Record and brief — Prince George's County v. United States

Supreme Court brief1981

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SEP 8 1981

a ALEXANDEASL. STEVAS,

ee a DLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1981

PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY, MARYLAND

Petitioners,

Vv.

UNITED STATES CF AMERICA, ET AL.,

Respondents

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

PETITION

ROBERT B. OSTROM

County Attorney, Counsel of Record

MICHAEL O. CONNAUGHTON

Deputy County Attorney

ROBERT H. DRUMMER

Associate County Attorney

Attorneys for Petitioner

$104 County Administration Building

Upper Marlboro, Maryland 20870

(301) 952-4124

ae my eee emma me a em a a

THE CASILLAS PRESS. INC ~1717 K Street N W —Waestungton. 0. C ~223-1220

(i)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether a federal district court order issued pursuant

to the Clean Water Act requiring a state agency to pur-

chase a specific land site in the State of Maryland and

develop thereon a sludge composting facility, without

regard for state law governing the development of such

facilities, violates the principles of federalism embodied in

the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution?

2. Whether a federal district court order enjoining a

state agency from complying with a Maryland state court

order and enjoining all parties from initiating further state

court proceedings violates the federal Anti-Injunction

Act, 28 U.S.. § 2283, which protects the independence of

state courts?

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

The parties to this proceeding are: the United States of

America; the State of Maryland; the Commonwealth of

Virginia; the District of Columbia; the State Water Con-

trol Board of Virginia; Prince George’s County,

Maryland; Montgomery County, Maryland; Fairfax

County; Virginia; and the Washington Suburban Sanitary

Commission.

(iii)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

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of) -Rithy fe cere i

i a ade cnbaa teed enienetaes csewen ili

DD ccc cb vckbeeacsebennees teeaenen ili

i ce lal oe cha sebenesaakeoseetson I

tn. lacheaganel nds aeeese. sébiethatenaebaesees 2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES .......... 2

ee EE ovo ccccsesesesbasbectuéndgenenn 2

BASIS FOR FEDERAL JURISDICTION .................0055. 8

REASONS FOR GRANTING THIS WRIT ...............6645. 8

PE .. .vecusdabun die dhnwaseevebesésoss od0%ences 21

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page

Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America v. Richman Bros.,

0665s ceca che duesyasadabensnathueeens 14

Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of

Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281 (1970) .. 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20

Baker v. Gotz,

Be a CEP: GEOUD ov ccc ccccccccccecccenccceces 14

(iv)

City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan,

el i a i i che 6ocdeeeunteeeeees 11

Denver-Greeley Valley Water Users Association v.

McNeil, 131 F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1942) ....... 0... ccc eee 19

Doe v. Ceci,

EEE, SEED 6. ooo ccbs0bteccecstcecedouse 17,18

Harkrader v. Wadley,

ee ee Se Te aba eke ene aengenes s

Grenchik v. Mandel,

ES CUED g co wdcccceccbuvassecebssoves 20

Kegonsa Joint Sanitary District v. City of Stoughton,

87 Wis.2d 131, 274 N.W.2d 598 (1979) ... 0... cece eee ees 11

Kline v. Burke Construction Co.,

EE tou 2s ccc yan ceuebesnseesueesesees 20

Lamb Enterprises v. Kiroff,

EE, CED nc ocvccccuceusedevedvceseceses 14

Mitchum vy. Foster,

a ee eeGda we ke 13,14

National League of Cities v. Usery,

IE 5 os ou 60sbocebecectceeayeuces 9, 10, 11, 12

Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co.,

i 26s eee aeaeh hones es eee eeeiesas 13

Reines Distributors, Inc. v. Admiral Credit Corp.

182 F.Supp. 226 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), reversed on other

grounds, 319 F.2d 609 (2nd Cir. 1963) 2... 0... cece ee 13

Roth v. Bank of the Commonwealth,

EE, CEE ooo oncccctéébbseebecnccnsnesone 14

Samuel C. Ennis & Co., Inc. v. Woodmar Realty Co.,

I SL «ccc coc ueeneesonsonccssecenecencs 15

(v)

State of Oklahoma ex rel. Wilson v. Blankenship,

live ceenwebessteeueesdcvess 15

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,

Be er 20

Toucey v. New York Life Insurance Co.,

Da ae c.g ye 964 40:6 0066s 60560060009 15

Town of Sutton v. Water Supply and Pollution Control

Commission, 116 N.H. 154, 355 A.2d 867 (1976) ............. 11

Train v. City of New York,

ls SPEED ov ccc wrewsvccccccccccvecccovececeveces 11

United States v. Ashland Oil & Transportation Co.,

a eT Es CEE 66 cc ccc dcccccececscsssesvcceces 9

Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp.,

SUEDE oo hob bccccndoccccsecoceceseseues 13, 19, 20

Woods Exploration & Production Co. v. Aluminum Co.

of America, 438 F.2d 1286 (Sth Cir. 1971) ................ 15, 16

Constitutional Provisions

Constitution of the United States

EEE Lo. <5, sepa eeee6600beessdeebesseeeese 8,9, 10

Constitution of the United States

I ns ic boe beech eee oesbeseseeesecooses 17

Statutes

CC PEPPOPTETTTTTLTTT TUTE TT TTT TTT TTT .2

eels. sce auneenceseh000reseeetees 8

EE So onnd.weddanes oe seenesesses 8, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19

i ic cteccdenesecceenessiuecves 3,8,9

(vi)

Miscellaneous

7 Moore’s FeperAt Practice 4 60 (2d ed. 1979) ............... 14

Senate Rep. No. 92-414, 92nd Congress, Ist Sess. 1

GROUND cccccccchuscoghoudseecuseeebeedpadeneeel 11

17 WriGut, MILLER & Cooper, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

PUG GE GP ONOTE «cccccccéscsduccebieteuueee 19, 20

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1981

N EE

PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY, MARYLAND

Petitioners,

Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.,

Respondents

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

PETITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-

cuit consolidated the following cases in the September

Term, 1979, in all of which Prince George’s County,

Maryland was the Intervenor-Defendant, Appellant:

United States of America v. District of Columbia, et al.

(No. 80-1495); State War Control Board, et al. vy.

Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission, et al. (No.

80-1496); State Waiter Control Board, An Agency of the

2

Commonwealth of Virginia, et al. v. Washington Subur-

ban Sanitary Commission, et al. (No. 80-1653); United

States of America v. District of Columbia, et al. (No.

80-1654); State Water Control Board, et al. v. Washington

Suburban Sanitary Commission, et al. (No. 80-1718);

United States of America v. District of Columbia, et al.

(No. 80-1719). This opinion, filed June 10, 1981, has not

yet been reported.

JURISDICTION

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for

the District of Columbia Circuit was issued on June 10,

1981. This petition has been filed within ninety days of

that date. This Court has jurisdiction to review the deci-

sion of the Court of Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES

The following are citations to the Constitutional provi-

sions and statutes which this case involves. Their pertinent

text is set forth in the Appendix to this Petition. Tenth

Amendment, Constitution of the United States; 28 U.S.C.

§ 2283; 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1252, 1311, 1319, 1345, 1370.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This controversy concerns the disposal of sewage sludge

generated at the Blue Plains Sewage Treatment Plant,

which is located at the confluence of the Potomac and

Anacostia Rivers in the District of Columbia.' The prin-

cipal jurisdictions which use the Blue Plains facility are:

the District of Columbia; Montgomery County,

'Sludge is the residual waste material which results from the treat-

ment of sewage. Blue Plains produces approximately 1£00 tons of

sludge per day.

3

Maryland; Prince George’s County, Maryland; and Fair-

fax County, Virginia. On behalf of the two Maryland

counties, the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission

(WSSC), an administrative agency created by the Laws

of Maryland, is the operating agency for water and sewer

disposal.? At issue is the division of authority between the

federal and state courts to intervene in various aspects of

sludge disposal.

The groundwork of this controversy was laid in 1973

when the Virgina Water Control Board, Fairfax County

and the District of Columbia brought suit in the United

States District Court for the District of Columbia

(hereafter the district court) against the WSSC. The suit

alleged that WSSC was exceeding its allotted use of the

Blue Plains plant, thus causing the plant to discharge in-

adequately treated sewage into the Potomac River. The

United States intervened as party plaintiff, alleging that

this excess flow was polluting the river in violation of the

Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1973, 33 U.S.C.

§ 1251 et seq. (Clean Water Act). Montgomery County,

Prince George’s County, and the State of Maryland in-

tervened as parties defendant.

With this suit as an impetus, the user jurisdictions

entered into the Blue Plains Sewage Treatment Plant

Agreement of 1974; it provided that each jurisdiction ex-

cept the District of Columbia would accept responsibility

for disposing a proportionate share of sludge, that a per-

manent disposal plan would be devised by June 1976, and

that the plan would be implemented by December 1977.

It appearing that the agreed-upon schedule would not be

met, the United States filed a complaint in the district

?The policies of WSSC are determined by six Commissioners, three

from each county. Its budget is subject to the approval of both county

governments.

4

court in November 1977 alleging that the 1974 Consent

Decree had been violated, and that the failure to devise a

permanent sludge disposal plan would violate the Clean

Water Act. A Consent Order extended the period of com-

pliance with the 1974 Agreement to September 1975.

In May 1978, upon motion of the United States and

evidence that a permanent sludge disposal plan was not

forthcoming, the district court entered an order requiring

each jurisdiction to designa.« a site, any site, within its

boundaries for sludge disposal. Montgomery County

designated “Site 2,” a 115-acre undeveloped tract in the

Montgomery Industrial Park, adjacent to the Prince

George’s County border and within one mile of approx-

imately 25,000 Montgomery and Prince George’s County

residents.? On July 10, 1978 the district court entered an

order reflecting the sites designated by the counties, order-

ing that the sites be developed for sludge disposal and

made operational by July 1, 1979. The range of this 1978

order is now in question.

The WSSC and Montgomery County immediately in-

itiated the development of Site 2, filing condemnation pro-

ceedings to acquire the land in October 1978. The 1979-1980

budget adoped by WSSC in May 1979 included $16.9

million for the acquisition and construction of the facility.

Prince George’s County opposed the development of

Site 2 as a sludge composting facility. Its position was and

continues to be that, for a number of reasons, an alter-

native location would be more appropriate. A title ex-

amination of Montgomery County’s designated site had

‘Site 2 was designated as a composting site, where sludge and wood

chips would be mixed and left in piles to aerate for 35-45 days. The

Calverton Citizens Association, representing area residents, filed a

report with the district court alleging that such a use would subject

them to health hazards.

5 ®

revealed restrictive covenants which prevented the propos-

ed use of the tract.* Condemnation would cost three to

five million dollars and take three to five years to com-

plete. The added time and expense of acquisition would

affect Prince George’s County, which pays sewer usage

and water consumption rates to WSSC, and its residents.

Furthermore, the funds that WSSC provided in its 1979-80

budget for Site 2 land acquisition had never been given the

required approval by the County, yet WSSC was about to

expend those funds illegally to purchase the site. Prince

George’s County, therefore, sought to enjoin the acquisi-

tion of Site 2 in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s

County.’ The court found that it had concurrent jurisdic-

tion over the controversy, but denied the injunction on

November 27, 1979.

The WSSC reversed its position shortly thereafter,

presumably on the basis of its General Counsel’s opinion

that the covenants on the land were enforceable, and his

recommendation that the condemnation action be aban-

doned. On March 12, 1980 the WSSC Commissioners, in

particular the three from Prince George’s County, voted to

delete Site 2 funding from its 1986-81 budget.

Montgomery County continued to advocate for the

development of Site 2, despite its acknowledgment that the

covenants on the land would make it difficult to operate a

‘The covenants precluded use of the land in any manner which

would create objectionale odors, genrate dense smoke or high levels

of noise, or constitute a “dump or sanitary landfill.”

Prince George's County v. WSSC, No. E-7692 (Circuit Court for

Prince George’s County, Maryland, filed Nov. 27, 1979), appealed to

the Court of Special Appeals, No. 122, September Term 1980 (the

budget suit).

6

composting facility at that site. Its response to WSSC’s

vote to delete acquisition funds from the budget was to

turn to the federal court — on April 4, 1980 Montgomery

County moved the district court to compel WSSC to

restore those funds to its budget. A rather peremptory

hearing was held during which no evidence was received

on the cost of acquiring the covenants. Nonetheless, on

April 25, 1980 the district court ordered WSSC to reinsert

in its budget the funds to acquire Site 2. The authority for

issuing this April 25 order is now being questioned.

Following the April 25 order, the WSSC Commissioners

convened a meeting and a vote was taken to reinsert Site 2

monies in the budget. Because timing and procedure pro-

blems could not be settled, the three Commissioners from

Prince George’s County refused to vote. Again

Motgomery County turned to the district court, moving

that the three Commissioners be cited for contempt. The

district court refused to do so, but did rule on June 4, 1980

that the restoration of funds was a purely ministerial act

(pursuant to the April 25 order) which required no vote,

and ordered WSSC’s General Manager to do it.* The

federal court’s authority for issuing this June 4 order is

now being questioned.

Prince George’s County continued to oppose Mont-

gomery County’s selection of Site 2 because of the time,

expense and illegal means involved in acquiring the land

and developing it for sludge disposal. Since these objec-

tions concerned issues of state law, two tangential state

court actions were initiated — both prior to the 1980

orders of the federal court. The first alleged that the state

sewage sludge permit was invalid and that the public

*The funds were reinserted on June 11, 1980. On June 13 WSSC of-

fered $6,000,000 to purchase the site; the covenants were not purchas-

ed.

7

health and environment were not adequately protected; this

action was never ruled upon.’ In the second, Prince George’s

County sought relief against WSSC, alleging that because

of the restrictive covenants, by acquiring Site 2 the WSSC

would be spending public monies for land which could not

be used for the very public purposes for which it was being

condemned, and that this would amount to a breach of

fiduciary duty on the part of the WSSC Commissioners. *

The Circuit Court issued an order on June 17, 1980, at

which time it was fully aware of the federal court’s April

25 order to reinsert Site 2 funds in WSSC’s budget, and its

June 4 order effecting the same. The state court issued a

temporary injunction preventing WSSC from acquiring

Site 2 until the covenant suit could be heard two months

hence. This June 17 order, it is urged, should have been

given effect.

Instead of complying with the state court injunction, the

WSSC immediately turned to the federal court. On June

27, 1980 the district court issued an expansive order which

enjoined WSSC from complying with the June 17 state

court injunction; ordered WSSC to expeditiously proceed

to develop the compost facility at Site 2; ordered Prince

George’s County to withdraw from the three state court

proceedings involving Site 2; enjoined all parties from in-

itiating any state court proceeding which would frustrate

the district court’s orders; and ordered that any modifica-

’Calverton Citizens Association v. Buck, et al., No. E-70934 (Cir-

cuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland, filed April 16, 1980)

(the permit suit).

*Prince George's County v. WSSC, No. E-8512 (Circuit Court for

Prince George’s County, Maryland, filed April 16, 1980) (the cove-

nant suit).

tion of the federal court’s orders was to be sought only in

federal court. Prince George’s County sought a stay of this

order which was denied by the district court on June 27

and by the Court of Appeals on July 3. On June 10, 1981

the June 27, 1980 district court injunction was upheld by

the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

Prince George’s County alleges that the expansive

orders of the district court violated principles of

federalism embodied in the Tenth Amendment of the Con-

stitution, as well as the federal Anti-Injunction Act. It

amounted to a radical intrusion on state prerogatives.

BASIS FOR FEDERAL JURISDICTION

Federal jurisdiction in the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia was originally based on 28

U.S.C. § 1332 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202. The United

States intervened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1345 and 33

U.S.C. § 1319, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act

of 1973.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THIS WRIT

Important questions of federalism and state sovereignty

are posed by this case. The Court of Appeals failed to

recognize the state court proceedings for what they were

— separate and distinct from the federal proceedings, con-

cerned solely with intrastate issues. The various orders of

the district court constituted an unconstitutional en-

croachment on state rights in violation of the Tenth

Amendment, and violated the federal Anti-Injunction

Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283. It is the duty of the Supreme Court

to guard the states from encroachment upon their reserved

rights by the federal government or the federal courts.

Harkrader v. Wadley, 172 U.S. 148, 162 (1898).

9

Federal jurisdiction was originally invoked in this con-

troversy under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of

1973, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seg. (Clean Water Act). Insofar

as the Act controls the type and amount of pollution that

may be discharged either directly or indirectly into the

navigable water of the states, it has been held to be a pro-

per exercise of the commerce power of Congress. United

States v. Ashland Oil and Transportation Co., 504 F.2d

1317 (6th Cir. 1974).

The extent to which the commerce power may be used to

impose federal standards on the sovereign states was ad-

dressed in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.

833 (1976). This Court held that Congress may not exer-

cise its power Over interstate commerce “to force directly

upon the States its choices as to how essential decisions

regarding the conduct of integral governmental functions

are to be made.” 426 U.S. at 855. In Usery the extension of

the Fair Labor Standard Act’s minimum wage and max-

imum hour provisions to state employees was held invalid;

to require state compliance would be an impermissible in-

trusion into the protected area of state sovereignty. The

power to determine the hours and wages of state

employees was an “integral” state function, essential to the

separate and independent existence of the states. Applica-

tion of the standards usurped state discretion and displac-

ed state policies regarding the manner in which the

delivery of governmental services would be structured.

The decision confirms that the principle of federalism em-

bodied within the Tenth Amendment restricts the manner

in which the commerce power may be exercised.

In the case at bar the federal court, under the auspices

of the Clean Water Act, enforced the provisions that Act

10

in a manner that drastically invaded state sovereignty.

Under the Usery doctrine the decision may not stand.

The issue is narrower than the Court of Appeals would

have it appear. Certainly the federal government has

plenary power over environmental protection, including

water pollution, and the federal court had authority to re-

quire user jurisdictions of the Blue Plains facility to devise

a plan to dispose of sludge in order to comply with federal

requirements. However, the question at the heart of the

conflict, and the one with which the state court was in-

timately involved, was simply where in Montgomery

County the composting facility should be developed. The

question of whether such a facility should be built was

properly resolved by the federal court; the question of

where it should be located was purely a state issue.

The state court sought to wrestle with issues concerning

the effect the proposed use of Site 2 would have on its

citizens, including health and environmental safety, waste

of public funds, and breach of public trust. But the federal

court usurped the state’s ability to make the above con-

siderations. Using the Clean Water Act as a theoretical

and jurisdictional basis, the federal court went beyond the

limits of its authority under that Act, as limited by Usery

and the Tenth Amendment. It ordered that these funds be

expended for the acquisition of Site 2, regardless of the

waste of public funds which might be entailed should that

site not be usable for its public purpose. Finally, the

federal court prohibited further challenges to the develop-

ment of Site 2 in the state courts, thereby eliminating the

power of the state to consider vital concerns for the public

health and safety of its citizens which surround the pur-

chase and use of the site for its proposed purpose.

The federal order leaves no discretion to the State of

Maryland, its agencies (such as the WSSC), or its political

11

subdivisions. WSSC must provide funds to acquire Site 2;

the tract land in Montgomery Industrial Park must be con-

demned; this land must be developed as a sludge com-

posting facility. Any state or county concerns are preclud-

ed. Surely the federal court’s authority to enforce the

Clean Water Act does not extend so intrusively into in-

trastate concerns. This is similar to the type of interference

with “integral government functions” which this Court

found abhorrent in Usery.

The federal court’s actions appear even more intrusive

when considered in light of the federal/state interplay con-

templated by Congress in enacting the Federal Water

Pollution Control Act of 1973. While Congress did indeed

establish a “comprehensive program for controlling and

abating water pollution,” City of Milwaukee vy. Illinois

and Michigan, _._. U.S. ___., 101 S.Ct. 1784, 1793

(1981), citing Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 37

(1975), the Act is not “exclusive. Rather, it “contemplates

a shared authority between the Federal government and

the individual States.” City of Milwaukee v. [linois and

Michigan, supra., 101 S.Ct. at 1805 (Justice Blackmun,

dissenting). Its purpose is stated this way:

“The states shall lead the national effort to pre-

vent, control and abate water pollution . . . the

Federal role has been limited to support of, and

assistance to, the States.” Senate Report No.

92-414, 92nd Congress, Ist Session, p. ! (1971).

The Act has been interpreted to grant concurrent jurisdic-

tion over water pollution to both state and federal courts.

Town of Sutton v. Water Supply and Pollution Control

Commission, 116 N.H. 154, 355 A.2d 867 (1976); Kegonsa

Joint Sanitary District v. City of Stoughton, 87 Wis.2d

131, 274 N.W.2d 598 (1979).

The reliance by the Court of Appeals on the balancing

12

test espoused in Justice Blackmun’s concurring opinion in

Usery is misplaced, for it ignores the unambiguous deci-

sion of the Court. Even if Justice Blackmun’s view is

adopted, however, it cannot be used to justify the intrusive

federal court actions taken in the present case. As Justice

Blackmun interprets the Usery decision, a balancing ap-

proach is mandated: states are protected from federal in-

trusion only where the state interest is outweighed by the

federal interest -— where the federal interest is

“demonstrably greater and where state compliance with

imposed federal standards is essential.” 326 U.S. at 856.

Here there was no violation of federal standards. On the

contrary, there is every indication that the state courts

were taking measures to enable the counties and WSSC to

comply fully with federal standards. If Site 2 had been

purchased and the quagmire of anticipated problems

arisen to prevent its development or use for sludge

disposal, the federal purpose would have been frustrated

and federal standards violated. If, instead, the state courts

had been allowed to anticipate and resolve such problems,

effective and more immediate compliance would be en-

sured. In other words, state court resolution of the permit,

budget and covenant disputes might have led to the con-

clusion that an alternative location be selected for the

disposal of Montgomery County’s proportionate share of

sludge from Blue Plains. It might have led to the conclu-

sion that Site 2 was appropriate for this purpose. Either

way, the state court is simply assisting the federal court in

its quest that a suitable disposal site be made operational

as soon as possible. There is no conflict with federal stan-

dards. There is no contradiction between state and federal

interests. Both can, and should, be permitted to coexist,

each without interference from the other.

It is desirable that this Court review the decision of the

13

Court of Appeals to determine the extent to which a

federal court may intrude on the sovereignty of the state in

order to effect compliance with the Clean Water Act, an

act promulgated under the commerce power of the United

States Congress.

Il.

The Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, provides:

“A court of the United States may not grant an

injunction to stay proceedings in a state court ex-

cept as expressly authorized by Act of Congress,

or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to

protect or effectuate its judgments.”

The purpose of the Act, which rests on the fundamental

constitutional independence of the states and their courts,

Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of

Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281, 287 (1970), is to

“prevent needless friction betwen state and federal

courts.” Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 232, n. 10

(1972), citing Oklahoma Packing Co. V. Oklahoma Gas &

Electric Co., 309 U.S. 4, 9 (1940). Its prohibition forms a

“formidable barrier” to the use of federal court injunc-

tions to stay state court proceedings. Reines Distributors,

Inc. v. Admiral Credit Corp., 182 F.Supp. 226, 227

(S.D.N.Y. 1960), reversed on other grounds, 319 F.2d 609

(2nd Cir. 1963).

This court has consistently and emphatically required

strict compliance with the statute, describing it as an “ab-

solute prohibition” against any injunction of any state

court proceeding that does not fall within one of the three

specifically defined exceptions to the Act. Vendo Co.v.

Lekiro-Vend Corp., 443 U.S. 623, 630 (1977). Any doubts

about the propriety of a federal injunction against a state

14

court proceeding “should be resolved in favor of permit-

ting the state courts to proceed in an orderly fashion to

finally determine the controversy.” At/antic Coast Line R.

Co., supra., 398 U.S. at 297. It is “clear beyond cavil that

the prohibition is not to be whittled away by judicial im-

provisation.” Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America

v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511, 514 (1955).

a.

The “protect or effectuate its judgments” exception to

§ 2283 was used by the district court as a basis for issuing

the June 27, 1980 order enjoining compliance with a state

court injunction and enjoining the initiation and prosecu-

tion of state court proceedings. Known also as the

“relitigation” exception, there is some question as to its

breadth and intent.

The exception has been described as a means of protec-

ting the party who succeeded in federal court from being

put through the expense and inconvenience of relitigating

the same issue. Baker v. Gotz, 415 F.Supp. 1243, 1250

(D.Del. 1976). Its intent, it has been said, is to affirm the

power of the federal courts to enjoin the relitigation of

cases in state courts which have been “fully and finally”

adjudicated at the federal level. Reviser’s Note to 28

U.S.C. § 2283; 7 Moore’s FEDERAL Practice ¢ 60, 39(2)

at 627 (2nd ed. 1979); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225

Roth v. Bank of the Commonwealth, 583 F.2d 527 (6th

Cir. 1978) citing Lamb Enterprises v. Kiroff, 549 F.2d

1052, 1061 (6th Cir. 1977).

For the most part the courts are clear in their applica-

tion of the exception. It is used simply to solve the pro-

blem of multiple litigation of the same cause of action.

Where allegedly conflicting lawsuits in both state and

federal courts present essentially different issues and dif-

ferent causes of action, an injunction to stay the state

15

court proceedings will not lie. State of Oklahoma ex rel.

Wilson v. Blankenship, 447 F.2d 687, 692 (10th Cir. 1971);

Woods Exploration & Production Co. v. Aluminum Co.

of America, 438 F.2d 1286 (Sth Cir. 1971); Samuel C. En-

nis & Co., Inc. v. Woodmar Realty Co., 542 F.2d 45 (7th

Cir. 1976). As Justice Reed wrote in his dissenting opinion

in Toucey v. New York Life Insurance Co., 314 U.S. 118

(1941), these injunctions are tolerated only because, in the

alternative:

“... a federal judgment entered perhaps after

years of expense in money and energy and after

the production of thousands of pages of evidence

comes to nothing that is final. It is to be only the

basis for a plea of res judicata which is to be ex-

amined by another court, unfamiliar with the

record already made, to determine whether the

issues were or were not settled by the former *.d-

judication.” 314 U.S. at 144.

If this interpretation of the intent and application of the

“protect and effectuate” exception had been applied to the

case at bar, it would have been clear that the state court was

not relitigating issues which had been “fully and finally”

adjudicated at the federal court. The causes of action dif-

fered in each court. In the federal suit the cause of action

was to prevent violations of the Clean Water Act caused

by the discharge of pollutants from the Blue Plains Plant.

The controversies with which the state court was involved

included protection of public revenues, enforceability and

compensability of covenants under state law, and the

siatutory right of counties to approve the budget of a state

agency. None of these issues was considered by the federal

court.

Certainly none of these state issues had been “fully and

16

finally” adjudicated by the federal court. Although the

district court order of July 10, 1978 did address Site 2, the

reference was made out of deference to Montgomery

County’s designation of this particular site. The 1978

order was result-oriented, not site-oriented.® The result it

sought to achieve was the disposal of sludge from Blue

Plains so that the Clean Water Act would not be violated;

its focus was not on where the disposal sites would be

located. The order provided for compliance with state law,

and the implication was clear that if Site 2 did not pass

muster under state law, an alternative site could be chosen.

Judge Goldberg of the Fifth Circuit describes the “pro-

tect and effectuate” exception as a means of assuring the

winner in federal court that he “will not be deprived of the

fruits of his victory by a later contrary state

judgment. . . .” Woods Exploration & Pro. Co., supra.,

438 F.2d at 1312. The heart of the 1978 federal court

order, the “fruit” if you will, is that Montgomery County

proceed expeditiously to develop and begin operating a

sludge disposal site. Any state court decisions would be

collateral, and not contrary, to that order, and would

deprive neither Montgomery County nor the WSSC of the

“fruits” of their 1978 federal victory. The absence of a

relitigation problem, therefore, precludes an injuction of

state court proceedings.

The Court of Appeals in the case at bar did not adopt

this interpretation of the “protect and effectuate” excep-

tion. Instead of looking to determine whether the issues

raised in the state court had already been raised and fully

litigated at the federal level, the court looked to the effect

*Although the April 25 and June 4, 1980 orders of the district court

did refer specifically to Site 2 in mandating that WSSC include funds

for its purchase in the budget, these orders were allegedly attempts on-

ly to enforce the 1978 order.

17

of the state proceeding on the prior federal judgment. It

apparently found support for this position in this language

from Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., supra, 398 U.S. at 295:

“Both exceptions to the general prohibition of

§ 2283 imply that some federal injunctive relief

may be necessary to prevent a state court from so

interfering with a federal court’s consideration or

disposition of a case as to seriously impair the

federal court’s flexibility and authority to decide

that case.”

This language, however, follows a lengthy discussion of

the “in aid of jurisdiction” exception to § 2283, and it is

doubtful that it was intended to expand the interpretation

of the “protect or effectuate” exception. In context the

language in Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. appears simply to

illuminate the “in aid of” exception, showing its

similarities with the “protect and effectuate” exception and

reasserting its restrictive application.

The Court of Appeals’ reliance on Doe v. Ceci, 517 F.2d

1203 (7th Cir. 1975) is also misplaced, for that case merely

reasserts the long-standing view that injunctions may issue

only to prevent relitigation of matters that have been final-

ly decided by the federal court. In Doe a county hospital’s

policy prohibited the performance of elective abortions.

The federal court enjoined enforcement of the policy as

violative of the Fourteenth Amendment, ordering the defen-

dants to make hospital facilities available for elective

abortions, particularly for Jane Doe, the original, and in-

digent, plaintiff. A state court issued an injunction

restraining the disbursement of county funds to pay for

abortions of indigent women. The federal court then

issued an injunction, preventing the state court judge from

enforcing his injunction against payments. The court’s ra-

tionale was that the original federal order, issued on

behalf of an indigent patient, necessarily contemplated

and required payment for elective abortions from county

funds. The issue of payment, then, had been fully litigated

and the state action could be enjoined.

The case at bar is distinguishable from Doe. Again, the

1978 district court order was resuit-oriented rather than

site-oriented. It anticipated compliance with state law re-

quirements in the purchase and development of Site 2. The

state court’s June 17 temporary injunction on the purchase

of Site 2 until certain state law issues could be resolved did

not, therefore, conflict with the federal court order. Since

these state law issues had not (and could not have) been

litigated, either explicitly or impliedly, in the federal court,

there was no relitigation problem.

Even if a broad interpretation of the “relitigation” ex-

ception is accepted, it cannot be stretched to the limits

adopted by the Court of Appeals in the present case. By

upholding a federal injunction against state court pro-

ceedings which concerned different issues, had not been

litigated in the federal arena, and had only a tangential

relationship to prior federal court orders, the Court of Ap-

peals enlarged the “protect and effectuate” exception to

§ 2283. This Court has warned against such “loose

statutory construction.” Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.,

supra., 398 U.S. at 287.

The Court of Appeals considered it sufficient that the

state court was enjoining one course of conduct which

would have complied with the federal court order (the pur-

chase and development of Site 2). However, other courses

of conduct were available which would have equally com-

plied, namely, the purchase and development of an alter-

native site. It was within the realm of the state court’s

19

jurisdiction to make this determination. The mere fact

that both state and federal courts entertained litigation

concerning Site 2, and that this overlap of jurisdiction pro-

vided an arena in which conflict may have occurred, does

not justify the federal court’s injunction. Denver-Greeley

Valley Water Users Association v. McNeil, 131 F.2d 67, 71

(10th Cir. 1942); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., supra., 398

U.S. at 295 (even unmistakable interference with federal

rights does not justify an injunction of state court pro-

ceedings).

It is desirable that this Court review the analysis, inter-

pretation and application of the “protect and effectuate”

exception to the Anti-Injunction Act applied by the Court

of Appeals to determine if that court has unduly broaden-

ed the exception.

b.

The Court of Appeals added, in a footnote, that the “in

aid of jurisdiction” exception to the Anti-Injunction Act,

28 U.S.C. § 2283, also justified issuance of the June 27,

1980 district court order. This Court has stated that in

order fo# the exception to apply, it is not enough that the

requested injunction be related to the federal jurisdiction

— it must be “necessary in aid of” that jurisdiction. Atlan-

tic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of

Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281, 296 (1970) (em-

phasis in the original).

Traditionally the exception has been interpreted to

mean that if an action is in rem, a federal court first ob-

taining jurisdiction over the res can enjoin suits in state

courts involving the same res. 17 WRIGHT, MILLER &

CoopeR, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4225

(1978); Vendo Co. v. Lektro Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623

20

(1977). In the instant case, both federal and state actions

are in personam, therefore, this rationale is inapplicable.

The exception has been extended in recent years in

school desegregation cases, where the federal court has

“taken the controversy in hand and will exercise continu-

ing jurisdiction over it.” 17 WriGHTt, MILLER & CooPER,

FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4225 (1978), citing

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,

501 F.2d 383 (4th Cir. 1974) and Grenchik v. Mandel, 373

F.Supp. 1289 (D.Md. 1973). The underlying rationale for

issuing injunctions in these cases, however, is that the

issues being litigated in the state courts could not be

separated from the issues and relief involved in the federal

suits. See Swann, supra. 501 F.2d at 384. This is certainly

not the situation in the present case, and the exception

should not be so extended.

The general rule, which should be applied here, is that in

personam actions may proceed concurrently in state and

federal courts, each without interference from the other.

Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., supra., 433 U.S. at 643.

Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U.S. 226, 230

(1922). It matters not that the same subject-matter is in-

volved, provided each court has jurisdiction over its

respective complaints. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., supra.,

398 U.S. at 297.

Here the state courts properly assumed jurisdiction over

intrastate issues. The federal court had no authority to in-

tervene and the “in aid of jurisdiction” exception to the

Anti-Injunction Act is inapplicable.

CONCLUSION

The Constitution of the United States recognizes and

preserves the autonomy and independence of the states —

21

independence in their judicial as well as legislative depart-

ments. From the beginning this country has maintained

two essentially separate legal systems, each of which pro-

ceeds independently of the other. The rank and authority

of both are equal, and any interference of one by the

other, except as specifically authorized, is an invasion of

the authority of the other. When the federal courts en-

croach on the rights and privileges of state courts, a denial

of state independence is suggested.

In the present case the federal court overstepped the

dividing line and encroached on areas within the realm of

the Maryland courts. Because this amounted to a viola-

tion of both the principles of federalism embodied in the

Tenth Amendment and the Anti-Injunction Act, a writ of

certiorari should issue.

Respectfully submittted,

ROBERT B. CSTROM

County Attorney

MICHAEL O. CONNAUGHTON

Deputy County Attorney

ROBERT H. DRUMMER

Associate County Attorney

xipueddy

etesee 7

81-479 SEP 8 198

No. a ae

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1981

PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY, MARYLAND

Petitioners

Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

Respondents

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

APPENDIX

ROBERT B. OSTROM

County Attorney, Counsel of Record

MICHAEL O. CONNAUGHTON

Deputy County Attorney

ROBERT H. DRUMMER

Associate County Attorney

Attorneys for Petitioner

5104 County Administration Building

Upper Marlboro, Maryland 20870

(301) 952-4124

THE CASILLAS PRESS. INC. -1717 K Street NW —Wastungton, 0. C.-273-1220

APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Order and Opinion of the United States District

Court for the District of Columbia Circuit,

I ores so i eee ues eeueneee

Order of the Court of Appeals consolidating cases,

PEE cha dbadkocceveckctcendoeeccioeseueonse

Order of the United States District Court for the

District of Columbia denying motion to stay,

Gs Sa es iw Jeulet vie men ae nae o4

Order of the District Court enjoining state proceedings,

ee es ee eee

Order of the District Court to show cause,

i iE ITI SES ee SP a OD eT eRe pry ee

Order of the District Court denying motion to stay,

June 19, 1980 ....... Oe casa akan bien ue so ie

Order of the Circuit Court for Prince George's County,

Maryland, issuing temporary injunction,

PIE 06 do neU CORED E NV WEse TEs eebnnasdecewnén’s

Order of the District Court denying motion for contempt

and ordering reinsertion of funds in budget,

PEE 646 G chen tabard one dneees cogBhrecrene see

Order of the District Court to insert funds in budget,

TE MEE a ca biksduvedeevescsesdeisssiseeccsons

Order of the District Court to designate and develop

sludge disposal facilities,

EA ne ee ee ee eee

Order of the District Court to designate sites,

PE cckene panda uneeden ss iNeeueabaenmokadse

Page

eS

cone ae

Ty

ee

sone ue

(ii)

Consent Decree of the District Court incorporating

Blue Plains Treatment Plant Agreement of 1974,

PEE VoudsRReRCsvereeceveesetcceseucasexesasaue 5Sa

Constitutional Provisions

Tenth Amendment, United States Constitution ................ 80a

Statutes

EEE VOCRdnssddsccissvesepcatesscenceseseseces 80a

PEE SdbeKhedecocecescscecncceeeedseessoueseen 80a

SCT ED uocteterenvedovescccccssecescusescuussscs 83a

EE Cite nS dcaduwderunesesendarenetdncucuesuns 87a

ET di dgindedsdusthiesdsndeNenddnctedcceesens 98a

EE ine navubcudedeconseneveseccessesseees 104a

TD 6 eee ccesecesesccccecccessecesevceveseses 106a

la

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication

in the Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested

to notify the Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be

made before the bound volumes go to press.

United States Court of Apprals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 80-1495

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Vv.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ET AL.

PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MARYLAND,

(INTERVENOR-DEFT.), APPELLANT

No. 80-1496

STATE WATER CONTROL BOARD, ET AL.

Vv.

WASHINGTON SUBURBAN SANITARY COMMISSION, ET AL.

PRINCE GEORGR’S COUNTY, MARYLAND,

(INTERVENOR-DEFT.), APPELLANT

Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment. The

court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out of time.

2a

No. 80-1653

STATE WATER CONTROL BOARD, AN AGENCY OF

THE COMMONWEAL /H OF VIRGINIA, ET AL.

v.

WASHINGTON SUBURBAN SANITARY COMMISSION, ET AL.

PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY, MARYLAND,

(INTERVENOR-DEFT.) , APPELLANT

No. 80-1654

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Vv.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ET AL.

PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY, MARYLAND, APPELLANT

No. 80-1718

STATE WATER CONTROL BOARD, ET AL.

Vv.

WASHINGTON SUBURBAN SANITARY COMMISSION, ET AL.

PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY, MARYLAND, APPELLANT

No. 80-1719

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

¥.

DISTRICT OF COLI™MBIA, ET AL.

PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MARYLAND, APPELLANT

3a

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(D.C. Civil Action Nos. 77-1929 and 1813-73)

Argued April 9, 1981

Decided June 10, 1981

Robert B. Ostrom, County Attorney, Prince George's

County with whom Richard S. Alper and Robert H.

Drummer, Associate County Attorneys were on the brief

for appellant.

Thomas A. Deming, Assistant Attorney General, State

of Maryland for appellee, State of Maryland.

John P. Arness with whom Curtis FE. von Kann, Allan

D. Windt and Henderson J. Brown, 1V, were on the brief

for appellee, Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission.

Rosanne Mayer, Attorney, Department of Justice with

whom James W. Moorman, Assistant Attorney General,

Anne S. Almy and Patrick J. Cafferty, Jr., Attorney, De-

partment of Justice were on the brief, for appellee, United

States of America. Angus Macheth and Donald W.

Stever, Attorney, Department of Justice also entered ap-

pearances for appellee, United States of America.

Marshall Coleman, Attorney General, James E. Ryan,

Jr., Deputy Attorney General and Frederick S. Fisher,

Assistant Attorney General, Commonwealth of Virginia

were on the brief for appellee, Commonwealth of Vir-

ginia, State Water Control Board.

Robert G. Tobin, Jr. Deputy County Attorney, Nathan

J. Greenbaum, Assistant County Attorney, Montgomery

County were on the brief for appellee, Montgomery

County, Maryland.

da

Frank W. Stearns and David T. Stitt, Assistant County

Attorneys also entered appearances for appellee, Fairfax

County, Virginia.

Judith W. Rogers, Corporation Counsel, Joyce M. No-

tarius, Richard G. Wise and Edward L. Curry, Assist-

ant Corporation Counsel were on the brief for appellee,

District of Columbia.

Before: MCGOWAN, TAMM and WALD, Circuit Judges

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WALD.

WALD, Circuit Judge: This appeal is the latest chapter

in an eight-year-old controversy concerning disposal of

sewage sludge generated at the Blue Plains Sewage

Treatment Plant in the District of Columbia. Since the

early 1970’s, the parties to this appeal have struggled

to devise a plan for sludge disposal at sites within the

Washington area jurisdictions which use the Blue Plains

facility. Appellant Prince George’s County (“P.G.

County”) opposes appellee Montgomery County’s selec-

tion of one such site (“Site 2”) for its sludge disposal.

The district court, however, endorsed the selection of

Site 2 in 1978 and ordered the budgeting of funds for

its implementation on April 25, 1980, and June 4, 1980.

In an effort to block that implementation, P.G. County

then instituted a series of state court actions. The dis-

trict court responded by enjoining further state court

proceedings on June 27, 1980. P.G. County argues here

that ie district court orders of April 25 and June 4

exceeucd the court’s authority under the Clean Water

Act, and that the order of June 27, 1980, violates the

Anti-Injunction statute. For the reasons stated below,

we disagree.

I. BACKGROUND

On September 24, 1973, the Virginia Water Control

Board, Fairfax County, and the District of Columbia

brought suit in the United States District Court for the

Sa

District of Columbia against the Washington Suburban

Sanitary Commission (“WSSC")' (Civil Action No.

1813-73). The complaint alleged that WSSC, in violation

of regional agreements, was exceeding its allotted use

of the Blue Plains sewage treatment plant in D.C., thus

causing the plant to discharge inadequately treated sew-

age into the Potomac River.

The United States intervened as a party-plaintiff, al-

leging that excess flow from the WSSC was causing

pollution of the Potomac in violation of the Federal Water

Pollution Control Act of 1970, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 ef seq.

Montgomery County, P.G. County, and the State of

Maryland intervened as parties defendant. Plaintiffs

then amended their complaint to request that P.G. and

Montgomery Counties be ordered to comply with another

provision of the regional agreement by designating and

providing sites for the disposal of sludge * generated at

the Blue Plains facility.

Prior to trial the parties entered into the Blue Plains

Sewage Treatment Plant Agreement, which was subse-

quently incorporated into a Consent Decree dated July

29, 1974. The decree provided that the court would re-

tain jurisdiction to enforce the agreement and required

'The WSSC is an agency formed under the laws of Mary-

land to serve the sewage and water supply needs of Mont-

gomery and Prince George’s Counties. The Commission's

policies are determined by six Commissioners, three from

each county. See Section 1-1 of the WSSC Code. Budgets

adopted by the WSSC are subject to the approval of both

county governments. Sections 1-4, 7-1.

* Sludge is the byproduct of the sewage treatment process.

Disposal methods include entrenchment in designated areas

and the composting process for which Site 2 was designated.

The end product of composting may be used as a fertilizer

or compost. The 1974 agreement contemplated that the Blue

Plains plant would generate 2,400 tons per day of sludge

requiring disposal. Joint Appendix at 108.

6a

court approval for any modification of it. The agree-

ment established limits on flows to the plant and pro-

vided that the user jurisdictions in the Washington

metropolitan area would devise a permanent equitable

plan for the disposal of sludge produced at Blue Plains

by June 30, 1976, and would implement the plan by

December 31, 1977. During the interim period the

parties agreed to dispose of sludge in proportion to their

share of sewage flow to the plant.

Despite the requirements of the Consent Decree, the

parties failed to agree on a permanent sludge disposal

plan. On the eve of the expiration date for the interim

plan, the United States filed a complaint in district court

(Civil Action No. 77-1929) on November 9, 1977, alleg-

ing that the District of Columbia, the WSSC, Mont-

gomery County, P.G. County, and Fairfax County had

violated the court’s 1974 order by failing to devise a

permanent sludge management plan. The complaint fur.

ther alleged that the impasse over sludge disposal would

cause the Blue Plains plant to curtail or eliminate treat-

ment of sewage, thus resulting in increased discharges

of pollutants into the Potomac River in violation of the

Federal Water Pollution Control Act. Like its prede-

cessor, the 1977 suit led to negotiations culminating in

a consent order, dated January 24, 1978, which extended

the date of the interim period under the 1974 agree-

ment to September 21, 1978, and extended the deadline

for submission of a permanent sludge plan to January

15, 1978.

The user jurisdictions again failed to agree on a

permanent plan. On May 18, 1978, upon motion of the

United States and after hearing, the district court en-

tered an order requiring each jurisdiction to file a re-

port designating a site within its boundaries for disposal

of sludge. Montgomery County submitted a report desig-

nating two sites for disposal of raw sludge, one of which

7a

was an undeveloped tract of land adjacent to the Mont-

gomery Industrial Park on the Montgomery County-

Prince George’s County border (Site 2). Site 2 was

designated as a composting site, where sludge would be

mixed with wood chips and aerated for periods of 35-45

days. The Calverton Citizens Association, representing

residents of the area surrounding Site 2, submitted a

report to the court, alleging that the proposed use of

Site 2 would subject them toa health hazard.

On July 10, 1978, the court entered an order requiring

the user jurisdictions to proceed to develop their desig-

nated sites for sludge disposal. In particular, Montgom-

ery County was ordered to have the Site 2 composting

facility operational by July 1, 1979. The court ordered

WSSC to take all necessary action, including acquisition

of property rights and obtaining all necessary permits.

The court also ordered that the user jurisdictions take

no action unrelated to protection of the public health to

prevent the sludge disposal measures ordered. Noting

the concerns expressed by the Calverton Citizens Associa-

tion, the court ordered that Montgomery County through

the WSSC take all measures necessary to protect the

public health in the implementation of Site 2. P.G.

County, which had made known its objections to Site 2

in a letter to the court dated June 28, 1978, did not

appeal the July 10 order.”

The WSSC and Montgomery County then proceeded

with the development of Site 2 as required by the 1978

order. The WSSC filed condemnation proceedings to ac-

quire Site 2 in the Circuit Court for Montgomery

*The District of Columbia appealed that portion of the

July 10 order requiring it to construct a compost facility

at the Blue Plains plant. This court affirmed the contested

portion of the order in an unpublished opinion. State Water

Control Bd. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission,

No. 78-1671 (D.C. Cir. June 7, 1979).

County, and obtained the requisite permit from the Mary-

land Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. In

May 1979 the WSSC adopted a budget for fiscal year

1980 which inciuded $16.9 million for the acquisition and

construction of the Site 2 facility.

P.G. County opposed implementation of Site 2 on sev-

eral fronts outside the forum of the district court. The

County unsuccessfully appealed the issuance of the health

permit to the Board of Review of the Maryland State

Health Department. It also brought suit in the Circuit

Court for Prince George’s County sceking to enjoin acqui-

sition of Site 2 on gruunds it had never given the requi-

site approval to WSSC funds allotted to Site 2.‘ The

Circuit Court dismissed the complaint, and P.G. County

appealed.

In March 1980 implementation of Site 2 encountered

more severe obstacles. First, the three WSSC Commis-

sioners from P.G. County blocked*funding for Site 2 in

SSC’s budget for fiscal year 1981. In addition, the

WSSC learned that a title search of the Site 2 land

conducted in connection with the condemnation proceed-

ing had revealed that the land was burdened by restric-

tive covenants * which appeared inconsistent with a com-

post facility and which might cost millions of dollars to

acquire. By letter dated March 18, 1980, the WSSC in-

formed the district court of the budget impasse and the

covenants.

* Prince George’s County v. WSSC, No. E-7692 (Circuit

Court for Prince George’s County, Maryland, filed Nov. 27,

1979).

* The covenants preclude use of the land in any manner

which would create objectionable odors, generate dense smoke

or high levels of noise, or constitute a “dump or sanitary

landfill.” P.G. County argued that because the covenants

run not only to owners of adjacent properties but also to

property owners “in the general neighborhood,” a lengthy

judicial determination of the composition of the penne

class would be required.

9a

Montgomery County then filed a motion in district

court on April 4 to compel the WSSC to restore funds

for Site 2 to its budget. After a hearing at which P.G.

County opposed the motion, the court issued an order

on April 25 requiring the WSSC to restore the funds

and to take all actions necessary to place Site 2 into

operation at the earliest practicable date. On May &

P.G. County noted an appeal from this order, the first

of this group of consolidated cases.

Despite the April 25 order, the three P.G. County WSSC

Commissioners declined to vote to reinsert funds for Site

2 in the budget. Consequently on May 14, 1980, Mont-

gomery County moved the district court to cite the three

Commissioners for contempt. The Commissioners de-

fended on grounds that the restoration of funds ordered

on April 25 was a purely niinisterial act which required

no Commission vote. After a hearing the district court

on June 4 denied the contempt motion but, finding that

reinsertion of the funds was a ministerial act, ordered the

General Manager of the WSSC to perform it. On June

5 P.G. County sought a stay from the district court of its

April 25 and June 4 orders, and on June 10 it noted an

appeal from the June 4 order." The district court denied

the motion for stay on June 19,

Meanwhile P.G. County had filed two new suits in

state court seeking to block implementation of the Site

2 facility. One suit alleged that the state sewage sludge

permit was invalid and that Site 2 constituted a_pros-

pective nuisance.’ The second suit alleged that because of

“On November 19, 1980, a motions panel of this court

summarily affirmed that portion of the June 4 order which

declined to hold the P.G. Commissioners in contempt. Sce

United States v. District of Columbia, No. 80-1495 (D.C.

Cir. Nov. 19, 1980) (per curiam order).

* Calverton County Association v. Buck, No. E-70934

(Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland, filed April

16, 1980).

10a

the restrictive covenants, acquisition of Site 2 would be

so costly as to render the WSSC Commissioners liable

for breach of fiduciary duty.’ In this second suit, the

Prince George’s County Circuit Court on June 17, 1980,

issued a temporary injunction forbidding the WSSC from

proceeding with the acquisition of Site 2 and ordering it

to withdraw a purchase offer it had made to the owners.

WSSC then moved in the district court for an order

to protect and effectuate the court’s prior judgments,

orders and decrees. Following a hearing, the district

court on June 27 issued an order which enjoined WSSC

from complying with the state court order and further

ordered WSSC to proceed expeditiously with development

of Site 2; ordered P.G. County to withdraw from the

three state court suits relating to Site 2; enjoined all

parties from initiating any state court proceeding which

would frustrate the district court’s orders; and ordered

any party believing modification of the court’s orders

was required to seek such modification only in the dis-

trict court or in this court.

The !ast of this group of consolidated cases is P.G.

County’s appeal of the June 27 order. P.G. County’s re-

quest for a stay of the order was denied first by the

district court on the same day and then by this court

on July 3. Two such requests for stay were later denied

by the Supreme Court. WSSC has proceeded to comply

with the April 25 and June 4 orders, has acquired legal

title té Site 2 and has let contracts for the construction of

the compost facility.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Tenth Amendment Objections

P.G. County argues that the three challenged district

court orders violate principles of federalism embodied in

* Prince George’s County v. WSSC, No. E-8512 (Circuit

Court for Prince George’s County, Maryland, filed April 16,

1980).

the tenth amendment and affirmed in Nationa! Leaque

of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Appellant al-

leges that the April 25 and June 4 orders of the district

court usurped the power of the WSSC to control its own

budget, thereby intruding upon an integral function of

a state agency. It further alleges that the June 27 order,

by prohibiting further collateral challenges to Site 2 in

state courts, usurped the power of the state of Maryland

to protect the public health and safety of its citizens.

Arguing that the Clean Water Act allocated the pri-

mary responsibility for eliminating water pollution to

the states, appellant concludes that the broad control

over the development of Site 2 asserted by the district

court exceeded both its powers under the Act and its

equity jurisdiction. We find these arguments without

merit.

In National League of Cities v. Usery, the Supreme

Court held that extension of the Fair Labor Standard

Act’s minimum wage and maximum hour provisions to

state employees was an impermissible exercise of the

commerce power because it impaired state sovereignty

guaranteed by the tenth amendment. In a plurality opin-

ion the Court held that the power to determine the

wages and hours of employees was an “integral” state

function, essential to the separate and independent exist-

ence of the states. Justice Blackmun, concurring, inter-

preted the plurality opinion as mandating a balancing

approach, protecting states from federal intrusion only

where the federal interest did not outweigh the state

interest. Justice Blackmun thought it apparent that Na-

tional League of Cities “does not outlaw federal power

in areas such as environmental protection, where the

federal interest is demonstrably greater and where state

compliance with imposed federal standards would be es-

sential.” 426 U.S. at 856.

We agree that whatever the precise limits of the

state sovereignty doctrine set forth in National League

l2a

of Cities,* it clearly does not control where, as here, the

federal interest has long been recognized as overriding."”

* The lower courts have limited National League of Cities

to legislation which is based on the commerce clause. Thus

the Second Circuit has held that the Federal Railway Labor

Act, which permits strikes by railroad employees, must yield

under Usery to a state statute barring strikes by public

employees, see United Transportation Union v. Long Island

Rail Road Co., 634 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1980), and the Sixth

Circuit has held that employees of a municipal airport were

not covered hy the Fair Labor Standards Act because opera

tion of the airport was an integral function of city govern-

ment, see Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033

(6th Cir. 1979). Compare State of New Hampshire v. Mar-

shall, 616 F.2d 240 (1st Cir.), appeal dismissed, 101 S. Ct.

53 (1980) (rejecting tenth amendment challenge to amend-

ments to Federal Unemployment Tax Act extending benefits

to state employees on grounds that statute was enacted under

spending power, not commerce power); Cantwell v. County

of San Mateo, 631 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,

101 S. Ct. 1703 (1981) (holding federal statute governing

retirement pay for reserve military personnel must prevail

over state statute, despite Usery, because federal statute

enacted under Congressional war power) ; Usery v. Charleston

County School District, 558 F.2d 1169 (4th Cir. 1977), and

Usery v. Allegheny County Institution District, 544 F.2d 148

(3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Allegheny County In-

stitution District v. Marshall, 430 U.S. 946 (1977) (rejecting

tenth amendment challenges to application of Equal Pay Act

to state and local governments on grounds Act was exercise

of Congressional power under Fourteenth Amendment).

In Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972), the

Court, in an opinion recognizing the existence of a federal

common law concerning interstate water pollution, stated:

Th: “ederal \ -ter Pollution Control act in § 1(b) de-

clares that it is federal policy “to recognize, preserve,

and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of

the States in preventing and controlling water pollu-

tion.” But the Act makes clear that it is federal, not

state, law that in the end controls the pollution of inter-

state or navigable waters.

Id. at 102 (footnote omitted).

l3a

The Supreme Court has recently described the 1972

amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act

as “a comprehensive program for controlling and abating

water pollution.” City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 49

U.S.L.W. 4445, 4449 (April 28, 1981) (quoting Train

v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 37 (1975)). While

it is clear that Congress contemplated that the states

would play an active role in this effort, it is equally

clear it did not contemplate that a subdivision of one

state would have the power to block a regional plan for

sewage disposal, thereby causing injury not only to its

own siate government but to neighboring states as well.

Cf. United States v. Duracell International, Ine., No.

80-1017 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 16, 1981) (rejecting tenth

amendment challenge to provision of Clean Water Act

holding liable any state which prevents municipality from

complying with Act).

The courts have recognized the breadth of this federal

interest and have upheld federal environmental legisla-

tion which, like the Clean Water Act, requires state im-

plementation while leaving the states latitude to make

essential choices. See United States v. Ohio Department

of Highway Safety, 635 F.2d 1195 (6th Cir. 1980),

cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3801 (April 28, 1981) (up-

holding authority of EPA under Clean Air Act to require

a state to deny registration to vehicles which have not

passed mandatory inspection); District of Columbia v.

Train, 521 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated as moot

sub nom. EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977) (same)."

' At issue in District of Columbia v. Train was an EPA

transportation control plan under the Clean Air Act for the

National Capital Region. This court affirmed the regulations

in part but struck down a portion of the plan which required

area jurisdictions to adopt automobile inspection and main-

tenance programs and to retrofit certain vehicles with pollu-

tion control dev ces. The court held that that portion of the

regulations, by substituting compelled state regulation for

l4a

When necessary the courts have exercised broad equitable

powers to ensure state compliance with federal environ-

mental laws, even where the exercise of such powers has

necessitated the bypassing of normal state decisional

processes. Thus after Detroit failed to comply with a

consent decree concerning sewage disposal, the district

court appointed the Mayor of Detroit as administrator

of the treatment plant, and directed him to act “without

the necessity of any actions on the part of the Common

Council of the City of Detroit when in the judgment

of the Administrator the same might unavoidably delay

or impede” compliance. United States v. City of Detroit,

476 F. Supp. 512, 515 (E.D. Mich. 1979); ef. Washing-

ton v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing

Vessel Assn., 443 U.S. 658 (1979) ‘sanctioning district

court’s direct supervision of state fisheries where neces-

sary to secure compliance with its order recognizing

Indian rights).

The weakness of appellant’s federalism argument is

underscored by the fact that it, along with other regional

jurisdictions, agreed that the district court should have

continuing authority to enforce the 1974 consent decree.

P.G. County voluntarily intervened in the initial suit

permissible federal regulation, exceeded the scope of the

commerce power, 521 F.2d at 992, and was such a “drastic”

invasion of state sovereignty as to violate the tenth amend-

ment, id. at 994. Appellant invokes Train to argue that the

district court orders in this case are likewise an impermis-

sibly “drastic” invasion of state sovereignty. We find the

analogy unpersuasive. The Train court emphasized that the

regulations invalidated there forced “unconsenting” states

to administer and enforce a federal program. /d. at 992. In

this case, however, appellant, along with other area juris-

dictions, entered into a consent decree and agreed that the

district court should retain power to enforce it. In addition,

the nature of state action required by the district court in this

case is significantly less intrusive on state sovereignty than

the ongoing state regulatory program invalidated in Train.

lSa

in 1973 and was a signatory to the consent decree which

emerged from that suit. Like the other parties to that

agreement, appellant failed to comply with the deadiines

it had agreed to meet, thereby necessitating enforcement

of the agreement by the district court. The tenth amend-

ment cannot be used to bar the very enforcement mech-

anism agreed to in 1974. Cf. Brown v. Necb, 25 Fair

Empl. Prac. Cases 267 (Lab. Rel. Rep. BNA) (6th Cir.

Mar. 3, 1981) (affirming district court order requiring

city, which had ordered layoffs from fire department due

to budget crisis, to comply with prior consent decree con-

cerning hiring of minorities by making layoffs propor-

tionate to racial composition of the department, even

though collective bargaining agreement and state law

provided that layoffs should be on basis of seniority).

Thus we find that the district court did not exceed

its statutory or equitable authority and that no interest

protected by the tenth amendment has been infringed.

B. Anti-Injunction Act Objections

Appellant’s second contention is that the district

court's order of June 27 violates the Anti-Injunction Act,

28 U.S.C. § 2283, which provides:

A court of the United States may not grant an in-

junction to stay proceedings in a state court except

as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where

necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or te protect or

effectuate its judgments.

The Supreme Court has noted that the purpose of the

Act, which rests on the fundamental constitutional inde-

pendence of the states and their courts,"* is to prevent

' Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Loco-

motive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281, 287 (1970).

l6a

“needless friction between state and federal courts.” "

The Court has applied the Act strictly," stating that

it is an “absolute prohibition” against any injunction

of any state court proceedings that does not fall within

one of the three specifically defined exceptions in the Act."

The issue for decision, then, is whether the June 27 order

falls within one of the thre’ exceptions.

The distri* court relied primarily, as do appellees

before this court, on the last of tue three exceptions,

which permits a federal court to enjoin a state proceed-

ing in order to “protect or effectuate” its judgments."

'"™ Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 233 (1972), quoting

Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co., 309

U.S. 4, 9 (1939).

7 Moore’s Federal Practice ‘ 60.39[2], at 657 (2d ed.

1979).

" Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 630

(1977). The United States has argued before this court that

the Act does not apply where, as here, one of the litigants

seeking to enjoin state proceedings is the federal gov-

ernment. The Supreme Court so held in two cases, rea-

soning that the policy behind the Act is far less compelling

where a stay is sought to protect “superior federal interests.”

See National Labor Relations Bd. v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S.

138, 146 (1971); Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352

U.S. 220, 226 (1957). The status of this implied exception

is left unclear in other decisions of the Court which stress

that the three specific statutory exceptions are exclusive and

“should not be enlarged by loose statutory construction.”

Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Loco-

motive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281, 287 (1970). Because this

issue is raised for the first time on appeal and because its

resolution is unnecessary to our disposition of this case,

we express no view on whether the participation of the fed-

eral government in this case renders § 2283 inapplicable.

' The district court also adverted to, and the appellees

secondarily rely on, the second exception, which permits an

injunction “in aid of” the federal court’s jurisdiction. The

Reviser’s Note to § 2283 states that the “in aid of” language

17a

Known as the “relitigation” exception, the “protect or

effectuate” language was intended to affirm the power

of federal courts to enjoin the relitigation of cases and

controversies fully adjudicated by such courts." The

Supreme Court has construed the exception to mean

that a state court may be prevented “from so interfering

with a federal court’s consideration or disposition of a

case as to seriously impair the federal court's flexibility

and authority to decide that case.” Aflantic Coast Line

Railroad Co. Vv. Brotherhood of Locomotive Enqincers,

398 U.S. 281, 295 (1970).

was intended “to conform to section 1651 of this title [the

All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651] and to make clear the recog-

nized power of the Federal courts to stay proceedings in

state cases removed to the district courts.” The “in aid of”

exception has also been construed to allow a federal court to

protect its prior jurisdiction over a res by enjoining a state

proceeding that interferes therewith. 1A Moore's Federal

Practice ‘ 0.225, at 2617 (2d ed. 1981): 17 Wright, Miller

& Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4225 (1978).

Professor Wright has suggested that the “in aid of” excep-

tion also encompasses cases “where a district court has taken

a controversy in hand and will exercise continuing jurisdic-

tion,” jd., reasoning that state court intervention in such a

controversy would seriously impair the power of the district

court to decide the case, and citing Swann v. Charlotte-

Mecklenburg Board of Education, 501 F.2d 383 (4th Cir.

1974), and Grenchik v. Mandel, 373 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Md.

1973). Because the Supreme Court has indicated that there

is some overlap between the “protect or effectuate” and “in

aid of” exceptions, see Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v.

Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281, 295

(1970). we believe that either of the exceptions provides

ample justification for the June 27 order.

'’ Reviser’s Note to 28 U.S.C. § 2283. The exception was

intended to overrule Toucey v. New York Life Insurance Co.,

314 U.S. 118 (1941), in which the Supreme Court had held

that federal courts lacked the power to enjoin relitigation in

state court of controversies adjudicated in federal court.

Appellant argues that this exception should be read

narrowly to permit an injunction only where the state

proceeding involves the same cause of action as did the

federal proceeding. Appellant contrasts the cause of ac-

tion in the federal suit, to ensure compliance with the

Clean Water Act by providing for sludge disposal, with

the causes of action in the enjoined state proceedings,

which involve issues such as compensability of restrictive

covenants under Maryland property law. Appellant con-

cludes that the state suits se collateral to, rather than

duplicative of, the federal suit and that therefore the

relitigation exception does not apply.

We believe, however, that Atlantic Coast Line man-

dates an examination of the effect a state proceeding

would have on a prior federal judgment, rather than a

comparison of formal causes of action. Where a state

court enjoins a course of conduct which is necessary to

comply with a prior federal court order, the federal court

has authority to effectuate its order by enjoining the

state proceeding. In Doe v. Ceci, 517 F.2d 1203 (7th

Cir. 1975), a federal district court had enjoined a county

hospital from refusing to permit its medical personnel to

perform elective abortions within the hospital. Subse-

quently a state court entered an order restraining county

officials from disbursing any county funds for elective

abortions. The district court enjoined enforcement of

the state court order and the Seventh Circuit affirmed

on grounds that such action was “necessary to effectuate

the earlier order of the federal court and thus not in

contravention of 28 U.S.C. § 2283.” Id. at 1204. See also

Henry Vv. First National Bank of Clarksdale, 595 F.2d

291, 306-07 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom.

Clethorne Hevrdware Co. v. Henry, 444 US. 1074

(1980); Thomason v. Cooper, 254 r.2d 808 (8th Cir.

1958); Baker v. Gotz, 415 F. Supp. 1243 (D. Del.),

aff'd mem., 546 F.2d 415 (3d Cir. 1976). Thus the dis-

trict court plainly acted within its authority in enjoining

19a

the WSSC from complying with the June 17 order of the

Cireuit Court for Prince George's County.

The State of Maryland, while acknowledging the power

of the district court to stay the Prince George’s Circuit

Court injunction, joins appellant in arguing that the

June 27 order was overly broad in enjoining both pend-

ing state proceedings which had not progressed to final

judgment and prospective state litigation concerning Site

2. The law is clear, however, that a federal court is not

required to await a final judgment by a state court be-

fore acting to protect its own decrees.'*

Where proceedings in a federal court have been on-

going for several years, as they have here, state pro-

ceedings which would frustrate the federal court’s effec-

tive disposition of the case have frequently been enjoined

even where the state proceedings have not yet progressed

to final judgment. Many of these cases have involved

school desegregation orders. See Swann v. Charlotte-

Mecklenburg Board of Education, 501 F.24 383 (4th

Cir. 1974) ; Grenchik v. Mandel, 373 F. Supp. 1298 (D.

'SIn Brown v. O’Brien, 469 F.2d 563 (D.C. Cir.), vacated

as moot, 409 U.S. 816 (1972), the Credentials Committee of

the Democratic Party had ruled that challenged delegates

from Illinois should be unseated and replaced. The unseated

delegates challenged this action in suits filed in both state

and federal court. In the federal suit, the defendant Demo-

cratic Party filed a counterclaim, seeking to enjoin prosecu-

tion of the state court action. The district court upheld the

action of the Credentials Committee but denied an injunction.

This court affirmed the judgment dismissing the complaint

but remanded for an injunction against the state court pro-

ceeding, finding that an injunction was necessary to prevent

the state court from “taking any action in any other court

that would impair the effectiveness and the integrity of the

judgments of this Court.” 469 F.2d at 574. See also Donelon

v. New Orleans Terminal Co., 474 F.2d 1108 (5th Cir.),

cert. denied, 414 U.S. 855 (1973).

20a

Md. 1973)."" In New York State Association for Re-

tarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 456 F. Supp. 85

(E.D.N.Y. 1978), the district court enjoined a state pro-

ceeding which would have interfered with its disposition

of a civil rights case over which it had acquired juris-

diction five years earlier, noting that the state court

plaintiffs’ claims would properly have been brought be-

fore the federal court. Jd. at 97. In this case, too, we

believe that if P.G. County believed changed circum-

stances required modification of the 1978 order, it was

obligated to seek such modification in the district court,

w:.ivh ordere' the implemen.ation ef Site 2 in 1978.

Thus we conclude that it was within the district court’s

discretion to enjoin P.G. County’s participation in the

three pending proceedings in Maryland state courts in

which the relief sought would have frustrated the district

court’s “flexibility and authority” to enforce its 1978

order. The injunction against prospective state court liti-

gation concerning Site 2, being outside the scope of

§ 2283,”° is likewise valid. In sum, we find no violation

' Appellant argues that the foregoing cases are distinguish-

able because they involve protection of individual constitu-

tional rights, as to which the federal injunctive power is

singularly broad. Whatever the validity of this suggestion

as a general proposition, it has no relevance in the context

of § 2283, which allows a federal court to enjoin state pro-

ceedings in order to “protect or effectuate” its judgments in

any type of proceeding. See Samuel C. Ennis & Co. v. Wood-

mar Realty Co., 542 F.2d 45 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,

429 U.S. 1096 (1977) (action in state court against trustee

in bankruptcy enjoined by federal court which had conducted

bankruptcy proceeding years earlier); Baker v. Gotz, 415

F. Supp. 1243 (D. Del.), aff'd mem., 546 F.2d 415 (3d Cir.

1976) (enjoining state court sequestration of notes which

conflicted with prior district court determination that se-

questration was not an available remedy).

* Section 2283 bars injunctions only of existing state court

proceedings and has no application before such proceedings

2la

of the Anti-Injunction Act or of equitable principles in

the June 27 injunction order.

Ill. CONCLUSION

We find that neither the tenth amendment nor the

Anti-Injunction Act was violated by the three district

court orders challenged here. We also find appellant's

other arguments, that evidentiary hearings were re-

quired before issuance of the orders and that the June 27

injunction was unwarranted under traditional equitable

criteria, without merit. We believe that the actions taken

by the district court were necessary to effectuate its 1978

order and to ensure the long overdue implementation of

a regional sludge management plan. Accordingly, the

judgment of the district court is

Affirmed.

have begun. In a case where equitable principles warrant

relief, a party may be enjoined from instituting proceedings

in a state court. 1A Moore’s Federal Practice * 0.208[3.-1],

at 2316 (2d ed. 1981): 17 Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal

Practice and Procedure § 4222 (1978).

22a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 80-1495 September Term, 1979

United States of America CA 77-1929

Vv.

( nited Mates Court

District of Columbia, et al. a

Columbia Cigcuit

; : Filed JUL 25 1980

Prince George’s County, Maryland sinzn

GEORGE A. F.

(Intervenor-deft.), Clerk

Appellant

No. 80-1496 “a CA 1813-73

State Water Control Board, et al.

Vv.

Washington Suburban Sanitary

Commission, et al.

Prince George’s County, Maryland,

(Intervenor-deft.),

Appellant

No. 80-1653 CA 1813-73

State Water Control Board, An

Agency of the Commonwealth of

Virginia, et al.

Vv.

Washington Suburban Sanitary

Commission, et al.

Prince George’s County, Maryland,

(Intervenor-deft.), ;

Appellant

23a

No. 80-1654 CA 77-1929

United States of America

v.

District of Columbia, et al.

Prince George’s County Maryland,

Appellant

24a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 80-1718 September Term, 1979

State Water Control Board, et al. CA 1813-73

v.

Washington Suburban Sanitary

Commission, et al.

Prince George’s County Maryland,

Appeiilant

and consolidated case No. 80-1719

ORDER

IT IS ORDERED, sua sponte, that these cases are con-

solidated.

For the Court:

GEORGE A. FISHER, Clerk

By: /s/

Daniel M. Cathey

First Deputy Clerk

25a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

STATE WATER CONTROL BOARD, et al.,:

Plaintiffs,

Vv. : Civil Action

: No. 1813-73

WASHINGTON SUBURBAN SANITARY :

COMMISSION, et al., :

: FILED

Defendants. ; JUN 27 1980

7 ee 5” eee it * JAMES F. DAVEY,

Clerk

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

Vv. : Civil Action

: No. 77-1929

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER

Upon consideration of the Motion of Prince George’s

County, Maryland, for a Stay of the Court’s June 27,

1980, Order, and the oral arguments of its counsel and the

counsel for Washington Suburbai Sanitary Commission,

it is hereby found by this Court that the Motion for Stay is

without merit. This Court’s June 27, 1980, Order, enjoin-

ing the parties io this case from attempting to circumvent

this Court’s prior judgments, orders and decrees, is

manifestly justified and necessary.

26a

This Court has both the power and the responsibility to

enjoin the parties before it from petitioning various state

courts to obtain equitable relief allowing them to ignore

portions of this Court’s decrees or compelling others to ig-

nore portions of this Court’s decrees. In the absence of

such an Order, this Court’s decrees will be rendered mean-

ingless, the comprehensive metropolitan area sewage plan

created by this Court over the past six years will be

destroyed, and the public interest will suffer.

Prince George’s County, therefore, has failed to

demonstrate any reason why a stay should be granted.

Moreover, the public health and welfare require that the

long overdue and much needed composting facility be con-

structed without delay. It is, accordingly,

ORDERED, this 27th day of June, 1980, that the Mo-

tion for Stay, filed by Prince George’s County, Maryland,

is denied.

John Lewis Smith, Jr.

United States District Court

8:30 o.m.

June 27, 1980

27a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

STATE WATER CONTROL BOARD, et al.,:

Plaintiffs,

v. : Civil Action

: No. 1813-73

WASHINGTON SUBURBAN SANITARY

COMMISSION, et al.,

; FILED

Defendants. : /¢ N27 !9s8e

at i i A a ale i a ae * JAMES F. DAVEY,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v. : Civil Action

: No. 77-1929

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER

Upon consideration of the Motion of Defendant

Washington Subu: an Sanitary Commission for Entry of

an Order to Protect and Effectuate this Court's

Judgments, Orders, and Decrees and memorandum in

support thereof, arguments of counsel presented at a hear-

ing on June 27, 1980, and the entire record herein, and it

appearing to the Court that:

(1) Jurisdiction of this Court in the instant cause has

been invoked pursuant to, infer alia, the Federal Water

Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 301, e/ seq.

28a

(2) Prince George’s County, Maryland, Montgomery

County, Maryland, and the State of Maryland all

sought and received permission to intevene as parties

defendant.

(3) On July 29, 1974, with the consent of all parties

hereto, including Prince George’s County, Maryland,

Montgomery County, Maryland, and the State of

Maryland, this Court entered a Consent Decree which,

inter alia,

(a) Contained a comprehensive agreement and

plan regarding management of sewage produced in

the respective party-jurisdictions, including detailed

provisions concerning disposition of digested and un-

digested sludge.

(b) Clearly stated that the provisions of the decree

applied to, and were binding upon, the parties, their

agents, servants, successors, and all persons, firms

and corporations acting under, through or for them

and upon those persons, firms and corporations in ac-

tive concert or participation with them.

(c) Provided that this Court retain jurisdiction in

order to enforce the provisions of this Decree and to

order any appropriate relief for violation thereof.

(4) On July 10, 1978, due to the failure of the parties

to agree on a method for disposition of the sewage

sludge generated at the Blue Plains Treatment Plant

after September 21, 1978, and finding that there existed

an emergency affecting ithe health and safety of the

residents of the Washington metropolitan area, this

Court, in pursuance of its jurisdiction under the 1974

Consent Decree, entered an order which, inter alia,

(a) Ordered that sludge disposal be conducted at

29a

certain locations specified in the order, including Site

2 in Montgomery County.

(b) Directed that the Washington Suburban

Sanitary Commission (WSSC) take all actions

necessary to manage sludge on the Maryland sites

designated in the order, including, but not limited to,

acquisition of property rights, obtaining of all re-

quired permits, design, construction and operation.

(c) Required all parties to take all steps necessary

to expedite review and processing of permit applica-

tions of the parties, their agents or contractors.

(d) Prohibited all user jurisdictions from taking

any action, unrelated to the protection of public

health, to prevent the disposal or composting of

sludge from the Blue Plains Plant under this order.

(e) Confirmed review of the submission of the

Calverton Citizens Associations and provided that

Montgomery County, through the WSSC take the

measures necessary to assure protection of the public

health, safety and welfare in the implementation of

Site 2.

(5) On April 25, 1980, in view of the failure of WSSC

Commissioners from Prince George’s County to join in

approving the inclusion of Site 2 in the WSSC budget,

this Court ordered all parties to continue to adhere to

the order of July 10, 1978 and ordered the Washington

Suburban Sanitary Commission (i) to put Site 2 back in-

to its budget, (ii) to take all actions necessary to manage

sludge on Site 2, including, but not limited to, acquiring

all property rights, and (iii) to place Site 2 into operation

at the earliest practicable date.

(6) On June 4, 1980, upon motion of Montgomery

County to hold the WSSC Commissioners from Prince

30a

George’s County in contempt for failure to vote Site 2

back into the WSSC budget, this Court ordered the

General manager of the Commission to include Site 2 in

the WSSC capital and operating budgets.

(7) Prince George’s County has appealed to the

United States Court of Appeals for the District of Col-

umbia Circuit from entry of this Court’s orders of April

25, 1980 and June 4, 1980.

(8) Prince George’s County did not appeal this

Court’s orders of July 10, 1978 and did not seek stay of

this Court’s orders of April 25, 1980 and June 4, 1980

until June 4, 1980 when it filed a motion for stay which

was oposed by other parties and denied by this Court on

June 19, 1980.

(9) Prince George’s County, in concert with the

Calverton Citizens Association and certain residents of

the Calverton area, both of which are represented by the

same counsel who made written submissions to this

Court on behalf of the Calverton Citizens Association

in connection with this Court’s order of July 10, 1978,

has recently filed various actions in the Circuit Courts

for Prince George’s County and Montgomery County

seeking relief which, if granted, would impede and

frustrate the WSSC and other parties hereto from com-

plying with this Court’s orders of July 10, 1978, April

25, 1980, and June 4, 1980.

(10) On June 17, 1980, in one of the actions brought

by Prince George’s County, the Circuit Court for Prince

George’s County entered an order which, inter alia, en-

joined the WSSC from expending any funds on Site 2

and directed the WSSC to seek a continuance of the

Site 2 condemnation trial, scheduled to commence in

Montgomery County Circuit Court on June 30, 1980.

3la

Dissolution of this order is necessary in aid of this

Court's jurisdiction in this matter and to protect and ef-

fectuate its judgments, decrees, and orders.

(11) If the parties to this case are allowed to pursue in

various state courts collateral attacks on this Court's

orders, judgments, and decrees, effectuation of the

comprehensive regional sewage program established by

the 1974 Consent Decree and subsequent implementing

orders will be impossible. Further pollution of the

Potomac River and violations of the Federal Water

Pollution Control Act will inevitably follow. The public

interest clearly necessitates that all challenges and objec-

tions to that comprehensive program be heard and

decided in this Court and, if necessary, in the United

States Court of Appeals in order to avoid the delay, ex-

pense, and inconsistent adjudications incident to litiga-

tion of these issues in diverse state and federal forums.

IT IS, THEREFORE, THIS 27TH DAY OF JUNE,

1980, ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:

(1) Defendant Washington Suburban Sanitary Com-

mission is hereby enjoined from complying with the

June 17, 1980 Order of the Circuit Court for Prince

George’s County, entered in Equity No. E-8512, and is

further enjoined to proceed expeditiously with condem-

nation proceedings, purchase negotiations, and all other

actions necessary to acquire Site 2 and establish there a

sludge composting facility at the earliest practicable

date.

(2) No later than June 30, 1980, intervenor-

defendant Prince George’s County, Maryland, shail file

appropriate papers in the Circuit Courts for Prince

George’s and Montgomery Counties (a) advising both

courts of the entry and the exact content of the instant

32a

order; (b) affirming its intent to fully comply with the

instant order unless and until it is stayed or reversed;

(c) moving the Circuit Court for Prince George’s Coun-

ty for dissolution of its June 17, 1980 order on grounds

that that order threatens to frustrate and impede orders

entered by this Court in these proceedings; and (d)

withdrawing the complaints that it has filed against

other parties to this action for relief which, if granted,

would impede or frustrate effectuation of any orders

entered by this Court in these proceedings. The state

court actions embraced by this paragraph include, but

are not limited to, Prince George’s County v.

Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission (Equity

No. E-7692, Circuit Court for Prince George’s County);

Prince George’s County, et al., v. Washington Subur-

ban Sanitary Commission (Equity No. E-8512, Circuit

Court for Prince George’s County); and Calverton

Citizens Association, Inc., et al., v. Buck, et al. (Equity

No. E-70934, Circuit Court for Montgomery County).

(3) All parties to this action, and all persons, firms,

and corporations in active concert or participation with

them, are hereby enjoined from taking any actions, in-

cluding initiation or continuation of any state court pro-

ceedings against other parties to this action, which

would frustrate or impede effectuation of this Court’s

judgments, decrees, and orders, or interfere with its

jurisdiction herein.

(4) Any party which believes it has good ground for

seeking modification of or relief from any of this

Court’s orders herein, including, but not limited to, its

orders of July 10, 1978, April 25, 1980, and June 4,

1980, shall seek such judicial action only in this Court or

in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia Circuit.

33a

(5S) Any person, firm or corporation, not a party

hereto, who believes there exists good ground for

modification or rescission of any order entered herein,

including, but not limited to, a contention that changed

circumstances since July 10, 1978 dictate that another

site be substituted for Site 2 in this Court's order of that

date, or believes it has other interests pertinent to the

proceedings herein, may seek such action herein by fil-

ing a motion for limited intervention outlining the

nature of the proposed intervenor’s interest, the action

desired by this Court, and the reasons and evidence in

support thereof.

John Lewis Smith, Jr.

United States District Court

6/27/80

34a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

STATE WATER CONTROL BOARD, et al.,:

Plaintiffs,

Vv. : Civil Action

: No. 1813-73

WASHINGTON SUBURBAN SANITARY =:

COMMISSION, et al., :

é FILED

Defendants. : %U% 20 1980

So * JAMES FE. DAVEY,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

Vv. : Civil Action

: No. 77-1929

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., :

Defendants.

ORDER

This Court, having been advised of the entry on June

17, 1980, of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County,

Maryland, Order, attached as Appendix A hereto, and it

appearing to the Court that that Order threatens to

frustrate and impede certain parties, including the

Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission, from com-

plying with this Court’s Order of April 25, 1980, it is, this

20 day of June, 1980,

ORDERED, that the parties to this action and those ad-

ditional persons designated on Appendix B hereto are

38a

directed to appear before this Court at 11:00 a.m. on June

27, 1980, to show cause why this Court should not take

immediate, appropriate action to ensure that its Order of

April 25, 1980 will be fully and effectively implemented.

John Lewis Smith, Jr.

United States District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing proposed

order were served, via first-class mail, postage prepaid,

this 19th day of June, 1980, on all persons listed on the

service list attached to the order as Appendix B.

John P Arness

Attorney for Washington

Suburban Sanitary Commission

36a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

STATE WATER CONTROL BOARD, et al., )

)

)

)

Plaintiffs,

Vv. ) Civil Action

) No. 1813-73

WASHINGTON SUBURBAN SANITARY )

COMMISSION, )

) FILED

Defendants. ) ‘UN '9 !98°

--) JAMES F. DAVEY.

) Clerk

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

: )

Plainuif, )

v. ) Civil Action

) No. 77-1929

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., )

Defendants. )

ORDER

Upon consideration of Prince George’s County’s motion

for stay of the order of court of April 25 and June 4, 1980

pending appeal, the memoranda in opposition filed

thereto by Montgomery County and United States of

America, it is by the Court this 19 day of June 1980

ORDERED that the motion for stay is denied.

United States District Judge

37a

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE’S

COUNTY, MARYLAND

PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY,

MARYLAND

Petitioners

Equity

v. : 3 Ne. E-8512

WASHINGTON SUBURBAN SANITARY : ORDER

COMMISSION

Respondent : _ FILED

JUNE 17, 1980

Upon consideration of the pleadings, affidavit, and

representations of counsel, it is this 17th day of June 1980,

by the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County,

Maryland, sitting in Equity

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that

WSSC, its officers, employees and agents be and hereby

are temporarily enjoined from appropriating or expending

any funds for the acquisition of Montgomery County Site

Two; and it is further

ORDERED that the WSSC is temporarily enjoined

from taking any further actions relating to Law Nos.

50,304, 50,305 in the Montgomery County Court which

are inconsistent with this Order, and it is further

ORDERED that the WSSC shall immediately withdraw

the offer made to the property owners in the condemna-

tion actions on June 13, and it is further

ORDERED that the parties shall if possible, complete

all discovery by July 22, and it is further

38a

ORDERED that a pre-trial conference is scheduled for

July 23 at 8:30 a.m., and it is further

ORDERED that all motions to be filed in the case shall

be set in on July 23, 1980, if it can be arranged with the

Assignment Office on June 17, and it is further

ORDERED that a hearing on the merits shall be set in

August, 1980, and it is further

ORDERED that the WSSC shall seek to continue the

hearing set for June 30 in Law Nos. 50,304 and 50,305 in

the Montgomery County Circuit Court and it is further

ORDERED that the parties shall fix the dates described

herein with the Assignment Office on June 17.

/s/

JUDGE

TRUE COPY-TEST

/s/

No. 56 6/17/80

39a

SERVICE LIST

Nathan J. Greenbaum, Esquire

Assistant County Attorney

County Office Building

Rockville, Maryland 20850

Counsel for Montgomery County, Md.

Frank W. Stearns, Esquire

Assistant County Attorney

4100 Chain Bridge Road

Fairfax, Virginia 22030

Counsel for Fairfax County, Va.

Frederick S. Fisher, Esquire

11 South Twelfth Street, Suite 308

Richmond, Virginia 23219

Counsel for State Water Control Board of Virginia

Richard Alper, Esquire

Prince George’s County Attorney’s office

5104 County Administration Building

Upper Marlboro, Maryland 20870

Counsei for Prince George’s County, Md.

Edward Curry, Esquire

Corporation Counsel’s Office

District Building

Washington, D.C. 20004

Counsel for District of Columbia

Patrick Cafferty, Esquire

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20430

counsel for United States of America

40a

Benjamin Bialek, Esquire

Maryland Environmental Services

Tawes State Office Building

Annapolis, Maryland 21401

Counsel for Maryland Environmental Services

Robert L. Collings, Esquire

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Sixth and Walnut Streets

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106

Counsel for U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Joseph B. Blocher, Esquire

8720 Georgia Avenue, Fifth Floor

Silver Spring, Maryland 20910

Counsel for Present Owners of Site 2

John Nolan, Esquire

Steptoe & Johnson

1250 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

Counsel for Commissioners Norris, Vislosky,

and Brooks

Aaron L. Handelman, Esquire

1120 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

Tenth Floor

Washington, D.C. 20036

Counsel for Individual Plaintiffs in Prince George’s

County Circuit Court Action, Equity No. E-8512

dia

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

STATE WATER CONTROL BOARD, et

| a E

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) Civil Action

) No. 1813-73

WASHINGTON SUBURBAN SANITARY )

COMMISSION, et al., )

) FILED

Defendants. ) %UN4 1980

we eee ee ee ee ee ee ee Se eee eee rere

) JAMES F. DAVEY.

) Clerk

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

Vv. ) Civil Action

) No. 77-1929

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., )

Defendants. )

ORDER

Having considered the pleadings and papers, and

arguments of counsel, on the motion cf Montgomery

County to cite Washington Suburban Sanitary Commis-

sioners Johanna S. Norris, Andrew M. Vislosky, and

Lawrence L. Brooks for contempt, the Court concludes:

(1) The inclusion of Site 2 in the FY 1981-86 CIP and

the FY 1981 Capital and Operating Budgets of the

Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission was required

42a

by the Court’s order of July 10, 1978, as specifically reaf-

firmed by the Court’s order of April 25, 1980; and

(2) Paragraph (a) of the Court’s order of April 25,

1980, required only ministerial steps for its implementa-

tion and the General Manager of the Commission is

hereby directed to include Site 2 in the FY 1981-86 CIP

and the FY 1981 Capital and Operating Budgets.

For these reasons, the Court has determined that Mon-

tgomery County’s motion to cite for contempt should be

denied. Therefore,

IT IS ORDERED that the motion of Montgomery

County to cite Washington Suburban Sanitary Commis-

sioners Johanna S. Norris, Andrew M. Vislosky, and

Lawrence L. Brooks for contempt of the order of April

25, 1980, is hereby denied.

United States District Judge

Dated: June 4, 1980

43a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

STATE WATER CONTROL BOARD, et al.

oD

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) Civil Action

) No. 1813-73

WASHINGTON SUBURBAN SANITARY )

COMMISSION, et al., )

) FILED

Defendants. ) “PRIL 25, 1980

EEE

) JAMES FE. DAVEY.

) Clerk

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

Vv. ) Civil Action

) No. 77-1929

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., )

Defendants. )

ORDER

Upon consideration of Montgomery County’s Motion

to Compel the WSSC to Comply with the Order of Court

dated July 10, 1978, all pleadings, the entire record herein,

and argument of counsel, it is by the Court this 25 day of

April 1980

ORDERED that all parties continue to adhere to the

Order filed by this Court on July 10, 1978, and it is further

ORDERED that the Washington Suburban Sanitary

Commission:

dda

(a) put Site 2 back into the FY 1981-86 CIP and FY

1981 Capital and Operating Budgets; and

(b) take all actions necessary to manage sludge on

Site 2, including, but not limited to, acquiring all property

rights including any covenant enforcement rights, obtain-

ing all required design, construction, and operation per-

mits as required by this Court in the July 10 Order; and

(c) place Site 2 into operation at the earliest practicable

date; and

(d) promptly notify the Court and all parties of the

dates necessary property rights are acquired, construction

commences, and operation begins.

/s/

United states District Judge

45a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

STATE WATER CONTROL BOARD;

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA;

FAIRFAX COUNTY, VIRGINIA;

and DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

Plaintiffs,

and

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Intervenor-Plaintiff,

ee

Vv. ) Civil Action

) No. 1813-73

WASHINGTON SUBURBAN SANITARY )

COMMISSION, et al., FILED

JUN 10 1980

Defendants.

JAMES b. DAVEY.

Clerk

and

)

)

)

)

)

)

MONTGOMERY COUNTY and PRINCE _)

GEORGE’S COUNTY, MARYLAND )

Intervenor-Defendants. )

)

)

)

)

)

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

Vv. ) Civil Action

) No. 77-1929

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., )

Defendants. )

46a

ORDER

Due to the failure of the users of the Blue Plains Sewage

Treatment Plant to agree on a method for disposition of

the sewage sludge generated at the plant after September

21, 1978, the District of Columbia will be forced to curtail

or eliminate treatment of sewage at the Blue Plains Plant

after that date unless the users are required to dispose of

the sludge from the plant. It is beyond dispute that the cur-

tailment or elimination of the treatment processes at the

plant would violate Section 301(a) of the Federal Water

Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a), and cause

substantial harm to the Potomac River into which the

plant discharges. The user jurisdictions are presently in

violation of the Court’s order of January 1978 amending

its order of July 29, 1974, requiring that they agree on a

permanent metropolitan-wide sludge disposal plan by

January 15, 1978. The user jurisdictions’ failure to agree

on such a plan is the major cause of the current emergency

situation which raises the possibility of a shutdown of the

Blue Plains Plant. On the basis of this factual

background, the Court has directed, by orders dated May

18 and June 12, 1978, that feasibility reports be prepared

by the user jurisdiction and sites be designated by them for

disposition of the sludge from the Blue Plains Plant for a

pericd of at least one year beginning September 21, 1978.

Upon consideration of the reports, designations, and

other submissions of the parties, the parties; oral presenta-

tions, and other materials in the record of these cases and

on the basis of the existence of #n emergency affecting the

health and safety on the residents of the Washington

metropolitan area, it is hereby ordered that the District of

Columbia, Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission

(the WSSC), Montgomery County, Prince George’s Coun-

ty, and Fairfax County shall take the following actions to

47a

accomplish composting or disposal of sewage sludge from

the Blue Plains Treatment Plant in a safe, environmentally

acceptable manner after September 21, 1978 for a period

of at least one year:

1. Undigested Sludge

a. Beginning on September 21, 1978 and continuing

through December 3, 1978, Prince George’s County,

through the WSSC, shall dispose of quantities of un-

digested sludge from the Blue Plains Plant at its P.G. 4 site

equal to its proportional share, its proportional share of

the District’s proportional share, Montgomery County’s

proportional share and Montgomery County’s propor-

tional share of the District’s proportiona! share of the un-

digested sludge from the Blue Plains Treatment Plant.

b. Beginning on December 4, 1978 and continuing

through the date on which the District of Columbia’s com-

posting facility at the Blue Plains Denitrification site is

completed or February 15, 1979, whichever occurs first,

Montgomery County, through the WSSC, shall dispose of

quantities of undigested sludge from the Blue Plains Plant

equal to its proportional share, its proportional share of

the District’s proportional share, Prince George’s County’s

proportional share, and Prince George’s County’s propor-

tional share of the District’s proportional share of the un-

digested sludge from the plant on approximateiy 30 acres

of a side owned by Montgomery County, Maryland, and

located between Shiloh Church Road and Interstate 70

near Clarksburg in Montgomery County, Maryland, or at

a site owned by the State of Maryland and located near

Seneca along the Potomac River in Montgomery County,

Maryland.

c. After completion of the District’s composting facility

at the Blue Plains denitrification site or February 15, 1979,

48a

whichever occurs first, Montgomery County and Prince

George’s County shall no longer be responsible for manag-

ing the District of Columbia’s proportional share of un-

digested sludge from the plant. However, Montgomery

County, through the WSSC, shall continue to dispose of

such amounts of undigested sludge to “reimburse” Prince

George’s County for the Montgomery County’s propor-

tional share and Montgomery County’s proportional share

of the District’s proportional share disposed of by Prince

George’s County under paragraph a above and at suc-

cessor facilities, as well as such amounts needed to attain

parity for amounts disposed of prior to September 21,

1978. Montgomery County, through the WSSC, shall con-

tinbue to manage the remainder at the above-described

sites and at composting facilities at a site owned by Contee

Sand and Gravel Company and Montgomery Industrial

Park, Inc., and located adjacen t to the Montgomery In-

dustrial Park on Route 29 in Montgomery County,

Maryland. Montgomery County, through the WSSC, shall

have said composting facilities operational by July 1,

1979.

d. The District of Columbia shall begin construction

immediately and shall complete by February 15, 1979 con-

struction of composting facilities located at the Blue

Plains Plant on the area currently reserved for the

denitrification process units. Beginning on that date the

District shall compost its proportional share of the un-

digested sludge from the Blue Plains Plant, plus additional

quantities to “reimburse” the other user jurisdictions in

kind for disposal by them of the District of Columbia’s

proportional share of una.zested sludge from the plant

between September 21, 1978 and the commencement of

operations of the District’s composting facilities.

e. Beginning on September 21, 1978 and continuing un-

49a

til September 21, 1979, Fairfax County, Virginia shall

dispose of quantities of undigested sludge from the plant

by incineration, in accordance with the County’s June 5,

1978 submission, equal to its proportional share of un-

digested sludge from the Blue Plains Plant. The County

shall also dispose of its proportional share of the District

of Columbia’s share of undigested sludge from the plant

until the District of Columbia’s composting facilities at the

Blue Plains denitrification site are prepared for use, or

February 15, 1979, whichever occurs first.

2. Digested Sludge:

a. Montgomery and Prince George’s Counties, through

the WSSC, and Fairfax County shall dispose of their pro-

portional shares of digested sludge from the Blue Plains

Plant in accordance with their submissions filed with the

Court, beginning on September 21, 1978 and continuing

through September 21, 1979. In addition, each of said par-

ties shall dispose of their respective proportional shares of

the District of Columbia’s proportional share of digested

sludge from the plant from September 21, 1978 through

February 15, 1979 or completion of the District’s com-

posting facility, whichever occurs first.

b. Thereafter, through September 21, 1979, the District

of Columbia shall compost its proportional share of

digested sludge from the plant to the maximum extent

feasible at its Blue Plains Plant composting facility after

its undigested sludge has been composted at the site. The

other user jurisdictions shall dispose of any portion of the

District’s proportional share of digested sludge which can-

not be composted at the Blue Plains composting site, with

each user jurisdiction disposing of its respective propor-

tional share of the excess digested sludge.

50a

3. The Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission

shall take all actions necessary to manage sludge on the

Maryland site: designated in this order, including but not

limited to, acq 1isition of property rights, obtaining of all

required permits, design, construction and operation.

4. The District of Columbia shall continue to be

responsible for the transportation of sludge to all sites

designated in this order in accordance with current prac-

tices.

5. The parties, including the Counties, the District of

Columbia, the WSSC, the State Water Control Board of

Virginia and the State of Maryland, shall take all steps

necessary to expedite review and processing (issuance or

denial) of permit applications of the parties, their agents

or contractors, required for the implementation of the

sludge management measures required by the foregoing

paragraphs. In the event the processing of a permit for any

of the said sites is delayed, the regulatory agency responsi-

ble for the delay shall, at the request of any party to these

proceedings, show cause to this court why such permit

shold not be expeditiously processed. No user jurisdiction

shall be excused from the responsibility for disposing or

composting of its share of the digested and undigested

sludges from the Blue Plains Plant because of denial of a

permit for a proposed facility.

6. No user jurisdiction shall take any action which is

not related to the protection of the public’s health to pre-

vent the disposal or composting of sludges from the Blue

Plaias Plant under this order.

7. The Calverton Citizens Association has filed submis-

sions with the Court concerning Monigomery County’s

Site 2 on Route 29. The Court has reviewed this informa-

tion, as well as the submissions of Montgomery County.

Sla

As required by this order, Montgomery County, through

the WSSC, must take the measures necessary to assure

that the public health, safety and welfare will be protected

in the implementation of Site 2. All the parties shall

similarly take steps to protect the public’s health in im-

plementing this order.

8. Each user jurisdiction shall immediately notify all

parties in writing of any circumstances or conditions

which come to its attention that may cause or may in any

way lead to a failure by it or another party hereto to meet

the requirements of this order.

9. It is understood that several parties to the ad-

judicatory hearing on the Blue Plains Plant NPDES Per-

mit are sec::sing to appeal to the Administrator of the En-

vironmental Protection Agency the decision of the

Regional Administrator not to require denitrification at

the plant in that permit. (In re NPDES permit No. D.C.

00021199, Docket No. DC-AH-001, Appeal No. 78-4). If

the Administrator decides to require installation of

denitrification units at the Blue Plains Plant, the District

of Columbia shall advise this Court as to whether such ac-

tion necessitates the relocation of the composting facility

required to be constructed by paragraph 1d of this order.

Should the Court find that such action is necessary, said

composting facility shall be relocated to a site specified by

the Court.

Dated: July 10, 1978

/s/

Unitd States District Judge

52a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

STATE WATER CONTROL BOARD;

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA;

FAIRFAX COUNTY, VIRGINIA;

and DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

Plaintiffs,

and

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Intervenor-Plaintiff,

lll i i i i

Vv. ) Civil Action

) No. 1813-73

WASHINGTON SUBURBAN SANITARY )

COMMISSION, et al., ) FILED

) MAY 18 1978

Defendants. ) j,wes e. pavev.

Clerk

and

MONTGOMERY COUNTY and PRINCE

GEORGE’S COUNTY, MARYLAND

Intervenor-Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

Vv. ) Civil Action

) No. 77-1929

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., )

Defendants. )

S3a

ORDER

Upon motion of the United States and after a hearing

thereon, it is hereby ordered that the District of Columbia,

Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission, Mont-

gomery County, Prince George’s County, and Fairfax

County shall take the following actions to accomplish

composting or disposal or sewage sludge from the Blue

Plains Treatment Plant after September 21, 1978:

(1) That each of the above-named parties shall

evaluate potential sites for composting or disposal of

digested and undigested sludge from the Blue Plains Treat-

ment Plant within each respective party’s boundaries.

Each party shall evaluate sites with capacity sufficient to

compost or dispose of sludge for a least one year and shall

prepare a report on the feasibility of composting or

disposing of sludge at each of the sites evaluated by June

5, 1978. Sites of less than one year disposal capacity

should also be evaluated if they can be prepared for use by

September 21, 1978, and other larger sites cannot be

prepared by that date.

(2) Each of the aforesaid parties, excluding the

Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission, shall

designate in writing to the Court by June 5, 1978 a site or

sites within its boundaries for composting or disposal of

its proportionate share of digested and undigested sludge

from the Blue Plains Treatment Plant for a period of at

least one year beginning on September 21, 1978.

(3) Each party shall take all steps necessary for com-

posting or disposal of its proportionate share of sludge

from the Blue Plains Treatment Plant at the designated

site in a safe, environmentally acceptable manner by

September 21 1978, and shall begin composting or dispos-

ing of its share of sludge on that date.

54a

It is further ordered that each party shall submit to the

Court and to all other parties on June 5, 1978 at a status

call at 10:30 A.M. its site feasibility report for sludge

disposal in that jurisdiction and its designation of a site or

sites for composting or disposal of sludge after September

21, 1978.

Dated: May 18, 1978

/s/

United States District Judge

5Sa

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

STATE WATER CONTROL BOARD;

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA;

FAIRFAX COUNTY, VIRGINIA;

and DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

Plaintiffs,

and

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Intervenor-Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action

No. 1813-73

WASHINGTON SUBURBAN SANITARY

COMMISSION,

Defendant

FILED

JULY 30, 1974

and

MONTGOMERY COUNTY and PRINCE

GEORGE’S COUNTY, MARYLAND

Intervenor-Defendants.

JAMES E. DAVEY,

Clerk

ee ee ee ee ee ee ee

DECREE

The Complaint having been filed herein on September

24, 1973 and with Plaintiffs, Intervenor-Plaintiff, Defend-

ant and Intervenor-Defendants by their respective at-

torneys having consented without trial or adjudication of

any issue of fact or law herein to the entry of this Decree,

and without this Decree constituting any evidence or ad-

56a

mission by any party hereto with respect to any issue of

fact or law herein:

NOW, THEREFORE, Before the taking of any

testimony, upon the pleadings, and without adjudication

of any issue of fact or law herein, and upon consent of the

parties hereto, to is Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed as

follows:

This Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter herein

and of the parties hereto.

The provisions of this Decree shall apply to and be bin-

ding upon the parties hereto, their agents, servants, suc-

cessors, and all persons, firms and corporations acting

under, through or for them and upon those persons, firms

and corporations in active concert or participation with

them.

The parties hereto incorporate their Agreement of June

13, 1974, (attached hereto as Exhibit A) into this Decree

and agree to comply fully with their obligations stated

thereunder. The above-named Agreement is fully en-

forceable hereunder and may only be revised by order of

the Court. Any revision of said Agreement is null and void

until approved by order of the Court. Implementation of

the provisions of paragraph 8(c) of the Agreement

attached hereto and incorporated herein shall not con-

stitute a revision for which the approval of the Court is re-

quired hereunder.

IV

The Decree is not and shall not be interpreted to be a

permit for the discharge of pollutants pursuant to Section

57a

402 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33

U.S.C. sec. 1342, or any other federal law, nor shall it in

any way affect any obligation of the parties hereto to

secure such a permit.

Vv

This Decree shall in no way relieve the parties hereto of

their obligations to comply with any local, state, or federal

law.

Vi

This Court shall have the power to amend this Decree

only upon application by one or more of the parties

hereto, upon proper notification and hearing as required

by the rules of the Court.

Vil

This Court shall retain jurisdiction in order to enforce

the provisions of this Decree and to order any appropriate

relief for violation thereof.

July 29, 1974

/s/

United States District Judge

We hereby consent to the entry of the foregoing Decree

without further notice.

STATE WATER CONTROL BOARD

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA,

Plaintiff,

ANDREW P. MILLER

Attorney General of Virginia

58a

GERALD L. BALILES

Deputy Attorney Gencrai

By:/s/ mel .

JAMES E. RYAN, JR.

Assistant Attorney General

FAIRFAX COUNTY, VIRGINIA

Plaintiff,

By:/s/ wae!

FREDERICK LEE RUCK

County Attorney

JOHN F. RICK

Assistant County Attorney

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

Plaintiff,

C. FRANCIS MURPHY

Corporation Counsel

District of Columbia

IVERSON O. MITCHELL III

Assistant Corporation Counsel

a eae

JOHN C. SALYER

Assistant Corporation Counsel

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Intervenor-Plaintiff,

By: /s/___ . —

WALLACE H. JOHNSON

Assistant Attorney General

Land and Natural Resources

Division

WALTER KIECHEL, JR

Deputy Assistant Attorney General

MARTIN GREEN

Chief, Pollution Control Section

JOHN E. VARNUM

Attorney, Land and Natural

Resources Division

Department of Justice

WASHINGTON SUBURBAN SANITARY

COMMISSION,

Defendant,

59a

JOHN B. KENKEL .-

General Counsel

J. EUGENE CLEARY

Assistant General Counsel

By: /s/

CURTIS E. VON KANN

HOGAN AND HARTSON

Attorneys for Washington Suburban

Sanitary Commission

MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAND,

Intervenor-Defendant,

By: /s/

Richard S. McKernon

County Attorney

STEPHEN P. JOHNSON

Assistant County Attorney

JOHN B. WALSH, JR.

Assistant County Attorney

60a

APPENDIX A

BLUE PLAINS

SEWAGE TREATMENT

PLANT AGREEMENT

(Appendices Omitted)

June, 1974

BLUE PLAINS SEWAGE TREATMENT PLANT

AGREEMENT

Recognizing that further measures are required to en-

sure that the Blue Plains sewage treatment plant will func-

tion adequately until the current expansion of the sewage

treatment facilities there is completed, the parties hereto

enter into the following agreement which shall be incor-

porated into the consent decree to be submitted to the

Court in the suit captioned State Water Control Board, et

al. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission, et al.,

Civil Action No. 1813-73, which is currently pending in

the District Court for the District of Columbia.

The parties hereto agree that the terms of this Agree-

ment supplement but, except as provided below, shall not

alter the terms and conditions of the 1970 Memorandum

of Understanding or the 1971 Interim Treatment Program

Agreement.

1. Definitions

(a) Flow - For the purpose of this Agreement, “flow”

means the average flow for any twelve con-

secutive months, hereinafter referred to as the

rolling annual average flow.

(b) Where the term “100,000 pounds per day of

BOD;”is used herein and in the agreement of

October 18, 1971, it means the total discharge of

(c)

(d)

6la

BOD, as measured on a monthly average basis

from the Blue Plains Treatment Plant including

any discharge from the Bolling Field overflow.

For the purposes of this Agreement “interim

chemical addition program” means the chemical

addition program, as defined in the 1971 Interim

Treatment Program Agreement, at the Blue

Plains Plant during the “interim period.” The im-

plementation of this program shall enable the

Plant to reduce the pollutant load to the River to

a maximum of BOD; 100,000 pounds per day or

less, as required at any time by the discharge per-

mit issued pursuant to § 402 of the Federal

Water Pollution Control Act.

Interim Period -The “interim period” means that

period of time beginning with the date of execu-

tion of this Agreement and ending with the date

on which the advanced waste treatment facilities

at Blue Plains are fully operational or the date on

which permanent sludge handling facilities at

Blue Plains are fully operational, or December

31, 1977, whichever date occurs first.

Allotted Flows

The parties hereto agree as follows:

(a)

For the period until the expanded secondary

treatment process with full plant chemical addi-

tion is placed into operation at the Blue Plains

Plant, the allocation of flows shall be based upon

the following premises:

(1)The allocation of flows to each user jurisdic-

tion, as established in the 1971 Interim

Chemical Agreement, is expressly conditioned

upon the successful implementation of the in-

(b)

(c)

62a

terim chemical addition program, which

necessarily includes the satisfactory marketing

and/or disposal of sludge which is produced

by that program. It is anticipated that this pro-

gram. It is anticipated that this program will

initially generate approximately 400 tons per

day of che.nical sludge.

(2f the interim chemical addition program is

successfully implemented, a total flow of 299

MGD shall be permitted to the Blue Plains

Plant. See Appendix A which is attached

hereto and incorporated herein.

(3)The allocation of that 299 MGD flow among

the user jurisdictions for any month shall be

that allocation set forth in Table | of Appen-

dix A.

After the expanded secondary treatment process

with full plant chemical addition is placed into

operation, a total flow of 309 MGD shall be per-

mitted to the Blue Plains Plant. The allocation of

that 309 MGD among the user jurisdictions shall

be that allocation set forth in Table 2 of Appen-

dix A.

(1Prince George’s and Montgomery Counties

agree to work out the allocation of flows

available to each through the Washington

Suburban Sanitary District to the Blue Plains

Sewage Treatment Plant at 309 MGD. The

allocation between Prince George’s and Mont-

gomery Counties shall cover the period be-

tween the completion of the Anacostia Force

Main and the completion and commencement

of operation of the advanced wastewater treat-

ment plant at Dickerson, Maryland. In the

(d)

63a

event that the counties fail to reach such an

agreement by diligent negotiation and analysis

of the future needs of both counties within 45

days from the date of this Agreement, officials

of these two counties agree to have the Gover-

nor of the State of Maryland decide the issue

and they also agree to accept his decision when

so made. In the event the Governor is called

upon to make such a decision, he will give due

consideration to the unmet development needs

in the Prince George’s portion of th Anacosti

Basin.

(2Following the completion and commence-

ment of operation of the Dickerson Plant, the

flow share between Prince George’s and

Montgomery Counties to the Blue Plains

Treatment Plant shall be on a equal basis.

Numerically, this sharing will allocate 76.6fi

MGD of the 309 MGD Blue Plains capacity

to each of the said counties

The storm water portion of the combined flows

from the District of Columbia which are

pumped to Blue Plains for treatment, (approx-

imately 90% receiving secondary treatment)

shall deducted from the total District of Colum-

bia flow, and shall not count in computation of

the allotted flow of the District of Columbia.

The storm water portion of these combined

flows shall be calculated as shown on Appendix

B, which is attached hereto and incororated

herein. When the 309 MGD advanced waste

treatment process is completed at Blue Plains,

there will be capacity to provide primary treat-

ment and disinfection for an additional 289

MGD of combined flow over and above the

3.

(a)

(b)

64a

combined flow referred to above. The District

of Columbia agrees to vigorously pursue a pro-

gram for the collection and treatment of all

combined flows.

Control of Sewage Flows

All parties hereto agree that the following cow ‘i-

tions shall be met:

For each -user jurisdiction, except the

Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission,

the sum of its “actual” flows plus all its “com-

mitted” flows shall at no lime exceed its allotted

flows as set forth in Appendix A. See Sample

Calculation #1 in Appendix C, which is attach-

ed hereto and incorporated herein.

For the purposes of computations made pur-

suant to paragraph 3(a), “actual flows” means

the highest rolling annual average flow recorded

for any month during the twelve consecutive

months ending with the month for which the

computation is made.

For purposes of computations made pursuant

to paragraph 3(a) “committed flows” means

those flows which have received all required ap-

provals to enter the sewerage System.

Recognizing that it has present sewer service

commitments outstanding under existing

regulatory orders and procedures, the

Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission

agrees to comply with all the following re-

quirements:

(1)fhe Commission shall defer, as necessary,

the connections of the present outstanding

65a

commitments made to its sewerage system

such that the requirements set forth in sub-

paragraphs 3.(b)(2), 3.(b)(3) and 3.{b}(4)

below are met at all times.

(2During the period from the date of this

Agreement until January 1, 1975, the Com-

mission shall control the flows within, and

the connections to, its sewerage system such

that, for each month, the “actual” flows

within its sewerage system (i.e., defined for

this time period to mean the rolling annual

average flow for the month for which the

computation is made) shall not exceed the

Commission’s allotment for that month as set

forth in Table 1 of Appendix A. (See Sample

Calculation #2 in Appendix C.)

(3During the period from January |, 1975, un-

til such time as the expanded secondary treat-

ment process with full plant chemical addi-

tion is placed into operation at the Blue

Plains Plant, the Commission shall control

the flows within, and the connections to, its

sewerage system such that, for each month,

the “actual” flows within its sewerage system

(i.e., defined for this time period to mean the

highest rolling annual average flow recorded

for any month within the twelve consecutive

months which immediately precede the

month for which the computation is made)

plus the flows attributable to the connections

made during the month for which the com-

putation is made shall not exceed 144 MGD.

(See Sample Calculation #3 in Appendix C.)

(4)After such time as the expanded secondary

treatment process with full plant chemical ad-

(c)

66a

dition is placed into operation at the Blue

Plains Plant, the Commission shall control

the sewer service commitments it makes, the

flows within, and the connections to, its

sewerage system such that, for each month,

the “actual” flows within its sewerage system

(i.e., defined for this time period to mean the

highest rolling annual average flow recorded

for any month within the twelve consecutive

months ending with the month for which the

computation is made) plus the total flows at-

tributable to all outstanding commitments to

provide sewerage service where such flows

will be treated at the Blue Plains Plant shal!

not exceed 153.294 MGD. (See Sample

Calculation #4 in Appendix C.)

If, for any reason, any user jurisdiction violates

any condition or any requirement set forth

above which is applicable to it, that user

jurisdiction shall immediately stop making any

further hook-ups, connections and extensions

to its sewerage system. The sole exceptions to

this ban shall be:

Elimination of an alternative method of

sewage disposal which is certified to be a

public health hazard by the chief officer of

the State health agency or his designated local

representative this certification shall only be

made on a parcel by parcel basis.

Public service buildings, which includes

schools, hospitals, nursing homes, medical

and dental clinics, churches and synagogues,

and structures used by public agencies in pro-

67a

viding essential services for public health and

welfare.

iii. Those buildings which have received sewer

service commitments, and for which the

footings had been poured and finally in-

spected as of the date that the ban on further

hook-ups is imposed.

Such user jurisdiction agrees to make no further

hook-ups, connections or extensions until three

consecutive months have passed during which

that user jurisdiction has complied, for each of

those months, with all conditions and re-

quirements set forth above applicable to it.

Flow Reporting

Each user jurisdiction agrees to submit to the

District of Columbia each month a report which

sets forth that user jurisdiction’s actual flows,

committed flows and total flows attributable to

all actual connections made during that month.

Such report shall contain a break down of total

committed flows by sewer sheds and by calendar

year during which such flows are expected to be

connected to the system. Such report shall fur-

ther set forth the total flows attributable to any

connections and hookups made pursuant to the

exceptions contained in 3.c. above. The District

of Columbia shall consolidate each month the

reports of all new jurisdictions and furnish

copies of such consolidated report to each party

hereto.

Flow Measuring and Monitoring

A committee will be established by E.P.A., the

68a

District, WSCC, Fairfax County, and other user

jurisdictions, to develop a metering program

which shall include, but not be limited to,

maintenance, calibration, monitoring, replace-

ment, location of additional meters, and repor-

ting. The District of Columbia shall be the

responsible party to install, replace, calibrate,

record, and otherwise maintain all flow meters

(35 at present) presently used to compute flows

tributary to Blue Plains and those additional

meters which may be installed for this purpose.

Each user jurisdiction shall bear the actual cost,

as billed by the District of Columbia, for the

above services actually received by that user

jurisdiction.

Reduction of Flows

The parties hereto agree to take action necessary

to reduce and control flows in the collector and

interceptor systems tributary to Blue Plains.

Such action shall include, but not be limited to,

the following:

(a)

(b)

Infiltration and Inflow Abatement - All user

jurisdictions signatory hereto agree to expedite

studies and to take all necessary corrective ac-

tion as soon as possible to reduce infiltration

and inflows into the system to within acceptable

limits.

Water Conservation Methods - All user

jurisdictions signatory hereto agree, subject to

existence of requisite legal authority, to adopt

water conservation procedures in their respec-

tive jurisdictions similar in objective to those

69a

recommended by the Metropolitan Washington

Council of Governments.

7. Correction of Raw Sewage Overflows

(a) The District and WSCC agree to the following

(b)

schedule to stop all overflows in the Cabin John

Basin. The existing valve on the relief sewer to

the Maryland Potomac Interceptor has been fu-

ly opened and this flow is being metered by

WSSC. A permanent connection (the size of

which is to be determined within one month

after the date of this Agreement by the District

and WSCC) to the Potomac Interceptor (Dulles

Interceptor) will be permitted by the District so

long as it is metered and does not affect the flow

allocation of other Potomac Interceptor users

and flow through that connection shall be

counted as part of the total WSSC allocatino to

Blue Plains. The permanent connection will be

completed within 300 days after the necessary

permits have been granted by the National Park

Service.

To relieve overflows of raw sewage into the

Anacostia River, the WSSC and District of Col-

umbia agree to expedite the construction of a

sewer interceptor from Bladensburgh to Blue

Plains. The initial segments of such interceptor

shall be constructed within fifteen months

following the completion of all necessary ad-

ministrative actions, with a temporary connec-

tion to an existing District of Columbia sewer at

the Penn Central railroad crossing as stated in

the Interim Chemical Agreement of October 18,

1971. EPA and the other parties to this Agree-

ment agree to coordinate and cooperate, within

70a

their respective statutory powers, toward

resolution of all applicable administrative ac-

tions required to expedite the construction of

this interceptor. Such administrative actions in-

clude but are not limited to, obtaining necessary

rights-of-way, obtaining all necessary permits,

and arrangement of the necessary financing.

(c) To mitigate the overflows at Bolling Field,

the District agrees to maintain a sewage

screen at the outlet of this overflow. Further

reduction of wet weather overflows at this

location will result when the new primary

sedimentation tanks are placed in operation

at Blue Plains.

Sludge Management

The parties hereto recognize that the successful

operation of the Blue Plains Plant necessitates

the management and distribution of sludges,

both digested and undigested, from the

wastewater treatment process. The parties fur-

ther recognize that during the past year Prince

George’s County has received most of the

digested sludge from the Blue Plais Plant

(184,000 tons). Additionally, Fairfax County has

received the majority of the refuse (260,000 tons)

from the District of Columbia. The parties also

agree that the interim chemical addition program

cannot be successfully implemented unless ade-

quate sludge management capability is secured.

In the spirit of regional cooperation, the parties

hereto agree to manage and accept both the

digested and undigested sludges in the following

manner:

Tla

(a) Digested Sludge

(1) Digested sludge is produced at a rate of

up to 310 tons per day (approximately

20% solids by weight). Digested sludge

has agricultural value as a soil condi-

tioner and fertilizer, and will be manag-

ed by such methods as land spreading

and burial to the extent tht the sludge

cannot be made available for beneficial

reuse through composting, thermal

dehydration, or other acceptable

methods. Within 10 days of the execu-

tion of this Agreement, Montgomery,

Prince George’s, and Fairfax Counties

(the latter representing all Virginia

flows during the interim period) agree

to designate sites for the receipt of

digested sludge on a proportionate

basis in accordance with allocated flows

to the Blue Plains Plant at the 309

MGD level, except as provided in

paragraph 8(b)(4), which provides for

an additional quantity of digested

sludge to be allocated to Fairfax Coun-

ty.

(2) Except as provided in paragraph 8(b)(4),

each of the above-mentioned Counties is re-

quired to receive its proportionate share of

all digested sludge, by flows, and a propor-

tionate share of the District of Columbia's

proportionate share of the digested sludge,

by flows, during the interim period. The

receipt of the District of Columbia’s propor-

tionate share of the digested sludge by the

(b)

72a

suburban jurisdictions recognizes that the

District of Columbia has exhausted all sites

for land containment within its boundaries.

It is intended that the distribution of

digested sludge be rotated at least every 90

days, in the most efficient manner available

to the District of Columbia. For accounting

purposes, all sludge distributed to a county

shall be credited to its proportionate share.

The District of Columbia shall render

quarterly reports to all parties on the

distribution of digested sludge pursuant to

this paragraph.

Undigested Sludge

(1) Undigested sludge will be produced in-

itially at a rate of approximately 400

tons per day (approximately 20% solids

by weight) resulting from the addition

of chemicals to the wastewater.

(2) Recognizing that the prime responsibili-

ty for the operation of the Blue Plains

Plant rests with the District of Colum-

bia, the State of Maryland, operating

through the Maryland Environmental

Service (MES), agrees to assist the

District by providing for management

and disposal of all undigested solids

resulting directly from the interim

chemical treatment of sewage at the

Blue Plains Plant. The proposed

method of undigested sludge manage-

ment and disposal will include one or

more of such methods as: thermal

(3)

73a

dehydration; composting; and land

containment. The MES has programm-

ed thermal dehydration facilities at

Blue Plains with a nominal initial

capacity of 240 tons per day of un-

digested sludge. Expansion of that

system, as well as composting of un-

digested sludge, will depend upon

testing currently underway by the U.S.

Department of Agriculture, MES, and

the District of Columbia, and upon

testing of the thermal dehydration units

at Blue Plains. A site or combination of

sites for land containment is needed as

a backup form of undigested sludge

management, in case the thermal

dehydration, composting or other alter-

native Operations are not sucessful.

The MES, in cooperation with Mon-

tgomery County and Prince George’s

County, will conduct the appropriate

studies to select the necessary sites, and

the transport routes thereto. The MES

will prepare and release the final site

selection report within a period of 50

days after the date of this Agreement.

Montgomery County and Prince

George’s County each agree to select

and approve a site or combination of

sites, including the transportation

routes thereto, within 50 days after the

release of the MES report. The MES

agrees to acquire the rights necessary to

use said sites and to place into opera-

(4)

74a

tion on said sites undigested sludge

disposal and/or handling facilities

within 50 days after said sites have been

selected and approved.

Begining 150 days after the date of this

Agreement, and to the extent that ther-

mal dehydration and/or composting

have not been successful in disposing of

all of the undigested sludge, Mon-

tgomery County, Prince George Coun-

ty, and Fairfax County will each receive

its proportionate share of all undigested

sludge, by flow allocation, and a pro-

portionate share of the District of Col-

umbia’s sludge, by flow allocation, dur-

ing the interim period, except that Fair-

fax County will receive its propor-

tionate share of undigested sludge in

the form of digested sludge. The Fair-

fax County share of undigested sludge

will be accepted by Montgomery and

Prince Georges Counties proportional-

ly, by flow allocation, in adition to

their own shares as defined above. In

return, Fairfax County will accept, in

addition to the amount of digested

sludge specified as its share in Section

8(a)(2), an amount of digested sludge

equal in quantity to the Fairfax County

share of undigested sludge, as defined

in this paragraph; this additional quan-

tity of digested sludge will be subtracted

from the proportional shares of Mon-

(5)

7Sa

tgomery and Prince Georges Counties,

as defined in paragraph 8(a)(2) on a

proportional basis, by flow allocation.

Accordingly, all of the undigested

sludges shall be received and disposed

of in Montgomery and Prince Georges

Counties; and the amounts of digested

sludges to be received by Montgomery

and Prince Georges Counties in accor-

dance with the terms of paragraph

8(a)(2) will be reduced proportionally

by the receipt of additional digested

sludges by Fairfax County. See Appen-

dix D attached hereto and incorporated

herein. In the event that the thermal

dehydration or composting operations

are successful and the resultant pro-

ducts are unmarketable, those products

shall be distributed on the same basis.

Operational decisions to achieve the

proportionate sharing of undigested

sludge will rest with the MES, which

shall make quarterly reports thereon to

each party hereto.

All costs of sludge handling and

disposal, and all costs attributable to

the interim chemical program, in-

cluding costs for acquisition of proper-

ty rights necessitated pursuant to this

Agreement, shall be borne by the user

jurisdictions on the ratio of their

respective monthly flows to the total of

the monthly flows to the Plant. The

District of Columbia shall be responsi-

ble for the collection and disbursement

(c)

(d)

76a

of all money required to implement the

provisions of this paragraph.

(6) The user jurisdictions signatory hereto

recognize the need to resolve the matter

of recovery of costs and values of pro-

perty acquired for sludge disposal, and,

accordingly, agree to enter negotiations

and to resolve this issue by July 1, 1976.

The District of Columbia, MES, and their

agents and all persons, firms or corpora-

tions acting under, through or for them, by

contract or otherwise, shall deliver and app-

ly all undigested and digested sludge in ac-

cordance with formal procedures establish-

ed by the respective receiving jurisdictions;

provided, however, that such procedures

shall not alter the distribution of sludges

among the respective jurisdictions as set

forth herein.

The parties hereto recognize that a regional

agreement in required prior to the com-

mencement of operation of the advance

wastewater treatment processes at the Blue

Plains Plant in order to dispose adequately

of the digested and undigested sludge which

will be generated from the additional treat-

ment processes at the Plant. It is anticipated

that the installation and operation of all

AWT treatment at the Blue Plains Plant will

generate approximately 2,400 tons per day

of sludge. The parties will agree, on or

before July 1, 1976, on a permanent

metropolitan-wide equitable disposal plan

which will require the parties hereto to ac-

77a

cept sludge, whether digested, undigested,

or both, on a fair share basis to be affective

as soon as possible a*ter said Agreement is

achieved, but no later than December 31,

1977.

(e) In the event that there is any dispute as to

the distribution of raw and/or digested

sludges, or unmarketable products produc-

ed therefrom, among Montgomery, Prince

George’s and Fairfax Counties during the in-

terim period, the algebraic expressions set

forth in Appendix D shail control such

distribution.

Conference Procedure

Technical representatives of all parties shall meet

in the first week of January, April, July and Oc-

tober of each year to review the watewater treat-

ment programs within the Washington

Metropolitan Area. The october meeting will in-

clude the principals of the parties hereto. The

quarterly meetings shall be arranged by the Ex-

ecutive Director of the Metropolitan Washington

Council of Governments. By written notice of at

least 5 days, any of the parties hereto may call a

special meeting if it feels conditions warrant im-

mediate action. The user jurisdictions signatory

hereto agree to meet, as provided above, before

any future litigation concerning the subject mat-

ter of this Agreement is commenced by any user

jurisdiction signatory hereto against any other

party hereto. No meeting shall be required as a

condition precedent to litigation if such a

meeting cannot be held within 30 calendar days

78a

of the date on which the request for the meeting

was made to all parties hereto.

10. As a signatory party to this Agreement, the En-

vironmental Protection Agency in no respect

waives its authority or obligations under the

Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.

§ 1251, ef seq., including its authority under

Subsection 402(h) of that Act, or any other ap-

plicable Federal statute. This Agreement shall

not affect nor alter the terms of any National.

Pgliutant Discharge Elimination System Permit

which may be issued for the discharge or

discharge which are the subjects of this Agree-

ment.

This Agreement shall become effective on June 13,

1974.

WITNESS the following signatures of the parties by

their duly-authorized agents.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

By: /s/ Illegible Date: June 13, 1974

illegible June 13, 1974

WASHINGTON SUBURBAN SANITARY

COMMISSION

By: /s/ Illegible Date: June 10, 1974

Ilegible June 13, 1974

MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAND

By: /s/ Illegible Date: June 13, 1974

Illegible June 14, 1974

PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY, MARYLAND

79a

By: /s/ Illegible Date: June 14, 1974

Illegible June 17, 1974

STATE OF MARYLAND

By: /s/ Illegible Date: June 13, 1974

MARYLAND ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES

By: /s/ Illegible Date: June 13, 1974

FAIRFAX COUNTY, VIRGINIA

By: /s/ Illegible Date: June 13, 1974

Illegible June 13, 1974

STATE WATER CONTROL BOARD,

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

By: /s/ Illegible Date: June 13, 1974

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION AGENCY

By: /s/ Illegible Date: June 13, 1974

Illegible June 13, 1974

80a

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES

AND ORDINANCES

Constitutional Provisions

AMENDMENT X

The powers not delegated to the United States by th

Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reser

ed to the States respectively, or to the people.

Statutes

28 U.S.C. §2283. Stay of State Court Proceedings

A court of the United States may not grant an injun

tion to stay proceedings in a State court except as express

authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in a

of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effeciuate its jud

ments. (June 25, 1948. c. 646, §1, 62 Stat. 968)

33 U.S.C. §1251. Congressional declaration of goals ai

policy

(a) The objective of this Act is to restore and maintain t

chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Natio1

8la

waters. In order to achieve this objective it is hereby

declared that, consistent with the provisions of this Act —

(1) it is the national goal that the discharge of

pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by

1985;

(2) it is the national goal that wherever attainable, an

interim goal of water quality which provides for the pro-

tection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife

and provides for recreation in and on the water be

achieved by July 1, 1983;

(3) it is the national policy that the discharge of toxic

pollutants in toxic amounts be prohibited;

(4) it is the national policy that Federal financial

assistance be provided to construct publicly owned

waste treatment works;

(5) it is the national policy that areawide waste treat-

ment management planning processes be developed and

implemented to assure adequate control of sources of

pollutants in each State; and

(6) it is the national policy that a major research and

demonstration effort be made to develop technology

necessary to eliminate the discharge of pollutants into

the navigate waters, waters of the contiguous zone, and

the oceans.

(b) It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve,

and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of

States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, to plan

the development and use (including restoration, preserva-

tion, and enhancement) of land and water resources, and

82a

to consult with the Administrator in the exercise of his

authority under this Act. It is the policy of Congress that

the States manage the construction grant program under

this Act and implement the permit programs under sec-

tions 402 and 404 of this Act [33 USC §§ 1342, 1344]. It is

further the policy of the Congress to support and aid

research relating to the prevention, reduction, and

elimination of pollution, and to provide Federal tech-

nical services and financial aid to State and interstate

agencies and municipalities in connection with the preven-

tion, reduction, and elimination of pollution.

(c) It is further the policy of Congress that the President,

acting through the Secretary of State and such national

and international organizations as he determines appro-

priate, shall take such action as may be necessary to insure

that to the fullest extent possible all foreign countries shall

take meaningful action for the prevention, reduction, and

elimination of pollution in their waters and in interna-

tional waters and for the achievement of goals regarding

the elimination of discharge of pollutants and the im-

provement of water quality to at least the same extent as

the United States does under its laws.

(d) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the

Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency

(hereinafter in this Act called “Administrator”) shall ad-

minister this Act.

(e) Public participation in the development, revision, and

enforcement of any regulation, standard, effluent limita-

tion, plan, or program established by the Administrator or

any State under this Act shall be provided for, encourag-

ed, and assisted by the Administrator and the States. The

Administrator, in cooperation with the States, shall de-

velop and publish regulations specifying minimum guide-

lines for public participation in such process.

83a

(f) It is the national policy that to the maximum extent

possible the procedures utilized for implementing this Act

shall encourage the drastic minimization of paperwork

and interagency decision procedures, and the best use of

available manpower and funds, so as to prevent needless

duplication and unnecessary delays at all levels of govern-

ment.

(g) It is the policy of Congress that the authority of each

State to allocate quantities of water within its jurisdiction

shall not be superseded, abrogated or otherwise impaired

by this Act. It is the further policy of Congress that

nothing in this Act shall be construed to supersede or

abrogate rights to quantities of water which have been

established by any State. Federal agencies shall co-operate

with State and local agencies to develop comprehensive

solutions to prevent, reduce and eliminate pollution in

concert with programs for managing water resources.

(June 30, 1948, ch 758, Title 1, § 101, as added, Oct. 18,

1972, P.L. 92-500, § 2, 86 Stat. 816; Dec. 27, 1977, P.L.

95-217, §§ 5(a), 26(b), 91 Stat. 1567.)

33 USC § 1252. Comprehensive programs for water

pollution control

(a) Preparation and development. The Administrator

shall, after careful investigation, and in cooperation with

other Federal agencies, State water pollution control agen-

cies, interstate agencies, and the municipalities and in-

dustries involved, prepare or develop comprehensive pro-

grams for preventing, reducing, or eliminating the pollu-

tion of the navigable waters and ground waters and im-

proving the sanitary condition of surface and under-

ground waters. In the development of such comprehensive

programs due regard shall be given to the improvements

84a

which are necessary to conserve such waters for the protec-

tion and propagation of fish and aquatic life and wildlife,

recreational purposes, and the withrawal of such waters

for public water supply, agricultural, industrial, and other

purposes. For the purpose of this section, the Adminis-

trator is authorized to make joint investigations with any

such agencies of the condition of any waters in any State

or States, and of the discharges of any sewage, industrial

wastes, or substance which may adversely affect such

waters.

(b) Planning for reservoirs; storage for regulation of

streamflow. (1) In the survey or planning of any reser-

voir by the Corps of Engineeers, Burcau of Reclama-

tion, or other Federal agency, consideration shall be

given to inclusion of storage for regulation of stream-

flow, except that any such storage and water releases

shall not be provided as a substitute for adequate treat-

ment or other methocs of controlling waste at the

source.

(2) The need for and the value of storage for regulation

of streamflow (other than for water quality) ir cluding

but not limited to navigation, salt water intrusion,

recreation, aesthetics, and fish and wildlife, shall be

determined by the Corps of Engineers, Bureau of Recla-

mation, or other Federal agencies.

(3) The need for, the value of, and the impact of,

storage for water quality control shall be determined by

the Administrator, and his views on these matters shail

be set forth in any report or presentation to Congress

proposing authorization or construction of any reser-

voir including such storage.

(4) The value of such storage shall be taken into ac-

count in determinilng the economic value of the entire

85a

project of which it is a part, and costs shall be allocasted

to the purpose of regulation of streamflow in a manner

which will insure that all project purposes, share equi-

tably in the benefits of multiple-purpose construction.

(5) Costs of regulation of streamflow features incor-

porated in any Federal reservoir or other impoundment

under the provisions of this Act shall be determined and

the beneficiaries identified and if the benefits are

widespread or national in scope, the costs of such

features shall be nonreimbursable.

(6) No license granted by the Federal Power Commis-

sion [Federal Energy Regulatory Commission] for a hy-

droelectric power project shall include storage for

regulation of streamflow for the purpose of water quali-

ty control unless the Administrator shall recommend its

inclusion and such reservoir storage capacity shall not

exceed such proportion of the total storage required for

the water quality control plan as the drainage area of

such reservoir bears to the drainage area of the river

basin or basins involved in such water quality control

plan.

(c) Basins; grants to State agencies. (1) The Admin-

istrator shall, at the request of the Governor of a State,

or a majority of the Governors when more than one

State is involved, make a grant to pay not to exceed 50

per centum of the administrative expenses of a planning

agency for a period not to exceed three years, which

period shall begin after the date of enactment of the

Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of

1972 [enacted Oct. 18, 1972], if such agency provides

for adequate representation of appropriate State, in-

terstate, local, or (when appropriate) international in-

terests in the basin or portion thereof involved and is

capable of developing an effective, comprehensive

86a

water quality control plant for a basin or portion

thereof.

(2) Each planning agency receiving a grant under this

subsection shall develop a comprehensive pollution con-

trol plan for the basin or portion thereof which —

(A) is consistent with any applicable w

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