Record and brief — Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization v. United States

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FILED

81-542 SEP 16 1961

No ALEX° ND

————_ ———___—__———_

RL. STEVAS.,

FRK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1981

PROFESSIONAL AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS

ORGANIZATION, et al.,

Petitioners,

Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

RICHARD J. LEIGHTON*

GARY ETHAN KLEIN

SCOTT D. ANDERSEN

NEAL GOLDFARB

LEIGHTON CONKLIN LEMOV

JACOBS AND BUCKLEY

2033 M. Street, N.W., Suite 800

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 785-4800

HARVEY NATHAN

100 North LaSalle Street

Suite 1407

Chicago, "Illinois 60602

(312) 782-0198

Attorneys for Petitioners

*Counsel of Record

THE CASILLAS PRESS. (NC.-1717 K Street N W.-Waestengton. O. C.-223-1220

(i)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Whether jurisdiction to enjoin strike activity in the

federal sector is vested exclusively in the Federal

Labor Relations Authority by Title VII of the Civil

Service Reform Act of 1978.

«

2. Whether injunctive relief against federal sector strike

activity is available under 5 U.S.C. § 7311.*

*The parties to the proceeding in the Seventh Circuit below were as

follows: The United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellant; The Pro-

fessional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO); PATCO

O’Hare Local #316 (PATCO O'Hare); the officers, agents, directors,

managers, servants and members of both PATCO and PATCO

O’Hare; John M. Paolino; Richard L. Scholz; Tom Brockett; John

Doe and Richard Roe, Defendants-Appellees.

All Defendants-Appellees join in this petition.

(iii)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Questions Presented ..............++- PO OTE OTE TO ‘a

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ee oe se ed Le kash ehneen a

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aed Cn eueeseceeneneee a

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I. The Decision Below Raises Important Ques-

tions Concerning the Proper Remedies for

EE 6 ccs nkdeneneeisaeesnnsedcees 5

Il. The Decision Below Casts Doubt on the Scope

of FLRA Exclusive Jurisdiction Over Unfair

Labor Practices Other Than Strikes ................. 10

Ill. The Decision Below Conflicts in Principle With

an Earlier Decision of the Second Circuit ........... il

(iv)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page

Air Transport Association v. PATCO,

313 F.Supp. 181 (E.D.N.Y.) rev'd in part sub nom.

United States v. PATCO, 438 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1970),

I Se PFE ccc ccnccssesccccccccsccess 3,7

Air Transport Association v. PATCO,

No. 81-7447 (2d Cir., filed June 19, 1981) ............060045. &

Amalgamated Association of Street, Electrical Railway

and Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S.

DT cb gabe a teecabesuandssekessékndesaeesene seeds .3

Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers v. J.P. Stevens

& Co., 475 F.Supp. 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), vacated as

A PS TEED occ cccccccceesecsecesevccces 12

Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc.,

EE DEE av cccccdecesoosncecéicosccencese ~

Buckley v. American Federation of Television and Radio

Artists, 496 F.2d 305 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419

WB. CETD CIID co cccccccccccccccccccctcccvcccccces 11, 12, 13

Clark v. Mark,

No. 79-CV-777 (N.D.N.Y. August 27, 1980) ............ 7, 10, 13

International Brotherhood of Boilermakers v. Hardeman,

NEP TPIVTTTT TTTTT TTT TTT Tee 12

Iowa Beef Processors v. Gorman,

476 F.Supp. 1382 (N.D. Iowa 1979) ..........0ccee cece eeeee 12

Marriott Corp. v. Great America Service Trades Council,

I, MEE 6c cn ccuereeeecseuanentboestwers 12

National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 1263

v. Commandant, Defense Language Institute, 493 F.Supp.

EE do dnd on 4d06 nedbecneen beeeses 7,10,13

(v)

In re Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization

Litigation, MDL Docket No. 480 (J.P.M.L., filed

SUE EEEED ceucvddkawbecaucovérceceden hiiviienewcudus sa

San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,

ER a 3, 12,13

Smith v. Evening News Association,

i es caves den ebutedesesedeue 12

TVA v. Local 110, Sheet Metal Workers,

ee CT CPG CUED Sovcccescccucssescccess 3, 7-8

United States v. Branch 60, National Association of

Letter Carriers, 312 F.Supp. 619 (D.Conn. 1970) .............. 3

United States v. PATCO,

504 F.Supp. 432, supplemented, 504 F.Supp. 442

(N.D. Ill. 1980), rev'd, No. 80-2854 (7th Cir.

DT «cl ducileie gegunecoueeeeedseeeesuckeued 1,3,4

United States v. PATCO,

No. 80-2854 (7th Cir. June 18, 1981) .................. 1,4, 5,11

United States v. United Mine Workers,

iia cei ce neeeedd (esmasaweeds o%e 5,6

Statutes

Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L.

No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 ......... passim

EE i ie nd oe inne bceubeweeeeoee 10

i ae cee suipeebebenestenat 10

Ne ide cea eadeneeboueseent 3

SER SSE I ee ee 3,4

Nee a ale li i oe ae 2, 4,6

a ee se luee ieee 12

SPUR OUOE ovccvesedccescesveccccescesencesecesscoens 12

(vi)

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sO TBE 60 ct cnedeusdéésesseudseseeneeeeeeee 2,4

SPT. © ED 0 0 cd cccencesdeciséskdeuessesenseeeeee 2

pK rere 1906-66400 eseebeneeeaeennene 2,3

Norris-La Guardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101, ef seg. ............. $,6,7

National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, ef seg. .........

pF re rer eo heme Se -

PST eee a

Ps OD 0 6000 0svesneestasenesneeneeeeee a

Se UNG 066 6600060060seeeenscessennnenneen 2

EE re 2,11

Ss © BREED ccccvesdececkésiddcuseneueneeneneeal 2

Taft-Hartley Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947)

POR Te eee 12

§ 305, current version codified at 5 U.S.C. § 7311 ........... 6

Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, § 102,

SPO OEE ccccccessestésececesesassenee 12

pT errr ee ee .9

Third Urgent Deficiency Appropriations Act of

1946, Pub.L. No. 79-419, § 201, 60 Stat.

BED, FEOED 0 cccccccccvecessvcconcocsevescesessecssseuues .6

Miscellaneous

“NTEU Plans to Strike, Backs PATCO Step,” Federal

Times, September 7, 1981, at 4co0l.3 ........ cece cece eeccees )

“Union Recognition in Federal Government, 1980,”

Gov't. Employee Rel. Rep. (BNA)

DsND FED VOM EE. cc ccccscdcccccecceceseseeteann 6

“Work Stoppages in Government, 1979,” Gov't.

Employee Rel. Rep. (BNA) Reference File

ee

(vii)

“NTEU Convention Delegates Vote Themselves Closer to

Militancy,” Gov't. Employee Rel. Rep. (BNA)

No. 925, at $-6 (August 17, 1981) ...........ceceeceeeeeeeees

“Postal Service and APWU, NALC Agree After Marathon

Sessions,” Gov't. Employee Rel. Rep. (BNA)

Be ee Ae I le CUED oc cccccccccccccccccccoccceeseoese

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1981

PROFESSIONAL AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS

ORGANIZATION, (PATCO), e¢ ai.,

Petitioners,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

The petitioners Professional Air Traffic Controllers

Organization, ef a/., respectfully pray that a writ of cer-

tiorari issue to review the judgment and opinion of the

United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

entered in this proceeding on June 18, 1981.

OPINIONS BELOW

fhe opinions of the Court of Appeals, reported at

107 LRRM 3057, and of the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, reported at 504

F.Supp. 432, supplemental opinion, 504 F.Supp. 442, are

reproduced in the Appendix hereto.

2

JURISDICTION

The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh

Circuit was entered on June 18, 1981, and this petition for

certiorari was filed within 90 days of that date. This

Court’s jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTES INVOLVED

The following statutes are involved in this case: Title

VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.

95-454, Stat. 1111, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135; 5 U.S.C.

§ 7311; 18 U.S.C. § 2; 18 U.S.C. § 1918; 28 U.S.C.

§ 1345; and 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 153(a), (d), 157, 160(a)-(j).

The text of these provisions is reproduced in the Appendix

hereto.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization

(“PATCO”) is the labor organization recognized as the ex-

clusive bargaining agent for the nation’s air traffic con-

troilers, who are employees of the Federal Aviation Ad-

ministration (“FAA”), within the Department of

Transportation. PATCO Local No. 316 is one of

PATCO’s local affiliates, representing controllers in the

FAA’s Chicago O’Hare facilities. The individual peti-

tioners are officers of PATCO or of Local No. 316.

On August 18, 1980, the respondent United States sued

petitioners in the United States District Court for the Nor-

thern District of Illinois. The complaint alleged that the in-

dividual petitioners, aided and abetted by each other, and

PATCO and local No. 316, aided and abetted by the in-

dividual petitioners, had engaged in strike activity against

the United States, and that such activity was illegal under 5

U.S.C. § 7311. Jurisdiction was alleged to exist under 28

3

U.S.C. § 1345. A temporary restraining order was issued

and subsequently extended by consent until January 20,

1981.

On December 15, 1980, the district court, Milton I.

Shadur, J., dismissed the complaint for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction, holding that, under Title VII of the

Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135,

jurisdiction to adjudicate and enjoin federal sector labor

union strike activity lies exclusively in the Federal Labor

Relations Authority (“FLRA”). The court noted that Con-

gress intentionally modelled the FLRA after the National

Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”). The court reasoned,

therefore, that, like the NLRB, the FLRA was intended to

have exclusive jurisdiction over conduct constituting an

ur air labor practice. (The court cited, inter alia, San

D.ego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236,

248 (1959), and Amalgamated Association of Street Elec-

trical Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403

U.S. 274, 292 (1971).) The court concluded that, because it

is an unfair labor practice under Title VII for a labor

union to enage in strike activity, 5 U.S.C. § 7116(b)(7), the

federal courts have no subject matter jurisdiction over

such activity.' The court acknowledged that injunctions

against federal labor union strike activity had been issued

on three reported occasions before 1978,? but it held that

these decisions did not survive the enactment in that year

of the Civil Service Reform Act.

'The court recognized, however, that, under the specific provisions

of 5 U.S.C. § 7123(d), the federal district courts do have jurisdiction

to enjoin such conduct temporarily in an action brough by the FLRA,

pending administrative adjudication of the dispute.

?Air Transport Ass'n v. PATCO, 313 F.Supp. 181 (E.D. N.Y.),

rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. United States v. PATCO, 438

F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 915 (1971); United

States v. Branch 60, National Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 312 F.Supp.

619 (D. Conn. 1970); TVA v. Local 110, Sheet Metal Workers Inter-

nationel Ass'n, 233 F.Supp. 997 (W.D. Ky. 1962).

4

On December 19, 1980, the district court issued a sup-

plemental opinion clarifying that the complaint was

dismissed as to the individual defendants as well as to the

labor organization defendants. The court explained that,

in its view, the FLRA’s exclusive jurisdiction encompassed

not only alleged strike activity by federal sector labor

unions, but also such activity by the officers of such

unions on behalf of the unions. It also stated that, because

violation of 5 U.S.C. § 7311 constitutes a crime, 18

U.S.C. § 1918, the equitable doctrine that the commission

of a crime will not be enjoined barred injunctive relief

against violation of § 7311.

The United States appealed, and on June 18, 1981, the

United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

reversed. The Seventh Circuit held that, contrary to the

district court’s conclusion, the enactment of Title VII had

no effect on the preexisting case law under which federal

sector labor union strike activity had been enjoined. The

court held that the FLRA’s jurisdiction over federal sector

labor union strike activity was not exclusive, because such

activity not only constitutes an unfair labor practice, but is

independently illegal under a separate federal statute, 5

U.S.C. § 7311.

Additionally, the Seventh Circuit held that, as a matter

of policy, the United States should not be required to de-

pend only on the procedures of 5 U.S.C. § 7123(d), under

which the FLRA may obtain temporary injunctive relief

against federal sector labor union strike activity. Rather,

the court believed that the United States should be allowed

to seek an injunction against such strike activity directly,

through a suit initiated and prosecuted by the Department

of Justice.

Finally, the court held that, under 5 U.S.C. § 7311,

5

striking federal workers may be enjoined and ordered

back to work, even though that provision prohibits

anyone who has participated in a strike against the United

States from holding a federal position, and despite the

general principle that crimes will not be enjoined.

On remand from the Court of Appeals, further pro-

ceedings in the district court have been adjourned until

after oral argument in Air Transport Association v. PAT-

CO, No. 81-7447 (2d Cir., filed June 19, 1981), a case in-

volving a similar question of federal court jurisdiction

over federal sector labor union strike activity.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT?

I. THE DECISION BELOW RAISES IMPOR-

TANT QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE

PROPER REMEDIES FOR FEDERAL SEC-

TOR STRIKES

This Court held in 1947 that the restrictions of the

Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101, et seq., on labor

injunctions do not apply to strikes by federal workers.

United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258

’Petitioner PATCO is party to a pending appeal in the United States

Court of Appeals for '* 2 Second Circuit raising an issue similar to the

question involved her . Air Transport Association v. PATCO, No.

81-7447 (2d Cir., filed June 19, 19814. That case also deals with

whether the FLRA’s jurisdiction over federal sector labor union strike

activity is exclusive. (The plaintiffs in that case are private parties,

however, not the United States.)

Oral argument in the Air Transport Association case has been ten-

tatively scheduled for the week of September 21, 1981. If the Second

Circuit rules in favor of PATCO on that issue, a conflict will have

arisen between that decision and the instant decision of the Seventh

Circuit. Petitioners therefore respectfully urge that this Court net act

on this petition until the Second Circuit decides PATCO’s appeal, in

order that this Court have the benefit of the Second Circuii’s opinion

in deciding whether to grant certiorari in the instant case.

6

(1947). In fact, federal sector employment represents

perhaps the broadest exception to the Norris-LaGuardia

Act. Yet this Court has had no occasion since 1947 to con-

sider what factors properly bear on the issuance of federal

sector labor injunctions.

At the time that the United Mine Workers case was

decided, there was no generally applicable statute dealing

specifically with federal sector strikes.‘ Since that time,

union representation in the federal sector has grown enor-

mously,* and two statutes relating expressly to federal sec-

tor strikes have been enacted. The first statute, now

codified at 5 U.S.C. § 7311, applies to individual federal

employees. It provides, in pertinent part, that “[aJn in-

dividual may not accept or hold a position in the Govern-

ment of the United States... if he . . . participates in a

strike... against the Government of the United

States . . .” The second statute, Title VII of the Civil Ser-

vice Reform Act of 1978 (“Title VII"), 5 U.S.C.

§§ 7101-7135, is directed toward federal sector labor

organizations, rather than toward individual federal

employees. It established a comprehensive administrative

scheme to regulate federal sector labor-management rela-

tions, including strikes.

‘The Third Urgent Deficiency Appropriations Act of 1946, Pub.L.

No. 79-419, § 201, 60 Stat. 262, 268-69, dealt with federal sector

strikes, but that provision was limited in application to employees

paid from funds appropriated by the Act.

The first generally applicable provision dealing with federal sector

strikes was enacted several months after the United Mine Workers

case was decided. Taft-Hartley Act, Pub.L. No. 80-101, § 305, 61

Stat. 136, 160 (June 23, 1947).

‘The percentage of federal employees covered by a negotiated

agreement has increased from 6% in 1964 to 57% in 1980. “Union

Fecognition in Federal Government, 1980,” Gov't Employee Rel.

Rep. (BNA) Reference File 71:201 ,222.

7

Each of these statutes calls into question the continued

availability of permanent injunctive relief against federal

sector strikes. Injunctive relief in the form of a back-to-

work order to individual striking employees is pro-

blematical in light of 5 U.S.C. § 7311’s unequivocal com-

mand that a striking federal employee “may not accept or

hold a position in the Government of the United

States. .. .” And Title VII raises serious questions as to

the jurisdiction of federal district courts over strike activi-

ty in the federal sector, because the statute established an

administrative agency (the FLRA) in which exclusive

jurisdiction over federal sector unfair labor practices is

vested.®

The Norris-LaGuardia Act represents a fundamental

policy determination that labor injunctions present issues

of unusual sensitivity. Although the Norris-LaGuardia

Act is not itself applicable to federal employees, labor in-

junctions in the federal sector possess much the same sen-

sitivity as do labor injunctions in the private sector. It is

thus especially inappropriate that issues having to do with

labor injunctions in the federal sector be allowed to re-

main unsettled. This case presents these issues squarely for

perhaps the first time.’

*The United States has successfully argued in two cases outside the

strike context that the FLRA has exclusive jurisdiction over unfair

labor practices. National Federation of Federal Employees, Local

1263 v. Commandant, Defense Language Institute, 493 F.Supp. 675

(N.D. Cal. 1980); Clark v. Mark, No. 79-CV-777 (N.D. N.Y. August

27, 1980).

’Preliminary injuctions against federal sector strikes were granted

in three reported cases prior to the enactment of Title VII, as mention-

ed supra. Air Transport Ass’n v. PATCO, 313 F.Supp. 181 (E.D.

N.Y.), rev'd in part on other grounds sub non. United States vy. PAT-

CO, 438 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 915 (1971);

United States v. Branch 60, Nat'l Assn’ of Letter Carriers, 312

F.Supp. 619 (D. Conn. 1970); TVA v. Local 110, Sheet Metal

The importance of resolving the issues this case poses is

not limited to the immediate outcome of this lawsuit.

There are matters of broader significance to PATCO and

to the United States Government at stake. PATCO is

alleged to have called, condoned, and participated in a na-

tionwide strike of air traffic controllers beginning on

August 3, 1981. The United States has brought approx-

imately 100 separate actions across the country against

PATCO, seeking to enjoin this alleged strike. Several ac-

tions have been filed by private parties. PATCO intends to

raise the issues involved here in each of these cases. It will

require an enormous expenditure of the resources of PAT-

CO, of the United States, and of the federal courts to

litigate these issues separately in dozens of identical ac-

tions in the district courts, and then by identical appeals in

each judicial circuit. The instant case provides this Court

the opportunity to give the lower courts authoritative

guidance, and thus to make extensive duplicative litigation

unnecessary.*®

Moreover, the significance of the instant case is not

limited to just the immediate parties. Other federal sector

labor unions have participated in strikes in the past, the il-

Workers International Ass’n, 233 F.Supp. 997 (W.D. Ky. 1962). In

some of these cases, the injunctions were entered pursuant to consent.

In none of the decisions is there any illuminating discus“on of

whether injunctive relief was properly available.

*PATCO has moved before the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict

Litigation to consolidate these actions for pretrial purposes. /n re

Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization Litigation, MDL

Docket No. 480 (J.P.M.L., filed Aug. 13, 1981). The United States

has opposed this motion. If the cases are not consolidated, they will

proceed separately through the district and circuit courts. If they are

consolidated, but the transferee court does not grant PATCO’s mo-

tion to dismiss or for summary judgment, the actions will be remand-

ed to the transferor courts for separate trial, judgment, and appeal.

9

legality of such strikes notwithstanding. According to

Bureau of Labor Statics figures, 22 work stoppages have

occurred within the federal labor force from 1962 through

1979.9 As recently as this past summer, several postal

workers unions, representing half a million federal

employees, threatened to engage in an illegal strike.'® Ad-

‘ditionally, the National Treasury Employees Union,

representing roughly 100,000 employees, is reportedly

planning for the possibility of a strike yet to come.'' The

“Work Stoppages in Government, i979,” Gov't Employee Rel.

Rep. (BNA) Reference File 71:1011, 1014. The specific figures are as

follows:

Number of Workers

Year Stoppages Involved

1962 5 4,200

1968 3 1,700

1969 2 600

1970 3 19>,800

1971 2 1,000

1973 1 500

1974 2 500

1976 1 fewer than 100

1977 2 400

1978 1 4,800

During the same period, there were thousands of work stonpages by

state and local public employees, id., even though such strikes are

generally illegal.

‘Postal Service and APWU, NALC Agree After Marathon Ses-

sions,” Gov't Employee Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 922 at 5 (July 27, 1981).

Postal workers are not covered by Title VII of the Civil Service

Reform Act. See 39 U.S.C. § 1209. They are, however, covered by 5

U.S.C. § 7311, which excludes from federal employment anybody

who strikes against the federal government. Thus, the example of the

postal workers unions is evidence that many federal workers are will-

ing to go on strike when collective bargaining fails.

''“NTEU Convention Delegates Vote Themselves Closer to Militan-

cy,” Gov't Employee Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 925 at 5-6 (Aug. 17, 1981);

“NTEU to Plan Strike, Backs PATCO Step,” Federal Times, Sept. 7,

1981, at 4 col. 3.

10

possibility of significant labor-management disputes in the

federal sector, including further strikes, is a real one, and

the issues involved here are thus of importance to the en-

tire federal workforce and to every Federal agency.

Il. THE DECISION BELOW CASTS DOUBT

ON THE SCOPE OF FLRA EXCLUSIVE

JURISDICTION OVER UNFAIR LABOR

PRACTICES OTHER THAN STRIKES

The government has argued successfully in cases not in-

volving strikes that the FLRA’s jurisdiction over conduct

arguably constituting an unfair labor practice is exclusive.

National Federation of Federal Employees Local 1263 v.

Commandant, Defense Language Institute, 493 F.Supp.

675 (N.D. Cal. 1980); Clark v. Mark, No. 79-CV-777

(N.D.N.Y. August 27, 1980). Thus, the position of the

United States seems to be that federal sector labor union

strike activity represents the sole exception to the general

rule of FLRA exclusive jurisdiction over unfair labor prac-

tices. It may be, however, that once an exception is created

for strike activity, similar exceptions will have to be

recognized for other unfair labor practices.

For example, in a suit by the government as manage-

ment to enjoin strike activity by a federal sector labor

union, the defense of “unclean hands” presumably will be

available to the union. Could the union therefore show

that the government was not entitled to equitable relief

because it had precipitated the strike by its unfair labor

practices? The union might argue, for example, that the

agency had refused to bargain with it in good faith, 5

U.S.C. § 7116(a)(5), or that it had interfered with

employees’ right to join or assist a labor organization, id.

§ 7116(a)(1). Generally, such contentions would be ex-

clusively within the jurisdiction of the FLRA. It might well

1

be held, however, that management having resorted

directly to the courts, the union should be entitled to de-

fend itself on an equal footing. In such a situation, the

federal court might exercise pendant jurisdiction over the

union’s unfair labor practice charge.

By recognizing one exception to the general rule of

FLRA exclusive jurisdiction, therefore, the Seventh Cir-

cuit in this case may well have thrown the door open to

further exceptions. If so, the consequence will be a major

change, if not disruption, of the administrative scheme

that Congress created when it passed Title VII. Thus, the

impact of this case is not limited to strike activity. Rather,

the question involved here affects the resolution of a wide

range of labor-relations issues in the federal sector.

Ill. THE DECISION BELOW CONFLICTS IN

PRINCIPLE WITH AN EARLIER DECI-

SION OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Another reason for granting certiorari in this case is that

the Court of Appeals’ decision below is inconsistent with

the decision of the Second Circuit in Buckley v. American

Federation of Television and Radio Artists, 496 F.2d 305

(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1093 (1974). In Buckley, a

case arising in the private sector, radio and television com-

mentator William F. Buckley and others contended that

their first amendment rights were violated by provisions in

the broadcasting stations’ collective bargaining agreements

requiring them to join the American Federation of Televi-

sion and Radio Artists and subject themselves to union

discipline. The Second Circuit held that, because this con-

tention arguably amounted to an allegation of an unfair

labor practice under the National Labor Relations Act 29

U.S.C § 158(a}(3), the district court had no jurisdiction

over the constitutional claim. The Court of Appeals relied

12

on the Garmon doctrine, under which conduct con-

Stituting or arguably constituting an unfair labor practice

is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. 496 F.2d

at 312-13 (citing San Diego Building Trades Council v.

Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959)).

The Buckley decision thus stands for the proposition

that the federal courts may not exercise jurisdiction over

matters otherwise within the exclusive jurisdiction of the

NLRB merely because the conduct in question is also

alleged to be illegal under an independent source of federal

law.'?

The Seventh Circuit held in the instant case, however,

that, assuming the Garmon doctrine to be generally ap-

plicable to federal sector labor-management relations, it

was nevertheless inapplicable to labor union strike activi-

ty. The court explained that “the work slowdown involved

in the instant case is not only an unfair labor practice but

'24ccord, lowa Beef Processors, Inc. v. Gorman, 476 F.Supp. 1382

(N.D. Iowa 1979) (conduct constituting unfair labor practice also con-

stituted violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) ); Amalgated Clothing and

Textile Workers v. J.P. Stevens & Co., (conduct constituting unfair

labor practice also constituted violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983), vacated

as moot, 638 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1980).

As far as we can determine, exceptions to the Garmon doctrine have

been recognized on the ground that the conduct in question was

covered by a federal statute other than the National Labor Relations

Act only where the other statute expressly provided for a judicial

remedy. E.g., International Brotherhood of Boilermakes v.

Hardeman, 401 U.S. 233 (1971) (Labor-Management Reporting and

Disclosure Act, § 102, 29 U.S.C. § 412); Smith v. Evening News

Ass’n., 371 U.S. 195 (1962) (Taft-Hartley Act, § 301, 29 U.S.C.

§ 185); Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 517 F.2d 976 (2d Cir.

1975) (antitrust laws, see 15 U.S.C. § 15); Marriott Corp. v. Great

America Services Trade Council, 552 F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 1977)

(trademarks laws, see 15 U.S.C. § 1114).

13

is also prohibited by a separate statute, 5 U.S.C. § 7311.”

App. 982. This view is entirely inconsistent with that

of the Second Circuit in Buckley, supra.

Moreover, since the Seventh Circuit’s decision necessari-

ly — if implicitly — represents a holding as to the scope of

the Garmon doctrine, its effects is not limited to federal

sector labor-management relations, but extends as well to

private sector labor-management relations under the Na-

tional Labor Relations Act. This is so because the inten-

tional analogy between the NLRB and the FLRA cannot

be a one-way street. Once it is accepted that the Garmon

doctrine applies to Title VII of the Civil Service Reform

Act,'? decisions under Title VII dealing with the doctrine

will also be relevant as precedent under the National

Labor Relations Act.

The inconsistency between the decisions of the Seventh

Circuit in the instant case and the Second Circuit in

Buckley thus casts uncertainty on the scope and effect of

the Garmon doctrine in the private sector. This Court

should resolve that uncertainty by granting certiorari in

this case.

'5As noted at note 6, supra, the United States has argued vigorously

— and successfully — that the Garmon doctrine does so apply. See

National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 1263 v. Comman-

dant, Defense Language Institute, 493 F.Supp. 675 (N.D. Cal. 1980);

Clark v. Mark, No. 79-CV-777 (N.D. N.Y. August 27, 1980).

14

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, this Court should grant a writ of

certiorari to review the judgment and opinion of the Court

of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,

RICHARD J. LEIGHTON*

GARY ETHAN KLEIN

SCOTT D. ANDERSEN

NEAL GOLDFARB

LEIGHTON CONKLIN LEMOV

JACOBS AND BUCKLEY

2033 M. Street, N.W., Suite 800

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 785-4800

HARVEY NATHAN

100 North LaSalle Street

Suite 1407

Chicago, Illinois 60602

(312) 782-0198

Attorneys for Petitioners

*Counsel of Record

Xxilpusdday

81 -5 42 FILED

SEP 16 1968

No.

IN THE CLERK

Supreme Court of the United States “——

October Term, 1981

PROFESSIONAL AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS

ORGANIZATION, et al.,

Petitioners,

Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

APPENDIX TO

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

RICHARD J. LEIGHTON*

GARY ETHAN KLEIN

SCOTT D. ANDERSEN

NEAL GOLDFARB

LEIGHTON CONKLIN LEMOV

JACOBS AND BUCKLEY

2033 M. Street, N.W., Suite 800

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 785-4800

HARVEY NATHAN

100 North LaSalle Street

Suite 1407

Chicago, illinois 60602

(312) 782-0198

Attorneys for Petitioners

*Counsel of Record

——

THE CASILLAS PRESS, INC.-1717 K Street N W.—Westungion, 0. C.~2273-1220

(i)

INDEX

Page

Appendix A — Statutes Involved ...............cc cece nceeees la

Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978,

Ne iti i dct vig dnemedusosaewenaet la

ie re ie eid sed cumseensneseseused’ Sla

To a ls Iu ia Sla

a a ee ea $2a

aa i 52a

29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 153(a), (d), 157, 160(a)-(j) ..............05. 53a

Appendix B — Opinion of the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

i a ie edad ue eeaneetseukeuane 64a

Appendix C — Supplemental Opinion of the United

States District Court for the Northern District of

I ee eT 84a

Appendix D -— Opinion of the Court of Appeals for

the Seventh Circuit, June 18, 1961 ......... cc ccc cece cccees 87a

Appendix E — Judgment of the Court of Appeals for

the Seventh Circuit, June 18, 1981... 2... cece ee 108a

Appendix F — Opinion of the United States District

Court for the Northern District of New York in

Clark v. Mark, No. 79-CV-777 (Aug. 27, 1980) ............. 110a

APPENDIX A

STATUTES INVOLVED

Civil Service Reform Act of 1978,

Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111

Title VII, U.S.C. §§ 7101 ef seq.:

SUBCHAPTER I — GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec.

7101. Findings and purpose.

7102. Employees’ rights.

7103 Definitions; application.

7104 Federal Labor Relations Authority.

7105 Powers and duties of the Authority.

7106 Management rights.

SUBCHAPTER II — RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF

AGENCIES AND LABOR ORGANIZATIONS

7111. Exclusive recognition of labor organizations.

7112 Determination of appropriate units for labor

organization representation.

7113 National consultation rights.

7114 Representation rights and duties.

7115 Allotments to representatives.

7116. Unfair labor practices.

7117. Duty to bargain in good faith; compelling need; du-

ty to consult.

7118 Prevention of unfair labor practices.

7119. Negotiation impasses; Federal Service Impasses

Panel.

7120. Standards of conduct for labor organizations.

2a

SUBCHAPTER III — GRIEVANCES, APPEALS,

7121.

AND REVIEW

Grievance procedures.

7122. Exceptions to arbitral awards.

7123.

Judicial review; enforcement.

SUBCHAPTER IV — ADMINISTRATIVE AND

7131.

7132.

7133.

7134.

7135

OTHER PROVISIONS

Official time.

Subpenas.

Compilation and publication of data.

Regulations.

Continuation of existing laws, recognitions,

agreements, and procedures.

SUBCHAPTER | — GENERAL PROVISICNS

§ 7101. Findings and purpose

(a) The Congress finds that —

(1) experience in both private and public employment

indicates that the statutory protection of the right of

employees to organize, bargain collectively, and par-

ticipate through labor organizations of their own choos-

ing in decisions which affect them —

(A) safeguards the public interest,

(B) contributes to the effective conduct of public

business, and

(C) facilitates and encourages the amicable set-

tlements of disputes between employees and their

employers involving conditions of employment; and

3a

(2) the public interest demands the highest standards

of empioyee performance and the continued develop-

ment and implementation of modern and progressive

work practices to facilitate and improve employee per-

formance and the efficient accomplishment of the

operations of the Government.

Therefore, labor organizations and collective bargaining

in the civil service are in the public interest.

(b) It is the purpose of this chapter to prescribe certain

rights and obligations of the employees of the Federal

Government and to establish procedures which are design-

ed to meet the special requirements and needs of the

Government. The provisions of this chapter should be in-

terpreted in a manner consistent with the requirement of

an effective and efficient Government. (Pub. L. 95-454,

Oct. 13, 1978, 92 Stat. 1192.)

§ 7102. Employees’ rights

Each employee shall have the right to form, join, or

assist any labor organization, or to refrain from any such

activity, freely and without fear of penalty or reprisal, and

each employee shall be protected in the exercise of such

right. Except as otherwise provided under this chapter,

such right includes the right —

(1) to act for a labor organization in the capacity of a

representative and the right, in that capacity, to present

the views of the labor organization to heads of agencies

and other officials of the executive branch of the

Government, the Congress, or other appropriate

authorities, and

(2) to engage in collective bargaining with respect to

conditions of employment through representative

4a

chosen by employees under this chapter.

(Pub. L. 95-454, Oct. 13, 1978, 92 Stat. 1192.)

§ 7103. Definitions; application

(a) For the purpose of this chapter —

(1) “person” means an individual, labor organiza-

tion, or agency;

(2) “employee” means an individual —

(A) employed in an agency; or

(B) whose employment in an agency has ceased

because of any unfair labor practice under section

7116 of this title and who has not obtained any other

regular and substantially equivalent employment, as

determined under regulations prescribed by the

Federal Labor Relations Authority; but does not in-

clude —

(i) an alien or noncitizen of the United States who

occupies a position outside the United States;

(ii) a member of the uniformed services;

(iii) a supervisor or a management official;

(iv) an officer or employee in the Foreign Service

of the United States employed in the Department of

State, the Agency for International Development, or

the International Communication Agency; or

(v) any person who participates in a strike in viola-

tion of section 7311 of this title;

(3) “agency” means an Executive agency (including a

nonappropriated fund instrumentality described in sec-

tion 2105(c) of this title and the Veterans’ Canteen Ser-

vice, Veterans’ Administration), the Library of Con-

Sa

gress, and the Government Printing Office, but does not

include —

(A) the General Accounting Office;

(B) the Federal Bureau of Investigation;

(C) the Central Intelligence Agency;

(D) the National Security Agency;

(E) the Tennessee Valley Authority;

(F) the Federal Labor Relations Authority; or

(G) the Federal Service Impasses Panel;

(4) “labor organization” means an organization com-

posed in whole or in part of employees, in which

employees participate and pay dues, and which has as a

purpose the dealing with an agency concerning

grievances and conditions of employment, but does not

include —

(A) an organization which, by its constitution,

bylaws, tacit agreement among its members, or other-

wise, denies membership because of race, color,

creed, national origin, sex, age, preferential or non-

preferential civil service status, political affiliation,

marital status, or handicapping condition:

(B) an organization which advocates the overthrow

of the constitutional form of government of the

United States;

(C) an organization sponsored by an agency; or

(D) an organization which participates in the con-

duct of a strike against the Government or any agency

thereof or imposes a duty or obligation to conduct,

assist, or participate in such a strike;

(5) “dues” means dues, fees, and assessments;

(6) “Authority” means the Federal Labor Relations

Authority described in section 7104(a) of this title;

6a

(7) “Panel” means the Federal Service Impasses Panel

described in section 7119(c) of this title;

(8) “collective bargaining agreement” means an

agreement entered into as a result of collective bargain-

ing pursuant to the provisions of this chapter;

(9) “grievance” means any complaint —

(A) by any employee concerning any matter

relating to the employment of the employee; ;

(B) by any labor organization concerning any mat-

ter relating to the employment of any employee; or

(C) by any employee, labor organization, or agen-

cy concerning —

(i) the effect or interpretation, or a claim of

breach, of a collective bargaining agreement; or

(ii) any claimed violation, misinterpretation, or

misapplication of any law, rule, or regulation af-

fecting conditions of employment;

(16) “supervisor” means an individual employed by

an agency having authority in the interest of the agency

to hire, direct, assign, promote, reward, transfer,

furlough, layoff, recall, suspend, discipline, or remove

employees, to adjust their grievances, or to effectively

recommend such action, if the exercise of the authority

is not merely routine or clerical in nature but requires

the consistent exercise of independent judgment, except

that, with respect to any unit which includes firefighters

or nurses, the term “supervisor” includes only those in-

dividuals who devote a preponderance of their employ-

ment time to exercising such authority;

(11) “management official” means an_ individual

employed by an agency in a position the duties and

7a

responsibilities of which require or authorize the in-

dividual to formulate, determine, or influence the

policies of the agency;

(12) “collective bargaining” means the performance

of the mutual obligation of the representative of an

agency and the exclusive representative of employees in

an appropriate unit in the agency to meet at reasonable

times and to consult and bargain in a good-faith effort

to reach agreement with respect to the conditions of

employment affecting such employees and to execute, if

requested by either party, a written document incor-

porating any collective bargaining agreement reached,

but the obligation referred to in this paragraph does not

compel either party to agree to a proposal or to make a

concession;

(13) “confidential employee” means an employee

who acts in a confidential capacity with respect to an in-

dividual who formulates or effectuates management

policies in the field of labor-management relations;

(14) “conditions of employment” means personnel

policies, practices, and matters, whether established by

rule, regulation, or otherwise, affecting working condi-

tions, except that such term does not include policies,

practices, and matters —

(A) relating to political activities prohibited under

subchapter III of chapter 73 of this title;

(B) relating to the classification of any position; or

(C) to the extent such matters are specifically pro-

vided for by Federal statute;

(15) “professional employee” means —

(A) an employee engaged in the performance of

work —

(i) requiring knowledge of an advanced type in a

field of science or learning customarily acquired by

a prolonged course of specialized intellectual in-

struction and study in an institution of higher

learning or a hospital (as distinguished from

knowledge acquired by a general academic educa-

tion, or from an apprenticeship, or from training in

the performance of routine mental, manual,

mechanical, or physical activities;

(ii) requiring the consistent exercise of discretion

and judgment in its performance;

(iii) which is predominantly intellectual and

varied in character (as distinguished from routine

mental, manual, mechanical, or physical work);

and

(iv) which is of such character that the output

produced or the result accomplished by such work

cannot be standardized in relation to a given period

of time; or

(B) an employee who has completed the courses of

specialized intellectual instruction and study describ-

ed in subparagraph (A)(i) of this paragraph and is

performing related work under appropriate direction

or guidance to qualify the employee as a professional

employee described in subparagraph (A) of this

paragraph;

(16) “exclusive representative” means any labor

organization which—

(A) is certified as the exclusive representative of

employees in an appropriate unit pursuant to section

7111 of this title; or

9a

(B) was recognized by an agency immediately

before the effective date of this chapter as the ex-

clusive representative of employees in an appropriate

unit —

(i) on the basis of an election, or

(ii) on any basis other than an election, and con-

tinues to be so recognized in accordance with the

provisions of this chapter;

(17) “firefighter” means any employee engaged in the

performance of work directly connected with the con-

trol and extinguishment of fires or the maintenance and

use of firefighting apparatus and equipment; and

(18) “United States” means the 50 States, the District

of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,

Guam, the Virgin Islands, the Trust Territory of the

Pacific Islands, and any territory or possession of the

United States.

(b)(1) The President may issue an order excluding any

agency or subdivision thereof from coverage under this

chapter if the President determines that —

(A) the agency or subdivision has as a primary

function intelligence, counterintelligence, in-

vestigative, or national security work, and

(B) the provisions of this chapter cannot be applied

to that agency or subdivision in a manner consistent

with national security requirements and considera-

tions.

(2) The President may issue an order suspending any

provision of this chapter with respect to any agency, in-

stallation, or activity located outside the 50 States and

the District of Columbia, if the President determines

10a

that the suspension is necessary in the interest of na-

tional security. (Pub. L. 95-454, Oct. 13, 1978, 92 Stat.

1192.)

§ 7104. Federa! Labor Relations Authority

(a) The Federal Labor Relations Authority is composed

of three members, not more than 2 of whom may be

adherents of the same political party. No member shall

engage in any other business or employment or hold

another office or position in the Government of the

United States except as otherwise provided by law.

(b) Members of the Authority shall be appointed by the

President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,

and may be removed by the President only upon notice

and hearing and only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or

malfeasance in office. The President shall designate one

member to serve as Chairman of the Authority.

(c)(1) One of the original members of the Authority

shall be appointed for a term of 1 year, one for a term of 3

years, and the Chairman for a term of 5 years. Thereafter,

each member shall be appointed for a term of 5 years.

(2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1) of this subsection,

the term of any raember shall not expire before the

earlier of —

(A) the date on which the member’s successor takes

office, or

(b) the last day of the Congress beginning after the

date on which the member’s term of office would (but

for this subparagraph) expire.

An individual chosen to fill a vacancy shall be appointed

for the unexpired term of the member replaced.

(d) A vacancy in the Authority shall not impair the

right of the remaining members to exercise all of the

powers of the Authority.

(e) The Authority shall make an annual report to the

President for transmittal to the Congress which shall in-

clude information as to the cases it has heard and the deci-

sions it has rendered.

(f)(1) The General Counsel of the Authority shall be ap-

pointed by the President, by and with the advice and con-

sent of the Senate, for a term of 5 years. The General

Counsel may be removed at any time by the President. The

General Counsel shall hold no other office or possition in

the Government of the United States except as provided by

law.

(2) The General Counsel may —

(A) investigate alleged unfair labor practices under

this chapter,

(B) file and prosecute complaints under this

chapter, and

(C) exercise such other powers of the Authority as

the Authority may prescribe.

(3) The General Counsel shall have direct authority

over, and responsibility for, all employees in the office

of General Counsel, including employees of the General

Counsel in the regional offices of the Authority. (Pub.

L. 95-454, Oct. 13, 1978, 92 Stat. 1196.)

§ 7105. Powers and duties of the Authority

(a1) The Authority shall provide leadership in

establishing policies and guidance relating to matters

under this chapter, and, except as otherwise provided,

shall be responsible for carrying out the purpose of this

chapter.

12a

(2) The Authority shall, to the extent provided in this

chapter and in accordance with regulations prescribed

by the Authority —

(A) determine the appropriateness of units for

labor organization representation under section 7112

of this title;

(B) supervise or conduct elections to determine

whether a labor organization has been selected as an

exclusive representative by a majority of the

employees in an appropriate unit and otherwise ad-

minister the provisions of section 7111 of this title

relating to the according of exclusive recognition to

labor organizations;

(C) prescribe criteria and resolve issues relating to

the granting of national consultation rights under sec-

tion 7113 of this title;

(D) prescribe criteria and resolve issues relating to

determining compelling need for agency rules or

regulations under section 7117(b) of this title;

(E) resolves issues relating to the duty to bargain in

good faith under section 7117(c) of this title;

(F) prescribe criteria relating to the granting of con-

sultation rights with respect to conditions of employment

under section 7117(d) of this title;

(G) conduct hearings and resolve complaints of

unfair labor practices under section 7118 of this title;

(H) resolve exceptions to arbitrator’s awards under

section 7122 of this title; and

(1) take such other actions as are necessary and ap-

propriate to effectively administer the provisions of

this chapter.

l3a

(b) The Authority shall adopt an official seal which

shall be judicially noticed.

(c) The principal office of the Authority shall be in or

about the District of Columbia, but the Authority may meet

and exercise any or all of its powers at any time or piace. Ex-

cept as otherwise expressly provided by law, the Authority

may, by one or more of its members or by such agents as it

may designate, make any appropriate inquiry necessary to

carry out its duties wherever persons subject to this

chapter are located. Any member who participates in the

inquiry shall not be disqualified from later participating in

a decision of the Authority in any case relating to the in-

quiry.

(d) The Authority shall appoint an Executive Director

and such regional directors, administrative law judges

under section 3105 of this title, and other individuals as it

may from time to time find necessary for the proper per-

formance of its functions. The Authority may delegate to

officers and employees appointed under this subsection

authority to perform such duties and make such expen-

ditures as may be necessary.

(e)(1) The Authority may delegate to any regional direc-

tor its authority under this chapter —

(A) to determine whether a group of employees is

an appropriate unit;

(B) to conduct investigations and to provide for

hearings;

(C) to determine whether a question of representa-

tion exists and to direct an election; and

(D) to supervise or conduct secret ballot elections

and certify the results thereof.

(2) The Authority may delegate to any administrative

l4a

law judge appointed under subsection (d) of this section

its authority under section 7118 of this title to determine

whether any person has engated in or is engaging in an

unfair labor practice.

(f) If the Authority delegates any authority to any

regional director or administrative law judge to take any

action pursuant to subsection (e) of this section, the

Authority may, upon application by any interested person

filed within 60 days after the date of the action, review

such action, but the review shall not, unless specifically

ordered by the Authority, operate as a stay of action. The

Authority may affirm, modify, or reverse any action

reviewed under this subsection. If the Authority does not

undertake to grant review of the action under this subsec-

tion within 60 days after the later of —

(1) the date of the action; or

(2) the date of the filing of anyapplication under this

subsection for review of the action; the action shall

become the action of the Authority at the end of such

60-day period.

(g) In order to carry out its functions under this

chapter, the Authority may —

(1) hold hearings;

(2) administer oaths, take the testimony or deposi-

tion of any person under oath and issue subpenas as

provided in section 7132 of this title; and

(3) may require an agency or a labor organization to

cease and desist from violations of this chapter and re-

quire it to take any remedial action it considers ap-

propriate to carry out the policies of this chapter.

(h) Except as provided in section 518 of title 28, relating

to litigation before the Supreme Court, attorneys

15a

designated by the Authority may appear for the Authority

and represent the Authority in any civil action brought in

connection with any function carried out by the Authority

pursuant to this title or as otherwise authorized by law.

(i) In the exercise of the functions of the Authority

under this title, the Authority may request from the Direc-

tor of the Office of Personnel Management an advisory

oMinion concerning the proper interpretation of rules,

regulations, or policy directives issued by the Office of

Personnel Management in connection with any matter

before the Authority. (Pub. L. 95-454, Oct. 13, 1978, 92

Stat. 1196.)

§ 7106. Management rights

(a) Subject to subsection (b) of this section, nothing in

this chapter shall affect the authority of any management

official of any agency —

(1) to determine the mission, budget, organization,

number of employees, and internal security practices of

the agency; and

(2) in accordance with applicable laws —

(A) to hire, assign, direct, layoff, and retain

employees in the agency, or to suspend, remove,

reduce in grade or pay, or take other disciplinary ac-

tion against such employees;

(B) to assign work, to make determinations with

respect to contracting out, and to determine the per-

sonnel by which agency operations shall be con-

ducted; —

(C) with respect to filling positions, to make selec-

tions for appointments from —

16a

(i) among properly ranked and certified can-

didates for promotion; or

(ii) any other appropriate source; and

(D) to take whatever actions may be necessary to

carry out the agency mission during emergencies.

(b) Nothing in this section shall preclude any agency

and any labor organization from negotiating —

(1) at the election of the agency, on the numbers,

types, and grades of employees or positions assigned to

any organizational subdivision, work project, or tour of

duty, or on the technology, methods, and means of per-

forming work;

(2) procedures which management officials of the

agency will observe in exercising any authority under

this section; or

(3) appropriate arrangements for employees adverse-

ly affected by the exercise of any authority under this

section by such management officials.

(Pub. L. 95-454, Oct. 13, 1978, 92 Stat. 1198.)

SUBCHAPTER II — RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF

AGENCIES AND LABOR ORGANIZATIONS

§ 7111. Exclusive recognition of labor organizations

(a) An agency shall accord exclusive recognition to a

labor organization if the organization has been selected as

the representative, in a secret ballot election, by a majority

of the employees in an appropriate unit who cast valid

ballots in the election.

(b) If a petition is filed with the Authority —

i7a

(1) by any person alleging —

(A) in the case of an appropriate unit for which

there is no exclusive representative, that 30 percent of

the employees in the appropriate unit wish to be

represented for the purpose of collective bargaining

by an exclusive representative, or

(B) in the case of an appropriate unit for which

there is an exclusive representative, that 30 percent of

the employees in the unit allege that the exclusive

representative is no longer the representative of the

majority of the employees in the unit; or

(2) by any person seeking clarification of, or an

amendment to, a certification then in effect or a matter

relating to representation;

the Authority shall investigate the petition, and if it has

reasonable cause to believe that a question of representa-

tion exists, it shall provide an opportunity fer a hearing

(for which a transcript shall be kept) after reasonable

notice. If the Authority finds on the record of the hearing

that a question of representation exists, the Authority

shall supervise or conduct an election on the question by

secret ballot and shall certify the results thereof. An elec-

tion under this subsection shall not be conducted in any

appropriate unit or in any subdivision thereof within

which, in the preceding 12 calendar months, a valid elec-

tion under this subsection has been heid.

(c) A labor organization which —

(1) has been designated by at least 10 percent of the

employees in the unit specified in any petition filed pur-

suant to subsection (b) of this section;

(2) has submitted a valid copy of a current or recently

expired collective bargaining agreement for the unit; or

(3) has submitted other evidence that it is the ex-

clusive representative of the employees involved;

may intervene with respect to a petition filed pursuant to

subsection (b) of this section and shall be placed on the

ballot of any election under such subsection (b) with

respect to the petition.

(d) The Authority shall determine who is eligible to vote

in any election under this section and shall establish rules

governing any such election, which shall include rules

allowing employees eligible to vote the opportunity to

choose —

(1) from labor organizations on the ballot, that labor

organization which the employees wish to have repre-

sent them; or

(2) not to be represented by a labor organization.

In any election in which no choice on the ballot receives a

majority of the votes cast, a runoff election shall be con-

ducted between the two choices receiving the highest

number of votes. A labor organization which receives the

majority of the votes cast in an election shall be certified

by the Authority as the exclusive representative.

(e) A labor organization seeking exclusive recognition

shall submit to the Authority and the agency involved a

roster of its officers and representatives, a copy of its con-

stitution and bylaws, and a statement of its objectives.

(f) Exclusive recognition shall not be accorded to a labor

organization —

(1) if the Authority determines that the labor organiza-

tion is subject to corrupt influences or influences oppos-

ed to democratic principles;

19a

(2) in the case of a petition filed pursuant to subsec-

tion (b)(1)A) of this section, if there is not credible

evidence that at least 30 percent of the employees in the

unit specified in the petition wish to be represented for

the purpose of collective bargaining by the labor

organization seeking exclusive recognition;

(3) if there is then in effect a lawful written collective

bargaining agreement between the agency involved and

an exclusive representative (other than the labor

organization seeking exclusive recognition) covering any

employees included in the unit specified in the petition,

unless —

(A) the collective bargaining agreement has been in

effect for more than 3 years, or

(B) the petition for exclusive recognition is filed

not more than 105 days and not less than 60 days

before the expiration date of the of the collective

bargaining agreement; or

(4) if the Authority has, within the previous 12

calendar months, conducted a secret ballot election for

the unit described in any petition under this section and

in such election a majority of the employees voting

chose a labor organization for certification as the unit’s

exclusive representative.

(g) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit

the waiving of hearings by stipulation for the purpose of a

consent election in conformity with regulations and rules

or decisions of the Authority. (Pub. L. 95-454, Oct. 13,

1978, 92 Stat. 1199.)

§ 7112. Determination of appropriate units for labor

organization representation

(a)(1) The Authority shall determine the ap-

propriateness of any unit. The Authority shall determine

20a

in each case whether, in order to ensure employees the

fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed under

this chapter, the appropriate unit should be established on

an agency, plant, installation, functional, or other basis

and shall determine any unit to be an appropriate unit only

if the determination will ensure a clear and identifiable

community of interest among the employees in the unit

and will promote effective dealings with, and efficiency of

the operations of, the agency involved.

(b) A unit shall not be determined to be appropriate

under this section solely on the basis of the extent to which

employees in the proposed unit have organized, nor shall a

unit be determined to be appropriate if it includes —

(1) except as provided under section 7125(a)(2) of this

title, any management official or supervisor;

(2) a conficential employee;

(3) an employee engaged in personnel work in other

than a purely clerical capacity;

(4) an employee engaged in administering the provi-

sions of this chapter;

(5) both professional employees and other

employees, unless a majority of the professional

employees vote for inclusion in the unit;

(6) any employee engaged in intelligence, counter-

intelligence, investigative, or security work which direct-

ly affects national security; or

(7) any employee primarily engaged in investigation

or audit functions relating to the work of individuals

employed by an agency whose duties directly affect the

internal security of the agency but only if the functions

are undertaken to ensure that the duties are discharged

honestly and with integrity.

2la

(c) Any employee who is engaged in administering any

provision of law relating to labor-manageme..t relations

may not be represented by a labor organization —

(1) which represents other individuals to whom such

provision applies; or

(2) which is affiliated directly or indirectly with an

organization which represents other individuals to

whom such provision applies.

(d) Two or more units which are in an agency and for

which a labor organization is the exclusive representative

may, upon petition by the agency or labor organization,

be consolidated with or without an election into a single

larger unit if the Authority considers the larger unit to be

appropriate. The Authority shall certify the labor

organization as the exclusive representative of the sew

larger unit. (Pub. L. 95-454, Oct. 13, 1978, 92 Stat. 1200.)

§ 7113. National consultation rights

(a)(1) If, in connection with any agency, no labor

organization has been accorded exclusive recognition on

an agency basis, a labor organization which is the ex-

clusive representative of a substantial number of the

employees of the agency, as determined in accordance

with criteria prescribed by the Authority, shall be granted

national consultation rights by the agency. National con-

sultation rights shall terminate when the labor organiza-

tion no longer meets the criteria prescribed by the Authori-

ty. Any issue relating to any labor organization’s eligibility

for, or continuation of, national consultation rights shall

be subject to determination by the Authority.

(b)(1) Any labor organization having national consulta-

tion rights in connection with any agency under subsection

(a) of this section shall—

22a

(A) be informed of any substantive change in con-

ditions of employment proposed by the agency, and

(B) be permitted reasonable time to present its

views and recommendations regarding the changes.

(2) If any views or recommendations are presented

under paragraph (1) of this subsection to an agency by

any labor organization —

(A) the agency shall consider the views or recom-

mendations before taking final action on any matter

with respect to which the views or recommendations

are presented; and

(B) the agency shall provide the labor organization

a written statement of the reasons for taking the final

action.

(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the

right of any agency or exclusive representative to engage in

collective bargaining. (Pub. L. 95-454, Oct. 13, 1978, 92

Stat. 1201.)

§ 7114. Representation rights and duties

(a)(1) A labor organization which has been accorded

exclusive recognition is the exclusive representative of the

employees in the unit it represents and is entitled to act

for, and negotiate collective bargaining agreements cover-

ing, all employees in the unit. An exclusive representative

is responsible for representing the interests of all

employees in the unit it represents without discrimination

and without regard to labor organization membership.

(2) An exclusive representative of an appropriate unit

in an agency shall be given the opportunity to be

represented at —

23a

(A) any formal discussion between one or more

representatives of the agency and one or more

employees in the unit or their representatives concern-

ing any grievance or any personnel policy or practices

or other general condition of employment; or

(B) any examination of an employee in the unit by

a representative of the agency in connection with an

investigation if —

(i) the employee reasonably believes that the ex-

amination may result in disciplinary action against

the employee; and

(ii) the employee requests representation.

(3) Each agency shall annually inform its employees

of their rights under paragraph (2)(B) of this subsection.

(4) Any agency and any exclusive representative in

any appropriate unit in the agency, through appropriate

representatives, shall meet and negotiate in good faith

for the purposes of arriving at a collective bargaining

agreement. In addition, the agency and the exclusive

representative may determine appropriate techniques,

consistent with the provisions of section 7119 of this ti-

tle, to assist in any negotiation.

(5) The rights of an exclusive representative under the

provisions of this subsection shall not be construed to

preclude an employee from —

(A) being represented by an attorney or other

representative, other than the exclusive represen-

tative, of the employee’s own choosing in any

grievance or appeal action; or

(B) exercising grievance or appellate rights

established by law, rule, or regulation; except in the

24a

case of grievance or appeal procedures negotiated

under this chapter.

(b) The duty of an agency and an exclusive represen-

tative to negotiate in good faith under subsection (a) of

this section shall include the obligation —

(1) to approach the negotiations with a sincere

resolve to reach a collective bargaining agreement;

(2) to be represented at the negotiations by duly

authorized representatives prepared to discuss and

negotiate on any condition of employment;

(3) to meet at reasonable times and convenient places

as frequently as may be necessary, and to avoid un-

necessary delays;

(4) in the case of an agency, to furnish to the ex-

clusive representative involved, or its authorized

representative,upon request and, to the extent not pro-

hibited by law, data—

(A) which is normally maintained by the agency in

the regular course of business;

(B) which is reasonably available and necessary for

full and proper discussion, understanding, and

negotiation of subjects within the scope of collective

bargaining; and

(C) which does not constitute guidance, advice,

counsel, or training provided for management of-

ficials or supervisors, relating to collective bargain-

ing; and

(5) if agreement is reached, to execute on the request

of any party to the negotiation a written document em-

bodying the agreed terms, and to take such steps as are

necessary to implement such agreement.

25a

(cl) An agreement between any agency and an ex-

clusive representative shall be subject to approval by the

head of the agency.

(2) The head of the agency shall approve the agree-

ment within 30 days from the date the agreement is ex-

ecuted if the agreement is in accordance with the provi-

sions of this chapter and any other applicable law, rule,

or regulation (unless the agency has granted an excep-

tion to the provision).

(3) If the head of the agency does not approve or

disapprove the agreement within the 30-day period, the

agreement shall take effect and shall be binding on the

agency and the exclusive representative subject to the

provisions of this chapter and any other applicable law,

rule, or regulation.

(4) A local agreement subject to a national or other

controlling agreement at a higher level shall be approved

under the procedures of the controlling agreement or, if

none, under regulations prescribed by the agency. (Pub.

L. 95-454, Oct. 13, 1978, 92 Stat. 1202.)

§ 7115. Allotments to representatives

(a) If an agency has received from an employee in an ap-

propriate unit a written assignment which authorizes the

agency to deduct from the pay of the employee amounts

for the payment of regular and periodic dues of the ex-

clusive representative of the unit, the agency shall honor

the assignment and make an appropriate allotment pur-

suant to the assignment. Any such allotment shall be made

at no cost to the exclusive representative or the employee.

Except as provided under subsection (b) of this section,

any such assignment may not be revoked for a period of |

year.

26a

(b) An allotment under subsection (a) this section for

the deduction of dues with respect to any employee shall

terminate when —

{1) the agreement between the agency and the ex-

clusive representative involved cases to be applicable to

the employee; or

(2) the employee is suspended or expelled from

membership in the exclusive representative.

(c(1) Subject to paragraph (2) of this subsection, if a

petition has been filed with the Authority by a labor

organization alleging that 10 percent of the employees in

an appropriate unit in an agency have membership in the

labor organization, the Authority shall investigate the

petition to determine its validity. Upon certification by the

Authority of the validity of the petition, the agency shall

have a duty to negotiate with the labor organization solely

concerning the deduction of dues of the labor organization

from the pay of the members of the labor organization

who are employees in the unit and who make a voluntary

allotment for such purpose.

(2)(A) The provisions of paragraph (1) of this subsec-

tion shall not apply in the case of any appropriate unit for

which there is an exclusive representative.

(B) Any agreement under paragraph (1) of this subsec-

tion between a labor organization and an agency with

respect to an appropriate unit shall be null and void upon

the certification of an exclusive representative of the unit.

(Pub. L. 95-454, Oct. 13, 1978, 92 Stat. 1203.)

§ 7116. Unfair labor practices

For the purpose of this chapter, it shall be an unfair

labor practice for an agency —

27a

(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce any employee

in the exercise by the employee of any right under this

chapter;

(2) to encourage or discourage membership in any

labor organization by discrimination in connection with

hiring, tenure, promotion, or other conditions of

employment;

(3) to sponsor, control, or otherwise assist any labor

organization, other than to furnish, upon request,

customary and routine services and facilities if the ser-

vices and facilities are also furnished on an impartial

basis to other labor organizations having equivalent

status;

(4) to discipline or otherwise discriminate against an

employee because the employee has filed a complaint,

affidavit, or petition, or has given any information or

testimony under this chapter;

(5) to refuse to consult or negotiate in good faith with

a labor organization as required by this chapter;

(6) to fail or refuse to cooperate in impasse pro-

cedures and impasse decisions as required by this

chapter;

(7) to enforce any rule or regulation (other than a rule

or regulation implementing section 2302 of this title)

which is in conflict with any applicable collective

bargaining agreement if the agreement was in effect

before the date the rule or regulation was prescribed; or

(8) to otherwise fail or refuse to comply with any pro-

vision of this chapter.

(b) For the purpose of this chapter, it shall be an unfair

labor practice for a labor organization —

28a

(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce any employee

in the exercise by the employee of any right under this

chapter;

(2) to cause or attempt to cause an agency to

discriminate against any employee in the exercise by

the employee of any right under this chapter;

(3) to coerce, discipline, fine, or attempt to coerce a

member of the labor organization as punishment

reprisal, or for the purpose of hindering or impeding the

member’s work performance or productivity as an

employee or the discharge of the member’s duties as an

employee;

(4) to discriminate against an employee with regard to

the terms or conditions of membership in the !abor

organization on the basis of race, color, creed, national

origin, sex, age, preferential or nonpreferential civil

service status, political affilation, marital status, or han-

dicapping condition;

(5) to refuse to consult or negotiate in good faith with

an agency as required by this chapter;

(6) to fail or refuse to cooperate in impasse pro-

cedures and impasse decisions as required by this

chapter;

(7)(A) to call, or participate in, a strike, work stop-

page, or slowdown, or picketing of an agency in a labor-

management dispute if such picketing interferes with an

agency’s operations, or

(B) to condone any activity described in subparagraph

(A) of this paragraph by failing to take action to prevent

or stop such activity; or

(8) to otherwise fail or refuse to comply with any pro-

vision of this chapter.

29a

Nothing in paragraph (7) of this subsection shall result in

any informational picketing which does not interfere with

an agency’s operations being considered as an unfair labor

practice.

(c) For the purpose of this chapter it shall be an unfair

labor practice for an exclusive representative to deny

membership to any employee in the appropriate unit

represented by such exclusive representative except for

failure — °

(1) to meet reasonable occupational standards uniform-

ly required for admission, or

(2) to tender dues uniformly required as a condition

of acquiring and retaining membership.

This subsection does not preclude any labor organization

from enforcing discipline in accordance with procedures

under its constitution or bylaws to the extent consistent

with the provisions of this chapter.

(d) Issues which can properly be raised under an appeals

procedure may not be raised as unfair labor practices pro-

hibited under this section. Except for matters wherein,

under section 7121(e) and (f) of this title, an employee has

an option of using the negotiated grievance procedure or

an appeals procedure, issues which can be raised under a

grievance procedure may, in the discretion of the aggriev-

ed party, be raised under the grievance procedure or as an

unfair labor practice under this section, but not under

both procedures.

(e) The expression of any personal view, argument, opi-

nion or the making of any statement which —

(1) publicizes the fact of a representational election

and encourages employees to exercise their right to vote

in such election,

30a

(2) corrects the record with respect to any false or

misleading statement made by any person, or

(3) informs employees of the Government’s policy

relating to labor-management relations and representa-

tion,

shall not, if the expresssion contains no threat of

reprisal or force or promise of benefit or was not made

under coercive conditions, (A) constitute an unfair

labor practice under any provision of this chapter, or

(B) constitute grounds for the setting aside of any elec-

tion conducted under any provisions of this chapter.

(Pub. L. 95-454, Oct. 13, 1978, 92 Stat. 1204.)

§ 7117. Duty to gargain in good faith; compelling need;

duty to consult

(a)(1) Subject to paragraph (2) of this subsection, the

duty to bargaining in good faith shall, to the extent not in-

consistent with any Federal law or any Government-

wide rule or regulation, extend to matters which are the

subject of any rule or regulation only if the rule or regula-

tion is not a Government-wide rule or regulation.

(2) The duty to bargain in good faith shall, to the ex-

tent not inconsistent with Federal law or any Government

wide rule or regulation, extend to matters which are the

subject of any agency rule or regulation referred to in

paragraph (3) of this subsection only if the Authority has

determined under subsection (b) of this section that no

compelling need (as determined under regulations

prescribed by the Authority) exists for the rule or regula-

tion.

(3) Paragraph (2) of the subsection applies to any rule or

regulation issued by any agency or issued by any primary

national subdivision of such agency, unless an exclusive

3la

representative represents an appropriate unit including not

less than a majority of the employees in the issuing agency

or primary national subdivision, as the case may be, to

whom the rule or regulation is applicable.

(b)(1) In any case of collective bargaining in which an

exclusive representative alleges that no compelling need

exists for any rule or regulation referred to in subsection

(aX(3) of this section which is then in effect and which

governs any matter at issue in such collective bargaining,

the Authority, shall determine under paragraph (2) of this

subsection, in accordance with regulations prescribed by

the Authority whether such a compelling need exists.

(2) For the purpose of this section, a compelling need

shall be determined not to exist for any rule or regulation

only if —

(A) the agency, or primary national subdivision, as

the case may be, which issued the rule or regulation in-

forms the Authority in writing that a compelling need

for the rule or regulation does not exist; or

(B) the Authority determines that a compelling need

for a rule or regulation does not exist.

(3) A hearing may be held, in the discretion of the

Authority, before a determination is made under this

subsection. If a hearing is held, it shall be expedited to the

extent practicable and shall not include the General

Counsel as a party.

(4) The agency, or primary national subdivision, as the

case may be, which issued the rule or regulation shall be a

necessary party at any hearing under this subsection.

(c)(1) Except in any case to which subsection (b) of this

section applies, if an agency involved in collective bargain-

32a

ing with an exclusive representative alleges that the duty to

bargain in good faith does not extend to any matter, the

exclusive representative may appeal the allegation to the

Authority in accordance with the provisions of this subsec-

tion.

(2) The exclusive representative may, on or before the

15th day after the date on which the agency first makes the

allegation referred to in paragraph (1) of this subsection,

institute an appeal under this subsection by —

(A) filing a petition with the Authority; and

(B) furnishing a copy of the petition to the head of the

agency.

(3) On or before the 30th day after the date of the

receipt by the head of the agency of the copy of the peti-

tion under paragraph (2)(B) of this subsection, the agency

shall —

(A) file with the Authority a statement —

(i) withdrawing the allegation; or

(ii) setting forth in full its reasons supporting the

allegation; and

(B) furnish a copy of such statement to the exclusive

representative.

(4) On or before the 15th day after the date of the

receipt by the exclusive representative of a copy of a state-

ment under paragraph (3)(B) of this subsection, the ex-

clusive representative shall file with the Authority its

response to the statement.

(5) A hearing may be held, in the discretion of the

Authority, before a determination is made under this

subsection. If a hearing is held, it shall not include the

General Counsel as a party.

33a

(6) The Authority shall expedite proceedings under this

subsection to the extent practicable and shall issue to the

exclusive representative and to the agency a written deci-

sion on the allegation and specific reasons therefor at the

earliest practicable date.

(dl) A labor organization which is the exclusive

representative of a substantial number of employees,

determined in accordance with criteria prescribed by the

Authority, shall be granted consultation rights by any

agency with respect to any Government-wide rule or

regulation issued by the agency effecting any substantive

change in any condition of employment. Such consulta-

tion rights shall terminate when the labor organization no

longer meets the criteria prescribed by the Authority. Any

issue relating to a labor organization’s eligibility for, or

continuation of, such consultation rights shall be subject

to determination by the Authority.

(2) A labor organization having consultation rights

under paragraph (1) of this subsection shall —

(A) be informed of any substantive change in condi-

tions of employment proposed by the agency, and

(B) shall be permitted reasonable time to present its

views and recommendations regarding the changes.

(3) If any views or recommendations are presented

under paragraph (2) of this subsection to an agency by

any labor organization —

(A) the agency shall consider the views or recommen-

dations before taking final action on any matter with

respect to which the views or recommendations are

presented; and

(B) the agency shall provide the labor organization a

written statement of the reasons for taking the final ac-

tion.

34a

(Pub. L. 95-454, Oct. 13, 1978, 92 Stat. 1205.)

§7118. Prevention of unfair labor practices

(a)(1) If any agency or labor organization is charged by

any person with having engaged in or engaging in an un-

fair labor practice, the General Counsel shall investigate

the charge and may issue and cause to be served upon the

agency or labor organization a complaint. In any case in

which the General Counsel does not issue a complaint

because the charge fails to state an unfair labor practice,

the General Counsel shall provide the person making the

charge a written statement of the reasons for not issuing a

complaint.

(2) Any complaint under paragraph (1) of this subsec-

tion shall contain a notice —

(A) of the charge;

(B) that a hearing will be held before the Authority

(or any member thereof or before an individual

employed by the authority and designated for such

purpose); and

(C) of the time and place fixed for the hearing.

(3) The labor organization or agency involved shall have

the right to file an answer to the original and any amended

complaint and to appear in person or otherwise and give

testimony at the time and place fixed in the complaint for

the hearing.

(4)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B) of this

paragraph, no complaint shall be issued based on any

alleged unfair labor practice which occurred more than 6

months before the filing of the charge with the Authority.

(B) If the General Counsel determines that the person

filing ariy charge was prevented from filing the charge dur-

35a

ing the 6-month period referred to in subparagraph (A) of

this paragraph by reason of —

(i) any failure of the agency or labor organization

against which the charge is made to perform a duty

owed to the person, or

(ii) any concealment which prevented discovery of the

alleged unfair labor practice during the 6-month period,

the General Counsel may issue a complaint based on the

charge if the charge was filed during the 6-month period

beginning on the day of the discovery by the person of

the alleged unfair labor practice.

(5) The General Counsel may prescribe regulations pro-

viding for informal methods by which the alleged unfair

labor practice may be resolved prior to the issuance of a

complaint.

(6) The Authority (or any member thereof or any in-

dividual employed by the Authority and designated for

such purpose) shall conduct a hearing on the complaint

not earlier than 5 days after the date on which the com-

plaint is served. In the discretion of the individual or in-

dividuals conducting the hearing, any person involved

may be allowed to intervene in the hearing and to present

testimony. Any such hearing shall, to the extend prac-

ticable, be conducted in accordance with the provisions of

subchapter II of chapter 5 of this title, except that the par-

ties shall not be bound by rules of evidence, whether

statutory, common law, or adopted by a court. A

transcript shall be kept of the hearing. After such a hear-

ing the Authority, in its discretion, may upon notice

receive further evidence or hear argument.

(7) If the Authority (or any member thereof or any in-

dividual employed by the Authority and designated for

such purpose) determines after any hearing on a complaint

under paragraph (5) of this subsection that the

36a

preponderance of the evidence received demonstrates that

the agency or labor organization named in the complaint

has engaged in or is engaging in an unfair labor practice,

then the individual or individuals conducting the hearing

shall state in writing their findings of fact and shall issue

and cause to be served on the agency or labor organization

an order —

(A) to cease and desist from any such unfair labor prac-

tice in which the agency or labor organization is

engaged;

(B) requiring the parties to renegotiate a collective

bargaining agreement in accordance with the order of

the Authority and requiring that the agreement, as

amended, be given retroactive effect;

(C) requiring reinstatement of an employee with

backpay in accordance with section 5596 of this title; or

(D) including any combination of the actions

described in subparagraphs (A) through (C) of this

paragraph or such other action as will carry out the

purpose of this chapter.

If any such order requires reinstatement of an employee

with backpay, backpay may be required of the agency (as

provided in section 5596 of this title) or of the labor

organization, as the case may be, which is found to have

engaged in the unfair labor practice involved.

(8) If the individual or individuals conducting the hear-

ing determine that the preponderance of the evidence

received fails to demonstrate that the agency or labor

organization named in the complaint has engaged in or is

engaging in an unfair labor practice, the individual or in-

dividuals shall state in writing their findings of fact and

shall issue an order dismissing the complaint.

37a

(b) In connection with any matter before the Authority

in any proceeding under this section, the Authority may re-

quest, in accordance with the provisions of section 7105(i)

of this title, from the Director of the Office of Personnel

Management an advisory opinion concerning the proper

interpretation of rules, regulations, or other policy direc-

tives issued by the Office of Personnel Management.

(Pub. L. 95-454, Oct. 13 1978, 92 Stat. 1207.)

§ 7119. Negotiation impasses; Federal Service Impasses

Panel

(a) The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service

shall provide services and assistance to agencies and ex-

clusive representatives in the resolution of negotiation im-

passes. The Service shall determine under what cir-

cumstances and in what manner it shall provide services

and assistance.

(b) If voluntary arrangements including the services of

the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service or any

other third party mediation, fail to resolve a negotiation

impasse —

(1) either party may request the Federal Service Im-

passes Panel to consider the matter, or

(2) the parties may agree to adopt a procedure for

binding arbitration of the negotiation impasse, but only

if the procedure is approved by the Panel.

(c)(1) The Federal Service Impasses Panel is an entity

within the Authority, the function of which is to provide

assistance in resolving negotiation impasses between agen-

cies and exclusive representatives.

(2) The Panel shall be composed of a Chairman and at

least six other members, who shall be appointed by the

President, solely on the basis of fitness to perform the

duties and functions involved, from among individuals

38a

who are familiar with Government operations and

knowledgeable in labor-management relations.

(3) Of the original members of the Panel, 2 members

shall be appointed for a term of 1 year, 2 members shall be

appointed for a term of 3 years, and the Chairman and the

remaining members shall be appointed for a term of 5

years. Thereafter each member shall be appointed for »

term of 5 years, except that an individual chosen to fill a

vacancy shall be appointed for the unexpired term of the

member replaced. Any member of the Panel may be

removed by the President.

(4) The Panel may appoint an Executive Director and

any other individuals it may from time to time find

necessary for the proper performance of its duties. Each

member of the Panel who is not an employee (as defined in

section 2105 of this title) is entitled to pay at a rate equal to

the daily equivalent of the maximum annual rate of basic

pay then currently paid under the General Schedule for

each day he is engaged in the performance of official

business of the Panel, including travel time, and is entitled

to travel expenses as provided under section 5703 of this

title.

(SMA) The Panel or its designee shall promptly in-

vestigate any impasse presented to it under subsection (b)

of this section. The Panel shall consider the impasse and

shall either —

(i) recommend to the parties procedures for the resolu-

tion of the impasse; or

(ii) assist the parties in resolving the impasse through

whatever methods and procedures, including factfind-

‘ng and recommendations, it may consider appropriate

to accomplish the purpose of this section.

(B) If the parties do not arrive at a settlement after

assistance by the Panel under subparagraph (A) of this

paragraph, the Panel may—

39a

(i) hold hearings;

(ii) administer oaths, take the testimony or deposi-

tion of any person under oath, and issue subpenas as

provided in section 7132 of this title; and

(iii) take whatever action is necessary and not incon-

sistent with this chapter to resolve the impasse.

(C) Notice of any final action of the Panel under this

section shall be promptly served upon the parties, and the

action shall be binding on such parties during the term of

the agreement unless the parties agree otherwise. (Pub. L.

95-454, Oct. 13, 1978, 92 Stat. 1208.)

§ 7120. Standards of conduct for labor organizations

(a) An agency shall only accord recognition to a labor

organization that is free from corrupt influences and in-

fluences opposed to basic democratic principles. Except as

provided in subsection (b) of this section, an organiza-

tion is not required to prove that it is free from such in-

fluences if it is subject to governing requirements adopted

by the organization or by a national or international labor

organization or federation of labor organizations with

which it is affiliated, or in which it participates, containing

explicit and detailed provisions to which it subscribes call-

ing for—

(1) the maintenance of democratic procedures and

practices including provisions for periodic elections to

be conducted subject to recognized safeguards and pro-

visions defining and securing the right of individual

members to participate in the affairs of the organiza-

tion, to receive fair and equal treatment under the

governing rules of the organization, and to receive fair

process in disciplinary proceedings;

(2) the exclusion from office in the organization of

persons affiliated with communist or other totalitarian

movements and persons identified with corrupt in-

fluences;

40a

(3) the prohibition of business or financial interests

on the part of organization officers and agents which

conflict with their duty to the organization and its

members; and

(4) the maintenance of fiscal integrity in the conduct

of the affairs of the organization, including provisions

for accounting and financial controls and regular finan-

cial reports or summaries to be made available to

members.

(b) Notwithstanding the fact that a labor organization

has adopted or subscribed to standards of conduct as pro-

vided in subsection (a) of this section, the organization is

required to furnish evidence of its freedom from corrupt

influences or influences opposed to basic democratic prin-

ciples if there is reasonable cause to believe that —

(1) the organization has been suspended or expelled

from, or is subject to other sanctions, by a parent labor

organization, or federation of organizations with which

it had been affiliated, because it has demonstrated an

unwillingness or inability to comply with governing re-

quirements comparable in purpose to those required by

subsection (a) of this section; or

(2) the organization is in fact subject to influences

that would preclude recognition under this chapter.

(c) A labor organization which has or seeks recognition

as a representative of employees under this chapter shall

file financial and other reports with the Assistant

Secretary of Labor for Labor Management Relations pro-

vide for bonding of officials and employees of the

organization, and comply with trusteeship and election

standards.

(d) The Assistant Secretary shall prescribe such regula-

tions as are necesséry to carry out the purposes of this sec-

tion. Such regulatic™s shall conform generally to the prin-

dla

ciples applied to labor organizations in the private sector.

Complaints of violations of this section shall be filed with

the Assistant Secretary. In any matter arising under this

section, the Assistant Secretary may require a labor

organization to cease and desist from violations of this

section and require it to take such actions as he considers

appropriate to carry out the policies of this section.

(e) This chapter does not authorize participation in the

management of a labor organization or acting as a

representative of a labor organization by a management

official, a supervisor, or a confidential employee, except

as specifically provided in this chapter, or by an employee

if the participation or activity would result in a conflict or

apparent conflict of interest or would otherwise be incom-

patible with law or with the official duties of the

employee.

(f) In the case of any labor organization which by omis-

sion or commission has willfully and intentionally, with

regard to any strike, work stoppage, or slowdown,

violated section 7116(b)‘7) of this title, the Authority

shall, upon an appropriate finding by the Authority of

such violation —

(1) revoke the exclusive recognition status of the labor

organization, which shall then immediately cease to be

legally entitled and obligated to represent employees in

the unit; or

(2) take any other appropriate disciplinary action.

(Pub.L. 95-454, Oct. 13 1978, 92 Stat. 1210.)

SUBCHAPTER III—GRIEVANCES, APPEALS, AND

REVIEW

§ 7121. Grievance procedures

(al) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this

subsection any collective bargaining agreement shall pro-

42a

vide procedures for the settlement of grievances, including

question of arbitrability. Except as provided in (d) and (e)

of this section, the procedures shall be the exclusive pro-

cedures for resolving grievances which fall within its

coverage.

(2) Any colle ve bargaining agreement may exclude

any matter fr .. the application of the grievance pro-

cedures which are provided for in the agreement.

(b) Any negotiated grievance procedure referred to in

subsection (a) of this section shall —

(1) be fair and simple,

(2) provide for expeditious processing, and

(3) include procedures that —

(A) assure an exclusive representative the right, in

its own behalf or on behalf of any employee in the

unit represented by the exclusive representative, to

present and process grievances;

(B) assure such an employee the right to present a

grievance in the employee’s own behalf, and assure

the exclusive representative the right to be present

during the grievance proceeding; and

(C) provide that any grievance not satisfactorily

settled under the negotiated grievance procedure shall

be subject to binding arbitration which may be

invoked by either the exclusive representative or the

agency.

(c) The preceding subsections of this section shall not

apply with respect to any grievance concerning —

(*) any claimed violation of subchapter III of chapter

73 of this title (relating to prohibited political activities);

(2) retirement, life insurance, or health insurance;

(3) a suspension or removal under section 7532 of this

title;

43a

(4) any examination, certification, or appointment; or

(5) the classification of any position which does not

result in the reduction in grade or pay of an employee.

(d) An aggrieved employee affected by a prohibited per-

sonnel practice under section 2302(b)(1) of this title which

also falls under the coverage of the negotiated grievance

procedure may raise the matter under a statutory pro-

cedure or the negotiated procedure, but not both. An

employee shall be deemed to have exercised his option

under this subsection to raise the matter under either a

statutory procedure or the negotiated procedure at such

time as the employee timely initiates an action under the

applicable statutory procedure or timely files a grievance

in writing, in accordance with the provisions of the parties’

negotiated procedure, whichever event occurs first. Selec-

tion of the negotiated procedure in no manner prejudices

the right of an aggrieved employee to request the Merit

Systems Protection Board to review the final decision pur-

suant to section 7702 of this title in the case of any person-

nel action that could have been appealed to the Board, or,

where applicable, to request the Equal Employment Op-

portunity Commission to review a final decision in any

other matter involving a complaint of discrimination of

the type prohibited by any !aw administered by the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission

(e)(1) Matters covered under sections 4303 and 7512 of

this title which also fall within the coverage of the

negotiated grievance procedure may, in the discretion of

the aggrieved employee, be raised either under the ap-

pellate procedures of section 7701 of this title or under the

negotiated grievance procedure, but not both. Similar

matters which arise under other personnel systems ap-

plicable to employees covered by this chapter may, in the

discretion of the aggrieved employee, be raised either

under the appellate procedures, if any, applicable to those

>

44a

matters, or under the negotiated grievance procedure, but

not both. An employee shall be deemed to have exercised

his option under this subsection to raise a matter either

under the applicable appellate procedures or under the

negotiated grievance procedure at such time as the

employee timely files a notice of appeal under the ap-

plicable appellate procedures or timely files a grievance in

writing in accordance with the provisions of the parties’

negotiated grievance procedure, whichever event occurs

first.

(2) In matters covered under sections 4303 and 7512 of

this title which have been raised under the negotiated

grievance procedure in accordance with this section, an ar-

bitrator shall be governed by section 7701(c)(1) of this title

as applicable.

(f) In matters covered under sections 4303 and 7512 of

this title which have been raised under the negotiated

grievance procedure in accordance with this section, sec-

tion 7703 of this title pertaining to judicial review shall ap-

ply to the award of an arbitrator in the same manner and

under the same conditions as if the matter had been

decided by the Board. In matters similar to those covered

under sections 4303 and 7512 of this title which arise under

other personnel systems and which an aggrieved employee

has raised under the negotiated grievance procedure,

judicial review of an arbitrator’s award may be obtained in

the same manner and on the same basis as could be obtain-

ed of a final decision in such matters raised under the ap-

plicable appellate procedures. (Pub. L. 95-454, Oct. 13,

1978, 92 Stat. 1211; amended Pub.L. 96-54, Aug: 14,

1979, 93 Stat. 383.)

§ 7122. Exceptions to arbitral awards

(a) Either party to arbitration under this chapter may

file with the Authority an exception to any arbitrator’s

award pursuant to the arbitration (other than an award

4Sa

relating to a matter described in section 7121 (f) of this

title). If upon review the Authority finds that the award is

deficient —-

(1) because it is contrary to any law, rule, or regulation;

or

(2) on other grounds similar to those applied by

Federal courts in private sector labor-management rela-

tions;

the Authority may take such action and make such recom-

mendations concerning the award as it considers

necessary, consistent with applicable laws, rules or regula-

tions.

(b) If no exception to an arbitrator’s award is filed

under subsection (a) of this section during the 30-day

period beginning on the date of such award, the award

shall be final and binding. An agency shall take the actions

required by an arbitrator’s final award. The award may in-

clude the payment of backpay (as provided in section 5596

of this title). (Pub. L. 95-454, Oct. 13, 1978, 92 Stat.

1212.)

§ 7123. Judicial review; enforcement

(a) Any person aggrieved by any final order of the

Authority other than an order under —

(1) section 7122 of this title (involving an award by an

arbitrator), unless the order involves an unfair labor

practice under section 7118 of this title, or

(2) section 7112 of this title (involving an appropriate

unit determination),

may, during the 60-day period beginning on the date on

which the order was issued, institute an action for judicial

review of the Authority’s order in the United States court

of appeals in the circuit in which the person resides or

transacts business or in the United States Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia.

46a

(b) The Authority may petition any appropriate United

States court of appeals for the enforcement of any order

of the Authority and for appropriate temporary relief or

restraining order.

(c) Upon the filing of a petition under subsection (a) of

this section for judicial review or under subsection (b) of

this section for enforcement, the Authority shall file in the

court the record in the proceedings, as provided in section

2112 of title 28. Upon the filing of the petition, the court

shall cause notice thereof to be served to the parties

involved, and thereupon shall have jurisdiction of the pro-

ceeding and of the question determined therein and may

grant any temporary relief (including a temporary

restraining order) it considers just and proper, and may

make and enter a decree affirming and enforcing, modify-

ing and enforcing as so modified, or setting aside in whole

or in part the order of the Authority. The filing of a peti-

tion under subsection (a) or (b) of this section shall not

operate as a stay of the Authority’s order unless the court

specifically orders the stay. Review of the Authority’s

order shall be on the record in accordance with section 706

of this title. No objection that has not been urged before

the Authority, or its designee, shall be considered by the

court, unless the failure or neglect to urge the objection is

excused because of extraordinary circumstances. The find-

ings of the Authority with respect to questions of fact, if

supported by substantial evidence on the record con-

sidered as a whole, shall be conclusive. If any person ap-

plies to the court for leave to adduce additional evidence

and shows to the satisfaction of the court that the addi-

tional evidence is material and that there were reasonable

grounds for the failure to adduce the evidence in the hear-

ing before the Authority, or its designee, the court may

order the additional evidence to be taken before the

Authority, o1 its designee, and to be made a part of the

record. The Authority may modify its findings as to the

47a

facts, or make new findings by reason of additional

evidence so taken and filed. The Authority shall file its

modified or new findings, which, with respect to questions

of fact, if supported by substantial evidence on the record

considered as a whole shall be conclusive. The Authority

shall file its recommendations, if any, for the modification

or setting aside of its original order. Upon the filing of the

record with the court, the jurisdiction of the court shall be

exclusive and its judgment and decree shall be final, except

that the judgment and decree shall be subject to review by

the Supreme Court of the United States upon writ of cer-

tiorari or certification as provided in section 1254 of title

28.

(d) The Authority may, upon issuance of a complaint as

provided in section 7118 of this title charging that any per-

son has engaged in or is engaging in an unfair labor prac-

tice, petition any United States district court within any

district in which the unfair labor practice in question is

alleged to have occurred or in which such person resides or

transacts business for appropriate temporary relief (in-

cluding a restraining order). Upon the filing of the peti-

tion, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon

the person, and thereupon shall have jurisdiction to grant

any temporary relief (including a temporary restraining

order) it considers just and proper. A court shall not grant

any temporary relief under this section if it would interfere

with the ability of the agency to carry out its essential

functions or if the Authority fails to establish probable

cause that an unfair labor practice is being committed.

(Pub. L. 95-454, Oct 13, 1978, 92 Stat. 1213.)

SUBCHAPTER IV—ADMINISTRATIVE AND

OTHER PROVISIONS

§ 7131. Official time

(a) Any employee representing an exclusive represen-

48a

tative in the negotiation of a collective bargaining agree-

ment under this chapter shall be authorized official time

for such purposes, including attendance at impasse pro-

ceeding, during the time the employee otherwise would be

in a duty status. The number of employees for whom of- |

ficial time is authorized under this subsection shall not ex-

ceed the number of individuals designated as representing

the agency for such purposes.

(b) Any activities performed by any employee relating to

the internal business of a labor organization (including the

solicitation of membership, elections of labor organiza-

tion officials, and collection of dues) shall be performed

during the time the employee is in a non-duty status.

(c) Except as provided in subsection (a) of this section,

the Authority shall determine whether any employee par-

ticipating for, or on behalf of, a labor organization in any

phase of proceedings before the Authority shall be

authorized official time for such purpose during the time

the employee otherwise would be in a duty status.

(d) Except as provided in the preceding subsections of

this section —

(1) any employee representing an exclusive represen-

tative, or

(2) in connection with any other matter covered by

this chapter, any employee in an appropriate unit

represented by an exclusive representative,

shall be granted official time in any amount the agency

and the exclusive representative involved agree to be

reasonable, necessary, and in the public interest. (Pub. L.

95 — 454, Oct. 13, 1978, 92 Stat. 1214.)

49a

§ 7132. Subpenas

(a) Any member of the Authority, the General Counsel,

or the Panel, any administrative law judge appointed by

the Authority under section 3105 of this title, and any

employee of the Authority designated by the Authority

may —

(1) issue subpenas requiring the attendance and

testimony of witnesses and the production of documen-

tary or other evidence from any place in the United

States; and

(2) administer oaths, take or order the taking of

depositions, order responses to written interrogatories,

examine witnesses, and receive evidence.

No subpena shall be issued under this section which re-

quires the disclosure of intramanagement guidance, ad-

vice, counsel, or training within an agency or between an

agency and the Office of Personnel Management.

(b) In the case of contumacy or failure to obey a

subpena issued under subsection (a)(1) of this section, the

United States district court for the judicial district in

which the person to whom the subpena is addressed resides

or is served may issue an order requiring such person to

appear at any designated place to testify or to produce

documentary or other evidence. Any failure to obey the

order of the court may be punished by the court as a con-

tempt thereof.

(c) Witnesses (whether appearing voluntarily or under

subpena) shall be paid the same fee and mileage

allowances which are paid subpenaed witnesses in the

courts of the United States. (Pub. L. 95-454, Oct. 13,

1978, 92 Stat. 1214.)

§ 7133. Compilation and publication of data

(a) The Authority shall maintain a file of its proceedings

50a

and copies of all available agreements and arbitration

decisions, and shall publish the texts of its decisions and

the actions taken by the Panel under section 7119 of this

title.

(b) All files maintained under subsection (a) of this sec-

tion shall be open to inspection and reproduction in

accordance with the provisions of sections 552 and 552a of

this title. (Pub. L. 95-454, Oct. 13, 1978, 92 Stat. 1215.)

§ 7134. Regulations

The Authority, the General Counsel, the Federal Media-

tion and Conciliation Service, the Assistant Secretary of

Labor for Labor Management Relations, and the Panel

shall each prescribe rules and regulations to carry out the

provisions of this chapter applicable to each of them,

respectively. Provisions of subchapter II of chapter 5 of

this title shall be applicable to the issuance, revision or

repeal of any such rule or regulation. (Pub. L. 95-454,

Oct. 13, 1978, 92 Stat. 1215.)

§ 7135. Continuation of existing laws, recognitions,

agreements, and procedures

(a) Nothing contained in this chapter shall preclude —

(1) the renewal or continuation of an exclusive

recognition, certification of an exclusive representative,

or a lawful agreement between an agency and an ex-

clusive representative of its employees, which is entered

into before the effective date of this chapter; or

(2) the renewal, continuation, or initial according of

recognition for units of management officials or super-

visors represented by labor organizations which

historically or traditionally represent management of-

ficials or supervisors in private industry and which hold

exclusive recognition for units of such officials or super-

visors in any agency on the effective date of this

chapter.

Sla

(b) Policies, regulations, and procedures established

under and decisions issued under Executive Orders

11491, 11616, 11636, 11787, and 11838, or under any

other Executive order, as in effect on the effective date

of this chapter, shall remain in full force and effect until

revised or revoked by the President, or unless super-

seded by specific provisions of this chapter or by regula-

tions or decisions issued pursuant to this chapter. (Pub.

L. 95-454, Oct. 13, 1978, 92 Stat. 1215.)

5 U.S.C. § 7311: Loyalty and striking

An individual may not accept or hold a position in the

Government of the United States or the government of the

District of Columbia if he —

(1) advocates the overthrow of our constitutional

form of government;

(2) is a member of an organization that he knows ad-

vocates the overthrow of our constitutional form of

government;

(3) participates in a strike, or asserts the right to

strike, against the Government of the United States or

the government of the District of Columbia; or

(4) is a member of an organization of employees of

the government of the United States or of individuals

employed by the government of the District of Colum-

bia that he knows asserts the right to strike against the

Government of the United States or the government of

the District of Columbia.

18 U.S.C. § 2: Principals

(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United

States or aids abets, counsels, commands, induces or pro-

cures its commission, is punishable as a principal.

52a

(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if

directly performed by him or another would be an offense

against the United States, is punishable as a principal.

18 U.S.C. § 1918: Disloyalty and asserting the right to

strike against the Government

Whoever violates the provision of section 7311 of title 5

that an individual may not accept or hold a position in the

Government of the United States or the government of the

District of Columbia if he—

(1) advocates the overthrow of our constitutional

form of government;

(2) is a member of an organization that he knows ad-

vocates the overthrow of our constitutional form of

government;

(3) participates in a strike, or asserts the right to

strike, against the Government of the United States or

the government of the District of Columbia; or

(4) is a member of an organization of employees of

the Government of the United States or of individuals

employed by the government of the District of Colum-

bia that he knows asserts the right to strike against the

Government of the United States or the government of

the District of Columbia;

shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not

more than one year and a day, or both.

28 U.S.C. §1345: United States as plaintiff

Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, the

district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil ac-

tions, suits or proceedings commenced by the United

States, or by any agency or officer thereof expressly

authorized to sue by Act of Congress.

Sia

National Labor Relations Act 29 U.S.C. § 151 ef seq.:

§ 151. Findings and declaration of policy

The denial by some employers of the right of employees

to organize and the refusal by some employers to accept

the procedure of collective bargaining lead to strikes and

other forms of industrial strife or unrest, which have the

intent or the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing

commerce by (a) impairing the efficiency, safety, or opera-

tion of instrumentalities of commerce; (b) occurring in

the current of commerce; (c) materially affecting, restrain-

ing, or controlling the flow of raw materials or manufac-

tured or processed goods from or into the channels of

commerce, or the prices of such materials or goods in

commerce; or (d) causing diminution of employment and

wages in such volume as substantially to impair or disrupt

the market for goods flowing from or into the channels of

commerce.

The inequality of bargaining power between emplcyees

who do not possess full freedom of association or actual

liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in

the corporate or other forms of ownership association

substantially burdens and affects the flow of commerce,

and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions in

industry by preventing the stabilization of competitive

wage rates and working conditions within and between in-

dustries.

Experience has proved that protection by law of the

right of employees to organize and bargain collectively

safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or inter-

ruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing

certain recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest,

by encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly ad-

justment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as

54a

to wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by

restoring equality of bargaining power between employers

and employees.

Experience has further demonstrated that certain prac-

tices by some labor organizations, their officers, and

members have the intent or the necessary effect of burden-

ing or cbstructing commerce by preventing the free flow

of goods in such commerce through strikes and other

forms of industrial unrest or through concerted activities

which impair the interest of the public in the free flow of

such commerce. The elimination of such practices is a

necessary condition to the assurance of the rights herein

guaranteed.

It is declared to be the policy of the United States to

eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to

the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate

these obstructions when they have occurred by encourag-

ing the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and

by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of

association, self-organization, and designation of

representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of

negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment

or other mutual aid or protection.

§ 153. National Labor Relations Board — Creation, com-

position, appointment, and tenure; Chairman; removal of

members

(a) The National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter

called the “Board”) created by this subchapter prior to its

amendment by the Labor Management Relations Act,

1947, is continued as an agency of the United States, ex-

cept that the Board shall consist of five instead of three

members, appointed by the President by and with the ad-

vice and consent of the Senate. Of the two additional

5Sa

members so provided for, one shall be appointed for a

term of five years and the other for a term of two years.

Their successors, and the successors of the other members,

shall be appointed for terms of five years each, excepting

that any individual chosen to fill a vacancy shall be ap-

pointed only for the unexpired term of the member whom

he shall succeed. The President shall designate one

member ot serve as Chairman of the Board. Any member

of the Board may be removed by the President, upon

notice and hearing, for neglect of duty or malfeasance in

office, but for no other cause.

*_ * &*

General Counsel: appointment and tenure;

powers and duties; vacancy

(d) There shall be a General Counsel of the Board who

shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice

and consent of the Senate, for a term of four years. The

General Counsel of the Board shall exercise general super-

vision over ail attorneys employed by the Board (other

than trial examiners and legal assistants to Board

members) and over the officers and employees in the

regional offices. He shall have final authority, on behalf

of the Board, in respect of the investigation of charges and

issuance of complaints under section 160 of this title, and

in respect of the prosecution of such complaints before the

Board, and shall have such other duties as the Board may

prescribe or as may be provided by law. In case of a vacan-

cy in the office of the General Counsel the President is

authorized to designate the officer or employee who shall

act as General Counsel during such vacancy, but no per-

son Or persons so designated shall so act (1) for more than

forty days when the Congress is in session unless a

nomination to fill such vacancy shall have been submitted

56a

to the Senate, or (2) after the adjournment sine die of the

session of the Senate in which such nomination was sub-

mitted.

§ 157. Right of employees as to organization, collective

bargaining, etc.

Employees shall have the right to self-organization to

form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collec-

tively through representatives of their own choosing, and

to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of

collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,

and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of

such activities except to the extent that such right may be

affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor

organization as a condition of employment as authorized

in section 158(a)(3) of this title.

. = *

§ 160. Prevention of unfair labor practices — Powers of

Board generally

(a) The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to

prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor

practice (listed in section 158 of this title) affecting com-

merce. This power shall not be affected by any other

means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may

be established by agreement, law, or otherwise: Provided,

That the Board is empowered by agreement with any agen-

cy of any State or Territory to cede to such agency

jurisdiction over any cases in any industry (other than

mining, manufacturing, communications, and transporta-

tion except where predominantly local in character) even

though such cases may involve labor disputes affecting

57a

commerce, unless the provision of the State or Territorial

Statute applicable to the determination of such cases by

such agency is inconsistent with the corresponding provi-

sion of this subchapter or has received a construction in-

consistent therewith.

Complaint and notice of hearing; answer; court

rules of evidence applicable

(b) Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged

in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice the

Board, or any agent or agency designated by the Board for

such purposes, shall have power to issue and cause to be

served upon such person a complaint stating the charges in

that respect, and containing a notice of hearing before the

Board or a member thereof, or before a designated agent

or agency, at a place therein fixed, not less than five days

after the serving of said complaint: Provided, That no

complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice

occurring more than six months prior to the filing of the

charge with the Board and the service of a copy thereof

upon the person against whom such charge is made, unless

the person aggrieved thereby was prevented from filing

such charge by reason of service in the armed forces, in

which event the six-month period shall be computed from

the day of his discharge. Any such complaint may be

amended by the member, agent, or agency conducting the

hearing or the Board in its discretion at any time prior to

the issuance of an order based thereon. The person so

complained of shall have the right to file an answer to the

original or amended complaint and to appear in person or

otherwise and give testimony at the place and time fixed in

the complaint. In the discretion of the member, agent, or

agency conducting the hearing or the Board, any other

person may be allowed to intervene in the said proceeding

and to present testimony. Any such proceeding shall, so

58a

far as practicable, be conducted in accordance with the

rules of evidence applicable in the district courts of the

United States under the rules of civil procedure for the

district courts of the United States, adopted by the

Supreme Court of the United States pursuant to section

2072 of Title 28.

Reduction of testimony to writing; findings and

orders of Board

(c) The testimony taken by such member, agent, or

agency or the Board shall be reduced to writing and filed

with the Board. Thereafter, in its discretion, the Board

upon notice may take further testimony or hear argument.

If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the

Board shall be of the opinion that any person named in the

complaint has engaged in or or is engaging in any such un-

fair labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings

of fact and shall issue and cause to be served on such per-

son an order requiring such person to cease and desist

from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirm-

ative action including reinstatement of employees with or

without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this

subchapter: Provided, That where an order directs

reinstatement of an employee, back pay may be required

of the employer or labor organization, as the case may be,

responsible for the discrimination suffered by him: And

provided further, That in determining whether a com-

plaint shall issue alleging a violation of subsection (a)(1) or

(a)(2) of section 158 of this title, and in deciding such

cases, the same regulations and rules of decision shall

apply irrespective of whether or not the labor organization

affected is affiliated with a labor organization national or

international in scope. Such order may further require

such person to make reports from time to time showing

the extent to which it has complied with the order. If upon

59a

the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall

not be of the opinion that the person named in the com-

plaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair

labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of

fact and shall issue an order dismissing the said complaint.

No order of the Board shall require the reinstatement of

any individual as an employee who has been suspended or

discharged, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such

individual was suspended or discharged for cause. In case

the evidence is presented before a member of the Board, or

before an examiner or examiners thereof, such member, or

such examiner or examiners as the case may be shall issue

and cause to be served on the parties to the proceeding a

proposed report, together with a recommended order,

which shall be filed with the Board, and if no exceptions

are filed within twenty days after service thereof upon

such parties or within such further period as the Board may

authorize, such recommended order shall become the

order of the Board and become effective as therein

prescribed.

Modification of findings or orders prior to filing

record in court

(d) Until the record in a case shall have been filed in a

court, as hereinafter provided, the Board may at any time

upon reasonable notice and in such manner as it shall

deem proper, modify or set aside, in whole or in part, any

finding or order made or issued by it.

Petition to court for enforcement of order;

proceedings; review of judgment

(e) The Board shall have power to petition any court of

appeals of the United States, or if all the courts of appeals

60a

to which application may be made are in vacation, any

district court of the United States, within any circuit or

district, respectively, wherein the unfair labor practice in

question occurred or wherein such person resides or trans-

acts business for the enforcement of such order and for

ppropriate temporary relief or restraining order, and

shall file in the court the record in the proceedings, as pro-

vided in section 2112 of Title 28. Upon the filing of such

petition, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served

upon such person, and thereupon shall have jurisdiction

of the proceeding and of the question determined therein,

and shall have power to grant such temporary relief or

restraining order as it deems just and proper, and to make

and enter a decree enforcing, modifying, and enforcing as

so modified, or setting aside in whole or in part the order

of the Board. No objection that has not been urged before

the Board, its member, agent, or agency, shall be con-

sidered by the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge

such objection shall be excused because of extraordinary

circumstances. The findings of the Board with respect to

questions of fact if supported by substantia’ evidence on

the record considered as a whole shall be conclusive. If

either party shall apply to the court for leave to adduce ad-

ditional evidence and shall show to the satisfaction of the

court that such additional evidence is material and that

there were reasonable grounds for the failure to adduce

such evidence in the hearing before the Board, its member,

agent or agency, the court may order such additional

evidence to be taken before the Board, its member, agent,

or agency, and to be made a part of the record. The Board

may modify its findings as to the facts, or make new find-

ings by reason of additional evidence so taken and filed,

and it shall file such modified or new findings, which find-

ings with respect to questions of fact if supported by

substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole

6la

shall be conclusive, and shall file its recommendations, if

any, for the modification or setting aside of its original

order. Upon the filing of the record with it the jurisdiction

of the court shall be exclusive and its judgment and decree

shall be final, except that the same shall be subject to

review by the appropriate United States court of appeals if

application was made to the district court as herein above

provided, and by the Supreme Court of the United States

upon writ of certiorari or certification as provided in sec-

tion 1254 of Title 28.

Review of final order of Board on petition to court

(f) Any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board

granting or denying in whole or in part the relief sought

may obtain a review of such order in any United States

court of appeals in the circuit wherein the unfair labor

practice in question was alleged to have been engaged in or

wherein such person resides or transacts business, or in the

United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-

bia, by filing in such a court a written petition praying that

the order of the Board be modified or set aside. A copy of

such petition shall be forthwith transmitted by the clerk of

the court to the Board, and thereupon the aggrieved party

shall file in the court the record in the proceeding, certified

by the Board, as provided in section 2112 of Title 28.

Upon the filing of such petition, the court shall proceed in

the same manner as in the case of an application by the

Board under subsection (e) of this section, and shall have

the same jurisdiction to grant to the Board such temporary

relief or restraining order as it deems just and proper, and

in like manner to make and enter a decree enforcing,

modifying, and enforcing as so modified, or setting aside

in whole or in part the order of the Board; the findings of

the Board with respect to questions of fact if supported by

62a

substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole

shall in like manner be conclusive.

Institution of court proceedings as stay of Board’s order

(g) The commencement of proceedings under subsection

(e) or (f) of this section shall not, unless specifically

ordered by the court, operate as a stay of the Board’s order.

Jurisdiction of courts unaffected by limitations prescribed

in sections 101 to 115 of this title

(h) When granting appropriate temporary relief or a

restraining order, or making and entering a decree en-

forcement, modifying, and enforcing as so modified, or

setting aside in whole or in part an order of the Board, as

provided in this section, the jurisdiction of courts sitting in

equity shall not be limited by sections 101 to 115 of this

title.

Expeditious hearings on petitions

(i) Petitions filed under this subchapter shall be heard

expeditiously, and if possible within ten days after they

have been docketed.

Injunctions

(j) The Board shall have power, upon issuance of a com-

plaint as provided in subsection (b) of this section charging

that any person has engaged in or is engaging in an unfair

labor practice, to petition any United States district court,

within any district wherein the unfair labor practice in

question is alleged to have occurred or wherein such per-

son resides or transacts business, for appropriate tem-

porary relief or restraining order. Upon the filing of any

63a

such petition the court shall cause notice thereof to be

served upon such person, and thereupon shall have

jurisdiction to grant to the Board such temporary relief or

restraining order as it deems just and proper.

* 7 .

64a

APPENDIX B

504 F. Supp. 432

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff,

.

PROFESSIONAL AIR TRAFFIC CON-

TROLLERS ORGANIZATION

(PATCO) et al., Defendants.

No. 80 C 4390.

United States District Court,

N.D. Illinois, E.D.

Dec. 15, 1980.

Thomas P. Sullivan, U.S. Atty., Frederick H. Branding,

Linda A. Wawzenski, Asst. U.S. Attys., Chicago, Ill., for

plaintiff.

Richard J. Leighton, Leighton, Conklin, Lemov & Jacobs, Gary

Ethan Klein, Washington, D.C., Harvey Nathan, Chicago, Ill., for

defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SHADUR, District Judge.

This case of first impression requires a resolution of the

tension between the forces supporting judicial control over

the congressional policy against strikes by federal

employees and the forces supporting the congressional

policy for administrative resolution of unfair labor prac-

tices by federal employees’ labor unions. Defendants Pro-

fessional Air Traffic Controllers Organization and its

O’Hare Local No 316 (though they are separate entities,

for convenience this opinion will refer to them collectively

by use of the singular term “PATCO”) and a number of

their officers have been sued by the United States for a

preliminary and permanent injunction against a claimed

slowdown (alleged to be equivalent to a strike) of air traf-

fic controllers at Chicago’s O’Hare Field. PATCO has

moved to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction. For

the reasons stated in this memorandum opinion and order

PATCO’s motion is granted.

65a

Facts'

PATCO is a labor organization representing air traffic

controller employees of the Federal Aviation Administra-

tion (“FAA”). On July 31, 1980 PATCO, aided and abet-

ted by the individual defendants, organized and directed a

concerted slowdown of the air traffic controllers working

at Chicago’s O’Hare International Airport. That slow-

down is characterized as a “strike” against the operations

of the air traffic control system, creating a concerted

obstruction to the movement of air traffic within this

District and throughout substantial areas of the United

States. It has significantly impaired such operations and

air traffic movement, causing great loss and inconvenience

to the public and the airlines.

When the United States brought this action August 18,

1980 Judge Bua of the Court entered a temporary restrain-

ing order prohibiting PATCO, the individual defendants

and PATCO’s members from “continuing, encouraging,

ordering, aiding, engaging, obstructing or taking any part

in any work stoppage or slowdown” (TRO#l(a)). Since

that time the parties have consented to the extension of the

TRO from time to time, most recently through January

20, 1981.

Jurisdictional Section Invoked by the United States

PATCO has now moved to dismiss the Complaint under

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) on the theory that Congress has

vested exclusive jurisdiction over the conduct complained

of in the Federal Labor Relations Authority (“FLRA”).

For the United States, on the other hand, the case is one

for the straightforward invocation of the grant of jurisdic-

tion under 28 U.S.C. § 1345:

'For purposes of this motion to dismiss, the “facts” are of course

those alleged in the Complaint. This Court neither makes nor implies

any findings as to the truth of the allegations.

66a

Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, the

district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil

actions, suits or proceedings commenced by the United

States, or by any agency or officer thereof expressly

authorized to sue by Act of Congress.

Thus the question may be simply put as whether Title VII

of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101

ff. (“Title VII”), which created the FLRA, is an Act of

Congress that “otherwise provide[s].” That question is not

as simply answered, for it requires analysis not only of

Title VII but of two pre-existing enactments, 5 U.S.C.

§ 7311 and 18 U.S.C. § 1918.

Title VII and FLRA Jurisdiction

Under 5 U.S.C. § 7116(b):

(b) For the purpose of this chapter, it shall be an

unfair labor practice for a labor organization —

*ece+ + ee *e © * *

(7)(A) to call, or participate in, a strike, work stoppage,

or slowdown. . . or

(B) to condone any activity described in subparagraph

(A) of this paragraph by failing to take action to preven-

tor stop such activity. .. .

That statutory language is tracked almost verbatim by the

Complaint, which alleges that each of the entities compris-

ing PATCO “organized, directed, and commenced a strike

against the operations of the air traffic control system and

the movement of air traffic within the district and

throughout substantial areas of the United States” (410),

that “This strike has taken the form of a concerted

slowdown and a concerted obstruction to the movement of

aircraft in air commerce or air transportation” (412) and

that “PATCO has failed to take any action to prevent or to

stop the illegal actions of its members at O’Hare” (414).

67a

There is therefore no question that the Complaint

charges an unfair labor practice under Title VII. Indeed,

two days preceding the filing of this action FAA filed a

charge with the FLRA, complaining against PATCO of

the same actions alleged in the Complaint in virtually iden-

tical language, charging that such conduct is a violation of

5 U.S.C. § 7116(b)(7)(A) and (B) and concluding:

Because such illegal activity is continuing or expected to

continue and because such illegal activity has and will

interfere with the ability of the FAA to carry out its

essential functions, we request the General Counsel,

FLRA, seek appropriate temporary relief (including a

restraining order) under 5 U.S.C. 7123(d).

Accordingly FLRA jurisdiction over the controversy be-

tween the United States and PATCO is uncontroverted.?

Purpose and History of Title VII

Title VII has created a structure and procedure for the

investigation and prosecution of unfair labor practices in

the federal sector, including its own provisions for judicial

review of FLRA’s decisions in a Court of Appeals, not a

District Court (5 U.S.C. § 7123(b)). It specifically em-

powers FLRA to petition a District Court for necessary

temporary relief (including a TRO) upon issuance of an

unfair labor practice complaint (5 U.S.C. § 7123(d)).

2In footnote 18 to its brief in this action the United States advises

that, “Consistent with the argument that proceedings, if any, before

the FLRA are legally irrelevant to the disposition of the defendants’

motion,” FAA has chosen to seek to withdraw its unfair labor practice

charge before the FLRA without prejudice. That decision is itself

“legally irrelevant” to the present motion. This Court’s subject matter

jurisdiction cannot be conferred by such a choice, just as it could not

be defeated by a choice to institute FLRA proceedings if jurisdiction

nere exists. We are dealing with the effect of Title VII itself, not with

the effect of its having been invoked by one of the parties.

68a

Those provisions embrace the only role given the federal

courts under the statute, substantially (and deliberately, as

will be discussed below) paralleling the structure of the

National Labor Relations Act applicable to the private

sector.

As for the question of intended exclusivity, initial

scrutiny of the statute itself discloses the following role for

FLRA (5 U.S.C. § 7105(a)(1), emphasis added):

[FLRA] shall provide leadership in establishing

policies and guidance relating to matters under

this chapter, and, except as otherwise provided,

shall be responsible for carrying out the purpose

of this chapter.’

Section 7101(b) defines “the purpose of this chapter to

prescribe certain rights and obligations of the employees

of the Federal Government and to establish procedures

which are designed to meet the special requirements and

need of the Government.” It mandates that the provisions

“should be interpreted in a manner consistent with the re-

quirement of an effective and efficient Government.” And

like the counterpart NLRB, Section 7105(a)(2)(G) em-

powers FLRA to “conduct hearings and resolve com-

plaints of unfair labor practices under section 7118.”

Before the enactment of Title VII, federal sector labor-

management relations were governed by Executive Order

11491, as amended (the successor to Executive Order

10988). That Order provided for an exclusively ad-

ministrative process, with the Federal Labor Relations

‘With two statutes thus containing “except as otherwise provided”

clauses, we seem to have an analytical problem reminiscent of the ren-

voi concept in conflict of laws cases.

69a

Council having limited review of decisions regarding alleg-

ed unfair labor practice complaints (decided initially by

the Assistant Secretar ' of Labor for Labor-Management

Relations). There was no place for the federal judiciary in

the structure or procedure for dealing with claimed unfair

labor practices in federal employment. Stevens v. Carey,

483 F.2d 188, 191 (7th Cir. 1973).

Congress enacted Title VII to establish a statutory base

in place of the dependency on Executive Orders. As stated

in the reprinted Legislative History of the Federal Service

Labor-Management Relations Statute, Title VII of the

Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 96th Cong. Ist Sess.

(Comm. Print No. 96-7) (hereinafter “Legis. Hist.” at

684:

Title VII of the bill establishes a statutory basis

for labor-management relations in the Federal

service. Since 1962, Executive Orders have

governed the collective bargaining reiationship in

the Federal sector. Title VII would for the first

time enact into law the rights and obligations of

the parties to this relationship — employees,

agencies, and labor organizations.

Title VII, in concert with the President’s Re-

organization Plan No. 2 of 1978, also con-

structs a new framework for the conduct of

Federal labor-management relations. The

Federal Labor Relations Authority, an indepen-

dent establishment in the executive branch,

together with its Office of General Counsel, will

be primarily responsible for the administration

70a

of the program and the enforcement of the

policies reflected in Title VII.

FLRA was intentionally cast in the mold of the NLRB (id.

at 687):

Section 7104, in concert with Reorganization

Plan No. 2 of 1978, establishes and describes the

Federal Labor Relations Authority, an indepen-

dent establishment in the executive branch. The

committee intends that the Authority’s role in

Federal sector labor-management relations be

analogous to that of the National Labor Rela-

tions Board in the private sector. Functions

which, under the Executive Order 11491 pro-

gram, were distributed among various entities

(such as the Civil Service Commission and the

Department of Labor) are to be consolidated

under the Authority.

One of the features of the NLRA most desired by Con-

gress to be imported into federal sector employment rela-

tionships was that of defined judicial review in the Courts

of Appeal. As stated by Congressman William Ford

(Legis. Hist. 856):*

One of the central elements of a fair labor rela-

tions program is effective impartial administra-

tion. Title VII provides for the creation of an in-

dependent and neutral Federal labor relations

authority to administer the Federal labor-

management program and subjects the decisions

of the authority to judicial review.

“Cong. Ford was one of the bill’s floor managers and a co-sponsor.

on whose statements (quoted later in this opinion) the United States

relies to support its position.

7la

By providing for judicial review of the

authority’s decisions, smilar to that provided

under the National Labor Relations Act, the

right of both sides to receive an impartial deci-

sion is further strengthened, while making the

authority more accountable for its actions.

Judicial review is one of the primary benefits of a

statutory program over an Executive order, and

to limit such review also limits the advantages of

codification.

As already stated, federal District Courts were given no

jurisdiction under Title VII except for the limited power to

grant temporary relief (including injunctive relief) on the

petition of FLRA after issuance of an unfair labor practice

complaint by its General Counsel, 5 U.S.C. § 7123(b) and

(d).

Exclusivity of jurisdiction is an established hallmark of

the NLRB, after which FLRA is tailored. As stated in

Amalgamated Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison

Co., 309 U.S. 261, 264-65, 60 S.Ct. 561, 563, 84 L.Ed. 738

(1940) (emphasis added):

To attain its object Congress created a particular

agency, the National Labor Relations Board,

and established a special procedure. The aim,

character and scope of that special procedure are

determinative of the question now before us.

Within the range of its constitutional power,

Congress was entitled to determine what remedy

w would provide, the way that remedy should be

s@ught, the extent to which it should be afforded,

and the means by which it should be made effec-

tive. Comgress has entrusted to the Board ex-

clusively the prosecution of the proceeding by its

72a

own complaint, the conduct of the hearing, the

adjudication and the granting of appropriate

relief. The Board as a public agency acting in the

public interest, not any private person or group,

not any employee or group of employees, is

chosen as the instrument to assure protection

from the described unfair conduct in order to

remove obstructions to interstate commerce.

In the same way, the “role and function” of FLRA’s

General Counsel were specified to “be analogous” to those

of NLRB’s General Counsel (Legis. Hist. 688). That

analogy was underscored in the area of unfair labor prac-

tices (Legis. Hist. 766):

It is intended that unfair labor practice com-

plaints will be handled by the General Counsel of

the Authority in a manner essentially identical to

National Labor Relations Board practices in the

private sector.

As the Supreme Court characterized NLRB’s General

Counsel in NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132,

138-39, 95 S.Ct. 1504, 1510-11, 44 L.Ed.2d 29 (1975) (em-

phasis added):

Congress has delegated to the Office of General

Counsel “acting for the Board” the unreviewable

authority to determine whether a complaint shall

be filed. 29 U.S.C. Section 153(d); Vaca v. Sipes,

386 U.S. 171, 182 [87 S.Ct. 903, 912, 17 L.Ed.2d

842]. In those cases in which he decides that a

complaint shall issue, the General Counsel

becomes an advocate before the Board in sup-

port of the complaint. In those cases in which he

decides not to issue a complaint, no proceeding

before the Board occurs at all. The practical ef-

73a

fect of this administrative scheme is that a party

delieving himself the victim of an unfair labor

practice can obtain neither adjudication nor

remedy under the labor statute without first per-

suading the Office of General Counsel that his

claim is sufficiently meritorious to warrant

Board consideration.

There is no designated role for the Department of Justice,

as contrasted with the General Counsel, in protecting the

public interest when that interest is threatened by action

that constitutes an unfair labor practice under the Na-

tional Labor Relations Act (applicable to private sector

employment). Title VII has similarly carved out no

specific role for the Department of Justice in protecting

the public interest against like threats in the federal

employment sector. If that power exists, it must be found

to have survived elsewhere despite the comprehensive

scheme reflected by adoption of Title VII.

To put the matter in a slightly different way, it is plain

beyond cavil that the NLRB, after which Congress

specifically modeled FLRA, has exclusive jurisdiction over

conduct that assertedly constitutes an unfair labor prac-

tice. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359

U.S. 236, 248, 79 S.Ct. 773, 781, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959);

Amalgamated Ass’n of Street Electrical Ry. & Motor

Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 292, 91

S.Ct. 1909, 1920, 29 L.Ed.2d 473 (1971) (applying that

rule even though the complaint was not framed in unfair

labor practice terms). Were FAA a private employer it

could not come to this Court for injunctive relief and

bypass the NLRB. We turn then to the question whether

its status as a federal employer destroys the parallel and

permits FLRA to be thus by passed.

74a

Case Law Under Title VII

We do not write on an entirely clean slate with respect to

the relationship between FLRA and the federal courts. In

two 1980 cases District Courts have held subject matter

jurisdiction absent in suits seeking injunctive and other

relief on behalf of federal employees against conduct that

the Courts held would also constitute an unfair labor prac-

tice. National Federation of Federal Employees, Local

1263 v. Commandant, Defense Language Institute, 493

F.Supp. 675 (N.D.Cal. 1980), Clark v. Mark, Secretary of

the Air Force, No. 79-CV-777 (N.D. N.Y. August 27,

1980).

In each of those cases the Court engaged in a persuasive

analysis, more extended than the prior portion of this opi-

nion, and concluded that FLRA was vested with exclusive

jurisdiction to deal with conduct that constituted an unfair

labor practice. In each case the Department of Justice,

which argues to the contrary here, successfully urged that

the Court was without subject matter jurisdiction.

As perhaps the capstone to its argument in the other two

cases, adopted in each instance by the District Court in

reaching its decision, the Department of Justice argued

(National Federation Br. 8, 9):

The Supreme Court has held on numerous occa-

sions that where, as here, Congress has provided

statutory review procedures designed to permit

agency expertise to be applied to particular pro-

blems, those procedures must be considered ex-

clusive. Whitney Bank v. New Orleans Bank, 379

U.S. 411, 421 [85 S.Ct. 551, 558, 13 L.Ed.2d

*Indeed, the Department of Justice brief in National Federation,

which PATCO attached as an exhibit to its memorandum to this

Court, might well have been written as PATCO’s brief in shis case.

75a

386] (1964); Callanan Road Improvements Co.

v. United States, 345 U.S. 507 [73 S.Ct. 803, 97

L.Ed. 1206] (1953); Myers v. Bethlehem Ship-

building Corp., 303 U.S. 41 [58 S.Ct. 459, 82

L.Ed. 638] (1938) . . . . That Congress has not

expressly provided that the statutory procedure is

to be exclusive does not require a different result

where it has rejected provision for district court

review and instead enacted a specific statutory

scheme for obtaining judicial review. Whitney

Bank v. New Orleans, supra, 379 U.S. at 422 [85

S.Ct. at 558]. Exhaustion of the statutorily

prescribed procedure is a prerequisite to judicial

review. Id., Montgomery v. Rumsfeld, 572 F.2d

250 (9th Cir. 1978).

Adopting that argument, the Court in National Federation

stated (493 F.Supp. at 678):

If the statutory procedures are designed to per-

mit agency expertise to be applied to particular

problems, and if district court jurisdiction would

decrease the effectiveness of the statutory design,

then such statutory procedures should be con-

sidered exclusive. Whitney National Bank v.

Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co., 379 U.S. 411,

420-21 [85 S.Ct. 551, 557-58, 13 L.Ed.2d 386]

(1965); Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp.,

303 U.S. 41 [58 S.Ct. 459, 82 L.Ed. 638] (1938).

Congress need not expressly label the statutory

procedures as exclusive. Whitney National Bank,

supra, 379 U.S. at 422 [85 S.Ct. at 558].

After reviewing the statutory purpose of Title VIi (par-

ticularly 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101 and 7105(a)(1), quoted earlier

in this opinion), the Court continued (493 F.Supp. at 679):

76a

In view of the comprehensive scope of the

FLRA’s duty and authority over labor manage-

ment relations in, the federal government, it

would be inconsistent for the district court to

assume jurisdiction over subject matter entrusted

to the expertise of the agency.

This conclusion in turn underscores the parallel to the

NLRA and decisions under it. As the Supreme Court

stated in Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, et

al. v. Richman Bros. Co., 348 U.S. 511, 516-17, 75 S.Ct.

452, 455-56, 99 L.Ed. 600 (1955), employing language that

readily paraphrases to Title VII and FLRA (emphasis add-

ed to the same language the Department of Justice

underscored in its National Federation brief):

Congress has provided an administrative agency

to pass on claims that rights granted by the Act

are denied or that restrictions imposed by the Act

are disregarded. Only after the Board has found

such claims to be well-founded and has for-

mulated remedies for their vindication does the

jurisdiction for their vindication does the

jurisdiction for review by the Court of Appeals

come into being. However, injunctive relief or a

temporary restraining order may be obtained by

the Board from the appropriate District Court,

pending final adjudication by the Board “upon

issuance of a complaint” by the Board or when

there is “reasonable cause to believe” in the truth

of a charge that a party “has engaged in an unfair

labor practice within the meaning of paragraph

(4)(A), (B), or (C) of Section 8(b).” Congress ex-

plicitly gave such jurisdiction to the district

courts only on behalf of the Board on a petition

by it or “the officer or regional attorney to whom

77a

the matter may be referred.” § 10(j), (1), 61 Stat.

149, 29 U.S.C. § 160(j), (1). To hold that the

Tafi-Hariley Act also authorizes a_ private

litigant to secure interim relief would be to ignore

the closely circumscribed jurisdiction given to the

District Court and to generalize where Congress

has chosen to specify. To find exclusive authority

for relief vested in the Board and not in private

parties accords with other aspects of the Act. See

Amalgamated Utility Workers v. Consolidated

Edison Co., 308 U.S. 261 [60 S.Ct. 561, 84 L.Ed.

738]. Such was the authority recognized in

Capital Service, Inc. v. Labor Board, 347 U.S.

501 [74 S.Ct. 699, 98 L.Ed. 887]. Jd.

All that remains, then,is to consider the possible impaci of

5 U.S.C. § 7311 and 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1918.

Effect of Other Statutes On FLRA Exclusivity

Congress has also dealt specifically with the right — or

more accurately the lack of right — of federal employees

to strike against the government. Although the United

States in its brief characterizes the statute as a “prohibition

against strikes in the public sector,” 5 U.S.C. § 7311 does

not literally speak in those terms, but rather in terms of

one of the conditions of public employment:

An individual may not accept or hold a position

in the Government of the United States or the

Government of the District of Columbia if he—

* . * . 7

(3) participates in a strike, or asserts

the right to strike, against the Govern-

ment of the United States or the

78a

government of the District of Colum-

bia; or

(4) is a member of an organization

of employees of the Government of the

United States or of individuals

employed by the government of the

District of Columbia that he knows

asserts the right to strike against the

Government of the United States or the

government of the District of Colum-

bia.

Section 7311 must however be considered in conjunc-

tion with 18 U.S.C. § 1918, which makes an individual’s

violation of its provisions a crime, and 18 U.S.C. § 2(a),

which subjects anyone aiding and abetting commission of

a federal crime to punishment as a criminal principal.

Thus the specific statutory consequence of an individual

employee’s strike participation is his or her potential fer-

mination of employment under Section 7311 and potential

prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1918. As for a /abor

organization, in statutory terms its exposure is to potential

prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 2(a).

On three occasions before enactment of Title VII,

District Courts have exercised their jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1345° to enjoin strikes by fedeal sector

employees and labor unions (one of those cases granting

such relief against PATCO itself). Air Transport Ass’n v.

PATCO, 313 F.Supp. 181 (E.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd in part

and rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom., United

*At that time, of course, there was clearly no Act of Congress that

“otherwise provided.” Accordingly, because the plaintiff in each case

was the United States or a federal agency, Section 1345 jurisdiction

unquestionably existed.

79a

States v. PATCO, 438 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,

402 U.S. 915, 91 S.Ct. 1373, 28 L.Ed.2d 661 (1971);

United States v. Branch 60, National Ass’n of Letter Car-

riers, 312 F.Supp. 619, 621 (D.Conn. 1970); TVA v. Local

110, Sheet Metal Workers’ International Ass’n, 233

F.Supp, 997, 1000 (W.D.K.Y.) 1962). In each instance the

Court predicated relief on 5 U.S.C. § 7311 and the

criminal provisions of 18 U.S.C.’

Against that total background, we return to the

legislative history under Title VII to examine its references

to § U.S.C. § 7311. When proposed Title VII (having been

introduced in both Houses of Congress in May 1978) was

reported out of the respective Senate and House commit-

tees, it included a provision making it an unfair labor

practice for a labor organization to call, condone or

engage in a strike. On the House floor, Representative

Erlenborn sought to strike Title VII from the proposed

Civil Service Reform Act because of his concern that

federal employee strikes would become only unfair labor

practices rather than remaining illegal as they were under

existing law (124 Cong. Rec. H. 9454 (daily ed. Sept. 11,

1978)):

. .. Under the current law and the Executive

Order a strike by federal employees is illegal. The

provision here in Title VII instead makes it mere-

ly an unfair labor practice.

* * . 7 *

What I was pointing out is that at the present

time it is illegal, not just an unfair labor practice,

an illegal! strike by Federal employees supported

None of the decisions appeared to give any consideration to the

general equitable doctrine that injunctive relief will not be granted

against the commission of a crime.

80a

by their union will lead to the union no longer be-

ing allowed to be the exclusive bargaining agent.

Now that will be changed, in substance, by this

Title VII.

In response, co-sponsor and floor manager Represen-

tative Williarn Ford stated that the existing invalidity of

federal employee strikes (id. at 9455):

is not affected by this law at all, or by this bill,

rather, so the act of striking will continue to be a

violation of Federal law. The difference is that

this bill for the first time will add on top of that a

specific procedure available to the Government

to go after a labor organization which advocates

strike activity by making that an unfair labor

practice reachable in the same way that any other

unfair labor practice committed by the union or

its representatives is reached by the statute, so

that, in fact, we did not affect the existing law on

strike

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Record and brief — Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization v. United States · 454 U.S. 1083 | Frix