Record and brief — Mobil Oil Corp. v. United States Department of Energy

Supreme Court brief1981

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Office Supreme Court, US.

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81- 499 SEP 11 1981

ALEXAN® STEVAS,

IN THE | CLK ad

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1981

Mosit O1 CorRPORATION,

Petitioner,

Vv.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY,

James B. E>warps, SECRETARY OF ENERGY,

AND Tosco CORPORATION,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES TEMPORARY

EMERGENCY COURT OF APPEALS

Of Counsel: R. Bruce MCLEAN

Cuarces S. LinpBerG Daniet JosEPH

WILLIAM C. STREETS (Counse! of Record)

Gait F. ScHutz Harry R. SILVER

Mosit Oi. Corporation Josepn T. Casey, Jr.

3225 Gallows Road Davip A. HoLzwortH

Fairfax , Virginia 22037 AKIN, Gump, STRAUSS, HAvER & FELD

1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 887-4000

Counsel for Petitioner

Mobil Oil Corporation

rr

PRESS OF BYRON S. ADAMS PRINTING, INC., WASHINGTON, D.C.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether it is proper for a federal court of appeals to

ignore findings and conclusions made by a district court in

granting a preliminary injunction and to fail to limit its scope

of review to assessing whether the district court's action was a

clear abuse of its discretion.

2. Whether a federal court of appeals can, in conflict

with other federal courts of appeals, require a party seeking a

preliminary injunction to satisfy a standard that imposes a

burden of showing conclusively that irreparable injury will

occur and that additionally ignores, rather than balances,

other factors, particularly the applicant’s likelihood of

ultimately prevailing upon the merits.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EEE ILE PLE IP PPE PNET i

TEE A RS oP SA te eee eee

EE 6 6c 50 b.0'e'6 o eb0eeee.eceedes

A. Regulatory Background ..... shiekavaednnaunens

B. The District Court's Opinion ...................

C. The Court of Appeals’ Decision .................

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ................006.

1. The Court Of Appeals Failed To Limit The Scope Of

lis Review To Determining Whether The District

Court Had Abused Its Discretion ................ 8

ll. The Decision Below Conflicts With Decisions Of

Other Circuits In Ruling That An Applicant Must

Make A “‘Clear Showing”’ Of Irreparable Harm In

Order To Obtain A Preliminary Injunction And

Theat The Applicant’s Likelihood Of Success On The

ED no 66 eccctecsescbseseansessc 11

Er. (Eee te to Oe eo eee wea bales 21

CoN DW NON NHN — <

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES: Page

Alabama v. United States, 279 U.S. 229 (1929) 2.2... x

Blackwelder Furn. Co. of Statesville, Inc. v. Seilig Manufac-

turing Co., 550 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1977) 22... 13 n.8

Brown v. Chote, 411 U.S. 452 (1973) «2.22... eee ee. 8, 13

Charlie's Girls, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 483 F.2d 953 (2d Cir.

FSR O EE or POS 12

Citizens for a Better Environment v. City of Park Ridge, 567

nD... scavacneutwneabwouses 12

Continental Group, Inc. v. Amoco Chemicals Corp., 614

F.2d 351 (3d Cir. 1980) .......... .eise en melee 12, 13

Dataphase Systems, Inc. v. C L Systems, Inc., 640 F.2d 109

i a vats 5 6qacbn gn swthhndteéeceas 13 n.8

Doran v. Salem Inn, 422 U.S. 922 (1975) . 2.2... .0.04.. 8

Foley vy. Alabama State Bar, 648 F.2d 355 (Sth Cir.

Be aca haa ay 400 Gated eckedeeeniee at 13

Gilley v. United States, 649 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1981) 2... 13

Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738

EE ae et wcbeteendd eedveces 15

Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. Holiday Tours,

ae | oe ey, 12

Luadgrin v. Clavtor, 619 F.2d 61 ChOth Cir. 1980) 2... .. 12

Meccano, Lid. v. Wanamaker, 253 U.S. 136 (1920) = 8, 10 n.7

Perry v. Perry, 90 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 19ST) 222... 15

Rahley v. Columbia Phonograph Co., 122 F. 623 (4th Cir.

Eas 10. ousaeek bis adeees eo senevaewene 10 n.7

Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S.61 1974)... 160.10, 17 0.11

Texas Traction Co. v. Barron G. Collier, Inc., 195 F. 65

Re a a a Se 10 0.7

Tosco v. Lubanks, No. 10-35 (TECA Aug. 14,1980) 16.10

United Steelworkers vy. Swit, No. 80-1193, 49 U.S.L.W.

SR a nar ee 10

University of Texas v. Camenisch, (OU S.Ct. 1830 1981). 14

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Comm'n v. Holiday

Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d 841 OD.C. Cir. 1977) 2000... 12

vi

Table of Authorities Continued

Page

STATUTES, REGULATIONS, AND RULES:

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553

I en ee ee eekee 19 n.13

Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, as amended, 12

TR Ree | 2, 8n.5

Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, 15 U.S.C.

EE 3s. 5's c's ecb beeeeu mews 2, 20 n.14

Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, 28 U.S.C.81254(1) ... 2

The Pay Administration Act, as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 5596

cea seeds ls ss aheveesnseuceets es 17 n.11

Subpart C of the Mandatory Petroleum Allocation Regu-

lations, 1OC.F.R.§ 211.61 et seg. A981) 2.2.2.0... 2

Section 211.66, 1OC.F.R.§ 211.66 ............... 6

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. (1980)

ES EE PEO Se 16 n.10

NTE ee sen ee ee wn 10

MISCELLANEOUS AUTHORITIES:

Laycock, Book Review, “Injunctions and the Irreparable

Injury Rule,’ 57 Tex. L. Rev. 1065 (1979) ...... 14n9

Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91

i cd a cesedaeteccenedene 13

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1981

No.

Mosit O1 Corporation,

Petitioner,

v.

Unirep STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY,

James B. Epwarps, SECRETARY OF ENERGY,

AND Tosco CORPORATION,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES TEMPORARY

EMERGENCY COURT OF APPEALS

Mobil Oil Corporation respectfully petitions for a writ of

certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Tem-

porary Emergency Court of Appeals in Mobil Oil Corp. v.

DOE, _— F.2d — (TECA 1981), entered on August 14,

1981.!

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the district court is not reported, but is

reprinted in the separate Appendix as App. B (9a-85a). The

opinion of the court of appeals — the decision from which cer-

liorari is sought — is not reported, but is reprinted as App. A

(la-7a).

' The caption of the case in this Court contains the names of all

parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is sought to be

reviewed. The list naming all parent companies, subsidiaries (except

wholly owned subsidiaries), and affiliates of Mobil, required by Rule

28.1 of this Court's Rules, was included in Mobil’s Application to

Stay Mandate Pending Certiorari, filed on September 2, 1981, and is

incorporated here by reference.

2

JURISDICTION

The court below entered judgment on August 14, 1981.

App. A (la). Under section 211 of the Economic Stabilization

Act of 1970, as amended, 12 U.S.C. §1904 note (1976), a peti-

tion for certiorari may be filed within 30 days of the judgment

of the court of appeals. This Court has jurisdiction to review

the judgment below under section 211(g) and 28 U.S.C.

$1254(1).

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED

The pertinent sections of the Emergency Petroleum Alloca-

tion Act of 1973, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §751 et. seq. (1976)

and sections of Subpart C of the Mandatory Petroleum Alloca-

tion Regulations, 10 C.F.R. $211.61 ef. seg. (1981), are

reprinted in the separate Appendix as App. E (9la-93a) and

App. F (9Sa-128a), respectively.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Mobil Oil Corporation brought this action under section

211 of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, as amended, 12

U.S.C. § 1904 note (1976), in the District Court for the North-

ern District of New York alleging that there were serious flaws

in the administration by the Department of Energy of its En-

tillements Program, under which the Department required

companies that refine crude oil to make huge cash payments

to each other for the purpose of equalizing the economic ben-

efits of refiners’ varying access to price-controlled crude oil.

Mobil sought a preliminary injunction to bar the issuance of

the final entitiements list (the order requiring purchase and

sale of entitlements) and the termination of the Entitlements

Program until the Department of Energy corrected flaws in

the program. The district court, in an 80-page opinion,

granted a preliminary injunction, finding a great likelihood of

success on the merits, irreparable injury to Mobil in the

absence of relies, lack of injury to DOE or other parties from

the injunction, and consistency of the relief with the public in-

terest.

Without discussing the d‘strict court's opinion, and without

mentioning that the district court had written an opinion, the

court of appeals reversed. It held that Mobil had failed to

establish the certainty of irreparable injury in the absence of

preliminary relief. Accordingly, the court of appeals held that

preliminary relief must be denied.

Mobil sought a stay of mandate pending certiorari from the

court of appeals by motion of August 19, 1981. That motion

was denied on September 2. On that date Mobil sought a stay

from this Court. On September 3, Justice Brennan stayed the

mandate until further order (No. A-192).

A. Regulatory Background

While the details of the operation of the Entitlements Pro-

gram are complex, the theory of the program was quite sim-

ple.’ The program was intended to equalize the economic ben-

efits of access to lower cost price-controlled crude oil among

companies that refined crude oil. This equalization was ac-

complished on a monthly basis by requiring refiners that re-

ported proportionately greater access to price-controlled crude

oil to make cash payments to refiners that reported propor-

lionately lesser access. The average access to price-controlled

crude oil was established on the basis of reports from all

refiners of price-controlled crude oil receipts compared to re-

ports of all crude oil refined for the month.

The basic mechanics of the program were as follows. An

‘“‘entitlement’’ was, in essence, a license to refine price-con-

trolled crude oil. One entitlement was needed for every barre!

of price-controlled crude oil a company refined.

Every month the Department of Energy calculated how

much price-controlled crude oil was available nationwide on

the basis of reports from refiners as to the crude received at

their refineries. Then the Department issued entitlements to

all refiners. The number issved to each refiner was supposed

lo represent one entitlement for each barrel of price-con-

The operation of the Entitlements Program is set forth in detail in

the opinion of the district court. App. B (1 1a-18a).

4

trolled crude oil that the refiner would have had if all refiners

had had proportionately equal access to price-controlled

crude. If a refiner was issued fewer entitlements than barrels

of price-controlled crude oil that it reported, the Department

ordered it to buy entitlements at a fixed price from refiners

that had been issued more entitlements than they needed.

Criminal and civil penalties could be imposed against any firm

that failed to follow the Department of Energy's orders.

As the district court found, there has always been an incen-

tive for refiners to avoid reporting the receipt of price-con-

trolled crude oil, since the fewer barrels of price-controlled

crude oil a refiner reported, the fewer entitlements that it had

to buy (or the more that it could sell). See App. B (18a-27a),

(39a-45a). The district court also found that the agency’s reg-

ulations gave refiners flexibility in reporting refinery receipts

of price-controlled crude oil, such that refiners could choose

an accounting system that permitted them to build up inven-

tories of price-controlled crude oil not technically booked into

their refineries and thus not incurring any entitlements obliga-

tions. Mobil did not have such a system. It reported for en-

tillements purposes any price-controlled crude oil it acquired.

As early as 1977, Mobil advised the Department of Energy

that the Departmeni’s own published figures were showing

that substantial volumes of crude oil that had been reported to

the agency as being price-controlled when they were produced

at oil fields were never reported as price-controlled refinery

receipts. When President Carter announced the phased de-

control of crude oil pricing in 1979, the incentive to avoid re-

porting the receipt of price-controlled crude oil became

stronger. All a refiner had to do to make an immense profit

was buy price-controlled crude oil, hold it in a nonrefining in-

ventory until afier decontrol, and then sell it at the free mar-

ket price, without ever having incurred an entitlements obli-

gation on it (/.e., without having had to share the benefit of ac-

cess to it).

After announcement of phased decentrol, the rate at which

price-controlled crude was disappearing increased rapidly. By

the time President Reagan announced immediate decontrol

on January 28, 1981, the incentive was overwhelming and the

gap between barrels of price-controlled oil reported as pro-

duced and barrels reported as rece’ ed by a refiner for entitle-

ments purposes had become immense. App. B (20a-22a).

As *>e district court found, this “‘disappearance”’ of price-

controlled crude oil had serious consequences for the integrity

of the regulatory scheme, the consumer, the refining indus-

try, and refiners, including Mobil, that had not caused the dis-

appearance. App. B (24a-26a). Because not all price-controlled

crude oil was reported, the Entithements Program could not

and did not achieve its purpose of equitably distributing access

to all price-controlled crude oil. This effect was felt concretely

and massively. The fewer barrels of price-controlled crude oil

reported, the lower the national average of price-controlled

crude oil available for sharing, which resulted in the issuance

of fewer entitlements to all refiners and, consequently, higher

crude oil acquisition costs for all. These higher crude oil costs

could be passed on to the consumer. App. B (24a). The district

court found that in 1979 and 1980, refine’s’ crude oil costs

had been wrongly increased by $5.6 billion to the great injury

of those refiners, like Mobil, that had not manipulated in-

ventories. App. B (24a).

The impact on Mobil provided a dramatic example. When

the average volume of price-controlled crude oil declined, due

to “‘disappearing”’ crude oil, Mobil had to buy more entitle-

ments to make up for the increasing gap between the artificial-

ly decreased industry average and Mobil’s refinery receipts.

The district court found that in 1979 and 1980, Mobil was

forced to pay $284 million for additional entitlements because

of disappearing price-controlled crude oil. App. B (26a). The

district court also found that if the final regular entitlements

notice requiring the purchase and sale of entitlements is is-

sued, Mobil will be forced to buy an additional $50 million

worth of entitlements. App. B (77a).

B. The District Court's Opinion

In an exhaustive 80-page opinion the district court

preliminarily enjoined the Department of Energy from termi-

naling the program by issuing final entitlements notices. The

final regular notice, which reflects transactions for the first 27

days of January, 1981,’ would require Mobil to buy an addi-

tional approximately $50 million worth of entithkements. App.

B (77a). The court made extensive findings based on live tes-

limony, public data compiled by the Department of Energy,

and a repoit prepared by an independent consultant for the

agency.

The district court found that Mobil was likely to prevail on

the merits. App. B (6Sa-75a). In short, the district court found

that substantial quantities of price-controlled crude oil had

“disappeared,” that the disappearance materially distorted

the Entitlements Program and subverted its purpose, that the

cause of the disappearance was regulatory loopholes that per-

mitted some companies to avoid reporting receipt of price-

controlled crude oil, and that the Department of Energy had

been aware of the problem for four years and had refused to

do anything about it.

The distric! court also found that Mobil would suffer ir-

reparable injury if the final entithkements notice was issued

without corrective action by the agency. App. B (7Sa-80a).

The court found that there was no remedy available to Mobil

that could provide return of the $50 million it would be re-

quired to pay, let alone return of the $284 million Mobil has

already lost, should Mobil prevail on the merits.

‘ Entitlements notices were issued two months after the applicable

transactions occurred. See 10 C.F.R. § 211.66. After oral argument in

the court of appeals, the Department of Energy issued final so-called

“clean-up” regulations specifically designed to end the agency's role

in the program. The proposed *‘clean-up"’ regulations, discussed by

the district court, did not deal with the problem of disappearing crude

oil, App. B (78a-79a)_ and the court of appeals did not conclude to

the contrary.

The district court also found that the public interest would

be best served by terminating the Entitlements Program only

after all price-controlled oi! has been accounted for. App. B

(80a). The court further found that the Department of Energy

as administrator of the program would not be injured by the

issuance of an injunction. App. B (80a). Finally, the district

court found that all refiners that did not cause crude oil to

*“disappear’’ would benefit from the issuance of an injunction

that required the agency to take corrective action. Conversely,

the only refiners that would benefit from the failure to issue

an injunction are those companies that are responsible for the

problem and that unjustly benefited from disappearing price-

controlled crude oil. 4

C. The Court of Appeals’ Decision

The Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals reversed the

district court in a terse seven-page opinion that does not even

mention that the district court wrote an opinion. App. A (la-

7a). The court of appeals did not address the merits, except to

quote language from a decision by the Department of

Energy's Office of Hearings and Appeals agreeing with

Mobil’s position on the merits. Indeed, the court of appeals

did not discuss or even mention any of the findings made by

the district court. The court of appeais reversed the district

court on the sole ground that Mobil had “‘failed to make a

clear showing that it will suffer irreparable harm if an injunc-

tion does not issue.” App. A (4a). The court of appeals

reasoned that Mobil had not shown irreparable injury because

three purported avenues of relief were said to be available: (1)

court challenge of the determination of the Department of

Energy's Office of Hearings and Appeals that it lacked jurisdic-

tion over Mobil’s claim, (2) Mobil’s Petition for Emergency

Rulemaking that had been pending since February 10; and (3)

the right to appeal administratively from the issuance of a final

‘ App. B (81a). Significantly, no evidence was presented to the dis-

trict court concerning harm to any company in the event an injunc-

tion was issued.

rule that does not address the problem raised by Mobil — /.e.,

the right to ask the agency to change its mind.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

1. The Court Of Appeals Failed To Limit The Scope Of Its Re-

view To Determining Whether The District Court Had

Abused Its Discretion.

This Court has repeaicdly ruled that the scope of appellate

review of the grant or denial of preliminary injunctive relief is

to be confined solely to the abuse-of-discretion standard. F.x.,

Doran v. Salem Inn, 422 U.S. 922, 931-32 (1975); Brown v.

Chote, 411 U.S. 452, 457 (1973). This standard has been uni-

formly mandated by this Court for many years. E.g¢., Alabama

v. United States, 279 U.S. 229. 230-31 (1929); Meccano, Lid.

v. Wanamaker, 253 U.S. 136, 141 (1920).

The court of appeals here simply ignored this limitation on

its scope of review. The court did not acknowledge that the

standard applied, and in reversing it did not deal with or even

mention any finding or conclusion that the district court had

made in the course of its exhaustive 80-page opinion. In fact,

the court of appeals did not even mention that the district

court had written an opinion.°

‘A number of statements in the text of the court of appeals’ opin-

ion also make it clear that that court effectively considered de novo,

rather than on the basis of the district court's decision, the question

of whether Mobil was entitled to a preliminary injunction. The court

of appeals siated, for example, that it found it “unnecessary to re-

view the merits of Mobil’s explanations of how it sustained the con-

tentions it advances.”’ App. A (4a) (emphasis added). It also held.

** this court finds that Mobil has failed to make a clear showing that it will

suffer irreparable harm if an injunction does not issue.”’ /bid. (em-

phasis added). The court later stated, ** with the finding that Mobil has

Jailed to show irreparable harm, we need not reach the question of the

construction of section 211 of the Economic Stabilization Act... .”

App. A (7a) (emphasis added).

All of these statements reflect the court's error. What it should

have been reviewing was not **Mobil’s explanations,”’ but the dis-

trict court's findings of fact and conclusion, reached after a lengthy

9

The court of appeals’ failure to treat the grant of preliminary

relief as being within the district court’s discretion and to

defer to — much tess to mention — the district court’s opin-

ion is egregious error that warrants correction by this Court.

A motion for preliminary injunction, coming at an inter-

locutory stage of litigation, must be decided on the basis of an

incomplete record. At such an interlocutory stage, the district

court's day-to-day familiarity with the case is of unique value.°

That is particularly so where, as here, the district court's deci-

sion, even though preliminary, is based upon substantial vol.

umes of evidence, here there were both live testimony and

hundreds of pages of exhibits (by volume, most of the docu-

mentary evidence being DOE’s own material offered by

Mobil). Even on the issue of irreparable injury — the only is-

sue thought to be relevant by the court of appeals — the dis-

trict court’s opinion contains an extended factual and legal

discussion. App. B (75a-80a). Not even this section of the dis-

trict court’s opinion was referred to by the court of appeals.

Thus, this case represents a serious departure from the

long-established and frequently repeated standard of review

set by this Court. This Court should correct that error.

discussion of the evidence and the law, that Mobil had an over-

whelming chance of success on the merits. App. B (6Sa-7Sa).

Similarly, it was not appropriate for the court of appeals to “‘find”

that Mobil had failed to show irreparable injury, rather its task was to

assess whether the district court's findings and conclusions on that

question (App. B (75a-80a)) were an abuse of discretion.

* Even in the short time the case was before him, Judge Munson

had entertained, heard argument, and ruled upon a large number of

matters — motions by the government to dismiss and to quash a sub-

poena for documents, a motion for a temporary restraining order, the

separate question of the court's jurisdiction to grant relief (not ai is-

sue here), and supplemental briefing on the significance of a massive

DOE study, which Mobil argued, and the court found, supported

Mobil’s other evidence. Aside from his 80-page opinion granting a

preliminary injunction, issued on June 3, 1981, the district court also

issued a ten-page decision on May 15 partially granting and partially

denying the government's motion to quash a subpoena and an opin-

ion On its grant of a temporary restraining order on April 29.

10

There is a second reason for this Court to act on this ques-

tion. Not only did the court of appeals disregard its own lim-

ited review function, but it did so in circumstances that will

particularly discourage district courts from pursuing their ap-

propriate functions. Here the district court undertook to pre-

pare in a matter of 22 days (the time between hearing and

decision on preliminary relief) a massive and comprehensive

opinion assessing the legal background and the evidence and

setting out its findings and conclusions on every issue raised

by the parties. This labor musi have been performed at great

inconvenience to the district court, but it no doubt repre-

sented that court's desire to fulfill its obligation to explain its

decision in an important case. By ignoring this exemplary

effort the court of appeals effectively told the district court that

it had been wasting its time in expressing its views. That

message creates an unfortunate precedent that this Court

should erase.

This Court has granted certiorari and received briefs on the

merits, but not yet heard oral argument, on a similar issue. In

United Steelworkers v. Swint, No. 80-1193, 49 U.S.L.W. 3788

(April 20, 1981), the Court agreed to consider whether the

courts of appeals are always bound by the clearly erroneous

standard of Rule 52(a), Fed. R. Civ. P., in reviewing a district

court's factfindings. The Fifth Circuit had there held that that

standard does not apply where findings are made under an.

erroneous view of the law. In the present case the court of ap-

peals has effectively held that there are circumstances, not

defined, in which a court of appeals may dispense with the

abuse-of-discretion standard, which covers both matters of

fact and legal issues,’ that normally applies on review of a dis-

trict court’s disposition of a motion for preliminary injunction.

We submit that the issues are related and are of equal impor-

tance, and the Court should consider and dispose of the two

cases together.

’ E.g., Texas Traction Co. v. Barron G. Collier, Inc., 195 F. 65, 66

(Sth Cir. 1912); Rahley v. Columbia Phonograph Co., 122 F. 623,

625 (4th Cir. 1903); both cited by this Court with approval in Mec-

cano, Lid. v. Wanamaker, 253 U.S. at 141.

Il. The Decision Below Conflicts With Decisions Of Other

Circuits In Ruling That An Applicant Must Make A

“Clear Showing” Of irreparable Harm In Order To Ob-

tain A Preliminary Injunction And That The Applicant's

Likelihood Of Success On The Merits Is Irrelevant.

The court of appeals’ decision reversing the district court's

grant of a preliminary injunction is in direct conflict with the

decisions of at least three and, more likely, five other courts of

appeals. lt furthermore enlarges the disagreement and confu-

sion already existing among the courts of appeals as to the

proper standard to apply in determining whether a preliminary

injunction should issue. This Court should rule upun this sig-

nificant issue.

The court of appeals held that the preliminary injunction

was wrongly granted solely because *‘Mobil has not shown

that issuance of the [entitlements] notice will place it in a posi-

tion which precludes ultimate recovery. ...° App. A (4a).

The court held that it was ‘“‘unnecessary”’ for it to consider

Mobil’s likelihood of success on the merits because “‘this

court finds that Mobil has failed to make a clear showing that

it will suffer irreparable harm if an injunction does not issue.”

Id. Specifically, the court of appeals relied on Mobil’s opportu-

nity to try again to convince the Department of Energy to

change its position and to provide an administrative means for

Mobil to obtain relief. The court reached this conclusion

despite the Department of Energy’s repeated statements that

it intends to terminate the Entitlements Program without ac-

tion on, or further investigation of, its mismanagement of the

Entitlements Program, as soon as it is no longer enjoined

from doing so. The court of appeals did not disturb or even

address the finding by the district court that Mobil would be

without a remedy for wrongful payments if the Department of

Energy refused to modify its position.

The rule so expressed is in conflict with the rules estab-

lished by at least the Second, Ninth, and District of Columbia

Circuits. While those circuits do not entirely agree among

themselves, they do agree that it is not necessary for a party

12

that irreparable injury will inevitably occur in the absence of

interlocutory relief. Rather, in those courts the movant need

show only a “‘possibility’’ of irreparable injury, and that

possibility is then one factor to be weighed with others, most

particularly the likelihood of ultimate success on the merits

and the effect of grant or denial of relief on other persons.

Charlie's Girls, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 483 F.2d 953, 954 (2d Cir.

1973) (per curiam), Washington Metropolitan Area Transit

Comm'n v. Holiday Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d 841, 843 (D.C. Cir.

1977). Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National

Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir. 1980). The

Ninth Circuit is quite explicit about the balancing effect (id. at

1201):

In this circuit the moving party may meet its burden by

demonstrating either (1) a combination of probable suc-

cess on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury

or (2) that serious questions are raised and the balance of

hardships tips sharply in its favor. [Citation omitted.]

These are no’ separate tests but the outer reaches ‘‘of a

single continuum.” [Citation omitted.]

The test in two other circuits, the Seventh and Tenth, is

more rigid, but still appears to conflict with the holding in the

present case. The Tenth Circuit has held that a movant must

demonstrate that there is a ‘‘prob. ole danger” of irreparable

injury, apparently without any balancing. Lundgrin v. Claytor,

619 F.2d 61, 63 (10th Cir. 1980). The Seventh Circuit requires

a “*balanc[ing of] the probability of ultimate success at the fi-

nal hearing with the consequences of immediate irreparable

injury possibly stemming from denial of the injunction.”

Citizens for a Better Environment v. City of Park Ridge, 567 F.2d

689, 690-91 (7th Cir. 1975) (Emphasis added).

In contrast, the Third, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits, most

similarly to the court of appeals in the present case, impose an

absolute requirement that the movant establish that it ‘‘will

suffer” irreparable injury if preliminary relief is denied. Conti-

nental Group, Inc. v. Amoco Chemicals Corp., 614 F.2d 351,

359 (3d Cir. 1980) (*This Court has heid that more than a

risk of irreparable harm must be demonstrated. The requisite

13

for injunctive relief has been characterized as a ‘clear showing

of immediate irreparable injury’. ...°); Foley v. Alabama

State Bar, 648 F.2d 355, 358 (Sth Cir. 1981); Gilley v. United

States, 649 F.2d 449, 454 (6th Cir. 1981).

Thus, there is very substantial conflict and confusion

among the courts of appeals as to the proper standard to ap-

ply.* One author has referred to the preliminary injunction

standards employed by the federal courts as a ‘dizzying diver-

sity of formulations, unaccompanied by any explanation for

choosing one instead of another... ..’ Leubsdorf, The Stand-

ard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 525, 526

(1978). While this Court has not to our knowledge ruled

directly on the issue, it has stated its approval of a standard

clearly at variance with that used by the court of appeals here.

In Brown v. Chote, 411 U.S. at 456, this Court said in part

(emphasis added):

The issuance of the requested preliminary injunction was

the only action taken by the District Court. In determin-

ing whether such relief was required, that court properly

addressed itself to two relevant factors: first, the ap-

pellee’s possibilities of success on the merits; and second,

the possibility that irreparable injury would have resulted,

absent interlocutory relief.

In addition to the fact that it extended the conflict among

the courts of appeals, the decision in the present case further

merits review because it is incorrect and exacts an unreasona-

bly stringent standard for preliminary relief.

* The Eighth Circuit, for example, recently was required to con-

_ sider the issue en banc in order to clarify the standard to be applied by

the district courts of that circuit in Dataphase Systems, Inc. v. C L

Systems, Inc., 640 F.2d 109 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc). That court

noted, **[wJe apprehend that in recent years some misunderstanding

of that standard has developed. We recognize that language in some

of our recent opinions may have contributed to uncertainty as to the

appropriate test or tests.”’ /d. at 112. See also Blackwelder Furn. Co.

of Statesville, Inc. v. Seilig Manufacturing Co., 550 F.2d 189 (4th

Cir. 1977) (reversing a district court’s denial of a preliminary injunc-

tion because the lower court mistakenly applied an appellate court

standard not a trial court standard. /d. at 193-94).

14

It is the essence of preliminary relief that it is sought early in

litigation, usually to preserve the status quo, when there is

need for rapid decision and the parties’ factual and legal pre-

sentations are incomplete. For that reason, a movant is not re-

quired to prove his case in full at a preliminary injunction

hearing. University of Texas v. Camenisch, 101 S. Ct. 1830,

1833 (1981). It is universally recognized and each of the court

of appeals’ decisions cited above (at 172-13) states that a

movant for preliminary relief need show only a likcithood of

success on the merits.

It is utterly inconsistent with this rationale to require, as did

the court of appeals here, a movant to show in every case that

in no conceivable circumstances would he not suffer irrepara-

ble injury if relief is denied.” At least two courts have specifi-

cally recognized that any showing — including irreparability of

injury — required for a preliminary injunction cannot be

*There would appear to be two possible explanations why some

courts might have required a clear showing of irreparable injury

First, as a practical matter in many cases there is no question of the

irreparability of the harm that will be suffered if relief is denied.

Some courts may have become accustomed to the ease with which a

significant number of parties have been able to make the showing. In

many cases, however, the irreparability of injury may not be clear at

the preliminary injunction stage. As we have urged, it is illogical in

such cases to require the movant to show irreparable injury to a cer-

tainty at an early stage.

Second, there appears to be at least some confusion arising from

the fact that irreparable injury — or, more correctly put, an injury

without an adequate remedy at law — was a jurisdictional prere-

quisite of equity relief. See Laycock, Book Review, “‘Injunctions and

the Irreparable Injury Rule,’ 57 Tex. L. Rev. 1065, 1070-71 (1979).

But that should not be a problem with invocation of preliminary

equitable relief. In any event, the court of appeals has not suggested

here that Mobil could obtain any reliel at law; all the remedies sug-

gested as not impossible by the court of appeals are equitable and ad-

ministrative. The sole importance of a showing of the likelihood of

irreparable injury in the present case is the weighing of equitable fac-

tors to determine whether in the district court's proper exercise of

discretion preliminary relief was warranted.

15

absolute because of the interlocutory stage at which the ques-

tion must be decided. Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch

Co., 206 F.2d 738, 742-43 (2d Cir. 1953) (Frank, J.). Perry v.

Perry, 190 F.2d 601, 602 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (Bazelon, J.).

This case shows how the lack of a consistent standard

among the courts of appeals permits individual courts to pick

one of the existing formulations and to pursue it to an illogical

conclusion. Here the district court held, and the court of ap-

peals did not disagree, that if the Department of Energy were

to end the Entithements Program as it now plans by simply

issuing the final lists as soon as it is free to, Mobil will have no

mechanism to invoke in order to seek a remedy. Nor did the

court of appeals disagree with the district court’s conclusion

that the DOE has failed to act over the four years that it has

known of the distortion of the program by “disappearing”

price-controlled crude oil, and that it is unlikely to act. Indeed,

the court of appeals joined in the criticism of DOE for its inac-

tion. App. A (6a-7a). Instead, the court of appeals held that

Mobil had not shown irreparable injury because the DOE

might act to create a mechanism by which relief could be

sought. App. A (4a). Thus, the reversal of the district court's

grant of a preliminary injunction was based on a holding not

that Mobil had a route to pursue to obtain relief, but rather

that the DOE might give it one. This holding, we submit, is far

more severe than those of other courts, because the future

availability of any of these avenues is not known and cannot

be known now, and at this preliminary stage of the litigation it

is decidedly unfair to deny Mobil relief pendente lite on the

possibility that one may become available.

That is particularly so because Mobil has made a strong

showing on the other factors that should be weighed with its

showing on irrevarable injury. The district court concluded

(without question from the court of appeals) that Mobil has a

strong likelihood «of success on the merits. The district court

held that DOE hau mismanaged the Entitlements Program

and refused to correct that mismanagement, that a number of

refiners had been able to take advantage of the flaws in the

16

program by manipulating their inventories to avoid reporting

their receipts of price-controlled crude oil, that these acts had

already cost thos. refiners who had not manipulated invento-

ries $5.6 billion. Both the district court and the court of ap-

peals criticized the DOE in unusually strong terms for its inac-

tion in the face of a serious problem. The district court found

that Mobil has already been wrongly forced to pay $284 mil-

lion into the program and that publication of the final entitle-

ments list, as DOE intends to publish it, would wrongly re-

quire Mobil to pay an additional $50 million. The district court

also held (again without any question from the court of ap-

peals) that preliminary relief would not injure the DOE or

third parties. '”

" The DOE introduced no evidence before the district court on

this or any other point.

In an unusual development, the Tosco Corporation, without even

attempting to appear before the district court, asked the court of ap-

peals for a writ of mandamus that would have forbidden the district

court to grant preliminary relief. Tosco submitted an affidavit in sup-

port of that petition. The court of appeals dismissed the petition on

June 9, 1981, although it permitted Tosco to intervene in the appeal.

App. D (89a). It is unclear whether Tosco’s affidavit, which was filed

as part of the mandamus action that was dismissed, is in the record of

this case, but in any event it should not be considered since it was not

submitted to the district court first. In a companion case dismissing a

similar writ simultaneously sought by Tosco, the court of appeals

faulted Tosco for not first appearing and presenting its claims before

the district court, Tosco v. Eubanks, No. 10-35 (TECA August 14,

1981), slip op. at 3, and it would obviously be irregular and wrong to

judge the correctness of the district cos s action on the basis of the

evidence that was intentionally not submitted to it. In any event, the

Tosco affidavit shows no more than temporary loss of money, which

does not amount to irreparable injury. Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S

61 (1974).

We also submit that Tosco should not be permitted to participate

in this Court. The court of appeals seriously erred in permitting

Tosco to intervene, since us the court of appeals itself later held in

Tosco v. Eubanks, Tosco had no excuse for its failure to appear in the

district court. Thus, its intervention in the court of appeals was em-

phatically untimely. C/. Rule 24(a) and (b), Fed. R. Civ. P. It will en-

courage evasion of parties’ responsibilities to raise their claims as

17

With respect to irreparable injury, the district court noted

that the monthly entitlements lists are the only means the De-

partment of Energy had to correct errors made in its prior ad-

ministration of the program, and that apart from issuance of

such lists, there exists no means to redress such errors. App.

B (78a). The Department of Energy neither pays nor receives

funds under the Entithements Program, rather, it orders

refiners to pay huge sums to other refiners. There is no DOE

regulation that permits, and no precedent for, one refiner to

make any judicial claim against another for over- or underpay-

ment of entitlements obligations. The district court also held

— and the DOE’s attempts to defeat stay of the court of ap-

peals’ mandate underscore — that the DOE will issue the final

list or lists (see note 13, infra) as soon as possible if the

preliminary injunction is lifted. This will permit those refiners

who have manipulated their inventories to increase and con-

solidate the improper advantage they have taken. It will also

leave Mobil without any mechanism of redress to regain its

losses even assuming that Mobil’s claim of injury is sustained.

The three routes suggested by the court of appeals as possi-

bly providing courses through which Mobil could obtain relief

are, to put it mildly, weak reeds. DOE may unilaterally defeat

all of them.'' The court of appeals held: first, that DOE might

soon as possible if Tosco, which disdained to appear in district court,

is permitted to appear as a party in this Court arguing that the district

court was wrong.

With respect to the effect of the injunction on third parties, there

were also a number of briefs amicus curiae filed by smail refiners in

the court of appeals containing statements of counsel which are of

course non-evidentiary. Moreover, most of the amici supported

Mobil’s position.

'' For this reason the court of appeals’ reliance on Sampson v.

Murray, 415 U.S. 61 (1974), was entirely misplaced. There this

Court held that adequate relief could be had without an injunction

because the Pay Administration Act, as amended, § U.S.C. § 5596

(1980), provided a means of compensation for temporary loss of em-

ployment. 415 U.S. at 90-91. Here, by contrast, no such route to ob-

tain relief will exist after the final lists, now enjoined, are issued. The

court of appeals has held that Mobil’s injury is not irreparable be-

cause it is possible that DOE will create a remedy.

18

still rule on an emergency petition for rulemaking filed by

Mobil seven months ago, on February 10, and concerning

which DOE has done absolutely nothing, second, that Mobil

might sue to overturn the decision in which the DOE’s Office

of Hearings and Appeals held that it lacked jurisdiction to or-

der relief;'’ and third, that Mobil might administratively “‘ap-

peal’’ the publication of final regulations governing the so-

called **clean-up” entitlements list. App. A (Sa).

None of these possibilities provides any assurance that a

mechanism to obtain ultimate recovery would exist to provide

relief shouid Mobil prevail on the merits. It is DOE’s official

position (although Mobil would not agree) that the Office of

Hearings and Appeals lacked jurisdiction over the merits of

Mobil’s claim. The court of appeals offered only the possibility

that Mobil might initiate a judicial challenge of that position,

the court did not comment on Mobil’s chance of success in

overcoming DOE's interpretation of its own internal dele-

gations of decision-making power. In any event, DOE could

formally change those delegations to defeat OHA’s jurisdic-

tion definitively. The first and third of the court’s suggestions

amount to nothing more than the possibility that DOE may

yet change its mind. '' Given the fact that the district court and

'? Since DOE itself appeared and argued before the Office of Hear-

ings and Appeals that OHA lacked jurisdiction, it will not lie in the

government's mouth to suggest that such a suit might be successful.

'* After oral argument in the court of appeals, DOE promulgated in

final form the “‘clean-up™ regulations discussed by the district court

at App. B (78a-79a). Under these regulations, after a so-called clean-

up list that will reflect some corrections to prior reports (which DOE

now Says that it will publish very shortly after the mandate issues),

DOE as an agency would no longer act on entitlements disputes but

would leave them to the courts to settle. DOE then argued by letter

to the court of appeals that these new regulations did provide the av-

enue for relief that Mobil was seeking. Mobil responded by letter (see

App. G (129a-134a)), arguing that the constitutionality of the mech-

anism set up by the new regulations was highly doubtful at best be-

cause it sought to have litigation between a complaining party and

DOE be binding on all refiners regardiess of whether they were or

could have been parties, and also because the regulations assumed

19

the DOE’s own quasi-independent hearing authority, the Of-

fice of Hearings and Appeals, in a passage quoted with ap-

proval by the court of appeals itself, have strongly criticized

DOE for its inaction and its self-fostered ignorance about the

disappearing price-controlled crude oil, the possibility that

DOE will finally do something voluntarily to create a route for

relief must be regarded as remote. Clearly, if the agency does

not change its stated intention to terminate the Entitlements

Program us soon as possible, Mobil will suffer irreparable in-

jury that could not be rectified even if Mobil ultimately pre-

vails on the merits. '*

the existence of (or tried to establish) the right of private federal

court actions between refiners to settle entitlements disputes — a

cause of action for which there is no precedent and which the district

court found (App. B (78a)) did not exist. Mobil also showed that

even if such lawsuits could be maintained, there would be thousands

of such actions over this dispute alone as those refiners that had been

injured sought to find and fasien liability on those refiners that had

unfairly profited by inventory manipulation. There are about 300

refiners in the United States.

The court of appeals did not agree with DOE that this *‘clean-up”

mechanism provides a remedy for Mobil. Rather, the court in a brief

phrase summarized the content of the rule and told Mobil that it

could *‘appeal”* the issuance of the final regulations under 5 U.S.C.

$553. App. A (6a). (The DOE regulation cited in the court’s opin-

ion, 10 C.F.R. §$ 205.160, merely provides that 5 U.S.C. § 553 ap-

plies.) Of course, section 553 does not provide for an appeal in the

commonly understood sense of asking a higher authority to review

the decision of a lower. All it provides, in section 553(e), is the right

to petition an agency to “issue, amend, or repeal a rule.’ Since

Mobil has had a petition for rulemaking seeking the identical result

pending since February 10, it is unlikely in the extreme that the “‘ap-

peal” of the “‘clean-up”’ regulations will bring Mobil anything more

than the DOE inaction that its February 10 petition for rulemaking |

has brought.

'4 In the court of appeals, the government took as its primary posi-

iion that the courts lack the power to require an agency to issue any

change in its regulations that the agency in its discretion refuses to is-

20

None of these aliernatives amount to more than an incho-

ate and bare chance that DOE will change its position and de-

cide to provide a route to obtain relief. There is a high likeli-

hood that DOE will continue to refuse to act and that,

therefore, the injury that Mobil will suffer if the preliminary

injunction is vacated will be in fact irreparable. It is most

likely, morcover, that when weighed under a different, and,

we believe, more appropriate standard, the decision of the dis-

trict court granting preliminary relief would be affirmed.

sue. Brief of Appellants, TECA No. 2-35, filed June 12, 1981, at 9-

16. The government stated in part (id. at 11):

If there kas been manipulation [by some refiners] of the

{Entitlements Preeram] regulations, the loopholes can be closed

only by issuing a regulation, and the authority to write regula-

tions was given solely to the Secretary in §4(a) of the

[Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act]. 15 U.S.C. § 753(a).

The court of appeals apparently accepted (and at least did not contra-

dict) this view. Thus, for all that appears, if the DOE continues to fail

and refuse to modify its regulations to provide an avenue for relief,

Mobil will be left without any remedy at all.

21

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the petition for a writ of certiorari should

be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Akin, Gump, STRAUSS, HAVER & FELD

Of Counsel: By:

CHarces S. LInpBERG R. Bruck MCLEAN

WittiaM C. STREETS Daniet JoserH

Gai F. Scuutz (Counsel of Record)

Mosit O1t CORPORATION Harry R. SILVER

3225 Gallows Road Joseru T. Casey, Jr.

Fairfax, Virginia 22037 Davip A. HOLZwWoRTH

1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

Counsel for Petitioner

Mobil Oil Corporation

Dated: September I1, 1981

22

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

| hereby certify that copies of the foregoing Petition for a

Writ of Certiorari to the United Stetes Temporary Emergency

Court of Appeals were served this 11th day of September,

1981, on each of the following by hand:

THe Honor ast Rex Lee

Solicitor Gencral

U.S. Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

Kennetu L. BACHMAN, Jr., Esquire

Cieary, Gorriies, STEEN & HAMILTON

1250 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

Suite 400

Washington, D.C. 20036

Nancy C. CRIsMAN, Esquire

Office of General Counsel

U.S. Department of Energy

1000 Independence Avenue, S.W.

Room 6H-025

Washington, D.C. 20585

Daniel Joseph

4

IN THE —-_

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1981

Moasit O1r CORPORATION,

Petitioner,

We

UNiTED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY,

James B. Epwarps, SECRETARY OF ENERGY,

AND Tosco CORPORATION,

Respondents.

APPENDIX TO

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES TEMPORARY

EMERGENCY COURT OF APPEALS

Of Counsel: R. Bruce MCLEAN

Cuarces S. LinpBerG Daniet Josern

WiittaM C. STREETS (Counsel of Record)

Galt F. Scuutz Harry R. SILVER

Mobil Oil Corporation Josern T. Casey, JR.

3225 Gallows Road Davip A. HoLzZwortH

Fairfax, Virginia 22037 Akin, Gump, Strauss, Haver & Fecp

1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 887-4000

Counsel for Petitioner

Mobil Oil Corporation

PRESS OF BYRON S. ADAMS PRINTING, INC., WASHINGTON, D.C.

la

APPENDIXA

TEMPORARY EMERGENCY COURT OF APPEALS

oF THE UNITED STATES

No. 2-35

Monit Ou CorPoRATION, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

—against—

UNitrep STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

AND JAMES B. Epwarps, SECRETARY, ’

DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of New York

(No. 81 Civ. 340).

Argued: June 17, 1981 Decided: August 7, 1981

Judgment entered: August 14, 1981

APPEARANCES

Daniet Joserpn, Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, Wash-

ington, D.C. (R. Bruce McLean, Harry R. Silver, Joseph T.

Casey, Jr. and David A. Holzworth, Charles S. Lindberg,

William C. Streets and Gail F. Schultz, Mobil Oil Corporation,

Fairfax, Virginia, on the brief), for Plaintiff-Appellee Mobil

Oil Corporation.

Kenneth L. Bachman, Jr., Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen &

Hamilton, Washington, D.C. with whom Sara D. Schotland,

Eugene M. Goott and Mark N. Duvall, were on the brief for

Intervenor Tosco Corporation.

David W. Caruthers, Of Counsel, on the brief for Amicus

Curiae Crown Central Petroleum Corporation, Baltimore,

Maryland, Richard P. Noland and Robert R. Morrow, Suther-

land, Ashbiil & Brennan, Washington, D.C., on the brief for

Amicus Curiae Texas City Refining, Inc., Karen S. Bedell and

Jamie Replogle, Shank, Irwin, Conant, Williamson & Greve-

lle, Washington, D.C., on the brief for Amicus Curiae Hunt Oil

2a

Company, and Edwin Jason Dryer and “iichael R. Bromwich,

Foley, Lardner, Hollabaugh & Jacobs, Washington, D.C., on

the brief for Amicus Curiae Independent Refiners Association

of America.

Nancy C. CrisMAn, United States Department of Energy,

Washington, D.C. (Thomas H. Kemp, Samuel Soopper, Mar-

cia Sowles and Robert C. Powers, on the brief), for Defend-

ants- Appellants.

Before Metzner, MAxwect and Lacey, Judges.

Metzner, Judge.

The Department of Energy (DOE) appeals from an order of

the United States District Court for the Northern District of

New York (Munson, J.), granting Mobil Oil Corporation

(Mobil) a preliminary injunction enjoining DOE from issuing

any further Entitlements Notices and from requiring Mobil to

comply with any such notices.

The court found that Mobil would suffer irreparable harm if

DOE is permitted to issue their Entitlements Notice covering

the period January 1-28, 1981.

The Entitlements Notices which were enjoined are an inte-

gral part of the Entitlements Program (Program). That Pro-

gram was created to maintain equitable distribution of price-

controlled crude oil throughout the petroleum industry. The

Program was a necessary procedure to cure imbalances re-

sulting from the imposition of price and allocation controls on

petroleum products under the Emergency Petroleum Alloca-

tion Act (EPAA).

For a detailed discussion of the Program, see Cities Service

Co. v. Federal Energy Administration, 529 F.2d 1016 (TECA

1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 947 (1976), and Pasco, Inc. v.

Federal Energy Administration, 525 F.2d 1391 (TECA 1975).

As the extreme energy crisis passed, many aspects of the

price and allocation regulations were put on standby status. Fi-

nally, on January 28, 1981, President Reagan signed an

Exccutive Order directing immedizte decontrol of all remain-

3a

ing crude oil and refined petroleum products, and revoking all

regulations governing those products. Executive Order 12287,

46 Fed. Reg. 9909 (1/30/81).

However, that order specifically provided that the Secretary

of Energy “‘may . . . adopt such regulations and take such ac-

tions as he deems necessary to implement this Order, includ-

ing the promulgation of entitlements notices for periods prior

to this Order and the establishment of a mechanism for en-

titlements adjustments for periods prior to this Order.”

As of the date of the Executive Order, entitlements notices

for December 1980 and January 1-28, 1980, had not yet been

issued.

Mobil offers data gleaned from reports furnished to DOE

(10 C.F.R. § 211.66) to argue that large quantities of price-

controlled crude oil have ‘“‘disappeared”’ from the Entitle-

ments Program due to refiners’ manipulation of these regula-

tions. Mobil asks that DOE be prevented from finalizing the

obligations of the participating refiners under the program

until all price-controlled crude oil is accounted for.

An “entitlement” in essence is a license to refine a barrel of

price-controlled crude oil. Each month each refiner is given a

number of entitlements equal to the National Domestic Crude

Oil Supply Ratio {DOSR) multiplied by the volume of crude

oil runs-to-stills reported by the refiner in that month. 10

C.F.R. §211.67(a)(1). The DOSR is computed, also on a

monthly basis, as the ratio of all refiners’ reported receipts of

price-controlled crude oil to all refiners’ crude oil runs-to-

stilis. 10 C.F.R. § 211.62. If a refiner’s reported receipts of

price-controlled crude oil exceed the number of entitlements

received under the above formula, a sufficient number of en-

titlements must be purchased by the refiner to cover the ex-

cess. If a refiner’s reported receipts of price-controlled crude

are less than the number of entitlements designated to the

refiner by DOE, then that refiner must sell the excess entitle-

ments. 10 C.F.R. § 211.67(b) (ec).

4a

DOE also sets the price of the entitlements to be purchased

and sold. It does not match up buyers with sellers. The agency

merely assigns the obligation to buy or sell entithements and

leaves it to the refiners to comply. Historic trading relation-

ships have arisen between refiners who are traditionally in the

position of buying entitlements and those who must tradi-

tionally sell entitlements.

The notices are published within about two months of the

subject month, and may include adjustments for errors,

exception relief or recertification as determined by DOE.

It is unnecessary to review the merits of Mobil’s explana-

tions of how it sustains the contentions it advances. This court

finds that Mobil has failed to make a clear showing that it will

suffer irreparable harm if an injunction does not issue. Trieb-

wasser & Katz v. American Telephone & Telegraph Company,

535 F.2d 1356, 1359 (2d Cir. 1976).

Mobil has not shown that issuance of the notice will place it

in a position which precludes ultimate recovery, through ju-

dicial or administrative proceedings, of losses allegedly traced

to previous erroneous entitlements notices.

The standard for determining whether a party has shown tr-

reparable injury is founded upon the court's ability to

ultimately grant an effective remedy. The traditional standard

is set forth in Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Association v. Federal

Power Commission, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1921), where

the court said:

**Mere injuries, however substantial, in terms of mon-

cy, time and energy necessarily expended in the absence

of a stay, are not enough. The possibility that adequate

compensatory or other corrective relief will be available at

a later date, in the ordinary course of litigation, weighs

heavily against a claim of irreparable harm.”

Temporary loss of income, recoverable upon successful ter-

mination of the litigation, will not usually constitute irrepara-

ble injury. Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90 (1974).

Sa

There are at least three avenues of administrative relief

available to Mobil. On February 10, 1981, Mobil petitioned

DOE’s Economic Regulatory Administration (ERA) to insti-

tute a rulemaking proceeding to amend the entitlements regu-

lations to account for all price-controlled crude oil. ERA has

not yet acted on this petition.

On March 12, 1981, Mobil appealed its obligations under

the Entitlements Notice covering December 1980 to the Of-

fice of Hearings and Appeals (OHA), alleging the same

defects as claimed in the instant litigation, and asking that the

December Notice be remanded to ERA for recalculation. An

interlocutory order issued on June 4, 1981 (46 Fed. Reg.

32661 (June 24, 1981)), proposed that ERA be required to

gather information from each refiner to ascertain how much

price-controlled crude oil has disappeared from the program.

However, on July 8, 1981, subsequent to the argument of the

appeal before this court, OHA determined that it lacked

jurisdiction to hear the appeal because Mobil in effect was

seeking an amendment to the rules. This order of OHA is a fi-

nal order subject to judicial review.

Subsequent to the argument of this appeal, ERA issued a

Final Rule to comply with the suggestion of the Executive Or-

der that a mechanism be established to adjust entitlements

obligations for periods prior to decontrol. 10 C.F.R. § 211.69,

added July 9, 1981, 46 Fed. Reg. 36092, July 13, 1981. The

rule provided for a final *‘clean-up” list, effectively ending the

Entitlements Program, and for a self-executing mechanism

intended to account for judicial and administrative determina-

tions made after the August 15, 1981 reporting date for the fi-

nal list. If Mobil is dissatisfied with this Final Rule, it is free to

file an administrative appeal from this rule making. 10 C.F_R.

§ 205.160(b), 5 U.S.C. § $53.

Thus it is clear at this writing that Mobil has remedies which

will give it an opportunity to have its claims reviewed and

adjudicated. There is no conceivable reason why established

and orderly procedures should be bypassed. Furthermore, the

6a

nature of the claim and the proof are more appropriately con-

sidered in the first instance by the administrative agency.

There is, of course, a time problem in view of the expiration

on September 30, 1981, of the statutory authority for the con-

trol program. 15 U.S.C. § 760g. The court is mindful of the

savings clause in that statute. However, at this point we are

not prepared to discuss the scope of that clause.

The court is aware of prior situations in which the agency

seems to have been slow in discharging its functions. F.z.,

Marathon Oil Co. v. Department of Energy, 642 F.2d 436, 439

(TECA 1981). We express the hope that this matter will be

expeditiously disposed of because of the nature of the claims

made by Mobil.

The important nature of the problem raised by Mobil is

attested to by OHA, a division within DOE, with expertise in

this area. In its opinion of July 8, 1981, referred to above, it

made the following observations:

‘**Based upon our review of the entire record in this

proceeding we conclude that the problems and issues pre-

sented by Mobil are matters of great significance to the

Entitlements Program aad should be carefully considered

by the appropriate officials of the Department of Energy

(DOE).”* (p. 1)

**Although we have in essence no jurisdiction to grant

Mobil’s appeal, we do find that Mobil has raised serious

questions concerning ERA’s administration of the En-

titlements Program.” (p. 19)

* al * * al

*... we are particularly disturbed that such a dispute

exists nearly one-half year after decontrol. . . . Although

ERA has attempted to discredit Mobil’s method of quan-

titative analysis of the evidence, the ERA apparenily

lacks knowledge of the degree to which upstream

stockpiling of crude oil and the use of time exchanges in-

Ta

creased towards the end of the program as Mobil alleges.

Moreover, as far as we know, ERA has shown no inclina-

tion to obtain such knowledge.” (pp. 19-20)

**. . . we believe it incumbent upon ERA to attempt to

exercise its broad rulemaking discretion in an informed

and rational manner consistent with the President's Or-

der and the relevant statutory objectives.”’ (p. 20) (Foot-

notes omitted.)

With the finding that Mobil has failed to show irreparable

harm, we need not reach the question of the construction of

Section 211 of the Economic Stabilization Act as to the per-

missible scope of the injuction.

The order is reversed and the motion for a preliminary in-

junction is denied.

9a

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

81-CV-340

Mosit Oit CorPoRATION,

Plaintiff.

VS.

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND

James B. EDWARDS, SECRETARY,

Defendants.

Appearances For The Plaintiff: Of Counsel:

Bono, ScHoeNneck & KING THomas E. Myers, Esq.

One Lincoln Center

Syracuse, New York 13202

AKIN, Gump, STRAUSS, HAvuER & FeELp R. Bruce McLean, Esa.

1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W. Daniet Josepn, Esa.

Washington, D.C. 20036 Harry SILVER, Esq.

WitiiaM C. Streets, Eso. Joseru T. Casey, Eso.

Gai F. Scuuttz, Esa.

Mosit Ow CorPORATION

3225 Gallows Road

Fairfax, Virginia 22037

Appearances For The Defendants: Of Counsel:

Georce H. Lowe PAULA Ryan, Esa.

Unites STATES ATTORNEY Assistant U.S. Attorney

Nor THERN District or New York

100 S. Clinton Street

Syracuse, New York 13260

Tuomas H. Kemp., Esa.

SAMUEL Sooper, Esa.

1000 Independence Avenue, S.W.

Washington, D.C. 20585

Howarp G. Munson, C.J.

10a

Memorandum- Decision

FILED

JUNE 3, 1981

Presently before the Court are two motions — the first has

been made by the plaintiff Mobil Oil Corporation (Mobil) to

enjoin the issuance by the defendants Department of Energy

and Secretary James B. Edwards (hereinafter collectively

referred to as DOE) of the “January entitlements notice.”’ See

10 C.F.R. §211.67() (1980). The second motion has been

made by the defendants to dismiss plaintiffs complaint.

Briefly, the entitlements notice is an essential component of

the DOE’s entitlements program, which is designed to

equalize the access of domestic refiners to price-controlled do-

mestic crude oil. See Pasco, Inc. v. Fed. Energy Admin., 525

F.2d 1391, 1395 (TECA 1975). This is accomplished by re-

quiring cash transfers (entitlements) to be made from those

domestic refiners with a proportionately greater access to

price-controlled crude, to those refiners less fortunately situ-

ated. A corresponding “‘entitlements notice’ is then pub-

lished every month reflecting each refiners’ entitlements obli-

gation under the program.

To function properly, the entitlements program depends in

no small measure on the accurate report of a refiner’s

e-controlled crude oil. The instant suit

Mobil’s claim that there are in fact

porting such “‘receipts’’ by refiners.

sult of this misreporting, it has had

share of entitlements obligations.

Accordingly,. Mobil moved for temporary and preliminary in-

juctive relief to prevent the DOE from issuing its **January

entitlements notice,’ which allegedly would have immediate-

ly required Mobil to shoulder an inequitable share of entitle-

ments obligations. This Court granted Mobil’s request for a

temporary restraining order on April 21, 1981, and enjoined

the DOE “‘from issuing any further entitlements notices and

widespread abuses in

Mobil contends that as

lla

from requiring Mobil to comply with such notices.” The tem-

porary restraining order was to remain in effect for twenty

days. See Memorandum-Decision and Order, dated April 21,

1981, at p. 6.

In the meantime, the DOE moved to dismiss plaintiffs

complaint. The DOE maintains that pursuant to the doctrine

of primary jurisdiction, this Court should defer consideration

of the instant case, until the DOE has had an opportunity to

complete its own investigation of the merits of Mobil’s claims.

The Court is informed by the DOE that it is currently investi-

gating the probiem of misreporting, but has not as yet com-

pleted this investigation. For similar reasons the DOE addi-

tionally argues that plaintiff has failed to exhaust administra-

tive remedies, and that the instant dispute is not ripe for ju-

dicial resolution. Furthermore, the DOE asserts that even

assuming arguendo that plaintiff has satisfied these legal

doctrines, it has neither stated a claim nor demonstrated that

it will suffer irreparable injury, should the DOE issue the

‘January Entitlements notice.”

A hearing on plaintiffs preliminary injunction motion was

held on May 12, 1981 and live testimony was taken on the is-

sues of misreporting in the DOE’s entitlements program, and

the likelihood that plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if the

“January entitlements notice” is released. That same day the

Court also heard the parties’ arguments with regard to the

DOE’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint. To fully under-

stand the merits of both pending motions, a more detailed ex-

amination of the entitlements program is in order.

Constrained by the Arab oil embargo and dwindling domes-

tic production, the supplies of crude oil in the United States

decreased dramatically in 1973. The combined affect of these

factors caused severe increases in the price of oil and related

products. See 39 Fed. Reg. 31650 (August 30, 1974). To

soften the economic hardships associated with reduced sup-

plies and higher prices, the Cost of Living Council created a

<a,

12a

price control system for crude oil as a part of Phase IV, see

former 6 C.F.R. Part 150, Subpart L, 38 Fed. Reg. 22536 (Au-

gust 22, 1973), of the Stabilization Program. See the Econom-

ic Stabilization Act of 1970, as emended, 12 U.S.C. $1904 note.

The system was designed to control the prices of petroleum

from the wellhead to finished products, and to create a price

incentive to encourage the production of additional quantities

of domestic crude.

Under the regulations a “‘base production control level”

(BPCL) was established for cach domestic crude oil producing

property, equal to the volume of production from that prop-

erty during each month of 1972. Production levels for the

property up to the amount of the BPCL in the corresponding

months of any subsequent year had to be sold al a price no

higher than a regulatory ceiling price. This crude oil was refer-

red to commonly as “old oil.’ If the property produced crude

oil in excess of the BCPL, the additional quantities or **new

oil’ could be sold at the higher world market price. See 10

C.F.R. 8212.72 (1980). Also exempt from price controls, and

consequently saleable at world market prices, were all

imported oil and crude oil produced from marginal or

stripper’ wells. See 10 C.F.R. $8 212.15-16 (1980). At the

same time, refinery prices for selected petroleum products

were also controlled by regulations. By their terms, refiners

were required to establish base prices for each controlled

product at their May 15, 1973 price levels, but were permitted

a certain degree of price allowance for the increased costs of

imported or domestic crude oil from which these controlled

products were refined. See 10 C.F.R. §§ 212.81-85 (1980).

While the end of the Arab oil embargo in 1974 led to rep-

lenished supplies of imported crude oil, the overall price of

foreign crude increased significantly. This price increase

widened the disparity between the controlled price for ‘‘old

oil’ and the market price of “‘new oil,’’ and was reflected in

the costs and therefore the reiative prices charged by refiners.

See 39 Fed. Reg. 31650 (August 30, 1974). However, refiners

with greater access to the less expensive price-controiled

l3a

crude oil — typically the larger integrated refiner — has a cost

advantage over those of their competitors who could only se-

cure supplies of uncontrolled crude oil — usually the small or

independent refiners. Thus, at a time when increased supplies

of crude oil made the market place much more sensitive to

price considerations, the economic viability of these small and

independent refiners was being threatened. Moreover, con-

sumers in various parts of the country who depended primari-

ly on stocks of uncontrolled crude oil (‘new oil,’ imported

and ‘‘stripper’’ crude oil) contended with much higher prices

than other regions with ready access to crude oil that was

price-controlled.

In an effort to eliminate the inequities in the refining and

marketing sectors of the petroleum industry without sacrific-

ing the beneficial elements of the two-tier price system, the

Federal Energy Administration (FEA), the immediate pre-

decessor of the DOE, proposed and adopted the entitlements

program. See generally 10 C.F.R. $8 21 1.66-67 (1980).

Transcript of May 12, 1981 hearing at p. 31 (hereinafter Tr. at

p.___). As reflected in its legislative history, the primary pur-

pose of the entitlements program was the equitable distribu-

tion of price-controlled crude oil throughout the petroleum

industry:

In large measure, the goal of the proposal is to improve

the access of small and independent refiners to old do-

mestic oil. In addition, however, the proposed program ts

also designed effectively to provide all refiners with pro-

portionate amounts of old oil, base¢ on their relative

refinery capacities. The proposed program is accordingly

aimed not only at bringing the small and independent

refining sector as a ciass into a More competitive position

with respect to the majors, but it is also specifically de-

signed to assure that all segments of the petroleum indus-

try will benefit equally from lower-priced domestic oil.

Thus, the FEA anticipates that in some cases, major oil

companies (with a low level of old oil supplies) will bene-

fit by the pregram, while some small refiners (with a high

level of old oil supplies) may be required to buy entitle-

l4a

ments under the program. This goal is consistent with the

Congressional objectives of achieving equitable prices

among all sectors of the petroleum industry and preserv-

ing an economically sound and competitive petroleum in-

dustry.

39 Fed. Reg. 31650 (August 30, 1974).

Toward these ends, the FEA rejected the option of actual

physical reallocation of crude oil among refiners, in favor of

monthly cash payments to refiners with relatively less access

to price-controlled crude oil than the national average, from

refiners with proportionately greater access. See Tr. at p. 32,

and 10 C.F.R. §211.67(b) (1980). These entitlements obliga-

tions are costed into the price of crude oil, see 10 C.F.R.

$211.67(m) (1980), and then adjusted into the maximum

lawful price for the following month. See 10 C.F.R. § 212.83{c)

(2) (1980). See generally, Pasco, Inc. v. FEA, 525 F.2d 1391,

1395 (TECA 1975), Cities Service Co. v. FEA, 529 F.2d 1016,

1021 (TECA 1975). A description of the mechanics of the en-

titlements program follows.

Under the provisions of the entitlements program, each

refiner must report on a monthly basis, inter alia, its crude oil

runs to distillation units, as well as the price, volume, and type

of all crude oil booked into the refinery as a “‘receipt.”’ See 10

C.F.R. $211.66 (1980). These reports are due approximately

two months after the report subject month. /d. Based on the

inforn...ion gleaned from these reports, every eligible refiner

is issued a number of entitlements for the month. An entitle-

ment is a “‘license”™’ to refine one barrel of price-controlled

crude oil for the month. See 10 C.F.R. § 211.62 (1980).

To determine a refiner’s monthly allocation of entitle-

ments, the formula — vastly simplified — is as follows: the

national domestic supply ratio (DOSR), which is the ratio of

price-controlled crude to the national total runs to stills, is

multiplied by the volume of crude oil runs to stills reported by

the refiner for that month. See 10 C.F.R. §211.67(a)01)

(1980). A refiner is then issued entitlements equal to the

15a

above computed figure. The second step in determining the

refiner’s ultimate entitlements obligation is to calculate the

monthly receipts of “‘deemed old oil.” See 10 C.F.R.

§ 211.67(b)(2) (1980). This sum represents a refiner’s total

receipts of price-controlled crude oil. A refiner’s entitlements

position is the difference between its entitlement allocation

and deemed old oil receipts. If the entitlements allocation is

greater than a refiner’s deemed old oil receipts, the refiner will

be able to sell entitlements. Whereas, if the entitlements

allocation is less than a refiner’s deemed old oil receipts, it will

have to purchase additional entitlements from a refiner that is

in a position to sell entitlements, in order to process those

additional supplies of price-controlled crude. See 10 C.F.R.

$§ 211.67(b)-(c) (1980).' The regulations do not match up en-

titlements purchasers and sellers every month for the purpose

of making these transactions. Instead, historic trading rela-

' Imagine a system with only two refineries, each of whom runs

100 barrels of crude. Refinery A has only price-controlled crude

at a value of $8.00 a barrel and Refinery B has only uncontrolled

crude at $38.00 a barrel. Now, in this particular example the sup-

ply ratio that | am speaking of would be 100 barrels of price-con-

trolled crude divided by 200 barrels of runs or fifty percent.

The entitlement price would be the difference between the

$38.00 uncontrolled price and the $8.00 old oil price or $30.00

for each entitlement. When the entitlements list were issued it

would be seen that Refiner A would require 100 entitlements,

he would only have been issued fifty. Therefore, he would have

to buy fifty entitlements from Retiner B at a cost of $30.00 for

each entitlement and when these transactions are finished you

would find through arithmetic that Refiner A’s average crude

cost. . . would have gone up $15.00 a barrel to a total of $23.00 a

barrel whereas Refiner B's average crude cost would have gone

down $15.00 per barrel from $38.00 and would also be at $38.00

and you can see that we have in effect allocated the benefits of

price-controlled equitably.

Testimony of Roy K. Murdock, General Manager of Crude Oil and

Gas Liquids for Mobil Oil Corporation’s United States Marketing

and Refining Division. Tr. at pp. 33-34.

loa

tionships have evolved in the industry. The price of an entitle-

ment, however, is set by regulation, and is determined by

subtracting from the weighted average cost of a barrel of un-

controlled crude, the weighted average cost of a barrel of ‘old

oil.” See 10 C.F.R. § 211.6741) (4) (1980). ?

Every month the DOE publishes an entitlements notice

“evidencing the issuance of entitlements’’ and containing the

following information: The DOSR, the name of each refiner

to which entitlements have been issued, the number of bar-

rels of deemed old oil included in each refiner’s adjusted

crude oil receipts, the number of entitlements issued to each

refiner, the number of entitlements required to be purchased

or sold by each such refiner, and the price at which entitle-

ments shall be purchases and sold. See 10 C.F.R.

$ 211.67(i1)(2) (1980). A refiner’s failure to comply with the

obligations imposed by the entitlements notice or the entitle-

ments program in general, is subject to civil liability of

$20,000 per day for each day of non-compliance, and criminal

sanctions of imprisonment for one year and a fine of $40,000

per day for each day of non-compliance. See 15 U.S.C. § 754;

10 C.F.R. $8 205.203(a) (2), (b) CI) (A), (c) 1) 0B).

Two final points on the operation of the entitlements pro-

gram must be made. The first is that although the entitle-

ments program is operated on a monthly basis, a given

month’s entitlements notice does not reflect a “‘freeze-

frame” picture of the refinery industry for that month. As a

primary matter, the entitlements notice itself is issued two

months after the subject month it reports about. Secondly,

such factors as errors in reporting, recertifications of crude oil,

adjustments in crude oil receipts and costs, and exception

relief granted by the DOE's Office of Hearings and Appeals,

inject a degree of inaccuracy in each month's entitlements

notice. Yet, over the course of the program these discrepan-

? In other words, **The price of entitlement was, in effect, the eco-

nomic benefit of access to price-controlled oil." Murdock testimony,

Tr. at p. 33.

17a

cies are supposed to be accounted for, and correction lists are

issued accordingly. See Tr. at p. 46, and Plaintiffs Exhibit

#2(y).

It should also be noted that the entitlements program has

been amended several times over the course of its life.’ Some

of these amendments were to further advance the goal of

equitable distribution of price-controlled crude oil. Stull other

changes have been for the purpose of granting subsidies to

various sectors of the petroleum industry. For example, the

deemed old oil computation was necessitated by a change in

the program that added an ‘‘upper’’ tier of price-controlled

crude oil, and redesignated “‘old oil’ as “‘lower™’ tier.‘ It will

be recalled that the original form of the entitlements program

only included the one category of *‘old oil.” Perhaps most af-

fected by the changes in the entitlements program’s direc-

tions, especially in the area of subsidies, has been the DOSR

calculation. The DOSR now incorporates different types of

subsidies, which are provided in the form of additional alloca-

tions of entitlements for the following programs: small refiner

“bias,” exceptions and appeals relief in the entitlements pro-

gram, California heavy crude refining incentives, for the

import of naptha into Puerto Rico, for the import of residual

fuel oil into the East Coast refining district, synthetic fuel de-

velopment, domestic residual fuel deductions, and for crude

oil sold to the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. The effect of

' See generally **Validation of the Crude Oil Entitlements Informa-

tion System,”’ study prepared for the DOE by Tera, Inc., dated

March 9, 1981 [hereinafter Validation Study]; Appendix C **History

of the Entitlements Program;"* Attachment F-1 ‘**The Domestic

Crude Oil Entitlements Program Calculations.” Upon Mobil's

motion and over the DOE's claim of executive privilege, the Court

ordered the DOE to release this study for purposes of the instant liti-

gation. See this Court’s May 15, 1981 Memorandum-Decision and

Order.

* Today, the deemed old oil calculation also factors in the

weighted average cost of upper tier Alaska North Slope crude oil. See

10 C.F.R. §211.67(b)(2) (1980).

18a

these program modifications has been to reduce the size of the

DOSR. As shall be explained in greater detail momentarily, a

lower DOSR causes fewer entitlements to be issued to all

refiners, and therefore increases their proportionate burden

under the program In addition, a lower DOSR furthers the

likelihood that even some traditional entitlements sellers will

become entitlements purchasers.’ See infra at pp. 14-15. With

this examination of the purpose, evolution, and operation of

the entitlements program complete, the Court turns to con-

sider the factual predicate for Mobil’s assertion that a

preliminary injunction should issue against the DOE’s *‘Janu-

ary entitlements notice.”

Due to the cost differential between a barrel of price-con-

trolled and uncontrolled crude oil, there was always a financial

incentive in the petroleum industry to find methods, whether

legal or extra-legal, to “‘convert”’ price-controlled crude oil

into uncontrolled crude oil. A refiner that could make a barrel

of price-controlled oil — selling, for example, at $8.00 a bar-

rel, “‘disappear’’ and then later ‘“‘reappear’’ as uncontrolled

crude oil — selling, for example, at the world market price of

$38.00 a barrel, would stand to make a tidy profit of $30.00 on

each barrel sold. Mobil asserts that the phased, and more

recently, the complete decontrol of the petroleum industry

has provided even additional financial incentive to cheat or

‘**game”’ the price-control regulations. Some additional back-

ground on decontrol is necessary.

On April 5, 1979 President Carter announced his intention

to deregulate all domestic crude oil. Soon thereafter, the DOE

took steps to implement the President’s decision, and it

adopted the first of a series of amendments to its regulations,

with a view towards gradually lifting the price-controls on do-

mestic crude-oil by October 1, 1981. See 44 Fed. Reg. 66187

(November 19, 1979). The plans for phased decontrol, how-

’ Validation Study, Attachment F-1 at p. F-42.

19a

ever, were interrupted by a change in presidential administra-

tions. Shortly after being sworn into office, President Reagan

fulfilled one of his campaign pledges by issuing Executive Or-

der No. 12287 on January 28, 1981. That Order provides in

pertinent part:

By the authority vested in me as President by the Con-

stitution and statutes of the United States of America,

including the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of

1973, as amended (15 U.S.C. 751 et seg.), and notwith-

standing the delegations to the Secretary of Energy in

Executive Order No. 11790, as amended by Executive

Order No. 12038, and in order to provide for an immedi-

ate and orderly decontrol of crude oil and refined petro-

leum products, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section |. All crude oil and refined petroleum products

are exempted from the price and allocation controls

adopted pursuant to the Emergency Petroleum Alloca-

tion Act of 1973, as amended. The Secretary of Energy

shall promptly take such action as is necessary to revoke

the price and allocation regulations made unnecessary by

this Order.

* . * . *

Section 3. The Secretary of Energy may, pursuant to

Executive Order No. 11790, as amended by Executive

Order No. 12038, adopt such regulations and take such

actions as he deems necessary to implement this Order,

including the promulgation of entitlements notices for

periods prior to this Order and the establishment of a

mechanism for entitlements adjustments for periods

prior to this Order.

Section 4. The Secretary of Energy is authorized to take

such other actions as he deems necessary to ensure that

the purposes of this Order are effectuated.

Section 5. Because advance notice of and public pro-

cedure on the decontrol provided by this Order would be

20a

likely to cause actions that could lead to economic distor-

tions and dislocations, and would therefore be contrary to

the public interest, this Order shall be effective im-

mediately.

46 Fed. Reg. 9909-10 (January 30, 1981).

The announcement of phased decontrol and the knowledge

that all price-controls on crude oil would be lifted by October

1, 1981, imparted refiners with a new and unique opportunity

to cheat or “‘game”™ the regulatory system and to make

**windfall” profits. With the coming of decontrol, all a refiner

had to do in order to maximize its profits on price-controlled

crude oil, would be to somehow withhold barrels of the low

cost price-controlled crude from the market until after the

date of decontrol.* Of course, a barrel of price-controlled

crude oil after the date of decontrol would be worth the higher

world market price. Thus, when decontrol was announced on

April 5, 1979, the petroleum industry was at once provided

with further incentive to cheat and ‘‘game”™ the regulatory

scheme, and with the method to accomplish these ends. In

addition, unwitting participation in such schemes was

forthcoming from the political arena. Due to his campaign

pledge, President Reagan's election in November 1980,

brought with it the chance that complete decontrol would be

adopted before its scheduled date of October 1, 1981, and that

profits could be taken even sooner. This turned out to be a

safe bet, since, as stated already, decontrol of the petroleum

industry was in fact ordered by President Reagan on January

28, 1981. Testimony provided by Mobil suggests that this was

also the day when millions of barrels of once price-controlled

crude oil suddenly began to “‘reappear.”” A more detailed ex-

* This conclusion is confirmed by the Validation Study at p. IX. A

Congressional Committee reported that a similar problem of disap-

pearing stripper well oil could also be traced to the anticipation of

decontrol. See H.R. Rep. (96-150-58) 96th Cong., 2nd Sess., Com-

mittee on Interstate Commerce, The Case of the Billion Dollar

Stripper (October, 1980)

21a

amination of this phenomenon and its affect on the entitle-

ments program follows.

At a May 12, 1981 hearing held by this Court on plaintiffs

motion for a preliminary injunction, testimony was taken on

the problem of the disappearance of price-controlled oil, and

its specific affect on the entitlements program. Testifying for

plaintiff Mobil was Mr. Roy K. Murdock, General Manager of

Crude Oil and Gas Liquid for Mobil’s United States Mar-

keting and Refining Division. Murdock based his conclusions

about the disappearance of price-controlled crude oil, and its

subsequent reappearance, on an analysis of data contained in

the “‘Domestic Crude Oil First Purchasers Report” and the

monthly entitlements notices. Appropriately entitled, the

First Purchaser reports, inter alia, coliects data at the first

point of purchase of crude oil, which is usually at the refin-

eries. lt will be recalled that the monthly entitlements notices

publish data on each of the calculations relevant to the opera-

tions of the entitlements program, such as all refinery receipts.

See supra at pp. 7-8. Therefore, a comparison of the two data

systems can be expected to yield statistically similar volumes

of crude oil moving throughout the industry.’ Nontheless, it

shall be seen that in actuality, wide discrepancies between the

two systems are commonplace. thus evidencing the disap-

pearance phenomenon.

Murdock testified at the hearing that the DOSR — the ratio

of price-controlled crude to total runs to stills — has gradually

declined between 1979 and 1980, with a marked decline evi-

dent in November and December of 1980. Tr. at pp. 48-49,

Plaintiffs Exhibits ##3 and 4 [plaintiffs exhibits will be

delineated Exh. #___ .] In the same two-year period the price

of an entitlement — the difference between the cost of lower

tiered price-controlled and uncontrolled crude oil — more

than tripled from $8.74 to $27.06. /d. As for the comparison of

the First Purchasers data and entitlements program receipts,

’ The soundness of this conclusion is confirmed by the Validation

Study, Appendix J at pp. J-28 - J-30.

22a

Murdock testified that in the past two years a disparity or dis-

appearance occured in volumes of lower tier price-controlled

crude reported, and that this disparity has increased over

time. Exh. ##5 and 6. In January, 1979, some 179,000 barrels

of price-controlled crude oil were disappearing every day. By

December, 1980, the rate of disappearance had increased to

$20,000 barrels of price-controlled crude oil every day. Tr. at

pp. §3-53.

A comparison on the First Purchasers and entitlements pro-

gram data on upper tier crude oil shows equally dramatic

trends. Tr. at pp. 56-59, Exh. ##7 and 8. For approximately

the first six months of 1979, more upper tier crude was re-

ported as received at refineries than was produced and sold

during that period. This trend inverted by August 1979, and a

disparity or disappearance of 23,000 barrels per day of price-

controlled crude oil was reported. By December of 1980 the

disappearance rate had increased to 426,000 barrels per day. It

should be added that the relative price of upper tier crude oil

during this period changed substantially. At the beginning of

1979 upper tier crude was very near in price to the world mar-

ket price of crude oil. However, by the end of 1979 the world

market price of crude oil had out-paced the price of upper tier

crude, and was worth approximately twice as much. The data

for upper tier Alaskan North Slope Crude, which has been

price-controlled since May 1980, shows a pattern similar to

that of upper tier crude. Tr. at pp. 60-62, Exh. ##9 and 10. At

the same time, overall production in all tiers of price-con-

trolled crudes was declining throughout 1979 and 1980. Tr. at

p. 64. Nevertheless, a calculation of the percentage disparity,

for example, in both categories of lower and upper tier crude

is quite revealing. In January 1979, 2.3% of lower and upper

tier crude oil had disappeared, by December 1979, 43.4% of

lower and upper tier crude oil had disappeared. Tr. at pp. 64-

66, Exh. ##12 and 13.

In total figures, in the year 1979, between 5.2 million and

10.4 million barrels of crude oil were disappearing from the

regulatory system every month. By the year 1980, between 12.0

23a

million and 29.6 million barrels of crude oil were disappearing

every month. Tr. at pp. 69-71, Exh #414 and 15." While these

millions of barrels of price-controlled crude oil were disap-

pearing, curiously, it seems that at least some of this crude oil

was reappearing as decontrolled crude. In January 1980 a

surplus of 175,000 barrels per day of decontrolled crude oil ap-

peared in the regulatory system. This figure represents crude

oi! that was reported as receipts by refiners, but was not re-

ported as having been purchased by first purchasers. By

December of 1980, there were 809,000 barrels per day of

decontrolled crude oil reappearing in this manner, even

though there was really no record of it having been produced.

Tr. at pp. 81-83. Significantly, the accuracy of all the data de-

scribed above is noi contested by the DOE.

* The Validation Study also reported on the disappearance of

price-controlled crude oil:

Comparisons of adjusted DCOE data to data reported on the Do-

mestic Crude Fuel Purchaser (sic) system (DCFP) for the

period 1977 through 1979 show DCFP data to be greater on an

annual basis for all receipt categories combined with net annual

differences decreasing from 158.2 million barrels in 1977 to

102.9 [hand corrected in Report to 33.9] million barrels in 1978

[hand corrected in Report to 1979]. In 1979, aggregate domestic

receipts reported to DCOE exceeded those reported on DCFP

by 1.2 million barrels. Since some of the total net differences in

1979 may be accounted for by condensate and utility and other

non-refining usage, on a gross yearly basis, the vast bulk of do-

mestic crude sold to first purchasers appears to find its way to

refiners.

Important differences have been found, however, in comparing

categorical volumes reported on the two systems. Particularly in

1979, both old oil and new oil have “‘disappeared”’ between

DCFP and DCOE systems. In the case of old oil, the 1979 differ-

ence resulted in a net “‘disappearance’’ of 78.4 million barrels

(215,000 barrels/day) or 9.78 percent of all reported DCOE

receipts. If this discrepancy was in fact due to errors in the

DCOE system, then old oil for 1979 could be said to have been

24a

If the cost of an entitlement is factored into these figures for

disappearing crude, remembering that between 1979 and 1980

the price of an entitlement was increasing, $5.6 dillion of en-

ltitlements obligations were not channeled through the entitle-

ments program on a total volume of over 250.3 million barrels

of price-controlled crude oil. Tr. at pp. 71-75; Exh ##15 and

16. Moreover, from the American public's point of view, if

price-controlled crude that disappeared later reappeared as

higher priced uncontrolled crude, then this $5.6 billion figure

represents increased crude costs that may be passed on to

them. The Court will next address in more specific terms the

ways in which the disappearance of price-controlled crude

impacts upon entitlements program refiners. Afterwards, the

possible explanations for the disappearance will be considered.

understated by 8.91 percent. For the 3 year period, old oi! may

have been up to 9.87 percent understated. [See Appendix K,

#28}.

New oil receipts also differed between the two systems (DCOE

and DFCP) in 1979, such that 9.4 million barrels (26,000 bar-

rels/day) or 0.87 percent may have ‘“‘disappeared.”’ New oil

receipts then may have been 0.86 percent understated in 1979.

Id. at pp. 65-66. See also Validation Study at pp. i, vii, 95, 96, J-28 - J-

32. The Validation Study further confirmed that upon ‘‘disappear-

ing,’ the price-controlled crude ‘reappeared’ as uncontrolled

crude. Summarizing the twin problems of the disappearance and

reappearance of crude oil, the Validation Study concluded:

The impacts or consequences of these discrepancies are, how-

ever, significant. In terms of data quality, the net volume of

**missing’’ old oil represents 9.78 percent of the volume of old

oil reported on DCOE in 1979 (7.5 percent of the reported vol-

umes for all three years). The net volume of **missing”’ new oil

represents 0.9 percent of the volume of new oil reported on

DCOE in 1979 (for the three-year period, new oil receipts re-

ported on DCOE exceeded those on DCFP by 0.6 percent of the

reported new oil receipts on DCOE).

Id. at p. 96.

2Sa

To understand how the disappearance of price-controlled

crude oil affects the entitlements program refiners, the me-

chanics of the program must be reconsidered. The disap-

pearance of price-controlled crude oil causes a concomitant

reduction in the DOSK — the ratio of price-controlled crude

to the national total runs to stills. Since the number of entitle-

ments issued to each refiner is a product of the DOSR and that

refiners’ runs to stills, a shrinking DOSR will cause less en-

titlements to be issued to all refiners in the program. This

means that an entitlements purchaser will have to purchase

more entitlements to make up for this net loss, and to be able

to refine its excess of price-controlled crude over the national

average. By the same token, a seller of entitlements is neg-

atively affected by being issued less entitlements, because it

will have fewer entitlements to sell in order to offset its lim-

ited access (in comparison to the national average) to price-

controlled crude. Moreover, the disappearance of price-con-

trolled crude oil increases the likelihood that the DOSR will

shrink to such a low level that it would cause many traditional

entitlements sellers to have access to more price-controlled

crude oil than the national average.” With this change in posi-

tion these traditional entitlements sellers would themselves

be required to become purchasers of entitlements.

» Similarly, the Validation Study found that the disappearance of

price-controlled crude oil had a major impact on participants in the

entitlements program and on consumers. The Study observed that

the problem of disappearing oil:

Apart from considerations of data quality, from the standpoint

of the entitlements program, *‘losses’’ of controlled crudes (old

and new oils) cause the DOSR to be lower (i.e., understated).

Thus, fewer entitlements are allocated and fewer entitlements

obligations are paid. For example, using adjusted/amended total

old and new oil receipt volumes for 1979, if the entire discrepan-

cy between the DCOE and DCFP systems was in fact due to

errors in DCOE data, then the amount of entitlements obliga-

tions not incurred can be estimated at $1.341 billion. For the ref-

erence month of December, 1979, if all of the apparent discre-

26a

As a participant in the entitlements program Mobil has been

directly affected by the problem of disappearing crude oil.

Mobil traditionally has been a purchaser of entitlements and

has expended some $800 million over the life of the program.

Tr. at p. 38. In December of 1980, for instance, Mobil was re-

quired to purchase $48 million worth of entitlements. Because

it has been a traditional purchaser of entitlements, Mobil has

had to purchase additional entitlements as a result of the dis-

appearance of price-controlled crude oil, and the fewer entitle-

ments it has been issued due to the shrinking DOSR. See Exh.

#3. Murdock testified that in 1979, with Mobil’s approximate-

ly 5% industry share of the national runs to stills, Mobil paid

an additional entitlements burden of $64.4 million on $1.3 bil-

lion of entitlements obligations that escaped the program as a

result of the disappearance of price-controlled crude oil. In the

year 1980, however, Mobil’s increased entitlements burden

was four times this amount. According to Murdock’s tes-

timony, $4.3 billion of entitlements obligations escaped the

entitlements program in 1980, and Mobil’s share of that

burden was $220 million of additional entitlements purchases

— all because of disappearing price-controlled crude. This

figure represents 85% of Mobil’s total entitlements obligation

for that year. Tr. at p. 91; Exh. #2!.

pancy between the two systems (DCOE and DCFP) was caused

by “errors” in the DCOE data, the DOSR would have been

reduced from 0.234137 to 0.214510 (8.38 percent of what the

DOSR *‘would have been” if the *‘missing’’ old and new oil was

included). This would result in decreased entitlement alloca-

tions totaling $208.5 million (8.38 percent), increasing all

refiners’ per-barrel post-entitlement crude cost by $0.43 (1.85

percent). (See Appendix K, #40.)

From the customer's standpoint, if the crudes that disappeared

in 1979 reappeared as higher-priced uncontrolled (such as

stripper), then up to $1.344 billion in “‘extra’’ crude costs may

have been passed through.

Validation Study at pp. 104-05. (Footnotes omitted).

27a

Murdock testified that a variety of factors could have con-

tributed or actually have caused the incredible disappearance

of price-controlled crude. Certainly phased decontrol is one of

these, since it was designed to gradually reduce the amount of

crude oil subject to price-controls. A second factor is that the

entitlements system is constantly undergoing adjustments and

corrections. Yet the importance of either of these reasons is

suspect due to the fact that the disappearance of price-con-

trolled crude was both continuous, and increased at a faster

rate than the base volumes of price-controlled crude were de-

creasing.’ Tr. ai p. 55; see e.g. Exh. ##5-8, 12.

Still a third possible explanation for the disappearance of

price-controlled crude is the operation of the DOE's Tertiary

Incentive Program. As part of the phased decontrol of crude

oil, and for the purpose of increasing domestic production, the

DOE adopted the Tertiary Program to provide producers with

front-end financing for exotic or ‘‘enhanced’’ forms of oii

recovery. See 46 Fed. Reg. 25315 (May 6, 1981). This incen-

tive was in the form of enabling a producer to recertify lower

and upper tier crude oil as tertiary incentive crude, and, as a

consequence, to receive the market price instead of the other-

wise applicable controlled price. More specifically, under this

program a producer may certify sufficient quantities of crude

oil as tertiary incentive crude to enable it to receive additional

revenue to recover expenses on seventy-five percent of cer-

tain enhanced forms of crude oil recovery. Murdock raised

the possibility that, in the process of recertifying the price-

controlled crude oil as tertiary incentive crude, the First Pur-

chasers or entitlements program data might not have ac-

© The Validation Study supports the view that factors such as the

definitional differences between the First Purchasers and entitle-

ments programs, adjustments and errors in reporting, only would ac-

count for an insignificant net disappearance of price-controlled

crude. /d. at pp. 96-100. Furthermore, the Study eliminated the

possibility that non-refinery uses of crude oil had a material affect on

the statistics for disappearing price-controlled crude oil. /d. at p. 98.

28a

curately accounted for and reported this recertification. Thus,

a reporting error could have resulted such that a barrel of

price-controlled crude would seem to have disappeared upon

a comparison of the First Purchasers and entitlements pro-

gram data.

After raising this possibility, Murdock effectively demon-

strated that it was an implausible explanation for the disap-

pearance of price-controlled crude. Murdock conceded that

the Tertiary Program would cause the DOSR to shrink be-

cause tertiary incentive crude reduced the quantity of price-

controlled crude on the market. As described before, a

shrinking DOSR causes additional burdens to befall entitle-

ments program refiners. See supra at pp. 14-15. But he dis-

counted the likelihood that the failure of first purchasers to

adjust for tertiary incentive crude could account for the sig-

nificant disappearance of price-controlled crude oil. Some fur-

ther background on the adjustment procedures in the First

Purchasers Report and the entitlements program will prove

useful.

There is a difference in adjustment procedures between the

First Purchasers and entitlements program data collection sys-

tems. In the First Purchasers system, a barrel of crude oil re-

ported as price-controlled in the month of September, for ex-

ample, and subsequenily recertified the following month as

price-controlled crude, would not cause the September First

Purchasers data to be adjusted. Instead, the recertification

would be shown in the next month's First Purchasers report.

The contrary is the case with the entitlements program, which

would adjust its September data to reflect the recertification of

the price-controlled crude. However, based on the foregoing,

a subsequent comparison of the Firsi Purchasers and entitle-

ments program data for the month of September would show

that one barrel of price-controlled crude had disappeared. Fur-

thermore, it is possible that a disappearance could also be

caused if the first purchaser were to simply fail to make the

amendment in the First Purchasers Report to reflect the terti-

ary incentive recertification to begin with. In both of these ex-

amples the disappearance would have been caused by the fact

29a

that the barrel of price-controlled crude was not entered into

the September First Purchasers Report as price-controlled

crude, but was adjusted in the September entitlements pro-

gram data as tertiary incentive crude.

Murdock testified that for several reasons these two

scenarios are improbable explanations for the disappearance

of significant quantities of price-controlled crude oil. First, he

stated that there was absolutely no incentive for a first pur-

chaser of crude oil to “‘neglect’’ to properly amend its First

Purchaser filing to account for the recertification of tertiary in-

centive crude. Tr. at p. 110. A refiner’s First Purchaser filing is

nothing more than a report, and does not, unlike the refiner

reports of the entitlements program, affect that refiner’s

financial obligations under the DOE’s regulatory scheme. /d.

at 110-11. In fact the opposite appears to be the case. The First

Purchasers Report for the year 1980, and for January of 1981.

see Exh. #1, reveals that in fact first purchasers accounted for

hundreds of thousands of barrels of tertiary incentive crude.

Moreover, at the hearing on plaintiffs preliminary injunction

motion, there was no evidence presented that would suggest

that the accuracy of the First Purchasers Reports should be

substantially doubted.'' And while it would be possible that,

in recertifying tertiary incentive crude, differences in deadline

amendment requirements could cause a barrel of price-con-

trolled crude to seem to have disappeared, adjustment pro-

cedures would eventually account for the disappearance in the

following month's data, and no net loss actually would have

occurred.

Of greater moment is the fact that, even assuming arguendo

that the disappearance of price-controlled crude oil could be

explained by misreporting in the Tertiary Incentive Program,

this rationale would not account for most of the crude oil that

has disappeared. The volume of crude oil attributable to the

entire Tertiary Incentive Program is relatively insignificant

\t' See supra, note 10.

30a

when compared to statistics on the total volume of disappear-

ing price-controlled crude. Tr. at p. 126. Furthermore, the

problem of misreporting in the Tertiary Incentive Program,

under the scenario outlined above, would only address the

disappearance of price-controlled crude oil that has already

been booked as such into the entitlements program as a refin-

ery receipt. By contrast, the disappearance of crude oil as

reflected in a comparison of the First Purchasers and entitle-

ments data, is caused by the problem of crude oil that has not

been booked into the entitlements program in the first place.

Therefore, the purported problem of misreporting in the Ter-

tiary Incentive Program could not explain how millions of bar-

rels of price-controlled crude oil, accounted for in the First

Purchasers Reports, subsequently disappeared and were nev-

er booked into the entitlements program."’

Murdock testified that the most reasonable explanation for

the disappearance of price-controlled crude, and why much of

it never seems to reach the entitlements program, is due to

the use of manipulative inventory practices by refiners in the

entitlements program. Tr. at pp. 53-4. For a refiner looking to

maximize profits through the sale of price-controlled crude af-

ter decontrol, entitlements obligations would first have to be

avoided. Manipulative inventorying uniquely serves this end.

After the announcement of decontrol, refiners realized that

commonly used inventory oractices in the industry could also

be employed to delay the booking of their relatively inexpen-

sive price-controlled crude as received at the refinery (this is

called ‘“‘selective inventorying,”’ tr. at p. 78), until after the

uate of decontrol, when it would be worth the much higher

2 The Validation Study concluded: **Thus while the inclusion (or

exclusion) of out-of-period adjustments can be seen to affect any

comparisons of monthly totals, over longer periods of time (e.g., |

year), these monthly variations can be expected to cancel each other

out, and the inclusion (or exclusion) of adjustments or amendments

can be seen to contribute to very little, if any, to the apparent discre-

pancies between systems.”” /d. at p. 98.

3ha

world market price. The obvious point of this exercise was to

avoid the entitlements obligations in order to make a “*wind-

fall’ profit from the difference between the controlled and

market price — approximately $25.00 per barrel — on each

barrel of price-controlled crude inventoried in this manner.

Tr. at p. 38. In other words, the purpose of the plan was to

make price-controlled crude oil disappear, and then later reap-

pear for sale after decontrol.

If refiners scanned the horizon to search out obstacles to

this plan in general, or to manipulative inventory practices in

particular, they were not to find them in the DOE’s entitle-

ment program regulations. Actually, even before the an-

nouncement of decontrol, a variety of manipulative inven-

torying practices were already permitied by the entitlements

program's regulations and reporting procedures. The origins

of such practices may be traced to the program's accounting

constructs, which provide that an entitlement obligation is to

only be imposed at the time a barrel of price-controlled crude

oil is reported as having been received by the refinery. More

specifically, a refinery receipt is charitably defined as follows:

‘*“Crude receipts’’ means, as to a particular refiner, the

volume of crude oil (a) booked into its refineries in accor-

dance with accounting procedures generally accepted and

consistently and historically applied by the refiner con-

cerned, for its own account or for the account of a firm

other than a refiner or (b) if not previously so booked

into its refineries, delivered by that refiner for its account

to another refiner pursuant to a processing agreement

with that other refiner. Crude oil receipts shall not in-

clude crude oil received by a refiner for the purpose of

processing at its refineries for the account of another

refiner. A particular crude oil receipt shall be deemed to

have occurred when the related cost is booked into refin-

ery inventory in accordance with accounting procedures

generally accepted and consistently and historically ap-

plied by the refiner concerned, whether or not such crude

oil has been actually received by that refiner, except that

32a

crude oil delivered by one refiner to another refiner pur-

suant to a processing agreement will be deemed to have

been delivered by the delivering refiner to the other

refiner when the risk of loss passes to the other refiner

under the particular processing agreement or when the

crude oil is received at the refinery of the other refiner,

whichever occurs first. Crude oil which has been added

by a refiner to its inventory and which is thereafter sold

or otherwise disposed of without processing for the ac-

count of that refiner shall be deducted from its crude oil

receipts at the time when the related cost is deducted

from refinery inventory in accordance with accounting

procedures generally accepted and consistently and his-

torically applied by the refiner concerned. The volume of

domestic crude oil included in a refiner’s crude oil

receipts shall be evidenced by and consistent with in-

voices received with respect to such crude oil receipts.

10 C.F.R. § 211.67 (1980); See tr. at pp. 84-5.

Thus, constrained simply by the flexible requirement that

they employ “‘accounting procedures generally accepted and

consistently and historically applied,’ a refiner is in effect

allowed by the regulations to report a receipt of price-con-

trolled crude for entitlements purposes at any point in the

supply chain from wellhead to refinery gate.'’ Tr. at p. 102. A

') Murdock’s testimony on the flexibility of entitlements program

regulations was confirmed by the Validation Study:

The program-dependent nature of the key data elements thus

tends to cloud what appear to be otherwise straight-forward defi-

nitions. Particularly in the case of receipts, substantial inter-

pretational latitude for respondents is built into the system by

the regulations. Total receipts for the industry include volumes

of crude at every stage of the supply chain from wellhead to

refinery gate. While most receipts are directly tied to some

physical transaction that has already occurred (e.g., receipt at

the refinery gate, transfer of title at the point of first sale, or

loading into a tanker), in some cases receipt volumes are tied to

33a

variety of accounting techniques have been used as a result, as

have inventory practices designed to take advantage of them.

For instance, some refiners use the “refinery gate’’ method

which reports the crude as a «eceipt at the time it physically

enters the refinery.'* This legally enables a refiner to leave

unreported for entitlements purposes, any price-controlled

crude that has been purchased by the refiner, but continues to

be physically located outside the refinery, such as in pipelines,

intermediate storage, and in terminals or ships. '* Tr. at pp. 53-

4. This practice is to be distinguished from the method

whereby a barrel of crude is deemed as a receipt when some

physical transaction has already occurred. For instance, Mobil

uses a point of purchase (usually at the wellhead) inventory

practice. By comparison to the previous example, Mobil

would be required to report for entitlements purposes, crude

it had purchased though had not as yet physically received. Tr.

al p. 86.

physical transactions that will (or are expected to) occur in the

future (i.e., in the case of some exchanges). In addition, many

individual respondents report crudes from different sources in

different ways, thus qualifying the meaning of receipts for that

respondent alone. In short, the data elements are financial/ac-

counting and program constructs that have little meaning outside

their programmatic contexts.

Id. at p. 42. See also Validation Study at pp. 8, 40, 93, Appendix Lat p.

1-6, Appendix J at p. J-28.

'* The Validation Study reported that *‘about 30 percent of the

refineries sampled booked domestic receipts upon receipt at the

refinery gate.”* /d. at p. 68.

'’ In this regard the Validation Study states that **Respondent in-

terviews confirmed that many large integrated companies do not

necessarily book crude immediately into ‘refinery accounts.” Instead,

crude may be carried on the books of a production or supply com-

pany, and reported as being physically located not at refineries.’* /d.

at Appendix J, at p. J-36.

34a

Another legal and quite commonly used practice is called

“time exchanges.”’ See 10 C.F.R. §211.67(g) (1980). Under

this practice a refiner, for example, exchanges crude with an-

other refiner in one month, with the intent that crude oil of

similar quality and quantity would be returned in the following

month. However, under the entitlements program's regula-

tions, the receipt of the crude oil need not be reported until it

is actually received on exchange.'* Tr. at p. 78. It will be re-

called that an entitlement obligation is only incurred when a

barrel of price-controlled crude is booked into a refiner as a

receipt. With the use of time exchanges, a refiner could ex-

change away price-controlled crude for decontrolled crude to

be returned on the event of decontrol. The regulations, more-

over, would seem sufficiently broad to permit refiners to en-

gage in reciprocal time exchanges so that both could assist the

other in avoiding the entitlements obligations. Tr. at p. 79. At

the same time, Section 211.67(g) apparently would permit a

refiner to avoid reporting receipts of price-controlled crude oil

exchanges, where the terms of the exchange were not limited

to location and quality differentials, and instead focused on

the crude oil “‘tier’’ being exchanged. A refiner engaged in

this type of practice with a reseller or other refiner that had

been able to avoid reporting a crude oil receipt under the en-

titlements program, would not have to report a price-con-

trolled exchange after decontrol.

The final manipulative inventory device that will be dis-

cussed is called “‘splitting entitlements.” Tr. at p. 85. Murdock

testified that the entithements program regulations are flexible

enough to permit refiners to selectively deem their non-refin-

ing inventories to be made up entirely of price-controlled

crude oil. Refiners could take advantage of this regulation to

avoid entitlements obligations. He described this practice as

follows:

In point of fact, a refiner is permitted, if his accounting

system, historic accounting system allowed, to selectively

© See supra, note 13.

35a

deem that price-controlled oil as being short-stopped or

withheld in intermediate inventory as illustrated on this

chart and that uncontrolled oil is being withdrawn from

that inventory outside the refinery and delivered to the

refinery.

. * ‘ * *

Price-controlled oil would appear to, would seem to dis-

appear between the first purchaser and the refinery while

uncontrolled oil would reappear. The obvious intention

of this action would be to retain that price-controlled oil

in that tank outside the refinery prior to its positon, prior

to its imposition of entitlement obligation until decontrol.

Tr. at pp. 85-6; see Exh. #21."

Still, to fully understand the likely impact of these inventory

practices on the problem of disappearing crude oil, it must be

appreciated that even before the announcement of decontrol,

refiners manipulated their stocks of crude oil to reduce inven-

tory costs and to maximize their profits. '* This too was accom-

plished by intentionally inventorying the less expensive price-

'? This practice was uncovered by the Validation Study:

If it is assumed that holders of crude stocks will seek to mini-

mize their inventory costs, then it will be advantageous for them

to attempt, wherever possible, to have those tnventories con-

sist of lower-priced crude (i.c., old oil). This hypothesis was

shown to be true in the case of one major integrated oil company

that held crude stocks outside its refinery accounts and thus out-

side the entitlements program. These stocks intentionally con-

sisted of predominately old oil. In that company’s case, the sep-

arate crude supply division acted essentially as a reseller of

crude, “‘selling’’ only such crude to the refining entity as it

chose to (in this case, higher-priced, generally uncontrolled

crudes) in order to keep its inventory value as low as possible.

Id. at p. 103, Executive Summary at p. IX.

'* The Validation Study confirms these practices were employed

between the years 1977 and 1979:

36a

controlled crude, and by constantly refining the more expen-

sive uncontrolled crude. Moreover, even then the price-con-

trolled crude was “‘short-stopped™ outside the refinery to

avoid the entitlements obligations.’ It therefore seems highly

probable that since the announcement of decontrol, each of

the above described inventory practices have continued to be

used by refiners, but with the promise of much more profita-

ble results, than before. Plainly, these practices would perfect-

ly serve both to enable a refiner to avoid entitlements obliga-

tions, and to resell price-controlled crude after decontrol in

order to take advantage of the world market price. And con-

sider the incentive to misreport: the fewer barrels of price-

controlled crude an entitlements seller reports, correspon-

dingly fewer entitlements will be charged off of its total obliga-

tions. Similarly, the fewer barrels of price-controlled crude re-

ported by an entitlements purchaser, correspondingly fewer

entitlements will have to be purchased.

Furthermore, the manipulative inventory practices just de-

scribed could not only accomplish these ends, tiiey were vir-

tually sanctioned by the DOE’s flexible regulations. Thus, it is

reasonable to assume that manipulative inventorying would

explain much of the disappearance of price-controlled crude,

especially when it is considered that other devices that could

Exhibit J-23 also shows that while “‘entithement stocks’ have

been drawn down over the three-year period (28.8 million bar-

rels), stocks held at locations other than refineries have been

significantly built up (124.3 million barrels). This finding is rele-

vant to the problem of the *‘disappearance of old oil"* in that one

explanation given the problem was that stocks may have been

built up, possibly with significant volumes of controlled crude,

outside refinery accounts for entitlements purposes.

Id. at p. 3-38.

Id. at pp. 101-02.

37a

be employed to achieve the same results were illegal.” For in-

stance, the miscertification of price-controlled crude oil as

decontrolled crude carries with it the possibility of incurring

civil and criminal liabilities.”’ See 10 C_F_R. § 205.203 (1980).

As Murdock aptly stated in his testimony before the Court:

I think it’s very unreasonable to assume that the magni-

tude of the disappearance that | have shown on these

charts is a result of criminal action. Miscertilication is a

criminal act and while I don’t doubt that there are crimi-

nals in the oil business, as well as any other business, it is

inconceivable that disappearance of this magnitude could

be the result of criminal acts and it would be inconceiva-

ble to imagine that oil companies would engage in crimi-

nal acts when exactly the same financial benefit could be

obtained by a perfectly legal, or at least certainly not pro-

hibited, application of the Department of Energy regula-

tions. For that reason we are very convinced that the

great bulk of the disappearance which has occurred in the

last two vears is, in fact, the result of this taventory ma-

nipulation.

Tr. at p. 87. Murdock added that miscertification more likely

played a role in the disappearance of price-controlled crude

before 1979; in other words, before the announcement of the

coming of decontrol was made. At that time the average rates

» The Validation Study uncovered no evidence of miscertifica-

tion. /d. at p. 100. Moreover, it compared the practice of miscertifica-

tion to that of manipulative inventorying, and of the latter con-

cluded: **This practice is essentially different from the incentives to

misreport discribed [sic] in this Appendix. To a large extent the prac-

tice entails taking full advantage of the regulations.’ Appendix L at

p. L-2.

* This may explain why between 1974-1977, the DOE has issued

only $83.5 million in “*Notices of Probable Violations’ (emphasis

supplied), on a total entitlements obligation of $39 billion for the

sume period. Validation Study at p. 61.

38a

of disappearance were smaller, fluctuating between 2.5% and

4.0%. Tr. at pp. 86-7.” This is probably because before the an-

nouncement of decontrol refiners had limited options availa-

ble to them to “‘game”™ the entitlements program. As a result,

they would be more likely to turn to more desperate means,

such as miscertification, to profit from selling price-controlled

crude oil as uncontrolled crude. Of course, after the an-

nouncement of the coming of decontrol, they could in addi-

tion ‘“‘game™’ the entitlements program to make even greater

margins of profit.

A final factor that increases the likelihood that manipulative

inventory practices were the primary cause of the large quan-

tities of price-controlled crude after 1979, is the substantial

‘“‘reappearance™’ of similarly large quantities of unconirolled

crude.’’ As indicated already, a comparison of the First Pur-

chasers Reports and the entitlements program data reveals

that uncontrolled crude was reappearing after the announce-

ment of decontrol in greater amounts than had been reported

2 The Validation Study found insignificant amounts of miscer-

tifications during that period:

Audits by DOE (Enforcement and the Office of Special

Counsel) of entitlements records have similarly found a

relatively small volume of violations. It was estimated that less

than 0.5 percent of total reported volumes and/or entitlements

benefits — see Chapter II], Part E.2.b. Enforcement audits as of

February, 1978 determined that for the period November, 1974

to December, 1976. old oil receipts were understated by less

than 720,000 (approximately 5,600 barrels per day), while new

oil receipts were overstated by about 240,000 barrels (approx-

imately 19,000 barrels per day). On the other hand, preliminary

audits of five resellers conducted by ERA in 1977, indicated that

approximately 50,000 barrels per day of old oil were being cer-

tified as new oil.

Id. at pp. 100-101 (footnotes omitted).

2’ See supra, note 18. see also Validation Study at pp. 94-95, Exh.

##18 and 19.

39a

even as being produced in the same time period. This finding

is consistent with the use of *‘selective inventorying,”” “time

exchanges,’ and “splitting entitlements.”’ Each of these prac-

tices would enable a refiner to hold price-controlled crude out-

side of the refinery, and thereby avoid the entitlements obli-

gation, while permitting the refiner to process more expensive

uncontrolled crude. In sum, motivated by the opportunity to

make “‘windfall” profits after decontrol, manipulative inven-

lorying practices provided refiners with perfectly legal means

to make such profits. A comparison of the First Purchaser's

Reports and entitlements program data would seem to verify

that refiners took advantage of this opportunity. Tr. at pp. 77-

80.

While understandably reluctant to admit it, for at least four

years now the DOE has been keenly aware of the problem of

disappearing price-controlled crude oil, and the fact that lit-

erally millions of barrels of price-controlled crude have not

been accounted for in the entitlements program. On April 15,

1977, some two years before the announcement of decontrol,

a Mobil vice-president, Bonner H. Templeton, wrote to J. F.

O'Leary, administrator of the FEA, to complain about the

problem of the disappearance of price-controlled crude. Tem-

pleton stated in his letter that for the twelve months com-

mencing February 1976, a comparison of the First Purchasers

Reports and entitlements program data revealed a 1.0% dis-

parity in the quantities of “‘old oil” reported. In addition,

Templeton stated:

Assuming such conversion is solely to upper tier crude,

this difference of 1% represents an overall increase in in-

dustry crude costs to refiners of about $0.5 million per

day, or $190 million per year. Again, assuming that there

is no mathematical or other explanation for this difler-

ence the mechanics of the Entitlements Program are such

that the industry's crude costs are being increased. The

end result is an apparent windfall to a few individual firms

at the expense of others.

40a

He concluded his letter by requesting that the DOE conduct a

thorough investigation of the problem.

In response to Templeton’s letter, Gorman C. Smith, Act-

ing Deputy Administrator of the FEA, wrote back in a letter

dated May 19, 1977, that the problem of the variances in data

between the two systems was a concern to the FEA, and that

‘a thorough analysis and review of the data is being con-

ducted.” By June of 1977, this investigation had been com-

pleted, and a report entitled *‘Survey of the Disappearance of

Old Oil (1977 Survey) was submitted to Administrator

O'Leary from Wayne W. Porter of the FEA’s Office of Com-

pliance Operations and Regulatory Programs. To assess the

problem of disappearing price-controlled crude, the 1977

Survey compared the First Purchasers Reports with the en-

litlements program data for two periods: from February

through December 1976, and from January through April

1977. The 1977 Survey made the following findings:

A comparison of this data for the period February

through December 1976 showed that first purchasers re-

ported 89,000 barrels per day (B/D) more of the lower

tier crude (old oil) than was reported by the refiners. In

the same period 85,000 B/D more upper tier crude was

reported by the refiners than was reported by first pur-

chasers.

The disappearing oil problem has grown recently. Be-

tween January and April 1977 refiners reported 201,000

B/D less old oil than the first purchasers. Upper tier crude

receipts reported by the refiners exceeded that reported

by first purchasers by 82,000 B/D. An additional 119,000

B/D of old oil reported by first purchasers were not re-

ported in refiner receipts.

Id. at p. 1.

The 1977 Survey went on to state that the problem of dis-

parities between the two data systems had “remained at es-

sentially the same level throughout the period of com-

4la

parison.”’ /d. However, it concluded that there was “‘no clear

explanation for this sudden growth in ‘disappearing’ old oil.”

Id. The 1977 Survey. nevertheless, did isolate “‘potential

causes*’ of the problem as being “erroneous reporting” and

‘regulatory loopholes.’ /d. at p. 2. Specifically, the 1977

Survey found that miscertifications of tier categories *‘account

for a significant portion of the old oi! which has become upper

tier.’ /d. Also uncovered were “‘inconsistencies and defini-

tional problems in reporting crude receipts involving [time]

exchanges.” /d. Still another cause of the disappearance of

price-controlled crude was traced to the fact that there was no

requirement in the entitlements program that crude oil used

for non-refining purposes be reported. The 1977 Survey

stated: *‘Consequently, the volumes of old oil used by refiners

for fuel, as well as the old oil sold by resellers to firms which

do not refine the oil, disappear from the reporting system.”

Id. at p. 4. This practice, is, of course, consistent with “‘split-

ling entitlements.” See supra, at p. 22.

A year later, the same data collected in the 1977 Survey,

was again analyzed by a separate DOE sub-agency in a report

entitled **Background Paper on the Disappearance of Old

Oil,’ dated March 14, 1978, internal memorandum for Lin-

coln E. Moses by Charles E. Smith. (1978 Paper). This addi-

tional study confirmed each of the conclusions made in the

1977 Survey. First, that in corjunction with the disappearance

of ‘old oil,’ *‘new oil’ was reappearing in the entitlements

program. /d. at p. 6. And second, that the rate of disappear-

ance had increased during the February through January 1977

According to the 1978 Paper:

A comparison of these data for the period February 1976

through January 1977 showed that the first purchasers reported

108,000 barrels per day more of old oil than was reported by the

refiners. For this same period of time, the first purchasers re-

ported 91,000 barrels per day less of new oil than was reported

by the refiners.

Id. at p. 6.

42a

period, such that ‘‘old oil'* was not only reappearing, but it

was disappearing from the entitlements system altogether. /d.

at p. 7.°° Third, the 1978 Paper attributed these statistics pri-

marily to miscertifications of crude oil tiers, and secondarily to

misreporting due to time exchanges and crude oil used for

nonrefining purposes. /d. at pp. 10-12.

As already described in this Memorandum-Decision, the

DOE also undertook to commission an independent study of

the problems in the entitlements program's data systems. This

study has been completed and is entitled ‘Validation of the

Crude Oil Entitlements Information System,”’ dated March 9,

1981. (Validation Study). In assessing the performance of the

entitlements program's data system, the Validation Study

compared the First Purchaser Reports with entitlements pro-

gram data for the years 1977 through 1979. The Validation

Study observed: **We found, as other previous investigations

have, [citing the two previously mentioned studics among

others] that the volumes of domestic crude reported as old oil

on [First Purchasers Reports] are larger than those reported

on the [entitlements program data] system. .. . The missing

old oil is approximately 241 million barrels, or an average of

220,000 barrels per day over the 1977-1979 period.”” /d. at pp.

vi-viili. The Validation Study concluded as follows:

To the extent that nonrefining inventories consist of

crude oil reported to the First Purchaser System as old oil

but not to the DCOE, then these volumes would seem to

have “‘disappeared ~’ If it is assumed that firms will seek

to Minimize their inventory costs and maximize the value

of an entitlement, then it would be to their advantage to

2’ [the date] indicates that, although the amount of old oil which

turned into new oil has remained relatively stable (approximate-

ly 1.20% of total crude oil), the amount of crude oil which has

“disappeared” from the system altogether has increased

markedly (from -.22% to 1.71%).

1978 Paper, at p. 8.

43a

have these inventories consist mainly of the cheaper price

controlled crude oil. With the advent of decontrol, those

companies that have considerable inventories of old oil

will be able to sell the oil at uncontrolled prices, which are

four or five times greater than the purchase price of old

oil. Companies that did not follow such a practice will

more than likely be at a competitive disadvantage, but we

are unable to qualify this problem.

Id. at pp. ix-x.°°

On December 16, 1980 Allen E. Murray, President of the

Marketing and Refining Division of Mobil wrote to the Secre-

» See also Affidavit submitted by Barton RK. House, Acting Ad-

ministrator of the ERA, in Metzenbaum v. Edwards, Civil Action No.

81-405 (D.D.C. filed February 19, 1981). In a related context, Mr.

House gave testimony in support of the President's decision to order

decontrol without notice and comment. In this regard, Mr. House

stated:

if the effective date of the decontrol order had been deferred

pending notice and comment, producers, resellers and refiners

of price-controlled crude oil could have been expected to engage

in various forms of stockpiling and hoarding in order to capture

the benefits of selling the crude oil at uncontrolled prices once

the decontrol order became effective. The benefits to producers,

resellers and refiners of such delay during the rulemaking period

could have been substantial. As of December 1980, lower tier

crude oil was selling to refiners for an average of $7.49 per barrel

and upper tier crude oil was selling for an average of $15.51 per

barrel. The market price of crude oil at that time was $34.55.

Therefore, the expected additional profit to be gained by with-

holding old oil would be $27.06 per barrel and $19.04 per barre!

for upper tier crude oil. Companies could have withheld price

controlled crude oil from the market, for example, by reducing

present production levels, modifying their standard inventory

procedures, using all available storage tank capacity, and hiring

and filling oil tankers to capacity for use as storage.

Affidavit of Barton R. House, 4 4 (February 24, 1981), annexed to

plaintiffs complaint as Exhibit C.

44a

tary of Energy about the increasing rate at which price-con-

trolled crude was disappearing **in the last few months.’ Mur-

ray stated in his letter that “*[t}he total controlled oil disap-

pearance as reported through September by DOE now

amounts to over half a million barrels per day or 6 percent of

total! U.S. production. These losses of controlled crude are

largely offset by increases in the volume of refiner stripper oi!

receipts." Deputy Secretary Lynn R. Coleman responded in a

January 19, 1981 letter to Murray, in which he stated that “*I

have asked the Office of Special Counsel for Compliance to

look into this matter. As the Office responsible for monitoring

the compliance of the 35 largest refiners with the Depart-

ment’s pricing and allocation regulations, the Special

Counsel's office is particularly interested in this problem.”

Mobil claims that despite its repeated attempts to bring the

problem of disappearing crude oil to the DOE’s attention over

the course of four years, those efforts proved futile. Undeter-

red, nevertheless, Mobil then petitioned the Economic Regu-

latory Administration of the DOE to institute an emergency

rulemaking proceeding to take comments on a proposed regu-

iation that would impose an entitlements obligation on every

barrel of price-controlled crude oil received though not re-

ported by refiners and resellers between November |. 1974

and January 28, 1981. In its petition, Mobil described the pro-

posed amendments as follows.

The purpose of these amendments is to ensure that, with

the abrupt termination of federal price controls on the

production and sale of domestic crude oil, the benefits, as

well as the burdens, of such regulations have been borne

equitably by all affected parties including consumers.

Abrupt termination without full accountability by cach

refiner and reseller for price-controlled crude oil held in

inventory on the date of decontrol will result in an unwar-

ranted windfall to some firms at the expense of other

companies and consumers.

February 10, 1981 Petition for Emergency Rulemaking

Regarding the Domestic Crude Allocation Program, at p. |.

45a

Defendants’ Exhibit A. The DOE informs the Court that

Mobil’s Proposed Rulemaking remains under consideration.

On March 12, 1981 Mobil also filed an appeal of the DOF’s

December, 1980 entitlements notice with the DOE’s Office of

Hearings and Appeals (OHA), and a decision on this appeal is

still pending. Mobil has, in addition, filed a request to stay the

January entitlements notice pending a decision on its appeal,

but the OHA has not responded to this request within its reg-

ulatory mandated time period of ten working days. See 10

C.F.R. § 205.199(h) (i) C1980).

Accordingly, Mobil filed this action on April 10, 1981 and

seeks a declaration from this Court that the DOE's post-

decontrol entitlements notices are unlawful. Mobil additional-

ly prays for injunctive relief to prevent the DOE from issuing

any further entitlements notices, until such notices fully take

into account all price-controlled crude oil produced and sold

between November |, 1974 and January 28, 1981. Mobil con-

tends that due to the manipulative practices of certain entitle-

ments program refiners, entitlements notices as presently

contemplated by the DOE are woefully inaccurate. The DOE's

refusal to take corrective measures. says Mobil, is arbitrary,

capricious, an abuse of the DOE's discretion, and in excess of

its statutory authority under the Emergency Petroleum

Allocation Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. $751, et seq. Lastly,

Mobil argues that unless it is granted a preliminary injunction

to protect the status quo, it will suffer immediate irreparable

harm because it would never be able to recoup its lost reve-

nues. Before the Court may address the merits of plaintiffs

claims, defendant's motion to dismiss must first be con-

sidered.

IV.

The DOE has moved te dismiss plaintif!s complaint, and

has put forward three separate, bul related grounds. The first

of these is that Mobil has failed to exhaust its administrative

remedies. The DOE argues that Mobil has already raised the

insiant claims before the DOE in the form of a petition for

46a

emergency rulemaking, and an appeal before the OHA. Since

both the petition and the appeal remain under consideration

by the DOE’s relevant sub-agencies, and either could afford

plaintiff all of the relief which it seeks in its complaint, the

DOE contends that judicial review of these issues at this time

would be premature and a waste of judicial resources. Accord-

ing to the DOE, the provinces of this Court are ill-suited to

conduct an investigation and audit of the entitlements pro-

gram, or to assess the implications of the various manipulative

practices alleged by plaintiff. The DOE maintains that **This is

obviously an area in which the initial factfinding and applica-

tion of the regulations must be left to the agency prior to any

involvement by the courts.’ Defendant's Memorandum in

Support of Motion to Dismiss at p. 6. And finally, the DOE

says that in addition to the adminisirative procedures outlined

above, plaintiff has not undertaken to apply for “exception

relief to “‘prevent special hardship, inequity, or unfair dis-

tribution of burdens.’ 10 C.F_R. § 205.50 et seg. (1980). The

DOE maintains that this form of relief is especially appropriate

here since plaintiff claims that the impact of the regulatory

scheme will have severe economic consequences on its opera-

tion.

Traditionally it has been held by the courts that a party will

not be permitted to pursue judicial relief until available ad-

ministrative remedies have been exhausted. See e.g. Parisi v.

Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 37-8 (1972), McKart v. United Sates,

395 U.S. 187, 193 (1969). Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding

Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938), see generally, 5 Mezines,

Stein & Gruff, Administrative Law, § 49.01 (1979). The under-

lying purposes of the doctrine of exhaustion are multifold and

have been summarized in Mckart v. United States, supra at

193-95, as follows: (1) to avoid premature interruption of the

administrative process, (2) to permit the agency to develop

the necessary factual background upon which decisions must

be based; (3) to enable the agency to exercise its discretion or

administrative expertise, (4) to improve the efficiency of the

administrative process; (5) to conserve increasingly scarce ju-

47a

dicial resources. (6) to provide an agency with the opportunity

to discover and correct its own orders, and (7) to avoid the

possibility that “frequent and deliberate flouting of admin-

istrative processes could weaken the effectiveness of an

agency by encouraging people to ignore ‘ts procedures.” See

also Hawthorne Oil & Gas Corp. v. DOE, No. 5-50 (TECA,

April 24, 1981). slip op. at 14-15, Touche Ross & Co. v. S.ELC.,

609 F.2d $70, 575-77 (2d Cir. 1979), Diapulse Cerp. v. Food &

D. Admin., 500 F.2d 75, 77 (2d Cir. 1974).

However, in the absence of these factors, or in exceptional

circumstances, a plaintifY will not be pressed to fulfill the

exhaustion requirement. Thus, when the prescribed admin-

istrative remedy is plainly inadequate, for instance, due to un-

reasonable administrative delay, exhaustion is unnecessary.

Walker v. Southern Railway, 385 U.S. 196, 198 (1966). United

States Alkali Export Ass'n vy. United States, 325 U.S. 196, 210

(1945). A plaintiff, morcover, will not be required by a court

to exhaust administrative remedies when irreparable harm

would result. See Hawthorne Oil & Gas Corp. v. DOE, supra at

p. 14, Touche Ross & Co. v. S.E.C., 609 F.2d $70, 576 0.11 (2d

Cir. 1979). Neither will the doctrine of exhaustion be held to

apply in the situation where the agency has clearly acted tn ex-

cess of its statutory authority. Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184,

188-91 (1958), Hawthorne Oil & Gas Corp. v. DOE, supra at p

15, Touche Ross & Co. v. S.E.C., supra at 575-76. And lastly,

exhaustion will not be required where to do so would be

futile, such as where the very administrative procedure under

attack is the one that the agency says must be exhausted

Hawthorne Oil & Gas v. DOE, supra at p. 1S. Nat. Conservative

Political v. Fed. Election, 8526 F.2d 953, 957 (D.C. Cir 1980)

(per curiam), National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v

Train, 510 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir, 1975). Touche Ross & Co. v.

S.E.C., supra at 577, Finnerty v. Cowen, 508 F.2d 972, 982-83

(2d Cir. 1974). Davis v. Bolger, 496 F. Supp. 559, 567 (D.D.C.

1980). In weighing these factors and balancing the relative in-

terests involved, the applications of the exhaustion doctrine

are within the sound discretion of the court NLRB v. Marine

Workers, 391 U.S. 418, 426 1.8 (1968).

48a

With regard to the instant case, the Court does not believe

it is necessary for plaintiff Mobil to further exhaust its admin-

istrative remedies. At this juncture some additional clarifica-

tion of the issues in this case is appropriate. The central issues

in this dispute may be summarized as follows: (1) Have sub-

stantial quantities of price-controlled crude oil disappeared

from the entitlements program since its inception through the

date of decontrol, such that the DOE’s entitlements notices

have not reasonably accounted for all price-controlled crude

produced and sold during the life of the entitlements program.

(2) If substantial quantities of price-controlled crude have dis-

appeared and affected the reasonable accuracy of these

notices, would the DOE exceed its statutory authority by issu-

ing post-decontrol entitlements notices which it knows do not

reasonably account for the price-controlled crude that has dis-

appeared. (3) Will plaintiff suffer irreparable harm as a result

of the issuance of post-decontrol entitlements notices which

do not reasonably account for the price-controlled crude oil

that has disappeared, and which, therefore, are not reasonably

accurate.

As for the first of these issues, evidence submitted at the

May 12, 1981 hearing on plaintif{!s motion for a preliminary

injunction conclusively demonstrates that in the year, 1979

and 1980, approximately 250 million barrels of price-con-

trolled crude disappeared from the entitlements program. The

evidence also revealed that, as a result, some $5.6 billion

worth of entitlements obligations were not channeled through

the entitlements program. The DOE did not present any evi-

dence at the preliminary injunction hearing to dispute these

statistics. In fact, the DOE has totally conceded these points in

its written submissions to the Court. See Defendants’ Memo-

randum in Support of the Motion to Dismiss, at p. 7. Further-

more, the DOE does not dispute that the disappearance of

price-controlled crude has caused substantial and unnecessary

burdens to befall entitlements program refiners. Nor even

does it contest that the issuance of post-decontrol entitle-

ments notices in the form contemplated will exacerbate that

burden.

49a

But instead of conceding as well that the above admissions

would tend to raise questions about whether the DOE has ex-

ceeded its statutory authority by issuing these inaccurate post-

decontrol notices, the DOE has taken a different tack in this

litigation. It seems to be saying that because it has not ascer-

tained the exact causes for the disappearance of price-con-

trolled crude, or decided what to do about the problem, plain-

tiff has failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. In the

Court's view, not only do these contentions obfuscate the is-

sues as Stated above, they also misstate the record. For the

moment the relevant inquiry does not concern the possible

reasons for the disappearance of the price-controlled crude, or

what actions the DOE should have taken or could take to

eradicate the problem. Rather, the question in chief, and res-

tated necessarily in view of the DOE’s concessions, is whether

the DOE has now exceeded its statutory authority by issuing

the post-decontrol entitlements notices, while knowing full-

well that such notices are not reasonably accurate, and would

lead to further increase the already substantial and necessary

burden of entitlements refiners.

As a consequence, despite the fact that the DOE continues

to investigate the causes for the disappearance of price-con-

trolled crude, though perhaps admirable, this would have no

bearing on the exhaustion issue before the Court. What is es-

sential is that the DOE is about to issue post-decontrol entitle-

ments notices, and in so acting has arguably exceeded its

Statutory authority. Plaintiff claims that it will be irreparably

harmed as a result. To be considered for exhaustion pu: poses,

therefore, is whether plaintiff may now seek a judicial remedy.

The Court believes that when the issue in this case is framed

properly in this fashion, the above query must be answered in

the affirmative. The Supreme Court dealt with a related situa-

tion in Leedom v. AKyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958). In that case the

National Labor Relations Board had purportedly acted in ex-

cess of its authority when it certified a collective bargaining

unit without permitting all interested employees to vote on

the question. The Court found the exhaustion doctrine inap-

50a

plicable and stated: ‘‘This suit is not one to ‘review, in the

sense of that term in the Act, a decision of the Board made

within its jurisdiction. Rather it is one to strike down an order

of the Board made in excess of its delegated powers and con-

trary to a specific provision of the Act.” Leedom v. Kyne, 358

U.S. 184, 186 (1958); see also McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional,

372 U.S. 10, 17 (1962). The instant case falls within this well-

settled exception to the exhaustion requirement. Specifically,

whether the DOE acted “‘plainly beyond its jurisdiction” in

deciding to issue post-decontrol entitlements notices which it

knew were not reasonably accurate. See Touche Ross & Co. v.

S.E.C., 609 F.2d 570, $75 (2d Cir. 1979), Sterling Drug, Inc. v.

Weinberger, 509 F.2d 1236, 1239 (2d Cir. 1975).

Flowing from these conclusions is that none of the purposes

of the exhaustion requirement would be served by deferring

to the DOE. The instant case does not present a situation

where, by permitting judicial review, the administrative proc-

ess would be prematurely interrupted. Based on the fore-

going, it is clear that plaintiff complains herein of an admin-

istrative decision that has been completed. This Court may

enjoin the effect of that decision, but in so doing, it would not

be enjoining the administrative decision-making process. See

Touche Ross & Co. v. S.E.C., 609 F.2d at 576. It would also ap-

pear that there would be little use for additional development

of a factual record since the issue here is the reasonableness of

the DOE’s conduct as based on existing facts. Moreover, a

further sounding of the DOE’s expertise in this matter would

not be productive. The issues raised in this case are primarily

legal. For example, one of the DOE’s arguments is that it has

no discretion in issuing the post-decontrol entithements

notices because it is required to do so by applicable regula-

tions. This is a purely legal judgment on the part of the DOE,

and it may properly be reviewed by the Court. See Touche Ross

& Co. v. S.E.C., 609 F.2d 570, 577 (2d Cir. 1979); Consumers

Union v. Cost of Living Council, 491 F.2d 1396, 1399 (TECA)

cert. denied 416 U.S. 984 (1974). Various other legal judg-

ments also have been made by the DOE in reaching its deci-

Sla

sion on whether to issue the inaccurate entitlements notices.

These include: the legal effect of President Reagan's oil indus-

try decontrol order, see Executive Order No. 11287, 48 Fed.

Reg. 9909 (January 28, 1981) and see supra at p. 10, has had

on the DOE’s supposed legal obligation to issue post-

decontrol entitlements notices, the applicability of the under-

lying purposes of the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act,

15 U.S.C. §753(b)(1); and whether entitlement program

refiners would suffer irreparable harm if the DOE released en-

titlements notices which were not reasonably accurate.

In addition, it seems clear that remanding this case to the

DOE would be futile. The DOE claims that it is legally re-

quired to issue the entitlements notices, and therefore would

not provide plaintiff with a remedy. And in a situation such as

the present case, where the very administrative procedure

under attack — here the DOE's investigatory process — is the

one which the agency claims must be exhausted, it has been

held that the exhaustion doctrine need not be applied. See

Hawthorne Oil & Gas Corp. v. DOE, supra at p. 15, Touche Ross

& Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d at 577: National Resources Defense

Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1975);

Diapulse Corp. v. Food & Drug Admin., 500 F.2d 75, 78 (2d Cir.

1974). Finally, plaintiff claims that it will be irreparably

harmed should the DOE be permitted to issue the contem-

plated post-decontrol entitlements notices. As will be ad-

dressed in greater detail infra at pp. 7Sa-8la, Mobil claims that

in the years 1979 and 1980, it was forced to expend approx-

imately $280 million as a result of the problem of disappearing

price-controlled crude oil and the affect of this problem on the

entitlements program. Mobil says that it will be unable to

recoup these losses. Moreover, if required to comply with the

January entitlements notice, Mobil estimates that it would

have to further satisfy unnecessary obligations of $50 million.

The Court believes that it is equally clear that Mobil will not

be able to recoup these additional monies if the January en-

tillements notice is released. See infra at pp. 75a-8la. The

DOE’s claim that plaintiff has not been irreparably harmed be-

S2a

cause the January notice has yet to be released is entirely [riv-

olous. “‘The purpose of an injunction is to prevent future

violations. .. ..’ United States v. W.T. Grant, 345 U.S. 629,

633 (1953). In the Court's view, plaintiffs alleged harm is in-

deed irreparable and the exhaustion doctrine ought not be ap-

plied.’’ See Hawthorne Oil & Gas Corp. v. DOE, supra at p. 15:

Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d at 576-77 n. 11.

As just described, the Court believes that the central issue

in this lawsuit is whether the DOE exceeded its statutory au-

thority when it decided to issue post-decontrol entitlements

notices that it knew were not reasonably accurate, and that

would substantially and unnecessarily burden entitlements

program refiners. The Court further concludes that the DOE

potentially abused its discretion and acted in an arbitrary and

capricious manner when it decided to issue said notices. This

additional finding grows out of the DOE's mischaracterization

of the status of its *‘investigation”’ into the problem of the dis-

appearance of price-controlled crude oil. The DOE has

attempted to suppress the fact that it has conducted and com-

missioned studies on this problem and its impact on the en-

titlements program. It has also sought to suppress the fact that

these studies reached similar conclusions with regard to the

dimensions of the problem of disappearing price-controlled

crude oil, and the implications of this problem on the entitle-

» In view of the fact that the DOE also argued before the OHA

that plaintiffs appeal would not properly lie because plaintiff had

failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, plaintiff is estopped

from making that same argument before this Court. See Transcript of

March 27, 1981 hearing before OHA, case no. BEA-0630, at pp. 96,

104, 107. Moreover, the DOE's suggestion that plaintiff has not

exhausted its administrative remedies because it has not petitioned

for “exceptional relief’ under 10 C.F.R. § 205.50 (1980) is mis-

placed. This regulation provides ‘‘the procedures for applying for

exception from a regulation .. “’ 10 C.F_R. § 205.504a)(1) (1980).

Plaintiff has not sought to be excepted from the regulations, but only

that they not be manipulated by others to plaintiffs detriment.

S3a

ments program refiners. Moreover, the DOE has pretended to

disguise its own failure to investigate these issues after having

been put on notice of the situation at least four years ago. The

Court believes that the DOE’s reasonably specific knowledge

of the problem of disappearing price-controlled crude and the

impact that this problem was having on the entitlements pro-

gram, and its failure 10 make reasonable efforts to remedy this

situation, bears directly on the reasonableness of the DOE's

decision to issue the post-decontrol entitlements notices.

Although the DOE has represented that its investigation

into the problem of the disappearance of price-controlled

crude is still in its infancy, and that additional time is required

to formulate a policy to address the problem. this summary of

the DOE’s investigatory efforts is not entirely truthful. As de-

scribed earlier in this Memorandum-Decision, see supra at pp.

25-27; at least since June of 1977 when it first received the re-

sults of a study on the disappearance of price-controlled crude

oil, the DOE was placed on notice that price-controlled crude

oil was disappearing from the entitlements program, and that

there were several likely causes for this result. A second study

of this problem was conducted the following year and the

same conclusions were reached concerning the problem and

its causes. Moreover, the findings of both these studies were

subsequently confirmed by a report dated March 9, 1981,

which was the culmination of an independent study commis-

sioned by the DOE. It would therefore appear that based on

“*investigations”’ it has conducted already into the problem of

the disappearance of price-controlled crude oil, see supra at pp.

25-27, and its affect on the entitlements program, the DOF

has had four years to formulate a reasonable and corrective re-

sponse thereto.

Unfortunately through its inaction, the DOE has not for-

mulated such a response. Instead, it has pursued three

different courses of action. First the DOE has decided to pro-

ceed full steam with the release of the post-decontrol entitle-

ments notices, and has ignored the serious inaccuracies con-

tained therein. Second, despite the far reaching implications

S4a

this decision has had on the entitlements program refiners,

the DOE has sought to leave the impression that its decision

to issue post-decontrol entitlements notices does not amount

‘o a policy determination on these implications. The DOE has

also tried to cover-up the fact that each of the studies it has

conducted or commissioned on the problem and causes of dis-

appearing price-controlled crude oil, and its impact on the en-

titlements program, reported virtually identical results. By

conveniently ignoring this fact, and by sitting back and feign-

ing to be aware of the problem of disappearing price-con-

trolled crude, though ignorant of its ‘‘actual’’ causes and

possible solutions, the DOE has attempted to fend off judicial

intervention into a problem it likely caused in the fir

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