Record and brief — Mobil Oil Corp. v. United States Department of Energy
Supreme Court brief1981
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
wom
Office Supreme Court, US.
ik iL&ED
81- 499 SEP 11 1981
ALEXAN® STEVAS,
IN THE | CLK ad
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1981
Mosit O1 CorRPORATION,
Petitioner,
Vv.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY,
James B. E>warps, SECRETARY OF ENERGY,
AND Tosco CORPORATION,
Respondents.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES TEMPORARY
EMERGENCY COURT OF APPEALS
Of Counsel: R. Bruce MCLEAN
Cuarces S. LinpBerG Daniet JosEPH
WILLIAM C. STREETS (Counse! of Record)
Gait F. ScHutz Harry R. SILVER
Mosit Oi. Corporation Josepn T. Casey, Jr.
3225 Gallows Road Davip A. HoLzwortH
Fairfax , Virginia 22037 AKIN, Gump, STRAUSS, HAvER & FELD
1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 887-4000
Counsel for Petitioner
Mobil Oil Corporation
rr
PRESS OF BYRON S. ADAMS PRINTING, INC., WASHINGTON, D.C.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether it is proper for a federal court of appeals to
ignore findings and conclusions made by a district court in
granting a preliminary injunction and to fail to limit its scope
of review to assessing whether the district court's action was a
clear abuse of its discretion.
2. Whether a federal court of appeals can, in conflict
with other federal courts of appeals, require a party seeking a
preliminary injunction to satisfy a standard that imposes a
burden of showing conclusively that irreparable injury will
occur and that additionally ignores, rather than balances,
other factors, particularly the applicant’s likelihood of
ultimately prevailing upon the merits.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EEE ILE PLE IP PPE PNET i
TEE A RS oP SA te eee eee
EE 6 6c 50 b.0'e'6 o eb0eeee.eceedes
A. Regulatory Background ..... shiekavaednnaunens
B. The District Court's Opinion ...................
C. The Court of Appeals’ Decision .................
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ................006.
1. The Court Of Appeals Failed To Limit The Scope Of
lis Review To Determining Whether The District
Court Had Abused Its Discretion ................ 8
ll. The Decision Below Conflicts With Decisions Of
Other Circuits In Ruling That An Applicant Must
Make A “‘Clear Showing”’ Of Irreparable Harm In
Order To Obtain A Preliminary Injunction And
Theat The Applicant’s Likelihood Of Success On The
ED no 66 eccctecsescbseseansessc 11
Er. (Eee te to Oe eo eee wea bales 21
CoN DW NON NHN — <
Vv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES: Page
Alabama v. United States, 279 U.S. 229 (1929) 2.2... x
Blackwelder Furn. Co. of Statesville, Inc. v. Seilig Manufac-
turing Co., 550 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1977) 22... 13 n.8
Brown v. Chote, 411 U.S. 452 (1973) «2.22... eee ee. 8, 13
Charlie's Girls, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 483 F.2d 953 (2d Cir.
FSR O EE or POS 12
Citizens for a Better Environment v. City of Park Ridge, 567
nD... scavacneutwneabwouses 12
Continental Group, Inc. v. Amoco Chemicals Corp., 614
F.2d 351 (3d Cir. 1980) .......... .eise en melee 12, 13
Dataphase Systems, Inc. v. C L Systems, Inc., 640 F.2d 109
i a vats 5 6qacbn gn swthhndteéeceas 13 n.8
Doran v. Salem Inn, 422 U.S. 922 (1975) . 2.2... .0.04.. 8
Foley vy. Alabama State Bar, 648 F.2d 355 (Sth Cir.
Be aca haa ay 400 Gated eckedeeeniee at 13
Gilley v. United States, 649 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1981) 2... 13
Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738
EE ae et wcbeteendd eedveces 15
Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. Holiday Tours,
ae | oe ey, 12
Luadgrin v. Clavtor, 619 F.2d 61 ChOth Cir. 1980) 2... .. 12
Meccano, Lid. v. Wanamaker, 253 U.S. 136 (1920) = 8, 10 n.7
Perry v. Perry, 90 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 19ST) 222... 15
Rahley v. Columbia Phonograph Co., 122 F. 623 (4th Cir.
Eas 10. ousaeek bis adeees eo senevaewene 10 n.7
Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S.61 1974)... 160.10, 17 0.11
Texas Traction Co. v. Barron G. Collier, Inc., 195 F. 65
Re a a a Se 10 0.7
Tosco v. Lubanks, No. 10-35 (TECA Aug. 14,1980) 16.10
United Steelworkers vy. Swit, No. 80-1193, 49 U.S.L.W.
SR a nar ee 10
University of Texas v. Camenisch, (OU S.Ct. 1830 1981). 14
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Comm'n v. Holiday
Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d 841 OD.C. Cir. 1977) 2000... 12
vi
Table of Authorities Continued
Page
STATUTES, REGULATIONS, AND RULES:
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553
I en ee ee eekee 19 n.13
Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, as amended, 12
TR Ree | 2, 8n.5
Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, 15 U.S.C.
EE 3s. 5's c's ecb beeeeu mews 2, 20 n.14
Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, 28 U.S.C.81254(1) ... 2
The Pay Administration Act, as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 5596
cea seeds ls ss aheveesnseuceets es 17 n.11
Subpart C of the Mandatory Petroleum Allocation Regu-
lations, 1OC.F.R.§ 211.61 et seg. A981) 2.2.2.0... 2
Section 211.66, 1OC.F.R.§ 211.66 ............... 6
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. (1980)
ES EE PEO Se 16 n.10
NTE ee sen ee ee wn 10
MISCELLANEOUS AUTHORITIES:
Laycock, Book Review, “Injunctions and the Irreparable
Injury Rule,’ 57 Tex. L. Rev. 1065 (1979) ...... 14n9
Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91
i cd a cesedaeteccenedene 13
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1981
No.
Mosit O1 Corporation,
Petitioner,
v.
Unirep STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY,
James B. Epwarps, SECRETARY OF ENERGY,
AND Tosco CORPORATION,
Respondents.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES TEMPORARY
EMERGENCY COURT OF APPEALS
Mobil Oil Corporation respectfully petitions for a writ of
certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Tem-
porary Emergency Court of Appeals in Mobil Oil Corp. v.
DOE, _— F.2d — (TECA 1981), entered on August 14,
1981.!
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the district court is not reported, but is
reprinted in the separate Appendix as App. B (9a-85a). The
opinion of the court of appeals — the decision from which cer-
liorari is sought — is not reported, but is reprinted as App. A
(la-7a).
' The caption of the case in this Court contains the names of all
parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is sought to be
reviewed. The list naming all parent companies, subsidiaries (except
wholly owned subsidiaries), and affiliates of Mobil, required by Rule
28.1 of this Court's Rules, was included in Mobil’s Application to
Stay Mandate Pending Certiorari, filed on September 2, 1981, and is
incorporated here by reference.
2
JURISDICTION
The court below entered judgment on August 14, 1981.
App. A (la). Under section 211 of the Economic Stabilization
Act of 1970, as amended, 12 U.S.C. §1904 note (1976), a peti-
tion for certiorari may be filed within 30 days of the judgment
of the court of appeals. This Court has jurisdiction to review
the judgment below under section 211(g) and 28 U.S.C.
$1254(1).
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED
The pertinent sections of the Emergency Petroleum Alloca-
tion Act of 1973, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §751 et. seq. (1976)
and sections of Subpart C of the Mandatory Petroleum Alloca-
tion Regulations, 10 C.F.R. $211.61 ef. seg. (1981), are
reprinted in the separate Appendix as App. E (9la-93a) and
App. F (9Sa-128a), respectively.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Mobil Oil Corporation brought this action under section
211 of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, as amended, 12
U.S.C. § 1904 note (1976), in the District Court for the North-
ern District of New York alleging that there were serious flaws
in the administration by the Department of Energy of its En-
tillements Program, under which the Department required
companies that refine crude oil to make huge cash payments
to each other for the purpose of equalizing the economic ben-
efits of refiners’ varying access to price-controlled crude oil.
Mobil sought a preliminary injunction to bar the issuance of
the final entitiements list (the order requiring purchase and
sale of entitlements) and the termination of the Entitlements
Program until the Department of Energy corrected flaws in
the program. The district court, in an 80-page opinion,
granted a preliminary injunction, finding a great likelihood of
success on the merits, irreparable injury to Mobil in the
absence of relies, lack of injury to DOE or other parties from
the injunction, and consistency of the relief with the public in-
terest.
Without discussing the d‘strict court's opinion, and without
mentioning that the district court had written an opinion, the
court of appeals reversed. It held that Mobil had failed to
establish the certainty of irreparable injury in the absence of
preliminary relief. Accordingly, the court of appeals held that
preliminary relief must be denied.
Mobil sought a stay of mandate pending certiorari from the
court of appeals by motion of August 19, 1981. That motion
was denied on September 2. On that date Mobil sought a stay
from this Court. On September 3, Justice Brennan stayed the
mandate until further order (No. A-192).
A. Regulatory Background
While the details of the operation of the Entitlements Pro-
gram are complex, the theory of the program was quite sim-
ple.’ The program was intended to equalize the economic ben-
efits of access to lower cost price-controlled crude oil among
companies that refined crude oil. This equalization was ac-
complished on a monthly basis by requiring refiners that re-
ported proportionately greater access to price-controlled crude
oil to make cash payments to refiners that reported propor-
lionately lesser access. The average access to price-controlled
crude oil was established on the basis of reports from all
refiners of price-controlled crude oil receipts compared to re-
ports of all crude oil refined for the month.
The basic mechanics of the program were as follows. An
‘“‘entitlement’’ was, in essence, a license to refine price-con-
trolled crude oil. One entitlement was needed for every barre!
of price-controlled crude oil a company refined.
Every month the Department of Energy calculated how
much price-controlled crude oil was available nationwide on
the basis of reports from refiners as to the crude received at
their refineries. Then the Department issued entitlements to
all refiners. The number issved to each refiner was supposed
lo represent one entitlement for each barrel of price-con-
The operation of the Entitlements Program is set forth in detail in
the opinion of the district court. App. B (1 1a-18a).
4
trolled crude oil that the refiner would have had if all refiners
had had proportionately equal access to price-controlled
crude. If a refiner was issued fewer entitlements than barrels
of price-controlled crude oil that it reported, the Department
ordered it to buy entitlements at a fixed price from refiners
that had been issued more entitlements than they needed.
Criminal and civil penalties could be imposed against any firm
that failed to follow the Department of Energy's orders.
As the district court found, there has always been an incen-
tive for refiners to avoid reporting the receipt of price-con-
trolled crude oil, since the fewer barrels of price-controlled
crude oil a refiner reported, the fewer entitlements that it had
to buy (or the more that it could sell). See App. B (18a-27a),
(39a-45a). The district court also found that the agency’s reg-
ulations gave refiners flexibility in reporting refinery receipts
of price-controlled crude oil, such that refiners could choose
an accounting system that permitted them to build up inven-
tories of price-controlled crude oil not technically booked into
their refineries and thus not incurring any entitlements obliga-
tions. Mobil did not have such a system. It reported for en-
tillements purposes any price-controlled crude oil it acquired.
As early as 1977, Mobil advised the Department of Energy
that the Departmeni’s own published figures were showing
that substantial volumes of crude oil that had been reported to
the agency as being price-controlled when they were produced
at oil fields were never reported as price-controlled refinery
receipts. When President Carter announced the phased de-
control of crude oil pricing in 1979, the incentive to avoid re-
porting the receipt of price-controlled crude oil became
stronger. All a refiner had to do to make an immense profit
was buy price-controlled crude oil, hold it in a nonrefining in-
ventory until afier decontrol, and then sell it at the free mar-
ket price, without ever having incurred an entitlements obli-
gation on it (/.e., without having had to share the benefit of ac-
cess to it).
After announcement of phased decentrol, the rate at which
price-controlled crude was disappearing increased rapidly. By
the time President Reagan announced immediate decontrol
on January 28, 1981, the incentive was overwhelming and the
gap between barrels of price-controlled oil reported as pro-
duced and barrels reported as rece’ ed by a refiner for entitle-
ments purposes had become immense. App. B (20a-22a).
As *>e district court found, this “‘disappearance”’ of price-
controlled crude oil had serious consequences for the integrity
of the regulatory scheme, the consumer, the refining indus-
try, and refiners, including Mobil, that had not caused the dis-
appearance. App. B (24a-26a). Because not all price-controlled
crude oil was reported, the Entithements Program could not
and did not achieve its purpose of equitably distributing access
to all price-controlled crude oil. This effect was felt concretely
and massively. The fewer barrels of price-controlled crude oil
reported, the lower the national average of price-controlled
crude oil available for sharing, which resulted in the issuance
of fewer entitlements to all refiners and, consequently, higher
crude oil acquisition costs for all. These higher crude oil costs
could be passed on to the consumer. App. B (24a). The district
court found that in 1979 and 1980, refine’s’ crude oil costs
had been wrongly increased by $5.6 billion to the great injury
of those refiners, like Mobil, that had not manipulated in-
ventories. App. B (24a).
The impact on Mobil provided a dramatic example. When
the average volume of price-controlled crude oil declined, due
to “‘disappearing”’ crude oil, Mobil had to buy more entitle-
ments to make up for the increasing gap between the artificial-
ly decreased industry average and Mobil’s refinery receipts.
The district court found that in 1979 and 1980, Mobil was
forced to pay $284 million for additional entitlements because
of disappearing price-controlled crude oil. App. B (26a). The
district court also found that if the final regular entitlements
notice requiring the purchase and sale of entitlements is is-
sued, Mobil will be forced to buy an additional $50 million
worth of entitlements. App. B (77a).
B. The District Court's Opinion
In an exhaustive 80-page opinion the district court
preliminarily enjoined the Department of Energy from termi-
naling the program by issuing final entitlements notices. The
final regular notice, which reflects transactions for the first 27
days of January, 1981,’ would require Mobil to buy an addi-
tional approximately $50 million worth of entithkements. App.
B (77a). The court made extensive findings based on live tes-
limony, public data compiled by the Department of Energy,
and a repoit prepared by an independent consultant for the
agency.
The district court found that Mobil was likely to prevail on
the merits. App. B (6Sa-75a). In short, the district court found
that substantial quantities of price-controlled crude oil had
“disappeared,” that the disappearance materially distorted
the Entitlements Program and subverted its purpose, that the
cause of the disappearance was regulatory loopholes that per-
mitted some companies to avoid reporting receipt of price-
controlled crude oil, and that the Department of Energy had
been aware of the problem for four years and had refused to
do anything about it.
The distric! court also found that Mobil would suffer ir-
reparable injury if the final entithkements notice was issued
without corrective action by the agency. App. B (7Sa-80a).
The court found that there was no remedy available to Mobil
that could provide return of the $50 million it would be re-
quired to pay, let alone return of the $284 million Mobil has
already lost, should Mobil prevail on the merits.
‘ Entitlements notices were issued two months after the applicable
transactions occurred. See 10 C.F.R. § 211.66. After oral argument in
the court of appeals, the Department of Energy issued final so-called
“clean-up” regulations specifically designed to end the agency's role
in the program. The proposed *‘clean-up"’ regulations, discussed by
the district court, did not deal with the problem of disappearing crude
oil, App. B (78a-79a)_ and the court of appeals did not conclude to
the contrary.
The district court also found that the public interest would
be best served by terminating the Entitlements Program only
after all price-controlled oi! has been accounted for. App. B
(80a). The court further found that the Department of Energy
as administrator of the program would not be injured by the
issuance of an injunction. App. B (80a). Finally, the district
court found that all refiners that did not cause crude oil to
*“disappear’’ would benefit from the issuance of an injunction
that required the agency to take corrective action. Conversely,
the only refiners that would benefit from the failure to issue
an injunction are those companies that are responsible for the
problem and that unjustly benefited from disappearing price-
controlled crude oil. 4
C. The Court of Appeals’ Decision
The Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals reversed the
district court in a terse seven-page opinion that does not even
mention that the district court wrote an opinion. App. A (la-
7a). The court of appeals did not address the merits, except to
quote language from a decision by the Department of
Energy's Office of Hearings and Appeals agreeing with
Mobil’s position on the merits. Indeed, the court of appeals
did not discuss or even mention any of the findings made by
the district court. The court of appeais reversed the district
court on the sole ground that Mobil had “‘failed to make a
clear showing that it will suffer irreparable harm if an injunc-
tion does not issue.” App. A (4a). The court of appeals
reasoned that Mobil had not shown irreparable injury because
three purported avenues of relief were said to be available: (1)
court challenge of the determination of the Department of
Energy's Office of Hearings and Appeals that it lacked jurisdic-
tion over Mobil’s claim, (2) Mobil’s Petition for Emergency
Rulemaking that had been pending since February 10; and (3)
the right to appeal administratively from the issuance of a final
‘ App. B (81a). Significantly, no evidence was presented to the dis-
trict court concerning harm to any company in the event an injunc-
tion was issued.
rule that does not address the problem raised by Mobil — /.e.,
the right to ask the agency to change its mind.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
1. The Court Of Appeals Failed To Limit The Scope Of Its Re-
view To Determining Whether The District Court Had
Abused Its Discretion.
This Court has repeaicdly ruled that the scope of appellate
review of the grant or denial of preliminary injunctive relief is
to be confined solely to the abuse-of-discretion standard. F.x.,
Doran v. Salem Inn, 422 U.S. 922, 931-32 (1975); Brown v.
Chote, 411 U.S. 452, 457 (1973). This standard has been uni-
formly mandated by this Court for many years. E.g¢., Alabama
v. United States, 279 U.S. 229. 230-31 (1929); Meccano, Lid.
v. Wanamaker, 253 U.S. 136, 141 (1920).
The court of appeals here simply ignored this limitation on
its scope of review. The court did not acknowledge that the
standard applied, and in reversing it did not deal with or even
mention any finding or conclusion that the district court had
made in the course of its exhaustive 80-page opinion. In fact,
the court of appeals did not even mention that the district
court had written an opinion.°
‘A number of statements in the text of the court of appeals’ opin-
ion also make it clear that that court effectively considered de novo,
rather than on the basis of the district court's decision, the question
of whether Mobil was entitled to a preliminary injunction. The court
of appeals siated, for example, that it found it “unnecessary to re-
view the merits of Mobil’s explanations of how it sustained the con-
tentions it advances.”’ App. A (4a) (emphasis added). It also held.
** this court finds that Mobil has failed to make a clear showing that it will
suffer irreparable harm if an injunction does not issue.”’ /bid. (em-
phasis added). The court later stated, ** with the finding that Mobil has
Jailed to show irreparable harm, we need not reach the question of the
construction of section 211 of the Economic Stabilization Act... .”
App. A (7a) (emphasis added).
All of these statements reflect the court's error. What it should
have been reviewing was not **Mobil’s explanations,”’ but the dis-
trict court's findings of fact and conclusion, reached after a lengthy
9
The court of appeals’ failure to treat the grant of preliminary
relief as being within the district court’s discretion and to
defer to — much tess to mention — the district court’s opin-
ion is egregious error that warrants correction by this Court.
A motion for preliminary injunction, coming at an inter-
locutory stage of litigation, must be decided on the basis of an
incomplete record. At such an interlocutory stage, the district
court's day-to-day familiarity with the case is of unique value.°
That is particularly so where, as here, the district court's deci-
sion, even though preliminary, is based upon substantial vol.
umes of evidence, here there were both live testimony and
hundreds of pages of exhibits (by volume, most of the docu-
mentary evidence being DOE’s own material offered by
Mobil). Even on the issue of irreparable injury — the only is-
sue thought to be relevant by the court of appeals — the dis-
trict court’s opinion contains an extended factual and legal
discussion. App. B (75a-80a). Not even this section of the dis-
trict court’s opinion was referred to by the court of appeals.
Thus, this case represents a serious departure from the
long-established and frequently repeated standard of review
set by this Court. This Court should correct that error.
discussion of the evidence and the law, that Mobil had an over-
whelming chance of success on the merits. App. B (6Sa-7Sa).
Similarly, it was not appropriate for the court of appeals to “‘find”
that Mobil had failed to show irreparable injury, rather its task was to
assess whether the district court's findings and conclusions on that
question (App. B (75a-80a)) were an abuse of discretion.
* Even in the short time the case was before him, Judge Munson
had entertained, heard argument, and ruled upon a large number of
matters — motions by the government to dismiss and to quash a sub-
poena for documents, a motion for a temporary restraining order, the
separate question of the court's jurisdiction to grant relief (not ai is-
sue here), and supplemental briefing on the significance of a massive
DOE study, which Mobil argued, and the court found, supported
Mobil’s other evidence. Aside from his 80-page opinion granting a
preliminary injunction, issued on June 3, 1981, the district court also
issued a ten-page decision on May 15 partially granting and partially
denying the government's motion to quash a subpoena and an opin-
ion On its grant of a temporary restraining order on April 29.
10
There is a second reason for this Court to act on this ques-
tion. Not only did the court of appeals disregard its own lim-
ited review function, but it did so in circumstances that will
particularly discourage district courts from pursuing their ap-
propriate functions. Here the district court undertook to pre-
pare in a matter of 22 days (the time between hearing and
decision on preliminary relief) a massive and comprehensive
opinion assessing the legal background and the evidence and
setting out its findings and conclusions on every issue raised
by the parties. This labor musi have been performed at great
inconvenience to the district court, but it no doubt repre-
sented that court's desire to fulfill its obligation to explain its
decision in an important case. By ignoring this exemplary
effort the court of appeals effectively told the district court that
it had been wasting its time in expressing its views. That
message creates an unfortunate precedent that this Court
should erase.
This Court has granted certiorari and received briefs on the
merits, but not yet heard oral argument, on a similar issue. In
United Steelworkers v. Swint, No. 80-1193, 49 U.S.L.W. 3788
(April 20, 1981), the Court agreed to consider whether the
courts of appeals are always bound by the clearly erroneous
standard of Rule 52(a), Fed. R. Civ. P., in reviewing a district
court's factfindings. The Fifth Circuit had there held that that
standard does not apply where findings are made under an.
erroneous view of the law. In the present case the court of ap-
peals has effectively held that there are circumstances, not
defined, in which a court of appeals may dispense with the
abuse-of-discretion standard, which covers both matters of
fact and legal issues,’ that normally applies on review of a dis-
trict court’s disposition of a motion for preliminary injunction.
We submit that the issues are related and are of equal impor-
tance, and the Court should consider and dispose of the two
cases together.
’ E.g., Texas Traction Co. v. Barron G. Collier, Inc., 195 F. 65, 66
(Sth Cir. 1912); Rahley v. Columbia Phonograph Co., 122 F. 623,
625 (4th Cir. 1903); both cited by this Court with approval in Mec-
cano, Lid. v. Wanamaker, 253 U.S. at 141.
Il. The Decision Below Conflicts With Decisions Of Other
Circuits In Ruling That An Applicant Must Make A
“Clear Showing” Of irreparable Harm In Order To Ob-
tain A Preliminary Injunction And That The Applicant's
Likelihood Of Success On The Merits Is Irrelevant.
The court of appeals’ decision reversing the district court's
grant of a preliminary injunction is in direct conflict with the
decisions of at least three and, more likely, five other courts of
appeals. lt furthermore enlarges the disagreement and confu-
sion already existing among the courts of appeals as to the
proper standard to apply in determining whether a preliminary
injunction should issue. This Court should rule upun this sig-
nificant issue.
The court of appeals held that the preliminary injunction
was wrongly granted solely because *‘Mobil has not shown
that issuance of the [entitlements] notice will place it in a posi-
tion which precludes ultimate recovery. ...° App. A (4a).
The court held that it was ‘“‘unnecessary”’ for it to consider
Mobil’s likelihood of success on the merits because “‘this
court finds that Mobil has failed to make a clear showing that
it will suffer irreparable harm if an injunction does not issue.”
Id. Specifically, the court of appeals relied on Mobil’s opportu-
nity to try again to convince the Department of Energy to
change its position and to provide an administrative means for
Mobil to obtain relief. The court reached this conclusion
despite the Department of Energy’s repeated statements that
it intends to terminate the Entitlements Program without ac-
tion on, or further investigation of, its mismanagement of the
Entitlements Program, as soon as it is no longer enjoined
from doing so. The court of appeals did not disturb or even
address the finding by the district court that Mobil would be
without a remedy for wrongful payments if the Department of
Energy refused to modify its position.
The rule so expressed is in conflict with the rules estab-
lished by at least the Second, Ninth, and District of Columbia
Circuits. While those circuits do not entirely agree among
themselves, they do agree that it is not necessary for a party
12
that irreparable injury will inevitably occur in the absence of
interlocutory relief. Rather, in those courts the movant need
show only a “‘possibility’’ of irreparable injury, and that
possibility is then one factor to be weighed with others, most
particularly the likelihood of ultimate success on the merits
and the effect of grant or denial of relief on other persons.
Charlie's Girls, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 483 F.2d 953, 954 (2d Cir.
1973) (per curiam), Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Comm'n v. Holiday Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d 841, 843 (D.C. Cir.
1977). Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National
Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir. 1980). The
Ninth Circuit is quite explicit about the balancing effect (id. at
1201):
In this circuit the moving party may meet its burden by
demonstrating either (1) a combination of probable suc-
cess on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury
or (2) that serious questions are raised and the balance of
hardships tips sharply in its favor. [Citation omitted.]
These are no’ separate tests but the outer reaches ‘‘of a
single continuum.” [Citation omitted.]
The test in two other circuits, the Seventh and Tenth, is
more rigid, but still appears to conflict with the holding in the
present case. The Tenth Circuit has held that a movant must
demonstrate that there is a ‘‘prob. ole danger” of irreparable
injury, apparently without any balancing. Lundgrin v. Claytor,
619 F.2d 61, 63 (10th Cir. 1980). The Seventh Circuit requires
a “*balanc[ing of] the probability of ultimate success at the fi-
nal hearing with the consequences of immediate irreparable
injury possibly stemming from denial of the injunction.”
Citizens for a Better Environment v. City of Park Ridge, 567 F.2d
689, 690-91 (7th Cir. 1975) (Emphasis added).
In contrast, the Third, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits, most
similarly to the court of appeals in the present case, impose an
absolute requirement that the movant establish that it ‘‘will
suffer” irreparable injury if preliminary relief is denied. Conti-
nental Group, Inc. v. Amoco Chemicals Corp., 614 F.2d 351,
359 (3d Cir. 1980) (*This Court has heid that more than a
risk of irreparable harm must be demonstrated. The requisite
13
for injunctive relief has been characterized as a ‘clear showing
of immediate irreparable injury’. ...°); Foley v. Alabama
State Bar, 648 F.2d 355, 358 (Sth Cir. 1981); Gilley v. United
States, 649 F.2d 449, 454 (6th Cir. 1981).
Thus, there is very substantial conflict and confusion
among the courts of appeals as to the proper standard to ap-
ply.* One author has referred to the preliminary injunction
standards employed by the federal courts as a ‘dizzying diver-
sity of formulations, unaccompanied by any explanation for
choosing one instead of another... ..’ Leubsdorf, The Stand-
ard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 525, 526
(1978). While this Court has not to our knowledge ruled
directly on the issue, it has stated its approval of a standard
clearly at variance with that used by the court of appeals here.
In Brown v. Chote, 411 U.S. at 456, this Court said in part
(emphasis added):
The issuance of the requested preliminary injunction was
the only action taken by the District Court. In determin-
ing whether such relief was required, that court properly
addressed itself to two relevant factors: first, the ap-
pellee’s possibilities of success on the merits; and second,
the possibility that irreparable injury would have resulted,
absent interlocutory relief.
In addition to the fact that it extended the conflict among
the courts of appeals, the decision in the present case further
merits review because it is incorrect and exacts an unreasona-
bly stringent standard for preliminary relief.
* The Eighth Circuit, for example, recently was required to con-
_ sider the issue en banc in order to clarify the standard to be applied by
the district courts of that circuit in Dataphase Systems, Inc. v. C L
Systems, Inc., 640 F.2d 109 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc). That court
noted, **[wJe apprehend that in recent years some misunderstanding
of that standard has developed. We recognize that language in some
of our recent opinions may have contributed to uncertainty as to the
appropriate test or tests.”’ /d. at 112. See also Blackwelder Furn. Co.
of Statesville, Inc. v. Seilig Manufacturing Co., 550 F.2d 189 (4th
Cir. 1977) (reversing a district court’s denial of a preliminary injunc-
tion because the lower court mistakenly applied an appellate court
standard not a trial court standard. /d. at 193-94).
14
It is the essence of preliminary relief that it is sought early in
litigation, usually to preserve the status quo, when there is
need for rapid decision and the parties’ factual and legal pre-
sentations are incomplete. For that reason, a movant is not re-
quired to prove his case in full at a preliminary injunction
hearing. University of Texas v. Camenisch, 101 S. Ct. 1830,
1833 (1981). It is universally recognized and each of the court
of appeals’ decisions cited above (at 172-13) states that a
movant for preliminary relief need show only a likcithood of
success on the merits.
It is utterly inconsistent with this rationale to require, as did
the court of appeals here, a movant to show in every case that
in no conceivable circumstances would he not suffer irrepara-
ble injury if relief is denied.” At least two courts have specifi-
cally recognized that any showing — including irreparability of
injury — required for a preliminary injunction cannot be
*There would appear to be two possible explanations why some
courts might have required a clear showing of irreparable injury
First, as a practical matter in many cases there is no question of the
irreparability of the harm that will be suffered if relief is denied.
Some courts may have become accustomed to the ease with which a
significant number of parties have been able to make the showing. In
many cases, however, the irreparability of injury may not be clear at
the preliminary injunction stage. As we have urged, it is illogical in
such cases to require the movant to show irreparable injury to a cer-
tainty at an early stage.
Second, there appears to be at least some confusion arising from
the fact that irreparable injury — or, more correctly put, an injury
without an adequate remedy at law — was a jurisdictional prere-
quisite of equity relief. See Laycock, Book Review, “‘Injunctions and
the Irreparable Injury Rule,’ 57 Tex. L. Rev. 1065, 1070-71 (1979).
But that should not be a problem with invocation of preliminary
equitable relief. In any event, the court of appeals has not suggested
here that Mobil could obtain any reliel at law; all the remedies sug-
gested as not impossible by the court of appeals are equitable and ad-
ministrative. The sole importance of a showing of the likelihood of
irreparable injury in the present case is the weighing of equitable fac-
tors to determine whether in the district court's proper exercise of
discretion preliminary relief was warranted.
15
absolute because of the interlocutory stage at which the ques-
tion must be decided. Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch
Co., 206 F.2d 738, 742-43 (2d Cir. 1953) (Frank, J.). Perry v.
Perry, 190 F.2d 601, 602 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (Bazelon, J.).
This case shows how the lack of a consistent standard
among the courts of appeals permits individual courts to pick
one of the existing formulations and to pursue it to an illogical
conclusion. Here the district court held, and the court of ap-
peals did not disagree, that if the Department of Energy were
to end the Entithements Program as it now plans by simply
issuing the final lists as soon as it is free to, Mobil will have no
mechanism to invoke in order to seek a remedy. Nor did the
court of appeals disagree with the district court’s conclusion
that the DOE has failed to act over the four years that it has
known of the distortion of the program by “disappearing”
price-controlled crude oil, and that it is unlikely to act. Indeed,
the court of appeals joined in the criticism of DOE for its inac-
tion. App. A (6a-7a). Instead, the court of appeals held that
Mobil had not shown irreparable injury because the DOE
might act to create a mechanism by which relief could be
sought. App. A (4a). Thus, the reversal of the district court's
grant of a preliminary injunction was based on a holding not
that Mobil had a route to pursue to obtain relief, but rather
that the DOE might give it one. This holding, we submit, is far
more severe than those of other courts, because the future
availability of any of these avenues is not known and cannot
be known now, and at this preliminary stage of the litigation it
is decidedly unfair to deny Mobil relief pendente lite on the
possibility that one may become available.
That is particularly so because Mobil has made a strong
showing on the other factors that should be weighed with its
showing on irrevarable injury. The district court concluded
(without question from the court of appeals) that Mobil has a
strong likelihood «of success on the merits. The district court
held that DOE hau mismanaged the Entitlements Program
and refused to correct that mismanagement, that a number of
refiners had been able to take advantage of the flaws in the
16
program by manipulating their inventories to avoid reporting
their receipts of price-controlled crude oil, that these acts had
already cost thos. refiners who had not manipulated invento-
ries $5.6 billion. Both the district court and the court of ap-
peals criticized the DOE in unusually strong terms for its inac-
tion in the face of a serious problem. The district court found
that Mobil has already been wrongly forced to pay $284 mil-
lion into the program and that publication of the final entitle-
ments list, as DOE intends to publish it, would wrongly re-
quire Mobil to pay an additional $50 million. The district court
also held (again without any question from the court of ap-
peals) that preliminary relief would not injure the DOE or
third parties. '”
" The DOE introduced no evidence before the district court on
this or any other point.
In an unusual development, the Tosco Corporation, without even
attempting to appear before the district court, asked the court of ap-
peals for a writ of mandamus that would have forbidden the district
court to grant preliminary relief. Tosco submitted an affidavit in sup-
port of that petition. The court of appeals dismissed the petition on
June 9, 1981, although it permitted Tosco to intervene in the appeal.
App. D (89a). It is unclear whether Tosco’s affidavit, which was filed
as part of the mandamus action that was dismissed, is in the record of
this case, but in any event it should not be considered since it was not
submitted to the district court first. In a companion case dismissing a
similar writ simultaneously sought by Tosco, the court of appeals
faulted Tosco for not first appearing and presenting its claims before
the district court, Tosco v. Eubanks, No. 10-35 (TECA August 14,
1981), slip op. at 3, and it would obviously be irregular and wrong to
judge the correctness of the district cos s action on the basis of the
evidence that was intentionally not submitted to it. In any event, the
Tosco affidavit shows no more than temporary loss of money, which
does not amount to irreparable injury. Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S
61 (1974).
We also submit that Tosco should not be permitted to participate
in this Court. The court of appeals seriously erred in permitting
Tosco to intervene, since us the court of appeals itself later held in
Tosco v. Eubanks, Tosco had no excuse for its failure to appear in the
district court. Thus, its intervention in the court of appeals was em-
phatically untimely. C/. Rule 24(a) and (b), Fed. R. Civ. P. It will en-
courage evasion of parties’ responsibilities to raise their claims as
17
With respect to irreparable injury, the district court noted
that the monthly entitlements lists are the only means the De-
partment of Energy had to correct errors made in its prior ad-
ministration of the program, and that apart from issuance of
such lists, there exists no means to redress such errors. App.
B (78a). The Department of Energy neither pays nor receives
funds under the Entithements Program, rather, it orders
refiners to pay huge sums to other refiners. There is no DOE
regulation that permits, and no precedent for, one refiner to
make any judicial claim against another for over- or underpay-
ment of entitlements obligations. The district court also held
— and the DOE’s attempts to defeat stay of the court of ap-
peals’ mandate underscore — that the DOE will issue the final
list or lists (see note 13, infra) as soon as possible if the
preliminary injunction is lifted. This will permit those refiners
who have manipulated their inventories to increase and con-
solidate the improper advantage they have taken. It will also
leave Mobil without any mechanism of redress to regain its
losses even assuming that Mobil’s claim of injury is sustained.
The three routes suggested by the court of appeals as possi-
bly providing courses through which Mobil could obtain relief
are, to put it mildly, weak reeds. DOE may unilaterally defeat
all of them.'' The court of appeals held: first, that DOE might
soon as possible if Tosco, which disdained to appear in district court,
is permitted to appear as a party in this Court arguing that the district
court was wrong.
With respect to the effect of the injunction on third parties, there
were also a number of briefs amicus curiae filed by smail refiners in
the court of appeals containing statements of counsel which are of
course non-evidentiary. Moreover, most of the amici supported
Mobil’s position.
'' For this reason the court of appeals’ reliance on Sampson v.
Murray, 415 U.S. 61 (1974), was entirely misplaced. There this
Court held that adequate relief could be had without an injunction
because the Pay Administration Act, as amended, § U.S.C. § 5596
(1980), provided a means of compensation for temporary loss of em-
ployment. 415 U.S. at 90-91. Here, by contrast, no such route to ob-
tain relief will exist after the final lists, now enjoined, are issued. The
court of appeals has held that Mobil’s injury is not irreparable be-
cause it is possible that DOE will create a remedy.
18
still rule on an emergency petition for rulemaking filed by
Mobil seven months ago, on February 10, and concerning
which DOE has done absolutely nothing, second, that Mobil
might sue to overturn the decision in which the DOE’s Office
of Hearings and Appeals held that it lacked jurisdiction to or-
der relief;'’ and third, that Mobil might administratively “‘ap-
peal’’ the publication of final regulations governing the so-
called **clean-up” entitlements list. App. A (Sa).
None of these possibilities provides any assurance that a
mechanism to obtain ultimate recovery would exist to provide
relief shouid Mobil prevail on the merits. It is DOE’s official
position (although Mobil would not agree) that the Office of
Hearings and Appeals lacked jurisdiction over the merits of
Mobil’s claim. The court of appeals offered only the possibility
that Mobil might initiate a judicial challenge of that position,
the court did not comment on Mobil’s chance of success in
overcoming DOE's interpretation of its own internal dele-
gations of decision-making power. In any event, DOE could
formally change those delegations to defeat OHA’s jurisdic-
tion definitively. The first and third of the court’s suggestions
amount to nothing more than the possibility that DOE may
yet change its mind. '' Given the fact that the district court and
'? Since DOE itself appeared and argued before the Office of Hear-
ings and Appeals that OHA lacked jurisdiction, it will not lie in the
government's mouth to suggest that such a suit might be successful.
'* After oral argument in the court of appeals, DOE promulgated in
final form the “‘clean-up™ regulations discussed by the district court
at App. B (78a-79a). Under these regulations, after a so-called clean-
up list that will reflect some corrections to prior reports (which DOE
now Says that it will publish very shortly after the mandate issues),
DOE as an agency would no longer act on entitlements disputes but
would leave them to the courts to settle. DOE then argued by letter
to the court of appeals that these new regulations did provide the av-
enue for relief that Mobil was seeking. Mobil responded by letter (see
App. G (129a-134a)), arguing that the constitutionality of the mech-
anism set up by the new regulations was highly doubtful at best be-
cause it sought to have litigation between a complaining party and
DOE be binding on all refiners regardiess of whether they were or
could have been parties, and also because the regulations assumed
19
the DOE’s own quasi-independent hearing authority, the Of-
fice of Hearings and Appeals, in a passage quoted with ap-
proval by the court of appeals itself, have strongly criticized
DOE for its inaction and its self-fostered ignorance about the
disappearing price-controlled crude oil, the possibility that
DOE will finally do something voluntarily to create a route for
relief must be regarded as remote. Clearly, if the agency does
not change its stated intention to terminate the Entitlements
Program us soon as possible, Mobil will suffer irreparable in-
jury that could not be rectified even if Mobil ultimately pre-
vails on the merits. '*
the existence of (or tried to establish) the right of private federal
court actions between refiners to settle entitlements disputes — a
cause of action for which there is no precedent and which the district
court found (App. B (78a)) did not exist. Mobil also showed that
even if such lawsuits could be maintained, there would be thousands
of such actions over this dispute alone as those refiners that had been
injured sought to find and fasien liability on those refiners that had
unfairly profited by inventory manipulation. There are about 300
refiners in the United States.
The court of appeals did not agree with DOE that this *‘clean-up”
mechanism provides a remedy for Mobil. Rather, the court in a brief
phrase summarized the content of the rule and told Mobil that it
could *‘appeal”* the issuance of the final regulations under 5 U.S.C.
$553. App. A (6a). (The DOE regulation cited in the court’s opin-
ion, 10 C.F.R. §$ 205.160, merely provides that 5 U.S.C. § 553 ap-
plies.) Of course, section 553 does not provide for an appeal in the
commonly understood sense of asking a higher authority to review
the decision of a lower. All it provides, in section 553(e), is the right
to petition an agency to “issue, amend, or repeal a rule.’ Since
Mobil has had a petition for rulemaking seeking the identical result
pending since February 10, it is unlikely in the extreme that the “‘ap-
peal” of the “‘clean-up”’ regulations will bring Mobil anything more
than the DOE inaction that its February 10 petition for rulemaking |
has brought.
'4 In the court of appeals, the government took as its primary posi-
iion that the courts lack the power to require an agency to issue any
change in its regulations that the agency in its discretion refuses to is-
20
None of these aliernatives amount to more than an incho-
ate and bare chance that DOE will change its position and de-
cide to provide a route to obtain relief. There is a high likeli-
hood that DOE will continue to refuse to act and that,
therefore, the injury that Mobil will suffer if the preliminary
injunction is vacated will be in fact irreparable. It is most
likely, morcover, that when weighed under a different, and,
we believe, more appropriate standard, the decision of the dis-
trict court granting preliminary relief would be affirmed.
sue. Brief of Appellants, TECA No. 2-35, filed June 12, 1981, at 9-
16. The government stated in part (id. at 11):
If there kas been manipulation [by some refiners] of the
{Entitlements Preeram] regulations, the loopholes can be closed
only by issuing a regulation, and the authority to write regula-
tions was given solely to the Secretary in §4(a) of the
[Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act]. 15 U.S.C. § 753(a).
The court of appeals apparently accepted (and at least did not contra-
dict) this view. Thus, for all that appears, if the DOE continues to fail
and refuse to modify its regulations to provide an avenue for relief,
Mobil will be left without any remedy at all.
21
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the petition for a writ of certiorari should
be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
Akin, Gump, STRAUSS, HAVER & FELD
Of Counsel: By:
CHarces S. LInpBERG R. Bruck MCLEAN
WittiaM C. STREETS Daniet JoserH
Gai F. Scuutz (Counsel of Record)
Mosit O1t CORPORATION Harry R. SILVER
3225 Gallows Road Joseru T. Casey, Jr.
Fairfax, Virginia 22037 Davip A. HOLZwWoRTH
1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
Counsel for Petitioner
Mobil Oil Corporation
Dated: September I1, 1981
22
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
| hereby certify that copies of the foregoing Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari to the United Stetes Temporary Emergency
Court of Appeals were served this 11th day of September,
1981, on each of the following by hand:
THe Honor ast Rex Lee
Solicitor Gencral
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
Kennetu L. BACHMAN, Jr., Esquire
Cieary, Gorriies, STEEN & HAMILTON
1250 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20036
Nancy C. CRIsMAN, Esquire
Office of General Counsel
U.S. Department of Energy
1000 Independence Avenue, S.W.
Room 6H-025
Washington, D.C. 20585
Daniel Joseph
4
IN THE —-_
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1981
Moasit O1r CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
We
UNiTED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY,
James B. Epwarps, SECRETARY OF ENERGY,
AND Tosco CORPORATION,
Respondents.
APPENDIX TO
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES TEMPORARY
EMERGENCY COURT OF APPEALS
Of Counsel: R. Bruce MCLEAN
Cuarces S. LinpBerG Daniet Josern
WiittaM C. STREETS (Counsel of Record)
Galt F. Scuutz Harry R. SILVER
Mobil Oil Corporation Josern T. Casey, JR.
3225 Gallows Road Davip A. HoLzZwortH
Fairfax, Virginia 22037 Akin, Gump, Strauss, Haver & Fecp
1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 887-4000
Counsel for Petitioner
Mobil Oil Corporation
PRESS OF BYRON S. ADAMS PRINTING, INC., WASHINGTON, D.C.
la
APPENDIXA
TEMPORARY EMERGENCY COURT OF APPEALS
oF THE UNITED STATES
No. 2-35
Monit Ou CorPoRATION, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
—against—
UNitrep STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
AND JAMES B. Epwarps, SECRETARY, ’
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of New York
(No. 81 Civ. 340).
Argued: June 17, 1981 Decided: August 7, 1981
Judgment entered: August 14, 1981
APPEARANCES
Daniet Joserpn, Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, Wash-
ington, D.C. (R. Bruce McLean, Harry R. Silver, Joseph T.
Casey, Jr. and David A. Holzworth, Charles S. Lindberg,
William C. Streets and Gail F. Schultz, Mobil Oil Corporation,
Fairfax, Virginia, on the brief), for Plaintiff-Appellee Mobil
Oil Corporation.
Kenneth L. Bachman, Jr., Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen &
Hamilton, Washington, D.C. with whom Sara D. Schotland,
Eugene M. Goott and Mark N. Duvall, were on the brief for
Intervenor Tosco Corporation.
David W. Caruthers, Of Counsel, on the brief for Amicus
Curiae Crown Central Petroleum Corporation, Baltimore,
Maryland, Richard P. Noland and Robert R. Morrow, Suther-
land, Ashbiil & Brennan, Washington, D.C., on the brief for
Amicus Curiae Texas City Refining, Inc., Karen S. Bedell and
Jamie Replogle, Shank, Irwin, Conant, Williamson & Greve-
lle, Washington, D.C., on the brief for Amicus Curiae Hunt Oil
2a
Company, and Edwin Jason Dryer and “iichael R. Bromwich,
Foley, Lardner, Hollabaugh & Jacobs, Washington, D.C., on
the brief for Amicus Curiae Independent Refiners Association
of America.
Nancy C. CrisMAn, United States Department of Energy,
Washington, D.C. (Thomas H. Kemp, Samuel Soopper, Mar-
cia Sowles and Robert C. Powers, on the brief), for Defend-
ants- Appellants.
Before Metzner, MAxwect and Lacey, Judges.
Metzner, Judge.
The Department of Energy (DOE) appeals from an order of
the United States District Court for the Northern District of
New York (Munson, J.), granting Mobil Oil Corporation
(Mobil) a preliminary injunction enjoining DOE from issuing
any further Entitlements Notices and from requiring Mobil to
comply with any such notices.
The court found that Mobil would suffer irreparable harm if
DOE is permitted to issue their Entitlements Notice covering
the period January 1-28, 1981.
The Entitlements Notices which were enjoined are an inte-
gral part of the Entitlements Program (Program). That Pro-
gram was created to maintain equitable distribution of price-
controlled crude oil throughout the petroleum industry. The
Program was a necessary procedure to cure imbalances re-
sulting from the imposition of price and allocation controls on
petroleum products under the Emergency Petroleum Alloca-
tion Act (EPAA).
For a detailed discussion of the Program, see Cities Service
Co. v. Federal Energy Administration, 529 F.2d 1016 (TECA
1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 947 (1976), and Pasco, Inc. v.
Federal Energy Administration, 525 F.2d 1391 (TECA 1975).
As the extreme energy crisis passed, many aspects of the
price and allocation regulations were put on standby status. Fi-
nally, on January 28, 1981, President Reagan signed an
Exccutive Order directing immedizte decontrol of all remain-
3a
ing crude oil and refined petroleum products, and revoking all
regulations governing those products. Executive Order 12287,
46 Fed. Reg. 9909 (1/30/81).
However, that order specifically provided that the Secretary
of Energy “‘may . . . adopt such regulations and take such ac-
tions as he deems necessary to implement this Order, includ-
ing the promulgation of entitlements notices for periods prior
to this Order and the establishment of a mechanism for en-
titlements adjustments for periods prior to this Order.”
As of the date of the Executive Order, entitlements notices
for December 1980 and January 1-28, 1980, had not yet been
issued.
Mobil offers data gleaned from reports furnished to DOE
(10 C.F.R. § 211.66) to argue that large quantities of price-
controlled crude oil have ‘“‘disappeared”’ from the Entitle-
ments Program due to refiners’ manipulation of these regula-
tions. Mobil asks that DOE be prevented from finalizing the
obligations of the participating refiners under the program
until all price-controlled crude oil is accounted for.
An “entitlement” in essence is a license to refine a barrel of
price-controlled crude oil. Each month each refiner is given a
number of entitlements equal to the National Domestic Crude
Oil Supply Ratio {DOSR) multiplied by the volume of crude
oil runs-to-stills reported by the refiner in that month. 10
C.F.R. §211.67(a)(1). The DOSR is computed, also on a
monthly basis, as the ratio of all refiners’ reported receipts of
price-controlled crude oil to all refiners’ crude oil runs-to-
stilis. 10 C.F.R. § 211.62. If a refiner’s reported receipts of
price-controlled crude oil exceed the number of entitlements
received under the above formula, a sufficient number of en-
titlements must be purchased by the refiner to cover the ex-
cess. If a refiner’s reported receipts of price-controlled crude
are less than the number of entitlements designated to the
refiner by DOE, then that refiner must sell the excess entitle-
ments. 10 C.F.R. § 211.67(b) (ec).
4a
DOE also sets the price of the entitlements to be purchased
and sold. It does not match up buyers with sellers. The agency
merely assigns the obligation to buy or sell entithements and
leaves it to the refiners to comply. Historic trading relation-
ships have arisen between refiners who are traditionally in the
position of buying entitlements and those who must tradi-
tionally sell entitlements.
The notices are published within about two months of the
subject month, and may include adjustments for errors,
exception relief or recertification as determined by DOE.
It is unnecessary to review the merits of Mobil’s explana-
tions of how it sustains the contentions it advances. This court
finds that Mobil has failed to make a clear showing that it will
suffer irreparable harm if an injunction does not issue. Trieb-
wasser & Katz v. American Telephone & Telegraph Company,
535 F.2d 1356, 1359 (2d Cir. 1976).
Mobil has not shown that issuance of the notice will place it
in a position which precludes ultimate recovery, through ju-
dicial or administrative proceedings, of losses allegedly traced
to previous erroneous entitlements notices.
The standard for determining whether a party has shown tr-
reparable injury is founded upon the court's ability to
ultimately grant an effective remedy. The traditional standard
is set forth in Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Association v. Federal
Power Commission, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1921), where
the court said:
**Mere injuries, however substantial, in terms of mon-
cy, time and energy necessarily expended in the absence
of a stay, are not enough. The possibility that adequate
compensatory or other corrective relief will be available at
a later date, in the ordinary course of litigation, weighs
heavily against a claim of irreparable harm.”
Temporary loss of income, recoverable upon successful ter-
mination of the litigation, will not usually constitute irrepara-
ble injury. Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90 (1974).
Sa
There are at least three avenues of administrative relief
available to Mobil. On February 10, 1981, Mobil petitioned
DOE’s Economic Regulatory Administration (ERA) to insti-
tute a rulemaking proceeding to amend the entitlements regu-
lations to account for all price-controlled crude oil. ERA has
not yet acted on this petition.
On March 12, 1981, Mobil appealed its obligations under
the Entitlements Notice covering December 1980 to the Of-
fice of Hearings and Appeals (OHA), alleging the same
defects as claimed in the instant litigation, and asking that the
December Notice be remanded to ERA for recalculation. An
interlocutory order issued on June 4, 1981 (46 Fed. Reg.
32661 (June 24, 1981)), proposed that ERA be required to
gather information from each refiner to ascertain how much
price-controlled crude oil has disappeared from the program.
However, on July 8, 1981, subsequent to the argument of the
appeal before this court, OHA determined that it lacked
jurisdiction to hear the appeal because Mobil in effect was
seeking an amendment to the rules. This order of OHA is a fi-
nal order subject to judicial review.
Subsequent to the argument of this appeal, ERA issued a
Final Rule to comply with the suggestion of the Executive Or-
der that a mechanism be established to adjust entitlements
obligations for periods prior to decontrol. 10 C.F.R. § 211.69,
added July 9, 1981, 46 Fed. Reg. 36092, July 13, 1981. The
rule provided for a final *‘clean-up” list, effectively ending the
Entitlements Program, and for a self-executing mechanism
intended to account for judicial and administrative determina-
tions made after the August 15, 1981 reporting date for the fi-
nal list. If Mobil is dissatisfied with this Final Rule, it is free to
file an administrative appeal from this rule making. 10 C.F_R.
§ 205.160(b), 5 U.S.C. § $53.
Thus it is clear at this writing that Mobil has remedies which
will give it an opportunity to have its claims reviewed and
adjudicated. There is no conceivable reason why established
and orderly procedures should be bypassed. Furthermore, the
6a
nature of the claim and the proof are more appropriately con-
sidered in the first instance by the administrative agency.
There is, of course, a time problem in view of the expiration
on September 30, 1981, of the statutory authority for the con-
trol program. 15 U.S.C. § 760g. The court is mindful of the
savings clause in that statute. However, at this point we are
not prepared to discuss the scope of that clause.
The court is aware of prior situations in which the agency
seems to have been slow in discharging its functions. F.z.,
Marathon Oil Co. v. Department of Energy, 642 F.2d 436, 439
(TECA 1981). We express the hope that this matter will be
expeditiously disposed of because of the nature of the claims
made by Mobil.
The important nature of the problem raised by Mobil is
attested to by OHA, a division within DOE, with expertise in
this area. In its opinion of July 8, 1981, referred to above, it
made the following observations:
‘**Based upon our review of the entire record in this
proceeding we conclude that the problems and issues pre-
sented by Mobil are matters of great significance to the
Entitlements Program aad should be carefully considered
by the appropriate officials of the Department of Energy
(DOE).”* (p. 1)
**Although we have in essence no jurisdiction to grant
Mobil’s appeal, we do find that Mobil has raised serious
questions concerning ERA’s administration of the En-
titlements Program.” (p. 19)
* al * * al
*... we are particularly disturbed that such a dispute
exists nearly one-half year after decontrol. . . . Although
ERA has attempted to discredit Mobil’s method of quan-
titative analysis of the evidence, the ERA apparenily
lacks knowledge of the degree to which upstream
stockpiling of crude oil and the use of time exchanges in-
Ta
creased towards the end of the program as Mobil alleges.
Moreover, as far as we know, ERA has shown no inclina-
tion to obtain such knowledge.” (pp. 19-20)
**. . . we believe it incumbent upon ERA to attempt to
exercise its broad rulemaking discretion in an informed
and rational manner consistent with the President's Or-
der and the relevant statutory objectives.”’ (p. 20) (Foot-
notes omitted.)
With the finding that Mobil has failed to show irreparable
harm, we need not reach the question of the construction of
Section 211 of the Economic Stabilization Act as to the per-
missible scope of the injuction.
The order is reversed and the motion for a preliminary in-
junction is denied.
9a
APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
81-CV-340
Mosit Oit CorPoRATION,
Plaintiff.
VS.
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND
James B. EDWARDS, SECRETARY,
Defendants.
Appearances For The Plaintiff: Of Counsel:
Bono, ScHoeNneck & KING THomas E. Myers, Esq.
One Lincoln Center
Syracuse, New York 13202
AKIN, Gump, STRAUSS, HAvuER & FeELp R. Bruce McLean, Esa.
1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W. Daniet Josepn, Esa.
Washington, D.C. 20036 Harry SILVER, Esq.
WitiiaM C. Streets, Eso. Joseru T. Casey, Eso.
Gai F. Scuuttz, Esa.
Mosit Ow CorPORATION
3225 Gallows Road
Fairfax, Virginia 22037
Appearances For The Defendants: Of Counsel:
Georce H. Lowe PAULA Ryan, Esa.
Unites STATES ATTORNEY Assistant U.S. Attorney
Nor THERN District or New York
100 S. Clinton Street
Syracuse, New York 13260
Tuomas H. Kemp., Esa.
SAMUEL Sooper, Esa.
1000 Independence Avenue, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20585
Howarp G. Munson, C.J.
10a
Memorandum- Decision
FILED
JUNE 3, 1981
Presently before the Court are two motions — the first has
been made by the plaintiff Mobil Oil Corporation (Mobil) to
enjoin the issuance by the defendants Department of Energy
and Secretary James B. Edwards (hereinafter collectively
referred to as DOE) of the “January entitlements notice.”’ See
10 C.F.R. §211.67() (1980). The second motion has been
made by the defendants to dismiss plaintiffs complaint.
Briefly, the entitlements notice is an essential component of
the DOE’s entitlements program, which is designed to
equalize the access of domestic refiners to price-controlled do-
mestic crude oil. See Pasco, Inc. v. Fed. Energy Admin., 525
F.2d 1391, 1395 (TECA 1975). This is accomplished by re-
quiring cash transfers (entitlements) to be made from those
domestic refiners with a proportionately greater access to
price-controlled crude, to those refiners less fortunately situ-
ated. A corresponding “‘entitlements notice’ is then pub-
lished every month reflecting each refiners’ entitlements obli-
gation under the program.
To function properly, the entitlements program depends in
no small measure on the accurate report of a refiner’s
e-controlled crude oil. The instant suit
Mobil’s claim that there are in fact
porting such “‘receipts’’ by refiners.
sult of this misreporting, it has had
share of entitlements obligations.
Accordingly,. Mobil moved for temporary and preliminary in-
juctive relief to prevent the DOE from issuing its **January
entitlements notice,’ which allegedly would have immediate-
ly required Mobil to shoulder an inequitable share of entitle-
ments obligations. This Court granted Mobil’s request for a
temporary restraining order on April 21, 1981, and enjoined
the DOE “‘from issuing any further entitlements notices and
widespread abuses in
Mobil contends that as
lla
from requiring Mobil to comply with such notices.” The tem-
porary restraining order was to remain in effect for twenty
days. See Memorandum-Decision and Order, dated April 21,
1981, at p. 6.
In the meantime, the DOE moved to dismiss plaintiffs
complaint. The DOE maintains that pursuant to the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction, this Court should defer consideration
of the instant case, until the DOE has had an opportunity to
complete its own investigation of the merits of Mobil’s claims.
The Court is informed by the DOE that it is currently investi-
gating the probiem of misreporting, but has not as yet com-
pleted this investigation. For similar reasons the DOE addi-
tionally argues that plaintiff has failed to exhaust administra-
tive remedies, and that the instant dispute is not ripe for ju-
dicial resolution. Furthermore, the DOE asserts that even
assuming arguendo that plaintiff has satisfied these legal
doctrines, it has neither stated a claim nor demonstrated that
it will suffer irreparable injury, should the DOE issue the
‘January Entitlements notice.”
A hearing on plaintiffs preliminary injunction motion was
held on May 12, 1981 and live testimony was taken on the is-
sues of misreporting in the DOE’s entitlements program, and
the likelihood that plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if the
“January entitlements notice” is released. That same day the
Court also heard the parties’ arguments with regard to the
DOE’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint. To fully under-
stand the merits of both pending motions, a more detailed ex-
amination of the entitlements program is in order.
Constrained by the Arab oil embargo and dwindling domes-
tic production, the supplies of crude oil in the United States
decreased dramatically in 1973. The combined affect of these
factors caused severe increases in the price of oil and related
products. See 39 Fed. Reg. 31650 (August 30, 1974). To
soften the economic hardships associated with reduced sup-
plies and higher prices, the Cost of Living Council created a
<a,
12a
price control system for crude oil as a part of Phase IV, see
former 6 C.F.R. Part 150, Subpart L, 38 Fed. Reg. 22536 (Au-
gust 22, 1973), of the Stabilization Program. See the Econom-
ic Stabilization Act of 1970, as emended, 12 U.S.C. $1904 note.
The system was designed to control the prices of petroleum
from the wellhead to finished products, and to create a price
incentive to encourage the production of additional quantities
of domestic crude.
Under the regulations a “‘base production control level”
(BPCL) was established for cach domestic crude oil producing
property, equal to the volume of production from that prop-
erty during each month of 1972. Production levels for the
property up to the amount of the BPCL in the corresponding
months of any subsequent year had to be sold al a price no
higher than a regulatory ceiling price. This crude oil was refer-
red to commonly as “old oil.’ If the property produced crude
oil in excess of the BCPL, the additional quantities or **new
oil’ could be sold at the higher world market price. See 10
C.F.R. 8212.72 (1980). Also exempt from price controls, and
consequently saleable at world market prices, were all
imported oil and crude oil produced from marginal or
stripper’ wells. See 10 C.F.R. $8 212.15-16 (1980). At the
same time, refinery prices for selected petroleum products
were also controlled by regulations. By their terms, refiners
were required to establish base prices for each controlled
product at their May 15, 1973 price levels, but were permitted
a certain degree of price allowance for the increased costs of
imported or domestic crude oil from which these controlled
products were refined. See 10 C.F.R. §§ 212.81-85 (1980).
While the end of the Arab oil embargo in 1974 led to rep-
lenished supplies of imported crude oil, the overall price of
foreign crude increased significantly. This price increase
widened the disparity between the controlled price for ‘‘old
oil’ and the market price of “‘new oil,’’ and was reflected in
the costs and therefore the reiative prices charged by refiners.
See 39 Fed. Reg. 31650 (August 30, 1974). However, refiners
with greater access to the less expensive price-controiled
l3a
crude oil — typically the larger integrated refiner — has a cost
advantage over those of their competitors who could only se-
cure supplies of uncontrolled crude oil — usually the small or
independent refiners. Thus, at a time when increased supplies
of crude oil made the market place much more sensitive to
price considerations, the economic viability of these small and
independent refiners was being threatened. Moreover, con-
sumers in various parts of the country who depended primari-
ly on stocks of uncontrolled crude oil (‘new oil,’ imported
and ‘‘stripper’’ crude oil) contended with much higher prices
than other regions with ready access to crude oil that was
price-controlled.
In an effort to eliminate the inequities in the refining and
marketing sectors of the petroleum industry without sacrific-
ing the beneficial elements of the two-tier price system, the
Federal Energy Administration (FEA), the immediate pre-
decessor of the DOE, proposed and adopted the entitlements
program. See generally 10 C.F.R. $8 21 1.66-67 (1980).
Transcript of May 12, 1981 hearing at p. 31 (hereinafter Tr. at
p.___). As reflected in its legislative history, the primary pur-
pose of the entitlements program was the equitable distribu-
tion of price-controlled crude oil throughout the petroleum
industry:
In large measure, the goal of the proposal is to improve
the access of small and independent refiners to old do-
mestic oil. In addition, however, the proposed program ts
also designed effectively to provide all refiners with pro-
portionate amounts of old oil, base¢ on their relative
refinery capacities. The proposed program is accordingly
aimed not only at bringing the small and independent
refining sector as a ciass into a More competitive position
with respect to the majors, but it is also specifically de-
signed to assure that all segments of the petroleum indus-
try will benefit equally from lower-priced domestic oil.
Thus, the FEA anticipates that in some cases, major oil
companies (with a low level of old oil supplies) will bene-
fit by the pregram, while some small refiners (with a high
level of old oil supplies) may be required to buy entitle-
l4a
ments under the program. This goal is consistent with the
Congressional objectives of achieving equitable prices
among all sectors of the petroleum industry and preserv-
ing an economically sound and competitive petroleum in-
dustry.
39 Fed. Reg. 31650 (August 30, 1974).
Toward these ends, the FEA rejected the option of actual
physical reallocation of crude oil among refiners, in favor of
monthly cash payments to refiners with relatively less access
to price-controlled crude oil than the national average, from
refiners with proportionately greater access. See Tr. at p. 32,
and 10 C.F.R. §211.67(b) (1980). These entitlements obliga-
tions are costed into the price of crude oil, see 10 C.F.R.
$211.67(m) (1980), and then adjusted into the maximum
lawful price for the following month. See 10 C.F.R. § 212.83{c)
(2) (1980). See generally, Pasco, Inc. v. FEA, 525 F.2d 1391,
1395 (TECA 1975), Cities Service Co. v. FEA, 529 F.2d 1016,
1021 (TECA 1975). A description of the mechanics of the en-
titlements program follows.
Under the provisions of the entitlements program, each
refiner must report on a monthly basis, inter alia, its crude oil
runs to distillation units, as well as the price, volume, and type
of all crude oil booked into the refinery as a “‘receipt.”’ See 10
C.F.R. $211.66 (1980). These reports are due approximately
two months after the report subject month. /d. Based on the
inforn...ion gleaned from these reports, every eligible refiner
is issued a number of entitlements for the month. An entitle-
ment is a “‘license”™’ to refine one barrel of price-controlled
crude oil for the month. See 10 C.F.R. § 211.62 (1980).
To determine a refiner’s monthly allocation of entitle-
ments, the formula — vastly simplified — is as follows: the
national domestic supply ratio (DOSR), which is the ratio of
price-controlled crude to the national total runs to stills, is
multiplied by the volume of crude oil runs to stills reported by
the refiner for that month. See 10 C.F.R. §211.67(a)01)
(1980). A refiner is then issued entitlements equal to the
15a
above computed figure. The second step in determining the
refiner’s ultimate entitlements obligation is to calculate the
monthly receipts of “‘deemed old oil.” See 10 C.F.R.
§ 211.67(b)(2) (1980). This sum represents a refiner’s total
receipts of price-controlled crude oil. A refiner’s entitlements
position is the difference between its entitlement allocation
and deemed old oil receipts. If the entitlements allocation is
greater than a refiner’s deemed old oil receipts, the refiner will
be able to sell entitlements. Whereas, if the entitlements
allocation is less than a refiner’s deemed old oil receipts, it will
have to purchase additional entitlements from a refiner that is
in a position to sell entitlements, in order to process those
additional supplies of price-controlled crude. See 10 C.F.R.
$§ 211.67(b)-(c) (1980).' The regulations do not match up en-
titlements purchasers and sellers every month for the purpose
of making these transactions. Instead, historic trading rela-
' Imagine a system with only two refineries, each of whom runs
100 barrels of crude. Refinery A has only price-controlled crude
at a value of $8.00 a barrel and Refinery B has only uncontrolled
crude at $38.00 a barrel. Now, in this particular example the sup-
ply ratio that | am speaking of would be 100 barrels of price-con-
trolled crude divided by 200 barrels of runs or fifty percent.
The entitlement price would be the difference between the
$38.00 uncontrolled price and the $8.00 old oil price or $30.00
for each entitlement. When the entitlements list were issued it
would be seen that Refiner A would require 100 entitlements,
he would only have been issued fifty. Therefore, he would have
to buy fifty entitlements from Retiner B at a cost of $30.00 for
each entitlement and when these transactions are finished you
would find through arithmetic that Refiner A’s average crude
cost. . . would have gone up $15.00 a barrel to a total of $23.00 a
barrel whereas Refiner B's average crude cost would have gone
down $15.00 per barrel from $38.00 and would also be at $38.00
and you can see that we have in effect allocated the benefits of
price-controlled equitably.
Testimony of Roy K. Murdock, General Manager of Crude Oil and
Gas Liquids for Mobil Oil Corporation’s United States Marketing
and Refining Division. Tr. at pp. 33-34.
loa
tionships have evolved in the industry. The price of an entitle-
ment, however, is set by regulation, and is determined by
subtracting from the weighted average cost of a barrel of un-
controlled crude, the weighted average cost of a barrel of ‘old
oil.” See 10 C.F.R. § 211.6741) (4) (1980). ?
Every month the DOE publishes an entitlements notice
“evidencing the issuance of entitlements’’ and containing the
following information: The DOSR, the name of each refiner
to which entitlements have been issued, the number of bar-
rels of deemed old oil included in each refiner’s adjusted
crude oil receipts, the number of entitlements issued to each
refiner, the number of entitlements required to be purchased
or sold by each such refiner, and the price at which entitle-
ments shall be purchases and sold. See 10 C.F.R.
$ 211.67(i1)(2) (1980). A refiner’s failure to comply with the
obligations imposed by the entitlements notice or the entitle-
ments program in general, is subject to civil liability of
$20,000 per day for each day of non-compliance, and criminal
sanctions of imprisonment for one year and a fine of $40,000
per day for each day of non-compliance. See 15 U.S.C. § 754;
10 C.F.R. $8 205.203(a) (2), (b) CI) (A), (c) 1) 0B).
Two final points on the operation of the entitlements pro-
gram must be made. The first is that although the entitle-
ments program is operated on a monthly basis, a given
month’s entitlements notice does not reflect a “‘freeze-
frame” picture of the refinery industry for that month. As a
primary matter, the entitlements notice itself is issued two
months after the subject month it reports about. Secondly,
such factors as errors in reporting, recertifications of crude oil,
adjustments in crude oil receipts and costs, and exception
relief granted by the DOE's Office of Hearings and Appeals,
inject a degree of inaccuracy in each month's entitlements
notice. Yet, over the course of the program these discrepan-
? In other words, **The price of entitlement was, in effect, the eco-
nomic benefit of access to price-controlled oil." Murdock testimony,
Tr. at p. 33.
17a
cies are supposed to be accounted for, and correction lists are
issued accordingly. See Tr. at p. 46, and Plaintiffs Exhibit
#2(y).
It should also be noted that the entitlements program has
been amended several times over the course of its life.’ Some
of these amendments were to further advance the goal of
equitable distribution of price-controlled crude oil. Stull other
changes have been for the purpose of granting subsidies to
various sectors of the petroleum industry. For example, the
deemed old oil computation was necessitated by a change in
the program that added an ‘‘upper’’ tier of price-controlled
crude oil, and redesignated “‘old oil’ as “‘lower™’ tier.‘ It will
be recalled that the original form of the entitlements program
only included the one category of *‘old oil.” Perhaps most af-
fected by the changes in the entitlements program’s direc-
tions, especially in the area of subsidies, has been the DOSR
calculation. The DOSR now incorporates different types of
subsidies, which are provided in the form of additional alloca-
tions of entitlements for the following programs: small refiner
“bias,” exceptions and appeals relief in the entitlements pro-
gram, California heavy crude refining incentives, for the
import of naptha into Puerto Rico, for the import of residual
fuel oil into the East Coast refining district, synthetic fuel de-
velopment, domestic residual fuel deductions, and for crude
oil sold to the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. The effect of
' See generally **Validation of the Crude Oil Entitlements Informa-
tion System,”’ study prepared for the DOE by Tera, Inc., dated
March 9, 1981 [hereinafter Validation Study]; Appendix C **History
of the Entitlements Program;"* Attachment F-1 ‘**The Domestic
Crude Oil Entitlements Program Calculations.” Upon Mobil's
motion and over the DOE's claim of executive privilege, the Court
ordered the DOE to release this study for purposes of the instant liti-
gation. See this Court’s May 15, 1981 Memorandum-Decision and
Order.
* Today, the deemed old oil calculation also factors in the
weighted average cost of upper tier Alaska North Slope crude oil. See
10 C.F.R. §211.67(b)(2) (1980).
18a
these program modifications has been to reduce the size of the
DOSR. As shall be explained in greater detail momentarily, a
lower DOSR causes fewer entitlements to be issued to all
refiners, and therefore increases their proportionate burden
under the program In addition, a lower DOSR furthers the
likelihood that even some traditional entitlements sellers will
become entitlements purchasers.’ See infra at pp. 14-15. With
this examination of the purpose, evolution, and operation of
the entitlements program complete, the Court turns to con-
sider the factual predicate for Mobil’s assertion that a
preliminary injunction should issue against the DOE’s *‘Janu-
ary entitlements notice.”
Due to the cost differential between a barrel of price-con-
trolled and uncontrolled crude oil, there was always a financial
incentive in the petroleum industry to find methods, whether
legal or extra-legal, to “‘convert”’ price-controlled crude oil
into uncontrolled crude oil. A refiner that could make a barrel
of price-controlled oil — selling, for example, at $8.00 a bar-
rel, “‘disappear’’ and then later ‘“‘reappear’’ as uncontrolled
crude oil — selling, for example, at the world market price of
$38.00 a barrel, would stand to make a tidy profit of $30.00 on
each barrel sold. Mobil asserts that the phased, and more
recently, the complete decontrol of the petroleum industry
has provided even additional financial incentive to cheat or
‘**game”’ the price-control regulations. Some additional back-
ground on decontrol is necessary.
On April 5, 1979 President Carter announced his intention
to deregulate all domestic crude oil. Soon thereafter, the DOE
took steps to implement the President’s decision, and it
adopted the first of a series of amendments to its regulations,
with a view towards gradually lifting the price-controls on do-
mestic crude-oil by October 1, 1981. See 44 Fed. Reg. 66187
(November 19, 1979). The plans for phased decontrol, how-
’ Validation Study, Attachment F-1 at p. F-42.
19a
ever, were interrupted by a change in presidential administra-
tions. Shortly after being sworn into office, President Reagan
fulfilled one of his campaign pledges by issuing Executive Or-
der No. 12287 on January 28, 1981. That Order provides in
pertinent part:
By the authority vested in me as President by the Con-
stitution and statutes of the United States of America,
including the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of
1973, as amended (15 U.S.C. 751 et seg.), and notwith-
standing the delegations to the Secretary of Energy in
Executive Order No. 11790, as amended by Executive
Order No. 12038, and in order to provide for an immedi-
ate and orderly decontrol of crude oil and refined petro-
leum products, it is hereby ordered as follows:
Section |. All crude oil and refined petroleum products
are exempted from the price and allocation controls
adopted pursuant to the Emergency Petroleum Alloca-
tion Act of 1973, as amended. The Secretary of Energy
shall promptly take such action as is necessary to revoke
the price and allocation regulations made unnecessary by
this Order.
* . * . *
Section 3. The Secretary of Energy may, pursuant to
Executive Order No. 11790, as amended by Executive
Order No. 12038, adopt such regulations and take such
actions as he deems necessary to implement this Order,
including the promulgation of entitlements notices for
periods prior to this Order and the establishment of a
mechanism for entitlements adjustments for periods
prior to this Order.
Section 4. The Secretary of Energy is authorized to take
such other actions as he deems necessary to ensure that
the purposes of this Order are effectuated.
Section 5. Because advance notice of and public pro-
cedure on the decontrol provided by this Order would be
20a
likely to cause actions that could lead to economic distor-
tions and dislocations, and would therefore be contrary to
the public interest, this Order shall be effective im-
mediately.
46 Fed. Reg. 9909-10 (January 30, 1981).
The announcement of phased decontrol and the knowledge
that all price-controls on crude oil would be lifted by October
1, 1981, imparted refiners with a new and unique opportunity
to cheat or “‘game”™ the regulatory system and to make
**windfall” profits. With the coming of decontrol, all a refiner
had to do in order to maximize its profits on price-controlled
crude oil, would be to somehow withhold barrels of the low
cost price-controlled crude from the market until after the
date of decontrol.* Of course, a barrel of price-controlled
crude oil after the date of decontrol would be worth the higher
world market price. Thus, when decontrol was announced on
April 5, 1979, the petroleum industry was at once provided
with further incentive to cheat and ‘‘game”™ the regulatory
scheme, and with the method to accomplish these ends. In
addition, unwitting participation in such schemes was
forthcoming from the political arena. Due to his campaign
pledge, President Reagan's election in November 1980,
brought with it the chance that complete decontrol would be
adopted before its scheduled date of October 1, 1981, and that
profits could be taken even sooner. This turned out to be a
safe bet, since, as stated already, decontrol of the petroleum
industry was in fact ordered by President Reagan on January
28, 1981. Testimony provided by Mobil suggests that this was
also the day when millions of barrels of once price-controlled
crude oil suddenly began to “‘reappear.”” A more detailed ex-
* This conclusion is confirmed by the Validation Study at p. IX. A
Congressional Committee reported that a similar problem of disap-
pearing stripper well oil could also be traced to the anticipation of
decontrol. See H.R. Rep. (96-150-58) 96th Cong., 2nd Sess., Com-
mittee on Interstate Commerce, The Case of the Billion Dollar
Stripper (October, 1980)
21a
amination of this phenomenon and its affect on the entitle-
ments program follows.
At a May 12, 1981 hearing held by this Court on plaintiffs
motion for a preliminary injunction, testimony was taken on
the problem of the disappearance of price-controlled oil, and
its specific affect on the entitlements program. Testifying for
plaintiff Mobil was Mr. Roy K. Murdock, General Manager of
Crude Oil and Gas Liquid for Mobil’s United States Mar-
keting and Refining Division. Murdock based his conclusions
about the disappearance of price-controlled crude oil, and its
subsequent reappearance, on an analysis of data contained in
the “‘Domestic Crude Oil First Purchasers Report” and the
monthly entitlements notices. Appropriately entitled, the
First Purchaser reports, inter alia, coliects data at the first
point of purchase of crude oil, which is usually at the refin-
eries. lt will be recalled that the monthly entitlements notices
publish data on each of the calculations relevant to the opera-
tions of the entitlements program, such as all refinery receipts.
See supra at pp. 7-8. Therefore, a comparison of the two data
systems can be expected to yield statistically similar volumes
of crude oil moving throughout the industry.’ Nontheless, it
shall be seen that in actuality, wide discrepancies between the
two systems are commonplace. thus evidencing the disap-
pearance phenomenon.
Murdock testified at the hearing that the DOSR — the ratio
of price-controlled crude to total runs to stills — has gradually
declined between 1979 and 1980, with a marked decline evi-
dent in November and December of 1980. Tr. at pp. 48-49,
Plaintiffs Exhibits ##3 and 4 [plaintiffs exhibits will be
delineated Exh. #___ .] In the same two-year period the price
of an entitlement — the difference between the cost of lower
tiered price-controlled and uncontrolled crude oil — more
than tripled from $8.74 to $27.06. /d. As for the comparison of
the First Purchasers data and entitlements program receipts,
’ The soundness of this conclusion is confirmed by the Validation
Study, Appendix J at pp. J-28 - J-30.
22a
Murdock testified that in the past two years a disparity or dis-
appearance occured in volumes of lower tier price-controlled
crude reported, and that this disparity has increased over
time. Exh. ##5 and 6. In January, 1979, some 179,000 barrels
of price-controlled crude oil were disappearing every day. By
December, 1980, the rate of disappearance had increased to
$20,000 barrels of price-controlled crude oil every day. Tr. at
pp. §3-53.
A comparison on the First Purchasers and entitlements pro-
gram data on upper tier crude oil shows equally dramatic
trends. Tr. at pp. 56-59, Exh. ##7 and 8. For approximately
the first six months of 1979, more upper tier crude was re-
ported as received at refineries than was produced and sold
during that period. This trend inverted by August 1979, and a
disparity or disappearance of 23,000 barrels per day of price-
controlled crude oil was reported. By December of 1980 the
disappearance rate had increased to 426,000 barrels per day. It
should be added that the relative price of upper tier crude oil
during this period changed substantially. At the beginning of
1979 upper tier crude was very near in price to the world mar-
ket price of crude oil. However, by the end of 1979 the world
market price of crude oil had out-paced the price of upper tier
crude, and was worth approximately twice as much. The data
for upper tier Alaskan North Slope Crude, which has been
price-controlled since May 1980, shows a pattern similar to
that of upper tier crude. Tr. at pp. 60-62, Exh. ##9 and 10. At
the same time, overall production in all tiers of price-con-
trolled crudes was declining throughout 1979 and 1980. Tr. at
p. 64. Nevertheless, a calculation of the percentage disparity,
for example, in both categories of lower and upper tier crude
is quite revealing. In January 1979, 2.3% of lower and upper
tier crude oil had disappeared, by December 1979, 43.4% of
lower and upper tier crude oil had disappeared. Tr. at pp. 64-
66, Exh. ##12 and 13.
In total figures, in the year 1979, between 5.2 million and
10.4 million barrels of crude oil were disappearing from the
regulatory system every month. By the year 1980, between 12.0
23a
million and 29.6 million barrels of crude oil were disappearing
every month. Tr. at pp. 69-71, Exh #414 and 15." While these
millions of barrels of price-controlled crude oil were disap-
pearing, curiously, it seems that at least some of this crude oil
was reappearing as decontrolled crude. In January 1980 a
surplus of 175,000 barrels per day of decontrolled crude oil ap-
peared in the regulatory system. This figure represents crude
oi! that was reported as receipts by refiners, but was not re-
ported as having been purchased by first purchasers. By
December of 1980, there were 809,000 barrels per day of
decontrolled crude oil reappearing in this manner, even
though there was really no record of it having been produced.
Tr. at pp. 81-83. Significantly, the accuracy of all the data de-
scribed above is noi contested by the DOE.
* The Validation Study also reported on the disappearance of
price-controlled crude oil:
Comparisons of adjusted DCOE data to data reported on the Do-
mestic Crude Fuel Purchaser (sic) system (DCFP) for the
period 1977 through 1979 show DCFP data to be greater on an
annual basis for all receipt categories combined with net annual
differences decreasing from 158.2 million barrels in 1977 to
102.9 [hand corrected in Report to 33.9] million barrels in 1978
[hand corrected in Report to 1979]. In 1979, aggregate domestic
receipts reported to DCOE exceeded those reported on DCFP
by 1.2 million barrels. Since some of the total net differences in
1979 may be accounted for by condensate and utility and other
non-refining usage, on a gross yearly basis, the vast bulk of do-
mestic crude sold to first purchasers appears to find its way to
refiners.
Important differences have been found, however, in comparing
categorical volumes reported on the two systems. Particularly in
1979, both old oil and new oil have “‘disappeared”’ between
DCFP and DCOE systems. In the case of old oil, the 1979 differ-
ence resulted in a net “‘disappearance’’ of 78.4 million barrels
(215,000 barrels/day) or 9.78 percent of all reported DCOE
receipts. If this discrepancy was in fact due to errors in the
DCOE system, then old oil for 1979 could be said to have been
24a
If the cost of an entitlement is factored into these figures for
disappearing crude, remembering that between 1979 and 1980
the price of an entitlement was increasing, $5.6 dillion of en-
ltitlements obligations were not channeled through the entitle-
ments program on a total volume of over 250.3 million barrels
of price-controlled crude oil. Tr. at pp. 71-75; Exh ##15 and
16. Moreover, from the American public's point of view, if
price-controlled crude that disappeared later reappeared as
higher priced uncontrolled crude, then this $5.6 billion figure
represents increased crude costs that may be passed on to
them. The Court will next address in more specific terms the
ways in which the disappearance of price-controlled crude
impacts upon entitlements program refiners. Afterwards, the
possible explanations for the disappearance will be considered.
understated by 8.91 percent. For the 3 year period, old oi! may
have been up to 9.87 percent understated. [See Appendix K,
#28}.
New oil receipts also differed between the two systems (DCOE
and DFCP) in 1979, such that 9.4 million barrels (26,000 bar-
rels/day) or 0.87 percent may have ‘“‘disappeared.”’ New oil
receipts then may have been 0.86 percent understated in 1979.
Id. at pp. 65-66. See also Validation Study at pp. i, vii, 95, 96, J-28 - J-
32. The Validation Study further confirmed that upon ‘‘disappear-
ing,’ the price-controlled crude ‘reappeared’ as uncontrolled
crude. Summarizing the twin problems of the disappearance and
reappearance of crude oil, the Validation Study concluded:
The impacts or consequences of these discrepancies are, how-
ever, significant. In terms of data quality, the net volume of
**missing’’ old oil represents 9.78 percent of the volume of old
oil reported on DCOE in 1979 (7.5 percent of the reported vol-
umes for all three years). The net volume of **missing”’ new oil
represents 0.9 percent of the volume of new oil reported on
DCOE in 1979 (for the three-year period, new oil receipts re-
ported on DCOE exceeded those on DCFP by 0.6 percent of the
reported new oil receipts on DCOE).
Id. at p. 96.
2Sa
To understand how the disappearance of price-controlled
crude oil affects the entitlements program refiners, the me-
chanics of the program must be reconsidered. The disap-
pearance of price-controlled crude oil causes a concomitant
reduction in the DOSK — the ratio of price-controlled crude
to the national total runs to stills. Since the number of entitle-
ments issued to each refiner is a product of the DOSR and that
refiners’ runs to stills, a shrinking DOSR will cause less en-
titlements to be issued to all refiners in the program. This
means that an entitlements purchaser will have to purchase
more entitlements to make up for this net loss, and to be able
to refine its excess of price-controlled crude over the national
average. By the same token, a seller of entitlements is neg-
atively affected by being issued less entitlements, because it
will have fewer entitlements to sell in order to offset its lim-
ited access (in comparison to the national average) to price-
controlled crude. Moreover, the disappearance of price-con-
trolled crude oil increases the likelihood that the DOSR will
shrink to such a low level that it would cause many traditional
entitlements sellers to have access to more price-controlled
crude oil than the national average.” With this change in posi-
tion these traditional entitlements sellers would themselves
be required to become purchasers of entitlements.
» Similarly, the Validation Study found that the disappearance of
price-controlled crude oil had a major impact on participants in the
entitlements program and on consumers. The Study observed that
the problem of disappearing oil:
Apart from considerations of data quality, from the standpoint
of the entitlements program, *‘losses’’ of controlled crudes (old
and new oils) cause the DOSR to be lower (i.e., understated).
Thus, fewer entitlements are allocated and fewer entitlements
obligations are paid. For example, using adjusted/amended total
old and new oil receipt volumes for 1979, if the entire discrepan-
cy between the DCOE and DCFP systems was in fact due to
errors in DCOE data, then the amount of entitlements obliga-
tions not incurred can be estimated at $1.341 billion. For the ref-
erence month of December, 1979, if all of the apparent discre-
26a
As a participant in the entitlements program Mobil has been
directly affected by the problem of disappearing crude oil.
Mobil traditionally has been a purchaser of entitlements and
has expended some $800 million over the life of the program.
Tr. at p. 38. In December of 1980, for instance, Mobil was re-
quired to purchase $48 million worth of entitlements. Because
it has been a traditional purchaser of entitlements, Mobil has
had to purchase additional entitlements as a result of the dis-
appearance of price-controlled crude oil, and the fewer entitle-
ments it has been issued due to the shrinking DOSR. See Exh.
#3. Murdock testified that in 1979, with Mobil’s approximate-
ly 5% industry share of the national runs to stills, Mobil paid
an additional entitlements burden of $64.4 million on $1.3 bil-
lion of entitlements obligations that escaped the program as a
result of the disappearance of price-controlled crude oil. In the
year 1980, however, Mobil’s increased entitlements burden
was four times this amount. According to Murdock’s tes-
timony, $4.3 billion of entitlements obligations escaped the
entitlements program in 1980, and Mobil’s share of that
burden was $220 million of additional entitlements purchases
— all because of disappearing price-controlled crude. This
figure represents 85% of Mobil’s total entitlements obligation
for that year. Tr. at p. 91; Exh. #2!.
pancy between the two systems (DCOE and DCFP) was caused
by “errors” in the DCOE data, the DOSR would have been
reduced from 0.234137 to 0.214510 (8.38 percent of what the
DOSR *‘would have been” if the *‘missing’’ old and new oil was
included). This would result in decreased entitlement alloca-
tions totaling $208.5 million (8.38 percent), increasing all
refiners’ per-barrel post-entitlement crude cost by $0.43 (1.85
percent). (See Appendix K, #40.)
From the customer's standpoint, if the crudes that disappeared
in 1979 reappeared as higher-priced uncontrolled (such as
stripper), then up to $1.344 billion in “‘extra’’ crude costs may
have been passed through.
Validation Study at pp. 104-05. (Footnotes omitted).
27a
Murdock testified that a variety of factors could have con-
tributed or actually have caused the incredible disappearance
of price-controlled crude. Certainly phased decontrol is one of
these, since it was designed to gradually reduce the amount of
crude oil subject to price-controls. A second factor is that the
entitlements system is constantly undergoing adjustments and
corrections. Yet the importance of either of these reasons is
suspect due to the fact that the disappearance of price-con-
trolled crude was both continuous, and increased at a faster
rate than the base volumes of price-controlled crude were de-
creasing.’ Tr. ai p. 55; see e.g. Exh. ##5-8, 12.
Still a third possible explanation for the disappearance of
price-controlled crude is the operation of the DOE's Tertiary
Incentive Program. As part of the phased decontrol of crude
oil, and for the purpose of increasing domestic production, the
DOE adopted the Tertiary Program to provide producers with
front-end financing for exotic or ‘‘enhanced’’ forms of oii
recovery. See 46 Fed. Reg. 25315 (May 6, 1981). This incen-
tive was in the form of enabling a producer to recertify lower
and upper tier crude oil as tertiary incentive crude, and, as a
consequence, to receive the market price instead of the other-
wise applicable controlled price. More specifically, under this
program a producer may certify sufficient quantities of crude
oil as tertiary incentive crude to enable it to receive additional
revenue to recover expenses on seventy-five percent of cer-
tain enhanced forms of crude oil recovery. Murdock raised
the possibility that, in the process of recertifying the price-
controlled crude oil as tertiary incentive crude, the First Pur-
chasers or entitlements program data might not have ac-
© The Validation Study supports the view that factors such as the
definitional differences between the First Purchasers and entitle-
ments programs, adjustments and errors in reporting, only would ac-
count for an insignificant net disappearance of price-controlled
crude. /d. at pp. 96-100. Furthermore, the Study eliminated the
possibility that non-refinery uses of crude oil had a material affect on
the statistics for disappearing price-controlled crude oil. /d. at p. 98.
28a
curately accounted for and reported this recertification. Thus,
a reporting error could have resulted such that a barrel of
price-controlled crude would seem to have disappeared upon
a comparison of the First Purchasers and entitlements pro-
gram data.
After raising this possibility, Murdock effectively demon-
strated that it was an implausible explanation for the disap-
pearance of price-controlled crude. Murdock conceded that
the Tertiary Program would cause the DOSR to shrink be-
cause tertiary incentive crude reduced the quantity of price-
controlled crude on the market. As described before, a
shrinking DOSR causes additional burdens to befall entitle-
ments program refiners. See supra at pp. 14-15. But he dis-
counted the likelihood that the failure of first purchasers to
adjust for tertiary incentive crude could account for the sig-
nificant disappearance of price-controlled crude oil. Some fur-
ther background on the adjustment procedures in the First
Purchasers Report and the entitlements program will prove
useful.
There is a difference in adjustment procedures between the
First Purchasers and entitlements program data collection sys-
tems. In the First Purchasers system, a barrel of crude oil re-
ported as price-controlled in the month of September, for ex-
ample, and subsequenily recertified the following month as
price-controlled crude, would not cause the September First
Purchasers data to be adjusted. Instead, the recertification
would be shown in the next month's First Purchasers report.
The contrary is the case with the entitlements program, which
would adjust its September data to reflect the recertification of
the price-controlled crude. However, based on the foregoing,
a subsequent comparison of the Firsi Purchasers and entitle-
ments program data for the month of September would show
that one barrel of price-controlled crude had disappeared. Fur-
thermore, it is possible that a disappearance could also be
caused if the first purchaser were to simply fail to make the
amendment in the First Purchasers Report to reflect the terti-
ary incentive recertification to begin with. In both of these ex-
amples the disappearance would have been caused by the fact
29a
that the barrel of price-controlled crude was not entered into
the September First Purchasers Report as price-controlled
crude, but was adjusted in the September entitlements pro-
gram data as tertiary incentive crude.
Murdock testified that for several reasons these two
scenarios are improbable explanations for the disappearance
of significant quantities of price-controlled crude oil. First, he
stated that there was absolutely no incentive for a first pur-
chaser of crude oil to “‘neglect’’ to properly amend its First
Purchaser filing to account for the recertification of tertiary in-
centive crude. Tr. at p. 110. A refiner’s First Purchaser filing is
nothing more than a report, and does not, unlike the refiner
reports of the entitlements program, affect that refiner’s
financial obligations under the DOE’s regulatory scheme. /d.
at 110-11. In fact the opposite appears to be the case. The First
Purchasers Report for the year 1980, and for January of 1981.
see Exh. #1, reveals that in fact first purchasers accounted for
hundreds of thousands of barrels of tertiary incentive crude.
Moreover, at the hearing on plaintiffs preliminary injunction
motion, there was no evidence presented that would suggest
that the accuracy of the First Purchasers Reports should be
substantially doubted.'' And while it would be possible that,
in recertifying tertiary incentive crude, differences in deadline
amendment requirements could cause a barrel of price-con-
trolled crude to seem to have disappeared, adjustment pro-
cedures would eventually account for the disappearance in the
following month's data, and no net loss actually would have
occurred.
Of greater moment is the fact that, even assuming arguendo
that the disappearance of price-controlled crude oil could be
explained by misreporting in the Tertiary Incentive Program,
this rationale would not account for most of the crude oil that
has disappeared. The volume of crude oil attributable to the
entire Tertiary Incentive Program is relatively insignificant
\t' See supra, note 10.
30a
when compared to statistics on the total volume of disappear-
ing price-controlled crude. Tr. at p. 126. Furthermore, the
problem of misreporting in the Tertiary Incentive Program,
under the scenario outlined above, would only address the
disappearance of price-controlled crude oil that has already
been booked as such into the entitlements program as a refin-
ery receipt. By contrast, the disappearance of crude oil as
reflected in a comparison of the First Purchasers and entitle-
ments data, is caused by the problem of crude oil that has not
been booked into the entitlements program in the first place.
Therefore, the purported problem of misreporting in the Ter-
tiary Incentive Program could not explain how millions of bar-
rels of price-controlled crude oil, accounted for in the First
Purchasers Reports, subsequently disappeared and were nev-
er booked into the entitlements program."’
Murdock testified that the most reasonable explanation for
the disappearance of price-controlled crude, and why much of
it never seems to reach the entitlements program, is due to
the use of manipulative inventory practices by refiners in the
entitlements program. Tr. at pp. 53-4. For a refiner looking to
maximize profits through the sale of price-controlled crude af-
ter decontrol, entitlements obligations would first have to be
avoided. Manipulative inventorying uniquely serves this end.
After the announcement of decontrol, refiners realized that
commonly used inventory oractices in the industry could also
be employed to delay the booking of their relatively inexpen-
sive price-controlled crude as received at the refinery (this is
called ‘“‘selective inventorying,”’ tr. at p. 78), until after the
uate of decontrol, when it would be worth the much higher
2 The Validation Study concluded: **Thus while the inclusion (or
exclusion) of out-of-period adjustments can be seen to affect any
comparisons of monthly totals, over longer periods of time (e.g., |
year), these monthly variations can be expected to cancel each other
out, and the inclusion (or exclusion) of adjustments or amendments
can be seen to contribute to very little, if any, to the apparent discre-
pancies between systems.”” /d. at p. 98.
3ha
world market price. The obvious point of this exercise was to
avoid the entitlements obligations in order to make a “*wind-
fall’ profit from the difference between the controlled and
market price — approximately $25.00 per barrel — on each
barrel of price-controlled crude inventoried in this manner.
Tr. at p. 38. In other words, the purpose of the plan was to
make price-controlled crude oil disappear, and then later reap-
pear for sale after decontrol.
If refiners scanned the horizon to search out obstacles to
this plan in general, or to manipulative inventory practices in
particular, they were not to find them in the DOE’s entitle-
ment program regulations. Actually, even before the an-
nouncement of decontrol, a variety of manipulative inven-
torying practices were already permitied by the entitlements
program's regulations and reporting procedures. The origins
of such practices may be traced to the program's accounting
constructs, which provide that an entitlement obligation is to
only be imposed at the time a barrel of price-controlled crude
oil is reported as having been received by the refinery. More
specifically, a refinery receipt is charitably defined as follows:
‘*“Crude receipts’’ means, as to a particular refiner, the
volume of crude oil (a) booked into its refineries in accor-
dance with accounting procedures generally accepted and
consistently and historically applied by the refiner con-
cerned, for its own account or for the account of a firm
other than a refiner or (b) if not previously so booked
into its refineries, delivered by that refiner for its account
to another refiner pursuant to a processing agreement
with that other refiner. Crude oil receipts shall not in-
clude crude oil received by a refiner for the purpose of
processing at its refineries for the account of another
refiner. A particular crude oil receipt shall be deemed to
have occurred when the related cost is booked into refin-
ery inventory in accordance with accounting procedures
generally accepted and consistently and historically ap-
plied by the refiner concerned, whether or not such crude
oil has been actually received by that refiner, except that
32a
crude oil delivered by one refiner to another refiner pur-
suant to a processing agreement will be deemed to have
been delivered by the delivering refiner to the other
refiner when the risk of loss passes to the other refiner
under the particular processing agreement or when the
crude oil is received at the refinery of the other refiner,
whichever occurs first. Crude oil which has been added
by a refiner to its inventory and which is thereafter sold
or otherwise disposed of without processing for the ac-
count of that refiner shall be deducted from its crude oil
receipts at the time when the related cost is deducted
from refinery inventory in accordance with accounting
procedures generally accepted and consistently and his-
torically applied by the refiner concerned. The volume of
domestic crude oil included in a refiner’s crude oil
receipts shall be evidenced by and consistent with in-
voices received with respect to such crude oil receipts.
10 C.F.R. § 211.67 (1980); See tr. at pp. 84-5.
Thus, constrained simply by the flexible requirement that
they employ “‘accounting procedures generally accepted and
consistently and historically applied,’ a refiner is in effect
allowed by the regulations to report a receipt of price-con-
trolled crude for entitlements purposes at any point in the
supply chain from wellhead to refinery gate.'’ Tr. at p. 102. A
') Murdock’s testimony on the flexibility of entitlements program
regulations was confirmed by the Validation Study:
The program-dependent nature of the key data elements thus
tends to cloud what appear to be otherwise straight-forward defi-
nitions. Particularly in the case of receipts, substantial inter-
pretational latitude for respondents is built into the system by
the regulations. Total receipts for the industry include volumes
of crude at every stage of the supply chain from wellhead to
refinery gate. While most receipts are directly tied to some
physical transaction that has already occurred (e.g., receipt at
the refinery gate, transfer of title at the point of first sale, or
loading into a tanker), in some cases receipt volumes are tied to
33a
variety of accounting techniques have been used as a result, as
have inventory practices designed to take advantage of them.
For instance, some refiners use the “refinery gate’’ method
which reports the crude as a «eceipt at the time it physically
enters the refinery.'* This legally enables a refiner to leave
unreported for entitlements purposes, any price-controlled
crude that has been purchased by the refiner, but continues to
be physically located outside the refinery, such as in pipelines,
intermediate storage, and in terminals or ships. '* Tr. at pp. 53-
4. This practice is to be distinguished from the method
whereby a barrel of crude is deemed as a receipt when some
physical transaction has already occurred. For instance, Mobil
uses a point of purchase (usually at the wellhead) inventory
practice. By comparison to the previous example, Mobil
would be required to report for entitlements purposes, crude
it had purchased though had not as yet physically received. Tr.
al p. 86.
physical transactions that will (or are expected to) occur in the
future (i.e., in the case of some exchanges). In addition, many
individual respondents report crudes from different sources in
different ways, thus qualifying the meaning of receipts for that
respondent alone. In short, the data elements are financial/ac-
counting and program constructs that have little meaning outside
their programmatic contexts.
Id. at p. 42. See also Validation Study at pp. 8, 40, 93, Appendix Lat p.
1-6, Appendix J at p. J-28.
'* The Validation Study reported that *‘about 30 percent of the
refineries sampled booked domestic receipts upon receipt at the
refinery gate.”* /d. at p. 68.
'’ In this regard the Validation Study states that **Respondent in-
terviews confirmed that many large integrated companies do not
necessarily book crude immediately into ‘refinery accounts.” Instead,
crude may be carried on the books of a production or supply com-
pany, and reported as being physically located not at refineries.’* /d.
at Appendix J, at p. J-36.
34a
Another legal and quite commonly used practice is called
“time exchanges.”’ See 10 C.F.R. §211.67(g) (1980). Under
this practice a refiner, for example, exchanges crude with an-
other refiner in one month, with the intent that crude oil of
similar quality and quantity would be returned in the following
month. However, under the entitlements program's regula-
tions, the receipt of the crude oil need not be reported until it
is actually received on exchange.'* Tr. at p. 78. It will be re-
called that an entitlement obligation is only incurred when a
barrel of price-controlled crude is booked into a refiner as a
receipt. With the use of time exchanges, a refiner could ex-
change away price-controlled crude for decontrolled crude to
be returned on the event of decontrol. The regulations, more-
over, would seem sufficiently broad to permit refiners to en-
gage in reciprocal time exchanges so that both could assist the
other in avoiding the entitlements obligations. Tr. at p. 79. At
the same time, Section 211.67(g) apparently would permit a
refiner to avoid reporting receipts of price-controlled crude oil
exchanges, where the terms of the exchange were not limited
to location and quality differentials, and instead focused on
the crude oil “‘tier’’ being exchanged. A refiner engaged in
this type of practice with a reseller or other refiner that had
been able to avoid reporting a crude oil receipt under the en-
titlements program, would not have to report a price-con-
trolled exchange after decontrol.
The final manipulative inventory device that will be dis-
cussed is called “‘splitting entitlements.” Tr. at p. 85. Murdock
testified that the entithements program regulations are flexible
enough to permit refiners to selectively deem their non-refin-
ing inventories to be made up entirely of price-controlled
crude oil. Refiners could take advantage of this regulation to
avoid entitlements obligations. He described this practice as
follows:
In point of fact, a refiner is permitted, if his accounting
system, historic accounting system allowed, to selectively
© See supra, note 13.
35a
deem that price-controlled oil as being short-stopped or
withheld in intermediate inventory as illustrated on this
chart and that uncontrolled oil is being withdrawn from
that inventory outside the refinery and delivered to the
refinery.
. * ‘ * *
Price-controlled oil would appear to, would seem to dis-
appear between the first purchaser and the refinery while
uncontrolled oil would reappear. The obvious intention
of this action would be to retain that price-controlled oil
in that tank outside the refinery prior to its positon, prior
to its imposition of entitlement obligation until decontrol.
Tr. at pp. 85-6; see Exh. #21."
Still, to fully understand the likely impact of these inventory
practices on the problem of disappearing crude oil, it must be
appreciated that even before the announcement of decontrol,
refiners manipulated their stocks of crude oil to reduce inven-
tory costs and to maximize their profits. '* This too was accom-
plished by intentionally inventorying the less expensive price-
'? This practice was uncovered by the Validation Study:
If it is assumed that holders of crude stocks will seek to mini-
mize their inventory costs, then it will be advantageous for them
to attempt, wherever possible, to have those tnventories con-
sist of lower-priced crude (i.c., old oil). This hypothesis was
shown to be true in the case of one major integrated oil company
that held crude stocks outside its refinery accounts and thus out-
side the entitlements program. These stocks intentionally con-
sisted of predominately old oil. In that company’s case, the sep-
arate crude supply division acted essentially as a reseller of
crude, “‘selling’’ only such crude to the refining entity as it
chose to (in this case, higher-priced, generally uncontrolled
crudes) in order to keep its inventory value as low as possible.
Id. at p. 103, Executive Summary at p. IX.
'* The Validation Study confirms these practices were employed
between the years 1977 and 1979:
36a
controlled crude, and by constantly refining the more expen-
sive uncontrolled crude. Moreover, even then the price-con-
trolled crude was “‘short-stopped™ outside the refinery to
avoid the entitlements obligations.’ It therefore seems highly
probable that since the announcement of decontrol, each of
the above described inventory practices have continued to be
used by refiners, but with the promise of much more profita-
ble results, than before. Plainly, these practices would perfect-
ly serve both to enable a refiner to avoid entitlements obliga-
tions, and to resell price-controlled crude after decontrol in
order to take advantage of the world market price. And con-
sider the incentive to misreport: the fewer barrels of price-
controlled crude an entitlements seller reports, correspon-
dingly fewer entitlements will be charged off of its total obliga-
tions. Similarly, the fewer barrels of price-controlled crude re-
ported by an entitlements purchaser, correspondingly fewer
entitlements will have to be purchased.
Furthermore, the manipulative inventory practices just de-
scribed could not only accomplish these ends, tiiey were vir-
tually sanctioned by the DOE’s flexible regulations. Thus, it is
reasonable to assume that manipulative inventorying would
explain much of the disappearance of price-controlled crude,
especially when it is considered that other devices that could
Exhibit J-23 also shows that while “‘entithement stocks’ have
been drawn down over the three-year period (28.8 million bar-
rels), stocks held at locations other than refineries have been
significantly built up (124.3 million barrels). This finding is rele-
vant to the problem of the *‘disappearance of old oil"* in that one
explanation given the problem was that stocks may have been
built up, possibly with significant volumes of controlled crude,
outside refinery accounts for entitlements purposes.
Id. at p. 3-38.
Id. at pp. 101-02.
37a
be employed to achieve the same results were illegal.” For in-
stance, the miscertification of price-controlled crude oil as
decontrolled crude carries with it the possibility of incurring
civil and criminal liabilities.”’ See 10 C_F_R. § 205.203 (1980).
As Murdock aptly stated in his testimony before the Court:
I think it’s very unreasonable to assume that the magni-
tude of the disappearance that | have shown on these
charts is a result of criminal action. Miscertilication is a
criminal act and while I don’t doubt that there are crimi-
nals in the oil business, as well as any other business, it is
inconceivable that disappearance of this magnitude could
be the result of criminal acts and it would be inconceiva-
ble to imagine that oil companies would engage in crimi-
nal acts when exactly the same financial benefit could be
obtained by a perfectly legal, or at least certainly not pro-
hibited, application of the Department of Energy regula-
tions. For that reason we are very convinced that the
great bulk of the disappearance which has occurred in the
last two vears is, in fact, the result of this taventory ma-
nipulation.
Tr. at p. 87. Murdock added that miscertification more likely
played a role in the disappearance of price-controlled crude
before 1979; in other words, before the announcement of the
coming of decontrol was made. At that time the average rates
» The Validation Study uncovered no evidence of miscertifica-
tion. /d. at p. 100. Moreover, it compared the practice of miscertifica-
tion to that of manipulative inventorying, and of the latter con-
cluded: **This practice is essentially different from the incentives to
misreport discribed [sic] in this Appendix. To a large extent the prac-
tice entails taking full advantage of the regulations.’ Appendix L at
p. L-2.
* This may explain why between 1974-1977, the DOE has issued
only $83.5 million in “*Notices of Probable Violations’ (emphasis
supplied), on a total entitlements obligation of $39 billion for the
sume period. Validation Study at p. 61.
38a
of disappearance were smaller, fluctuating between 2.5% and
4.0%. Tr. at pp. 86-7.” This is probably because before the an-
nouncement of decontrol refiners had limited options availa-
ble to them to “‘game”™ the entitlements program. As a result,
they would be more likely to turn to more desperate means,
such as miscertification, to profit from selling price-controlled
crude oil as uncontrolled crude. Of course, after the an-
nouncement of the coming of decontrol, they could in addi-
tion ‘“‘game™’ the entitlements program to make even greater
margins of profit.
A final factor that increases the likelihood that manipulative
inventory practices were the primary cause of the large quan-
tities of price-controlled crude after 1979, is the substantial
‘“‘reappearance™’ of similarly large quantities of unconirolled
crude.’’ As indicated already, a comparison of the First Pur-
chasers Reports and the entitlements program data reveals
that uncontrolled crude was reappearing after the announce-
ment of decontrol in greater amounts than had been reported
2 The Validation Study found insignificant amounts of miscer-
tifications during that period:
Audits by DOE (Enforcement and the Office of Special
Counsel) of entitlements records have similarly found a
relatively small volume of violations. It was estimated that less
than 0.5 percent of total reported volumes and/or entitlements
benefits — see Chapter II], Part E.2.b. Enforcement audits as of
February, 1978 determined that for the period November, 1974
to December, 1976. old oil receipts were understated by less
than 720,000 (approximately 5,600 barrels per day), while new
oil receipts were overstated by about 240,000 barrels (approx-
imately 19,000 barrels per day). On the other hand, preliminary
audits of five resellers conducted by ERA in 1977, indicated that
approximately 50,000 barrels per day of old oil were being cer-
tified as new oil.
Id. at pp. 100-101 (footnotes omitted).
2’ See supra, note 18. see also Validation Study at pp. 94-95, Exh.
##18 and 19.
39a
even as being produced in the same time period. This finding
is consistent with the use of *‘selective inventorying,”” “time
exchanges,’ and “splitting entitlements.”’ Each of these prac-
tices would enable a refiner to hold price-controlled crude out-
side of the refinery, and thereby avoid the entitlements obli-
gation, while permitting the refiner to process more expensive
uncontrolled crude. In sum, motivated by the opportunity to
make “‘windfall” profits after decontrol, manipulative inven-
lorying practices provided refiners with perfectly legal means
to make such profits. A comparison of the First Purchaser's
Reports and entitlements program data would seem to verify
that refiners took advantage of this opportunity. Tr. at pp. 77-
80.
While understandably reluctant to admit it, for at least four
years now the DOE has been keenly aware of the problem of
disappearing price-controlled crude oil, and the fact that lit-
erally millions of barrels of price-controlled crude have not
been accounted for in the entitlements program. On April 15,
1977, some two years before the announcement of decontrol,
a Mobil vice-president, Bonner H. Templeton, wrote to J. F.
O'Leary, administrator of the FEA, to complain about the
problem of the disappearance of price-controlled crude. Tem-
pleton stated in his letter that for the twelve months com-
mencing February 1976, a comparison of the First Purchasers
Reports and entitlements program data revealed a 1.0% dis-
parity in the quantities of “‘old oil” reported. In addition,
Templeton stated:
Assuming such conversion is solely to upper tier crude,
this difference of 1% represents an overall increase in in-
dustry crude costs to refiners of about $0.5 million per
day, or $190 million per year. Again, assuming that there
is no mathematical or other explanation for this difler-
ence the mechanics of the Entitlements Program are such
that the industry's crude costs are being increased. The
end result is an apparent windfall to a few individual firms
at the expense of others.
40a
He concluded his letter by requesting that the DOE conduct a
thorough investigation of the problem.
In response to Templeton’s letter, Gorman C. Smith, Act-
ing Deputy Administrator of the FEA, wrote back in a letter
dated May 19, 1977, that the problem of the variances in data
between the two systems was a concern to the FEA, and that
‘a thorough analysis and review of the data is being con-
ducted.” By June of 1977, this investigation had been com-
pleted, and a report entitled *‘Survey of the Disappearance of
Old Oil (1977 Survey) was submitted to Administrator
O'Leary from Wayne W. Porter of the FEA’s Office of Com-
pliance Operations and Regulatory Programs. To assess the
problem of disappearing price-controlled crude, the 1977
Survey compared the First Purchasers Reports with the en-
litlements program data for two periods: from February
through December 1976, and from January through April
1977. The 1977 Survey made the following findings:
A comparison of this data for the period February
through December 1976 showed that first purchasers re-
ported 89,000 barrels per day (B/D) more of the lower
tier crude (old oil) than was reported by the refiners. In
the same period 85,000 B/D more upper tier crude was
reported by the refiners than was reported by first pur-
chasers.
The disappearing oil problem has grown recently. Be-
tween January and April 1977 refiners reported 201,000
B/D less old oil than the first purchasers. Upper tier crude
receipts reported by the refiners exceeded that reported
by first purchasers by 82,000 B/D. An additional 119,000
B/D of old oil reported by first purchasers were not re-
ported in refiner receipts.
Id. at p. 1.
The 1977 Survey went on to state that the problem of dis-
parities between the two data systems had “remained at es-
sentially the same level throughout the period of com-
4la
parison.”’ /d. However, it concluded that there was “‘no clear
explanation for this sudden growth in ‘disappearing’ old oil.”
Id. The 1977 Survey. nevertheless, did isolate “‘potential
causes*’ of the problem as being “erroneous reporting” and
‘regulatory loopholes.’ /d. at p. 2. Specifically, the 1977
Survey found that miscertifications of tier categories *‘account
for a significant portion of the old oi! which has become upper
tier.’ /d. Also uncovered were “‘inconsistencies and defini-
tional problems in reporting crude receipts involving [time]
exchanges.” /d. Still another cause of the disappearance of
price-controlled crude was traced to the fact that there was no
requirement in the entitlements program that crude oil used
for non-refining purposes be reported. The 1977 Survey
stated: *‘Consequently, the volumes of old oil used by refiners
for fuel, as well as the old oil sold by resellers to firms which
do not refine the oil, disappear from the reporting system.”
Id. at p. 4. This practice, is, of course, consistent with “‘split-
ling entitlements.” See supra, at p. 22.
A year later, the same data collected in the 1977 Survey,
was again analyzed by a separate DOE sub-agency in a report
entitled **Background Paper on the Disappearance of Old
Oil,’ dated March 14, 1978, internal memorandum for Lin-
coln E. Moses by Charles E. Smith. (1978 Paper). This addi-
tional study confirmed each of the conclusions made in the
1977 Survey. First, that in corjunction with the disappearance
of ‘old oil,’ *‘new oil’ was reappearing in the entitlements
program. /d. at p. 6. And second, that the rate of disappear-
ance had increased during the February through January 1977
According to the 1978 Paper:
A comparison of these data for the period February 1976
through January 1977 showed that the first purchasers reported
108,000 barrels per day more of old oil than was reported by the
refiners. For this same period of time, the first purchasers re-
ported 91,000 barrels per day less of new oil than was reported
by the refiners.
Id. at p. 6.
42a
period, such that ‘‘old oil'* was not only reappearing, but it
was disappearing from the entitlements system altogether. /d.
at p. 7.°° Third, the 1978 Paper attributed these statistics pri-
marily to miscertifications of crude oil tiers, and secondarily to
misreporting due to time exchanges and crude oil used for
nonrefining purposes. /d. at pp. 10-12.
As already described in this Memorandum-Decision, the
DOE also undertook to commission an independent study of
the problems in the entitlements program's data systems. This
study has been completed and is entitled ‘Validation of the
Crude Oil Entitlements Information System,”’ dated March 9,
1981. (Validation Study). In assessing the performance of the
entitlements program's data system, the Validation Study
compared the First Purchaser Reports with entitlements pro-
gram data for the years 1977 through 1979. The Validation
Study observed: **We found, as other previous investigations
have, [citing the two previously mentioned studics among
others] that the volumes of domestic crude reported as old oil
on [First Purchasers Reports] are larger than those reported
on the [entitlements program data] system. .. . The missing
old oil is approximately 241 million barrels, or an average of
220,000 barrels per day over the 1977-1979 period.”” /d. at pp.
vi-viili. The Validation Study concluded as follows:
To the extent that nonrefining inventories consist of
crude oil reported to the First Purchaser System as old oil
but not to the DCOE, then these volumes would seem to
have “‘disappeared ~’ If it is assumed that firms will seek
to Minimize their inventory costs and maximize the value
of an entitlement, then it would be to their advantage to
2’ [the date] indicates that, although the amount of old oil which
turned into new oil has remained relatively stable (approximate-
ly 1.20% of total crude oil), the amount of crude oil which has
“disappeared” from the system altogether has increased
markedly (from -.22% to 1.71%).
1978 Paper, at p. 8.
43a
have these inventories consist mainly of the cheaper price
controlled crude oil. With the advent of decontrol, those
companies that have considerable inventories of old oil
will be able to sell the oil at uncontrolled prices, which are
four or five times greater than the purchase price of old
oil. Companies that did not follow such a practice will
more than likely be at a competitive disadvantage, but we
are unable to qualify this problem.
Id. at pp. ix-x.°°
On December 16, 1980 Allen E. Murray, President of the
Marketing and Refining Division of Mobil wrote to the Secre-
» See also Affidavit submitted by Barton RK. House, Acting Ad-
ministrator of the ERA, in Metzenbaum v. Edwards, Civil Action No.
81-405 (D.D.C. filed February 19, 1981). In a related context, Mr.
House gave testimony in support of the President's decision to order
decontrol without notice and comment. In this regard, Mr. House
stated:
if the effective date of the decontrol order had been deferred
pending notice and comment, producers, resellers and refiners
of price-controlled crude oil could have been expected to engage
in various forms of stockpiling and hoarding in order to capture
the benefits of selling the crude oil at uncontrolled prices once
the decontrol order became effective. The benefits to producers,
resellers and refiners of such delay during the rulemaking period
could have been substantial. As of December 1980, lower tier
crude oil was selling to refiners for an average of $7.49 per barrel
and upper tier crude oil was selling for an average of $15.51 per
barrel. The market price of crude oil at that time was $34.55.
Therefore, the expected additional profit to be gained by with-
holding old oil would be $27.06 per barrel and $19.04 per barre!
for upper tier crude oil. Companies could have withheld price
controlled crude oil from the market, for example, by reducing
present production levels, modifying their standard inventory
procedures, using all available storage tank capacity, and hiring
and filling oil tankers to capacity for use as storage.
Affidavit of Barton R. House, 4 4 (February 24, 1981), annexed to
plaintiffs complaint as Exhibit C.
44a
tary of Energy about the increasing rate at which price-con-
trolled crude was disappearing **in the last few months.’ Mur-
ray stated in his letter that “*[t}he total controlled oil disap-
pearance as reported through September by DOE now
amounts to over half a million barrels per day or 6 percent of
total! U.S. production. These losses of controlled crude are
largely offset by increases in the volume of refiner stripper oi!
receipts." Deputy Secretary Lynn R. Coleman responded in a
January 19, 1981 letter to Murray, in which he stated that “*I
have asked the Office of Special Counsel for Compliance to
look into this matter. As the Office responsible for monitoring
the compliance of the 35 largest refiners with the Depart-
ment’s pricing and allocation regulations, the Special
Counsel's office is particularly interested in this problem.”
Mobil claims that despite its repeated attempts to bring the
problem of disappearing crude oil to the DOE’s attention over
the course of four years, those efforts proved futile. Undeter-
red, nevertheless, Mobil then petitioned the Economic Regu-
latory Administration of the DOE to institute an emergency
rulemaking proceeding to take comments on a proposed regu-
iation that would impose an entitlements obligation on every
barrel of price-controlled crude oil received though not re-
ported by refiners and resellers between November |. 1974
and January 28, 1981. In its petition, Mobil described the pro-
posed amendments as follows.
The purpose of these amendments is to ensure that, with
the abrupt termination of federal price controls on the
production and sale of domestic crude oil, the benefits, as
well as the burdens, of such regulations have been borne
equitably by all affected parties including consumers.
Abrupt termination without full accountability by cach
refiner and reseller for price-controlled crude oil held in
inventory on the date of decontrol will result in an unwar-
ranted windfall to some firms at the expense of other
companies and consumers.
February 10, 1981 Petition for Emergency Rulemaking
Regarding the Domestic Crude Allocation Program, at p. |.
45a
Defendants’ Exhibit A. The DOE informs the Court that
Mobil’s Proposed Rulemaking remains under consideration.
On March 12, 1981 Mobil also filed an appeal of the DOF’s
December, 1980 entitlements notice with the DOE’s Office of
Hearings and Appeals (OHA), and a decision on this appeal is
still pending. Mobil has, in addition, filed a request to stay the
January entitlements notice pending a decision on its appeal,
but the OHA has not responded to this request within its reg-
ulatory mandated time period of ten working days. See 10
C.F.R. § 205.199(h) (i) C1980).
Accordingly, Mobil filed this action on April 10, 1981 and
seeks a declaration from this Court that the DOE's post-
decontrol entitlements notices are unlawful. Mobil additional-
ly prays for injunctive relief to prevent the DOE from issuing
any further entitlements notices, until such notices fully take
into account all price-controlled crude oil produced and sold
between November |, 1974 and January 28, 1981. Mobil con-
tends that due to the manipulative practices of certain entitle-
ments program refiners, entitlements notices as presently
contemplated by the DOE are woefully inaccurate. The DOE's
refusal to take corrective measures. says Mobil, is arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of the DOE's discretion, and in excess of
its statutory authority under the Emergency Petroleum
Allocation Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. $751, et seq. Lastly,
Mobil argues that unless it is granted a preliminary injunction
to protect the status quo, it will suffer immediate irreparable
harm because it would never be able to recoup its lost reve-
nues. Before the Court may address the merits of plaintiffs
claims, defendant's motion to dismiss must first be con-
sidered.
IV.
The DOE has moved te dismiss plaintif!s complaint, and
has put forward three separate, bul related grounds. The first
of these is that Mobil has failed to exhaust its administrative
remedies. The DOE argues that Mobil has already raised the
insiant claims before the DOE in the form of a petition for
46a
emergency rulemaking, and an appeal before the OHA. Since
both the petition and the appeal remain under consideration
by the DOE’s relevant sub-agencies, and either could afford
plaintiff all of the relief which it seeks in its complaint, the
DOE contends that judicial review of these issues at this time
would be premature and a waste of judicial resources. Accord-
ing to the DOE, the provinces of this Court are ill-suited to
conduct an investigation and audit of the entitlements pro-
gram, or to assess the implications of the various manipulative
practices alleged by plaintiff. The DOE maintains that **This is
obviously an area in which the initial factfinding and applica-
tion of the regulations must be left to the agency prior to any
involvement by the courts.’ Defendant's Memorandum in
Support of Motion to Dismiss at p. 6. And finally, the DOE
says that in addition to the adminisirative procedures outlined
above, plaintiff has not undertaken to apply for “exception
relief to “‘prevent special hardship, inequity, or unfair dis-
tribution of burdens.’ 10 C.F_R. § 205.50 et seg. (1980). The
DOE maintains that this form of relief is especially appropriate
here since plaintiff claims that the impact of the regulatory
scheme will have severe economic consequences on its opera-
tion.
Traditionally it has been held by the courts that a party will
not be permitted to pursue judicial relief until available ad-
ministrative remedies have been exhausted. See e.g. Parisi v.
Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 37-8 (1972), McKart v. United Sates,
395 U.S. 187, 193 (1969). Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding
Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938), see generally, 5 Mezines,
Stein & Gruff, Administrative Law, § 49.01 (1979). The under-
lying purposes of the doctrine of exhaustion are multifold and
have been summarized in Mckart v. United States, supra at
193-95, as follows: (1) to avoid premature interruption of the
administrative process, (2) to permit the agency to develop
the necessary factual background upon which decisions must
be based; (3) to enable the agency to exercise its discretion or
administrative expertise, (4) to improve the efficiency of the
administrative process; (5) to conserve increasingly scarce ju-
47a
dicial resources. (6) to provide an agency with the opportunity
to discover and correct its own orders, and (7) to avoid the
possibility that “frequent and deliberate flouting of admin-
istrative processes could weaken the effectiveness of an
agency by encouraging people to ignore ‘ts procedures.” See
also Hawthorne Oil & Gas Corp. v. DOE, No. 5-50 (TECA,
April 24, 1981). slip op. at 14-15, Touche Ross & Co. v. S.ELC.,
609 F.2d $70, 575-77 (2d Cir. 1979), Diapulse Cerp. v. Food &
D. Admin., 500 F.2d 75, 77 (2d Cir. 1974).
However, in the absence of these factors, or in exceptional
circumstances, a plaintifY will not be pressed to fulfill the
exhaustion requirement. Thus, when the prescribed admin-
istrative remedy is plainly inadequate, for instance, due to un-
reasonable administrative delay, exhaustion is unnecessary.
Walker v. Southern Railway, 385 U.S. 196, 198 (1966). United
States Alkali Export Ass'n vy. United States, 325 U.S. 196, 210
(1945). A plaintiff, morcover, will not be required by a court
to exhaust administrative remedies when irreparable harm
would result. See Hawthorne Oil & Gas Corp. v. DOE, supra at
p. 14, Touche Ross & Co. v. S.E.C., 609 F.2d $70, 576 0.11 (2d
Cir. 1979). Neither will the doctrine of exhaustion be held to
apply in the situation where the agency has clearly acted tn ex-
cess of its statutory authority. Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184,
188-91 (1958), Hawthorne Oil & Gas Corp. v. DOE, supra at p
15, Touche Ross & Co. v. S.E.C., supra at 575-76. And lastly,
exhaustion will not be required where to do so would be
futile, such as where the very administrative procedure under
attack is the one that the agency says must be exhausted
Hawthorne Oil & Gas v. DOE, supra at p. 1S. Nat. Conservative
Political v. Fed. Election, 8526 F.2d 953, 957 (D.C. Cir 1980)
(per curiam), National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v
Train, 510 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir, 1975). Touche Ross & Co. v.
S.E.C., supra at 577, Finnerty v. Cowen, 508 F.2d 972, 982-83
(2d Cir. 1974). Davis v. Bolger, 496 F. Supp. 559, 567 (D.D.C.
1980). In weighing these factors and balancing the relative in-
terests involved, the applications of the exhaustion doctrine
are within the sound discretion of the court NLRB v. Marine
Workers, 391 U.S. 418, 426 1.8 (1968).
48a
With regard to the instant case, the Court does not believe
it is necessary for plaintiff Mobil to further exhaust its admin-
istrative remedies. At this juncture some additional clarifica-
tion of the issues in this case is appropriate. The central issues
in this dispute may be summarized as follows: (1) Have sub-
stantial quantities of price-controlled crude oil disappeared
from the entitlements program since its inception through the
date of decontrol, such that the DOE’s entitlements notices
have not reasonably accounted for all price-controlled crude
produced and sold during the life of the entitlements program.
(2) If substantial quantities of price-controlled crude have dis-
appeared and affected the reasonable accuracy of these
notices, would the DOE exceed its statutory authority by issu-
ing post-decontrol entitlements notices which it knows do not
reasonably account for the price-controlled crude that has dis-
appeared. (3) Will plaintiff suffer irreparable harm as a result
of the issuance of post-decontrol entitlements notices which
do not reasonably account for the price-controlled crude oil
that has disappeared, and which, therefore, are not reasonably
accurate.
As for the first of these issues, evidence submitted at the
May 12, 1981 hearing on plaintif{!s motion for a preliminary
injunction conclusively demonstrates that in the year, 1979
and 1980, approximately 250 million barrels of price-con-
trolled crude disappeared from the entitlements program. The
evidence also revealed that, as a result, some $5.6 billion
worth of entitlements obligations were not channeled through
the entitlements program. The DOE did not present any evi-
dence at the preliminary injunction hearing to dispute these
statistics. In fact, the DOE has totally conceded these points in
its written submissions to the Court. See Defendants’ Memo-
randum in Support of the Motion to Dismiss, at p. 7. Further-
more, the DOE does not dispute that the disappearance of
price-controlled crude has caused substantial and unnecessary
burdens to befall entitlements program refiners. Nor even
does it contest that the issuance of post-decontrol entitle-
ments notices in the form contemplated will exacerbate that
burden.
49a
But instead of conceding as well that the above admissions
would tend to raise questions about whether the DOE has ex-
ceeded its statutory authority by issuing these inaccurate post-
decontrol notices, the DOE has taken a different tack in this
litigation. It seems to be saying that because it has not ascer-
tained the exact causes for the disappearance of price-con-
trolled crude, or decided what to do about the problem, plain-
tiff has failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. In the
Court's view, not only do these contentions obfuscate the is-
sues as Stated above, they also misstate the record. For the
moment the relevant inquiry does not concern the possible
reasons for the disappearance of the price-controlled crude, or
what actions the DOE should have taken or could take to
eradicate the problem. Rather, the question in chief, and res-
tated necessarily in view of the DOE’s concessions, is whether
the DOE has now exceeded its statutory authority by issuing
the post-decontrol entitlements notices, while knowing full-
well that such notices are not reasonably accurate, and would
lead to further increase the already substantial and necessary
burden of entitlements refiners.
As a consequence, despite the fact that the DOE continues
to investigate the causes for the disappearance of price-con-
trolled crude, though perhaps admirable, this would have no
bearing on the exhaustion issue before the Court. What is es-
sential is that the DOE is about to issue post-decontrol entitle-
ments notices, and in so acting has arguably exceeded its
Statutory authority. Plaintiff claims that it will be irreparably
harmed as a result. To be considered for exhaustion pu: poses,
therefore, is whether plaintiff may now seek a judicial remedy.
The Court believes that when the issue in this case is framed
properly in this fashion, the above query must be answered in
the affirmative. The Supreme Court dealt with a related situa-
tion in Leedom v. AKyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958). In that case the
National Labor Relations Board had purportedly acted in ex-
cess of its authority when it certified a collective bargaining
unit without permitting all interested employees to vote on
the question. The Court found the exhaustion doctrine inap-
50a
plicable and stated: ‘‘This suit is not one to ‘review, in the
sense of that term in the Act, a decision of the Board made
within its jurisdiction. Rather it is one to strike down an order
of the Board made in excess of its delegated powers and con-
trary to a specific provision of the Act.” Leedom v. Kyne, 358
U.S. 184, 186 (1958); see also McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional,
372 U.S. 10, 17 (1962). The instant case falls within this well-
settled exception to the exhaustion requirement. Specifically,
whether the DOE acted “‘plainly beyond its jurisdiction” in
deciding to issue post-decontrol entitlements notices which it
knew were not reasonably accurate. See Touche Ross & Co. v.
S.E.C., 609 F.2d 570, $75 (2d Cir. 1979), Sterling Drug, Inc. v.
Weinberger, 509 F.2d 1236, 1239 (2d Cir. 1975).
Flowing from these conclusions is that none of the purposes
of the exhaustion requirement would be served by deferring
to the DOE. The instant case does not present a situation
where, by permitting judicial review, the administrative proc-
ess would be prematurely interrupted. Based on the fore-
going, it is clear that plaintiff complains herein of an admin-
istrative decision that has been completed. This Court may
enjoin the effect of that decision, but in so doing, it would not
be enjoining the administrative decision-making process. See
Touche Ross & Co. v. S.E.C., 609 F.2d at 576. It would also ap-
pear that there would be little use for additional development
of a factual record since the issue here is the reasonableness of
the DOE’s conduct as based on existing facts. Moreover, a
further sounding of the DOE’s expertise in this matter would
not be productive. The issues raised in this case are primarily
legal. For example, one of the DOE’s arguments is that it has
no discretion in issuing the post-decontrol entithements
notices because it is required to do so by applicable regula-
tions. This is a purely legal judgment on the part of the DOE,
and it may properly be reviewed by the Court. See Touche Ross
& Co. v. S.E.C., 609 F.2d 570, 577 (2d Cir. 1979); Consumers
Union v. Cost of Living Council, 491 F.2d 1396, 1399 (TECA)
cert. denied 416 U.S. 984 (1974). Various other legal judg-
ments also have been made by the DOE in reaching its deci-
Sla
sion on whether to issue the inaccurate entitlements notices.
These include: the legal effect of President Reagan's oil indus-
try decontrol order, see Executive Order No. 11287, 48 Fed.
Reg. 9909 (January 28, 1981) and see supra at p. 10, has had
on the DOE’s supposed legal obligation to issue post-
decontrol entitlements notices, the applicability of the under-
lying purposes of the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act,
15 U.S.C. §753(b)(1); and whether entitlement program
refiners would suffer irreparable harm if the DOE released en-
titlements notices which were not reasonably accurate.
In addition, it seems clear that remanding this case to the
DOE would be futile. The DOE claims that it is legally re-
quired to issue the entitlements notices, and therefore would
not provide plaintiff with a remedy. And in a situation such as
the present case, where the very administrative procedure
under attack — here the DOE's investigatory process — is the
one which the agency claims must be exhausted, it has been
held that the exhaustion doctrine need not be applied. See
Hawthorne Oil & Gas Corp. v. DOE, supra at p. 15, Touche Ross
& Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d at 577: National Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
Diapulse Corp. v. Food & Drug Admin., 500 F.2d 75, 78 (2d Cir.
1974). Finally, plaintiff claims that it will be irreparably
harmed should the DOE be permitted to issue the contem-
plated post-decontrol entitlements notices. As will be ad-
dressed in greater detail infra at pp. 7Sa-8la, Mobil claims that
in the years 1979 and 1980, it was forced to expend approx-
imately $280 million as a result of the problem of disappearing
price-controlled crude oil and the affect of this problem on the
entitlements program. Mobil says that it will be unable to
recoup these losses. Moreover, if required to comply with the
January entitlements notice, Mobil estimates that it would
have to further satisfy unnecessary obligations of $50 million.
The Court believes that it is equally clear that Mobil will not
be able to recoup these additional monies if the January en-
tillements notice is released. See infra at pp. 75a-8la. The
DOE’s claim that plaintiff has not been irreparably harmed be-
S2a
cause the January notice has yet to be released is entirely [riv-
olous. “‘The purpose of an injunction is to prevent future
violations. .. ..’ United States v. W.T. Grant, 345 U.S. 629,
633 (1953). In the Court's view, plaintiffs alleged harm is in-
deed irreparable and the exhaustion doctrine ought not be ap-
plied.’’ See Hawthorne Oil & Gas Corp. v. DOE, supra at p. 15:
Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d at 576-77 n. 11.
As just described, the Court believes that the central issue
in this lawsuit is whether the DOE exceeded its statutory au-
thority when it decided to issue post-decontrol entitlements
notices that it knew were not reasonably accurate, and that
would substantially and unnecessarily burden entitlements
program refiners. The Court further concludes that the DOE
potentially abused its discretion and acted in an arbitrary and
capricious manner when it decided to issue said notices. This
additional finding grows out of the DOE's mischaracterization
of the status of its *‘investigation”’ into the problem of the dis-
appearance of price-controlled crude oil. The DOE has
attempted to suppress the fact that it has conducted and com-
missioned studies on this problem and its impact on the en-
titlements program. It has also sought to suppress the fact that
these studies reached similar conclusions with regard to the
dimensions of the problem of disappearing price-controlled
crude oil, and the implications of this problem on the entitle-
» In view of the fact that the DOE also argued before the OHA
that plaintiffs appeal would not properly lie because plaintiff had
failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, plaintiff is estopped
from making that same argument before this Court. See Transcript of
March 27, 1981 hearing before OHA, case no. BEA-0630, at pp. 96,
104, 107. Moreover, the DOE's suggestion that plaintiff has not
exhausted its administrative remedies because it has not petitioned
for “exceptional relief’ under 10 C.F.R. § 205.50 (1980) is mis-
placed. This regulation provides ‘‘the procedures for applying for
exception from a regulation .. “’ 10 C.F_R. § 205.504a)(1) (1980).
Plaintiff has not sought to be excepted from the regulations, but only
that they not be manipulated by others to plaintiffs detriment.
S3a
ments program refiners. Moreover, the DOE has pretended to
disguise its own failure to investigate these issues after having
been put on notice of the situation at least four years ago. The
Court believes that the DOE’s reasonably specific knowledge
of the problem of disappearing price-controlled crude and the
impact that this problem was having on the entitlements pro-
gram, and its failure 10 make reasonable efforts to remedy this
situation, bears directly on the reasonableness of the DOE's
decision to issue the post-decontrol entitlements notices.
Although the DOE has represented that its investigation
into the problem of the disappearance of price-controlled
crude is still in its infancy, and that additional time is required
to formulate a policy to address the problem. this summary of
the DOE’s investigatory efforts is not entirely truthful. As de-
scribed earlier in this Memorandum-Decision, see supra at pp.
25-27; at least since June of 1977 when it first received the re-
sults of a study on the disappearance of price-controlled crude
oil, the DOE was placed on notice that price-controlled crude
oil was disappearing from the entitlements program, and that
there were several likely causes for this result. A second study
of this problem was conducted the following year and the
same conclusions were reached concerning the problem and
its causes. Moreover, the findings of both these studies were
subsequently confirmed by a report dated March 9, 1981,
which was the culmination of an independent study commis-
sioned by the DOE. It would therefore appear that based on
“*investigations”’ it has conducted already into the problem of
the disappearance of price-controlled crude oil, see supra at pp.
25-27, and its affect on the entitlements program, the DOF
has had four years to formulate a reasonable and corrective re-
sponse thereto.
Unfortunately through its inaction, the DOE has not for-
mulated such a response. Instead, it has pursued three
different courses of action. First the DOE has decided to pro-
ceed full steam with the release of the post-decontrol entitle-
ments notices, and has ignored the serious inaccuracies con-
tained therein. Second, despite the far reaching implications
S4a
this decision has had on the entitlements program refiners,
the DOE has sought to leave the impression that its decision
to issue post-decontrol entitlements notices does not amount
‘o a policy determination on these implications. The DOE has
also tried to cover-up the fact that each of the studies it has
conducted or commissioned on the problem and causes of dis-
appearing price-controlled crude oil, and its impact on the en-
titlements program, reported virtually identical results. By
conveniently ignoring this fact, and by sitting back and feign-
ing to be aware of the problem of disappearing price-con-
trolled crude, though ignorant of its ‘‘actual’’ causes and
possible solutions, the DOE has attempted to fend off judicial
intervention into a problem it likely caused in the fir
This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.