Record and brief — Berger v. North American Co. for Life & Health Insurance

Supreme Court brief1981

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

uOnned

81-640 faa

No.

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Bnited States

OctTosBer TERM, 1981

MERTON B. BERGER, M_D.,

Petitioner,

VS.

NORTH AMERICAN COMPANY FOR

LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

SIDNEY F. WHEELER

Attorney for Petitioner

Of Counsel:

LONG, WEINBERG, ANSLEY & WHEELER

2500 The Equitable Building

100 Peachtree Street, N.W.

Atlanta, Georgia 30303

(404) 688-7900

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Can a Physician Be Sued for Malpractice by the

Insurance Carrier of His Patient When the Doctor Gratuitously

Completes an Insurance Claim Form Stating a Diagnosis and

the Insurance Company, But not the Patient, Feels the Diag-

nosis Was Incorrect?

2. In the Absence of Authoritative State Law, Did the

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Err In Refusing to Certify

the Within Matter to the Supreme Court of the State of

Georgia?

3. As a Matter of Policy, Should a Physician be Amenable

to a Suit by a Patient’s Insuror in the Absence of Any

Relationship Between the Doctor and Insurance Company?

*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ........10.ccccccscoscscscsscssenessscsenees i

ee ee eiitinceictticiiinseahinsicaiesiininiaiaanaaniidgainy il

TA Gr ATT EIS onsesnssccccesseorsessscesesncsceesessvens iil

SUIT acisnsatatpncisctechiddensesinscsimdibidniiinineininianiiaeba l

SR TITITIITE <cesccichirtchnncieepbeeccpniaiebasipscsaniniicdiniaiciiendann 2

eT I cnntsinicntinseihiitassiadicisthatninniaistanaanon 2

BA ree CO Be CIE occceccccnersesccsnensccsesvescseccees 4

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT.................... 7

I. The Fifth Circuit Rendered a Decision in Conflict

with Itself and Other Federal Courts in Ruling

That a Physician Can Be Sued for Malpractice by

the Insurance Carrier of His Patient When the

Company, but Not the Patient, Felt the Doctor’s

DngOSS Was TRCOTIICR .0..0ecccccesccccccccsccescessesscsceses 7

II. The Fifth Circuit Departed from the Accepted

and Usual Course of Judicial Proceedings by Not

Certifying the Case to the Georgia Supreme Court

in the Absence of Authoritative State Decisional

III. Certiorari Should Be Granted to Consider

Whether, as a Matter of Public Policy, a Physi-

cian Can Be Liable to His Patient’s Insuror in the

Absence of Any Relationship Between the Doctor

TEESE A ARE TOCA E TE 12

REE ER eee eae nen Renee ave EO 17

RRA ERC SENCERS ROTA NR ROS SRE la

eee

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES:

Alexander Hamilton Life Insurance Company v.

Trust Co. Bank, et al., Civil Action No. C76-893A

a Pe I SOUT cciichnsiabicetceibyiacliisaniadcinhnaemanedachintmiioens

Branch v. Anderson, 47 Ga. App. 602, 186 S.E. 771

RRR ETE aay Stn ie oERE TR pee nT TO

Ie STI esicicnciiceiiotscaiidesonsmieiinniucidoonipinideniontinaideenamindatmielicsétions

Dalbey v. Banks, 245 Ga. 162, 264 S.E.2d 4 (1980)...

Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 58 S. Ct.

Be ee is i Se i icinienstcitstinrsemsmncieeicdeinsediainenn

eed v. Grayson, 189 So. 2d 204 (Fla. App.

STONE iineie bestia eaieeaabchaieninbatinhbhbaanadiaiainicinsacieuiiinhiialnie

RTA RR SER Se AIR cane RD

Hollowell v. Jove, 628 F. 2d 513 ( Sth Cir. 1980) .........

Howard v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 136 Ga. App. 221,

es ee ae Ee 0 TIE issentnernesnncenieinresitenantenen

wo Malone, 146 Ga. App. 341, 247 S.E.2d 107

Se IIIa aa ddnidiepidagnnddéaibbiideabtanmbdatdiiaamiadanbi

In re McClintock, 558 F. 2d 732 ( Sth Cir. 1977).........

Johnston v. Sibley, 558 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. App. 1977)

Keene v. Wiggins, 69 Cal.App. 3d 308, 138 Cal. Rpt.

Part W O eidsiiebiaidaiudicnidtbaamenbinetibnipibaaapaeiniabuiddiiiinlinnes

McFarling v. Azar, 519 F. 2d 1075 ( 5th Cir. 1975).....

MacNerland v. Barnes, 129 Ga. App. 367, 199 S. E.

li aitiiibd aati ial hilaiceeeeiaibiaiieniniabilienes

Mattair v. St. Joseph’s Hospital, Ine., 141 Ga. App.

597, 234 S.E.2d 537, aff'd 239 Ga. 674, 238 S.E.

Pe PTF Pecsscenitiedadidatennsinuiicesemennicinissinininbianen

Nortek, Inc. v. Alexander Grant and Company, 532

2d 1013 (Sth Cir. 1976) cert. denied 429 U.

1042, 97 S.Ct. 742, 50 L. Ed. 2d 754 (1977)...

~ "Ti

Page

iV

Rogers v. Horvath, 65 Mich.A

pp. 644, 237 N.W.2d

95 ENE ATE Een mem me

Soto v. Frankford fuapient 478 F.Supp 1134 (E. D.

Sis SU UTITTET ciclcasciap centeemuetheaianacciadinbdetiiiiatiidedetibiniiilaininbeatiatinnte

Stephens Industries, Inc. v. Haskins & Sells, 438 F.

ee ER: WU dtnssiniiisnnsiinscdeiiaiinnnintnatibennen

Young v. Yarn, 136 Ga. App.

STATUTES:

Ga. Code Ann. § 84-924...........

Ga. Code Ann. § 24-3902.........

Ga. Code Ann. § 3-1101. ef seg

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).................

es Seinen

OTHER:

737, 222 S.E.2d 113

POP eee eee eee eee

Pree eer errr rier iret er

Pree eee SOOO Ceri rrr

TARR R eRe R Eee eee eee eee eee Fee

POeeee COCO OO Ore

SERRE EERE EEE EEE E EEE Eee

1A Moore’s Federal Practice J 0.309[ 3} oo...

Rule 36, Supreme Court of Georgia ..............:.cccceeeees

Supreme Court of the United States

OcTOBER TERM, 1981

MERTON B. BERGER, M_D.,

Petitioner,

vs.

NORTHERN AMERICAN COMPANY FOR

LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals, rendered on June 18,

1981, is not yet published; it is reprinted in Appendix A, infra,

at page l(a). The refusal of the Court of Appeals to grant an

en banc rehearing or to certify the within matter to the Supreme

Court of Georgia is likewise not published; it is reprinted herein

in Appendix B, infra, at page 1(b). The June 25, 1979, opinion

of the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia

granting petitioner's original motion for summary judgment is

2

not reported, but is attached herein as Appendix C, infra, on

page I(c). The August 18, 1979, denial of respondent's motion

for reconsideration of the grant of summary judgment is also

unpublished and is attached hereto as Appendix D, infra, at

page I(d). A newspaper article quoting opposing counsel's

opinion as <o the unique importance of the decision herein is

reproduced as Appendix E, infra, at page |(e).

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals, which is reprinted

in Appendix A, infra, at page 1(a), was entered on June 18,

1981. Petitioner filed a petition for rehearing en banc in the

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. This petition was denied

by an order filed August 10, 1981, said order being reprinted in

Appendix B hereto, infra, at page 1(b). Subsequently, the

petition to stay mandate was granted on September 3, 1981.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1254(1).

STATUTES INVOLVED

The following Georgia statutes and Supreme Court Rules

are relevant to the questions presented by this petition:

“MALPRACTICE OF SURGERY AND MEDICINE: A

person professing to practice surgery or the administering

of medicine for compensation must bring to the exercise of

his profession a reasonable degree of care and skill. Any

injury resulting from a want of such care and skill shall be

a tort for which recovery may be had.” (Ga. Laws, 1933,

p. 2013; Ga. Code Ann. § 84-924).

“SUPREME COURT AUTHORIZED TO RECEIVE

AND ANSWER CERTIFICATES AS TO STATE LAW

FROM FEDERAL APPELLATE COURTS: The Supreme

Court of this State may, by rule of Court, provide that,

when it shall appear to the Supreme Court of the United

States, to any Circuit Court of Appeals of the United

3

States, or to the Court of Appeals or the District of

Columbia that there are involved in any proceeding before

it questions or propositions of the laws of this State, which

are determinative of the said cause, and there are no clear

controlling precedents in the decisions of the Supreme

Court of this State, such Federal Appellate Court may

certify such questions or propositions of the laws of this

State to the Supreme Court of this State for instructions

concerning such questions or propositions of State law,

which certificate the Supreme Court of this State, by

written opinion, may answer: Provided, however, that the

Court of Appeals shall not have jurisdiction to consider

any questions certified under this section by transfer or

otherwise. (Georgia Laws, 1977, pp. 577, 578; Ga. Code

Ann. § 24-3902).

“ACTION FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE” defined:

As used in this section, the term ‘action for medical

malpractice’ means any claim for damages resulting from

the death or injury to any person arising out of (a) health,

medical, dental, or surgical: (1) service, (2) diagnosis, (3)

prescription, (4) treatment, or (5) care, rendered by a

person authorized by law to perform such service or by any

person acting under the supervision and control of such

lawfully authorized person, or (b) care or service rendered

by any public or private hospital, nursing home, clinic,

hospital authority, facility or institution, or by any officer,

agent or employee thereof acting within the scope of his or

her employment. (Ga. Laws, 1976, pp. 1363-1364; Ga.

Code Ann. § 3-1101.)

“GENERAL LIMITATIONS”: Except as otherwise pro-

vided in this Chapter, an action for medical malpractice

shall be brought within two years after the date on which

the negligent or wrongful act or omission occurred. (Ga.

Laws 1976, pp. 1363, 1364; Ga. Code Ann. § 3-1102.)

“Rule 36, Supreme Court of Georgia”

VI. FEDERAL APPELLATE COURTS

Rule 36.

(a) Certified Questions.

When it sha!! appear to the Supreme Court of the

United States, to any Circuit Court of Appeals of the

4

United States, or to the Court of Appeals of the

District of Columbia that there are involved in any

proceeding before it questions or propositions of the

laws of this State which are determinative of said

cause and there are no clear controlling precedents in

the appellate court decisions of this State, such federal

appellate court may certify such questions or proposi-

tions of the laws of Georgia to this court for instruc-

tions concerning such questions or propositions.

(b) Formulation of Questions, Records, etc.

The court certifying to this court a question of law

shall formulate the question and cause the question to

be certified and transmitted to this court, together with

copies of such parts of the record and briefs in the case

as the certifying court deems relevant.

(c) Docketing, etc., of Questions.

Such questions shall be docketed by the Clerk as

are other cases and the rules relating to oral argu-

ments, briefs, motions, etc., in direct appeals shall

apply.

(d) Costs.

The costs in such proceeding shall be equally

divided between the parties unless otherwise ordered

by this court.

Rule 37.

( Reserved )

(published at 242 Ga. 1007, 1008 (1978))

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

At all times relevant hereto petitioner Merton B. Berger

was a physician specializing in the practice of psychiatry in the

metropolitan Atlanta area. During the course of his practice, he

5

had occasion to serve as a psychiatric consultant to a number of

private and governmental entities, including the Federal Avia-

tion Administration.

During the late 1960's and early 1970's the Atlanta area

experienced phenomenal growth; this growth included At-

lanta’s Hartsficld Airport. Over those same years Dr. Berger

was consulted by a number of individuals employed as air

traffic controllers; some of these air traffic controllers had

obtained policies of disability income insurance from various

insurance companies, including North American Company for

Life and Health Insurance [hereinafter, North American].

From time to time, Dr. Berger diagnosed certain of these

individuals as suffering various mental and physical disorders,

which disqualified them from their extraordinarily sensitive

occupation.

As is the case with any patient, some air traffic controllers

found to be disabled by Dr. Berger would, from time to time,

present him with the necessary proof of claim forms supplied by

North American and request that he complete them so they

could obtain the benefits for which they were insured. As an

accommodation to his patients, Dr. Berger recorded on the

forms the previously determined diagnosis. Dr. Berger was

never paid by North American to arrive at a diagnosis for any

of his patients. Indeed, it is undisputed that Dr. Berger was

never paid by North American for anything, nor was he ever

employed by the company at any time. The present lawsuit is

an outgrowth of this factual background.

Suit was filed on January 25, 1977, in the United States

District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta

Division. Jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship of

all parties under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Defendants included the

present petitioner, Dr. Merton B. Berger, and twelve of his

patients, all of whom had come to him for treatment without

any involvement by North American in the physician selection

6

process. None of these air traffic controller defendants filed a

cross action against Dr. Berger, clearly indicating their satisfac-

tion with his care.

Respondent North American’s complaint asserted that the

diagnosis and subsequent representations of disability made by

Dr. Berger to it on its forms were negligently made and that, as

a proximate result, it was led to make substantial disability

payments to its insureds. No privity between Dr. Berger and

North American was alleged. The essence of the negligence

claim against Dr. Berger is found in paragraph 29 of the

complaint, wherein it is urged that Dr. Berger was under a duty

“.. to exercise reasonable care and prudence of the kind

customarily exercised by psychiatrists in this community when

rendering opinions as to the total and permanent disability of

their patients, and Berger failed to so act ...”. The complaint

also asserted a fraud action against Dr. Berger, but this issue is

not on appeal.

On April 6, 1977, after obtaining an extension of time in

which to answer, petitioner Berger filed a timely Answer

denying all allegations of negligence and/or fraud.

On February 12, 1979, Dr. Berger filed his motion for

summary judgment on both the negligence and fraud aspects of

the case. The motion was based upon Dr. Berger’s affidavit

demonstrating that he had never been an employee of North

American, had not been hired by it to perform any diagnosis or

other service and had no privity of any kind with North

American. Dr. Berger’s affidavit also established that in

expressing opinions as to the mental status of his patients on

North American’s forms, he was doing so only as an accom-

modation to his patients. On the issue now before this Court,

Dr. Berger contended that, since there was no privity between

himself and the insurance company of his private patients, there

could be no breach of any duty on his part, and, thus, there

could be no malpractice suit against him by the insurance

company. ,

-

On June 25, 1979, the trial court granted Dr Berger's

motion for summary judgment as to the negligence claim and

denied the motion as to fraud. In doing so, the trial judge

relied upon an admis. .on made by North American that there

was no privity between the parties; he also specifically noted

. a longstanding [Georgia] philosophy against extending

religence in professional matters ....” (Opinion of June 25,

1979, p. Sc, infra).

On July 9, 1979, North American filed a motion for

reconsideration of the grant of summary judgment. It was

denied and, on September 19, 1979, final judgment was entered

in favor of Dr. Berger on the negligence claim.

North American appealed this decision and, on June 18,

1981, a three judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit decided in a two to one decision to reverse

the trial court.

Petitioner promptly moved for an en banc rehearing

and/or, in the aiternative, moved for certification of the issue to

the Georgia Supreme Court. The motion was denied on August

10, 1981. Petitioner timely made a motion for stay of mandate

pending further appeal, which stay was granted on September

3, 1981.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT RENDERED A DECISION

IN CONFLICT WITH ITSELF AND OTHER

FEDERAL COURTS IN RULING THAT A PHY-

SICIAN CAN BE SUED FOR MALPRACTICE BY

THE INSURANCE CARRIER OF HIS PATIENT

WHEN THE COMPANY, BUT NOT THE

PATIENT, FELT THE DOCTOR’S DIAGNOSIS

WAS INCORRECT.

The first reason why the petition for a writ of certiorari

should be granted is that the decision of the Fifth Circuit herein

is in conflict with both prior Fifth Circuit precedent and earlier

decisions of other Federal courts.

In McFarling v. Azar, 519 F. 2d 1075 (Sth Cir. 1975), the

Fifth Circuit was confronted with a coverage question under a

physician’s professional liability insurance policy. The doctor

was employed by a life insurance company and had examined

an applicant for a life insurance policy 2¢ its request; he

thereafter submitted a fraudulent report t7 the company. In

reaching the ultimate issue, the Fifth Circuit found it necessary

to consider the following question:

“Does the duty, the breach of which is defined as malprac-

tice, run to a life insurance company which pays a doctor to

make on its behalf a single examination of an applicant for

insurance.” McFarling, at 1076-1077.

The Fifth Circuit cited as controlling a Florida case,

Greenwald v. Grayson, 189 So.2d 204 (Fla. App. 1966),

wherein a married couple employed a doctor to examine a child

whose adoption they were contemplating. The doctor failed to

discover a physical problem in the child; the couple, which

adopted the child in reliance upon the examination, later

discovered the problem and sued both in contract and in tort.

The trial court directed a verdict on behalf of the physician on

the negligence question, and the Florida appellate court ap-

proved. The court held that, in the absence of physician-patient

relationship, there could be no claim for malpractice.

Applying this rule, the Fifth Circuit held:

“As did the parents in Greenwald, the life insurance

company here employed a doctor to advise it on the

medical condition of a third-party. Whatever claims it

may have against this doctor for the intentional mis-

performance of his duties on its behalf, they are not the

kind of claims Florida recognizes as malpractice.” ( Jd. at

1077).

Based on the absence of the physician-patient relationship,

the Fifth Circuit, therefore, ruled that the physician could not

be liable for malpractice to the insurance company. Put

9

another way, McFarling is compelling authority for the proposi-

tion that no malpractice claim exists on behalf of an insurance

company against a physician who it employed to make an

examination of a third-party. Certainly this rule must apply

more strongly in the instant case where North American

admittedly never employed Dr. Berger to do anything.

Comparably, other Federal courts have held that a

physician’s duty to his patient does not create a duty to a third-

party non-patient. Such decisions rest on both the law relative

to physicians and on analogies from cases involving other

professionals. Soto v. Frankford Hospital, 478 F. Supp. 1134

(E. D. Pa. 1979); Nortek, Inc. v. Alexander Grant and Co., 532

F. 2d 1013 (Sth Cir. 1976), cert. denied 429 U. S. 1042, 97S.

Ct. 742, 50 L.Ed.2d 754 (1977); Stephens Industries, Inc. v.

Haskins & Sells, 438 F. 2d 357 (10th Cir. 1971).

For this reason, this Court is petitioned to grant certiorari

in order to resolve the conflict created by the Fifth Circuit both

with earlier precedent and with the law in other Federal

jurisdictions.

Il. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT DEPARTED FROM THE

ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL

PROCEEDINGS BY NOT CERTIFYING THE

CASE TO THE GEORGIA SUPREME COURT IN

THE ABSENCE OF AUTHORITATIVE STATE

DECISIONAL LAW.

The second reason why this petition for a writ of certiorari

should be granted is that the Fifth Circuit failed to certify the

within matter to the Supreme Court of Georgia.

The issue at bar is who may sue a physician for medical

negligence. Under the applicable rules of Erie Railroad Co. v.

Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1199 (1938) a

Federal court must look for Georgia decisions discussing the

necessity for a physician-patient relationship as a prerequisite to

a malpractice suit. Such decisions would, or should, determine

the outcome of Dr. Berger’s case in the Fifth Circuit.

10

The sole Georgia case on point is Buttersworth v. Swint, 53

Ga. App. 602, 186 S. E. 770 (1936). There an action was filed

against a Dr. Swint asserting negligence in treatment. The

plaintiff contended that she was an employee of the Milledge-

ville State Sanitarium of which Dr. Swint was superintendent.

Plaintiff contended that defendant was liable to her because he

had been advised of her health problem and negligently failed

to render proper and necessary attention. Defendant filed a

general demurrer, which was granted. On appeal, the Court of

Appeals of Georgia sustained the trial court:

“The obvious defect in the petition is that it fails to show

the relationship of the physician and patient existed be-

tween the plaintiff and the defendant; and on the other

hand it contains direct allegations which show that the

defendant never agreed to treat or advise her as her

physician.” ( Jd. at 772, italics supplied by the Court. )

Georgia courts have often impliedly held that, in order for

an action to lie for malpractice, the physician must have

undertaken the treatment of the plaintiff. Mattair v. St.

Joseph’s Hospital, Inc., 141 Ga. App. 597, 234 S.E.2d 537,

S.E.2d affirmed 239 Ga. 674, 238 S.E.2d 366 (1977). Georgia

cases concerning other professionals (i.e. accountants and

lawyers) have held that there must be a direct relationship

between the plaintiff and the defendant in order for the plaintiff

to sue for malpractice. Howard v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 136

Ga. App. 221, 220 S.E.2d 702 (1975); MacNerland v. Barnes,

129 Ga. App. 367, 199 S.E.2d 564 (1973); Hughes v. Malone,

146 Ga. App. 341, 247 S.E.2d 107 (1978).

Georgia courts also have a consistent record of restricting

the legal exposure of physicians. The Georgia malpractice

statute of limitations (Ga. Laws 1976, pp. 1363-1365; Ga. Code

Ann. § 3-1101, ef seg.) requires that an action must be brought

against a physician within two years of an alleged act or

omission. This statute has been held to mean exactly what it

says regardless of when the patient discovers or should have

discovered the injury. Dalbey v. Banks, 245 Ga. 162, 2645S. E.

2d 4 (1980). The so-called Doctrine of Informed Consent has

been rejected by the Georgia courts. Young v. Yarn, 136 Ga.

App. 737, 222 S.E.2d 113 (1976). The Doctrine of Res Ispa

Loquitur does not apply in malpractice suits against Georgia

physicians. Hayes v. Brown, 108 Ga. App. 360, 133 S.E.2d 102

(1963); Branch v. Anderson, 47 Ga. App. 858, 171 S.E. 771

(1933).

The Fifth Circuit certainly possessed persuasive indications

that a Georgia court, given an opportunity, would hold that a

physician could not be sued for medical negligence by a non-

patient. Ignoring this authority, the Fifth Circuit chose to rely

on reasoning by analogy in an unpublished Federal case

dealing with architects’ liability. Alexander Hamilton Life In-

surance Co. v. Trust Company Bank (Civil Action No. C76-

893A, N.D.Ga. 1979). This was error.

At the very least, the Fifth Circuit should have utilized the

available Georgia certification statute, Ga. Code Ann. § 24-

3902 and Supreme Court Rule 36 to send this vital question to

the Georgia Supreme Court for definitive resolution. It has

done so in the recent past on matters of much less importance.

Hollowell v. Jove, 628 F.2d 513 (Sth Cir. 1980).

Such a decision would have been in accord with usual

Federal practice and custom.

Concerning the importance of certification, Professor Moore

has noted:

“There has been much expression in favor of the device of

certification by the federal courts of an unsettled question

of state law to the highest court of that state to get a

definitive answer ... In two cases, Clay v. Sun Insurance

Office, Ltd. 363 U.S. 207, 80 S.Ct. 1222, 4 L.Ed.2d 1170

(1960) and Lehman Brothers v. Scheir, 416 U.S. 386, 94

S.Ct. 1741, 40 L.Ed.2d 215 (1974), the Supreme Court has

expressed its wholehearted approval of certification.” 1A.

Moore’s Federal Practice { 0.309[3], pp. 3131, 3132. See

also, Aldrich v. Aldrich, 375 U.S. 249, 84S. Ct. 305, 11

L.Ed.2d 304 (1963); Jn re McClintock, 558 F.2d 732 (5th

Cir. 1977); United States Life Insurance Company v.

Delaney, 328 F. 2d 483 ( Sth Cir. 1964); Wansor v. George

Hantscho Company, 570 F. 2d 1202, (Sth Cir. 1978).

12

In conclusion, petitioner agrees with Judge Clark, in his

able dissent in the present matter:

“(W )hen our certification rule permits Georgia’s highest

court to settle the issue, I look with disfavor upon estab-

lishing a precedent for Georgia Federal Courts in a

diversity case when it is obvious the decision will spawn

many progeny.” North American Company for Life &

Health Insurance v. Berger, at 8135 (attached hereto at

Appendix A).

Ill. CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED TO CON-

SIDER WHETHER, AS A MATTER OF PUBLIC

POLICY, A PHYSICIAN CAN BE LIABLE TO

HIS PATIENT’S INSUROR IN THE ABSENCE

OF ANY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DOC-

TOR AND THE COMPANY.

The third reason why this Petition for Writ of Certiorari

should be granted is that it presents a question of paramount

and overriding importance to the nation as a whole.

The Fifth Circuit has created a duty where none heretofore

existed. It has expanded the physician’s proper concern from

an exclusive dedication to the welfare of his patient to include a

concern for the satisfaction of the patient’s insurance company.

This decision has far ranging implications for both the medical

and insurance professions, and, more importantly, for all

Americans who from time to time consult physicians.

By imposing such duty on the physician, the Fifth Circuit

correspondingly creates a right of action for breach of that duty.

This right will foster innumerable and very real conflicts in the

health care delivery system. Who is the doctor to satisfy in

attempting to exercise a reasonable degree of care—the patient,

or the cost conscious insurance company? Who will compensate

the physician for the extra risk he now evidently runs of a

negligence suit by the insurance company? By what right does

an insurance company even obtain leave to label the care

rendered to its insureds as malpractice when (as here) the

patients make no such claim?

13

Indeed, The Fifth Circuit has created for North American,

and all insurance companies, greater rights than those afforded

to family members of patients or other individuals who

legitimately depend upon patients. The businessman whose

key employee is injured as a result of malpractice has no nght

to sue the physician, despite the real and demonstrable dam-

ages suffered as a consequence of the physician’s neglect. Cox

v. Stratton, 352 N.Y.S. 2d 834 (1974). The child whose father

is crippled by negligence of a physician has no claim against

him for malpractice; this is true, in Georgia at least, no matter

how great the child’s emotional or financial loss. Yet, under the

within decision, the insurance company may sue to collect all

benefits it feels were improperly paid, even if the patient makes

no claim of having received substandard care.

It would be possible to spin out scenarios illustrating the

evils of this precedent at some length." It is to prevent just such

abuses that innumerable cases, from all jurisdictions, have

rejected the very thing done by the Fifth Circuit.

In Chatman vy. Millis, 257 Ark. 451, 157 S.W.2d 504

(1975), Mrs. Chatman had been divorced from her husband,

plaintiff in the lawsuit. Under the terms of the divorce, Mrs.

Chatman had custody of their young son, with whom the

husband had visitation privileges. The wife suspected that her

ex-husband was subjecting the boy to homosexual conduct and,

to aid in terminating the visitation privileges, took the child to

1 Consider, for example, a not uncommon occurrence: A physi-

cian performs a vasectomy which is, for whatever reason, unsuccess-

ful. The patient’s wife becomes pregnant but, in the interval, the

attitude of the couple has changed and they are delighted by this

unexpected addition to their family. They harbor no ill will against

the physician and return to him for further care. They make no claim

against the physician for malpractice.

The patient’s insurance company, however, is subsequently

presented a bill for maternity costs which it would not have incurred

had the vasectomy been successful. Under the Fifth Circuit ruling,

does not the insuror have a right to sue for malpractice?

14

defendant Dr. Millis, a psychologist. Dr. Millis examined the

child and wrote a letter to Mrs. Chatman’s attorney advising

that it would be in the child’s best interest to have the father’s

visitation rights restricted. Evidencing knowledge that this

letter might be relied upon by a judicial officer, the psychologist

wrote that he would be willing to state his opinions in court.

Mr. Chatman then sued Dr. Millis for both defamation and

malpractice.

In the course of hearing special venue defenses the trial

court held that Arkansas recognized no action for malpractice

against a psychologist, and that even if such action existed,

there could be no action for malpractice under the facts of the

case since there was no doctor-patient relationship between the

Parties.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas approved,

holding that the allegations of plaintiffs complaint could not

state a cause of action. The court added:

“We do not flatly state that a cause for malpractice must

be predicated upon a contractual agreement between a

doctor ( psychologist) and a patient, but we do say that a

doctor-patient relationship must exist, i.e., there must be a

duty, as a doctor, owed from the practitioner to the

patient . .. Concisely stated, we simply reiterate that under

the facts alleged, appellee [Dr. Millis] owed no duty, as a

doctor, to appellant, and this duty must be in existence

before appellant can recover because of negligence, con-

stituting malpractice.” (Jd. at 506, italics added by the

court).

In Rogers v. Horvath, 65 Mich. App. 644, 237 N.W.2d 595

(1976), the Court construed the question before it as follows:

“The principal question raised by this appeal is whether a

professional physician-patient relationship is a legal pre-

requisite to basing a cause of action in professional

malpractice against a physician. .. . The term ‘malpractice’

denotes a breach of duty owed by one in rendering

professional services to a person who has contracted for

such services; in physician-malpractice cases, the duty

15

owed by the physician arises from the physician-patient

relationship. No such relationship existed in the case at

bar. Defendant was employed by General Motors to

examine one of its employees in preparation for a work-

men’s compensation hearing. Plaintiff did not employ the

defendant, nor did she seek to receive medical advice or

treatment. Under the circumstances, the defendant did not

owe plaintiff any duty arising from a physician-patient

relationship. This is not to say that a physician who

examines a person for reasons other than diagnosis or

treatment and for the benefit of someone other than the

examinee owes no duty of due care to that person. Rather,

we hold that the physician in such a case does not owe such

a duty of care as will subject him to liability for malprac-

tice.” (Jd. at 596-597).

In Johnston v. Sibley, 558 S.W.26 135 (Tex. App. 1977)

the Texas Court of Appeals held:

“It is well established principle of law that a physician is

liable for malpractice for negligence only where there is a

physician-patient relationship as a result of a contract,

express or implied, that the doctor will treat the patient

with proper professional skill, and there is a breach of

professional duty to the patient.” ( Jd. at 137).

The same result was reached in Keene v. Wiggins, 69 Cal.

App. 3d 308, 138 Cal. Rpt. 3 (1977):

“It is well established by authorities that in other states

{that} the physician is liable for malpractice or negligence

only where there is a relationship of physician-patient as a

result of a contract, express or implied, that the doctor will

treat the patient with proper professional skill and there is

a breach of professional duty to the patient ... Here we

find no physician-patient relationship, express or implied,

of the sort giving rise to a duty of care owed to [the

claimant] in connection with the report. The uncon-

tradicted declarations assert [the claimant] went to [the

doctor’s] office at the request of the carrier for exam-

ination. [The claimant] was present because he was

required to submit to examination as a claimant. There is

no assertion [the doctor] did anything more than examine

16

{the claimant] and make his report to Industrial In-

demnity as he was hired to do. ... [W]e must affirm the

holding of the trial court that on the basis of the declara-

tions, [the doctor] owed the claimant no duty of profes-

sional skill in connection with the report. [The doctor’s]

alleged failure to advise [the claimant] of some medical

condition did not give rise to a cause of action under the

circumstances of this case. Summary judgment was prop-

erly granted.” ( Jd. at 6, 8-9).

Respondent’s counsel has been quoted as stating that there

never has been a ruling by any court in the United States

similar to the one at bar. (See “Psychiatrist Facing Trial in

Controller-Stress Suit”, The Atlanta Journal-The Atlanta Con-

stitution. Saturday, August 29, 1981, pp. | and 6A). This is

true. It is respectfully submitted that before any such decision

affects both the medical and insurance professions, and the

public they serve, the nation’s highest court must examine the

issue.

17

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, petitioner respectfully

requests a Writ of Certiorari be granted and that the holding of

the Court below be reversed. In the alternative, this Court is

requested to exercise it’s discretion and certify this issue to the

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Respectfully submitted,

SIDNEY F. WHEELER

Attorney for Petitioner

Of Counsel:

LONG, WEINBERG, ANSLEY & WHEELER

2500 The Equitable Building

100 Peachtree Street, N.W.

Atlanta, Georgia 30303

(404) 688-7900

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Sidney F. Wheeler, attorney for petitioner Merton S.

Berger, M.D., and a member of the bar of the Supreme Court

of the United States, hereby certify that on the 2nd day of

October, 1981, I have served three true copies of the foregoing

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari upon the respondent and all

parties, by depositing in a United States Mailbox the required

number of true copies of said petition, with first class postage

pre-paid, correctly addressed to the counsel of record at their

post office address, as required by Supreme Court Rule No. 28.

MatTTHew H. Patton, Eso.

Everette L. Dorrermyre, Eso.

Kicpatrick & Copy

3100 The Equitable Building

100 Peachtree Street, N.W.

Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Joun A. Dunaway, Eso.

EuGene Hope, Esa.

Dunaway. Haas, Broome. Hope & BrinGes

2964 Peachtree Road. N.E.

Suite 440

Atlanta, Georgia 30305

C. James Jessee. Jr., Eso.

Georce E. Duncan, Jr., Eso.

Barry L. Roseman. Eso.

620 Northside Tower

6065 Roswell Road. N.E.

Atlanta Georgia

This 2nd day of October, 1981.

LONG, WEINBERG, ANSLEY

& WHEELER

/s/ Sipney F. WHEELER

Sidney F. Wheeler

2500 The Equitable Building Sworn to and Subscribed Before

100 Peachtree Street. N.W. Me This Ist Day of October. 1981

Atlanta, Georgia 30303

(404) 688-7900 Isl Harry D. GREEN. Jr.

Notary Public. Clarke County, Georgia

My Commission Expires July 19, 1982

.

oe

a

ee

&

we

'

=

la

NORTH AMERICAN COMPANY FOR

LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Merton B. BERGER et al., Defendants.

Merton B. Berger, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 79-3541.

United States Court of Appeals,

Fifth Circuit.

Unit B

June 18, 1981.

Before THomMaS A. CLARK and KRavitcn, Circuit Judges.

and Lynne,* District Judge.

LyNNngE, District Judge:

This appeal focuses on the age-old requireinent of privity

of contract between the parties in an action for the negligent

performance of a duty. Appellee Berger was a practicing

psychiatrist in the Atlanta area from 1968 through 1977. In his

capacity as psychiatric consultant to the Federal Aviation

Administration he diagnosed as totally disabled approximately

154 air traffic controllers. The basis for these diagnoses was

often job-related anxiety and depressive neurosis. A number of

these air traffic controllers held disability income insurance

policies issued by appellant North American. Berger certified

his findings to North American on the appellant’s claim forms

after the initial determination and periodically thereafter.

North American relied on these certifications in paying the

claims of various air traffic controllers. Because of the large

number of claims, North American investigated Berger and

concluded that many of his diagnoses of total disability were

* Senior District Judge of the Northern Distnct of Alabama, sitting by

designation.

2a

incorrect. It sued Berger to recover the disability benefits paid

to the air traffic controllers because of his allegedly fraudulent

or negligent diagnoses.

Appellant's claim against Berger for fraud is pending in the

District Court. Appellant appeals from the District Court's

granting of a summary judgment in Berger's favor on the

negligence count and its subsequent refusal to reconsider the

issue. The District Court ruled that because North American

was not in privity with Dr. Berger, it could not sue him to

recover for the results of his alleged negligence. Upon exam-

ination of the record and the forces motivating the privity

requirement, we disagree and reverse.

The appellee claims that the District Court rightly dis-

missed the negligence count of North American's compliant

because a doctor is not subject to malpractice liability unless the

injured party is or was the doctor’s patient. Buttersworth v.

Swint, 53 Ga.App. 602, 186 S.E. 770 ( 1936).' In support of its

position, appellee relies not only on cases concerning medical

malpractice, but on those charging other professionals with acts

of negligence. Howard v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 136 Ga.App.

221,220 S.E.2d 702 (1975); McNerland v. Barnes, 129 Ga.App.

368, 199 S.E.2d 564 (1973): Smith v. International Lawyers, 35

Ga.App. 158,132 S.E. 245 (1926). In each of these cases,

Georgia courts explicitly or implicitly refused to hold the

defendant professional liable because there was no direct

relationship between the injured party and the defendant.

Both Howard and McNerland concern the liability of

financial experts for incorrect financial assessments of business-

es in which the plaintiff subsequently invested. The McNerland

' Appellant argues that because of its peculiar facts. Buttersworth fails to

establish a sweeping privity requirement for malpractice actions. In Bur-

tersworth, the superintendent of a state hospital made the offhand statement

that the physical condition of one of his employees could be corrected “if she

would wear an abdominal support.” 53 Ga.App. at 604, 186 S.E. at 772. The

employee was not his patient: he never examined her. The case its

distinguishable from the instant situation because of the nature of the

opinions rendered in each case. Dr. Swint made a casual remark. Dr. Berger

filled out and signed appellant's certification forms with the intent for

appellant to rely on his opinion.

3a

court relied on Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174

N.E. 441 (1931), in which Judge Cardozo refused to hold an

accountant liable for a negligently prepared financial statement

because it would expose him “to a liability in an indeterminate

amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.”

174 N.E. at 444.2 The court in Howard was even more

protective of the defendant. It noted:

[A]s to third parties, even those the accountant knew

or should have known were relying on his audit,

liability can be found only upon fraudulent conduct,

and proof of mere negligence will not suffice.

220 S.E.2d at 704.

The court insulated accountants from liability to anyone except

those in privity.

In support of its requirement of privity in suits against

professionals for negligence. McNerland cited Smith v. Inter-

national Lawyers, 35 Ga.App. 158, 132 S.E. 245 (1926). The

Smith court refused to hold an attorney liable for negligence to

anyone but his client. The appe'lant distinguishes Smith on the

grounds that its privity requirement applied only to money-rule

procedures under Section 4954 of the Georgia Civil Code

(1910). MeNerland, however, cited Smith for its privity theme

and apparently overlooked the money-rule limitation.

While recognizing that a professional may not be held

liable to an “indeterminate class” of third parties, the appellant

contends that an exception to the general privity requirement

applies in this case. When a “tortfeasor provides an opinion

with actual or reasonable knowledge that the injured party will

rely on its accuracy,” he is liable for the foreseeable results.

2In numerous opinions prior and subsequent to Ultramares. the New

York courts recognized that the purpose of the privity requirement was to

protect an alleged tortfeasor from liability to a nameless. unforeseen class of

plaintiffs. Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 615 F.2d 68.82 (2d Cir. 1980); White

v. Guarente, 43 N.Y.2d 356,361. 401 N.Y.S.2d 474, 477.372 N.E.2d 315, 318

(1977). See Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N_E. 275 (1922).

3 North American Company for Life and Health Ins. v. Berger. No. C-77-

119-A (N.D. Ga., June 25. 1979) (order granting summary judgment).

4a

The appellant successfully distinguishes McNerland and

Howard, the accountant cases, from its own. In McNerland, the

faulty financial statements contained specific disclaimers which

should have put the plaintiff on notice that the statements had

not been audited by an independent CPA. In holding for the

defendant, the court emphasized the latter facts in conjunction

with lack of privity. In Howard, the defendant Dun &

Bradstreet never made a representation to the plaintiff with the

knowledge that he would rely upon it. Dr. Berger certainly had

no doubt as to whom he was making a representation and for

what purpose.

In sharp contrast to McNerland and Howard, appellant

cites Alexander Hamilton Life Insurance Company v. Trust Co.

Bank, No. C76-893-A (N.D. Ga., July 29, 1979), in which the

absence of privity failed to insulate an architect from liability to

an insurance company. As a preface to its opinion, the court

stated: “Although there are still many unsettled questions as to

the situations in which a party not in privity of contract may sue

for negligence, it is clear that in a large and increasing number

of instances such suits are allowed.” Jd. At 9.4 The architect in

Alexander Hamilton erroneously certified to an insurance com-

pany the completion of a hotel. In reliance on the architect's

certification, the insurance company purchased a construction

loan from the construction lender. Upon default by the

borrower, the insurance company foreclosed and sued the

architect. The architect relied on McNerland and Howard,

emphasizing the similar lack of privity in his own case. In

response, the court cited Bodin v. Gill, 216 Ga. 467, 117 S.E.2d

4 The court in Alexander Hamilton emphasized that the decision to allow

a person not in privity with the defendant to sue was largely a policy matter.

In United States v. Rogers & Rogers, \61 F Supp. 132. 135 (S.D.Cal.1958),

the court listed various factors which should play a part in the cecision:

“the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the

plainuff, the foreseeability of the harm to him. the degree of

certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury. the closeness of the

connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury

suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct,

and the policy of preventing future harm.” (citations omitted )

Alexander Hamilton at 10.

Sa

325 (1960), in which an architect's design of a church caused

water damage to the property of a neighboring landowner. In

spite of the absence of privity, the landowner recovered for the

architect’s negligence.> The Supreme Court of Georgia recog-

nized in Bodin that:

[T]he law imposes upon persons performing archi-

tectural, engineering, and other professional and

skilled services an obligation to exercise a reasonable

degree of care, skill and ability, which generally is

taken and considered to be such a degree of care and

skill as, under the circumstances, is ordinarily em-

ployed by their respective professions.

Id. at 472, 117 S.E.2d at 330.

The court thus identified a legal duty of care independent of

privity.

[1,2] The factual similarities between Alexander Hamilton

and the instant case are striking. The plaintiffs are both

insurance companies that relied on certifications made by

professionals before they took certain financial action. In

Alexander Hamilton, the architect certified completion directly

to the plaintiff. In the instant case, Berger, using the plaintiff's

forms, certified disability directly to the insurance company.

The relationship approaches that of privity.© At the very least,

5 Two other significant Georgia cases rely upon Bodin. In Covil v. Robert

& Co. Assocs., 112 Ga.App. 163, 144 S.E.2d 450 (1965). the court allowed

landowners to maintain an action against an architectural and engineering

firm that designed a nearby water pumping station that caused plaintiffs’

property to flood. In Dresco Mech. Contrs. Inc. v. Todd—CEA, §3\ F.2d

1292 (Sth Cir. 1976), although the plaintiff did not prevail on the merits of

the case, the court applied Georgia law and found that the defendant

engineer owed a duty imposed by law to a co-defendant manufacturer with

whom he was not in privity. The manufacturer had filed a third-party

complaint against the engineer. accusing him of negligently designing a

aeating plant which the manufacturer was under contract to build.

6 Appellant argues that doctors qualify as “other professionals” under

the Bodin rationale. especially in light of Ga.Code § 84-924, which states:

(footnote cov inues)

6a

the relationship was so close that Berger knew exactly who

would rely on his certification and for what purpose.’

Berger was under a duty to exercise reasonable care in

performing medical services, making diagnoses, and trans-

mitting them to «.ppellant. Summary judgment on the issue of

negligence was improper for this reason, and because it is

apparent that genuine issues of fact remain to be resolved. Our

resolution of the issue of privity makes a consideration of

appellant’s third-party-beneficiary agreement unnecessary.

(footnote continued)

A person professing to practice surgery or the administering of

medicine for compensation must bring to the exercise of his

profession a reasonable degree of care and skill. Any injury

resulting from a want of such care and skill shall be a tort for

which a recovery may be had.

Appellant emphasizes the language “any injury” in the statute. While

appellant's reading of the statute, i.e. that it confers a mght to sue for

monetary injury upon a third party, is rather ingenious, it is not persuasive.

More compelling is appellee's analysis of the statute's history. Its first

codification was in 1863 under the article entitled “Physical Injury.” It is

possible, however, to read the “other professionals” language in Bodin to

include doctors without resorting to the Georgia statute.

? Appellant cites Section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts as

further support for the argument that Dr. Berger had a duty to North

American. That section states:

(1) One who, in the course of his business. profession. or

employment, or in any other transaction in which he has a

pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the guidance of

others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for

pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon

the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or com-

Petence in obtaining or communicating the information.

(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in

Subsection (1) is limited to loss suffered

(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for

whose benefit and guidance he intends to supply the infor-

mation or knows that the recipient intends to supply it; and

(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends

the information to influence or knows that the recipient so

intends or in a substa stially similar transaction.

(footnote continues)

7a

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Tuomas A. CLarK, Circuit Judge. dissenting:

In dissenting I have two non-reasons and two reasons. The

non-reasons are the lack of precedent and my view that we

should certify this case to the Supreme Court of Georgia. A

decision can be made without the aid of precedent when there

is none. However, when our certification rule permits Georgia’s

highest court to settle the issue, I look with disfavor upon

establishing a precedent for Georgia federal courts in a diver-

sity case when it is obvious that the decision will spawn many

progeny.

The two reasons for dissenting are: (1 ) the complaint does

not seek the relief granted by the decision and opinion of the

majority; and, (2) the law of negligence and the relationship of

the parties give no basis in reason or logic for imposing this

liability on a doctor.

Turning to the complaint, it is my conclusion that in its

complaint the appellant failed to state a claim against Dr.

Berger for simple negligence or medical malpractice. If any-

thing, North American’s complaint states a claim against Dr.

Berger for the intentional tort of fraudulent misrepresentation.

North American in its complaint alleges that Dr. Berger is a

psychiatrist who disagreed with the FAA’s treatment of its air

traffic controllers and their emotional problems. He is charged

with conspiring with the controllers to cause them to fail to

report for work on the basis of a nervous condition and then

diagnose them as disabled because of their working conditions

and resulting nevousness. The complaint goes on to allege that

Dr. Berger’s wife is a lawyer with an office next to Dr. Berger's.

She is said to handle some of the legal problems of the air

traffic controllers, including their claims for workmen’s com-

pensation and private insurance disability benefits. One comes

(footnote continued)

The facts of this case fit very neatly into this section of the Restatement.

Appellee points out. however, that every illustration following the section

concerns commercial transactions. Appellant retorts that the filling out of

insurance disability forms and the payment of insurance proceeds are

commercial transactions. We agree with appellant.

8a

away from the complaint with the reaction that North Ameri-

can is accusing Dr. Berger of having a feud with the FAA and

profiting from his fees charged the air traffic controllers. The

complaint supports a claim for fraud, for intentional mis-

representation, for gross negligence—it does not support a

claim for simple negligence. At no place in the complaint is

there a count averring simple negligence in the manner sug-

gested by Form 9 in Appendix attached to the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. The appeal does not come to us on a motion

to dismiss, but on the district court’s grant of Dr. Berger’s

motion for summary judgment on the issue of his negligence vel

non vis a vis North American. Intuitively, one realizes that this

motion was advanced by Berger’s malpractice insurance carrier

so its role in the litigation could be determined. Since I find

that neither the allegations nor the affidavits against Berger

establish a claim for simple negligence, I would affirm.

Even if the allegations were sufficient, I would affirm. The

majority relies primarily on Georgia cases which hold architects

liable to third parties. Of course, it is logical to hold architects

liabile for injury to the public or an adjoining landowner when

such injury is the direct result of negligent design by the

architect of a structure. That is simple tort law of one party

owing reasonable care to another party and extending privity to

those who foreseeably might be injured if such care is not

taken.

The majority opinion permits every doctor to become

potentially liable for payments made by an insurance company

to its policy holder, the doctor’s patient, whenever, the doctor

compietes a form describing the patient’s condition, and the

doctor has made a mistake in diagnosing the condition. This

act of the doctor is done at the request of the company and is

done without consideration. The majority opinion imposes a

duty on doctors neither foreseeable nor contemplated by the

parties or their relationship.

Insurance companies insure persons against such risks as

death and disability. It is common knowledge that they pay

doctors to conduct examinations when issuing such policies.

9a

The policies, in case of a disability claim, require the policyhol-

der to submit to an examination at the request of the company

by a doctor hired by the company. Obviously, if a doctor

employed by an insurance company misses a diagnosis which

results in unwarranted liability of the company. the doctor may

be liable to the company for his negligent performance of the

contract.

The majority opinion creates privity without any just cause

or reason. In the disability policy the insured individual

authorizes the insurance company to secure information from

any doctor treating him or her in the event of a claim for

disability. The company, upon receiving a claim, conducts an

investigation of the alleged disability by sending a medical

form to doctors treating the claimant, as Berger in this case, by

writing the policyholder’s employer, by conducting surveillance.

by interviewing neighbors, and by seeking other relevant

information. Anyone furnishing information to the company

does so gratuitously for the purpose of assisting the company in

its assessment of the claim for disability benefits. None of these

persons, including a doctor, such as Berger here, is required to

cooperate. Most doctors do accommodate their patients by

giving the insurance company the same information furnished

the patient.

The doctor has a duty to the patient to make a correct

diagnosis of his illness, if he has one. Doctors. being human,

sometimes err. When they do. they are legally liable to the

patient for any damages sustained by the patient as the result of

the negligence. The employment contract and the relationship

create the duty to be careful.

Here our court creates a potential financial liability when

there is no contract and no relationship other than a gratuitous

one, when the doctor, at the request of the company, puts in

writing information about the patient’s condition as he sees it.’

If the doctor knowingly furnishes false information, he may be

‘Does the majority opinion permit a disability imsurance company to

recover from the claimant's employer or neighbor who furnishes erroneous

information supportive of the claim but negligently arrived at”

10a

held liable. If one lies to another, knowing the other will act to

his detriment based on the lie, responsibility for such an

intentional misrepresentation under certain circumstances may

ensue. Furnishing information derived through error. in-

nocently and gratuitiously, does not create such a responsibility.

Thus, I dissent.

Ib

IN THE

United States Court of Appeals

For THE FirTH Circuit

Unit B

No. 79-3541

NORTH AMERICAN COMPANY FOR LIFE

AND HEALTH INSURANCE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

MERTON B. BERGER, ET AL..

Defendants,

MERTON B. BERGER,

Defendant-Appellee.

Filed August 10, 1981

Appeal From the United States

District Court for the

Northern District of Georgia

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING AND

PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC

(Opinion June 18, 1981, 5 Cir., 198 , F.2d

(August 10, 1981)

2b

Before KRAVITCH and THomas A. CLarkK, Circuit Judges, and

LYNNE", District Judge.

Per CURIAM:

(y ) The Petition for Rehearing is DENIED and no member of

this panel nor Judge of this Administrative Unit in regular

active service having requested that the Court be polled on

rehearing en banc (Rule 35, Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure; Local Fifth Circuit Rule 16; Fifth Circuit Judicial

Council Resolution of January 14, 1981), the suggestion for

Rehearing En Banc is DENIED.

( ) The Petition for Rehearing is DENIED and the judges in

regular active service of this Administrative Unit having been

polled at the request of one of said judges and a majority of

said judges not having voted in favor of it (Rule 35, Federal

Rules of Appellate Procedure; Local Fifth Circuit Rule 16;

Fifth Circuit Judicial Council Resolution of January 14, 1981),

the suggestion for Rehearing En Banc is also DENIED.

( ) A member of this Administrative Unit in active service

having requested a poll on the reconsideration in this cause en

banc, and a majority of the judges in active service of said unit

not having voted in favor of it, rehearing en banc is DENIED.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT:

PHYLLIS KRAVITCH

United States Circuit Judge

* U.S. District Judge from the Northern District of Alabama, sitting by

designation.

Ic

United States District Court

Northern District of Georgia

Atlanta Division

NORTH AMERICAN COMPANY FOR

LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE

Civil Action File

versus No. C77-119A

MERTON B. BERGER, ef a/

ORDER

(Filed June 25, 1979)

Presently pending in the above styled action are the

motions of the defendants, Sidney B. Warner and Merton B.

Berger, for summary judgment.

Warner’s motion is based entirely on a clause of the

underlying insurance contract which reads:

2. Incontestable: (a) After this policy has been in

force for a period of two years during the lifetime of

the Insured (excluding any period during which the

Insured is disabled ), it shall become incontestable as

to the statements contained in the application.

(b) No claim for loss incurred or disability (as

defined in the policy) commencing after two years

from the date of issue of this policy shall be reduced

or denied on the ground that a disease or physical

condition not excluded from coverage by name or

specific description effective on the date of loss had

existed prior to the effective date of coverage of this

policy.

Subparagraph 2(b)’s language can be interpreted in two

ways. First, it could be construed to create, as a prerequisite to

2c

incontestability, a requirement that the insured’s disability did

not, in fact, “commence” until two years after the date of the

issuance of the policy. However, this would make the clause

meaningless because such a reading would always permit the

insurer to attempt to prove that the disability’s commencement

predated the second anniversary of the policy and perhaps the

date of the policy’s issue as well. If the insurer could prove that

disability began before the second anniversary then Subpara-

graph 2(b) would allow proof of the disability’s onset before

the date of issue.

The alternative construction interprets Subparagraph 2(b)

as rendering incontestable on the ground of pre-issue onset any

claim by the insured for disability supposedly occurring after

the second anniversary. Thus, any time an insured, such as

Warner, claimed that disability commenced after the second

year, the insurer would automatically be precluded from trying

to prove that disability began before the policy’s date of issue.

In effect the policy states that if the insurer cannot or does not

ascertain within the first"two, years that the insured is disabled

then it is forever barred from trying to prove that the disability

in fact preceded the policy’s issurance. This reasoning comports

with the Georgia courts’ philosophy concerning the purpose of

incontestability clauses. See Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.

Childs, 65 Ga. App. 468, 476-77 (1941).

Even so, the plaintiff is not precluded from showing, for

the purpose of avoiding incontestability under Subparagraph

2(a), that disability commenced after the date of the policy.

Subparagraph 2(a) is not inconsistent with itself under this

interpretation because the proof of post-issue disability affects

only the time limitations of the clause and is not necessarily

related to the ground of incontestability, namely, statements

contained in the application. Consequently, the plaintiff is

entitled to prove that Warner was disabled after the date of the

policy’s issue but only for the purpose of showing that the

policy was not in force for two full years excluding periods of

disability. To the extent the plaintiff proves pre-claim disability

precluding the policy from having been “in force” for two years

3c

within the meaning of the incontestability clause, the insurer

may also attempt to prove that statements contained in the

application voided the insurer’s contractual obligations.

Disability prior to the date of the policy might be relevant

to showing disability thereafter since the jury may infer that a

mental condition once started may continue. However, because

of Subparagraph 2(b) the plaintiff may not offer evidence of

pre-issue disability solely for the purpose of voiding the policy.

Instead, pre-issue disability is only relevant to the question of

tolling the two-year period in Subparagraph 2(a) and, even

then, the plaintiff must also establish that Warner was aware of

the incorrectness of statements made in the application.

Warner asserts in his sworn affidavit that he was not

disabled from September 13, 1973, the date of the policy, until

after its second anniversary. The plaintiff argues that such a

statement is insufficient to prove lack of disability but cites no

authority for this proposition. To the contrary, it must be

concluded that a person is normally one of the best sources of

information as to the state of his mental health at particular

times. Neither side maintains that Warner has ever been so

disabled as to not be capable of recognizing his problem.

Therefore, his own assertion of lack of disability until after the

policy’s second anniversary is a sufficient basis for requiring the

plaintiff to demonstrate the contrary.

The plaintiff has attempted to do so. However, Exhibits |

and 3 attached to the plaintiffs response under Rule 91.72,

Local Rules for the Northern District of Georgia, are useless in

that the copies are illegible. Exhibits 4 and 5 contain nothing

indicating disability prior to September 13, 1975. Finally,

Exhibit 6 is relevant to the fraud issue and has no conceivable

relation to actual disability before the second anniversary unless

the plaintiff is contending that Warner’s illness manifested itself

in attempts to defraud insurance companies.

According to the plaintiff, Exhibit 2 indicates that on

February 25, 1974 Warner admitted to symptoms which he

claimed at his deposition were demonstrative of his disability.

de

But Warner’s deposition has not been filed. Whether there is

evidence of disability prior to September 13, 1975 must await

supplementation of the record by the plaintiff.

Berger’s motion for summary judgment involves the plain-

tiff's claims of malpractice and fraud. He urges that no action

for negligent performance of medical practice can be brought

except by the patient or one who is in privity with the doctor.

The plaintiff in this case had not contractual relationship with

Berger.

Howard v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 136 Ga. App. 221

(1975), held that a financial reporting firm could not be liable

to someone not in privity with it for negligently advising that a

particular business was solvent when the reverse was true. In

view of the longstanding philosophy against extending negli-

gence in professional matters on which the Court of Appeals

relied, there appears no good reason why the Howard ruling

should not apply to the medical profession as well.

The plaintiff responds that there is an exception to the

requirement of privity when the alleged tortfeasor provides an

opinion with the actual or reasonable knowledge that the

injured party will rely on its accuracy. However, Howard

rejected even this extension of negligence liability:

[A]s to third parties, even those who the accountant

knew or should have known were relying on his

audit, liability can be found only upon fraudulent

conduct, and proof of mere negligence will not

suffice.

Id. at 223. The factual recitation in the opinion does not specify

whether Dun & Bradstreet was actually aware of Howard's

potential reliance on its report but apparently this point was

irrelevant for even in such a case no claim for negligence could

be stated. It seems clear that the Georgia courts are not willing

to loosen the privity requirement even when, as here, the

defendant’s knowledge of the plaintiffs reliance can be shown.

The plaintiff also claims that Ga. Code Ann. §84-924,

which reads:

Se

[a] person professing to practice surgery or the

administering of medicine for compensation must

bring to the exercise of his profession a reasonable

degree of care and skill. Any injury resulting from a

want of such care and skill shall be a tort for which a

recovery may be had[,] [emphasis added ]

provides for medicai malpractice claims by nonpatient third

parties because of the emphasized language. Insofar as can be

determined, this statute has never been interpreted by a

Georgia appellate court in the context presented in Berger’s

motion. In the absence of any authority to the contrary and on

the basis of the statute’s language this court will construe

Section 84-924 as being essentially neutral on the question of

who may be a party as distinguished from what types of injury

may be compensated. As the plaintiff concedes, “any injury”

refers to those injuries which are proximately caused by the tort.

There can be little doubt that, given its version of the facts, the

plaintiff's loss was a result of Berger's alleged negligence.

Nevertheless, the same was true in Howard and the Georgia

court, apparently for policy reasons, precluded liability to a

third party not in privity of contract. Who may recover is

distinctly different from the type of injuries for which recovery

may be had and only the latter question is answered by Section

84-294.

Although the plaintiff had no physician-patient or con-

tractual relationship with Berger it may still institute an action

for fraud against him. Howard v. Dun & Bradstreet, supra, at

223. Berger first insists that the complaint fails to plead fraud

with specificity as required by Rule 9(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. This

contention has been previously rejected. Order of July 14, 1977

at 9.

Next, Berger asserts that the plaintiff's cause of action is

based solely on his opinions of the air traffic controllers’

disability and that an opinion cannot suggest a suit alleging

fraud. Normally opinions cannot provide the basis for fraud

but there is a well-established exception as outlined by Profes-

sor Prosser:

dc

[I]t has been recognized very often that the ex-

pression of an opinion may carry with it an implied

assertion, not only that the speaker knows no facts

which would preciude such an opinion, but that he

does know facts which justify it. There is quite

general agreement that such an assertion is to be

implied where the defendant holds himself out or is

understood as having special knowledge of the mat-

ter which is not available to the plaintiff, so that his

opinion becomes in effect an assertion summarizing

his knowledge. Thus the ordinary man is free to deal

in reliance upon the opinion of an expert jeweler as to

the value of a diamond, of an attorney upon a point

of law, of a physician upon a matter of health, of a

banker upon the validity of a signature, or the owner

of land at a distance as to its worth, even though the

opinion is that of his antagonist in a bargaining

transaction. On the same basis it has been held that

statements by a seller as to the capacity of the thing

sold, or the condition of land, or other matters, which

on the part of one without special knowledge would

be regarded as mere opinion, may be relied on as

statements of fact. [footnotes omitted }.

W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, §109 at 726-27 ( 4th

ed. 1971). Apparently this rule was the implied reason for the

decision in Daugert v. Holland Furnace Co., 107 Ga. App. 566,

570 (1963), where an allegation of a false opinion based on

facts known to be untrue by a defendant holding himself out as

an expert created a cause of action. Similarly, the plaintiff here

had a right to rely on Berger’s professional medical opinion and

may recover if it can show that he knowingly misrepresented

the health of the air traffic controllers. The cases cited by

Berger with one exception’ involved opinions by a seller as to

the quality of goods for sale, a situation not present here.

‘Judge Lawrence expressly refrained from premising his decision in

United States ex rel MevA Corp. y. Northeast Construction Co. of West

Virginia, 298 F.Supp. 1135 (S.D. Ga. 1969), on the opinion rule. Id. at 1139.

Tc

Finally, whether the plaintiff exercised reasonable dili-

gence in discovering the fraud is a question for the jury. See

Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Orr, 319 F.2d 612 (Sth Cir.

1963); see also Braselton Bros. v. Better Maid Dairy Products,

Inc., 222 Ga. 472 (1966).

Accordingly, Warner’s motion for summary judgment is

granted in part and consideration is deferred in part. To the

extent the complaint asserts a claim on the premise that

Warner’s disability preexisted the date of the policy’s issue it is

dismissed. The plaintiff is directed to file a copy of the

transcript of Warner’s deposition within fifteen (15) days of the

filing of this order. The clerk shall resubmit Warner’s motion at

that time. Berger’s motion for summary judgment is granted in

part and denied in part. To the extent the complaint alleges a

claim for negligence in rendering professional services it is

dismissed.

So ordered this the 23 day of June, 1979.

/s/ ALBERT HENDERSON, Jr.

Judge, United States District

Court for the Northern

District of Georgia

Id

United States District Court for the

Northern District of Georgia

Atlanta Division

NORTH AMERICAN COMPANY

For Lire AND HEALTH

INSURANCE Civil Action

“. No. C-77-119-A

MERTON B. BerGer, M.D., ef ai.

ORDER

(filed August 28, 1979)

The case is presently before the court on the plainiffs

motion for oral argument and reconsideration of this court’s

order of June 25, 1979, and also on the court’s deferred ruling

on defendant Warner’s motion for summary judgment.

In the June 25 order, this court dismissed the plaintiff's

negligence claim against Dr. Berger, holding that a suit for

negligent performance of medical practice cannot be brought

by anyone except the patient or one who is in privity with the

doctor. The plaintiff, despite its earlier assertions that Berger

“had no contractual or physician-patient relationship with

North American,” now seeks to have the court find that North

American was a third-party beneficiary of the agreement

between Berger and Warner to furnish opinions to North

American regarding Warner’s disability. This argument was

raised for the first time by the plaintiff in its motion for

reconsideration.

The plaintiff has failed to show that Berger and Warner

intended to benefit North American by agreeing to furnish

Berger’s opinions to North American. See Continental Casualty

Co. v. Continental Rent-A-Car of Georgia, Inc., 349 F.Supp.

666 (N.D. Ga. 1972). This court adheres to its former ruling

that the holding in Howard v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 136 Ga.

App. 221 (1975) should apply to the medical profession and

2d

finds no privity. The plaintiffs motion for reconsideration

insofar as it relates to the portion of the June 25 order

dismissing the plaintiffs claim of medical negligence is DE-

NIED.

The court hereby GRANTS the motion for oral argument,

specifically limiting argument to the issue of the incontestability

of Part V, Para. 2, Sub. Para. (b) in the insurance policy.

Counsel should also be prepared to argue the merits of that

portion of Warner’s motion for summary judgment on which a

ruling was deferred in this court’s June 25 order.

Oral argument will be before the court in chambers on

September 5, 1979 at 2:00 p.m., and will be limited to thirty

minutes per side.

SO ORDERED, this 27th day of August, 1979.

/s/

Robert L. Vining, Jr.

United States District Judge

~

oy ae

ef t . < v <.e

het pes ty

AOA apt hee .

% e “ ¥

; Sieg «

ee

le

The Atlanta Journal

THE ATLANTA CONSTITUTION

VOL. 32, NO. 26 *“ * © P.O. BOX 4689

ATLANTA, GA. 30302, SATURDAY, AUGUST 29, 1981

Psychiatrist Facing Trial

In Controller-Stress Suit

By Sam Hepkins

Constitution Staff Writer

A federal appellate court, in what is thought to be a

landmark decision, has ruled that a psychiatrist may be liable to

a third party for allegedly negligent diagnosis and certification

of his patients.

The case involves an insurance company which sued

psychiatrist Merton B. Berger and 12 air traffic controllers in

Atlanta, claiming that Berger had made fraudulent or negligent

diagnoses of the controllers relating to alleged job-related

anxiety and depressive neurosis.

U.S. District Judge Robert L. Vining Jr. earlier had issued

a summary judgment dismissing the negligence allegations in

the case, but he retained the fraud allegations.

The Sth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Vining’s

ruling, which now means that both the negligence and fraud

allegations will have to be decided by a trial jury.

The suit has been pending since the North American

Company for Life and Health Insurance first filed the action on

Jan. 25, 1977.

The Illinois-based insurance company is seeking judgments

of $562,025 against Berger and a total of $179,025 against the

12 air traffic controllers. Berger, a former Atlanta-area resident,

later moved to Del Mar, Calif.

The Sth Circuit decision notes that Berger, in his capacity

as psychiatric consultant to the Federal Aviation Adminis-

tration, “diagnosed as toially disabled approximately 154 air

traffic controllers.”

2e

The basis for the diagnoses was often job-related anxiety

and depressive neurosis. A number of the air traffic controllers

held disability income insurance policies issued by the North

American company.

The court noted that North American had relied on

Berger's certification of the controllers’ alleged disability in

paying claims of the FAA employees.

“Because of the large number of claims,” the appellate

court said, “North American investigated Berger and concluded

that many of his diagnoses of total disability were incorrect. . . .

“It sued Berger to recover the disability benefits paid to the

air traffic controllers because of his allegedly fraudulent or

negligent diagnoses.”

The court further noted, in reversing Vining’s ruling, that

Berger had claimed the district judge rightly dismissed the

negligence count “because a doctor is not subject to malpractice

liability unless the injured party is or was the doctor’s patient.”

Matthew H. Patton of Atlanta, who represents North

American, said his firm and other law firms over the country

had researched the third-party negligence aspect of the case

and could not find a court ruling similar to the Sth Circuit’s.

The $562,025 judgment sought against Berger includes the

$179,025 disability payments paid to the 12 other defendants

and $383,000 paid to 17 other air traffic controllers who are not

named as defendants.

The Sth Circuit h~s denied Berger’s motion for a rehearing

on its reversal decision.

Patton said that since the suit was first file¢ more than four

years ago, the insurance company and 11 of the 12 air traffic

controllers have reached out-of-court settlements.

The original suit contends that Berger used inadequate

procedures to certify the alleged neuroses, supposedly caused

by the pressures on the air traffic controllers as they work in

radar rooms to monitor the incoming and outgoing airline

passenger planes to prevent them from colliding.

{ Office - Supreme Cor

¥ FILED

¢ NOW 6 oH

ALEXANDER \. Slevas.

CLEP:

NO. 81-640

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1981

MERTON B. BERGER, M.D.,

Petitioner,

vs.

NORTH AMERICAN COMPANY FOR

LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit,

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

Matthew H. Patton

Kilpatrick & Cody

3100 Equitable Building

100 Peachtree Street

Atlanta, Georgia 30043

(404) 572-6500

Attorney for Respondent

(i)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The questions presented by the Petition are more properly

stated as follows:

1. Should the Supreme Court grant certiorari to review a

court of appeals’ decision, issued in a purely diversity action, in-

terpreting and applying Georgia law with regard to a negligence

claim, the resolution of which was dependent upon the unusual

facts alleged in the complaint?

2. Where neither party sought an order certifying the ques-

tions presented to the Georgia Supreme Court, did the court of

appeals abuse its discretion in deciding the issue presented? Did

the court of appeals err in refusing to grant petitioner's motion

to certify the questions presented to the Georgia Supreme

Court, when the motion was not filed until thirteen days after

the court of appeals had entered its decision?

(ii)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

SPOT PUMP U UIE oo oc vcccwccepecccccecicuss (i)

an svc ce cenevesgeneeosusieuned (ii)

ey I oe sc de Kcvdesccusopecesnse (iii)

ee ei id ck wy' web sekensowndeue eat 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .. 2... ccc ccccccccccees 2

cv wecntaneeases¥uves’ 3

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION ....... 4

I. NO SPECIAL AND IMPORTANT

REASONS WARRANT REVIEW

GPS WOES Ge CU UAAINS oc ccc cc ccecesccess A

Il. THE DECISION BELOW IS NOT

IN CONFLICT WITH ANY

PT PCC U UE? PU UIT occ cccccccccccsccccccess 5

Ill. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT DID NOT

ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN

DECIDING THE ISSUES

PRESENTED RATHER THAN

CERTIFYING THE MATTER TO

THE GEORGIA SUPREME COURT............. 6

IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS GAVE

FULL CONSIDERATION TO THE

ISSUES PRESENTED AND

REACHED THE CORRECT

ET SoG aehauvebeuveedd nussteckuecseeses 7

ET tec divudaéditetsgepesévecenveeeserenes 9

(iii)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

BARNES. ATLANTAG® Paci

Lire INS CO of AMERICA,

ee Ee PEPE, DOVER cod sccccevscvcvcces

Bonin vy. Gitt, 216 Ga. 67,

See EP CED cbcvvessvedeccencceccesss

BuTNER». UNITED STATES, 440

RS ee

GLANZER v. SHEPARD, 233 N.Y. 236,

Es ctodénedeek euspecvics veces

LEHMAN BROTHERS vy SCHEIN, 416

Er dekedad cage +ccéabesnesesensees

MCFARLING vy. AZAR, 519 F.2d

1075 (Sth Cir. 1075 (Sth Cir. 1976)... 0.0...

Others

C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper,

FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,

SP os ccuabdudeewicaeccsevessa

RESTATEMENT OF TorTs (Second) §552 ..........

Rule 36, Supreme Court of Georgia.............

No. 81-640

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1981

MERTON B. BERGER, M.D..,

Petitioner,

vs.

NORTH AMERICAN COMPANY FOR

LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

Respondent, North American Company for Life and

Health Insurance, respectfully requests that this Court deny the

Petition for Writ of Certiorari to review the decision of the

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

OPINIONS BELOW

The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Fifth Circuit, rendered June 18, 1981, is now published at 648

F.2d 305 (1981).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On January 15, 1977, respondent, North American Com-

pany for Life and Health Insurance (“North American”), filed a

complaint for damages in the United States District Court for

the Northern District of Georgia against petitioner, Merton B.

Berger (‘Berger’). Also named as defendants were twelve air

traffic controllers to whom North American had paid disability

insurance benefits in reliance upon certifications of their dis-

ability made to North American by Berger. The complaint al-

leged, among other things, that Berger had either negligently or

fraudulently certified to North American the alleged disability

of the twelve defendant air traffic controllers as well as seven-

teen other air traffic controllers who held disability income

policies issued by North American.

The only claims still pending in the case are North

American’s claim against one of the air traffic controllers (and

his counterclaim against North American) and North

American’s claim against Berger. This appeal concerns only the

latter and arises from the Fifth Circuit's reversal of summary

judgment entered against North American with respect to its

negligence claim against Berger.

The facts before the court below may be briefly sum-

marized as follows. Berger is a practicing psychiatrist. From

January 1, 1968, until he quit his psychiatric practice in Atlanta

in December 1977, Berger by his own admission examined and

2

diagnosed as totally disabled 154 air traffic controllers

employed by the Federal Aviation Administration. Over two

thirds of these diagnoses were made during the years 1974, 1975,

and 1976 and in most cases, Berger found the disability to be

permanent and job related.

Among the air traffic controllers whom Berger diagnosed

as being totally disabled were the other twelve defendants and

certain other air traffic controllers, all of whom held disability

income policies issued by North American and most of whom

held disability income and credit disability policies with other

companies. Berger’s determination of total disability was

typically based upon a finding of a job-related anxiety and

depressive neurosis.

After his initial examination and periodically thereafter,

Berger certified to North American that the particular air traffic

controller was totally disabled. In each instance the certification

by Berger was made solely to North American, was made on

North American's claim forms, was made for the purpose of in-

ducing North American to pay the monthly disability benefit to

the air traffic controller, and was made with the knowledge that

North American would rely thereon in paying the claim.

Relying upon Berger’s certification of their disability,

North American paid the claims of various air traffic control-

lers. When the incidence of the claims for air traffic controllers

became unusually high, North American conducted an in-

vestigation which led North American to conclude that many of

the air traffic controllers whom Berger had certified as totally

disabled had, in fact, not been disabled. Thereupon, the present

action was instituted seeking to recover from Berger, among

other things, the disability benefits paid to the air traffic con-

trollers on the basis of his negligent or fraudulent certification.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The decision below involves an issue of state tort law and is

limited to the peculiar facts of this case. Thus, the case has

limited precedential value and there are no other special and im-

3

portant reasons that would merit this Court's review of the

court of appeals’ decision. Nor is the decision in conflict with

any other reported decision.

Furthermore, the court of appeals did not err, as petitioner

contends, in deciding the issues itself instead of certifying the

matter to the Georgia Supreme Court. Whether to certify a mat-

ter depends upon the facts and circumstances of the particular

case and that decision is committed to the sound discretion of

the court of appeals. Moreover, petitioner should not be heard

to complain since he did not move, until after entry of the court

of appeals’ decision, for certification to the Georgia Supreme

Court.

Finally, certiorari should not be granted because the deci-

sion below is both correct and fair. It is consistent with Georgia

legal precedent and accords with decisions in numerous cases in

other states as well as Section 552 of the RESTATEMENT

OFTORTS (Second).

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION

I.

NO SPECIAL AND IMPORTANT REASONS

WARRANT REVIEW ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI.

In his petition Berger argues that this case presents “ta ques-

tion of paramount and overriding importance to the nation as a

whole.” (Petition, at 12). That is a gross exaggeration, to say the

least. The decision below involved an extremely narrow issue of

Georgia tort law, i.e., whether a person practicing a profession,

in this case psychiatry, can be held liable to an insurance com-

pany to whom the psychiatrist made specific certifications with

knowledge that the insurance company would rely thereon. The

Fifth Circuit, in resolving that issue, limited its holding to the

specific facts of the dispute and, thus, the precedential

significance of the decision is quite limited.

However, even if the court of appeals’ decision is construed

4

as broadly as Berger suggests, it would not merit certiorari

review. The 1980 revision of the Supreme Court Rules deleted

allegedly erroneous decisions of state law by a court of appeals

from its list of considerations for granting a writ of certiorari.

Thus rarely, if ever, would interpretations of state law, even if

arguably erroneous, be a sufficient ground for the grant of a

writ. This is especially true where the decision below was limited

to the peculiar facts of the controversy.

THE DECISION BELOW IS NOT IN CONFLICT

WITH ANY REPORTED DECISIONS

Petitioner’s first stated ground for granting the writ is “that

the decision of the Fifth Circuit herein is in conflict with both

prior Fifth Circuit precedent and earlier decisions of the federal

courts.” (Petition, at 7, 8.) That is not the case and, frankly, it is

difficult to understand petitioner’s reasoning.

As evidence of the alleged “conflict,” petitioner cites

MCFARLING V. AZAR, 519 F.2d 1075 (Sth Cir. 1975). Aside from

the obvious distinctions between that case and the case sub

judice,' Berger’s argument misconceives the essential nature of

the federal system, a necessary consequence of which is that the

statutes and decisions of one state will often conflict with that of

another. Thus even if the law of Florida did conflict with the

law of Georgia, that would not constitute, in any sense, a

“conflict” meriting certiorari review.

'McFarling v. Azar did not involve a physician’s liability; it involved the issue

of his insurer’s liability under a professional liability policy covering ‘‘malprac-

tice’ and “‘error and mistake”’ where there was fraud on the part of the physi-

cian. The result depended, in part, on Florida’s narrow interpretation of

malpractice which, by definition in Florida, is an injury to a patient in the

context of a physician-patient relationship. North American has never claimed

to fall within the Florida definition of ‘‘malpractice.’’ Its claim, under Georgia

law, is for negligent certification.

THE FIFTH CIRCUIT DID NOT ABUSE ITS

DISCRETION IN DECIDING THE ISSUES

PRESENTED RATHER THAN CERTIFYING

THE MATTER TO THE GEORGIA

SUPREME COURT

Berger also contends that the petition “should be granted

because the Fifth Circuit failed to certify the within matter to

the Supreme Court of Georgia.” (Petition, at 9.)

It is well established that the decision of whether to use the

certification procedure “rests in the sound discretion of the

federal court.” LEHMAN BROTHERS V. SCHEIN, 416 U.S. 386,

391 (1974). There is no evidence that the Fifth Circuit abused its

discretion in electing to hear and decide the issues presented.

Whether an issue is appropriate for certification depends

upon its facts and circumstances. In this case there are several

reasons why the Fifth Circuit may have decided that certifica-

tion would not have been appropriate. In the first place, cer-

tification is only authorized where there is no controlling prece-

dent. See Rule 36, Supreme Court of Georgia. For reasons

stated in the court of appeals’ opinion and in Section IV, infra,

at 7, 8, there was, in this case, controlling Georgia precedent.

Second, certification is generally most appropriate where there

are clean-cut issues of law. This case, with its peculiar facts,

would have presented a difficult problem in formulating the is-

sues to be certified. This is particularly true since the case was

on appeal from grant of summary judgment, with many facts

not yet determined.

Berger’s argument regarding certification, taken to its

logical conclusion, would require that the Court adopt a rule

making certification mandatory whenever a court of appeals is

faced with a difficult question of state law. Apart from the prac-

tical impossibility of applying such a rule (at what point does a

question become too difficult for the federal courts?), this Court

has already stated that there is no obligation on the part of the

courts of appeals to resort to certification.

6

Furthermore, while certification is a useful tool in select

cases, it should not be used as a means of avoiding every dif-

ficult issue of state law. As former Chief Judge Brown, a strong

proponent of certification, said: “We use much judgment,

restraint and discretion in certifying. We do not abdicate.“

BARNES V. ATLANTA & PACIFIC LIFE INS. CO. OF AMERICA, 514

F.2d 704, 705 (5 th Cir. 1975). The judges of the Fifth Circuit

have had by far the most experience with certification, see C.

Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE, §4248, p. 530 (1978), and their decision in this case

should be respected.

This is especially so where, as here, Berger made no effort

to seek certification until after the Fifth Circuit had entered its

decision. Had Berger felt that certification was appropriate, he

should have moved the Fifth Circuit to certify the question

before that court had spent considerable time researching, hear-

ing, and deciding the issues. Having failed to do so, Berger

should not now be hea’ to complain that the court of appeals

proceeded to decide the issues presented to it.

IV.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GAVE FULL

CONSIDERATION TO THE ISSUES

PRESENTED AND REACHED THE

CORRECT DECISION

The petition presents no significant new authorities or

arguments on the issues decided by the Fifth Circuit. Inasmuch

as this Court has consistently recognized that circuit courts have

more expertise thas. the Court in applying the laws of the state

within their respective circuits, BuTNER V. UNITED STATES, 440

U.S. 48 (1979), respondent respectfully urges that the Court

defer to the decision of the court of appeals.

However, should the Court review the merits of the case,

respondent respectfully submits that it will conclude that the

decision below is correct. It is correct, first, because the Georgia

Supreme Court has held that a duty, independent of privity, is

7

imposed upon “persons performing architectural, engineering,

and other professional skilled services... .” Bopin v Git1, 216

Ga. 467, 117 S.E.2d 325 (1960). Although not specificalls

named, physicians are clearly among the persons performing

such “other professional and skilled services” and, therefore,

Berger owed a duty to North American even if privity was lack-

ing.

The decision below is correct for the additional reason that

the relationship between Berger and North American, under the

peculiar facts, is so close to privity, if not privity itself, as to give

rise to a legal duty. Writing for the majority, Judge Lynne

paraphrased Judge Cardozo’s opinion in GLANZER V

SHEPARD, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922) — the famous “-

bean weigher” case that is the seminal decision on the tort law

negligent misrepresentation. Judge Lynne stated:

In the instant case, Berger, using the plaintiff's forms, cer-

tified disability directly to the insurance company. The

relationship approaches that of privity. At the very least,

the relationship was so close that Berger knew exactly who

would rely on his certification and for what purpose.

Berger was under a duty to exercise reasonable care in per-

forming medical services, making diagnoses, and transmit-

ting them to appellant.

648 F.2d. at 308

The decision below is not only correct but fair. It accords

with Section 552 of the ResTaTEMENT OF TorTS (Second)

(titled “Information negligently supplied for the guidance of

others’’), and numerous other decisions involving negligent mis-

representation. The decision also accords with the common

sense of the matter. Berger had no obligation to make any cer-

tification to North American but once he elected to do so,

knowing that North American would rely thereon, Berger was

obliged to act with reasonable care. As Judge Cardozo said in

GLANZER V. SHEPARD, supra, “it is ancient learning that one

who assumes to act, even through gratuitously, may thereby

become subject to the duty of acting carefully, if he acts at all.”

135 N.E at 276.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the petition for writ of certiorari should

be denied.

Respectfully submitted

Matthew H. Patton

Kilpatrick & Cody

3100 Equitable Building

100 Peachtree Street

Atlanta, Georgia 30303

(404) 572-6500

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.

Record and brief — Berger v. North American Co. for Life & Health Insurance · 454 U.S. 1084 | Frix