department of Buildings, agreed with

this view and, in April 1980, commenced

proceedings before the New York City Board of

Standards and Appeals (BSA) to revoke the C.O.

Under the New York City Charter, §645(b)(3)(e),

a C.0. is presumptively valid until revoked by

tne BSA or by a court of competent

jurisdiction. As will oe discussed below, the

BSA proceedings sere interrupted by the

injunction order issued by the bankruptcy judge.

(2)

In granting injunctive relief,

Bankruptcy Judge Galgay* held that the

petitioners violated the automatic stay oy

commencing ‘evocation proceedings without leave

of his court, but, treating the City's papers as

a motion to vacate the automatic stay, denied

such relief because the City had not shown any

legitimate need to enforce its zoning

regulations in the instant case. He gave great

weight to the State's finding that there was a

need for a rmursing home for tne Hassidic

community. Although Judge Galgay did not make

any specific findings of “bad faith", he did

find that the City official's revocation efforts

were belated and initiated in response to

pressure by community groups. He concluded that

*” A copy of Als opinion is contained in

Appendix C.

12

under §411 of the Bankruptcy Act, he could

permanently enjoin revocation of the C.0. even

after transfer of title to Betn Rifka.

The City appealed to the District

Court. On appeal, Judge Leval reversed the

order of Judge Galgay on the ground that

_- enforcement of police powers such as zoning is

" qutside the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy

Court, citing Sec. 362 of the 1978 Bankruptcy

Code in support of his conclusion.*

Furthermore, he noted the tendency of bankruptcy

courts to put a higher premium on rehabilitation

of debtors than on uniform enforcement of

Tegulatory powers of the State which may

endanger the success of the reorganization and

doubted whether such courts were the appropriate

neutral forum to decide these issues.

¥" A Copy of his opinion is contained in

Appendix 8.

13

The Trustee appealed to the Second Circuit

and tnat court reversed Judge Leval and remanded

the case to the District Court for review of the

bankruptcy court's finding of bad faith on the

part of petitioners. The Court of Appeals

explained tnat by bad faith it meant more than

an erroneous determination of law or fact but

rather a showing by the Trustee that the City

seeks to enforce a law which is "flagrantly and

patently violative of express constitutional

prohibitions"; that the state forum is biased;

that the City acted in wilful disregard of the

law; that City officials clearly abused their

discretion in initiating proceedings against the

trustee; that the City’s motivation was a desire

to harass, by ill will, or by any other improper

motive (A27-28). The court noted that a

proceeding commenced by City officials in tne

14

usual manner upon notification of a violation

would not evidence bad faith (A28, 29).

The Circuit Court held that Bankruptcy

Rule 12-43, which bars commencement of a

proceeding to enforce a lien against the

Gebtor's property, was sufficiently broad to

Stay the City's attempted revocation of the

Debtor's C.0., since the nursing home was its

sole asset and critical to its reorganization

(Al9). It viewed §645 of the New York City

Charter, wnich makes a C.0. binding upon City

agencies (until revoked or modified by the Board

of Standards and Appeals or a court), as

investing a property-like quality to the C.0.,

despite its mere evidentiary nature (Al19-20).

It therefore concluded that the City officials

nad to petition the Bankruptcy Court to relieve

the City from the stay and demonstrate cause for

15

such relief (A20). It distinguished its own

decision in Smith v. New York State Liquor

Authority, In Re Bay Ridge Inn, Inc. 94 F2d. 555

(2d Cir. 1935), in which it had held that a

bankruptcy court had no power to compel the

State Liquor Authority to reinstate a liquor

license to a debtor on the ground that no bad

faith was alleged there, whereas in the present

case the Bankruptcy Court had made a finding

tnat the City's conduct was not a legitimate

exercise of police power (A23-24).

It went on to hold that $362 of the new

Bankruptcy Code was not a codification of

existing law under the Act, but rather a

legislative expression of preference for a

narrower application of the automatic stay in

tne future. It further neld that even under

§362 the Bankruptcy Court retained power to

enjoin bad faith enforcement of a local

Tegulation, even if the automatic stay was

inapplicable, and that Congress did not adopt a

total hands-off approach towards local

regulation (A24-25).

The dissent of Circuit Judge Mansfield

pointed out that the Trustee did not even assert

a Claim of denial of the debtor's constitutional

rights and that enforcemerit of State laws should

be left to the State's administrative apparatus,

with the debtor having the same right to

judicial review as any other party (A32). A

bankruptcy court should not be a super-Planning

Commission or Board of Standards and Appeals

(A352). The dissent pointed out that the State

administrative agencies and courts were not only

better equipped to determine the issues, out

that there was a fundamental conflict between a

17

bankruptcy court's interest or motivation -- to

rehabilitate the debtor for the benefit of

creditors -- and that of a state agency whose

interest is a fair and uniform enforcement of

Tegulatory powers which benefit the community at

large (A34). Judge Mansfield pointed out that,

if bankruptcy courts interfered witn State

regulatory agencies wherever threatened action

adversely affected the value of the debtor's

estate, it would work havoc with many State laws

(A34-35). He disputed the applicability of

Bankruptcy Rule 12-43 to such cases, since the

purpose of the rule was to prevent § lien

enforcement by secured parties from thwarting

reorganization. He raised doubt as to whether a

C.0. could be classified as "“property"*

especially where the legality of the use lapsed

by its non-exercise through the nonuse of the

facility for over two years (A37-40). Finally,

he found nothing in the record showing any bad

faith on the part of the petitioners (A43-46).

* A C.0. is merely a piece of paper evidencing

the existence of certain facts at the time it

was issued.

APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES

Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended*

§i. Creation of courts of

bankruptcy and their jurisdiction

(a) The courts of the United

Stated hereinbefore defined as courts

of bankruptcy are hereby created

courts of bankruptcy and are hereby

invested, within their respective

territorial limits as now established

or as they may be hereafter -

with such jurisdiction at law and in

equity as will enable them to

exercise original jurisdiction in

proceedings under this title, in

vacation, in chambers, and during

their respective terms, as they are

now or may oe hereafter held, to -

** *

(15) Make such orders, issue such

process, and enter such judgments, in

addition to those specifically

provided for, as may be necessary for

the enforcement of the provisions of

this title: Provided, however, That

an injunction to restrain a court may

be issued by the judge only;

**2 *

since the petition was filed in 1977.

petitions filed on

after October 1, 1979. P.L. 95-598, Sec.

20

(20) Exercise ancillary

jurisdiction over persons or property

within their respective territorial

limits in aid of a receiver or

court of bankruptcy: Provided

That the jurisdiction of the

court over a bankrupt's

into its

valid and the expenses of ancillary

administration, and transmitting tne

property or its proceeds to the court

of primary jurisdiction; ....

§4l11. Exclusive jurisdiction of

debtor and property

Where mot inconsistent with the

provisions of this chapter, the court

in which the petition is filed shall,

for the purposes of this chapter,

have exclusive jurisdiction of the

debtor and his property, wherever

located.

PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THE NEW YORK CITY

ZONING RESOLUTION

Section 12-10 of the Zoning Resolution contains

the following definitions of "non-conforming"

use and "non-conforming":

A oe oF 2 aide is any lawful use,

whether of a or other structure

or of a tract of land, which does not

ae oe ae

applicable regulations of the

district in which it is located, either

on the effective date of this resolution

or as a result of any subsequent

amendment thereto. — is

A non-conforming use shall result from

failure to conform to the applicable

district regulations on either permitted

Use Groups or performance standards.

A "non-conformity" is a failure by a

non-conforming use to conform to any one

of such applicable use regulations.

Sec. 52-61 of the Zoning Resolution provides:

If, for a continuous perioc of two years,

either the non-conforming use of land

with minor improvements is discontinued,

~ 4 the active operation of substantially

the a uses in any

—— *

or building or other structure shail

thereafter be used only for a

conforming use. Intent to resume

active operations shall not affect

the foregoing.

The provisions of this Section shall

not apply where such discontinuance

is directly caused by war, strike or

other labor difficulties, a

governmental program of materials

rationing, or the construction of a

duly authorized improvement project

by a body or a public utility company.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

(1)

Petitioners submit that a writ of

certiorari should issue because the Second

Circuit's decision of August 17, 1981 involves

important unsettled issues of bankruptcy court

jurisdiction and its relationship to enforcement

by goverrnmerital bodies of their police and

regulatory powers before administrative bodies

and in non-bankruptcy courts. The subject has

been a source of conflicting decisions of the

lower courts, on Bankruptcy, Oistrict and

Circuit levels, and it is important that this

conflict be expeditiously resolved to avoid

confrontations between state and federal courts

over tnese issues.

Petitioners note that there is

presently pending before this Court a petition

by the State of Missouri, et al. (No. &1-79,

Oct. 1981 Term) for a writ of certiorari to the

Eighth Circuit. We respectfully submit tnat the

Missouri petition raises similar jurisdictional

issues. If a writ is issued in that case, a

writ should be issued in this case as well and

oral argument on botn cases could be scheduled

for the same time. However, even if the

petition of the State of Missouri is denied

because this Court agrees witn the holding of the

Eighth Circuit that Missouri's grain law does

not properly fall into the classification of

"police and regulatory laws", it should grant

the petition herein because enforcement of

zoning laws is clearly enforcement of the

State's police powers. Indeed, the Eighth

Circuit itself, at 647 F.2d 768, 778 (Appendix

A-13 of Missouri's petition), cited District

Judge Leval's decision in the instant case in

its discussion of which types of governmental

regulatory activities were excluded from the

scope of the automatic stay. The Eighth Circuit

stated (647 F.2d at 775):

Tne present stay provisions [of

the mew Code] amplify and clarify

provisions of the former bankruptcy

law and bankruptcy rules provides for

an automatic stay of certain

proceedings against debtors. See,

@.g. ll U.S.C. 148 (repealed 1978);

1l U.S.C. §248 (repealed 1978); Rules

of Bankruptcy Procedure 401, 6l,

: — . eTs

interstate Service, 618 F. 2d 9, (7th

Cir. 1980) (labor laws); In re Bel

Air Chateau Hospital 611 F.2d 1248

(9th Cir. 1979) (labor laws); In re

National Hosptial and Institutional

Builders Co. 9 B.R. 948 (S.D. N.Y.

1981) (zoning laws); In re Grand

Spaulding Dodge Inc., 5 8.R. 581

(Bankruptcy Ct. N.D. Ill 1980)

(consumer protection laws); In fre

Canarico Quarries, Inc. 466 F. Supp.

1333 (0. Puerto Rico 1979)

(environmental protection laws); In

Te Colonial Tavern, Inc., 420 F.

Supp. 44 (0. Mass. 1976) (liquor

laws). (Underlining added. ]

The Eighth Circuit quoted from the legislative

history of $362 of the 1978 Code to explain te

purpose of excluding police and regulatory law

enforcement from the automatic stay.*

In all of the cases cited by the

Eighth Circuit, the automatic stay under the Act

was held to be inapplicable to matters of police

and regulatory enforcement. In addition to

these cases, the Sixtn Circuit recently held

that bankruptcy courts had no jurisdiction to

pass on the validity of workers’ claims for

injury or death as the exclusive jurisdiction is

vested in State courts in cases involving police

powers. State of Ohio v. Mansfield Tire and

Rubber Co, F.2d, Bankruptcy Law Reports,

CCH, $68,356 (Sept. 29, 1981). In contrast, the

Second Circuit decision in the instant case

appears to be alone in holding that

When Congress enacted the 1978 Code, it also

enacted 28 U.S.C. §1478 as an explicit

jurisdictional bar to removal to a Bankruptcy

Court of civil actions brought by a governmental

unit to enforce its police and regulatory powers.

27

the automatic stay applied to the enforcement of

police power laws.

‘Apart from the conflict of the Second

Circuit holding in the instant case with the

numerous authorities cited by the Eighth Circuit

(at p. 26, supra,) the holding is inconsistent

with the judicial philosophy expressed by this

Court in Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U.S. 79

(1939), in which the Court held that a

bankruptcy court cannot usurp the functions of a

state railroad commission and permit a railroad

in reorganization to abandon local service.

This Court noted that in construing legislation

involving operation of railroads owned by a

deotor, the Court traditionally upheld the power

of States to regulate their local transportation

and, in the absence of a clear Congressional

mandate to the

contrary, reorganization courts could not

interfere in such matters (id. at 83-84). This

Court rejected arguments that continuance of

state control over local passenger service would

impair the power of the bankruptcy court to

formulate a reorganization plan for I.C.C.

approval, noting that a single judge removed

from familiarity with local problems, and not

necessarily gifted with statesman-like

imagination, should not override decisions of

expert state agencies [id. at 89].

If the Second Circuit opinion is not

altered, the City could not issue a "vacate

order” on a building it believes to be hazardous

to life and limb without first obtaining leave

of a Bankruptcy Court if such building happened

to be owned by a debtor. If the Bankruptcy

Court is located outside of the City (perhaps

thousands of miles away), the City must then

expend considerable time and money just to seek

leave from a distant bankruptcy judge before it

can protect its citizens. This result

undermines the City's ability to protect the

very lives of its citizens in an emergency.

Moreover, as District Judge Leval pointed out in

his opinion (at 87-8), the fact that one has

filed in bankruptcy should not exempt him from

jurisdiction of local traffic courts or criminal

courts if he drives the wrong way on a one-way

street or commits a criminal assault.

As noted by Judge Leval, if bad faith

can be shown by the trustee, he has adequate

judicial remedies in the state courts or even in

a federal court under civil rights statutes

(Bl6 mn. 7).

It should be further noted that

Bankruptcy Judge Galgay held no hearings and all

his findings of facts were based on papers

submitted by the parties. All that the City

conceded is that it took no action to revoke the

C.0. until i980, when some local community

groups called the violation to its attention.

Since the City is unable to police all zoning

violations, it must necessarily depend on

citizen complaints for much of its enforcement.

The majority opinion concedes that response to

citize. complaints is not an indication of bad

faith (at A28-29). And, as the dissent points

out, there was no actual existing violation of

law because the debtor was not even using the

property as a nursing home and might never have

done so (at A44-46). Thus, there is nothing in

the record to support the Trustee's allegations

of bad faith.

31

Another issue on which the Second

Circuit's ruling conflicts with that of another

Circuit, the Third Circuit, is whether a C.0. is

"property" of the debtor within the constructive

custody of the court. In the present case, the

majority treated a certificate as valuable

property even though it was only evidentiary in

mature (Al9). In In Re Dolly Madison Industries

Inc., 504 F.2d 499 (3rd Cir. 1974), the Third

Circuit held that a certificate of authority to

do business in a certain state was not property,

citing Gills v. California, 293 U.S. 62 (1934),

in which this Court held that a bankruptcy court

was powerless to authorize non-compliance with a

state licensing statute.

As shown at pp. 8&9, supra, the

City’s zoning law is self-executing anc, upon

nonuse of the facility as a nursing home for two

years, the legality of its use lapsed ipso

facto, irrespective of the outstanding C.0O.

This lapse occurred in 1976, more than a year

before the petition was filed. The City was

thus entitled to obtain injunctive relief

against use of the property es @ nursing hone.

3 Rathkopf The Law of Zoning and Planning

§55-22. The C.0. itself cannot properly be

characterized as "property" within the

constructive custody of the court.

Moreover, Bankruptcy Judge Galgay's

injunction appears to extend beyond the duration

of the debtor's ownership of the facility, and

to affects the property permanently even after

it is transferred to other parties. The effect

of such an injunction order would be to

permanently prevent the City from enforcing a

violation of zoning laws long after the debtor

is gone from the scene. The result of such an

order is absurd.

Even during debtor's ownership, a

Trustee, as are all court officers, is obligated

to manage and operate property in his possession

in accordance with the valid laws of the state

in which the property is situated in the same

manner as any other property owner. 28 U.S.C.

§959(b). The courts have no power to dispense

with this statute.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, a writ

certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

ALLEN G. SCHWARTZ

Corporation Counsel of

the City of New York

Attorney for Petitioner

35

of

APPENDIX A

Opinion of the Court of Appeals

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For The Second Circuit

No. 1301 --September Term, 1980

(Argued April 29, 1981 Decided

August 17, 1981)

Docket No. 81-5009

In The Matter of

NATIONAL HOSPITAL AND INSTITUTIONAL BUILDERS

COMPANY, a Partnership,

Debtor.

NATIONAL HOSPITAL &

INSTITUTIONAL BUILDERS Co.,

Plaintiff,

JAMES L. GARRITY, Trustee of the Debtor,

Appellant,

on) <=

PHILIP GOLDSTEIN, NEW YORK CITY DEPT. OF

BUILDINGS, and NEW YORK CITY BOARD OF

STANDARDS & APPEALS,

Defendant s-Appellees.

Before:

LUMBARD , MANSFIELD, and VAN

The Debtor's trustee in bankruptcy

appeals from an order of the Southern District,

Leval, J., which reversed an order of Bankruptcy

Judge Galgay who had enjoined the City of New

York under the automatic stay provision of

Bankruptcy Rule 12-43 from seeking revocation of

the Debtor's Certificate of Occupancy.

Reversed and remanded for further

findings of facts.

Joseph

Laver, Marvin B. Mitzner, New

York, N.Y., of counsel), for

fopellees

LUMBARD, Circuit Judge:

James L. Garrity, acting as trustee

for the National Hospital and Institutional

Builders Company (Debtor), appeals from an order

of Jutge Leval of the Southern District

“reversing en order of the bankruptcy court.

Bankruptcy Judge Galgay had applied the

automatic stay imposed by Rule 12-43 of the

Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure to prohibit the

appellees -- various subdivisions and officers

of the City of New York -- from instituting or

continuing proceedings to revoke the Certificate

of Occupancy for the Debtor's nursing home.

Because the district court failed to review

Bankruptcy Judge Galgay's critical finding that

the City was pursuing the revocation in bad

faith, we reverse and remand for further

findings of fact.

The Debtor, a New York partnership,

owns as its sole asset a nursing home and the

land it occupies at 1000 Targee Street on Staten

Island. The Debtor's four partners were Bernard

Bergman and three members of his family. The

New York City Department of Health initially

granted approval for establishing the nursing

nome in April of 1966, and construction began in

June of 1969. Construction was completed in

June of 1973, and a final Certificate of

Occupancy (C.0.) was issued in June of that

year. Washington Heights Federal Savings and

Loan Association (Washington Federal) held a

mortgage on the property of approximately $2

million.

In 1975, Bergman was indicted by a

federal grand jury for filing false tax returns,

submitting false medicaid claims, making false

statements to the federal government, and

conspiring to commit those offenses and to

defraud the government. He was also indicted by

@ New York State grand jury for conspiracy,

filing fraudulent reimbursement claims, larceny,

and obstruction of government administration.

Bergman pled guilty to a violation of the New

York Public Officers Law as part of a larger

plea agreement that settled both the federal and

state indictments against him. Under that

agreement, Bergman's assets, which included his

interest in this and several other nursing

homes, were assigned to a state-appointed

A7

receiver for purposes of collecting a $2.5

million judgment against Bergman held by the

State. See Chase Manhattan Mortgage and Realty

Trust _v. Bergman (In re Bergman), 585 F.2d 1171

(2d Cir. 1978).

From the building's completion until

late 1979, the State of New York, which

regulates the establishment and construction of

nursing homes, had denied the approval necessary

for the nursing home to open. The State

contended that the initial establishment of the

nursing home in 1966 was improper and that

there was an excess of nursing home beds in

Richmond County. Because the State denied that

approval, the nursing home remained unopened,

and the Debtor defaulted in its mortgage and tax

payments.

On June 8, 1976, Washington Federal,

the Deptor's mortgagee and principal creditor,

commenced an action to foreciose in the Supreme

Court of the State of New York, County of

Richmond. On May 20, 1977, Washington Federal

entered into an agreement with the City of New

York to pay the delinquent real estate taxes and

otner assessments levied against the property.

A final judgment of foreclosure and sale was

entered on July 1, 1977, and the foreclosure

sale was scheduled for September 1, 1977. On

August 31, 1977, the Debtor filed its petition

for an arrangement under Chapter XII of the

Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §§801-926, and the

Bankruptcy Court notified all creditors,

including the City of New York, of the filing of

the petitiun. The automatic stay provision of

Bankruptcy Rule 12-43 prevented the foreclosure

sale scheduled for the next day.

On October 17, 1977, James L. Garrity

was appointed trustee upon the Debdtor's

application. Faced with the State's continued

refusal to approve the nursing home's

establishment, Bankruptcy Judge Galgay directed

Garrity to investigate other possible uses of

the facility. In March of 1978, Garrity

discussed with the New York State Department of

Health the possibility of selling the nursing

home to an Hassidic Jewish organization, and the

Department agreed that it would be willing to

authorize such a group to establish the home

under the religious group exception to the

State's public-need requirement.

On July 18, 1978, Garrity executed a

contract with Beth Rifka, Inc., the Hassidic

group, for the sale of the nursing home. The

parties established as a condition precedent,

however, the granting of establishment approval

and various other state? and federal approvals.

On August 24, 1979, ai’ter both Beth Rifka and

Garrity had submitted information to and

answered questions ‘rom various health-care

bodies, the Public Health Council of the State

of New York, the final state licensing

authority, granting Beth Rifka's application for

establishment approval subject to several minor

conditions. Because of certain improper

procedures on its own part, the Public Health

Council afterwards rescinded its approval,

resubmitted the application, and approved it

once again on December 21, 1979.

During the next several months, the

parties arranged financing for the sale and

eventually came to an accord. However, because

interest rates had risen substantially between

the Health Council's approval and the spring of

1980, Beth Rifka had to obtain an additional

approval from the Health Council. This final

approval was obtained on September 19, 1980, and

the sale was ready to be consummated, thus

providing the economic foundation for the

Bankruptcy Court's Chapter XII plan of

arrangement.

However, a few months before the

State granted the final approval and seven years

after the final C.0. was issued by the City, the

New York City Department of Buildings first

suggested that it might initiate proceedings to

invalidate the nursing home's C.0. Borough

Superintendent of Buildings Philip Goldstein

raised this possibility in a letter of May 7,

1980 which stated that the Debtor's intended

use of the facility was a non-conforming use and

that therefore he would initiate proceedings

before the Goard of Standards and Appeals to

Tevoke the C.0. Under Goldstein's view of the

City zoning law, the nursing home became °

nonconforming use when the zoning ordinances

were amended in 1974, after the C.0. was

granted; and nonconforming uses forfeited their

C.0.'s if they did not do business for two

years, as the Debtor's nursing home clearly had

not.

On June ll, 1980, Garrity's counsel

advised Goldstein that the Department of

Buildings was stayed, pursuant to Bankruptcy

Rule 12-43, from appealing to the Board of

Standards and Appeals to revoke the C.O.

Goldstein thereafter advised Garrity's counsel

that he intended to proceed with the revocation

on the advice of the Department's counsel that

the automatic stay was inapplicable. In a

letter dated August 4, 1980, Goldstein applied

to the Board of Standards and Appeals for such

revocation without leave of the bankruptcy

court. He also stated, however, that Garrity

could reobtain a C.0., despite that

nonconforming use, merely by requesting a

Special Permit from the Board. He added that

the City did not intend to oppose the grant of

the Special Permit. Thus, Goldstein's letter

requested revocation of the C.0. but established

that the City's interest was not sufficient for

it to oppose a Special Permit that would nullify

the revocation.

By an order to show cause dated

August 7, 1980, Garrity moved in the bankruptcy

court for an order staying Goldstein, the

Al4

Department of Buildings, and the Board of

Standards and Appeals from instituting or

continuing proceedings to revoke the Debtor's

C.0., or, in the alternative, for an order

edjudging Goldstein in contempt of the automatic

stay imposed by Rule 12-43. Secause the parties

did mot dispute the material facts, the

bankruptcy court did not take testimony but

rather invited the parties to submit proposed

findings. By order dated October 8, 1980,

Bankruptcy Judge Galgay granted Garrity's motion

for injunctive relief and denied the alternative

order of contempt. He first held that the C.0.

was “property” within the exclusive jurisdiction

of the bankruptcy court under section 411 of the

Bankruptcy Act. He then held that Bankruptcy

Rule 12-43's automatic stay of state proceedings

against a debtor's property therefore applied to

this Debtor's C.0. Finally, he held that the

City had failed to demonstrate the good cause

required for the court to vacate the stay and

that the facts demonstrated that the proposed

revocation of the C.0. was not a valid exercise

of the police power. The bankruptcy court based

that finding of bad faith on two observations.

First, Bankruptcy Judge Galgay found that the

City’s attempted revocation was not undertaken

to protect the public health and welfare of the

surrounding community because, if that had been

the true concern, it would not have taken seven

years for the City to act. Indeed, Goldstein

began the proceedings only after being prodded

by three community organizations which Garrity

asserts were motivated by a dislike of Hassidic

Jews. Second, Bankruptcy Judge Galgay noted

that the State of New York had extensively

reviewed the needs of the region and of the

Hassidic population, and it had concluded that

the Debtor's facility would fulfill an unmet

need in the community. He then held that the

State's interest in administering health care

was greater than the City's interest in having

the Debtor obtain a Special Permit (which the

City did not intend to oppose) to replace the

c.0.

Al7

On February 16, 1981, while the

appeal to the district court was pending,

Garrity opened the nursing home, and it admitted

patients for the first time.

Judge Leval reversed the order of the

bankruptcy court. He concluded that state

Tegulatory power was beyond the scope of the

bankruptcy court's exclusive jurisdiction.

Accordingly, the bankruptcy court could not

interpret Rule 12-43's automatic stay in a

manner that precluded the revocation. The

district court made no finding of fact regarding

the good faith of the City's conduct. Because

we believe the City's good faith to be critical

to this case, we reverse and remand to the

district court for findings of fact on that

issue.

Bankruptcy Rule 12-43, which was in

effect at the time the Debtor filed its Chapter

XII petition, provides that the petition “shall

Operate as a stay of the commencement or the

continuation of any court or other proceeding

against the debtor...or of any court proceedings

to enforce any lien against his property.” We

find Rule 12-43 sufficiently broad to stay the

City's intended revocation of the Debtor's C.0O.

The nursing home is the Debtor's sole asset, and

its establishment is critical to the Debtor's

economic recovery. The C.0. which the City

seeks to revoke represents the City's commitment

that, when the C.0. was issued, the nursing home

could legally be used for its intended purpose:

645(e) of the New York City Charter provides

that a C.0. is "binding and conclusive upon

all agencies and officers of the city...

unless and until the certificate is set aside,

vacated or modified by the board of standards

esd appeals oor a court of competent

jurisdiction." Given the importance of the C.0.

to the Debtor and the substantial weight the

C.0. is accorded by the City, we cannot say that

Goldstein's application for revocation is any

less a “proceeding against the debtor" than a

court proceeding or a pending arbitration. See

Rule 12-43 of Bankruptcy Procedure, Advisory

Committee Notes. Accordingly, the City's

attempted revocation of the C.0. was stayed by

the filing of the Debtor's petition in

bankruptcy.

To proceed with the revocation, the

City must petition the bankruptcy court and

demonstrate cause for relieving it from the

automatic stay under Bankruptcy Rule 12-43(d),

(e). Proof of good cause would obviously

include proof that the revocation was being

sought in good faith under state and federal

law. This court's opinion in Smith v. New York

State \iquor Authority (In re Bay Ridge Inn,

Inc.), 94 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1938) does ‘not

suggest that bankruptcy courts must defer to bad

faith local regulation. In Bay Ridge Inn, the

New York Liquor Authority had issued the debtor

a liquor license scheduled to expire one year

from its issuance on October 1, 1936, and the

debtor filed its petition in bankruptcy in

January of 1937. The Liquor Authority revoked

the debtor's license and denied it any refund

upon its license in June of 1937. The Nebtor

apparently did not dispute in the district court

that (1) it had never paid the deposit that was

required to be paid within 30 days of the

license's issuance; (2) it had attempted to

assign the license in February of 1937 although

the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law compelled

revocation as @ penalty for any attemt to

assign; and (3) the custodian of the debtor's

inn had been arrested for selling liquor during

prohibited hours. On Marchi, 1937, the

debtor's trustee surrendered the license to the

Liquor Authority to obtain a refund of $685.90.

On June 1 of that year, however, the Authority

concluded that the debtor had violated the

Beverage Control Law in three instances, revoked

the debtor's license, and denied it any refund

because refunds were not available when a

license was cancelled for violation of the

Beverage Control Law. The debtor, attempting to

salvage its refund, obtained an order from the

district court in September of 1937 which

annulled the Authority's decision.

This court reversed the district

court order. There was no evidence that the

Authority had acted in bad faith, and this court

held that the cebtor's remaining rights to a

Tefund were properly to be determined by state

tribunals./ unlike Bay Ridge Inn, the debtor

here is supported by the factual finding of the

bankruptcy court that the City's conduct was not

a valid exercise of its police power. Thus,

this case presents an entirely different issue

than was presented in Bay Ridge Inn, and the

T~"TColonial Tavern, inc. v. (In re

eed aie Blin oF wt

° not involve any assertion

of bad faith on the part of state and local

officials. Similarly, doctrines of federal

abstention in deference to state proceedings

have consistently not applied in cases of bad

faith conduct by the state. See Juidice v.

pose, 40 U.S. 327, 338 (1977); Huffman v.

td., 420 U.S. 592, 611 (1975);

ve S, 401 U.S. 37, 53-54 (1971).

A23

district court must review the finding of bad

faith before determining whether the Debtor's

only resort here lies’ in state and local

proceedings.

The City argues that the new

Bankruptcy Code dictates a different outcome in

this case because it specifies that the

automatic stay does not apply to proceedings by

goverrmental units to enforce their police or

Tegulatory powers. See ll U.S.C. §362. We

disagree. First, as the City concedes, the

earlier Sankrupcty Act, not the new Code,

controls in this case because the petition was

filed under the Act. See Guardian Mortgage

Investors v. Unofficial Noteholders—Debenture-

holders Creditors Committee, 607 F.2d 1020, 1023

n.6 (20d Cir. 1979). Second, Congress's

determination that the new Code's stay provision

should not preclude enforcement of local

regulation provides little direction for

interpreting the stay under the Act. Instead of

revealing its earlier intentions under the Act,

Congress may simply have been expressing its

preference for a narrower, rather than broader,

application of the automatic stay in the

future. Compare Katman v. New Jersey, 13 C.8.C.

524 (D.N.J. 1977); In re Hillsdale Foundry Co.,

2 C.B.C. 542 (W.D. Mich. 1974), with Colonial

Tavern, Inc. v. Byrne, 420 F. Supp. 44 (D. Mass.

1976). Third, Congress removed local regulation

only from the effect of the automatic stay; it

did not eliminate the bankruptcy court's power

to enjoin the enforcement of local regulation

which is shown to be used in bad faith. Thus,

although it addressed the issue, Congress did

not adopt the total hands-off approach toward

local regulation that the City advocates here.

Finally, we do not believe that

Congress, under either the Act or the Code,

intended to prohibit bankruptcy courts from

protecting a debtor's assets from bad faith

zoning regulation. If courts lacked that power,

a city interested in the outcome of a bankruptcy

petition could seriously interfere with

management of the bankrupt estate through

repeated threats of harmful rezoning. The

Constitution authorizes Congress to establish

uniform laws of bankruptcy, U.S. Const., Art. I,

§8, and it establishes that laws passed pursuant

to the Constitution are the supreme law of the

land, U.S. Const. Art. VI. Those grants of

authority surely include the power to thwart bad

faith frustration of federal bankruptcy policy.

On remand, upon the City's motion for

relief from the automatic stay, the district

court should review the bankruptcy court's

finding of bad faith on the part of the City.

We note that bad faith here means more than an

erroneous determination of law or fact. Rather,

the trustee must show, for example, that the

City seeks to enforce a law that is

"“'flagrantly and patently violative of express

constitutional prohibitions in every clause,

sentence or paragraph, and in whatever manner

and against whomever an effort might be made to

apply it,’" Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,

53-54 (1971); that the state forum is biased,

e.g., Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 93

S.Ct. 1689, 36 L.Ed. 2d 488 (1973); see McCune

v. Frank, 521 F.2d 1152, 1158 (2d Cir. 1975);

that the City acted in wilful disregard of the

law; that City officials clearly abused their

discretion in initiating proceedings against the

trustee; or that the “state proceeding [was]

motivated by a desire to harass," Huffman v.

Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611 (1975), by ill

will, or by any other improper motivation, cf.

Central Avenue News, Inc. v. City of Minot, No.

80-1521, slip op. at (8th Cir. Feb. 10,

1981) and Eagle Books, Inc. v. Reinhard, 416 F.

Supp. 345, 351 (N.D. Ill. 1976), vacated on

other grounds, 432 U.S. 902 (1977) ("The

gravamen of bad faith prosecution is the lack of

@ reasonable expectation that valid convictions

will result"). Of course, if the City shows

that its officials proceeded in the usual manner

upon notification of events requiring official

response, there would be no evidence that the

City acted in bad faith.”

Contrary to the City's assertions, it

is neither unseemly mor unusual for the

bankruptcy court to examine issues of state

zoning law to determine whether the intended

revocation is marred by procedural or

substantive defects. We emphasize that the

purpose of the bankruptcy laws -- to allow the

2—~Tf a private citizen instigated the

proceeding against the debtor to harass or

coerce the debtor in an unrelated matter, the

trustee may have a cause of action for damages

against that party for malicious abuse of legal

process. See l F. ge James, The Law of

Torts §4.9, at 330-31 (1956).

trustee without delay to marshal and administer

the assets of the debtor -- would be frustrated

were state officials free to interfere with the

administration of the bankrupt's estate through

bad faith zoning regulation. Nor is it

reasonable to require the bankruptcy court to

await the correction of such abuses by the state

courts. The attendant delay itself might

permanently damage the estate through the

inevitable dissipation of skilled personnel and

goodwill. Hence, if the City's intended

revocation is in bad faith, the bankruptcy

court's injunction should stand.

Accordingly, we reverse and remand

for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

MANSFIELD, Circuit Judge (Dissenting):

I respectfully dissent for reasons

that are well stated by Judge Leval in his

opinion and order dated February 25, 1961,

dissolving the injunction issued by the

. Bankruptcy Court, Galgay, J., barring New York

City officials from seeking to revoke a

certificate of occupancy that had permitted the .

establishment of a nursing home on the debtor's

property. In my view the Bankruptcy Court lacks

jurisdiction to interfere with the state's

enforcement of its regulatory powers. See Smith

v. New York State Liquor Authority, - (in re

Bay Ridge Inn, Inc.), 94 F.2d 555 (2d Cir.

1938); NLRB v. Jonas (In re Bel Air Chateau

Hospital, Inc.), 611 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1979);

Colonial Tavern, Inc. v. Byrne (In re Colonial

Tavern, Inc.), 420 F. Supp. 44 (D. Mass. 1976).

A31

Absent some claim of denial of the debtor's

constitutional rights -- and none is asserted

here -- those state police powers resi within

the exclusive jurisdiction of the state's

administrative apparatus, with the debtor having

the same right as any other citizen to obtain

state judicial review. A federal bankruptcy

court is not a super-City Planning Commission or

Board of Standards and Appeals.

Nothing in the Bankruptcy Act confers

upon the Bankruptcy Court, a statutory tribunal

of limited jurisdiction, any of the powers which

the majority would permit it to exercise here.

Strong federal-state comity considerations

militate against ederal intervention into state

zoning matters that are not attacked on

consitutional grounds. No showing is made that

state remedies are inadequate. with due respect

for the able bankruptcy judge's expertise in

bankruptcy matters, he would not ordinarily

possess the qualifications of the appropriate

state bodies to determine whether the City's

zoning regulations would be violated, whether

the nursing home here would "fulfill an unmet

need in the community," and whether any benefit

a nursing home would confer is outweighed by

other considerations, such as excessive burdens

on the community, traffic congestion, lack of

adequate parking space or roads, inadequate

off-street loading facilities, or the like.

These are matters that the appropriate City

administrative facility and state court are in a

much better position to evaluate than a

bankruptcy judge.

Aside from its lack of expertise and

qualifications to determine the reach of local

A33

zoning regulations, the Bankruptcy Court should

mot for another reason be empowered to enjoin

the state's exercise of its regulatory powers.

There is a fundamental conflict between a

bankruptcy court's interest or motivation and

that of the appropriate state tribunals. The

Bankruptcy Court, naturally enough, is solely

interested in enhancing the value of the

debtor's estate for the benefit of creditors

whereas the objective of state zoning bodies is

to enforce regulatory powers (whether they

relate to clean air, traffic, housing, size of

residence units, or type of land use) for the

benefit of the community at large. Lastly, we

should note that if the Bankruptcy Court can

prevent a state regulatory agency from taking

action that might lessen the value of the

estate, nothing would prevent it from enjoining

the state from invoking other state laws that

might affect the bankruptcy, such as _ those

calling for revocation of a license for cause or

lapse, prohibiting the erection of advertising

signs, prescribing fire control or safety

regulations, authorizing criminal proceedings,

or the like. | |

The majority, as a jurisdictional

basis for the Bankruptcy Court's action here,

relies on the automatic stay provisions of

Bankruptcy Rule 12-43. However, as Congress

made clear in its later more detailed

codification of the law in the new Bankruptcy

Code, Rule 12-43 was never intended to permit e

Bankruptcy Court to interfere with a

governmental unit's enforcement of its police or

regulatory power, see Bankruptcy Code

§362(b)(4), 11 U.S.C. §362(b)(4). Moreover, as

A35

"it is a

commonplace that a literal interpretation of the

warned,

i v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608,

624 (2d Cir. 1944)(concurring opinion), where he

words of a statute is not always a safu guide to

stated:

its meaning," Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin

Equally appropriate for present purposes are his

Learned Hand has wisely

Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).

remarks in Gui

Tet

ee Pa

Sy: Lae “1

paler a

if ate CEE saitctat

most decisive evidence of what they

See also Federal t_ Insurance ° Ve

Tremaine, 133 F.2d 827, 830 (2d Cir. 1943)

(L. Hand, C.J.) ("There is no surer guide in the

interpretation of a statute than its purpose when

that is sufficiently disclosed; nor any surer mark

of our solicitude for the letter than to wince at

carrying out that purpose because the words used do

not formally quite match with it"). The purpose of

Rule 12-43 was to supplement and reinforce the

Bankruptcy Court's exclusive jurisdiction over

property in its possession in order to avoid

creation or enforcement of liens by third parties.

It is questionable whether a Certificate of

Occupancy may be classified as "property, "= but

even if it were, it automatically ceased to exist as

T~Even if a Certificate of Occupancy is treated

as a property right, it is expressly conditioned

upon the. power of the Board of Standards to vacate

or modify it. Section 645(e) of the New York City

Charter provides:

“every certificate of occupancy shall,

and until set aside

upon

officers of the city, and shall be

binding and conclusive upon the

department of labor of the state of New

York, as to all matters therein set

forth, and no order, direction or

requirement affecting or a variance with

any matter set forth in any certificate

of occupancy shall be made or issued by

any agency or officer of the city, or by

the department of labor of the state of

New York, or any commission, board,

officer or member thereof, unless and

until the certificate is set aside

vaca or o

(footnote continue on next page)

A38

a matter of law in the present case when it lapsed

under New York City Zoning Resolution, §52-61,* by

reason of the permittee's admitted non-exercise of

standards and or a court of

application of the agency, department,

commission, officer or member thereof

to make or issue such order,

or requirement...." (Emphasis

supplied).

2 New York City Zoning Resolution, §52-6l,

provides in pertinent part:

"If, for a continuous period of two

years, either the non-conforming use of

land with minor improvements § is

discontinued, or the active operation of

substantially all the non-conforming

uses in any building or other structure

is discontinued, such land or building

or other structure shall thereafter be

used only for a conforming use. Intent

to resume active operations shall not

affect the foregoing."

the certificate for a continuous period of two

years prior to 1976.

The majority, apparently recognizing

that the automatic stay provisions of the Act may

have no application, nevertheless asserts that the

Bankruptcy Court has power to enjoin the "bad

faith" enforcement of local state regulations.”

I disagree. Such an exception would result in

>~“Tppeliant concedes that the Bankruptcy Court

lacks jurisdiction to prevent faith

enforcement of state zoning ons

contends that the issue is whether it has

jurisdiction to enjoin bad faith enforcement,

stating:

"This Court is not, as the City

suggests, faced with deciding whether a

bankruptcy court is vested with power to

prevent faith enforcement of

en order to protect health,

safety and welfare. It is beyond

peradventure that the bankruptcy court

cannot and should not do so. Here the

issue is the City's lack of

faith." (Appellant's Reply Br. at 1;

emphasis in original)

Bankruptcy Court mini-trials of purely state

regulatory issues whenever, as might be expected to

happen frequently, the debtor sought by claiming

"bad faith" to have those issues tried in a

Bankruptcy Court, which would be sympathetic toward

any resolution that would improve the estate,

rather than before state tribunals. The proper

remedy is to seek redress in the state courts,

which may be expected not to tolerate bad faith

conduct on the part of any regulatory officials.

Nor does the record in the present case

support a claim that the Borough Superintendent of

Buildings acted in bad (faith. Although a

Certificate of Occupancy was issued to the debtor

on June ll, 1973, the property remained vacant for

many years and was not operated as a nursing home

until 1960. In the meantime, on January 10, 1974,

the City’s Board of Estimate amended Zoning

Resolution §74-90 to prohibit the use of property .

as nursing homes except by special permit granted

by the City Planning Commission upon it making

certain findings as to landscaping, topography,

supporting neighborhood services, traffic and

benefits to the community. Since the debtor's

property had not, prior to January 10, 1974, ever

been used as a nursing home, this use could not

thereafter be permitted as a matter of right and

must be treated as a "non-conforming" use, Zoning

Res. §12-10, for which a special permit would be

required under Zoning Res. §74-90. Moreover, under

Zoning Res. §52-61 the right to use the property

for a nursing home evidenced by the Certificate of

Occupancy automatically lapsed and ceased to exist

by reason of the non-use of the property as a

nursing home for a continuous period of two years

after the issuance of the Certificate. All of

these regulations are laws of general application

which were not directed toward the debtor. The

proposed revocation of the debtor's Certificate of

Occupancy therefore amounts merely to a ministerial

act mandated by the law. When his attention was

brought to the existence of this non-conforming

use, the Borough Superintendent of Buildings

instituted the revocation proceeding now pending

before the Board of Standards and Appeals.

In view of this undisputed history I

find nothing in the record to suggest bad faith on

the part of the Sorough Superintendent of

Buildings. Nor did Judge Galgay find bad faith, as

the majority states; he found that the action was

"not within the valid exercise of its police power

under the zoning laws" because of the Borough

Superintendent's delay in bringing the revocation

proceeding. To this appellant suggests bad faith

based on the fact that the Superintendent was

instigated to act by community complaints. In my

view, to suggest that this indicates "bad faith"

borders on the absurd. The delay in the City

Department's institution of a ministerial action,

when there was no existing violation of law because

the debtor was not using the property as a nursing

home and might never do so (in view of the

continued refusal of the Public Health Council of

the State of New York to grant a cursing home

licenses), is so insignificant that it provides no

basis for an inference as to later motive or

intent. The Department of Buildings cannot be

expected to be aware of all instances where such

action is required. The fact that the lapse of the

Certificate of Occupancy was brought to the Borough

Superintendent 's attention by a community group

opposed to the nursing home use and hence having an

axe to grind does not taint the Borough

Superintendent's motive or action. This is

probably the most common manner in which threatened

violations of law are brought to the attention of

most law enforcement authorities, state or federal.

Finally, the best evidence that the

Borough Superintendent, once the matter was brought

to his attention, was merely doing his job, without

fear or favor, lies in his advice to appellant

Trustee that if the latter pursued the proper legal

course by seeking a special permit for nursing home

use from the City Planning Commission the

Department of Buildings would not oppose the

application. Indeed, since the City was under no

obligation to remain neutral in the matter, this

was evidence of the Borough Superintendent's good

faith in enforcing the law. There is not one whit

of evidence that in bringing the revocation proceed-

ing he was discriminating against appellant by

permitting other similarly-situated holders of

lapsed Certificates of Occupancy nevertheless to

operate without such certificates.

For the foregoing reasons I would affirm

the judgment of the district court.

Opinion of the District Court

Sane snr ew

In the Matter of

NATIONAL HOSPITAL AND 80 Civ. 6073

COMPANY, a Partnership,

Debtor.

OPINION AND ORDER

Sd etoeeeoeecece x

PIERRE N. LEVAL, U.S.D.J.

This is an appeal from a ruling of The

Honorable John J. Galgay, Bankruptcy udge,-

holding that administrative efforts by The City of

New York to revoke the Certificate of Occupancy of

@ nursing home owned by the debtor violated the

automatic stay provisions of Rule 12-43 of the

Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, and enjoining the

Tevocation proceedings under authority of Section

4ll of the 1896 Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 8ll.

The basic facts are not in dispute. The

debtor's sole asset is real property at 1000 Targee

Street on Staten Island on which stands an

unoccupied structure built as a nursing home for

the aged. The New York City Department of Health

gave its approval for the establishment of the

nursing home in April, 1966. Construction of the

home was begun by a prior owner in June, 1969.

Construction was completed in 1973. In January and

March 1973 temporary C.0.s were issued. In June

1973 a final C.0. was issued. However, the New

York State Public Health Council of the New York

State Department of Health declined to give the

home “establishment approval" because of an excess

of nursing homes on Staten Island.

The debtor acquired the property in

1975. In June 1977 the mortgagee of the building

began a suit in New York State Supreme Court to

foreclose its mortgage. Judgment of foreclosure

was entered, and the foreclosure sale was set for

September 1, 1977.

One day before the foreclosure sale, the

debtor filed a petition ‘or a real property

arrangement under Chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Act,

ll U.S.C. §§ 801-926. The foreclosure sale was

stayed by the automatic provision of Bankruptcy

Rule 12-43.

In March 1978 the Trustee obtained the

agreement of the New York State Department of

Health that establishment approval might be granted

under a special proviaion of New York law

applicable to religious groups, N.Y., Pub. Health

Law § 280l-a(3) (McKinney), if an Hassidic group

could demonstrate a need for nursing homes among

its adherents. The trustee then entered into a

contract for the sale of the nursing home to Beth

Rifka, Inc., an Hassidic Jewish organization,

conditioned upon Beth Rifka obtaining required

licenses and certificates.

Beth Rifka applied to the State

Department of Health for establishment approval,

which was granted in September 1980.

In the meantime Staten Island community

groups brought pressure on New York City govern-

mental bodies, seeking to prevent the establishment

of the nursing home. These efforts apparently were

quite successful. In May 1960, Philip Goldstein,

Borough Superintendent of the Department of

Buildings, indicated his intention to institute

proceedings before the Board of Standards and

Appeals to revoke the Certificate of Occupancy. On

Augus 4 he formally applied to the Board for

revocation of the C.0.2

The trustee then moved in the Bankruptcy

Court by order to show cause for a stay barring

Goldstein and the Board from revoking, or pursuing

the proceedings to revoke, the C.0. As noted

above, Judge Galgay, in a decision filed October 8,

ordered the revocation proceedings stayed, from

which decision this appeal is taken.?

Judge Galgay, after reviewing the

history of the nursing home, made findings that the

City's revocation efforts were belated and were in

Tesponse to pressure by community groups, that the

City did not believe in good faith that the home

would endanger or harm the community or

neighborhood, and that the State had an interest in

having the home opened.

He concluded that the revocation)

proceedings were not valid exercises of the City's

"police powers" under its zoning laws, and that the

revocation efforts were, therefore, not exempt from

the automatic stay of Rule 12-43.

Judge Galgay concluded it was an

appropriate exercise of the Bankruptcy Court's

powers to enjoin the revocation proceedings under

$411 of the Bankruptcy Act which gives the

Bankruptcy Court exclusive jurisdiction of the

debtor and his property.

In my view, Judge Galgay's opinion

failed to give proper deference to the rule that

state regulatory power is beyond the scope of

Séction 41l's exclusive grant of jurisdiction.

This statute, operating together with

the mandatory stay provisions set forth in the

Tules of the various bankruptcy chapters, protects

the debtor against multiple, uncoordinated suits

brought in various jurisdictions by a multitude of

Claimants. It gives the debtor a certain breathing

spell end peraits hie to asst the various cleisents

in a single forum in coordinated proceedings under

the supervision of a single judge. The statute and

Tule are motivated in part by the recognition that

most estates would be torn apart by legal fees and

chaos (to the disadvantage of all) if the debtor

were required to answer every separate action in a

separate proceeding in whatever court it may be

asserted. See Fideli Investors Vv.

Camelia Guilders, Inc., (In re Fidelity Mortgage

Investors), 550 F.2d 47, 55 (2 Cir. 1976), cert.

denied, 429 U.S. 1093, reh. den., 430 U.S. 976

(1977).

Courts have long recognized, however,

that a state's enforcement of its regulatory powers

(sometimes called police powers) against the debtor

or its property is a different kind of matter

affected by different considerations. The fact

that one has filed in bankruptcy should not exemt

him from jurisdiction of the local traffic courts

or criminal courts if he drives the wrong way on a

one-way street or commits a criminal assault.

87

Similarly if a state administrative agency is

charged with the responsiblity of establishing and

enforcing an anti-pollution plan, it would not make

sense to deprive the agency of power to enforce the

plan against bankruptcy subjects, except at the

sufferance of the Bankruptcy Court.

A state's (or municipality's) enforce-

ment of its regulatory. laws generally calls for

uniform application consistent with an overall plan

to achieve a desired effect, whether it be the

achievement of clean air standards, preservation of

the cleaniness of the town's drinking water, zoning

for industry, commerce and residence’ or

whatever. The enforcement of these plans is

ordinarily entrusted either to police, town council

or specialized administrative body, with protéction

against unjust, discriminatory or illegal enforce-

ment being entrusted to the local and state courts.

The concerns of such regulatory plans have

generally little or nothing to do with the question

of payment of debtors or with whether any subject

is solvent or insolvent. Many such regulatory

plans would be impaired, or at least applied in a

chaotic irrational fashion, if the responsible

administrative bodies were deprived of authority

over any subjects which happened to be engaged in

federal insolvency proceedings.

The responsibility and expertise of the

Bankruptcy Court, in contrast, is to achieve

orderly reorganization or distribution to creditors

of the estates of bankrupts. It has nothing to do

with the enforcement of state regulatory power.

Nor is the ability of the bankruptcy court to

supervise orderly liquidation or reorganization

overcome if the bankrupt remains subject to local

regulatory power.

For such reasons, it has been

established for many years in court decisions that

the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court does not

extend to the enforcement of state regulatory

power.” he sign-post decision on this principle

is the opinion of Judge A. N. Hand in 1938, in

Smith v. New York State Liquor Authority, Inc., (In

| Be Bay Ridge Inn, Inc.), 94 F.2d 555 (2 Cir.)

reversing an attempt by the District Court in

bankruptcy to overturn a forfeiture imposed on the

bankrupt by the State Liquor Authority.

The same principle was recently invoked

by the Oistrict Court in Massachusetts, Colonial

Tavern, Inc. v. Byrne, (In re Colonial Tavern,

Inc.), 420 F.Supp. 44 (1976), which noted:

The force of Judge Hand's opinion [in

Ba ] is even more apparent in the

of a Chapter XI proceeding, which

is voluntary, and in which Rule 11-44

Shippers Interstate Service, Inc., (Appeal of

NLRB), 618 F.2d 9 (7 Cir. 1980); and NLRB v. Jonas,

(In re Bel Air Chateau Hospital, Inc., 611 F.2d

1248 (9th Cir. 1979), applying the same rule to

labor board proceedings.

Anether consideration implicit in this

principle is that the Bankruptcy Court, with its

paramount concern for the success of the particular

reorganization or for maximizing recovery by

creditors, may well have little interest in the

state's enforcement of its regulatory powers®

where this endangers the success of the particular

reorganization. Re opinion of the bankruptcy

judge, here, for exemple, sade repested reference

to three years of effort epended in achieving

successful reorgenization which would be aborted if

the C.0. were revoked.

Judge Galgey recognized the existence of

the principle, but, in sy view, gave insufficient

Geference to it. SGeceuse he foud inproper

sotivetion and political influence, he considered

this mot te be a velid exercise of state police

power end therefore not within the rule of the Bay

Ridge case. The conclusion does not follow. This

reasoning effectively gives the Gankruptcy Court

supervisory review of state reguiations.

The a@utfority of the New York City

Oeparteenst of Guildings ami of the Goer of

Standunds and fepeele ever sing is 0 aatter of

state regulatory power, outside the scope of the

exclusive jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court. If

those regulatory agencies ect in a discriminatory

and improperly sotiveted fasiiion, redress lies in

the state courts according to the review provisions

of state lew.” ‘The arguments atvenced by the

trustee thet state review is too slow to save the

reorgenization are irrrelevent. The exclusive

jurisdiction and automatic stay provisiac were

never intended to place a berkrupt above and beyond

the reaches of state regulatory lew.

The order eppeeled from is reversed and

the case remanded.

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to revoke the Debtor’s Certificate of Occupancy

(C.0.). After careful review of the history of

this prolonged case and of the policies underlying

the role of the automatic stay in a reel property

arrangement, this Court grants the antion of the

trustee.

The Debtor, @ Mew York partnership, is

the fee amer of real property in Staten Island

improved with an unlicensed, wopened cursing hone

facility. Approvel for the establistwent of the

home wes obtained fros the Deperteent of Hospitals

of Mew York City in April 1966, and constmction

commenced in June 1969. Washington Federal Savings

and Loan ("Association") hes an outstanding sortgage

on the property of epproxisately $2 sillion.

On or about Je 6, 1976 the Association

commenced an action to foreclose its sortgege in

the Suprese Court of the State of New York, County

of Rictword. A final judgeert of foreclose ad

sale wes optered on july 1, 1977 wc the

foreclosure sale wes scheduled for Septester il,

i977. Ga Mgust 31, 1977 the ODedter filed a

petition for an arrangesent pursuant to Crepter XII

of the Geriktuptcy Act, LL US @l-92%6, ad sn

eutowstic stay of all suits and lien enforcesents

wes imposed by Rule 12-43.

On October 17, 1977, on application of

the Debtor, Jemes L. Garrity wes eppointed as

trustee. This Court directed nim to imestigate

the possible uses of the mursing howe facility

which would form the basis of the Debtor's plan of

arrangenent. At thet paint in time the State of

Mew York contended that the cursing home hed not

been properly established in 1966. Gecase of a

alleged excess of masing tome beds in Staten

Island, the state refused to grant establistment

@pprovel for the nursing hone.

Gn March 21, 1978 the trustee ad Nis

camsel secured the agreesent of the Deperteert of

Health of Mew York State thet esteblisieent

approval might be granted to the howe under the

religious grap exception to the need requiresent

of Section 2801-e(3) of the New York Public Health

Law. The state indicated thet it would entertain

an epplication by an Hessidic grap wich could

satisfy the state us to its bore fides and as to

the existence of an unmet need for nutsing howe

facilities among its aderents.

The trustee entered into a contract for

sale of the property to Geth Rife, Ic, mm

Messidic orgenization. A condition precedent to

the closing of this transaction wes the granting of

estahlistment epprovel, operating certificate ad

other such epprovals as required by the state for

the opening of the nursing home. Geth Rifle

submitted its epplicetio. for establisteent

approval to the Mew York State Oeperteent of —

Health, and efter mmerous seetifgs an‘ inquiries

the Public Health Council of the State of New York,

as firel Licensing athority, gated te

application with certain ainor conditions.

During the next several sonths all the

perties worked to obtain satisfactory firercing

errengesents. The high interest rates preveiling

Guring the winter end spring required an ackiitional

approval by the Public Health Curcil before the

financing could be finalized. This final approvel

wes granted on Septesber 19, 1960.

The present controversy concems the

existing Certificate of Gopecy for the

premises. A temporary C.0. hed been iswed by the

city on Jerwary 10, 1973 and a final C.0. for a 200 +

bed nursing home w26 [sic] accessory perking speces

wes issued on Le ll, 1973.

By @ Letter dated May 7, 1960, Goldstein

threatened to institute proceedings before the New

vork City Goard of Standards and Appeals to reve

the C.0. The letter stated thet under applicable

regulations the Debtor's use of the facility wes «

non-confusming use which hed been discontined ad

could therefore not be resumed. O Ime ll, 1960,

coumsel to the trustee ajvised Gidstein that the

Oeparteent of Guildings is stayed pursuent to Rule

12-43 from prosecuting ary appeal to the Goard of

Standemis and Appeals to rewie the C.0.

Subsequently Goldstein advised the trustee’s

comsel of his intention to institute the

proceedings on the advice of his om counsel that

the automatic stay wes inapplicable.

The Oebter’s building hes been vacant

since its completion wille everwes to ope it -s «

muxsing howe heave been pursued. Prior to the

filing of the Chapter XII petition end throughout

the lengtty proceedings end bearings before the

edrinistrative agencies and deperteents which hed

to tule on Beth Rifka’s application, Galdstein and

the Gureeu [sic] of Standards and Appeals took no

ection to revoke the C.0. The Debtor hes proceeded

with its plans to finally open the nursing home, ad

all of the parties have eqended a greet desl of

tise and energy in bringing thet plan to fruition.

certain commmity groups opposed to the nursing

use of the property «s 2 cursing a oe

non-conforming in thet district. Goldstein's

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letter of Ime 30, 1980 to Mew York City

Commissioner Irwin Fructean [sic] stated thet

various Staten Island residents hed requested thet

the Department of Guildings apply to the Goand of

Standards and Appeals for revacation of the C.0.

Sy @ letter dated Augst 4, 1960,

without leave of this Court, Goldstein applied to

the Goerd of Standeris and Appeals for such

revocation. An affidavit sutmitted by the Office of

General Counsel to the Department of Suildings of

the City of Mew York stated thet “under zoning

resolutions $§22-13, 74-90 ami 74-903, the nursing

Permit is obtained from the City Planning

Commission or @ variance is obtained from the Board

of Standards and Appeals. The Trustee say pursue

his remedies to obtain a Special Permit or

variance. The Depertuent. will not oppose such

spplication of tre Trustee." (Bwhesis sided).

Tis afvidevit clearly indicates thet the

Departeent of Buildings does not contend thet the

facility somehow endangers the local commmity, is

unsafe to its proposed occupents or will heve a

deleterious effect on the neighborfecd. The Court

takes notice of the fact, es reported by the

ctustee, thet the nursing home is located between a

hospital and a medical center.

It is egeinst this beckgroud of three

years of work by the parties to refebilitate the

Deptor within this Crepter XII proceeding that the

present action by Goldstein aust be viewed.

Section 411 of the Bankruptcy Act, Ll usc 4ll,

gtents the court in which the Coepter XII petition

is filed “exclusive jurisdiction -ver the dedtor

and his property,

wherever located." From this express grant of

jurisdiction flow the broed injunctive powers which

the court can exercise to preserve thet exclusive

jurisdiction. See Rules Comment to $411.

Although the Bankruptcy Act contains no

exact definition of whet constitutes the property

of a debtor, the courts heve clearly found thet

operating licenses integral to @ reorgenizationel

proceeding ere property subject to tre jurisdiction

of the Bankruptcy Court. See Caroline Pipeline

Company v. New York County Natural Gas Authority,

388 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1967); In re Zeitzer Food

Comp, 9 CHC 614 (E.0.N.Y. 1976); In re Parkchester

(operel Hospital 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 292 (S.D.N.Y.

1978). It follows tmet the C.0. which Goldstein

seeks to have revoked is property of the Debtor.

The nursing home facility is the Dedtor's sale

asset. Revocation of tre C.0. will significantly

ispeir the velue of the asset and comietely

uncermine any rehebilitation of the Debtor.

In In_w Zeitzeer, spre, the court

determined thet the automatic stay of Rule 11-44

(a) of the Rules of Gankruptcy Procedure is

‘epplicable to aduinistrative proceedings to revoke

an operating License of a debtor, absent a showing

thet there is an enctosctmert on the police power

of the state to protect the health au welfare

ofthe commmity. 9 CEC 624. The language of Rule

12-43 is alsost identical to the lengquege of Rule

11-44(a) and the cases decided under the Cepter XI

rules are eppliceble to a Chepter XII proceeding.

Similarly, this Court held “.t an eiministrative

proceeding by the New York State Comissioner of

Health to revoke an operating certificate for «

debtor's hospital wes automatically stayed by the

filing of the Chapter XI petition and requimd

permission of the court, after a showing of good

cause, to vacate thet stay. In re Parkchester

Gereral Hospital, 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 292 (S.D.N.Y.

1978). Goldstein hes commenced his action against

the Debtor while the Debtor and his property are

under the protection of this Court and without the

“ shouting of good cause which the court would require

to vacate the stay under Rule 12-43(d).

In @ vety recent case decided under the

mew Genktuptcy Code, the court reviewd the

legislative Nistcry of the new autometic stay

provision and the narrow exception carved aut for

certain adainistrative proceedings. The new Code

provision reflects the trend under prior case law

under the Gankruptcy Act to prevent actions thet

would result

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In_re King Memorial Hospital Inc, 6 Bankr. Ct.

Dec. 634, 635 (S.D. Fla. 1980) quoting 12% Cong

Rec H 11089 (Dec. 1976). In thet case the court

held that any determination by the Department of

Health and Rehebilitetive Services that the

debtor hospital hed forfeited its exception from

the Certificates of Need Law was enjoined by the

qutomatic stay as not evidencing a exercise of

the police power to protect the public health and

safety.

Similarly, this court finds thet the

action proposed by the City to revoke the C.0. is

not within the velid exercise of its police power

under the zoning lews. If there wes a legitinate

concern for the protection of the public health

and welfare of the commmity surrauding the

Debtor’s property, then an adsinistrative action

should have been brought auch earlier. The C.0.

wes issued on Ive ll, 1973. In all this tine

the City never souget to revoke or even inquire

into the bone fides of the Debtor's C.0. Now,

more than vhree years after the filing of the

bankruptcy petition on the eve of consummation

of the Debtor's plan, the City hes seen fit to

Commence revocation proceeding witfout leave of

this Couft.

The State of Mew York, after extended

eduinistrative review, hes determined thet the

Massidic population of New York City hes en urmet

need for a nursing home which can be appropriately

filled by the opening of the Debtar's already

constructed facility. The State hes also

determined thet Geth Rifkea hes the financial

Tesources to successfully operate this facility.

The interest of the State in the onierly

aduinistration of a@ health care progres for the

benefit of the commmity clearly outweighs the

technical objection of the City concerning the

trustee’s lack of a Special Permit to which the

Department of Buildings hes no opposition.

The motion of the trustee seeking an onder

thet Goldstein and the Soar of Stexiens ad

fgpeals are stayed from instituting or continuing

proceedings to revoke the Debtor's Certificate of

Occupancy is hereby granted.

The alternative eaotion adjudging Goldstein

in contespt of the fule 12-45 astomstic stay is

hereby denied.

It is so omered.

Dated: New York, New York

October 6, 1960

uonIsodde

mo. $/-957

In the ‘

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED

October Term, 1981 1

Im the Matter of National

Hospital and Institutional

Builders Co.

PHILIP GOLDSTEIN, NEW YORK CITY DE-

PARTMENT OF BUILDINGS and NEW YORK

CITY BOARD OF STANDARDS AND APPEALS,

Petitioners,

Vv.

JAMES L. GARRITY, Trustee of

National Hospital and Insti-

tutional Builders Co., Debtor,

New York, New York 10017

(212) 850-0700

Of Counsel:

Arthur S. Olick

James P. Heffernan

Maria P. Sperando

2. Does the Bankruptcy Court

have jurisdiction under the Bankruptcy

Act of 1896 to enjoin enforcement of

zoming le-s where there has been a

finding of bad faith enforcement?

Table of Authorities

Cases:

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On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals For the

Second Circuit

-2-

Preliminary State vent

The respondent, James L. Garrity,

Trustee of National Hospital and Insti-

tuticnual Builders Company, Debtor,

respectfully requests that this Court

Geny the petition for writ of certiorari,

seeking review of the Second Circuit's

opinion in this case. That opinion is

reported at 656 F.2d 39.

James L. Garrity, court-

appointed Trustee of National Hospital

-3-

certificate of occupancy for the Debtor's

nursing home. After notice and hearing

the motion was granted and an injunction

issued. On appeal to the District Court

the injunction was dissolved. Thereafter,

om March 13, 1961 the District Court

granted the Trustee's motion for a stay

pending appeal -

The Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit thereafter held that an

application for revocation of a certifi-

cate of occupancy was a proceeding

against the debtor controlled by Bank-

ruptcy Rule 12-43 and thus the Bank-

ruptcy Court had jurisdiction to stay

the attempted revocation of the Debtor's

certificate of occupancy.

+

with a fully equipped nursing home

facility. Until recently the nursing

home facility stood empty, unopened and

unlicensed. Om February 16, 1961, after

the Trustee advised both the District

Court and the Bankruptcy Court, the

nursing home, having obtained all the

necessary licenses, began admitting

residents.

. Approval for the establishment

of the nursing home (later disavowed)

was initially obtained in April, 1966,

from the New York City Department of

Hospitals. Construction began in June,

1969. Foundation permits were issued on

June 17, 1969 and om December 2, 1969.

Plans were finally approved on October 20,

1970, and a full permit issved. Temporary

certificates of occupancy were issued on

Jamary 10, 1973 and March 6, 1973. A

final certificate of occupancy for a

-5-

240-bed nursing home was issued on

Jane ll, 1973.

Ever since the building which

is the subject of the administrative

proceedings commenced by the City was

completed, and until very recently, it

stood vacant while avenues to open it as

@ mursing home were pursued. Primarily

as @ result of the State's refusal to

grant the needed approval, the Debtor on

August 31, 1977 filed a petition for a

real property arrangement pursuant to

Chapter XII of the Bankruptcy Act. All

creditors, including the City of New

York, were notified by the Bankruptcy

Court of the filing of the petition.

In March, 1978, the Trustee

finally secured the agreement of the New

York State Department of Health that

establishment approval coul be granted

te the nursing home under the religious

group exception to the need requirement

Thereupon, the Trustee entered

into negotiations with the prospective

purchaser and, om July 18, 1978, executed

Public Bealih Law.* The State indicated

of Section 280l-a(3) of the Mew York

that it wes prepared to establish an

Bassidic group which could satisfy the

State as to its boma fides and as to the

existence of an unmet need for nursing

home facilities among its adherents.

@ contract with Beth Rifka, Inc. ("Beth

Rifka"),. am Hassidic Jewish group, for

the sale of the property as a nursing

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home. A condition precedent to the

Closing of this transaction was the

granting of establishment and various

other State and federal approvals. A

short time later, om August 3, 1978,

Beth Rifka submitted to the Department

of Health its application for establishment

approval pursuant to the religious

exemption provision of State law.

After the Trustee, the Debtor

and Beth Rifka had met numerous times

with and had fielded numerous inquiries

by and from the various health care

Geliberative and determinative bodies,

om August 24, 1979, the Public Health

Council of the State of New York, the

final licensing authority, approved Beth

Rifka's application for establishment

approval for the nursing home subject to

certain minor conditions. This approval

was granted despite vigorous opposition

mounted by members of the local community.

-8-

Because of certain improper procedures

om its own part, the Public Health

Council afterwards rescinded its approval

and resubmitted the application, which

was again approved with minor conditions

om December 21, 1979.

During the next several months,

all of the parties worked to obtain

satisfactory financing arrangements and

eventually came to an accord. Unfortu-

mately, the high interest rates prevailing

@uring the winter and spring of 1960

required an additional approval by the

Public Health Council before the financing

could be effected. This final approval

was obtained in December, 1980, subject

te certain minor conditions. The way

was now clear for the sale to Beth Rifka

te be consummated, thus providing the

economic basis to confirm the Chapter

XII plan of arrangement.

-o-

Prior to the filing of the

Chapter XII petition and throughout the

protracted proceedings and hearings

before the various administrative agencies

and departments which had to rule on

Beth Rifka's application, the City sat

by silently, allowing the Debtor to

proceed with its plans to finally open

the nursing home. Bowing eventually to

Pressure from politically prominent

Staten Island residents opposed to the

operation in their neighborhood of a

nursing home with facilities to serve

the needs of Hassidic News, the City

Department of Buildings threatened to

institute proceedings before Standards

and Appeals to revoke the nursing home's

certificate of occupancy. This belated

threat was contained in a letter from

Goldstein dated May 7, 1980 (seven years

after the issuance of the Certificate of

Occupancy) in which he stated that under

-10-

applicable regulations, the Debtor's use

of the facility was a non-conforming use

which had been discontinued and could

therefore not be resumed. Carbon copies

of this letter were sent to, among

others, the local Staten Island Civic

Association and the Borough President,

establishing clearly the motivating

force behind the City's sudden and

«Zi—

apply to Standards and Appeals for

revocation of the certificate of occupancy.

Goldstein stated that he had “received

{such} a letter from Mr. Bruce G. Behrins,

am attormey for tae Concord Civic Associ-

ation, the Dongam Hills Estates Civic

Association and the Grasmere Civic

Association.“ He stated further that he

had “also received inquiries" about the

nursing home “from Lillian Prado, District

Manager of Community Board Mo. 2 and

from the Borough President's office."

Goldstein recited that the arguments to

be advanced in support of révocation had

been set forth by Mr. Behrins. Goldstein

acknowledged in his letter that he had -

been informed by the Trustee's counsel

that the contemplated proceeding to

revoke the certificate of occupancy

contravened the automatic stay of Rule

12-43. Carbon copies of this letter

were sent to, among others, Mr. Behrins,

-l2-

Borough President Gaeta and Community

Board District Manager Prado.

Despite the communications

which he received from the Trustee's

general and special counsel, Goldstein,

without leave of the Bankruptcy Court,

by letter dated August 4, 1960 applied

to Standards and Appeals “for revocation

of the certificate of occupancy of the

Danube Nursing Home at 1000 Targee

Street."* This application laid out the

arguments for revocation advanced by Hr.

Behrins. It is the proceeding commenced

by this application which the Bankruptcy

Court determined was violative of the

automatic stay and could not be allowed

to proceed, which decision was reversed

by the District Court and subsequently

_ upheld by the Court of Appeals.

By Order to Show Cause dated

August 7, 1960, the Trustee moved the

Bankruptcy Court for an order staying

Goldstein and Standards and Appeals from

instituting or continuing proceedings to

revoke the Debtor's certificate of

occupancy or, in the alternative, adjudg-

ing Goldstein in contempt of the automatic

stay imposed by Rule 12-43 of the Federal

Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and certi-

fying the facts constituting such contespt

to the district court. Because of the

agreement of the parties as to the

material facts, the Bankruptcy Court did

mot take testimony but invited the

parties to submit proposed findings of

fact and conclusions of law. By meno-

randum and order entered October 8,

1960, the Bankruptcy Court granted the

Trustee's motion for injunctive relief

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-15-

legal technicality rather than being

inspired by any concern for health,

safety or welfare and (2) the State,

whose interests in the care of its

elderly was paramount to the City's

assertion of techmical objections under

the zoning law, had determined that the

Hassidic Jewish population had an unmet

need for nursing home beds which could

be satisfied by this already constructed

facility (at a cost to the public far

-16-

rehabilitation of the Debtor,” the

Bankruptcy Court declined to permit

continuation of the proceedings commenced

in derogation of the stay, holding that

it had the jurisdiction to do so both by

virtee of the automatic stay and its

inherent injunctive power.

DECISION OF THE DISTRICT COURT

The City appealed the order of

the Bankruptcy Court to the District

Court. Several civic associations

sought to intervene as amicus curiae

before the District Court but their

motion to intervene was denied on March 2,

1981. By an opinion and order dated

February 25, 1961, the District Court

(Leval, J.) reversed the case and remanded

the case to the Bankruptcy Court. The

District Court's view of the law was

@iametrically opposed to the view held

by the Bankruptcy Court. Both Courts

-17-

acknowledge that the basic facts are not

in dispute and differ solely on their

interpretation of the law. The essence

of the difference of opinion between the

District Court and the Bankruptcy Court

was the opinion of the former that the

latter “. . . failed to give proper

@eference to the rule that state regula-

tery power is beyond the scope of Secticn

4ll's exclusive grant of jurisdiction."

The District Court contrasted the responsi-

bility and expertise of state agencies

in establishing and enforcing their

statutory mandate in a uniform fashion

with the responsibility and expertise of

the Bankruptcy Court to achieve orderly

reorganization or distribution to credi-

tors. The District Court held that the

Bankruptcy Court's responsibility is not

infringed if the bankrupt remained

subject to local regulatory power and

that, in all events, the bankruptcy

power. Relying primarily on Smith v.

Mew York State Liquor Authority (In Re

Bay Ridge Inn, Inc.}, 9@ F.2d 555 (2d

Cir. 1938) and its progeny, the District

Court hel@ fast to the proposition that

the jurisdiction of a Bankruptcy Court

does not extend to the enforcement of

state regulatory power. The District

Court ignored the uncontested fact that

the certificate of occapancy is “property”

of the bankrupt estate and dismissed as

irrelevant the findings of the Bankruptcy

Court of improper motivation and political

influence as a basis for an exemption to

the general rule established in Bay Ridge.

By so doing, the District Court also

rejected the cases relied upon by the

Trustee which gave rise to an exception

te the general rule of federal abstention

as employed in Bay Ridge. The District

-19-

Court's decision precluded the Bankruptcy

Court from determining, in the first

instance, whether it has jurisdiction,

i.e., that the purported exercise of the

police powers wes in bad faith and

lacked bona fides -

DECTSION OF THE SECOMD CIRCUIT

Qn appeal by the Trustee, the

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

upheld the Bankruptcy Court's power to

impose an order staying the enforcement

of the revocation proceedings by Goldstein

and Standards and Appeals. The Court

held that Bankruptcy Rule 12-43, which

was in effect at the time the debtor

filed its Chapter XII petition, was

broad enough to empower the Bankruptcy

Court to stay the City's intended revoca-

tion of the Debtor's certificate of

occupancy. The Court reasoned that an

application for revocation is no less a

-20-

"proceeding against the debtor” under

Rule 12-43 tham a court proceeding or a

pending arbitration in light of the

importance of the certificate of occupancy

and the substantial weight accorded it

by the City.

| The Court further held that

there must be a finding of bad faith on

the part of the City regarding the

Proposed revocation before it could be

Getermined whether the City was entitled

te relief from the automatic stay.

Significantly, the Court expressly

rejected the City's argument that the

new Bankruptcy Code dictated that a stay

was impermissible because it specifies

that the automatic stay does not apply

te proceedings by govermmental units to

enforce their police or regulatory

powers. It stated that the Bankruptcy

Act, not the new Code, controlled, that

the new Code's stay provision “provides

-21-

little direction for interpreting the

stay under the Act," and that “Congress

removed local regulation only from the

effect of the automatic stay; it did not

eliminate the Bankruptcy Court's power

te enjoin the enforcement of local

regulation which is shown to be used in

bad faith." 658 F.2d at 43.

-22-

Second Circuit.* Whether the automatic

stay provision of the Bankruptcy Act of

1898 is applicable to “bad faith" matters

Of police and regulatory enforcement is

not an issue of sufficient significance

necessitating this Court's review. Mor

is the issue as to whether a certificate

of occupancy is “property” of the debtor

within the exclusive jurisdiction of the

Bankruptcy Court under Section 411 of

the Bankruptcy Act one important enough

to merit this Court's intervention.

-23-

Furthermore, whatever the

significance of the legal issues in this

action, they are governed by the Bank-

ruptcy Act of 1896 which has been super-

seded by the new Bankruptcy Code and

therefore apply <> most to a mere handful

of actions still pending under the

Bankruptcy Act. There is, therefore,

little point to this Court's reviewing

what has become, in essence, a moot

question.

According to Mr. Justice

Harlan, “even where a ‘true’ conflict

may be said to exist, certiorari will

sometimes be denied where it seems

likely that the conflict may be resolved

as a result of future cases in the Court

of Appeals, or where the impact of the

conflict is narrowly confined and is not

apt to have continuing future conse-

quences, as where a statute which has

given rise to conflicting interpretations

-24-

has been repealed wr is about to

expire.“ Mr. Justice Harlan, “Some

Aspects of the Judicial Process in the

Supreme Court of the United States," 33

Australian L.J. 108 (1959) (emphasis

added) .

This Court has denied certio-

rari even where there has been a2 real

conflict in cases where the statute upon

which the controversy rested had expired

or had been amended in a manner which

Prevented the problem from occurring in

the future. See, e.g., United States v.

Abrams, 344 U.S. 855 (1952); Community

Services, Inc. v. United States, 342

U.S. 932 (1952); Sokol Bros. Furnitrere

Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Reve we,

340 U.S. 952 (1951); Beal v. United

States, 340 U.S. 852 (1950); United

States v. Wilkinson, 355 U.S. 839

(1957), as described in Berger v.

United States, 170 F.Supp. 795 (S.D.N.Y.

1959); Co. v.

Commissioner, 363 U.S. 827 (1960)-

Im addition to the insiqiifi-

cance and mootness of the legal questions

at issue here, the “conflict" pointed to

by petitioners as justifying this Court's

issuing a writ is illusory.

This Court's holding in Palmer

v. Massachusetts, 308 U.S. 79 (1939) to

the effect that a Bankruptcy Court

camnot usurp the functions of a State

railroad commission and permit a railroad

in reorganization to abandon local

service does not conflict with the

Second Circuit's decision in this case

and accordingly is not a reason for

granting the writ. The Palmer holding

is grounded upom the fact that the

Gebtor there was a bankrupt railroad.

This Court specifically stated that “the

whole scheme of § 77 [that part of the

Bankruptcy Act pertaining to railroad

-26-

reorganizations] leaves no doubt that

Congress did not mean to grant to the

@istrict courts the same scope as to

bankrupt roads that they may have in

dealing with other bankrupt estates."

308 U.S. at 87.

Even assuming that Palmer is

in comflict with the Second Circuit's

Gecision herein, that in itself is an

insufficient ground for certiorari to

issue, for, as noted by Messrs. Stern

and Gressman, “it is to be doubted that

a contrary opinion rendered 30 or 40

years ago, without any indication that

it has current vitality, will be enough

te comvince the Court that there is a

live conflict which should be resolved."

Stern and Gressmen, Supreme Court Prac-

tice, p. 271 (Sth Ed. 1978).

Furthermore, In re State of

Missouri, 647 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1981)

-27-

there the Court stated in dictum only

that automatic stays under the Bankruptcy

Act “aid not apply generally to proceedings

affecting the public health and safety

or certain regulatory activity." The

bankruptcy petition in that action was

filed in 1960 and hence was governed by

the new Bankruptcy Code which specifies

im § 362(b)(4) that the automatic stay

does not apply to proceedings by a

govermental unit to enforce its police

or regulatory powers. Moreover, the

Court actually held that the automatic

stay was proper because the Missouri

grain laws at issue primarily related

mot to matters of safety and health but

to the protection of the pecuniary

interest in the debtors" property. 647

F.2a at 776.*

-28-

Moreover, the alleged conflict

of the Second Circuit's holding in this

Case with the “numerous authorities”

cited in In re State of Missouri,

Supra, 667 F.2a at 775, is irrelevant as

to whether certiorari should issue here.

Most of those decisicnus, even if truly

in conflict with the Second Circuit's

of a federal court of appeals merely

The Second Circuit was correct

in its determination that the Bankruptcy

Court possesses the power to examine the

bona fides of administrative action,

taken under color of the police power,

im orde> to determine its jurisdiction

te protect property of the Debtor's

estate.

The Court of Appeals properly

interpreted Bankruptcy Rule 12-43, which

provides that the petition “shall

operate as a stay of the commencement or

the continuation of any court or other

Proceeding against the debtor ... or

of any court proceedings to enforce any

Lien against his property" as being

broad enough to stay the City's intended

-

-30-

revocation of the Debtor's certificate

ef occupancy. The Court concluded that

“[gliven the importance of the C.0. to

the Debtor and the substantial weight

the C.0. is accorded by the City, we

cammot say that Goldstein's application

for revocation is any less a ‘proceeding

against the debtor’ than a court proceed-

ing or a pending arbitration." 658 F.2d

at 42.

As noted by the Second Circuit,

if the Bankruptcy Courts lacked the

power to protect a debtor's assets from

bad faith zoning regulation, “a city

interested in the outcome of a bankruptcy

petition could seriously interfere

with management of the bankrupt estate

through repeated threats of harmful

zoning.“ Id. at 43. Obviously, this

will wreak havoc with the rehabilitative

purpose of Chapter XII.

Conclusion

For all of the foregoing

reasons, the petition for a writ of

certiorari should be denied, and the

Second Circuit's reversal of the District

Court's judgment should be allowed to

stand in all respects.

jeu Aidey

— SJOUOI Ned

LEQNARD KOERNER,

UDAH DICK,

JOSEPH I. LAUER,

MARVIN B. MITZNER,

of Counsel

PETITIONER'S REPLY GRIEF

Under Rule 22.5 of the Rules of this

Court, @ reply brief may be filed by @

petitioner if the Respondent's Grief in

Opposition raises a new argument not covered in

the Petition. Since respondent raises the

question of whether the issues involved are

*significant® enough for this Court to consider,

@ short reply is being sutmitted.

The critical question raised by the

petition was not limited to the automatic stay

of Bankruptcy Rule 12-435 which was superseded by

Sec. 362 of the new Bankruptcy Code, insofar es

benkruptcies filed on end after October 1, 1979

are involved. As the petition phrases the very

first question, the issue is the subject sstter

Jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts to enjoin the

exercise of police power wider ay

circumsterces. The issue is the same for

setters arising under the Act or under the Code,

since lack of jurisdiction does not only limit

automatic stays but also effects specific stays

or injunctions against the exercise of police

powers issued at the behest of a trustee or

debtor. As in the Missouri petition (No. 41-79

Oct. 196] Term), the issue is not merely wether

Bankruptcy Rule 12-45 wes intended to cover

police and governmental regulatory enforcesert,

but whether Congress ever grented jurisdiction

in Secs. 1 or 411 of the Gaerkrptcy Act or in

Sec. 105 of the Barkruptcy Code to permit

benkruptcy courts to interfere with state

goverrmentel operations. We sutmit thet, by

enacting 28 U.S.C. § 1478, barring removel of a

civil action by @ goverrmental wit to enforce

its police ena regulatory powers, Congress

declared its intention thet benkruptcy courts

should not be involved in this area end limited

their eutfority to directly effect @ mmici-

pelity's exercise of its police power.

For the reasons set forth in the

petition end in this Grief, the wit of

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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