Record and brief — Berger v. North American Co. for Life & Health Insurance
Supreme Court brief1981
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
uOnned
81-640 faa
No.
IN THE
Supreme Court of the Bnited States
OctTosBer TERM, 1981
MERTON B. BERGER, M_D.,
Petitioner,
VS.
NORTH AMERICAN COMPANY FOR
LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
SIDNEY F. WHEELER
Attorney for Petitioner
Of Counsel:
LONG, WEINBERG, ANSLEY & WHEELER
2500 The Equitable Building
100 Peachtree Street, N.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
(404) 688-7900
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Can a Physician Be Sued for Malpractice by the
Insurance Carrier of His Patient When the Doctor Gratuitously
Completes an Insurance Claim Form Stating a Diagnosis and
the Insurance Company, But not the Patient, Feels the Diag-
nosis Was Incorrect?
2. In the Absence of Authoritative State Law, Did the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Err In Refusing to Certify
the Within Matter to the Supreme Court of the State of
Georgia?
3. As a Matter of Policy, Should a Physician be Amenable
to a Suit by a Patient’s Insuror in the Absence of Any
Relationship Between the Doctor and Insurance Company?
*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ........10.ccccccscoscscscsscssenessscsenees i
ee ee eiitinceictticiiinseahinsicaiesiininiaiaanaaniidgainy il
TA Gr ATT EIS onsesnssccccesseorsessscesesncsceesessvens iil
SUIT acisnsatatpncisctechiddensesinscsimdibidniiinineininianiiaeba l
SR TITITIITE <cesccichirtchnncieepbeeccpniaiebasipscsaniniicdiniaiciiendann 2
eT I cnntsinicntinseihiitassiadicisthatninniaistanaanon 2
BA ree CO Be CIE occceccccnersesccsnensccsesvescseccees 4
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT.................... 7
I. The Fifth Circuit Rendered a Decision in Conflict
with Itself and Other Federal Courts in Ruling
That a Physician Can Be Sued for Malpractice by
the Insurance Carrier of His Patient When the
Company, but Not the Patient, Felt the Doctor’s
DngOSS Was TRCOTIICR .0..0ecccccesccccccccsccescessesscsceses 7
II. The Fifth Circuit Departed from the Accepted
and Usual Course of Judicial Proceedings by Not
Certifying the Case to the Georgia Supreme Court
in the Absence of Authoritative State Decisional
III. Certiorari Should Be Granted to Consider
Whether, as a Matter of Public Policy, a Physi-
cian Can Be Liable to His Patient’s Insuror in the
Absence of Any Relationship Between the Doctor
TEESE A ARE TOCA E TE 12
REE ER eee eae nen Renee ave EO 17
RRA ERC SENCERS ROTA NR ROS SRE la
eee
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES:
Alexander Hamilton Life Insurance Company v.
Trust Co. Bank, et al., Civil Action No. C76-893A
a Pe I SOUT cciichnsiabicetceibyiacliisaniadcinhnaemanedachintmiioens
Branch v. Anderson, 47 Ga. App. 602, 186 S.E. 771
RRR ETE aay Stn ie oERE TR pee nT TO
Ie STI esicicnciiceiiotscaiidesonsmieiinniucidoonipinideniontinaideenamindatmielicsétions
Dalbey v. Banks, 245 Ga. 162, 264 S.E.2d 4 (1980)...
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 58 S. Ct.
Be ee is i Se i icinienstcitstinrsemsmncieeicdeinsediainenn
eed v. Grayson, 189 So. 2d 204 (Fla. App.
STONE iineie bestia eaieeaabchaieninbatinhbhbaanadiaiainicinsacieuiiinhiialnie
RTA RR SER Se AIR cane RD
Hollowell v. Jove, 628 F. 2d 513 ( Sth Cir. 1980) .........
Howard v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 136 Ga. App. 221,
es ee ae Ee 0 TIE issentnernesnncenieinresitenantenen
wo Malone, 146 Ga. App. 341, 247 S.E.2d 107
Se IIIa aa ddnidiepidagnnddéaibbiideabtanmbdatdiiaamiadanbi
In re McClintock, 558 F. 2d 732 ( Sth Cir. 1977).........
Johnston v. Sibley, 558 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. App. 1977)
Keene v. Wiggins, 69 Cal.App. 3d 308, 138 Cal. Rpt.
Part W O eidsiiebiaidaiudicnidtbaamenbinetibnipibaaapaeiniabuiddiiiinlinnes
McFarling v. Azar, 519 F. 2d 1075 ( 5th Cir. 1975).....
MacNerland v. Barnes, 129 Ga. App. 367, 199 S. E.
li aitiiibd aati ial hilaiceeeeiaibiaiieniniabilienes
Mattair v. St. Joseph’s Hospital, Ine., 141 Ga. App.
597, 234 S.E.2d 537, aff'd 239 Ga. 674, 238 S.E.
Pe PTF Pecsscenitiedadidatennsinuiicesemennicinissinininbianen
Nortek, Inc. v. Alexander Grant and Company, 532
2d 1013 (Sth Cir. 1976) cert. denied 429 U.
1042, 97 S.Ct. 742, 50 L. Ed. 2d 754 (1977)...
~ "Ti
Page
iV
Rogers v. Horvath, 65 Mich.A
pp. 644, 237 N.W.2d
95 ENE ATE Een mem me
Soto v. Frankford fuapient 478 F.Supp 1134 (E. D.
Sis SU UTITTET ciclcasciap centeemuetheaianacciadinbdetiiiiatiidedetibiniiilaininbeatiatinnte
Stephens Industries, Inc. v. Haskins & Sells, 438 F.
ee ER: WU dtnssiniiisnnsiinscdeiiaiinnnintnatibennen
Young v. Yarn, 136 Ga. App.
STATUTES:
Ga. Code Ann. § 84-924...........
Ga. Code Ann. § 24-3902.........
Ga. Code Ann. § 3-1101. ef seg
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).................
es Seinen
OTHER:
737, 222 S.E.2d 113
POP eee eee eee eee
Pree eer errr rier iret er
Pree eee SOOO Ceri rrr
TARR R eRe R Eee eee eee eee eee Fee
POeeee COCO OO Ore
SERRE EERE EEE EEE E EEE Eee
1A Moore’s Federal Practice J 0.309[ 3} oo...
Rule 36, Supreme Court of Georgia ..............:.cccceeeees
Supreme Court of the United States
OcTOBER TERM, 1981
MERTON B. BERGER, M_D.,
Petitioner,
vs.
NORTHERN AMERICAN COMPANY FOR
LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Court of Appeals, rendered on June 18,
1981, is not yet published; it is reprinted in Appendix A, infra,
at page l(a). The refusal of the Court of Appeals to grant an
en banc rehearing or to certify the within matter to the Supreme
Court of Georgia is likewise not published; it is reprinted herein
in Appendix B, infra, at page 1(b). The June 25, 1979, opinion
of the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
granting petitioner's original motion for summary judgment is
2
not reported, but is attached herein as Appendix C, infra, on
page I(c). The August 18, 1979, denial of respondent's motion
for reconsideration of the grant of summary judgment is also
unpublished and is attached hereto as Appendix D, infra, at
page I(d). A newspaper article quoting opposing counsel's
opinion as <o the unique importance of the decision herein is
reproduced as Appendix E, infra, at page |(e).
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the Court of Appeals, which is reprinted
in Appendix A, infra, at page 1(a), was entered on June 18,
1981. Petitioner filed a petition for rehearing en banc in the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. This petition was denied
by an order filed August 10, 1981, said order being reprinted in
Appendix B hereto, infra, at page 1(b). Subsequently, the
petition to stay mandate was granted on September 3, 1981.
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1254(1).
STATUTES INVOLVED
The following Georgia statutes and Supreme Court Rules
are relevant to the questions presented by this petition:
“MALPRACTICE OF SURGERY AND MEDICINE: A
person professing to practice surgery or the administering
of medicine for compensation must bring to the exercise of
his profession a reasonable degree of care and skill. Any
injury resulting from a want of such care and skill shall be
a tort for which recovery may be had.” (Ga. Laws, 1933,
p. 2013; Ga. Code Ann. § 84-924).
“SUPREME COURT AUTHORIZED TO RECEIVE
AND ANSWER CERTIFICATES AS TO STATE LAW
FROM FEDERAL APPELLATE COURTS: The Supreme
Court of this State may, by rule of Court, provide that,
when it shall appear to the Supreme Court of the United
States, to any Circuit Court of Appeals of the United
3
States, or to the Court of Appeals or the District of
Columbia that there are involved in any proceeding before
it questions or propositions of the laws of this State, which
are determinative of the said cause, and there are no clear
controlling precedents in the decisions of the Supreme
Court of this State, such Federal Appellate Court may
certify such questions or propositions of the laws of this
State to the Supreme Court of this State for instructions
concerning such questions or propositions of State law,
which certificate the Supreme Court of this State, by
written opinion, may answer: Provided, however, that the
Court of Appeals shall not have jurisdiction to consider
any questions certified under this section by transfer or
otherwise. (Georgia Laws, 1977, pp. 577, 578; Ga. Code
Ann. § 24-3902).
“ACTION FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE” defined:
As used in this section, the term ‘action for medical
malpractice’ means any claim for damages resulting from
the death or injury to any person arising out of (a) health,
medical, dental, or surgical: (1) service, (2) diagnosis, (3)
prescription, (4) treatment, or (5) care, rendered by a
person authorized by law to perform such service or by any
person acting under the supervision and control of such
lawfully authorized person, or (b) care or service rendered
by any public or private hospital, nursing home, clinic,
hospital authority, facility or institution, or by any officer,
agent or employee thereof acting within the scope of his or
her employment. (Ga. Laws, 1976, pp. 1363-1364; Ga.
Code Ann. § 3-1101.)
“GENERAL LIMITATIONS”: Except as otherwise pro-
vided in this Chapter, an action for medical malpractice
shall be brought within two years after the date on which
the negligent or wrongful act or omission occurred. (Ga.
Laws 1976, pp. 1363, 1364; Ga. Code Ann. § 3-1102.)
“Rule 36, Supreme Court of Georgia”
VI. FEDERAL APPELLATE COURTS
Rule 36.
(a) Certified Questions.
When it sha!! appear to the Supreme Court of the
United States, to any Circuit Court of Appeals of the
4
United States, or to the Court of Appeals of the
District of Columbia that there are involved in any
proceeding before it questions or propositions of the
laws of this State which are determinative of said
cause and there are no clear controlling precedents in
the appellate court decisions of this State, such federal
appellate court may certify such questions or proposi-
tions of the laws of Georgia to this court for instruc-
tions concerning such questions or propositions.
(b) Formulation of Questions, Records, etc.
The court certifying to this court a question of law
shall formulate the question and cause the question to
be certified and transmitted to this court, together with
copies of such parts of the record and briefs in the case
as the certifying court deems relevant.
(c) Docketing, etc., of Questions.
Such questions shall be docketed by the Clerk as
are other cases and the rules relating to oral argu-
ments, briefs, motions, etc., in direct appeals shall
apply.
(d) Costs.
The costs in such proceeding shall be equally
divided between the parties unless otherwise ordered
by this court.
Rule 37.
( Reserved )
(published at 242 Ga. 1007, 1008 (1978))
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
At all times relevant hereto petitioner Merton B. Berger
was a physician specializing in the practice of psychiatry in the
metropolitan Atlanta area. During the course of his practice, he
5
had occasion to serve as a psychiatric consultant to a number of
private and governmental entities, including the Federal Avia-
tion Administration.
During the late 1960's and early 1970's the Atlanta area
experienced phenomenal growth; this growth included At-
lanta’s Hartsficld Airport. Over those same years Dr. Berger
was consulted by a number of individuals employed as air
traffic controllers; some of these air traffic controllers had
obtained policies of disability income insurance from various
insurance companies, including North American Company for
Life and Health Insurance [hereinafter, North American].
From time to time, Dr. Berger diagnosed certain of these
individuals as suffering various mental and physical disorders,
which disqualified them from their extraordinarily sensitive
occupation.
As is the case with any patient, some air traffic controllers
found to be disabled by Dr. Berger would, from time to time,
present him with the necessary proof of claim forms supplied by
North American and request that he complete them so they
could obtain the benefits for which they were insured. As an
accommodation to his patients, Dr. Berger recorded on the
forms the previously determined diagnosis. Dr. Berger was
never paid by North American to arrive at a diagnosis for any
of his patients. Indeed, it is undisputed that Dr. Berger was
never paid by North American for anything, nor was he ever
employed by the company at any time. The present lawsuit is
an outgrowth of this factual background.
Suit was filed on January 25, 1977, in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta
Division. Jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship of
all parties under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Defendants included the
present petitioner, Dr. Merton B. Berger, and twelve of his
patients, all of whom had come to him for treatment without
any involvement by North American in the physician selection
6
process. None of these air traffic controller defendants filed a
cross action against Dr. Berger, clearly indicating their satisfac-
tion with his care.
Respondent North American’s complaint asserted that the
diagnosis and subsequent representations of disability made by
Dr. Berger to it on its forms were negligently made and that, as
a proximate result, it was led to make substantial disability
payments to its insureds. No privity between Dr. Berger and
North American was alleged. The essence of the negligence
claim against Dr. Berger is found in paragraph 29 of the
complaint, wherein it is urged that Dr. Berger was under a duty
“.. to exercise reasonable care and prudence of the kind
customarily exercised by psychiatrists in this community when
rendering opinions as to the total and permanent disability of
their patients, and Berger failed to so act ...”. The complaint
also asserted a fraud action against Dr. Berger, but this issue is
not on appeal.
On April 6, 1977, after obtaining an extension of time in
which to answer, petitioner Berger filed a timely Answer
denying all allegations of negligence and/or fraud.
On February 12, 1979, Dr. Berger filed his motion for
summary judgment on both the negligence and fraud aspects of
the case. The motion was based upon Dr. Berger’s affidavit
demonstrating that he had never been an employee of North
American, had not been hired by it to perform any diagnosis or
other service and had no privity of any kind with North
American. Dr. Berger’s affidavit also established that in
expressing opinions as to the mental status of his patients on
North American’s forms, he was doing so only as an accom-
modation to his patients. On the issue now before this Court,
Dr. Berger contended that, since there was no privity between
himself and the insurance company of his private patients, there
could be no breach of any duty on his part, and, thus, there
could be no malpractice suit against him by the insurance
company. ,
-
On June 25, 1979, the trial court granted Dr Berger's
motion for summary judgment as to the negligence claim and
denied the motion as to fraud. In doing so, the trial judge
relied upon an admis. .on made by North American that there
was no privity between the parties; he also specifically noted
. a longstanding [Georgia] philosophy against extending
religence in professional matters ....” (Opinion of June 25,
1979, p. Sc, infra).
On July 9, 1979, North American filed a motion for
reconsideration of the grant of summary judgment. It was
denied and, on September 19, 1979, final judgment was entered
in favor of Dr. Berger on the negligence claim.
North American appealed this decision and, on June 18,
1981, a three judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit decided in a two to one decision to reverse
the trial court.
Petitioner promptly moved for an en banc rehearing
and/or, in the aiternative, moved for certification of the issue to
the Georgia Supreme Court. The motion was denied on August
10, 1981. Petitioner timely made a motion for stay of mandate
pending further appeal, which stay was granted on September
3, 1981.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
I. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT RENDERED A DECISION
IN CONFLICT WITH ITSELF AND OTHER
FEDERAL COURTS IN RULING THAT A PHY-
SICIAN CAN BE SUED FOR MALPRACTICE BY
THE INSURANCE CARRIER OF HIS PATIENT
WHEN THE COMPANY, BUT NOT THE
PATIENT, FELT THE DOCTOR’S DIAGNOSIS
WAS INCORRECT.
The first reason why the petition for a writ of certiorari
should be granted is that the decision of the Fifth Circuit herein
is in conflict with both prior Fifth Circuit precedent and earlier
decisions of other Federal courts.
In McFarling v. Azar, 519 F. 2d 1075 (Sth Cir. 1975), the
Fifth Circuit was confronted with a coverage question under a
physician’s professional liability insurance policy. The doctor
was employed by a life insurance company and had examined
an applicant for a life insurance policy 2¢ its request; he
thereafter submitted a fraudulent report t7 the company. In
reaching the ultimate issue, the Fifth Circuit found it necessary
to consider the following question:
“Does the duty, the breach of which is defined as malprac-
tice, run to a life insurance company which pays a doctor to
make on its behalf a single examination of an applicant for
insurance.” McFarling, at 1076-1077.
The Fifth Circuit cited as controlling a Florida case,
Greenwald v. Grayson, 189 So.2d 204 (Fla. App. 1966),
wherein a married couple employed a doctor to examine a child
whose adoption they were contemplating. The doctor failed to
discover a physical problem in the child; the couple, which
adopted the child in reliance upon the examination, later
discovered the problem and sued both in contract and in tort.
The trial court directed a verdict on behalf of the physician on
the negligence question, and the Florida appellate court ap-
proved. The court held that, in the absence of physician-patient
relationship, there could be no claim for malpractice.
Applying this rule, the Fifth Circuit held:
“As did the parents in Greenwald, the life insurance
company here employed a doctor to advise it on the
medical condition of a third-party. Whatever claims it
may have against this doctor for the intentional mis-
performance of his duties on its behalf, they are not the
kind of claims Florida recognizes as malpractice.” ( Jd. at
1077).
Based on the absence of the physician-patient relationship,
the Fifth Circuit, therefore, ruled that the physician could not
be liable for malpractice to the insurance company. Put
9
another way, McFarling is compelling authority for the proposi-
tion that no malpractice claim exists on behalf of an insurance
company against a physician who it employed to make an
examination of a third-party. Certainly this rule must apply
more strongly in the instant case where North American
admittedly never employed Dr. Berger to do anything.
Comparably, other Federal courts have held that a
physician’s duty to his patient does not create a duty to a third-
party non-patient. Such decisions rest on both the law relative
to physicians and on analogies from cases involving other
professionals. Soto v. Frankford Hospital, 478 F. Supp. 1134
(E. D. Pa. 1979); Nortek, Inc. v. Alexander Grant and Co., 532
F. 2d 1013 (Sth Cir. 1976), cert. denied 429 U. S. 1042, 97S.
Ct. 742, 50 L.Ed.2d 754 (1977); Stephens Industries, Inc. v.
Haskins & Sells, 438 F. 2d 357 (10th Cir. 1971).
For this reason, this Court is petitioned to grant certiorari
in order to resolve the conflict created by the Fifth Circuit both
with earlier precedent and with the law in other Federal
jurisdictions.
Il. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT DEPARTED FROM THE
ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS BY NOT CERTIFYING THE
CASE TO THE GEORGIA SUPREME COURT IN
THE ABSENCE OF AUTHORITATIVE STATE
DECISIONAL LAW.
The second reason why this petition for a writ of certiorari
should be granted is that the Fifth Circuit failed to certify the
within matter to the Supreme Court of Georgia.
The issue at bar is who may sue a physician for medical
negligence. Under the applicable rules of Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1199 (1938) a
Federal court must look for Georgia decisions discussing the
necessity for a physician-patient relationship as a prerequisite to
a malpractice suit. Such decisions would, or should, determine
the outcome of Dr. Berger’s case in the Fifth Circuit.
10
The sole Georgia case on point is Buttersworth v. Swint, 53
Ga. App. 602, 186 S. E. 770 (1936). There an action was filed
against a Dr. Swint asserting negligence in treatment. The
plaintiff contended that she was an employee of the Milledge-
ville State Sanitarium of which Dr. Swint was superintendent.
Plaintiff contended that defendant was liable to her because he
had been advised of her health problem and negligently failed
to render proper and necessary attention. Defendant filed a
general demurrer, which was granted. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals of Georgia sustained the trial court:
“The obvious defect in the petition is that it fails to show
the relationship of the physician and patient existed be-
tween the plaintiff and the defendant; and on the other
hand it contains direct allegations which show that the
defendant never agreed to treat or advise her as her
physician.” ( Jd. at 772, italics supplied by the Court. )
Georgia courts have often impliedly held that, in order for
an action to lie for malpractice, the physician must have
undertaken the treatment of the plaintiff. Mattair v. St.
Joseph’s Hospital, Inc., 141 Ga. App. 597, 234 S.E.2d 537,
S.E.2d affirmed 239 Ga. 674, 238 S.E.2d 366 (1977). Georgia
cases concerning other professionals (i.e. accountants and
lawyers) have held that there must be a direct relationship
between the plaintiff and the defendant in order for the plaintiff
to sue for malpractice. Howard v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 136
Ga. App. 221, 220 S.E.2d 702 (1975); MacNerland v. Barnes,
129 Ga. App. 367, 199 S.E.2d 564 (1973); Hughes v. Malone,
146 Ga. App. 341, 247 S.E.2d 107 (1978).
Georgia courts also have a consistent record of restricting
the legal exposure of physicians. The Georgia malpractice
statute of limitations (Ga. Laws 1976, pp. 1363-1365; Ga. Code
Ann. § 3-1101, ef seg.) requires that an action must be brought
against a physician within two years of an alleged act or
omission. This statute has been held to mean exactly what it
says regardless of when the patient discovers or should have
discovered the injury. Dalbey v. Banks, 245 Ga. 162, 2645S. E.
2d 4 (1980). The so-called Doctrine of Informed Consent has
been rejected by the Georgia courts. Young v. Yarn, 136 Ga.
App. 737, 222 S.E.2d 113 (1976). The Doctrine of Res Ispa
Loquitur does not apply in malpractice suits against Georgia
physicians. Hayes v. Brown, 108 Ga. App. 360, 133 S.E.2d 102
(1963); Branch v. Anderson, 47 Ga. App. 858, 171 S.E. 771
(1933).
The Fifth Circuit certainly possessed persuasive indications
that a Georgia court, given an opportunity, would hold that a
physician could not be sued for medical negligence by a non-
patient. Ignoring this authority, the Fifth Circuit chose to rely
on reasoning by analogy in an unpublished Federal case
dealing with architects’ liability. Alexander Hamilton Life In-
surance Co. v. Trust Company Bank (Civil Action No. C76-
893A, N.D.Ga. 1979). This was error.
At the very least, the Fifth Circuit should have utilized the
available Georgia certification statute, Ga. Code Ann. § 24-
3902 and Supreme Court Rule 36 to send this vital question to
the Georgia Supreme Court for definitive resolution. It has
done so in the recent past on matters of much less importance.
Hollowell v. Jove, 628 F.2d 513 (Sth Cir. 1980).
Such a decision would have been in accord with usual
Federal practice and custom.
Concerning the importance of certification, Professor Moore
has noted:
“There has been much expression in favor of the device of
certification by the federal courts of an unsettled question
of state law to the highest court of that state to get a
definitive answer ... In two cases, Clay v. Sun Insurance
Office, Ltd. 363 U.S. 207, 80 S.Ct. 1222, 4 L.Ed.2d 1170
(1960) and Lehman Brothers v. Scheir, 416 U.S. 386, 94
S.Ct. 1741, 40 L.Ed.2d 215 (1974), the Supreme Court has
expressed its wholehearted approval of certification.” 1A.
Moore’s Federal Practice { 0.309[3], pp. 3131, 3132. See
also, Aldrich v. Aldrich, 375 U.S. 249, 84S. Ct. 305, 11
L.Ed.2d 304 (1963); Jn re McClintock, 558 F.2d 732 (5th
Cir. 1977); United States Life Insurance Company v.
Delaney, 328 F. 2d 483 ( Sth Cir. 1964); Wansor v. George
Hantscho Company, 570 F. 2d 1202, (Sth Cir. 1978).
12
In conclusion, petitioner agrees with Judge Clark, in his
able dissent in the present matter:
“(W )hen our certification rule permits Georgia’s highest
court to settle the issue, I look with disfavor upon estab-
lishing a precedent for Georgia Federal Courts in a
diversity case when it is obvious the decision will spawn
many progeny.” North American Company for Life &
Health Insurance v. Berger, at 8135 (attached hereto at
Appendix A).
Ill. CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED TO CON-
SIDER WHETHER, AS A MATTER OF PUBLIC
POLICY, A PHYSICIAN CAN BE LIABLE TO
HIS PATIENT’S INSUROR IN THE ABSENCE
OF ANY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DOC-
TOR AND THE COMPANY.
The third reason why this Petition for Writ of Certiorari
should be granted is that it presents a question of paramount
and overriding importance to the nation as a whole.
The Fifth Circuit has created a duty where none heretofore
existed. It has expanded the physician’s proper concern from
an exclusive dedication to the welfare of his patient to include a
concern for the satisfaction of the patient’s insurance company.
This decision has far ranging implications for both the medical
and insurance professions, and, more importantly, for all
Americans who from time to time consult physicians.
By imposing such duty on the physician, the Fifth Circuit
correspondingly creates a right of action for breach of that duty.
This right will foster innumerable and very real conflicts in the
health care delivery system. Who is the doctor to satisfy in
attempting to exercise a reasonable degree of care—the patient,
or the cost conscious insurance company? Who will compensate
the physician for the extra risk he now evidently runs of a
negligence suit by the insurance company? By what right does
an insurance company even obtain leave to label the care
rendered to its insureds as malpractice when (as here) the
patients make no such claim?
13
Indeed, The Fifth Circuit has created for North American,
and all insurance companies, greater rights than those afforded
to family members of patients or other individuals who
legitimately depend upon patients. The businessman whose
key employee is injured as a result of malpractice has no nght
to sue the physician, despite the real and demonstrable dam-
ages suffered as a consequence of the physician’s neglect. Cox
v. Stratton, 352 N.Y.S. 2d 834 (1974). The child whose father
is crippled by negligence of a physician has no claim against
him for malpractice; this is true, in Georgia at least, no matter
how great the child’s emotional or financial loss. Yet, under the
within decision, the insurance company may sue to collect all
benefits it feels were improperly paid, even if the patient makes
no claim of having received substandard care.
It would be possible to spin out scenarios illustrating the
evils of this precedent at some length." It is to prevent just such
abuses that innumerable cases, from all jurisdictions, have
rejected the very thing done by the Fifth Circuit.
In Chatman vy. Millis, 257 Ark. 451, 157 S.W.2d 504
(1975), Mrs. Chatman had been divorced from her husband,
plaintiff in the lawsuit. Under the terms of the divorce, Mrs.
Chatman had custody of their young son, with whom the
husband had visitation privileges. The wife suspected that her
ex-husband was subjecting the boy to homosexual conduct and,
to aid in terminating the visitation privileges, took the child to
1 Consider, for example, a not uncommon occurrence: A physi-
cian performs a vasectomy which is, for whatever reason, unsuccess-
ful. The patient’s wife becomes pregnant but, in the interval, the
attitude of the couple has changed and they are delighted by this
unexpected addition to their family. They harbor no ill will against
the physician and return to him for further care. They make no claim
against the physician for malpractice.
The patient’s insurance company, however, is subsequently
presented a bill for maternity costs which it would not have incurred
had the vasectomy been successful. Under the Fifth Circuit ruling,
does not the insuror have a right to sue for malpractice?
14
defendant Dr. Millis, a psychologist. Dr. Millis examined the
child and wrote a letter to Mrs. Chatman’s attorney advising
that it would be in the child’s best interest to have the father’s
visitation rights restricted. Evidencing knowledge that this
letter might be relied upon by a judicial officer, the psychologist
wrote that he would be willing to state his opinions in court.
Mr. Chatman then sued Dr. Millis for both defamation and
malpractice.
In the course of hearing special venue defenses the trial
court held that Arkansas recognized no action for malpractice
against a psychologist, and that even if such action existed,
there could be no action for malpractice under the facts of the
case since there was no doctor-patient relationship between the
Parties.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas approved,
holding that the allegations of plaintiffs complaint could not
state a cause of action. The court added:
“We do not flatly state that a cause for malpractice must
be predicated upon a contractual agreement between a
doctor ( psychologist) and a patient, but we do say that a
doctor-patient relationship must exist, i.e., there must be a
duty, as a doctor, owed from the practitioner to the
patient . .. Concisely stated, we simply reiterate that under
the facts alleged, appellee [Dr. Millis] owed no duty, as a
doctor, to appellant, and this duty must be in existence
before appellant can recover because of negligence, con-
stituting malpractice.” (Jd. at 506, italics added by the
court).
In Rogers v. Horvath, 65 Mich. App. 644, 237 N.W.2d 595
(1976), the Court construed the question before it as follows:
“The principal question raised by this appeal is whether a
professional physician-patient relationship is a legal pre-
requisite to basing a cause of action in professional
malpractice against a physician. .. . The term ‘malpractice’
denotes a breach of duty owed by one in rendering
professional services to a person who has contracted for
such services; in physician-malpractice cases, the duty
15
owed by the physician arises from the physician-patient
relationship. No such relationship existed in the case at
bar. Defendant was employed by General Motors to
examine one of its employees in preparation for a work-
men’s compensation hearing. Plaintiff did not employ the
defendant, nor did she seek to receive medical advice or
treatment. Under the circumstances, the defendant did not
owe plaintiff any duty arising from a physician-patient
relationship. This is not to say that a physician who
examines a person for reasons other than diagnosis or
treatment and for the benefit of someone other than the
examinee owes no duty of due care to that person. Rather,
we hold that the physician in such a case does not owe such
a duty of care as will subject him to liability for malprac-
tice.” (Jd. at 596-597).
In Johnston v. Sibley, 558 S.W.26 135 (Tex. App. 1977)
the Texas Court of Appeals held:
“It is well established principle of law that a physician is
liable for malpractice for negligence only where there is a
physician-patient relationship as a result of a contract,
express or implied, that the doctor will treat the patient
with proper professional skill, and there is a breach of
professional duty to the patient.” ( Jd. at 137).
The same result was reached in Keene v. Wiggins, 69 Cal.
App. 3d 308, 138 Cal. Rpt. 3 (1977):
“It is well established by authorities that in other states
{that} the physician is liable for malpractice or negligence
only where there is a relationship of physician-patient as a
result of a contract, express or implied, that the doctor will
treat the patient with proper professional skill and there is
a breach of professional duty to the patient ... Here we
find no physician-patient relationship, express or implied,
of the sort giving rise to a duty of care owed to [the
claimant] in connection with the report. The uncon-
tradicted declarations assert [the claimant] went to [the
doctor’s] office at the request of the carrier for exam-
ination. [The claimant] was present because he was
required to submit to examination as a claimant. There is
no assertion [the doctor] did anything more than examine
16
{the claimant] and make his report to Industrial In-
demnity as he was hired to do. ... [W]e must affirm the
holding of the trial court that on the basis of the declara-
tions, [the doctor] owed the claimant no duty of profes-
sional skill in connection with the report. [The doctor’s]
alleged failure to advise [the claimant] of some medical
condition did not give rise to a cause of action under the
circumstances of this case. Summary judgment was prop-
erly granted.” ( Jd. at 6, 8-9).
Respondent’s counsel has been quoted as stating that there
never has been a ruling by any court in the United States
similar to the one at bar. (See “Psychiatrist Facing Trial in
Controller-Stress Suit”, The Atlanta Journal-The Atlanta Con-
stitution. Saturday, August 29, 1981, pp. | and 6A). This is
true. It is respectfully submitted that before any such decision
affects both the medical and insurance professions, and the
public they serve, the nation’s highest court must examine the
issue.
17
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, petitioner respectfully
requests a Writ of Certiorari be granted and that the holding of
the Court below be reversed. In the alternative, this Court is
requested to exercise it’s discretion and certify this issue to the
Supreme Court of Georgia.
Respectfully submitted,
SIDNEY F. WHEELER
Attorney for Petitioner
Of Counsel:
LONG, WEINBERG, ANSLEY & WHEELER
2500 The Equitable Building
100 Peachtree Street, N.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
(404) 688-7900
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Sidney F. Wheeler, attorney for petitioner Merton S.
Berger, M.D., and a member of the bar of the Supreme Court
of the United States, hereby certify that on the 2nd day of
October, 1981, I have served three true copies of the foregoing
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari upon the respondent and all
parties, by depositing in a United States Mailbox the required
number of true copies of said petition, with first class postage
pre-paid, correctly addressed to the counsel of record at their
post office address, as required by Supreme Court Rule No. 28.
MatTTHew H. Patton, Eso.
Everette L. Dorrermyre, Eso.
Kicpatrick & Copy
3100 The Equitable Building
100 Peachtree Street, N.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Joun A. Dunaway, Eso.
EuGene Hope, Esa.
Dunaway. Haas, Broome. Hope & BrinGes
2964 Peachtree Road. N.E.
Suite 440
Atlanta, Georgia 30305
C. James Jessee. Jr., Eso.
Georce E. Duncan, Jr., Eso.
Barry L. Roseman. Eso.
620 Northside Tower
6065 Roswell Road. N.E.
Atlanta Georgia
This 2nd day of October, 1981.
LONG, WEINBERG, ANSLEY
& WHEELER
/s/ Sipney F. WHEELER
Sidney F. Wheeler
2500 The Equitable Building Sworn to and Subscribed Before
100 Peachtree Street. N.W. Me This Ist Day of October. 1981
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
(404) 688-7900 Isl Harry D. GREEN. Jr.
Notary Public. Clarke County, Georgia
My Commission Expires July 19, 1982
.
oe
a
ee
&
we
'
=
la
NORTH AMERICAN COMPANY FOR
LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Merton B. BERGER et al., Defendants.
Merton B. Berger, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 79-3541.
United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
Unit B
June 18, 1981.
Before THomMaS A. CLARK and KRavitcn, Circuit Judges.
and Lynne,* District Judge.
LyNNngE, District Judge:
This appeal focuses on the age-old requireinent of privity
of contract between the parties in an action for the negligent
performance of a duty. Appellee Berger was a practicing
psychiatrist in the Atlanta area from 1968 through 1977. In his
capacity as psychiatric consultant to the Federal Aviation
Administration he diagnosed as totally disabled approximately
154 air traffic controllers. The basis for these diagnoses was
often job-related anxiety and depressive neurosis. A number of
these air traffic controllers held disability income insurance
policies issued by appellant North American. Berger certified
his findings to North American on the appellant’s claim forms
after the initial determination and periodically thereafter.
North American relied on these certifications in paying the
claims of various air traffic controllers. Because of the large
number of claims, North American investigated Berger and
concluded that many of his diagnoses of total disability were
* Senior District Judge of the Northern Distnct of Alabama, sitting by
designation.
2a
incorrect. It sued Berger to recover the disability benefits paid
to the air traffic controllers because of his allegedly fraudulent
or negligent diagnoses.
Appellant's claim against Berger for fraud is pending in the
District Court. Appellant appeals from the District Court's
granting of a summary judgment in Berger's favor on the
negligence count and its subsequent refusal to reconsider the
issue. The District Court ruled that because North American
was not in privity with Dr. Berger, it could not sue him to
recover for the results of his alleged negligence. Upon exam-
ination of the record and the forces motivating the privity
requirement, we disagree and reverse.
The appellee claims that the District Court rightly dis-
missed the negligence count of North American's compliant
because a doctor is not subject to malpractice liability unless the
injured party is or was the doctor’s patient. Buttersworth v.
Swint, 53 Ga.App. 602, 186 S.E. 770 ( 1936).' In support of its
position, appellee relies not only on cases concerning medical
malpractice, but on those charging other professionals with acts
of negligence. Howard v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 136 Ga.App.
221,220 S.E.2d 702 (1975); McNerland v. Barnes, 129 Ga.App.
368, 199 S.E.2d 564 (1973): Smith v. International Lawyers, 35
Ga.App. 158,132 S.E. 245 (1926). In each of these cases,
Georgia courts explicitly or implicitly refused to hold the
defendant professional liable because there was no direct
relationship between the injured party and the defendant.
Both Howard and McNerland concern the liability of
financial experts for incorrect financial assessments of business-
es in which the plaintiff subsequently invested. The McNerland
' Appellant argues that because of its peculiar facts. Buttersworth fails to
establish a sweeping privity requirement for malpractice actions. In Bur-
tersworth, the superintendent of a state hospital made the offhand statement
that the physical condition of one of his employees could be corrected “if she
would wear an abdominal support.” 53 Ga.App. at 604, 186 S.E. at 772. The
employee was not his patient: he never examined her. The case its
distinguishable from the instant situation because of the nature of the
opinions rendered in each case. Dr. Swint made a casual remark. Dr. Berger
filled out and signed appellant's certification forms with the intent for
appellant to rely on his opinion.
3a
court relied on Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174
N.E. 441 (1931), in which Judge Cardozo refused to hold an
accountant liable for a negligently prepared financial statement
because it would expose him “to a liability in an indeterminate
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.”
174 N.E. at 444.2 The court in Howard was even more
protective of the defendant. It noted:
[A]s to third parties, even those the accountant knew
or should have known were relying on his audit,
liability can be found only upon fraudulent conduct,
and proof of mere negligence will not suffice.
220 S.E.2d at 704.
The court insulated accountants from liability to anyone except
those in privity.
In support of its requirement of privity in suits against
professionals for negligence. McNerland cited Smith v. Inter-
national Lawyers, 35 Ga.App. 158, 132 S.E. 245 (1926). The
Smith court refused to hold an attorney liable for negligence to
anyone but his client. The appe'lant distinguishes Smith on the
grounds that its privity requirement applied only to money-rule
procedures under Section 4954 of the Georgia Civil Code
(1910). MeNerland, however, cited Smith for its privity theme
and apparently overlooked the money-rule limitation.
While recognizing that a professional may not be held
liable to an “indeterminate class” of third parties, the appellant
contends that an exception to the general privity requirement
applies in this case. When a “tortfeasor provides an opinion
with actual or reasonable knowledge that the injured party will
rely on its accuracy,” he is liable for the foreseeable results.
2In numerous opinions prior and subsequent to Ultramares. the New
York courts recognized that the purpose of the privity requirement was to
protect an alleged tortfeasor from liability to a nameless. unforeseen class of
plaintiffs. Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 615 F.2d 68.82 (2d Cir. 1980); White
v. Guarente, 43 N.Y.2d 356,361. 401 N.Y.S.2d 474, 477.372 N.E.2d 315, 318
(1977). See Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N_E. 275 (1922).
3 North American Company for Life and Health Ins. v. Berger. No. C-77-
119-A (N.D. Ga., June 25. 1979) (order granting summary judgment).
4a
The appellant successfully distinguishes McNerland and
Howard, the accountant cases, from its own. In McNerland, the
faulty financial statements contained specific disclaimers which
should have put the plaintiff on notice that the statements had
not been audited by an independent CPA. In holding for the
defendant, the court emphasized the latter facts in conjunction
with lack of privity. In Howard, the defendant Dun &
Bradstreet never made a representation to the plaintiff with the
knowledge that he would rely upon it. Dr. Berger certainly had
no doubt as to whom he was making a representation and for
what purpose.
In sharp contrast to McNerland and Howard, appellant
cites Alexander Hamilton Life Insurance Company v. Trust Co.
Bank, No. C76-893-A (N.D. Ga., July 29, 1979), in which the
absence of privity failed to insulate an architect from liability to
an insurance company. As a preface to its opinion, the court
stated: “Although there are still many unsettled questions as to
the situations in which a party not in privity of contract may sue
for negligence, it is clear that in a large and increasing number
of instances such suits are allowed.” Jd. At 9.4 The architect in
Alexander Hamilton erroneously certified to an insurance com-
pany the completion of a hotel. In reliance on the architect's
certification, the insurance company purchased a construction
loan from the construction lender. Upon default by the
borrower, the insurance company foreclosed and sued the
architect. The architect relied on McNerland and Howard,
emphasizing the similar lack of privity in his own case. In
response, the court cited Bodin v. Gill, 216 Ga. 467, 117 S.E.2d
4 The court in Alexander Hamilton emphasized that the decision to allow
a person not in privity with the defendant to sue was largely a policy matter.
In United States v. Rogers & Rogers, \61 F Supp. 132. 135 (S.D.Cal.1958),
the court listed various factors which should play a part in the cecision:
“the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the
plainuff, the foreseeability of the harm to him. the degree of
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury. the closeness of the
connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury
suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct,
and the policy of preventing future harm.” (citations omitted )
Alexander Hamilton at 10.
Sa
325 (1960), in which an architect's design of a church caused
water damage to the property of a neighboring landowner. In
spite of the absence of privity, the landowner recovered for the
architect’s negligence.> The Supreme Court of Georgia recog-
nized in Bodin that:
[T]he law imposes upon persons performing archi-
tectural, engineering, and other professional and
skilled services an obligation to exercise a reasonable
degree of care, skill and ability, which generally is
taken and considered to be such a degree of care and
skill as, under the circumstances, is ordinarily em-
ployed by their respective professions.
Id. at 472, 117 S.E.2d at 330.
The court thus identified a legal duty of care independent of
privity.
[1,2] The factual similarities between Alexander Hamilton
and the instant case are striking. The plaintiffs are both
insurance companies that relied on certifications made by
professionals before they took certain financial action. In
Alexander Hamilton, the architect certified completion directly
to the plaintiff. In the instant case, Berger, using the plaintiff's
forms, certified disability directly to the insurance company.
The relationship approaches that of privity.© At the very least,
5 Two other significant Georgia cases rely upon Bodin. In Covil v. Robert
& Co. Assocs., 112 Ga.App. 163, 144 S.E.2d 450 (1965). the court allowed
landowners to maintain an action against an architectural and engineering
firm that designed a nearby water pumping station that caused plaintiffs’
property to flood. In Dresco Mech. Contrs. Inc. v. Todd—CEA, §3\ F.2d
1292 (Sth Cir. 1976), although the plaintiff did not prevail on the merits of
the case, the court applied Georgia law and found that the defendant
engineer owed a duty imposed by law to a co-defendant manufacturer with
whom he was not in privity. The manufacturer had filed a third-party
complaint against the engineer. accusing him of negligently designing a
aeating plant which the manufacturer was under contract to build.
6 Appellant argues that doctors qualify as “other professionals” under
the Bodin rationale. especially in light of Ga.Code § 84-924, which states:
(footnote cov inues)
6a
the relationship was so close that Berger knew exactly who
would rely on his certification and for what purpose.’
Berger was under a duty to exercise reasonable care in
performing medical services, making diagnoses, and trans-
mitting them to «.ppellant. Summary judgment on the issue of
negligence was improper for this reason, and because it is
apparent that genuine issues of fact remain to be resolved. Our
resolution of the issue of privity makes a consideration of
appellant’s third-party-beneficiary agreement unnecessary.
(footnote continued)
A person professing to practice surgery or the administering of
medicine for compensation must bring to the exercise of his
profession a reasonable degree of care and skill. Any injury
resulting from a want of such care and skill shall be a tort for
which a recovery may be had.
Appellant emphasizes the language “any injury” in the statute. While
appellant's reading of the statute, i.e. that it confers a mght to sue for
monetary injury upon a third party, is rather ingenious, it is not persuasive.
More compelling is appellee's analysis of the statute's history. Its first
codification was in 1863 under the article entitled “Physical Injury.” It is
possible, however, to read the “other professionals” language in Bodin to
include doctors without resorting to the Georgia statute.
? Appellant cites Section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts as
further support for the argument that Dr. Berger had a duty to North
American. That section states:
(1) One who, in the course of his business. profession. or
employment, or in any other transaction in which he has a
pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the guidance of
others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for
pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon
the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or com-
Petence in obtaining or communicating the information.
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in
Subsection (1) is limited to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for
whose benefit and guidance he intends to supply the infor-
mation or knows that the recipient intends to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends
the information to influence or knows that the recipient so
intends or in a substa stially similar transaction.
(footnote continues)
7a
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Tuomas A. CLarK, Circuit Judge. dissenting:
In dissenting I have two non-reasons and two reasons. The
non-reasons are the lack of precedent and my view that we
should certify this case to the Supreme Court of Georgia. A
decision can be made without the aid of precedent when there
is none. However, when our certification rule permits Georgia’s
highest court to settle the issue, I look with disfavor upon
establishing a precedent for Georgia federal courts in a diver-
sity case when it is obvious that the decision will spawn many
progeny.
The two reasons for dissenting are: (1 ) the complaint does
not seek the relief granted by the decision and opinion of the
majority; and, (2) the law of negligence and the relationship of
the parties give no basis in reason or logic for imposing this
liability on a doctor.
Turning to the complaint, it is my conclusion that in its
complaint the appellant failed to state a claim against Dr.
Berger for simple negligence or medical malpractice. If any-
thing, North American’s complaint states a claim against Dr.
Berger for the intentional tort of fraudulent misrepresentation.
North American in its complaint alleges that Dr. Berger is a
psychiatrist who disagreed with the FAA’s treatment of its air
traffic controllers and their emotional problems. He is charged
with conspiring with the controllers to cause them to fail to
report for work on the basis of a nervous condition and then
diagnose them as disabled because of their working conditions
and resulting nevousness. The complaint goes on to allege that
Dr. Berger’s wife is a lawyer with an office next to Dr. Berger's.
She is said to handle some of the legal problems of the air
traffic controllers, including their claims for workmen’s com-
pensation and private insurance disability benefits. One comes
(footnote continued)
The facts of this case fit very neatly into this section of the Restatement.
Appellee points out. however, that every illustration following the section
concerns commercial transactions. Appellant retorts that the filling out of
insurance disability forms and the payment of insurance proceeds are
commercial transactions. We agree with appellant.
8a
away from the complaint with the reaction that North Ameri-
can is accusing Dr. Berger of having a feud with the FAA and
profiting from his fees charged the air traffic controllers. The
complaint supports a claim for fraud, for intentional mis-
representation, for gross negligence—it does not support a
claim for simple negligence. At no place in the complaint is
there a count averring simple negligence in the manner sug-
gested by Form 9 in Appendix attached to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. The appeal does not come to us on a motion
to dismiss, but on the district court’s grant of Dr. Berger’s
motion for summary judgment on the issue of his negligence vel
non vis a vis North American. Intuitively, one realizes that this
motion was advanced by Berger’s malpractice insurance carrier
so its role in the litigation could be determined. Since I find
that neither the allegations nor the affidavits against Berger
establish a claim for simple negligence, I would affirm.
Even if the allegations were sufficient, I would affirm. The
majority relies primarily on Georgia cases which hold architects
liable to third parties. Of course, it is logical to hold architects
liabile for injury to the public or an adjoining landowner when
such injury is the direct result of negligent design by the
architect of a structure. That is simple tort law of one party
owing reasonable care to another party and extending privity to
those who foreseeably might be injured if such care is not
taken.
The majority opinion permits every doctor to become
potentially liable for payments made by an insurance company
to its policy holder, the doctor’s patient, whenever, the doctor
compietes a form describing the patient’s condition, and the
doctor has made a mistake in diagnosing the condition. This
act of the doctor is done at the request of the company and is
done without consideration. The majority opinion imposes a
duty on doctors neither foreseeable nor contemplated by the
parties or their relationship.
Insurance companies insure persons against such risks as
death and disability. It is common knowledge that they pay
doctors to conduct examinations when issuing such policies.
9a
The policies, in case of a disability claim, require the policyhol-
der to submit to an examination at the request of the company
by a doctor hired by the company. Obviously, if a doctor
employed by an insurance company misses a diagnosis which
results in unwarranted liability of the company. the doctor may
be liable to the company for his negligent performance of the
contract.
The majority opinion creates privity without any just cause
or reason. In the disability policy the insured individual
authorizes the insurance company to secure information from
any doctor treating him or her in the event of a claim for
disability. The company, upon receiving a claim, conducts an
investigation of the alleged disability by sending a medical
form to doctors treating the claimant, as Berger in this case, by
writing the policyholder’s employer, by conducting surveillance.
by interviewing neighbors, and by seeking other relevant
information. Anyone furnishing information to the company
does so gratuitously for the purpose of assisting the company in
its assessment of the claim for disability benefits. None of these
persons, including a doctor, such as Berger here, is required to
cooperate. Most doctors do accommodate their patients by
giving the insurance company the same information furnished
the patient.
The doctor has a duty to the patient to make a correct
diagnosis of his illness, if he has one. Doctors. being human,
sometimes err. When they do. they are legally liable to the
patient for any damages sustained by the patient as the result of
the negligence. The employment contract and the relationship
create the duty to be careful.
Here our court creates a potential financial liability when
there is no contract and no relationship other than a gratuitous
one, when the doctor, at the request of the company, puts in
writing information about the patient’s condition as he sees it.’
If the doctor knowingly furnishes false information, he may be
‘Does the majority opinion permit a disability imsurance company to
recover from the claimant's employer or neighbor who furnishes erroneous
information supportive of the claim but negligently arrived at”
10a
held liable. If one lies to another, knowing the other will act to
his detriment based on the lie, responsibility for such an
intentional misrepresentation under certain circumstances may
ensue. Furnishing information derived through error. in-
nocently and gratuitiously, does not create such a responsibility.
Thus, I dissent.
Ib
IN THE
United States Court of Appeals
For THE FirTH Circuit
Unit B
No. 79-3541
NORTH AMERICAN COMPANY FOR LIFE
AND HEALTH INSURANCE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
MERTON B. BERGER, ET AL..
Defendants,
MERTON B. BERGER,
Defendant-Appellee.
Filed August 10, 1981
Appeal From the United States
District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING AND
PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC
(Opinion June 18, 1981, 5 Cir., 198 , F.2d
(August 10, 1981)
2b
Before KRAVITCH and THomas A. CLarkK, Circuit Judges, and
LYNNE", District Judge.
Per CURIAM:
(y ) The Petition for Rehearing is DENIED and no member of
this panel nor Judge of this Administrative Unit in regular
active service having requested that the Court be polled on
rehearing en banc (Rule 35, Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure; Local Fifth Circuit Rule 16; Fifth Circuit Judicial
Council Resolution of January 14, 1981), the suggestion for
Rehearing En Banc is DENIED.
( ) The Petition for Rehearing is DENIED and the judges in
regular active service of this Administrative Unit having been
polled at the request of one of said judges and a majority of
said judges not having voted in favor of it (Rule 35, Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure; Local Fifth Circuit Rule 16;
Fifth Circuit Judicial Council Resolution of January 14, 1981),
the suggestion for Rehearing En Banc is also DENIED.
( ) A member of this Administrative Unit in active service
having requested a poll on the reconsideration in this cause en
banc, and a majority of the judges in active service of said unit
not having voted in favor of it, rehearing en banc is DENIED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT:
PHYLLIS KRAVITCH
United States Circuit Judge
* U.S. District Judge from the Northern District of Alabama, sitting by
designation.
Ic
United States District Court
Northern District of Georgia
Atlanta Division
NORTH AMERICAN COMPANY FOR
LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE
Civil Action File
versus No. C77-119A
MERTON B. BERGER, ef a/
ORDER
(Filed June 25, 1979)
Presently pending in the above styled action are the
motions of the defendants, Sidney B. Warner and Merton B.
Berger, for summary judgment.
Warner’s motion is based entirely on a clause of the
underlying insurance contract which reads:
2. Incontestable: (a) After this policy has been in
force for a period of two years during the lifetime of
the Insured (excluding any period during which the
Insured is disabled ), it shall become incontestable as
to the statements contained in the application.
(b) No claim for loss incurred or disability (as
defined in the policy) commencing after two years
from the date of issue of this policy shall be reduced
or denied on the ground that a disease or physical
condition not excluded from coverage by name or
specific description effective on the date of loss had
existed prior to the effective date of coverage of this
policy.
Subparagraph 2(b)’s language can be interpreted in two
ways. First, it could be construed to create, as a prerequisite to
2c
incontestability, a requirement that the insured’s disability did
not, in fact, “commence” until two years after the date of the
issuance of the policy. However, this would make the clause
meaningless because such a reading would always permit the
insurer to attempt to prove that the disability’s commencement
predated the second anniversary of the policy and perhaps the
date of the policy’s issue as well. If the insurer could prove that
disability began before the second anniversary then Subpara-
graph 2(b) would allow proof of the disability’s onset before
the date of issue.
The alternative construction interprets Subparagraph 2(b)
as rendering incontestable on the ground of pre-issue onset any
claim by the insured for disability supposedly occurring after
the second anniversary. Thus, any time an insured, such as
Warner, claimed that disability commenced after the second
year, the insurer would automatically be precluded from trying
to prove that disability began before the policy’s date of issue.
In effect the policy states that if the insurer cannot or does not
ascertain within the first"two, years that the insured is disabled
then it is forever barred from trying to prove that the disability
in fact preceded the policy’s issurance. This reasoning comports
with the Georgia courts’ philosophy concerning the purpose of
incontestability clauses. See Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Childs, 65 Ga. App. 468, 476-77 (1941).
Even so, the plaintiff is not precluded from showing, for
the purpose of avoiding incontestability under Subparagraph
2(a), that disability commenced after the date of the policy.
Subparagraph 2(a) is not inconsistent with itself under this
interpretation because the proof of post-issue disability affects
only the time limitations of the clause and is not necessarily
related to the ground of incontestability, namely, statements
contained in the application. Consequently, the plaintiff is
entitled to prove that Warner was disabled after the date of the
policy’s issue but only for the purpose of showing that the
policy was not in force for two full years excluding periods of
disability. To the extent the plaintiff proves pre-claim disability
precluding the policy from having been “in force” for two years
3c
within the meaning of the incontestability clause, the insurer
may also attempt to prove that statements contained in the
application voided the insurer’s contractual obligations.
Disability prior to the date of the policy might be relevant
to showing disability thereafter since the jury may infer that a
mental condition once started may continue. However, because
of Subparagraph 2(b) the plaintiff may not offer evidence of
pre-issue disability solely for the purpose of voiding the policy.
Instead, pre-issue disability is only relevant to the question of
tolling the two-year period in Subparagraph 2(a) and, even
then, the plaintiff must also establish that Warner was aware of
the incorrectness of statements made in the application.
Warner asserts in his sworn affidavit that he was not
disabled from September 13, 1973, the date of the policy, until
after its second anniversary. The plaintiff argues that such a
statement is insufficient to prove lack of disability but cites no
authority for this proposition. To the contrary, it must be
concluded that a person is normally one of the best sources of
information as to the state of his mental health at particular
times. Neither side maintains that Warner has ever been so
disabled as to not be capable of recognizing his problem.
Therefore, his own assertion of lack of disability until after the
policy’s second anniversary is a sufficient basis for requiring the
plaintiff to demonstrate the contrary.
The plaintiff has attempted to do so. However, Exhibits |
and 3 attached to the plaintiffs response under Rule 91.72,
Local Rules for the Northern District of Georgia, are useless in
that the copies are illegible. Exhibits 4 and 5 contain nothing
indicating disability prior to September 13, 1975. Finally,
Exhibit 6 is relevant to the fraud issue and has no conceivable
relation to actual disability before the second anniversary unless
the plaintiff is contending that Warner’s illness manifested itself
in attempts to defraud insurance companies.
According to the plaintiff, Exhibit 2 indicates that on
February 25, 1974 Warner admitted to symptoms which he
claimed at his deposition were demonstrative of his disability.
de
But Warner’s deposition has not been filed. Whether there is
evidence of disability prior to September 13, 1975 must await
supplementation of the record by the plaintiff.
Berger’s motion for summary judgment involves the plain-
tiff's claims of malpractice and fraud. He urges that no action
for negligent performance of medical practice can be brought
except by the patient or one who is in privity with the doctor.
The plaintiff in this case had not contractual relationship with
Berger.
Howard v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 136 Ga. App. 221
(1975), held that a financial reporting firm could not be liable
to someone not in privity with it for negligently advising that a
particular business was solvent when the reverse was true. In
view of the longstanding philosophy against extending negli-
gence in professional matters on which the Court of Appeals
relied, there appears no good reason why the Howard ruling
should not apply to the medical profession as well.
The plaintiff responds that there is an exception to the
requirement of privity when the alleged tortfeasor provides an
opinion with the actual or reasonable knowledge that the
injured party will rely on its accuracy. However, Howard
rejected even this extension of negligence liability:
[A]s to third parties, even those who the accountant
knew or should have known were relying on his
audit, liability can be found only upon fraudulent
conduct, and proof of mere negligence will not
suffice.
Id. at 223. The factual recitation in the opinion does not specify
whether Dun & Bradstreet was actually aware of Howard's
potential reliance on its report but apparently this point was
irrelevant for even in such a case no claim for negligence could
be stated. It seems clear that the Georgia courts are not willing
to loosen the privity requirement even when, as here, the
defendant’s knowledge of the plaintiffs reliance can be shown.
The plaintiff also claims that Ga. Code Ann. §84-924,
which reads:
Se
[a] person professing to practice surgery or the
administering of medicine for compensation must
bring to the exercise of his profession a reasonable
degree of care and skill. Any injury resulting from a
want of such care and skill shall be a tort for which a
recovery may be had[,] [emphasis added ]
provides for medicai malpractice claims by nonpatient third
parties because of the emphasized language. Insofar as can be
determined, this statute has never been interpreted by a
Georgia appellate court in the context presented in Berger’s
motion. In the absence of any authority to the contrary and on
the basis of the statute’s language this court will construe
Section 84-924 as being essentially neutral on the question of
who may be a party as distinguished from what types of injury
may be compensated. As the plaintiff concedes, “any injury”
refers to those injuries which are proximately caused by the tort.
There can be little doubt that, given its version of the facts, the
plaintiff's loss was a result of Berger's alleged negligence.
Nevertheless, the same was true in Howard and the Georgia
court, apparently for policy reasons, precluded liability to a
third party not in privity of contract. Who may recover is
distinctly different from the type of injuries for which recovery
may be had and only the latter question is answered by Section
84-294.
Although the plaintiff had no physician-patient or con-
tractual relationship with Berger it may still institute an action
for fraud against him. Howard v. Dun & Bradstreet, supra, at
223. Berger first insists that the complaint fails to plead fraud
with specificity as required by Rule 9(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. This
contention has been previously rejected. Order of July 14, 1977
at 9.
Next, Berger asserts that the plaintiff's cause of action is
based solely on his opinions of the air traffic controllers’
disability and that an opinion cannot suggest a suit alleging
fraud. Normally opinions cannot provide the basis for fraud
but there is a well-established exception as outlined by Profes-
sor Prosser:
dc
[I]t has been recognized very often that the ex-
pression of an opinion may carry with it an implied
assertion, not only that the speaker knows no facts
which would preciude such an opinion, but that he
does know facts which justify it. There is quite
general agreement that such an assertion is to be
implied where the defendant holds himself out or is
understood as having special knowledge of the mat-
ter which is not available to the plaintiff, so that his
opinion becomes in effect an assertion summarizing
his knowledge. Thus the ordinary man is free to deal
in reliance upon the opinion of an expert jeweler as to
the value of a diamond, of an attorney upon a point
of law, of a physician upon a matter of health, of a
banker upon the validity of a signature, or the owner
of land at a distance as to its worth, even though the
opinion is that of his antagonist in a bargaining
transaction. On the same basis it has been held that
statements by a seller as to the capacity of the thing
sold, or the condition of land, or other matters, which
on the part of one without special knowledge would
be regarded as mere opinion, may be relied on as
statements of fact. [footnotes omitted }.
W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, §109 at 726-27 ( 4th
ed. 1971). Apparently this rule was the implied reason for the
decision in Daugert v. Holland Furnace Co., 107 Ga. App. 566,
570 (1963), where an allegation of a false opinion based on
facts known to be untrue by a defendant holding himself out as
an expert created a cause of action. Similarly, the plaintiff here
had a right to rely on Berger’s professional medical opinion and
may recover if it can show that he knowingly misrepresented
the health of the air traffic controllers. The cases cited by
Berger with one exception’ involved opinions by a seller as to
the quality of goods for sale, a situation not present here.
‘Judge Lawrence expressly refrained from premising his decision in
United States ex rel MevA Corp. y. Northeast Construction Co. of West
Virginia, 298 F.Supp. 1135 (S.D. Ga. 1969), on the opinion rule. Id. at 1139.
Tc
Finally, whether the plaintiff exercised reasonable dili-
gence in discovering the fraud is a question for the jury. See
Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Orr, 319 F.2d 612 (Sth Cir.
1963); see also Braselton Bros. v. Better Maid Dairy Products,
Inc., 222 Ga. 472 (1966).
Accordingly, Warner’s motion for summary judgment is
granted in part and consideration is deferred in part. To the
extent the complaint asserts a claim on the premise that
Warner’s disability preexisted the date of the policy’s issue it is
dismissed. The plaintiff is directed to file a copy of the
transcript of Warner’s deposition within fifteen (15) days of the
filing of this order. The clerk shall resubmit Warner’s motion at
that time. Berger’s motion for summary judgment is granted in
part and denied in part. To the extent the complaint alleges a
claim for negligence in rendering professional services it is
dismissed.
So ordered this the 23 day of June, 1979.
/s/ ALBERT HENDERSON, Jr.
Judge, United States District
Court for the Northern
District of Georgia
Id
United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia
Atlanta Division
NORTH AMERICAN COMPANY
For Lire AND HEALTH
INSURANCE Civil Action
“. No. C-77-119-A
MERTON B. BerGer, M.D., ef ai.
ORDER
(filed August 28, 1979)
The case is presently before the court on the plainiffs
motion for oral argument and reconsideration of this court’s
order of June 25, 1979, and also on the court’s deferred ruling
on defendant Warner’s motion for summary judgment.
In the June 25 order, this court dismissed the plaintiff's
negligence claim against Dr. Berger, holding that a suit for
negligent performance of medical practice cannot be brought
by anyone except the patient or one who is in privity with the
doctor. The plaintiff, despite its earlier assertions that Berger
“had no contractual or physician-patient relationship with
North American,” now seeks to have the court find that North
American was a third-party beneficiary of the agreement
between Berger and Warner to furnish opinions to North
American regarding Warner’s disability. This argument was
raised for the first time by the plaintiff in its motion for
reconsideration.
The plaintiff has failed to show that Berger and Warner
intended to benefit North American by agreeing to furnish
Berger’s opinions to North American. See Continental Casualty
Co. v. Continental Rent-A-Car of Georgia, Inc., 349 F.Supp.
666 (N.D. Ga. 1972). This court adheres to its former ruling
that the holding in Howard v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 136 Ga.
App. 221 (1975) should apply to the medical profession and
2d
finds no privity. The plaintiffs motion for reconsideration
insofar as it relates to the portion of the June 25 order
dismissing the plaintiffs claim of medical negligence is DE-
NIED.
The court hereby GRANTS the motion for oral argument,
specifically limiting argument to the issue of the incontestability
of Part V, Para. 2, Sub. Para. (b) in the insurance policy.
Counsel should also be prepared to argue the merits of that
portion of Warner’s motion for summary judgment on which a
ruling was deferred in this court’s June 25 order.
Oral argument will be before the court in chambers on
September 5, 1979 at 2:00 p.m., and will be limited to thirty
minutes per side.
SO ORDERED, this 27th day of August, 1979.
/s/
Robert L. Vining, Jr.
United States District Judge
~
oy ae
ef t . < v <.e
het pes ty
AOA apt hee .
% e “ ¥
; Sieg «
ee
le
The Atlanta Journal
THE ATLANTA CONSTITUTION
VOL. 32, NO. 26 *“ * © P.O. BOX 4689
ATLANTA, GA. 30302, SATURDAY, AUGUST 29, 1981
Psychiatrist Facing Trial
In Controller-Stress Suit
By Sam Hepkins
Constitution Staff Writer
A federal appellate court, in what is thought to be a
landmark decision, has ruled that a psychiatrist may be liable to
a third party for allegedly negligent diagnosis and certification
of his patients.
The case involves an insurance company which sued
psychiatrist Merton B. Berger and 12 air traffic controllers in
Atlanta, claiming that Berger had made fraudulent or negligent
diagnoses of the controllers relating to alleged job-related
anxiety and depressive neurosis.
U.S. District Judge Robert L. Vining Jr. earlier had issued
a summary judgment dismissing the negligence allegations in
the case, but he retained the fraud allegations.
The Sth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Vining’s
ruling, which now means that both the negligence and fraud
allegations will have to be decided by a trial jury.
The suit has been pending since the North American
Company for Life and Health Insurance first filed the action on
Jan. 25, 1977.
The Illinois-based insurance company is seeking judgments
of $562,025 against Berger and a total of $179,025 against the
12 air traffic controllers. Berger, a former Atlanta-area resident,
later moved to Del Mar, Calif.
The Sth Circuit decision notes that Berger, in his capacity
as psychiatric consultant to the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration, “diagnosed as toially disabled approximately 154 air
traffic controllers.”
2e
The basis for the diagnoses was often job-related anxiety
and depressive neurosis. A number of the air traffic controllers
held disability income insurance policies issued by the North
American company.
The court noted that North American had relied on
Berger's certification of the controllers’ alleged disability in
paying claims of the FAA employees.
“Because of the large number of claims,” the appellate
court said, “North American investigated Berger and concluded
that many of his diagnoses of total disability were incorrect. . . .
“It sued Berger to recover the disability benefits paid to the
air traffic controllers because of his allegedly fraudulent or
negligent diagnoses.”
The court further noted, in reversing Vining’s ruling, that
Berger had claimed the district judge rightly dismissed the
negligence count “because a doctor is not subject to malpractice
liability unless the injured party is or was the doctor’s patient.”
Matthew H. Patton of Atlanta, who represents North
American, said his firm and other law firms over the country
had researched the third-party negligence aspect of the case
and could not find a court ruling similar to the Sth Circuit’s.
The $562,025 judgment sought against Berger includes the
$179,025 disability payments paid to the 12 other defendants
and $383,000 paid to 17 other air traffic controllers who are not
named as defendants.
The Sth Circuit h~s denied Berger’s motion for a rehearing
on its reversal decision.
Patton said that since the suit was first file¢ more than four
years ago, the insurance company and 11 of the 12 air traffic
controllers have reached out-of-court settlements.
The original suit contends that Berger used inadequate
procedures to certify the alleged neuroses, supposedly caused
by the pressures on the air traffic controllers as they work in
radar rooms to monitor the incoming and outgoing airline
passenger planes to prevent them from colliding.
{ Office - Supreme Cor
¥ FILED
¢ NOW 6 oH
ALEXANDER \. Slevas.
CLEP:
NO. 81-640
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1981
MERTON B. BERGER, M.D.,
Petitioner,
vs.
NORTH AMERICAN COMPANY FOR
LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE,
Respondent.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit,
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
Matthew H. Patton
Kilpatrick & Cody
3100 Equitable Building
100 Peachtree Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30043
(404) 572-6500
Attorney for Respondent
(i)
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
The questions presented by the Petition are more properly
stated as follows:
1. Should the Supreme Court grant certiorari to review a
court of appeals’ decision, issued in a purely diversity action, in-
terpreting and applying Georgia law with regard to a negligence
claim, the resolution of which was dependent upon the unusual
facts alleged in the complaint?
2. Where neither party sought an order certifying the ques-
tions presented to the Georgia Supreme Court, did the court of
appeals abuse its discretion in deciding the issue presented? Did
the court of appeals err in refusing to grant petitioner's motion
to certify the questions presented to the Georgia Supreme
Court, when the motion was not filed until thirteen days after
the court of appeals had entered its decision?
(ii)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
SPOT PUMP U UIE oo oc vcccwccepecccccecicuss (i)
an svc ce cenevesgeneeosusieuned (ii)
ey I oe sc de Kcvdesccusopecesnse (iii)
ee ei id ck wy' web sekensowndeue eat 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .. 2... ccc ccccccccccees 2
cv wecntaneeases¥uves’ 3
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION ....... 4
I. NO SPECIAL AND IMPORTANT
REASONS WARRANT REVIEW
GPS WOES Ge CU UAAINS oc ccc cc ccecesccess A
Il. THE DECISION BELOW IS NOT
IN CONFLICT WITH ANY
PT PCC U UE? PU UIT occ cccccccccccsccccccess 5
Ill. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT DID NOT
ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
DECIDING THE ISSUES
PRESENTED RATHER THAN
CERTIFYING THE MATTER TO
THE GEORGIA SUPREME COURT............. 6
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS GAVE
FULL CONSIDERATION TO THE
ISSUES PRESENTED AND
REACHED THE CORRECT
ET SoG aehauvebeuveedd nussteckuecseeses 7
ET tec divudaéditetsgepesévecenveeeserenes 9
(iii)
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
BARNES. ATLANTAG® Paci
Lire INS CO of AMERICA,
ee Ee PEPE, DOVER cod sccccevscvcvcces
Bonin vy. Gitt, 216 Ga. 67,
See EP CED cbcvvessvedeccencceccesss
BuTNER». UNITED STATES, 440
RS ee
GLANZER v. SHEPARD, 233 N.Y. 236,
Es ctodénedeek euspecvics veces
LEHMAN BROTHERS vy SCHEIN, 416
Er dekedad cage +ccéabesnesesensees
MCFARLING vy. AZAR, 519 F.2d
1075 (Sth Cir. 1075 (Sth Cir. 1976)... 0.0...
Others
C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,
SP os ccuabdudeewicaeccsevessa
RESTATEMENT OF TorTs (Second) §552 ..........
Rule 36, Supreme Court of Georgia.............
No. 81-640
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1981
MERTON B. BERGER, M.D..,
Petitioner,
vs.
NORTH AMERICAN COMPANY FOR
LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE,
Respondent.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
Respondent, North American Company for Life and
Health Insurance, respectfully requests that this Court deny the
Petition for Writ of Certiorari to review the decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
OPINIONS BELOW
The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, rendered June 18, 1981, is now published at 648
F.2d 305 (1981).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On January 15, 1977, respondent, North American Com-
pany for Life and Health Insurance (“North American”), filed a
complaint for damages in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Georgia against petitioner, Merton B.
Berger (‘Berger’). Also named as defendants were twelve air
traffic controllers to whom North American had paid disability
insurance benefits in reliance upon certifications of their dis-
ability made to North American by Berger. The complaint al-
leged, among other things, that Berger had either negligently or
fraudulently certified to North American the alleged disability
of the twelve defendant air traffic controllers as well as seven-
teen other air traffic controllers who held disability income
policies issued by North American.
The only claims still pending in the case are North
American’s claim against one of the air traffic controllers (and
his counterclaim against North American) and North
American’s claim against Berger. This appeal concerns only the
latter and arises from the Fifth Circuit's reversal of summary
judgment entered against North American with respect to its
negligence claim against Berger.
The facts before the court below may be briefly sum-
marized as follows. Berger is a practicing psychiatrist. From
January 1, 1968, until he quit his psychiatric practice in Atlanta
in December 1977, Berger by his own admission examined and
2
diagnosed as totally disabled 154 air traffic controllers
employed by the Federal Aviation Administration. Over two
thirds of these diagnoses were made during the years 1974, 1975,
and 1976 and in most cases, Berger found the disability to be
permanent and job related.
Among the air traffic controllers whom Berger diagnosed
as being totally disabled were the other twelve defendants and
certain other air traffic controllers, all of whom held disability
income policies issued by North American and most of whom
held disability income and credit disability policies with other
companies. Berger’s determination of total disability was
typically based upon a finding of a job-related anxiety and
depressive neurosis.
After his initial examination and periodically thereafter,
Berger certified to North American that the particular air traffic
controller was totally disabled. In each instance the certification
by Berger was made solely to North American, was made on
North American's claim forms, was made for the purpose of in-
ducing North American to pay the monthly disability benefit to
the air traffic controller, and was made with the knowledge that
North American would rely thereon in paying the claim.
Relying upon Berger’s certification of their disability,
North American paid the claims of various air traffic control-
lers. When the incidence of the claims for air traffic controllers
became unusually high, North American conducted an in-
vestigation which led North American to conclude that many of
the air traffic controllers whom Berger had certified as totally
disabled had, in fact, not been disabled. Thereupon, the present
action was instituted seeking to recover from Berger, among
other things, the disability benefits paid to the air traffic con-
trollers on the basis of his negligent or fraudulent certification.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The decision below involves an issue of state tort law and is
limited to the peculiar facts of this case. Thus, the case has
limited precedential value and there are no other special and im-
3
portant reasons that would merit this Court's review of the
court of appeals’ decision. Nor is the decision in conflict with
any other reported decision.
Furthermore, the court of appeals did not err, as petitioner
contends, in deciding the issues itself instead of certifying the
matter to the Georgia Supreme Court. Whether to certify a mat-
ter depends upon the facts and circumstances of the particular
case and that decision is committed to the sound discretion of
the court of appeals. Moreover, petitioner should not be heard
to complain since he did not move, until after entry of the court
of appeals’ decision, for certification to the Georgia Supreme
Court.
Finally, certiorari should not be granted because the deci-
sion below is both correct and fair. It is consistent with Georgia
legal precedent and accords with decisions in numerous cases in
other states as well as Section 552 of the RESTATEMENT
OFTORTS (Second).
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION
I.
NO SPECIAL AND IMPORTANT REASONS
WARRANT REVIEW ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI.
In his petition Berger argues that this case presents “ta ques-
tion of paramount and overriding importance to the nation as a
whole.” (Petition, at 12). That is a gross exaggeration, to say the
least. The decision below involved an extremely narrow issue of
Georgia tort law, i.e., whether a person practicing a profession,
in this case psychiatry, can be held liable to an insurance com-
pany to whom the psychiatrist made specific certifications with
knowledge that the insurance company would rely thereon. The
Fifth Circuit, in resolving that issue, limited its holding to the
specific facts of the dispute and, thus, the precedential
significance of the decision is quite limited.
However, even if the court of appeals’ decision is construed
4
as broadly as Berger suggests, it would not merit certiorari
review. The 1980 revision of the Supreme Court Rules deleted
allegedly erroneous decisions of state law by a court of appeals
from its list of considerations for granting a writ of certiorari.
Thus rarely, if ever, would interpretations of state law, even if
arguably erroneous, be a sufficient ground for the grant of a
writ. This is especially true where the decision below was limited
to the peculiar facts of the controversy.
THE DECISION BELOW IS NOT IN CONFLICT
WITH ANY REPORTED DECISIONS
Petitioner’s first stated ground for granting the writ is “that
the decision of the Fifth Circuit herein is in conflict with both
prior Fifth Circuit precedent and earlier decisions of the federal
courts.” (Petition, at 7, 8.) That is not the case and, frankly, it is
difficult to understand petitioner’s reasoning.
As evidence of the alleged “conflict,” petitioner cites
MCFARLING V. AZAR, 519 F.2d 1075 (Sth Cir. 1975). Aside from
the obvious distinctions between that case and the case sub
judice,' Berger’s argument misconceives the essential nature of
the federal system, a necessary consequence of which is that the
statutes and decisions of one state will often conflict with that of
another. Thus even if the law of Florida did conflict with the
law of Georgia, that would not constitute, in any sense, a
“conflict” meriting certiorari review.
'McFarling v. Azar did not involve a physician’s liability; it involved the issue
of his insurer’s liability under a professional liability policy covering ‘‘malprac-
tice’ and “‘error and mistake”’ where there was fraud on the part of the physi-
cian. The result depended, in part, on Florida’s narrow interpretation of
malpractice which, by definition in Florida, is an injury to a patient in the
context of a physician-patient relationship. North American has never claimed
to fall within the Florida definition of ‘‘malpractice.’’ Its claim, under Georgia
law, is for negligent certification.
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN DECIDING THE ISSUES
PRESENTED RATHER THAN CERTIFYING
THE MATTER TO THE GEORGIA
SUPREME COURT
Berger also contends that the petition “should be granted
because the Fifth Circuit failed to certify the within matter to
the Supreme Court of Georgia.” (Petition, at 9.)
It is well established that the decision of whether to use the
certification procedure “rests in the sound discretion of the
federal court.” LEHMAN BROTHERS V. SCHEIN, 416 U.S. 386,
391 (1974). There is no evidence that the Fifth Circuit abused its
discretion in electing to hear and decide the issues presented.
Whether an issue is appropriate for certification depends
upon its facts and circumstances. In this case there are several
reasons why the Fifth Circuit may have decided that certifica-
tion would not have been appropriate. In the first place, cer-
tification is only authorized where there is no controlling prece-
dent. See Rule 36, Supreme Court of Georgia. For reasons
stated in the court of appeals’ opinion and in Section IV, infra,
at 7, 8, there was, in this case, controlling Georgia precedent.
Second, certification is generally most appropriate where there
are clean-cut issues of law. This case, with its peculiar facts,
would have presented a difficult problem in formulating the is-
sues to be certified. This is particularly true since the case was
on appeal from grant of summary judgment, with many facts
not yet determined.
Berger’s argument regarding certification, taken to its
logical conclusion, would require that the Court adopt a rule
making certification mandatory whenever a court of appeals is
faced with a difficult question of state law. Apart from the prac-
tical impossibility of applying such a rule (at what point does a
question become too difficult for the federal courts?), this Court
has already stated that there is no obligation on the part of the
courts of appeals to resort to certification.
6
Furthermore, while certification is a useful tool in select
cases, it should not be used as a means of avoiding every dif-
ficult issue of state law. As former Chief Judge Brown, a strong
proponent of certification, said: “We use much judgment,
restraint and discretion in certifying. We do not abdicate.“
BARNES V. ATLANTA & PACIFIC LIFE INS. CO. OF AMERICA, 514
F.2d 704, 705 (5 th Cir. 1975). The judges of the Fifth Circuit
have had by far the most experience with certification, see C.
Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, §4248, p. 530 (1978), and their decision in this case
should be respected.
This is especially so where, as here, Berger made no effort
to seek certification until after the Fifth Circuit had entered its
decision. Had Berger felt that certification was appropriate, he
should have moved the Fifth Circuit to certify the question
before that court had spent considerable time researching, hear-
ing, and deciding the issues. Having failed to do so, Berger
should not now be hea’ to complain that the court of appeals
proceeded to decide the issues presented to it.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GAVE FULL
CONSIDERATION TO THE ISSUES
PRESENTED AND REACHED THE
CORRECT DECISION
The petition presents no significant new authorities or
arguments on the issues decided by the Fifth Circuit. Inasmuch
as this Court has consistently recognized that circuit courts have
more expertise thas. the Court in applying the laws of the state
within their respective circuits, BuTNER V. UNITED STATES, 440
U.S. 48 (1979), respondent respectfully urges that the Court
defer to the decision of the court of appeals.
However, should the Court review the merits of the case,
respondent respectfully submits that it will conclude that the
decision below is correct. It is correct, first, because the Georgia
Supreme Court has held that a duty, independent of privity, is
7
imposed upon “persons performing architectural, engineering,
and other professional skilled services... .” Bopin v Git1, 216
Ga. 467, 117 S.E.2d 325 (1960). Although not specificalls
named, physicians are clearly among the persons performing
such “other professional and skilled services” and, therefore,
Berger owed a duty to North American even if privity was lack-
ing.
The decision below is correct for the additional reason that
the relationship between Berger and North American, under the
peculiar facts, is so close to privity, if not privity itself, as to give
rise to a legal duty. Writing for the majority, Judge Lynne
paraphrased Judge Cardozo’s opinion in GLANZER V
SHEPARD, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922) — the famous “-
bean weigher” case that is the seminal decision on the tort law
negligent misrepresentation. Judge Lynne stated:
In the instant case, Berger, using the plaintiff's forms, cer-
tified disability directly to the insurance company. The
relationship approaches that of privity. At the very least,
the relationship was so close that Berger knew exactly who
would rely on his certification and for what purpose.
Berger was under a duty to exercise reasonable care in per-
forming medical services, making diagnoses, and transmit-
ting them to appellant.
648 F.2d. at 308
The decision below is not only correct but fair. It accords
with Section 552 of the ResTaTEMENT OF TorTS (Second)
(titled “Information negligently supplied for the guidance of
others’’), and numerous other decisions involving negligent mis-
representation. The decision also accords with the common
sense of the matter. Berger had no obligation to make any cer-
tification to North American but once he elected to do so,
knowing that North American would rely thereon, Berger was
obliged to act with reasonable care. As Judge Cardozo said in
GLANZER V. SHEPARD, supra, “it is ancient learning that one
who assumes to act, even through gratuitously, may thereby
become subject to the duty of acting carefully, if he acts at all.”
135 N.E at 276.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the petition for writ of certiorari should
be denied.
Respectfully submitted
Matthew H. Patton
Kilpatrick & Cody
3100 Equitable Building
100 Peachtree Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
(404) 572-6500
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.