Record and brief — Goldstein v. Garrity
Supreme Court brief1982
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
voted
Office - Supreme Court, U.S.
81-951 mes key
Noy & 196!
whe; IN THE ALEXANDER L. STEVAS.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED stares CUERK
HOSPITAL AND INSTITUTIONAL
BUILDERS CO.
PHILIP GOLOSTEIN, NEW YORK CITY
DEPARTMENT OF BUILDINGS and NEW YORK
CITY BOARD OF STANDARDS AND APPEALS,
Petitioners,
Vv.
JAMES L. GARRITY, Trustee of Debtor,
Respondent.
ALLEN G. SCHWARTZ
Corporation Counsel of
the City of New York
Attorney for Petitioners
100 Church Street
New York, N.Y. 10007
(212) 566-4337
(212) 566-4159
LEONARD KOERNER,
' JUDAH DICK,
JOSEPH I. LAUER,
MARVIN B. MITZNER,
of Counsel
l. Whether a bankruptcy court has
subject matter jurisdiction to enjoin
enforcement of police and regulatory powers of a
governmental agency on any grounds?
2. Whether the automatic stay of
Bankruptcy Rule 12-43 applies to bar enforcement
of police and regulatory powers? .
3. Whether a certificate of
occupancy is "property" of the debtor within the
constructive custody of the bankruptcy court?
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Jurisdictional Statement........ssseeees
Statement of the Case.....csscccsecesees
Reasons for Granting the Writ...........
APPENDIX A.
Opinion of the Court of Appeals.........
APPENDIX 8.
Opinion of the District Court...........
APPENDIX C.
Opinion of the Bankruptcy Court.........
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES
Pages
zn ae mt Madison Industries Inrc.,
. Ir. eeeneeeeaeeaeaeaee 32
Gills v. California, 293 U.S. 62
eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 32
Palmer v. Massachusetts,
35 U.S. 79 vg 28-29
Smith v. New York State Liquor
>. I. pyle es 16
State of Missouri v. United States
T. ; U.S. Sup. Ct. October
Term, Docket No. Eereaeedccaocdsocococee 24-27
State of Ohio v. Mansfield Tire and
eee
Sn 27
STATUTES AND RULES
P.L. 95-S9B, SOC. 4038)... .cccccccccces 20
Ps Beiekbascbdeccccccctcccccccce | =6M
ER, eR kictddccccccccpsescicccce 5
es SONMalcicacehascccessccopecee 27
Bankruptcy Act Of 1898......ccccececccees 9,
Bankruptcy Code, Sec. SE2ecccccccccces 13, 16
Bankruptcy Rule DEiinbusecoéécode 9, 15,18
New York City Zoning Resolution.... 8, 21-22
New York City Pe Pevcdeacccceosee 1,11,14
TREATISES
3 Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and
PRUs cd ctdccccocsuccocccececcee 9, 31
* * &
STATEMENT
Tne petitioners, Philip Goldstein
(the Borough Superintendent of Staten Island of
the New York City Department of Buildings), the
New York City Department of Buildings, and the
New York City Board of Standards and Appeals,*
* The New York City Board of Standards and
Appeals (BSA) is a local quasi-judicial tribunal
with jurisdiction, inter alia, to determine
whether the zoning regulations have oeen
violated and is authorized to revoke a
certificate of occupancy if it finds that a
building cannot legally be used for the purpose
set forth in the certificate (N.Y. City Charter
Sec. 645(b)(3)(e)). BSA has yet to consider any
of the zoning issues mentioned herein by reason
of tne injunction.
seek a writ of certiorari to review an order of
the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit entered on August 17, 1981; no
motion for rehearing was filed.
The Second Circuit, by a divided
panel, reversed an order of the United States
District Court that dissolved a Bankruptcy Court
injunction barring the Department of Buildings
from proceeding with its application before the
Board of Standards and Appeals to revoke a
Certificate of Occupancy for use of a facility
owned by the Debtor as a nursing home. The
Second Circuit held that the Gankruptcy Court
had jurisdiction to enjoin the City from
enforcing its zoning laws, but that = such
jurisdiction should be exercised only if a
finding of “bad faith" enforcement is made by
the court, and remanded the case to the District
Court to determine the issue of bad faith.
Pending such determination, petitioners have
been enjoined from enforcing applicable laws.
The opinion of the Circuit Court below conflicts
with this Court's rationale in Palmer v.
Massachusetts, 308 U.S. 79 (1939), and with
decisions of the Third, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth
and Ninth Circuits.*
*See cases cited on pages 26-27, 32 infra.
OPINIONS BELOW
On August 17, 1981, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit filed an
order and opinion (as yet unreported) reversing
the order of United States District Judge LEVAL
which reversed an injunction order issued oy
Bankruptcy Judge GALGAY, permanently enjoining
tne City from taking any action to revoke a
certificate of occupancy issued in 1973 to use a
certain facility owned by the Debtor as a
nursing home.
Tne Circuit Court's Opinion was
published at 658 F.2d. 39 and is reproduced at
Appendix A. The Opinion of tne District Court
was publisned in 9 8.R. (West's) 948, and is
reproduced at Appendix 8. Tne Opinion of the
Bankruptcy Court is reproduced at Appendix C.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The judgment of the Court of Appeals
was entered on August 17, 1981. Title 28 U.S.C.
§1254(1) authorizes this Court to review cases
in the courts of appeal "by a writ of certiorari
upon the petition of any party to any civil or
criminal case, before or after rendition of
judgment or decree."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
(1)
Debtor's sole assef is a parcel of
Teal property located at 1000 Targee Street,
Staten Island, New York, which is improved poy a
structure built to be used as a nursing home.
Tne home was built by an affiliated predecessor
in title from 1969 to 1973, pursuant to approval
of State and City health authorities.
Construction of a nursing home at that time did
mot require a variance or special permit under
the then-existing zoning laws of the City of New
York.
Upon completion of construction in
1973, a final Certificate of Occupancy (C.0.)
was issued by the City Department of Buildings,
which certificate evidenced that the building
met building code requirements and that the use
thereof as a nursing home was legal at the time.
The nursing home was never opened because the
New York State Public Health Council declined to
give the home “establishment approval" due to an
excess of nursing homes in Staten Island.
In early 1974, the City amended its
Zoning Resolution to prohibit construction of
nursing nomes in certain designated residential
areas, including the area of Staten Island in
which 1000 Targee Street is located, without
first obtaining a Special Permit from the City
Planning Commission. Special Permits are not
granted as a matter of right, but may be granted
only if the proposed development meets certain
stated standards. The permit may also be
conditioned upon provision of appropriate
safeguards, such as off-street parking and
Telated improvements, which the City Planning
Commission finds will minimize the adverse impact
of the development on tne character of the
surrounding area.
Under the Zoning Resolution, an
amendment barring use of a facility already in
existence renders such facility a nonconforming
use, which use may nevertheless legally continue
to operate for so long as the structure exists
and the use is uninterrupted. If, however, a
legal nonconforming use is discontinued for two
years or more, it is deemed abandoned and may no
longer be lawfully used for such nonconforming
purpose, irrespective of the existence of a
valid C.0. (See, Zoning Resolution, §§ 12-10,
52-61, pp. 21-22 infra.)
It is undisputed that from 1974, when
the use of the premises as a nursing home became
nonconforming, until 1980, the premises were not
used for any purpose. In the view of petitioners
Goldstein and Department of Buildings, this
nonuse for a period of six (6) years constituted
an abandonment of the nonconforming use by
operation of law.*
In 1975, debtor had acquired title to
the property. In June 1977, the mortgagee
commenced foreclosure on its mortgage and
entered a judgment of foreclosure. Just before
the date scheduled for the sale, the deptor
filed a petition for a real property arrangement
under Chapter XII of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 USC
§§601-926, obtaining an automatic stay of
foreclosure by virtue of Bankruptcy Rule 12-43.
ve Telief against the violation of a
ordinance may be ae oe oe 3a
ty against an
cee wy gage of the - Ae a C. 0.
Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning,
55<22.
In March 1978, the trustee obtained
the agreement of the State Department of Health
that establishment approval for a nursing home
may be granted to a religious group which can
demonstrate a need for a nursing home for its
adnerents. The Trustee then entered into a
contract to sell the facility to Beth Rifka, a
Hassidic Jewish organization, conditioned upon
Beth Rifka's ability to obtain all necessary
licenses and certificates. Beth Rifka obtained
such approval in September 1980, and commenced
operations in March 1981, during the pendency of
this litigation.
Prior to April 1980, community groups
opposed to the nursing home called the attention
of petitioner Goldstein to a possible violation
of zoning regulations by use of the facility as
a nursing home based upon the abandorment of the
facility by two years of non-use. Goldstein,
after consultation witn his superiors in the New
York City Department of Buildings, agreed with
this view and, in April 1980, commenced
proceedings before the New York City Board of
Standards and Appeals (BSA) to revoke the C.O.
Under the New York City Charter, §645(b)(3)(e),
a C.0. is presumptively valid until revoked by
tne BSA or by a court of competent
jurisdiction. As will oe discussed below, the
BSA proceedings sere interrupted by the
injunction order issued by the bankruptcy judge.
(2)
In granting injunctive relief,
Bankruptcy Judge Galgay* held that the
petitioners violated the automatic stay oy
commencing ‘evocation proceedings without leave
of his court, but, treating the City's papers as
a motion to vacate the automatic stay, denied
such relief because the City had not shown any
legitimate need to enforce its zoning
regulations in the instant case. He gave great
weight to the State's finding that there was a
need for a rmursing home for tne Hassidic
community. Although Judge Galgay did not make
any specific findings of “bad faith", he did
find that the City official's revocation efforts
were belated and initiated in response to
pressure by community groups. He concluded that
*” A copy of Als opinion is contained in
Appendix C.
12
under §411 of the Bankruptcy Act, he could
permanently enjoin revocation of the C.0. even
after transfer of title to Betn Rifka.
The City appealed to the District
Court. On appeal, Judge Leval reversed the
order of Judge Galgay on the ground that
_- enforcement of police powers such as zoning is
" qutside the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy
Court, citing Sec. 362 of the 1978 Bankruptcy
Code in support of his conclusion.*
Furthermore, he noted the tendency of bankruptcy
courts to put a higher premium on rehabilitation
of debtors than on uniform enforcement of
Tegulatory powers of the State which may
endanger the success of the reorganization and
doubted whether such courts were the appropriate
neutral forum to decide these issues.
¥" A Copy of his opinion is contained in
Appendix 8.
13
The Trustee appealed to the Second Circuit
and tnat court reversed Judge Leval and remanded
the case to the District Court for review of the
bankruptcy court's finding of bad faith on the
part of petitioners. The Court of Appeals
explained tnat by bad faith it meant more than
an erroneous determination of law or fact but
rather a showing by the Trustee that the City
seeks to enforce a law which is "flagrantly and
patently violative of express constitutional
prohibitions"; that the state forum is biased;
that the City acted in wilful disregard of the
law; that City officials clearly abused their
discretion in initiating proceedings against the
trustee; that the City’s motivation was a desire
to harass, by ill will, or by any other improper
motive (A27-28). The court noted that a
proceeding commenced by City officials in tne
14
usual manner upon notification of a violation
would not evidence bad faith (A28, 29).
The Circuit Court held that Bankruptcy
Rule 12-43, which bars commencement of a
proceeding to enforce a lien against the
Gebtor's property, was sufficiently broad to
Stay the City's attempted revocation of the
Debtor's C.0., since the nursing home was its
sole asset and critical to its reorganization
(Al9). It viewed §645 of the New York City
Charter, wnich makes a C.0. binding upon City
agencies (until revoked or modified by the Board
of Standards and Appeals or a court), as
investing a property-like quality to the C.0.,
despite its mere evidentiary nature (Al19-20).
It therefore concluded that the City officials
nad to petition the Bankruptcy Court to relieve
the City from the stay and demonstrate cause for
15
such relief (A20). It distinguished its own
decision in Smith v. New York State Liquor
Authority, In Re Bay Ridge Inn, Inc. 94 F2d. 555
(2d Cir. 1935), in which it had held that a
bankruptcy court had no power to compel the
State Liquor Authority to reinstate a liquor
license to a debtor on the ground that no bad
faith was alleged there, whereas in the present
case the Bankruptcy Court had made a finding
tnat the City's conduct was not a legitimate
exercise of police power (A23-24).
It went on to hold that $362 of the new
Bankruptcy Code was not a codification of
existing law under the Act, but rather a
legislative expression of preference for a
narrower application of the automatic stay in
tne future. It further neld that even under
§362 the Bankruptcy Court retained power to
enjoin bad faith enforcement of a local
Tegulation, even if the automatic stay was
inapplicable, and that Congress did not adopt a
total hands-off approach towards local
regulation (A24-25).
The dissent of Circuit Judge Mansfield
pointed out that the Trustee did not even assert
a Claim of denial of the debtor's constitutional
rights and that enforcemerit of State laws should
be left to the State's administrative apparatus,
with the debtor having the same right to
judicial review as any other party (A32). A
bankruptcy court should not be a super-Planning
Commission or Board of Standards and Appeals
(A352). The dissent pointed out that the State
administrative agencies and courts were not only
better equipped to determine the issues, out
that there was a fundamental conflict between a
17
bankruptcy court's interest or motivation -- to
rehabilitate the debtor for the benefit of
creditors -- and that of a state agency whose
interest is a fair and uniform enforcement of
Tegulatory powers which benefit the community at
large (A34). Judge Mansfield pointed out that,
if bankruptcy courts interfered witn State
regulatory agencies wherever threatened action
adversely affected the value of the debtor's
estate, it would work havoc with many State laws
(A34-35). He disputed the applicability of
Bankruptcy Rule 12-43 to such cases, since the
purpose of the rule was to prevent § lien
enforcement by secured parties from thwarting
reorganization. He raised doubt as to whether a
C.0. could be classified as "“property"*
especially where the legality of the use lapsed
by its non-exercise through the nonuse of the
facility for over two years (A37-40). Finally,
he found nothing in the record showing any bad
faith on the part of the petitioners (A43-46).
* A C.0. is merely a piece of paper evidencing
the existence of certain facts at the time it
was issued.
APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended*
§i. Creation of courts of
bankruptcy and their jurisdiction
(a) The courts of the United
Stated hereinbefore defined as courts
of bankruptcy are hereby created
courts of bankruptcy and are hereby
invested, within their respective
territorial limits as now established
or as they may be hereafter -
with such jurisdiction at law and in
equity as will enable them to
exercise original jurisdiction in
proceedings under this title, in
vacation, in chambers, and during
their respective terms, as they are
now or may oe hereafter held, to -
** *
(15) Make such orders, issue such
process, and enter such judgments, in
addition to those specifically
provided for, as may be necessary for
the enforcement of the provisions of
this title: Provided, however, That
an injunction to restrain a court may
be issued by the judge only;
**2 *
since the petition was filed in 1977.
petitions filed on
after October 1, 1979. P.L. 95-598, Sec.
20
(20) Exercise ancillary
jurisdiction over persons or property
within their respective territorial
limits in aid of a receiver or
court of bankruptcy: Provided
That the jurisdiction of the
court over a bankrupt's
into its
valid and the expenses of ancillary
administration, and transmitting tne
property or its proceeds to the court
of primary jurisdiction; ....
§4l11. Exclusive jurisdiction of
debtor and property
Where mot inconsistent with the
provisions of this chapter, the court
in which the petition is filed shall,
for the purposes of this chapter,
have exclusive jurisdiction of the
debtor and his property, wherever
located.
PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THE NEW YORK CITY
ZONING RESOLUTION
Section 12-10 of the Zoning Resolution contains
the following definitions of "non-conforming"
use and "non-conforming":
A oe oF 2 aide is any lawful use,
whether of a or other structure
or of a tract of land, which does not
ae oe ae
applicable regulations of the
district in which it is located, either
on the effective date of this resolution
or as a result of any subsequent
amendment thereto. — is
A non-conforming use shall result from
failure to conform to the applicable
district regulations on either permitted
Use Groups or performance standards.
A "non-conformity" is a failure by a
non-conforming use to conform to any one
of such applicable use regulations.
Sec. 52-61 of the Zoning Resolution provides:
If, for a continuous perioc of two years,
either the non-conforming use of land
with minor improvements is discontinued,
~ 4 the active operation of substantially
the a uses in any
—— *
or building or other structure shail
thereafter be used only for a
conforming use. Intent to resume
active operations shall not affect
the foregoing.
The provisions of this Section shall
not apply where such discontinuance
is directly caused by war, strike or
other labor difficulties, a
governmental program of materials
rationing, or the construction of a
duly authorized improvement project
by a body or a public utility company.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
(1)
Petitioners submit that a writ of
certiorari should issue because the Second
Circuit's decision of August 17, 1981 involves
important unsettled issues of bankruptcy court
jurisdiction and its relationship to enforcement
by goverrnmerital bodies of their police and
regulatory powers before administrative bodies
and in non-bankruptcy courts. The subject has
been a source of conflicting decisions of the
lower courts, on Bankruptcy, Oistrict and
Circuit levels, and it is important that this
conflict be expeditiously resolved to avoid
confrontations between state and federal courts
over tnese issues.
Petitioners note that there is
presently pending before this Court a petition
by the State of Missouri, et al. (No. &1-79,
Oct. 1981 Term) for a writ of certiorari to the
Eighth Circuit. We respectfully submit tnat the
Missouri petition raises similar jurisdictional
issues. If a writ is issued in that case, a
writ should be issued in this case as well and
oral argument on botn cases could be scheduled
for the same time. However, even if the
petition of the State of Missouri is denied
because this Court agrees witn the holding of the
Eighth Circuit that Missouri's grain law does
not properly fall into the classification of
"police and regulatory laws", it should grant
the petition herein because enforcement of
zoning laws is clearly enforcement of the
State's police powers. Indeed, the Eighth
Circuit itself, at 647 F.2d 768, 778 (Appendix
A-13 of Missouri's petition), cited District
Judge Leval's decision in the instant case in
its discussion of which types of governmental
regulatory activities were excluded from the
scope of the automatic stay. The Eighth Circuit
stated (647 F.2d at 775):
Tne present stay provisions [of
the mew Code] amplify and clarify
provisions of the former bankruptcy
law and bankruptcy rules provides for
an automatic stay of certain
proceedings against debtors. See,
@.g. ll U.S.C. 148 (repealed 1978);
1l U.S.C. §248 (repealed 1978); Rules
of Bankruptcy Procedure 401, 6l,
: — . eTs
interstate Service, 618 F. 2d 9, (7th
Cir. 1980) (labor laws); In re Bel
Air Chateau Hospital 611 F.2d 1248
(9th Cir. 1979) (labor laws); In re
National Hosptial and Institutional
Builders Co. 9 B.R. 948 (S.D. N.Y.
1981) (zoning laws); In re Grand
Spaulding Dodge Inc., 5 8.R. 581
(Bankruptcy Ct. N.D. Ill 1980)
(consumer protection laws); In fre
Canarico Quarries, Inc. 466 F. Supp.
1333 (0. Puerto Rico 1979)
(environmental protection laws); In
Te Colonial Tavern, Inc., 420 F.
Supp. 44 (0. Mass. 1976) (liquor
laws). (Underlining added. ]
The Eighth Circuit quoted from the legislative
history of $362 of the 1978 Code to explain te
purpose of excluding police and regulatory law
enforcement from the automatic stay.*
In all of the cases cited by the
Eighth Circuit, the automatic stay under the Act
was held to be inapplicable to matters of police
and regulatory enforcement. In addition to
these cases, the Sixtn Circuit recently held
that bankruptcy courts had no jurisdiction to
pass on the validity of workers’ claims for
injury or death as the exclusive jurisdiction is
vested in State courts in cases involving police
powers. State of Ohio v. Mansfield Tire and
Rubber Co, F.2d, Bankruptcy Law Reports,
CCH, $68,356 (Sept. 29, 1981). In contrast, the
Second Circuit decision in the instant case
appears to be alone in holding that
When Congress enacted the 1978 Code, it also
enacted 28 U.S.C. §1478 as an explicit
jurisdictional bar to removal to a Bankruptcy
Court of civil actions brought by a governmental
unit to enforce its police and regulatory powers.
27
the automatic stay applied to the enforcement of
police power laws.
‘Apart from the conflict of the Second
Circuit holding in the instant case with the
numerous authorities cited by the Eighth Circuit
(at p. 26, supra,) the holding is inconsistent
with the judicial philosophy expressed by this
Court in Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U.S. 79
(1939), in which the Court held that a
bankruptcy court cannot usurp the functions of a
state railroad commission and permit a railroad
in reorganization to abandon local service.
This Court noted that in construing legislation
involving operation of railroads owned by a
deotor, the Court traditionally upheld the power
of States to regulate their local transportation
and, in the absence of a clear Congressional
mandate to the
contrary, reorganization courts could not
interfere in such matters (id. at 83-84). This
Court rejected arguments that continuance of
state control over local passenger service would
impair the power of the bankruptcy court to
formulate a reorganization plan for I.C.C.
approval, noting that a single judge removed
from familiarity with local problems, and not
necessarily gifted with statesman-like
imagination, should not override decisions of
expert state agencies [id. at 89].
If the Second Circuit opinion is not
altered, the City could not issue a "vacate
order” on a building it believes to be hazardous
to life and limb without first obtaining leave
of a Bankruptcy Court if such building happened
to be owned by a debtor. If the Bankruptcy
Court is located outside of the City (perhaps
thousands of miles away), the City must then
expend considerable time and money just to seek
leave from a distant bankruptcy judge before it
can protect its citizens. This result
undermines the City's ability to protect the
very lives of its citizens in an emergency.
Moreover, as District Judge Leval pointed out in
his opinion (at 87-8), the fact that one has
filed in bankruptcy should not exempt him from
jurisdiction of local traffic courts or criminal
courts if he drives the wrong way on a one-way
street or commits a criminal assault.
As noted by Judge Leval, if bad faith
can be shown by the trustee, he has adequate
judicial remedies in the state courts or even in
a federal court under civil rights statutes
(Bl6 mn. 7).
It should be further noted that
Bankruptcy Judge Galgay held no hearings and all
his findings of facts were based on papers
submitted by the parties. All that the City
conceded is that it took no action to revoke the
C.0. until i980, when some local community
groups called the violation to its attention.
Since the City is unable to police all zoning
violations, it must necessarily depend on
citizen complaints for much of its enforcement.
The majority opinion concedes that response to
citize. complaints is not an indication of bad
faith (at A28-29). And, as the dissent points
out, there was no actual existing violation of
law because the debtor was not even using the
property as a nursing home and might never have
done so (at A44-46). Thus, there is nothing in
the record to support the Trustee's allegations
of bad faith.
31
Another issue on which the Second
Circuit's ruling conflicts with that of another
Circuit, the Third Circuit, is whether a C.0. is
"property" of the debtor within the constructive
custody of the court. In the present case, the
majority treated a certificate as valuable
property even though it was only evidentiary in
mature (Al9). In In Re Dolly Madison Industries
Inc., 504 F.2d 499 (3rd Cir. 1974), the Third
Circuit held that a certificate of authority to
do business in a certain state was not property,
citing Gills v. California, 293 U.S. 62 (1934),
in which this Court held that a bankruptcy court
was powerless to authorize non-compliance with a
state licensing statute.
As shown at pp. 8&9, supra, the
City’s zoning law is self-executing anc, upon
nonuse of the facility as a nursing home for two
years, the legality of its use lapsed ipso
facto, irrespective of the outstanding C.0O.
This lapse occurred in 1976, more than a year
before the petition was filed. The City was
thus entitled to obtain injunctive relief
against use of the property es @ nursing hone.
3 Rathkopf The Law of Zoning and Planning
§55-22. The C.0. itself cannot properly be
characterized as "property" within the
constructive custody of the court.
Moreover, Bankruptcy Judge Galgay's
injunction appears to extend beyond the duration
of the debtor's ownership of the facility, and
to affects the property permanently even after
it is transferred to other parties. The effect
of such an injunction order would be to
permanently prevent the City from enforcing a
violation of zoning laws long after the debtor
is gone from the scene. The result of such an
order is absurd.
Even during debtor's ownership, a
Trustee, as are all court officers, is obligated
to manage and operate property in his possession
in accordance with the valid laws of the state
in which the property is situated in the same
manner as any other property owner. 28 U.S.C.
§959(b). The courts have no power to dispense
with this statute.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, a writ
certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
ALLEN G. SCHWARTZ
Corporation Counsel of
the City of New York
Attorney for Petitioner
35
of
APPENDIX A
Opinion of the Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For The Second Circuit
No. 1301 --September Term, 1980
(Argued April 29, 1981 Decided
August 17, 1981)
Docket No. 81-5009
In The Matter of
NATIONAL HOSPITAL AND INSTITUTIONAL BUILDERS
COMPANY, a Partnership,
Debtor.
NATIONAL HOSPITAL &
INSTITUTIONAL BUILDERS Co.,
Plaintiff,
JAMES L. GARRITY, Trustee of the Debtor,
Appellant,
on) <=
PHILIP GOLDSTEIN, NEW YORK CITY DEPT. OF
BUILDINGS, and NEW YORK CITY BOARD OF
STANDARDS & APPEALS,
Defendant s-Appellees.
Before:
LUMBARD , MANSFIELD, and VAN
The Debtor's trustee in bankruptcy
appeals from an order of the Southern District,
Leval, J., which reversed an order of Bankruptcy
Judge Galgay who had enjoined the City of New
York under the automatic stay provision of
Bankruptcy Rule 12-43 from seeking revocation of
the Debtor's Certificate of Occupancy.
Reversed and remanded for further
findings of facts.
Joseph
Laver, Marvin B. Mitzner, New
York, N.Y., of counsel), for
fopellees
LUMBARD, Circuit Judge:
James L. Garrity, acting as trustee
for the National Hospital and Institutional
Builders Company (Debtor), appeals from an order
of Jutge Leval of the Southern District
“reversing en order of the bankruptcy court.
Bankruptcy Judge Galgay had applied the
automatic stay imposed by Rule 12-43 of the
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure to prohibit the
appellees -- various subdivisions and officers
of the City of New York -- from instituting or
continuing proceedings to revoke the Certificate
of Occupancy for the Debtor's nursing home.
Because the district court failed to review
Bankruptcy Judge Galgay's critical finding that
the City was pursuing the revocation in bad
faith, we reverse and remand for further
findings of fact.
The Debtor, a New York partnership,
owns as its sole asset a nursing home and the
land it occupies at 1000 Targee Street on Staten
Island. The Debtor's four partners were Bernard
Bergman and three members of his family. The
New York City Department of Health initially
granted approval for establishing the nursing
nome in April of 1966, and construction began in
June of 1969. Construction was completed in
June of 1973, and a final Certificate of
Occupancy (C.0.) was issued in June of that
year. Washington Heights Federal Savings and
Loan Association (Washington Federal) held a
mortgage on the property of approximately $2
million.
In 1975, Bergman was indicted by a
federal grand jury for filing false tax returns,
submitting false medicaid claims, making false
statements to the federal government, and
conspiring to commit those offenses and to
defraud the government. He was also indicted by
@ New York State grand jury for conspiracy,
filing fraudulent reimbursement claims, larceny,
and obstruction of government administration.
Bergman pled guilty to a violation of the New
York Public Officers Law as part of a larger
plea agreement that settled both the federal and
state indictments against him. Under that
agreement, Bergman's assets, which included his
interest in this and several other nursing
homes, were assigned to a state-appointed
A7
receiver for purposes of collecting a $2.5
million judgment against Bergman held by the
State. See Chase Manhattan Mortgage and Realty
Trust _v. Bergman (In re Bergman), 585 F.2d 1171
(2d Cir. 1978).
From the building's completion until
late 1979, the State of New York, which
regulates the establishment and construction of
nursing homes, had denied the approval necessary
for the nursing home to open. The State
contended that the initial establishment of the
nursing home in 1966 was improper and that
there was an excess of nursing home beds in
Richmond County. Because the State denied that
approval, the nursing home remained unopened,
and the Debtor defaulted in its mortgage and tax
payments.
On June 8, 1976, Washington Federal,
the Deptor's mortgagee and principal creditor,
commenced an action to foreciose in the Supreme
Court of the State of New York, County of
Richmond. On May 20, 1977, Washington Federal
entered into an agreement with the City of New
York to pay the delinquent real estate taxes and
otner assessments levied against the property.
A final judgment of foreclosure and sale was
entered on July 1, 1977, and the foreclosure
sale was scheduled for September 1, 1977. On
August 31, 1977, the Debtor filed its petition
for an arrangement under Chapter XII of the
Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §§801-926, and the
Bankruptcy Court notified all creditors,
including the City of New York, of the filing of
the petitiun. The automatic stay provision of
Bankruptcy Rule 12-43 prevented the foreclosure
sale scheduled for the next day.
On October 17, 1977, James L. Garrity
was appointed trustee upon the Debdtor's
application. Faced with the State's continued
refusal to approve the nursing home's
establishment, Bankruptcy Judge Galgay directed
Garrity to investigate other possible uses of
the facility. In March of 1978, Garrity
discussed with the New York State Department of
Health the possibility of selling the nursing
home to an Hassidic Jewish organization, and the
Department agreed that it would be willing to
authorize such a group to establish the home
under the religious group exception to the
State's public-need requirement.
On July 18, 1978, Garrity executed a
contract with Beth Rifka, Inc., the Hassidic
group, for the sale of the nursing home. The
parties established as a condition precedent,
however, the granting of establishment approval
and various other state? and federal approvals.
On August 24, 1979, ai’ter both Beth Rifka and
Garrity had submitted information to and
answered questions ‘rom various health-care
bodies, the Public Health Council of the State
of New York, the final state licensing
authority, granting Beth Rifka's application for
establishment approval subject to several minor
conditions. Because of certain improper
procedures on its own part, the Public Health
Council afterwards rescinded its approval,
resubmitted the application, and approved it
once again on December 21, 1979.
During the next several months, the
parties arranged financing for the sale and
eventually came to an accord. However, because
interest rates had risen substantially between
the Health Council's approval and the spring of
1980, Beth Rifka had to obtain an additional
approval from the Health Council. This final
approval was obtained on September 19, 1980, and
the sale was ready to be consummated, thus
providing the economic foundation for the
Bankruptcy Court's Chapter XII plan of
arrangement.
However, a few months before the
State granted the final approval and seven years
after the final C.0. was issued by the City, the
New York City Department of Buildings first
suggested that it might initiate proceedings to
invalidate the nursing home's C.0. Borough
Superintendent of Buildings Philip Goldstein
raised this possibility in a letter of May 7,
1980 which stated that the Debtor's intended
use of the facility was a non-conforming use and
that therefore he would initiate proceedings
before the Goard of Standards and Appeals to
Tevoke the C.0. Under Goldstein's view of the
City zoning law, the nursing home became °
nonconforming use when the zoning ordinances
were amended in 1974, after the C.0. was
granted; and nonconforming uses forfeited their
C.0.'s if they did not do business for two
years, as the Debtor's nursing home clearly had
not.
On June ll, 1980, Garrity's counsel
advised Goldstein that the Department of
Buildings was stayed, pursuant to Bankruptcy
Rule 12-43, from appealing to the Board of
Standards and Appeals to revoke the C.O.
Goldstein thereafter advised Garrity's counsel
that he intended to proceed with the revocation
on the advice of the Department's counsel that
the automatic stay was inapplicable. In a
letter dated August 4, 1980, Goldstein applied
to the Board of Standards and Appeals for such
revocation without leave of the bankruptcy
court. He also stated, however, that Garrity
could reobtain a C.0., despite that
nonconforming use, merely by requesting a
Special Permit from the Board. He added that
the City did not intend to oppose the grant of
the Special Permit. Thus, Goldstein's letter
requested revocation of the C.0. but established
that the City's interest was not sufficient for
it to oppose a Special Permit that would nullify
the revocation.
By an order to show cause dated
August 7, 1980, Garrity moved in the bankruptcy
court for an order staying Goldstein, the
Al4
Department of Buildings, and the Board of
Standards and Appeals from instituting or
continuing proceedings to revoke the Debtor's
C.0., or, in the alternative, for an order
edjudging Goldstein in contempt of the automatic
stay imposed by Rule 12-43. Secause the parties
did mot dispute the material facts, the
bankruptcy court did not take testimony but
rather invited the parties to submit proposed
findings. By order dated October 8, 1980,
Bankruptcy Judge Galgay granted Garrity's motion
for injunctive relief and denied the alternative
order of contempt. He first held that the C.0.
was “property” within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the bankruptcy court under section 411 of the
Bankruptcy Act. He then held that Bankruptcy
Rule 12-43's automatic stay of state proceedings
against a debtor's property therefore applied to
this Debtor's C.0. Finally, he held that the
City had failed to demonstrate the good cause
required for the court to vacate the stay and
that the facts demonstrated that the proposed
revocation of the C.0. was not a valid exercise
of the police power. The bankruptcy court based
that finding of bad faith on two observations.
First, Bankruptcy Judge Galgay found that the
City’s attempted revocation was not undertaken
to protect the public health and welfare of the
surrounding community because, if that had been
the true concern, it would not have taken seven
years for the City to act. Indeed, Goldstein
began the proceedings only after being prodded
by three community organizations which Garrity
asserts were motivated by a dislike of Hassidic
Jews. Second, Bankruptcy Judge Galgay noted
that the State of New York had extensively
reviewed the needs of the region and of the
Hassidic population, and it had concluded that
the Debtor's facility would fulfill an unmet
need in the community. He then held that the
State's interest in administering health care
was greater than the City's interest in having
the Debtor obtain a Special Permit (which the
City did not intend to oppose) to replace the
c.0.
Al7
On February 16, 1981, while the
appeal to the district court was pending,
Garrity opened the nursing home, and it admitted
patients for the first time.
Judge Leval reversed the order of the
bankruptcy court. He concluded that state
Tegulatory power was beyond the scope of the
bankruptcy court's exclusive jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the bankruptcy court could not
interpret Rule 12-43's automatic stay in a
manner that precluded the revocation. The
district court made no finding of fact regarding
the good faith of the City's conduct. Because
we believe the City's good faith to be critical
to this case, we reverse and remand to the
district court for findings of fact on that
issue.
Bankruptcy Rule 12-43, which was in
effect at the time the Debtor filed its Chapter
XII petition, provides that the petition “shall
Operate as a stay of the commencement or the
continuation of any court or other proceeding
against the debtor...or of any court proceedings
to enforce any lien against his property.” We
find Rule 12-43 sufficiently broad to stay the
City's intended revocation of the Debtor's C.0O.
The nursing home is the Debtor's sole asset, and
its establishment is critical to the Debtor's
economic recovery. The C.0. which the City
seeks to revoke represents the City's commitment
that, when the C.0. was issued, the nursing home
could legally be used for its intended purpose:
645(e) of the New York City Charter provides
that a C.0. is "binding and conclusive upon
all agencies and officers of the city...
unless and until the certificate is set aside,
vacated or modified by the board of standards
esd appeals oor a court of competent
jurisdiction." Given the importance of the C.0.
to the Debtor and the substantial weight the
C.0. is accorded by the City, we cannot say that
Goldstein's application for revocation is any
less a “proceeding against the debtor" than a
court proceeding or a pending arbitration. See
Rule 12-43 of Bankruptcy Procedure, Advisory
Committee Notes. Accordingly, the City's
attempted revocation of the C.0. was stayed by
the filing of the Debtor's petition in
bankruptcy.
To proceed with the revocation, the
City must petition the bankruptcy court and
demonstrate cause for relieving it from the
automatic stay under Bankruptcy Rule 12-43(d),
(e). Proof of good cause would obviously
include proof that the revocation was being
sought in good faith under state and federal
law. This court's opinion in Smith v. New York
State \iquor Authority (In re Bay Ridge Inn,
Inc.), 94 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1938) does ‘not
suggest that bankruptcy courts must defer to bad
faith local regulation. In Bay Ridge Inn, the
New York Liquor Authority had issued the debtor
a liquor license scheduled to expire one year
from its issuance on October 1, 1936, and the
debtor filed its petition in bankruptcy in
January of 1937. The Liquor Authority revoked
the debtor's license and denied it any refund
upon its license in June of 1937. The Nebtor
apparently did not dispute in the district court
that (1) it had never paid the deposit that was
required to be paid within 30 days of the
license's issuance; (2) it had attempted to
assign the license in February of 1937 although
the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law compelled
revocation as @ penalty for any attemt to
assign; and (3) the custodian of the debtor's
inn had been arrested for selling liquor during
prohibited hours. On Marchi, 1937, the
debtor's trustee surrendered the license to the
Liquor Authority to obtain a refund of $685.90.
On June 1 of that year, however, the Authority
concluded that the debtor had violated the
Beverage Control Law in three instances, revoked
the debtor's license, and denied it any refund
because refunds were not available when a
license was cancelled for violation of the
Beverage Control Law. The debtor, attempting to
salvage its refund, obtained an order from the
district court in September of 1937 which
annulled the Authority's decision.
This court reversed the district
court order. There was no evidence that the
Authority had acted in bad faith, and this court
held that the cebtor's remaining rights to a
Tefund were properly to be determined by state
tribunals./ unlike Bay Ridge Inn, the debtor
here is supported by the factual finding of the
bankruptcy court that the City's conduct was not
a valid exercise of its police power. Thus,
this case presents an entirely different issue
than was presented in Bay Ridge Inn, and the
T~"TColonial Tavern, inc. v. (In re
eed aie Blin oF wt
° not involve any assertion
of bad faith on the part of state and local
officials. Similarly, doctrines of federal
abstention in deference to state proceedings
have consistently not applied in cases of bad
faith conduct by the state. See Juidice v.
pose, 40 U.S. 327, 338 (1977); Huffman v.
td., 420 U.S. 592, 611 (1975);
ve S, 401 U.S. 37, 53-54 (1971).
A23
district court must review the finding of bad
faith before determining whether the Debtor's
only resort here lies’ in state and local
proceedings.
The City argues that the new
Bankruptcy Code dictates a different outcome in
this case because it specifies that the
automatic stay does not apply to proceedings by
goverrmental units to enforce their police or
Tegulatory powers. See ll U.S.C. §362. We
disagree. First, as the City concedes, the
earlier Sankrupcty Act, not the new Code,
controls in this case because the petition was
filed under the Act. See Guardian Mortgage
Investors v. Unofficial Noteholders—Debenture-
holders Creditors Committee, 607 F.2d 1020, 1023
n.6 (20d Cir. 1979). Second, Congress's
determination that the new Code's stay provision
should not preclude enforcement of local
regulation provides little direction for
interpreting the stay under the Act. Instead of
revealing its earlier intentions under the Act,
Congress may simply have been expressing its
preference for a narrower, rather than broader,
application of the automatic stay in the
future. Compare Katman v. New Jersey, 13 C.8.C.
524 (D.N.J. 1977); In re Hillsdale Foundry Co.,
2 C.B.C. 542 (W.D. Mich. 1974), with Colonial
Tavern, Inc. v. Byrne, 420 F. Supp. 44 (D. Mass.
1976). Third, Congress removed local regulation
only from the effect of the automatic stay; it
did not eliminate the bankruptcy court's power
to enjoin the enforcement of local regulation
which is shown to be used in bad faith. Thus,
although it addressed the issue, Congress did
not adopt the total hands-off approach toward
local regulation that the City advocates here.
Finally, we do not believe that
Congress, under either the Act or the Code,
intended to prohibit bankruptcy courts from
protecting a debtor's assets from bad faith
zoning regulation. If courts lacked that power,
a city interested in the outcome of a bankruptcy
petition could seriously interfere with
management of the bankrupt estate through
repeated threats of harmful rezoning. The
Constitution authorizes Congress to establish
uniform laws of bankruptcy, U.S. Const., Art. I,
§8, and it establishes that laws passed pursuant
to the Constitution are the supreme law of the
land, U.S. Const. Art. VI. Those grants of
authority surely include the power to thwart bad
faith frustration of federal bankruptcy policy.
On remand, upon the City's motion for
relief from the automatic stay, the district
court should review the bankruptcy court's
finding of bad faith on the part of the City.
We note that bad faith here means more than an
erroneous determination of law or fact. Rather,
the trustee must show, for example, that the
City seeks to enforce a law that is
"“'flagrantly and patently violative of express
constitutional prohibitions in every clause,
sentence or paragraph, and in whatever manner
and against whomever an effort might be made to
apply it,’" Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,
53-54 (1971); that the state forum is biased,
e.g., Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 93
S.Ct. 1689, 36 L.Ed. 2d 488 (1973); see McCune
v. Frank, 521 F.2d 1152, 1158 (2d Cir. 1975);
that the City acted in wilful disregard of the
law; that City officials clearly abused their
discretion in initiating proceedings against the
trustee; or that the “state proceeding [was]
motivated by a desire to harass," Huffman v.
Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611 (1975), by ill
will, or by any other improper motivation, cf.
Central Avenue News, Inc. v. City of Minot, No.
80-1521, slip op. at (8th Cir. Feb. 10,
1981) and Eagle Books, Inc. v. Reinhard, 416 F.
Supp. 345, 351 (N.D. Ill. 1976), vacated on
other grounds, 432 U.S. 902 (1977) ("The
gravamen of bad faith prosecution is the lack of
@ reasonable expectation that valid convictions
will result"). Of course, if the City shows
that its officials proceeded in the usual manner
upon notification of events requiring official
response, there would be no evidence that the
City acted in bad faith.”
Contrary to the City's assertions, it
is neither unseemly mor unusual for the
bankruptcy court to examine issues of state
zoning law to determine whether the intended
revocation is marred by procedural or
substantive defects. We emphasize that the
purpose of the bankruptcy laws -- to allow the
2—~Tf a private citizen instigated the
proceeding against the debtor to harass or
coerce the debtor in an unrelated matter, the
trustee may have a cause of action for damages
against that party for malicious abuse of legal
process. See l F. ge James, The Law of
Torts §4.9, at 330-31 (1956).
trustee without delay to marshal and administer
the assets of the debtor -- would be frustrated
were state officials free to interfere with the
administration of the bankrupt's estate through
bad faith zoning regulation. Nor is it
reasonable to require the bankruptcy court to
await the correction of such abuses by the state
courts. The attendant delay itself might
permanently damage the estate through the
inevitable dissipation of skilled personnel and
goodwill. Hence, if the City's intended
revocation is in bad faith, the bankruptcy
court's injunction should stand.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand
for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
MANSFIELD, Circuit Judge (Dissenting):
I respectfully dissent for reasons
that are well stated by Judge Leval in his
opinion and order dated February 25, 1961,
dissolving the injunction issued by the
. Bankruptcy Court, Galgay, J., barring New York
City officials from seeking to revoke a
certificate of occupancy that had permitted the .
establishment of a nursing home on the debtor's
property. In my view the Bankruptcy Court lacks
jurisdiction to interfere with the state's
enforcement of its regulatory powers. See Smith
v. New York State Liquor Authority, - (in re
Bay Ridge Inn, Inc.), 94 F.2d 555 (2d Cir.
1938); NLRB v. Jonas (In re Bel Air Chateau
Hospital, Inc.), 611 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1979);
Colonial Tavern, Inc. v. Byrne (In re Colonial
Tavern, Inc.), 420 F. Supp. 44 (D. Mass. 1976).
A31
Absent some claim of denial of the debtor's
constitutional rights -- and none is asserted
here -- those state police powers resi within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the state's
administrative apparatus, with the debtor having
the same right as any other citizen to obtain
state judicial review. A federal bankruptcy
court is not a super-City Planning Commission or
Board of Standards and Appeals.
Nothing in the Bankruptcy Act confers
upon the Bankruptcy Court, a statutory tribunal
of limited jurisdiction, any of the powers which
the majority would permit it to exercise here.
Strong federal-state comity considerations
militate against ederal intervention into state
zoning matters that are not attacked on
consitutional grounds. No showing is made that
state remedies are inadequate. with due respect
for the able bankruptcy judge's expertise in
bankruptcy matters, he would not ordinarily
possess the qualifications of the appropriate
state bodies to determine whether the City's
zoning regulations would be violated, whether
the nursing home here would "fulfill an unmet
need in the community," and whether any benefit
a nursing home would confer is outweighed by
other considerations, such as excessive burdens
on the community, traffic congestion, lack of
adequate parking space or roads, inadequate
off-street loading facilities, or the like.
These are matters that the appropriate City
administrative facility and state court are in a
much better position to evaluate than a
bankruptcy judge.
Aside from its lack of expertise and
qualifications to determine the reach of local
A33
zoning regulations, the Bankruptcy Court should
mot for another reason be empowered to enjoin
the state's exercise of its regulatory powers.
There is a fundamental conflict between a
bankruptcy court's interest or motivation and
that of the appropriate state tribunals. The
Bankruptcy Court, naturally enough, is solely
interested in enhancing the value of the
debtor's estate for the benefit of creditors
whereas the objective of state zoning bodies is
to enforce regulatory powers (whether they
relate to clean air, traffic, housing, size of
residence units, or type of land use) for the
benefit of the community at large. Lastly, we
should note that if the Bankruptcy Court can
prevent a state regulatory agency from taking
action that might lessen the value of the
estate, nothing would prevent it from enjoining
the state from invoking other state laws that
might affect the bankruptcy, such as _ those
calling for revocation of a license for cause or
lapse, prohibiting the erection of advertising
signs, prescribing fire control or safety
regulations, authorizing criminal proceedings,
or the like. | |
The majority, as a jurisdictional
basis for the Bankruptcy Court's action here,
relies on the automatic stay provisions of
Bankruptcy Rule 12-43. However, as Congress
made clear in its later more detailed
codification of the law in the new Bankruptcy
Code, Rule 12-43 was never intended to permit e
Bankruptcy Court to interfere with a
governmental unit's enforcement of its police or
regulatory power, see Bankruptcy Code
§362(b)(4), 11 U.S.C. §362(b)(4). Moreover, as
A35
"it is a
commonplace that a literal interpretation of the
warned,
i v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608,
624 (2d Cir. 1944)(concurring opinion), where he
words of a statute is not always a safu guide to
stated:
its meaning," Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin
Equally appropriate for present purposes are his
Learned Hand has wisely
Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
remarks in Gui
Tet
ee Pa
Sy: Lae “1
paler a
if ate CEE saitctat
most decisive evidence of what they
See also Federal t_ Insurance ° Ve
Tremaine, 133 F.2d 827, 830 (2d Cir. 1943)
(L. Hand, C.J.) ("There is no surer guide in the
interpretation of a statute than its purpose when
that is sufficiently disclosed; nor any surer mark
of our solicitude for the letter than to wince at
carrying out that purpose because the words used do
not formally quite match with it"). The purpose of
Rule 12-43 was to supplement and reinforce the
Bankruptcy Court's exclusive jurisdiction over
property in its possession in order to avoid
creation or enforcement of liens by third parties.
It is questionable whether a Certificate of
Occupancy may be classified as "property, "= but
even if it were, it automatically ceased to exist as
T~Even if a Certificate of Occupancy is treated
as a property right, it is expressly conditioned
upon the. power of the Board of Standards to vacate
or modify it. Section 645(e) of the New York City
Charter provides:
“every certificate of occupancy shall,
and until set aside
upon
officers of the city, and shall be
binding and conclusive upon the
department of labor of the state of New
York, as to all matters therein set
forth, and no order, direction or
requirement affecting or a variance with
any matter set forth in any certificate
of occupancy shall be made or issued by
any agency or officer of the city, or by
the department of labor of the state of
New York, or any commission, board,
officer or member thereof, unless and
until the certificate is set aside
vaca or o
(footnote continue on next page)
A38
a matter of law in the present case when it lapsed
under New York City Zoning Resolution, §52-61,* by
reason of the permittee's admitted non-exercise of
standards and or a court of
application of the agency, department,
commission, officer or member thereof
to make or issue such order,
or requirement...." (Emphasis
supplied).
2 New York City Zoning Resolution, §52-6l,
provides in pertinent part:
"If, for a continuous period of two
years, either the non-conforming use of
land with minor improvements § is
discontinued, or the active operation of
substantially all the non-conforming
uses in any building or other structure
is discontinued, such land or building
or other structure shall thereafter be
used only for a conforming use. Intent
to resume active operations shall not
affect the foregoing."
the certificate for a continuous period of two
years prior to 1976.
The majority, apparently recognizing
that the automatic stay provisions of the Act may
have no application, nevertheless asserts that the
Bankruptcy Court has power to enjoin the "bad
faith" enforcement of local state regulations.”
I disagree. Such an exception would result in
>~“Tppeliant concedes that the Bankruptcy Court
lacks jurisdiction to prevent faith
enforcement of state zoning ons
contends that the issue is whether it has
jurisdiction to enjoin bad faith enforcement,
stating:
"This Court is not, as the City
suggests, faced with deciding whether a
bankruptcy court is vested with power to
prevent faith enforcement of
en order to protect health,
safety and welfare. It is beyond
peradventure that the bankruptcy court
cannot and should not do so. Here the
issue is the City's lack of
faith." (Appellant's Reply Br. at 1;
emphasis in original)
Bankruptcy Court mini-trials of purely state
regulatory issues whenever, as might be expected to
happen frequently, the debtor sought by claiming
"bad faith" to have those issues tried in a
Bankruptcy Court, which would be sympathetic toward
any resolution that would improve the estate,
rather than before state tribunals. The proper
remedy is to seek redress in the state courts,
which may be expected not to tolerate bad faith
conduct on the part of any regulatory officials.
Nor does the record in the present case
support a claim that the Borough Superintendent of
Buildings acted in bad (faith. Although a
Certificate of Occupancy was issued to the debtor
on June ll, 1973, the property remained vacant for
many years and was not operated as a nursing home
until 1960. In the meantime, on January 10, 1974,
the City’s Board of Estimate amended Zoning
Resolution §74-90 to prohibit the use of property .
as nursing homes except by special permit granted
by the City Planning Commission upon it making
certain findings as to landscaping, topography,
supporting neighborhood services, traffic and
benefits to the community. Since the debtor's
property had not, prior to January 10, 1974, ever
been used as a nursing home, this use could not
thereafter be permitted as a matter of right and
must be treated as a "non-conforming" use, Zoning
Res. §12-10, for which a special permit would be
required under Zoning Res. §74-90. Moreover, under
Zoning Res. §52-61 the right to use the property
for a nursing home evidenced by the Certificate of
Occupancy automatically lapsed and ceased to exist
by reason of the non-use of the property as a
nursing home for a continuous period of two years
after the issuance of the Certificate. All of
these regulations are laws of general application
which were not directed toward the debtor. The
proposed revocation of the debtor's Certificate of
Occupancy therefore amounts merely to a ministerial
act mandated by the law. When his attention was
brought to the existence of this non-conforming
use, the Borough Superintendent of Buildings
instituted the revocation proceeding now pending
before the Board of Standards and Appeals.
In view of this undisputed history I
find nothing in the record to suggest bad faith on
the part of the Sorough Superintendent of
Buildings. Nor did Judge Galgay find bad faith, as
the majority states; he found that the action was
"not within the valid exercise of its police power
under the zoning laws" because of the Borough
Superintendent's delay in bringing the revocation
proceeding. To this appellant suggests bad faith
based on the fact that the Superintendent was
instigated to act by community complaints. In my
view, to suggest that this indicates "bad faith"
borders on the absurd. The delay in the City
Department's institution of a ministerial action,
when there was no existing violation of law because
the debtor was not using the property as a nursing
home and might never do so (in view of the
continued refusal of the Public Health Council of
the State of New York to grant a cursing home
licenses), is so insignificant that it provides no
basis for an inference as to later motive or
intent. The Department of Buildings cannot be
expected to be aware of all instances where such
action is required. The fact that the lapse of the
Certificate of Occupancy was brought to the Borough
Superintendent 's attention by a community group
opposed to the nursing home use and hence having an
axe to grind does not taint the Borough
Superintendent's motive or action. This is
probably the most common manner in which threatened
violations of law are brought to the attention of
most law enforcement authorities, state or federal.
Finally, the best evidence that the
Borough Superintendent, once the matter was brought
to his attention, was merely doing his job, without
fear or favor, lies in his advice to appellant
Trustee that if the latter pursued the proper legal
course by seeking a special permit for nursing home
use from the City Planning Commission the
Department of Buildings would not oppose the
application. Indeed, since the City was under no
obligation to remain neutral in the matter, this
was evidence of the Borough Superintendent's good
faith in enforcing the law. There is not one whit
of evidence that in bringing the revocation proceed-
ing he was discriminating against appellant by
permitting other similarly-situated holders of
lapsed Certificates of Occupancy nevertheless to
operate without such certificates.
For the foregoing reasons I would affirm
the judgment of the district court.
Opinion of the District Court
Sane snr ew
In the Matter of
NATIONAL HOSPITAL AND 80 Civ. 6073
COMPANY, a Partnership,
Debtor.
OPINION AND ORDER
Sd etoeeeoeecece x
PIERRE N. LEVAL, U.S.D.J.
This is an appeal from a ruling of The
Honorable John J. Galgay, Bankruptcy udge,-
holding that administrative efforts by The City of
New York to revoke the Certificate of Occupancy of
@ nursing home owned by the debtor violated the
automatic stay provisions of Rule 12-43 of the
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, and enjoining the
Tevocation proceedings under authority of Section
4ll of the 1896 Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 8ll.
The basic facts are not in dispute. The
debtor's sole asset is real property at 1000 Targee
Street on Staten Island on which stands an
unoccupied structure built as a nursing home for
the aged. The New York City Department of Health
gave its approval for the establishment of the
nursing home in April, 1966. Construction of the
home was begun by a prior owner in June, 1969.
Construction was completed in 1973. In January and
March 1973 temporary C.0.s were issued. In June
1973 a final C.0. was issued. However, the New
York State Public Health Council of the New York
State Department of Health declined to give the
home “establishment approval" because of an excess
of nursing homes on Staten Island.
The debtor acquired the property in
1975. In June 1977 the mortgagee of the building
began a suit in New York State Supreme Court to
foreclose its mortgage. Judgment of foreclosure
was entered, and the foreclosure sale was set for
September 1, 1977.
One day before the foreclosure sale, the
debtor filed a petition ‘or a real property
arrangement under Chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Act,
ll U.S.C. §§ 801-926. The foreclosure sale was
stayed by the automatic provision of Bankruptcy
Rule 12-43.
In March 1978 the Trustee obtained the
agreement of the New York State Department of
Health that establishment approval might be granted
under a special proviaion of New York law
applicable to religious groups, N.Y., Pub. Health
Law § 280l-a(3) (McKinney), if an Hassidic group
could demonstrate a need for nursing homes among
its adherents. The trustee then entered into a
contract for the sale of the nursing home to Beth
Rifka, Inc., an Hassidic Jewish organization,
conditioned upon Beth Rifka obtaining required
licenses and certificates.
Beth Rifka applied to the State
Department of Health for establishment approval,
which was granted in September 1980.
In the meantime Staten Island community
groups brought pressure on New York City govern-
mental bodies, seeking to prevent the establishment
of the nursing home. These efforts apparently were
quite successful. In May 1960, Philip Goldstein,
Borough Superintendent of the Department of
Buildings, indicated his intention to institute
proceedings before the Board of Standards and
Appeals to revoke the Certificate of Occupancy. On
Augus 4 he formally applied to the Board for
revocation of the C.0.2
The trustee then moved in the Bankruptcy
Court by order to show cause for a stay barring
Goldstein and the Board from revoking, or pursuing
the proceedings to revoke, the C.0. As noted
above, Judge Galgay, in a decision filed October 8,
ordered the revocation proceedings stayed, from
which decision this appeal is taken.?
Judge Galgay, after reviewing the
history of the nursing home, made findings that the
City's revocation efforts were belated and were in
Tesponse to pressure by community groups, that the
City did not believe in good faith that the home
would endanger or harm the community or
neighborhood, and that the State had an interest in
having the home opened.
He concluded that the revocation)
proceedings were not valid exercises of the City's
"police powers" under its zoning laws, and that the
revocation efforts were, therefore, not exempt from
the automatic stay of Rule 12-43.
Judge Galgay concluded it was an
appropriate exercise of the Bankruptcy Court's
powers to enjoin the revocation proceedings under
$411 of the Bankruptcy Act which gives the
Bankruptcy Court exclusive jurisdiction of the
debtor and his property.
In my view, Judge Galgay's opinion
failed to give proper deference to the rule that
state regulatory power is beyond the scope of
Séction 41l's exclusive grant of jurisdiction.
This statute, operating together with
the mandatory stay provisions set forth in the
Tules of the various bankruptcy chapters, protects
the debtor against multiple, uncoordinated suits
brought in various jurisdictions by a multitude of
Claimants. It gives the debtor a certain breathing
spell end peraits hie to asst the various cleisents
in a single forum in coordinated proceedings under
the supervision of a single judge. The statute and
Tule are motivated in part by the recognition that
most estates would be torn apart by legal fees and
chaos (to the disadvantage of all) if the debtor
were required to answer every separate action in a
separate proceeding in whatever court it may be
asserted. See Fideli Investors Vv.
Camelia Guilders, Inc., (In re Fidelity Mortgage
Investors), 550 F.2d 47, 55 (2 Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1093, reh. den., 430 U.S. 976
(1977).
Courts have long recognized, however,
that a state's enforcement of its regulatory powers
(sometimes called police powers) against the debtor
or its property is a different kind of matter
affected by different considerations. The fact
that one has filed in bankruptcy should not exemt
him from jurisdiction of the local traffic courts
or criminal courts if he drives the wrong way on a
one-way street or commits a criminal assault.
87
Similarly if a state administrative agency is
charged with the responsiblity of establishing and
enforcing an anti-pollution plan, it would not make
sense to deprive the agency of power to enforce the
plan against bankruptcy subjects, except at the
sufferance of the Bankruptcy Court.
A state's (or municipality's) enforce-
ment of its regulatory. laws generally calls for
uniform application consistent with an overall plan
to achieve a desired effect, whether it be the
achievement of clean air standards, preservation of
the cleaniness of the town's drinking water, zoning
for industry, commerce and residence’ or
whatever. The enforcement of these plans is
ordinarily entrusted either to police, town council
or specialized administrative body, with protéction
against unjust, discriminatory or illegal enforce-
ment being entrusted to the local and state courts.
The concerns of such regulatory plans have
generally little or nothing to do with the question
of payment of debtors or with whether any subject
is solvent or insolvent. Many such regulatory
plans would be impaired, or at least applied in a
chaotic irrational fashion, if the responsible
administrative bodies were deprived of authority
over any subjects which happened to be engaged in
federal insolvency proceedings.
The responsibility and expertise of the
Bankruptcy Court, in contrast, is to achieve
orderly reorganization or distribution to creditors
of the estates of bankrupts. It has nothing to do
with the enforcement of state regulatory power.
Nor is the ability of the bankruptcy court to
supervise orderly liquidation or reorganization
overcome if the bankrupt remains subject to local
regulatory power.
For such reasons, it has been
established for many years in court decisions that
the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court does not
extend to the enforcement of state regulatory
power.” he sign-post decision on this principle
is the opinion of Judge A. N. Hand in 1938, in
Smith v. New York State Liquor Authority, Inc., (In
| Be Bay Ridge Inn, Inc.), 94 F.2d 555 (2 Cir.)
reversing an attempt by the District Court in
bankruptcy to overturn a forfeiture imposed on the
bankrupt by the State Liquor Authority.
The same principle was recently invoked
by the Oistrict Court in Massachusetts, Colonial
Tavern, Inc. v. Byrne, (In re Colonial Tavern,
Inc.), 420 F.Supp. 44 (1976), which noted:
The force of Judge Hand's opinion [in
Ba ] is even more apparent in the
of a Chapter XI proceeding, which
is voluntary, and in which Rule 11-44
Shippers Interstate Service, Inc., (Appeal of
NLRB), 618 F.2d 9 (7 Cir. 1980); and NLRB v. Jonas,
(In re Bel Air Chateau Hospital, Inc., 611 F.2d
1248 (9th Cir. 1979), applying the same rule to
labor board proceedings.
Anether consideration implicit in this
principle is that the Bankruptcy Court, with its
paramount concern for the success of the particular
reorganization or for maximizing recovery by
creditors, may well have little interest in the
state's enforcement of its regulatory powers®
where this endangers the success of the particular
reorganization. Re opinion of the bankruptcy
judge, here, for exemple, sade repested reference
to three years of effort epended in achieving
successful reorgenization which would be aborted if
the C.0. were revoked.
Judge Galgey recognized the existence of
the principle, but, in sy view, gave insufficient
Geference to it. SGeceuse he foud inproper
sotivetion and political influence, he considered
this mot te be a velid exercise of state police
power end therefore not within the rule of the Bay
Ridge case. The conclusion does not follow. This
reasoning effectively gives the Gankruptcy Court
supervisory review of state reguiations.
The a@utfority of the New York City
Oeparteenst of Guildings ami of the Goer of
Standunds and fepeele ever sing is 0 aatter of
state regulatory power, outside the scope of the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court. If
those regulatory agencies ect in a discriminatory
and improperly sotiveted fasiiion, redress lies in
the state courts according to the review provisions
of state lew.” ‘The arguments atvenced by the
trustee thet state review is too slow to save the
reorgenization are irrrelevent. The exclusive
jurisdiction and automatic stay provisiac were
never intended to place a berkrupt above and beyond
the reaches of state regulatory lew.
The order eppeeled from is reversed and
the case remanded.
a cil 0
il 1iGat,
: UAL
: ie tt ne
“ai
HTT
HG ii
liad
el
s §8
li
hei ch
a te
ye
al
Mo. 77 B 2265
to revoke the Debtor’s Certificate of Occupancy
(C.0.). After careful review of the history of
this prolonged case and of the policies underlying
the role of the automatic stay in a reel property
arrangement, this Court grants the antion of the
trustee.
The Debtor, @ Mew York partnership, is
the fee amer of real property in Staten Island
improved with an unlicensed, wopened cursing hone
facility. Approvel for the establistwent of the
home wes obtained fros the Deperteent of Hospitals
of Mew York City in April 1966, and constmction
commenced in June 1969. Washington Federal Savings
and Loan ("Association") hes an outstanding sortgage
on the property of epproxisately $2 sillion.
On or about Je 6, 1976 the Association
commenced an action to foreclose its sortgege in
the Suprese Court of the State of New York, County
of Rictword. A final judgeert of foreclose ad
sale wes optered on july 1, 1977 wc the
foreclosure sale wes scheduled for Septester il,
i977. Ga Mgust 31, 1977 the ODedter filed a
petition for an arrangesent pursuant to Crepter XII
of the Geriktuptcy Act, LL US @l-92%6, ad sn
eutowstic stay of all suits and lien enforcesents
wes imposed by Rule 12-43.
On October 17, 1977, on application of
the Debtor, Jemes L. Garrity wes eppointed as
trustee. This Court directed nim to imestigate
the possible uses of the mursing howe facility
which would form the basis of the Debtor's plan of
arrangenent. At thet paint in time the State of
Mew York contended that the cursing home hed not
been properly established in 1966. Gecase of a
alleged excess of masing tome beds in Staten
Island, the state refused to grant establistment
@pprovel for the nursing hone.
Gn March 21, 1978 the trustee ad Nis
camsel secured the agreesent of the Deperteert of
Health of Mew York State thet esteblisieent
approval might be granted to the howe under the
religious grap exception to the need requiresent
of Section 2801-e(3) of the New York Public Health
Law. The state indicated thet it would entertain
an epplication by an Hessidic grap wich could
satisfy the state us to its bore fides and as to
the existence of an unmet need for nutsing howe
facilities among its aderents.
The trustee entered into a contract for
sale of the property to Geth Rife, Ic, mm
Messidic orgenization. A condition precedent to
the closing of this transaction wes the granting of
estahlistment epprovel, operating certificate ad
other such epprovals as required by the state for
the opening of the nursing home. Geth Rifle
submitted its epplicetio. for establisteent
approval to the Mew York State Oeperteent of —
Health, and efter mmerous seetifgs an‘ inquiries
the Public Health Council of the State of New York,
as firel Licensing athority, gated te
application with certain ainor conditions.
During the next several sonths all the
perties worked to obtain satisfactory firercing
errengesents. The high interest rates preveiling
Guring the winter end spring required an ackiitional
approval by the Public Health Curcil before the
financing could be finalized. This final approvel
wes granted on Septesber 19, 1960.
The present controversy concems the
existing Certificate of Gopecy for the
premises. A temporary C.0. hed been iswed by the
city on Jerwary 10, 1973 and a final C.0. for a 200 +
bed nursing home w26 [sic] accessory perking speces
wes issued on Le ll, 1973.
By @ Letter dated May 7, 1960, Goldstein
threatened to institute proceedings before the New
vork City Goard of Standards and Appeals to reve
the C.0. The letter stated thet under applicable
regulations the Debtor's use of the facility wes «
non-confusming use which hed been discontined ad
could therefore not be resumed. O Ime ll, 1960,
coumsel to the trustee ajvised Gidstein that the
Oeparteent of Guildings is stayed pursuent to Rule
12-43 from prosecuting ary appeal to the Goard of
Standemis and Appeals to rewie the C.0.
Subsequently Goldstein advised the trustee’s
comsel of his intention to institute the
proceedings on the advice of his om counsel that
the automatic stay wes inapplicable.
The Oebter’s building hes been vacant
since its completion wille everwes to ope it -s «
muxsing howe heave been pursued. Prior to the
filing of the Chapter XII petition end throughout
the lengtty proceedings end bearings before the
edrinistrative agencies and deperteents which hed
to tule on Beth Rifka’s application, Galdstein and
the Gureeu [sic] of Standards and Appeals took no
ection to revoke the C.0. The Debtor hes proceeded
with its plans to finally open the nursing home, ad
all of the parties have eqended a greet desl of
tise and energy in bringing thet plan to fruition.
certain commmity groups opposed to the nursing
use of the property «s 2 cursing a oe
non-conforming in thet district. Goldstein's
nf
letter of Ime 30, 1980 to Mew York City
Commissioner Irwin Fructean [sic] stated thet
various Staten Island residents hed requested thet
the Department of Guildings apply to the Goand of
Standards and Appeals for revacation of the C.0.
Sy @ letter dated Augst 4, 1960,
without leave of this Court, Goldstein applied to
the Goerd of Standeris and Appeals for such
revocation. An affidavit sutmitted by the Office of
General Counsel to the Department of Suildings of
the City of Mew York stated thet “under zoning
resolutions $§22-13, 74-90 ami 74-903, the nursing
Permit is obtained from the City Planning
Commission or @ variance is obtained from the Board
of Standards and Appeals. The Trustee say pursue
his remedies to obtain a Special Permit or
variance. The Depertuent. will not oppose such
spplication of tre Trustee." (Bwhesis sided).
Tis afvidevit clearly indicates thet the
Departeent of Buildings does not contend thet the
facility somehow endangers the local commmity, is
unsafe to its proposed occupents or will heve a
deleterious effect on the neighborfecd. The Court
takes notice of the fact, es reported by the
ctustee, thet the nursing home is located between a
hospital and a medical center.
It is egeinst this beckgroud of three
years of work by the parties to refebilitate the
Deptor within this Crepter XII proceeding that the
present action by Goldstein aust be viewed.
Section 411 of the Bankruptcy Act, Ll usc 4ll,
gtents the court in which the Coepter XII petition
is filed “exclusive jurisdiction -ver the dedtor
and his property,
wherever located." From this express grant of
jurisdiction flow the broed injunctive powers which
the court can exercise to preserve thet exclusive
jurisdiction. See Rules Comment to $411.
Although the Bankruptcy Act contains no
exact definition of whet constitutes the property
of a debtor, the courts heve clearly found thet
operating licenses integral to @ reorgenizationel
proceeding ere property subject to tre jurisdiction
of the Bankruptcy Court. See Caroline Pipeline
Company v. New York County Natural Gas Authority,
388 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1967); In re Zeitzer Food
Comp, 9 CHC 614 (E.0.N.Y. 1976); In re Parkchester
(operel Hospital 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 292 (S.D.N.Y.
1978). It follows tmet the C.0. which Goldstein
seeks to have revoked is property of the Debtor.
The nursing home facility is the Dedtor's sale
asset. Revocation of tre C.0. will significantly
ispeir the velue of the asset and comietely
uncermine any rehebilitation of the Debtor.
In In_w Zeitzeer, spre, the court
determined thet the automatic stay of Rule 11-44
(a) of the Rules of Gankruptcy Procedure is
‘epplicable to aduinistrative proceedings to revoke
an operating License of a debtor, absent a showing
thet there is an enctosctmert on the police power
of the state to protect the health au welfare
ofthe commmity. 9 CEC 624. The language of Rule
12-43 is alsost identical to the lengquege of Rule
11-44(a) and the cases decided under the Cepter XI
rules are eppliceble to a Chepter XII proceeding.
Similarly, this Court held “.t an eiministrative
proceeding by the New York State Comissioner of
Health to revoke an operating certificate for «
debtor's hospital wes automatically stayed by the
filing of the Chapter XI petition and requimd
permission of the court, after a showing of good
cause, to vacate thet stay. In re Parkchester
Gereral Hospital, 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 292 (S.D.N.Y.
1978). Goldstein hes commenced his action against
the Debtor while the Debtor and his property are
under the protection of this Court and without the
“ shouting of good cause which the court would require
to vacate the stay under Rule 12-43(d).
In @ vety recent case decided under the
mew Genktuptcy Code, the court reviewd the
legislative Nistcry of the new autometic stay
provision and the narrow exception carved aut for
certain adainistrative proceedings. The new Code
provision reflects the trend under prior case law
under the Gankruptcy Act to prevent actions thet
would result
;
f
i
oy ee
Hail
Hh :
it
In_re King Memorial Hospital Inc, 6 Bankr. Ct.
Dec. 634, 635 (S.D. Fla. 1980) quoting 12% Cong
Rec H 11089 (Dec. 1976). In thet case the court
held that any determination by the Department of
Health and Rehebilitetive Services that the
debtor hospital hed forfeited its exception from
the Certificates of Need Law was enjoined by the
qutomatic stay as not evidencing a exercise of
the police power to protect the public health and
safety.
Similarly, this court finds thet the
action proposed by the City to revoke the C.0. is
not within the velid exercise of its police power
under the zoning lews. If there wes a legitinate
concern for the protection of the public health
and welfare of the commmity surrauding the
Debtor’s property, then an adsinistrative action
should have been brought auch earlier. The C.0.
wes issued on Ive ll, 1973. In all this tine
the City never souget to revoke or even inquire
into the bone fides of the Debtor's C.0. Now,
more than vhree years after the filing of the
bankruptcy petition on the eve of consummation
of the Debtor's plan, the City hes seen fit to
Commence revocation proceeding witfout leave of
this Couft.
The State of Mew York, after extended
eduinistrative review, hes determined thet the
Massidic population of New York City hes en urmet
need for a nursing home which can be appropriately
filled by the opening of the Debtar's already
constructed facility. The State hes also
determined thet Geth Rifkea hes the financial
Tesources to successfully operate this facility.
The interest of the State in the onierly
aduinistration of a@ health care progres for the
benefit of the commmity clearly outweighs the
technical objection of the City concerning the
trustee’s lack of a Special Permit to which the
Department of Buildings hes no opposition.
The motion of the trustee seeking an onder
thet Goldstein and the Soar of Stexiens ad
fgpeals are stayed from instituting or continuing
proceedings to revoke the Debtor's Certificate of
Occupancy is hereby granted.
The alternative eaotion adjudging Goldstein
in contespt of the fule 12-45 astomstic stay is
hereby denied.
It is so omered.
Dated: New York, New York
October 6, 1960
uonIsodde
mo. $/-957
In the ‘
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
October Term, 1981 1
Im the Matter of National
Hospital and Institutional
Builders Co.
PHILIP GOLDSTEIN, NEW YORK CITY DE-
PARTMENT OF BUILDINGS and NEW YORK
CITY BOARD OF STANDARDS AND APPEALS,
Petitioners,
Vv.
JAMES L. GARRITY, Trustee of
National Hospital and Insti-
tutional Builders Co., Debtor,
New York, New York 10017
(212) 850-0700
Of Counsel:
Arthur S. Olick
James P. Heffernan
Maria P. Sperando
2. Does the Bankruptcy Court
have jurisdiction under the Bankruptcy
Act of 1896 to enjoin enforcement of
zoming le-s where there has been a
finding of bad faith enforcement?
Table of Authorities
Cases:
-S
“Ls WPMRY
me att a
734 >
27
v- Abrams, 344
) -““eeeeeeeeeeeee & 24
c
“see eceeeeeeeeeeeeeee
(¢. _-. ) ee ee
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals For the
Second Circuit
-2-
Preliminary State vent
The respondent, James L. Garrity,
Trustee of National Hospital and Insti-
tuticnual Builders Company, Debtor,
respectfully requests that this Court
Geny the petition for writ of certiorari,
seeking review of the Second Circuit's
opinion in this case. That opinion is
reported at 656 F.2d 39.
James L. Garrity, court-
appointed Trustee of National Hospital
-3-
certificate of occupancy for the Debtor's
nursing home. After notice and hearing
the motion was granted and an injunction
issued. On appeal to the District Court
the injunction was dissolved. Thereafter,
om March 13, 1961 the District Court
granted the Trustee's motion for a stay
pending appeal -
The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit thereafter held that an
application for revocation of a certifi-
cate of occupancy was a proceeding
against the debtor controlled by Bank-
ruptcy Rule 12-43 and thus the Bank-
ruptcy Court had jurisdiction to stay
the attempted revocation of the Debtor's
certificate of occupancy.
+
with a fully equipped nursing home
facility. Until recently the nursing
home facility stood empty, unopened and
unlicensed. Om February 16, 1961, after
the Trustee advised both the District
Court and the Bankruptcy Court, the
nursing home, having obtained all the
necessary licenses, began admitting
residents.
. Approval for the establishment
of the nursing home (later disavowed)
was initially obtained in April, 1966,
from the New York City Department of
Hospitals. Construction began in June,
1969. Foundation permits were issued on
June 17, 1969 and om December 2, 1969.
Plans were finally approved on October 20,
1970, and a full permit issved. Temporary
certificates of occupancy were issued on
Jamary 10, 1973 and March 6, 1973. A
final certificate of occupancy for a
-5-
240-bed nursing home was issued on
Jane ll, 1973.
Ever since the building which
is the subject of the administrative
proceedings commenced by the City was
completed, and until very recently, it
stood vacant while avenues to open it as
@ mursing home were pursued. Primarily
as @ result of the State's refusal to
grant the needed approval, the Debtor on
August 31, 1977 filed a petition for a
real property arrangement pursuant to
Chapter XII of the Bankruptcy Act. All
creditors, including the City of New
York, were notified by the Bankruptcy
Court of the filing of the petition.
In March, 1978, the Trustee
finally secured the agreement of the New
York State Department of Health that
establishment approval coul be granted
te the nursing home under the religious
group exception to the need requirement
Thereupon, the Trustee entered
into negotiations with the prospective
purchaser and, om July 18, 1978, executed
Public Bealih Law.* The State indicated
of Section 280l-a(3) of the Mew York
that it wes prepared to establish an
Bassidic group which could satisfy the
State as to its boma fides and as to the
existence of an unmet need for nursing
home facilities among its adherents.
@ contract with Beth Rifka, Inc. ("Beth
Rifka"),. am Hassidic Jewish group, for
the sale of the property as a nursing
a i HH
HH ire
Het
ae i
*
~
home. A condition precedent to the
Closing of this transaction was the
granting of establishment and various
other State and federal approvals. A
short time later, om August 3, 1978,
Beth Rifka submitted to the Department
of Health its application for establishment
approval pursuant to the religious
exemption provision of State law.
After the Trustee, the Debtor
and Beth Rifka had met numerous times
with and had fielded numerous inquiries
by and from the various health care
Geliberative and determinative bodies,
om August 24, 1979, the Public Health
Council of the State of New York, the
final licensing authority, approved Beth
Rifka's application for establishment
approval for the nursing home subject to
certain minor conditions. This approval
was granted despite vigorous opposition
mounted by members of the local community.
-8-
Because of certain improper procedures
om its own part, the Public Health
Council afterwards rescinded its approval
and resubmitted the application, which
was again approved with minor conditions
om December 21, 1979.
During the next several months,
all of the parties worked to obtain
satisfactory financing arrangements and
eventually came to an accord. Unfortu-
mately, the high interest rates prevailing
@uring the winter and spring of 1960
required an additional approval by the
Public Health Council before the financing
could be effected. This final approval
was obtained in December, 1980, subject
te certain minor conditions. The way
was now clear for the sale to Beth Rifka
te be consummated, thus providing the
economic basis to confirm the Chapter
XII plan of arrangement.
-o-
Prior to the filing of the
Chapter XII petition and throughout the
protracted proceedings and hearings
before the various administrative agencies
and departments which had to rule on
Beth Rifka's application, the City sat
by silently, allowing the Debtor to
proceed with its plans to finally open
the nursing home. Bowing eventually to
Pressure from politically prominent
Staten Island residents opposed to the
operation in their neighborhood of a
nursing home with facilities to serve
the needs of Hassidic News, the City
Department of Buildings threatened to
institute proceedings before Standards
and Appeals to revoke the nursing home's
certificate of occupancy. This belated
threat was contained in a letter from
Goldstein dated May 7, 1980 (seven years
after the issuance of the Certificate of
Occupancy) in which he stated that under
-10-
applicable regulations, the Debtor's use
of the facility was a non-conforming use
which had been discontinued and could
therefore not be resumed. Carbon copies
of this letter were sent to, among
others, the local Staten Island Civic
Association and the Borough President,
establishing clearly the motivating
force behind the City's sudden and
«Zi—
apply to Standards and Appeals for
revocation of the certificate of occupancy.
Goldstein stated that he had “received
{such} a letter from Mr. Bruce G. Behrins,
am attormey for tae Concord Civic Associ-
ation, the Dongam Hills Estates Civic
Association and the Grasmere Civic
Association.“ He stated further that he
had “also received inquiries" about the
nursing home “from Lillian Prado, District
Manager of Community Board Mo. 2 and
from the Borough President's office."
Goldstein recited that the arguments to
be advanced in support of révocation had
been set forth by Mr. Behrins. Goldstein
acknowledged in his letter that he had -
been informed by the Trustee's counsel
that the contemplated proceeding to
revoke the certificate of occupancy
contravened the automatic stay of Rule
12-43. Carbon copies of this letter
were sent to, among others, Mr. Behrins,
-l2-
Borough President Gaeta and Community
Board District Manager Prado.
Despite the communications
which he received from the Trustee's
general and special counsel, Goldstein,
without leave of the Bankruptcy Court,
by letter dated August 4, 1960 applied
to Standards and Appeals “for revocation
of the certificate of occupancy of the
Danube Nursing Home at 1000 Targee
Street."* This application laid out the
arguments for revocation advanced by Hr.
Behrins. It is the proceeding commenced
by this application which the Bankruptcy
Court determined was violative of the
automatic stay and could not be allowed
to proceed, which decision was reversed
by the District Court and subsequently
_ upheld by the Court of Appeals.
By Order to Show Cause dated
August 7, 1960, the Trustee moved the
Bankruptcy Court for an order staying
Goldstein and Standards and Appeals from
instituting or continuing proceedings to
revoke the Debtor's certificate of
occupancy or, in the alternative, adjudg-
ing Goldstein in contempt of the automatic
stay imposed by Rule 12-43 of the Federal
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and certi-
fying the facts constituting such contespt
to the district court. Because of the
agreement of the parties as to the
material facts, the Bankruptcy Court did
mot take testimony but invited the
parties to submit proposed findings of
fact and conclusions of law. By meno-
randum and order entered October 8,
1960, the Bankruptcy Court granted the
Trustee's motion for injunctive relief
it
i
a
i!
THRE
Ui
|
:
|
4
;
i
iF
lk
rf
fe
P
|
-15-
legal technicality rather than being
inspired by any concern for health,
safety or welfare and (2) the State,
whose interests in the care of its
elderly was paramount to the City's
assertion of techmical objections under
the zoning law, had determined that the
Hassidic Jewish population had an unmet
need for nursing home beds which could
be satisfied by this already constructed
facility (at a cost to the public far
-16-
rehabilitation of the Debtor,” the
Bankruptcy Court declined to permit
continuation of the proceedings commenced
in derogation of the stay, holding that
it had the jurisdiction to do so both by
virtee of the automatic stay and its
inherent injunctive power.
DECISION OF THE DISTRICT COURT
The City appealed the order of
the Bankruptcy Court to the District
Court. Several civic associations
sought to intervene as amicus curiae
before the District Court but their
motion to intervene was denied on March 2,
1981. By an opinion and order dated
February 25, 1961, the District Court
(Leval, J.) reversed the case and remanded
the case to the Bankruptcy Court. The
District Court's view of the law was
@iametrically opposed to the view held
by the Bankruptcy Court. Both Courts
-17-
acknowledge that the basic facts are not
in dispute and differ solely on their
interpretation of the law. The essence
of the difference of opinion between the
District Court and the Bankruptcy Court
was the opinion of the former that the
latter “. . . failed to give proper
@eference to the rule that state regula-
tery power is beyond the scope of Secticn
4ll's exclusive grant of jurisdiction."
The District Court contrasted the responsi-
bility and expertise of state agencies
in establishing and enforcing their
statutory mandate in a uniform fashion
with the responsibility and expertise of
the Bankruptcy Court to achieve orderly
reorganization or distribution to credi-
tors. The District Court held that the
Bankruptcy Court's responsibility is not
infringed if the bankrupt remained
subject to local regulatory power and
that, in all events, the bankruptcy
power. Relying primarily on Smith v.
Mew York State Liquor Authority (In Re
Bay Ridge Inn, Inc.}, 9@ F.2d 555 (2d
Cir. 1938) and its progeny, the District
Court hel@ fast to the proposition that
the jurisdiction of a Bankruptcy Court
does not extend to the enforcement of
state regulatory power. The District
Court ignored the uncontested fact that
the certificate of occapancy is “property”
of the bankrupt estate and dismissed as
irrelevant the findings of the Bankruptcy
Court of improper motivation and political
influence as a basis for an exemption to
the general rule established in Bay Ridge.
By so doing, the District Court also
rejected the cases relied upon by the
Trustee which gave rise to an exception
te the general rule of federal abstention
as employed in Bay Ridge. The District
-19-
Court's decision precluded the Bankruptcy
Court from determining, in the first
instance, whether it has jurisdiction,
i.e., that the purported exercise of the
police powers wes in bad faith and
lacked bona fides -
DECTSION OF THE SECOMD CIRCUIT
Qn appeal by the Trustee, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
upheld the Bankruptcy Court's power to
impose an order staying the enforcement
of the revocation proceedings by Goldstein
and Standards and Appeals. The Court
held that Bankruptcy Rule 12-43, which
was in effect at the time the debtor
filed its Chapter XII petition, was
broad enough to empower the Bankruptcy
Court to stay the City's intended revoca-
tion of the Debtor's certificate of
occupancy. The Court reasoned that an
application for revocation is no less a
-20-
"proceeding against the debtor” under
Rule 12-43 tham a court proceeding or a
pending arbitration in light of the
importance of the certificate of occupancy
and the substantial weight accorded it
by the City.
| The Court further held that
there must be a finding of bad faith on
the part of the City regarding the
Proposed revocation before it could be
Getermined whether the City was entitled
te relief from the automatic stay.
Significantly, the Court expressly
rejected the City's argument that the
new Bankruptcy Code dictated that a stay
was impermissible because it specifies
that the automatic stay does not apply
te proceedings by govermmental units to
enforce their police or regulatory
powers. It stated that the Bankruptcy
Act, not the new Code, controlled, that
the new Code's stay provision “provides
-21-
little direction for interpreting the
stay under the Act," and that “Congress
removed local regulation only from the
effect of the automatic stay; it did not
eliminate the Bankruptcy Court's power
te enjoin the enforcement of local
regulation which is shown to be used in
bad faith." 658 F.2d at 43.
-22-
Second Circuit.* Whether the automatic
stay provision of the Bankruptcy Act of
1898 is applicable to “bad faith" matters
Of police and regulatory enforcement is
not an issue of sufficient significance
necessitating this Court's review. Mor
is the issue as to whether a certificate
of occupancy is “property” of the debtor
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Bankruptcy Court under Section 411 of
the Bankruptcy Act one important enough
to merit this Court's intervention.
-23-
Furthermore, whatever the
significance of the legal issues in this
action, they are governed by the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1896 which has been super-
seded by the new Bankruptcy Code and
therefore apply <> most to a mere handful
of actions still pending under the
Bankruptcy Act. There is, therefore,
little point to this Court's reviewing
what has become, in essence, a moot
question.
According to Mr. Justice
Harlan, “even where a ‘true’ conflict
may be said to exist, certiorari will
sometimes be denied where it seems
likely that the conflict may be resolved
as a result of future cases in the Court
of Appeals, or where the impact of the
conflict is narrowly confined and is not
apt to have continuing future conse-
quences, as where a statute which has
given rise to conflicting interpretations
-24-
has been repealed wr is about to
expire.“ Mr. Justice Harlan, “Some
Aspects of the Judicial Process in the
Supreme Court of the United States," 33
Australian L.J. 108 (1959) (emphasis
added) .
This Court has denied certio-
rari even where there has been a2 real
conflict in cases where the statute upon
which the controversy rested had expired
or had been amended in a manner which
Prevented the problem from occurring in
the future. See, e.g., United States v.
Abrams, 344 U.S. 855 (1952); Community
Services, Inc. v. United States, 342
U.S. 932 (1952); Sokol Bros. Furnitrere
Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Reve we,
340 U.S. 952 (1951); Beal v. United
States, 340 U.S. 852 (1950); United
States v. Wilkinson, 355 U.S. 839
(1957), as described in Berger v.
United States, 170 F.Supp. 795 (S.D.N.Y.
1959); Co. v.
Commissioner, 363 U.S. 827 (1960)-
Im addition to the insiqiifi-
cance and mootness of the legal questions
at issue here, the “conflict" pointed to
by petitioners as justifying this Court's
issuing a writ is illusory.
This Court's holding in Palmer
v. Massachusetts, 308 U.S. 79 (1939) to
the effect that a Bankruptcy Court
camnot usurp the functions of a State
railroad commission and permit a railroad
in reorganization to abandon local
service does not conflict with the
Second Circuit's decision in this case
and accordingly is not a reason for
granting the writ. The Palmer holding
is grounded upom the fact that the
Gebtor there was a bankrupt railroad.
This Court specifically stated that “the
whole scheme of § 77 [that part of the
Bankruptcy Act pertaining to railroad
-26-
reorganizations] leaves no doubt that
Congress did not mean to grant to the
@istrict courts the same scope as to
bankrupt roads that they may have in
dealing with other bankrupt estates."
308 U.S. at 87.
Even assuming that Palmer is
in comflict with the Second Circuit's
Gecision herein, that in itself is an
insufficient ground for certiorari to
issue, for, as noted by Messrs. Stern
and Gressman, “it is to be doubted that
a contrary opinion rendered 30 or 40
years ago, without any indication that
it has current vitality, will be enough
te comvince the Court that there is a
live conflict which should be resolved."
Stern and Gressmen, Supreme Court Prac-
tice, p. 271 (Sth Ed. 1978).
Furthermore, In re State of
Missouri, 647 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1981)
-27-
there the Court stated in dictum only
that automatic stays under the Bankruptcy
Act “aid not apply generally to proceedings
affecting the public health and safety
or certain regulatory activity." The
bankruptcy petition in that action was
filed in 1960 and hence was governed by
the new Bankruptcy Code which specifies
im § 362(b)(4) that the automatic stay
does not apply to proceedings by a
govermental unit to enforce its police
or regulatory powers. Moreover, the
Court actually held that the automatic
stay was proper because the Missouri
grain laws at issue primarily related
mot to matters of safety and health but
to the protection of the pecuniary
interest in the debtors" property. 647
F.2a at 776.*
-28-
Moreover, the alleged conflict
of the Second Circuit's holding in this
Case with the “numerous authorities”
cited in In re State of Missouri,
Supra, 667 F.2a at 775, is irrelevant as
to whether certiorari should issue here.
Most of those decisicnus, even if truly
in conflict with the Second Circuit's
of a federal court of appeals merely
The Second Circuit was correct
in its determination that the Bankruptcy
Court possesses the power to examine the
bona fides of administrative action,
taken under color of the police power,
im orde> to determine its jurisdiction
te protect property of the Debtor's
estate.
The Court of Appeals properly
interpreted Bankruptcy Rule 12-43, which
provides that the petition “shall
operate as a stay of the commencement or
the continuation of any court or other
Proceeding against the debtor ... or
of any court proceedings to enforce any
Lien against his property" as being
broad enough to stay the City's intended
-
-30-
revocation of the Debtor's certificate
ef occupancy. The Court concluded that
“[gliven the importance of the C.0. to
the Debtor and the substantial weight
the C.0. is accorded by the City, we
cammot say that Goldstein's application
for revocation is any less a ‘proceeding
against the debtor’ than a court proceed-
ing or a pending arbitration." 658 F.2d
at 42.
As noted by the Second Circuit,
if the Bankruptcy Courts lacked the
power to protect a debtor's assets from
bad faith zoning regulation, “a city
interested in the outcome of a bankruptcy
petition could seriously interfere
with management of the bankrupt estate
through repeated threats of harmful
zoning.“ Id. at 43. Obviously, this
will wreak havoc with the rehabilitative
purpose of Chapter XII.
Conclusion
For all of the foregoing
reasons, the petition for a writ of
certiorari should be denied, and the
Second Circuit's reversal of the District
Court's judgment should be allowed to
stand in all respects.
jeu Aidey
— SJOUOI Ned
LEQNARD KOERNER,
UDAH DICK,
JOSEPH I. LAUER,
MARVIN B. MITZNER,
of Counsel
PETITIONER'S REPLY GRIEF
Under Rule 22.5 of the Rules of this
Court, @ reply brief may be filed by @
petitioner if the Respondent's Grief in
Opposition raises a new argument not covered in
the Petition. Since respondent raises the
question of whether the issues involved are
*significant® enough for this Court to consider,
@ short reply is being sutmitted.
The critical question raised by the
petition was not limited to the automatic stay
of Bankruptcy Rule 12-435 which was superseded by
Sec. 362 of the new Bankruptcy Code, insofar es
benkruptcies filed on end after October 1, 1979
are involved. As the petition phrases the very
first question, the issue is the subject sstter
Jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts to enjoin the
exercise of police power wider ay
circumsterces. The issue is the same for
setters arising under the Act or under the Code,
since lack of jurisdiction does not only limit
automatic stays but also effects specific stays
or injunctions against the exercise of police
powers issued at the behest of a trustee or
debtor. As in the Missouri petition (No. 41-79
Oct. 196] Term), the issue is not merely wether
Bankruptcy Rule 12-45 wes intended to cover
police and governmental regulatory enforcesert,
but whether Congress ever grented jurisdiction
in Secs. 1 or 411 of the Gaerkrptcy Act or in
Sec. 105 of the Barkruptcy Code to permit
benkruptcy courts to interfere with state
goverrmentel operations. We sutmit thet, by
enacting 28 U.S.C. § 1478, barring removel of a
civil action by @ goverrmental wit to enforce
its police ena regulatory powers, Congress
declared its intention thet benkruptcy courts
should not be involved in this area end limited
their eutfority to directly effect @ mmici-
pelity's exercise of its police power.
For the reasons set forth in the
petition end in this Grief, the wit of
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.