Record and brief — Prince George's County v. United States
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gi- 4 ¢ 2 FI LED
SEP 8 1981
a ALEXANDEASL. STEVAS,
ee a DLERK
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1981
PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY, MARYLAND
Petitioners,
Vv.
UNITED STATES CF AMERICA, ET AL.,
Respondents
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
PETITION
ROBERT B. OSTROM
County Attorney, Counsel of Record
MICHAEL O. CONNAUGHTON
Deputy County Attorney
ROBERT H. DRUMMER
Associate County Attorney
Attorneys for Petitioner
$104 County Administration Building
Upper Marlboro, Maryland 20870
(301) 952-4124
ae my eee emma me a em a a
THE CASILLAS PRESS. INC ~1717 K Street N W —Waestungton. 0. C ~223-1220
(i)
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether a federal district court order issued pursuant
to the Clean Water Act requiring a state agency to pur-
chase a specific land site in the State of Maryland and
develop thereon a sludge composting facility, without
regard for state law governing the development of such
facilities, violates the principles of federalism embodied in
the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution?
2. Whether a federal district court order enjoining a
state agency from complying with a Maryland state court
order and enjoining all parties from initiating further state
court proceedings violates the federal Anti-Injunction
Act, 28 U.S.. § 2283, which protects the independence of
state courts?
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
The parties to this proceeding are: the United States of
America; the State of Maryland; the Commonwealth of
Virginia; the District of Columbia; the State Water Con-
trol Board of Virginia; Prince George’s County,
Maryland; Montgomery County, Maryland; Fairfax
County; Virginia; and the Washington Suburban Sanitary
Commission.
(iii)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
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of) -Rithy fe cere i
i a ade cnbaa teed enienetaes csewen ili
DD ccc cb vckbeeacsebennees teeaenen ili
i ce lal oe cha sebenesaakeoseetson I
tn. lacheaganel nds aeeese. sébiethatenaebaesees 2
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES .......... 2
ee EE ovo ccccsesesesbasbectuéndgenenn 2
BASIS FOR FEDERAL JURISDICTION .................0055. 8
REASONS FOR GRANTING THIS WRIT ...............6645. 8
PE .. .vecusdabun die dhnwaseevebesésoss od0%ences 21
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Page
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America v. Richman Bros.,
0665s ceca che duesyasadabensnathueeens 14
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281 (1970) .. 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20
Baker v. Gotz,
Be a CEP: GEOUD ov ccc ccccccccccecccenccceces 14
(iv)
City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan,
el i a i i che 6ocdeeeunteeeeees 11
Denver-Greeley Valley Water Users Association v.
McNeil, 131 F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1942) ....... 0... ccc eee 19
Doe v. Ceci,
EEE, SEED 6. ooo ccbs0bteccecstcecedouse 17,18
Harkrader v. Wadley,
ee ee Se Te aba eke ene aengenes s
Grenchik v. Mandel,
ES CUED g co wdcccceccbuvassecebssoves 20
Kegonsa Joint Sanitary District v. City of Stoughton,
87 Wis.2d 131, 274 N.W.2d 598 (1979) ... 0... cece eee ees 11
Kline v. Burke Construction Co.,
EE tou 2s ccc yan ceuebesnseesueesesees 20
Lamb Enterprises v. Kiroff,
EE, CED nc ocvccccuceusedevedvceseceses 14
Mitchum vy. Foster,
a ee eeGda we ke 13,14
National League of Cities v. Usery,
IE 5 os ou 60sbocebecectceeayeuces 9, 10, 11, 12
Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co.,
i 26s eee aeaeh hones es eee eeeiesas 13
Reines Distributors, Inc. v. Admiral Credit Corp.
182 F.Supp. 226 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), reversed on other
grounds, 319 F.2d 609 (2nd Cir. 1963) 2... 0... cece ee 13
Roth v. Bank of the Commonwealth,
EE, CEE ooo oncccctéébbseebecnccnsnesone 14
Samuel C. Ennis & Co., Inc. v. Woodmar Realty Co.,
I SL «ccc coc ueeneesonsonccssecenecencs 15
(v)
State of Oklahoma ex rel. Wilson v. Blankenship,
live ceenwebessteeueesdcvess 15
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,
Be er 20
Toucey v. New York Life Insurance Co.,
Da ae c.g ye 964 40:6 0066s 60560060009 15
Town of Sutton v. Water Supply and Pollution Control
Commission, 116 N.H. 154, 355 A.2d 867 (1976) ............. 11
Train v. City of New York,
ls SPEED ov ccc wrewsvccccccccccvecccovececeveces 11
United States v. Ashland Oil & Transportation Co.,
a eT Es CEE 66 cc ccc dcccccececscsssesvcceces 9
Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp.,
SUEDE oo hob bccccndoccccsecoceceseseues 13, 19, 20
Woods Exploration & Production Co. v. Aluminum Co.
of America, 438 F.2d 1286 (Sth Cir. 1971) ................ 15, 16
Constitutional Provisions
Constitution of the United States
EEE Lo. <5, sepa eeee6600beessdeebesseeeese 8,9, 10
Constitution of the United States
I ns ic boe beech eee oesbeseseeesecooses 17
Statutes
CC PEPPOPTETTTTTLTTT TUTE TT TTT TTT TTT .2
eels. sce auneenceseh000reseeetees 8
EE So onnd.weddanes oe seenesesses 8, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19
i ic cteccdenesecceenessiuecves 3,8,9
(vi)
Miscellaneous
7 Moore’s FeperAt Practice 4 60 (2d ed. 1979) ............... 14
Senate Rep. No. 92-414, 92nd Congress, Ist Sess. 1
GROUND cccccccchuscoghoudseecuseeebeedpadeneeel 11
17 WriGut, MILLER & Cooper, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PUG GE GP ONOTE «cccccccéscsduccebieteuueee 19, 20
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1981
N EE
PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY, MARYLAND
Petitioners,
Vv.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.,
Respondents
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
PETITION
OPINIONS BELOW
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit consolidated the following cases in the September
Term, 1979, in all of which Prince George’s County,
Maryland was the Intervenor-Defendant, Appellant:
United States of America v. District of Columbia, et al.
(No. 80-1495); State War Control Board, et al. vy.
Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission, et al. (No.
80-1496); State Waiter Control Board, An Agency of the
2
Commonwealth of Virginia, et al. v. Washington Subur-
ban Sanitary Commission, et al. (No. 80-1653); United
States of America v. District of Columbia, et al. (No.
80-1654); State Water Control Board, et al. v. Washington
Suburban Sanitary Commission, et al. (No. 80-1718);
United States of America v. District of Columbia, et al.
(No. 80-1719). This opinion, filed June 10, 1981, has not
yet been reported.
JURISDICTION
The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit was issued on June 10,
1981. This petition has been filed within ninety days of
that date. This Court has jurisdiction to review the deci-
sion of the Court of Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1254(1).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
The following are citations to the Constitutional provi-
sions and statutes which this case involves. Their pertinent
text is set forth in the Appendix to this Petition. Tenth
Amendment, Constitution of the United States; 28 U.S.C.
§ 2283; 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1252, 1311, 1319, 1345, 1370.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This controversy concerns the disposal of sewage sludge
generated at the Blue Plains Sewage Treatment Plant,
which is located at the confluence of the Potomac and
Anacostia Rivers in the District of Columbia.' The prin-
cipal jurisdictions which use the Blue Plains facility are:
the District of Columbia; Montgomery County,
'Sludge is the residual waste material which results from the treat-
ment of sewage. Blue Plains produces approximately 1£00 tons of
sludge per day.
3
Maryland; Prince George’s County, Maryland; and Fair-
fax County, Virginia. On behalf of the two Maryland
counties, the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission
(WSSC), an administrative agency created by the Laws
of Maryland, is the operating agency for water and sewer
disposal.? At issue is the division of authority between the
federal and state courts to intervene in various aspects of
sludge disposal.
The groundwork of this controversy was laid in 1973
when the Virgina Water Control Board, Fairfax County
and the District of Columbia brought suit in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia
(hereafter the district court) against the WSSC. The suit
alleged that WSSC was exceeding its allotted use of the
Blue Plains plant, thus causing the plant to discharge in-
adequately treated sewage into the Potomac River. The
United States intervened as party plaintiff, alleging that
this excess flow was polluting the river in violation of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1973, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251 et seq. (Clean Water Act). Montgomery County,
Prince George’s County, and the State of Maryland in-
tervened as parties defendant.
With this suit as an impetus, the user jurisdictions
entered into the Blue Plains Sewage Treatment Plant
Agreement of 1974; it provided that each jurisdiction ex-
cept the District of Columbia would accept responsibility
for disposing a proportionate share of sludge, that a per-
manent disposal plan would be devised by June 1976, and
that the plan would be implemented by December 1977.
It appearing that the agreed-upon schedule would not be
met, the United States filed a complaint in the district
?The policies of WSSC are determined by six Commissioners, three
from each county. Its budget is subject to the approval of both county
governments.
4
court in November 1977 alleging that the 1974 Consent
Decree had been violated, and that the failure to devise a
permanent sludge disposal plan would violate the Clean
Water Act. A Consent Order extended the period of com-
pliance with the 1974 Agreement to September 1975.
In May 1978, upon motion of the United States and
evidence that a permanent sludge disposal plan was not
forthcoming, the district court entered an order requiring
each jurisdiction to designa.« a site, any site, within its
boundaries for sludge disposal. Montgomery County
designated “Site 2,” a 115-acre undeveloped tract in the
Montgomery Industrial Park, adjacent to the Prince
George’s County border and within one mile of approx-
imately 25,000 Montgomery and Prince George’s County
residents.? On July 10, 1978 the district court entered an
order reflecting the sites designated by the counties, order-
ing that the sites be developed for sludge disposal and
made operational by July 1, 1979. The range of this 1978
order is now in question.
The WSSC and Montgomery County immediately in-
itiated the development of Site 2, filing condemnation pro-
ceedings to acquire the land in October 1978. The 1979-1980
budget adoped by WSSC in May 1979 included $16.9
million for the acquisition and construction of the facility.
Prince George’s County opposed the development of
Site 2 as a sludge composting facility. Its position was and
continues to be that, for a number of reasons, an alter-
native location would be more appropriate. A title ex-
amination of Montgomery County’s designated site had
‘Site 2 was designated as a composting site, where sludge and wood
chips would be mixed and left in piles to aerate for 35-45 days. The
Calverton Citizens Association, representing area residents, filed a
report with the district court alleging that such a use would subject
them to health hazards.
5 ®
revealed restrictive covenants which prevented the propos-
ed use of the tract.* Condemnation would cost three to
five million dollars and take three to five years to com-
plete. The added time and expense of acquisition would
affect Prince George’s County, which pays sewer usage
and water consumption rates to WSSC, and its residents.
Furthermore, the funds that WSSC provided in its 1979-80
budget for Site 2 land acquisition had never been given the
required approval by the County, yet WSSC was about to
expend those funds illegally to purchase the site. Prince
George’s County, therefore, sought to enjoin the acquisi-
tion of Site 2 in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s
County.’ The court found that it had concurrent jurisdic-
tion over the controversy, but denied the injunction on
November 27, 1979.
The WSSC reversed its position shortly thereafter,
presumably on the basis of its General Counsel’s opinion
that the covenants on the land were enforceable, and his
recommendation that the condemnation action be aban-
doned. On March 12, 1980 the WSSC Commissioners, in
particular the three from Prince George’s County, voted to
delete Site 2 funding from its 1986-81 budget.
Montgomery County continued to advocate for the
development of Site 2, despite its acknowledgment that the
covenants on the land would make it difficult to operate a
‘The covenants precluded use of the land in any manner which
would create objectionale odors, genrate dense smoke or high levels
of noise, or constitute a “dump or sanitary landfill.”
Prince George's County v. WSSC, No. E-7692 (Circuit Court for
Prince George’s County, Maryland, filed Nov. 27, 1979), appealed to
the Court of Special Appeals, No. 122, September Term 1980 (the
budget suit).
6
composting facility at that site. Its response to WSSC’s
vote to delete acquisition funds from the budget was to
turn to the federal court — on April 4, 1980 Montgomery
County moved the district court to compel WSSC to
restore those funds to its budget. A rather peremptory
hearing was held during which no evidence was received
on the cost of acquiring the covenants. Nonetheless, on
April 25, 1980 the district court ordered WSSC to reinsert
in its budget the funds to acquire Site 2. The authority for
issuing this April 25 order is now being questioned.
Following the April 25 order, the WSSC Commissioners
convened a meeting and a vote was taken to reinsert Site 2
monies in the budget. Because timing and procedure pro-
blems could not be settled, the three Commissioners from
Prince George’s County refused to vote. Again
Motgomery County turned to the district court, moving
that the three Commissioners be cited for contempt. The
district court refused to do so, but did rule on June 4, 1980
that the restoration of funds was a purely ministerial act
(pursuant to the April 25 order) which required no vote,
and ordered WSSC’s General Manager to do it.* The
federal court’s authority for issuing this June 4 order is
now being questioned.
Prince George’s County continued to oppose Mont-
gomery County’s selection of Site 2 because of the time,
expense and illegal means involved in acquiring the land
and developing it for sludge disposal. Since these objec-
tions concerned issues of state law, two tangential state
court actions were initiated — both prior to the 1980
orders of the federal court. The first alleged that the state
sewage sludge permit was invalid and that the public
*The funds were reinserted on June 11, 1980. On June 13 WSSC of-
fered $6,000,000 to purchase the site; the covenants were not purchas-
ed.
7
health and environment were not adequately protected; this
action was never ruled upon.’ In the second, Prince George’s
County sought relief against WSSC, alleging that because
of the restrictive covenants, by acquiring Site 2 the WSSC
would be spending public monies for land which could not
be used for the very public purposes for which it was being
condemned, and that this would amount to a breach of
fiduciary duty on the part of the WSSC Commissioners. *
The Circuit Court issued an order on June 17, 1980, at
which time it was fully aware of the federal court’s April
25 order to reinsert Site 2 funds in WSSC’s budget, and its
June 4 order effecting the same. The state court issued a
temporary injunction preventing WSSC from acquiring
Site 2 until the covenant suit could be heard two months
hence. This June 17 order, it is urged, should have been
given effect.
Instead of complying with the state court injunction, the
WSSC immediately turned to the federal court. On June
27, 1980 the district court issued an expansive order which
enjoined WSSC from complying with the June 17 state
court injunction; ordered WSSC to expeditiously proceed
to develop the compost facility at Site 2; ordered Prince
George’s County to withdraw from the three state court
proceedings involving Site 2; enjoined all parties from in-
itiating any state court proceeding which would frustrate
the district court’s orders; and ordered that any modifica-
’Calverton Citizens Association v. Buck, et al., No. E-70934 (Cir-
cuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland, filed April 16, 1980)
(the permit suit).
*Prince George's County v. WSSC, No. E-8512 (Circuit Court for
Prince George’s County, Maryland, filed April 16, 1980) (the cove-
nant suit).
tion of the federal court’s orders was to be sought only in
federal court. Prince George’s County sought a stay of this
order which was denied by the district court on June 27
and by the Court of Appeals on July 3. On June 10, 1981
the June 27, 1980 district court injunction was upheld by
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
Prince George’s County alleges that the expansive
orders of the district court violated principles of
federalism embodied in the Tenth Amendment of the Con-
stitution, as well as the federal Anti-Injunction Act. It
amounted to a radical intrusion on state prerogatives.
BASIS FOR FEDERAL JURISDICTION
Federal jurisdiction in the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia was originally based on 28
U.S.C. § 1332 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202. The United
States intervened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1345 and 33
U.S.C. § 1319, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
of 1973.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THIS WRIT
Important questions of federalism and state sovereignty
are posed by this case. The Court of Appeals failed to
recognize the state court proceedings for what they were
— separate and distinct from the federal proceedings, con-
cerned solely with intrastate issues. The various orders of
the district court constituted an unconstitutional en-
croachment on state rights in violation of the Tenth
Amendment, and violated the federal Anti-Injunction
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283. It is the duty of the Supreme Court
to guard the states from encroachment upon their reserved
rights by the federal government or the federal courts.
Harkrader v. Wadley, 172 U.S. 148, 162 (1898).
9
Federal jurisdiction was originally invoked in this con-
troversy under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of
1973, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seg. (Clean Water Act). Insofar
as the Act controls the type and amount of pollution that
may be discharged either directly or indirectly into the
navigable water of the states, it has been held to be a pro-
per exercise of the commerce power of Congress. United
States v. Ashland Oil and Transportation Co., 504 F.2d
1317 (6th Cir. 1974).
The extent to which the commerce power may be used to
impose federal standards on the sovereign states was ad-
dressed in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833 (1976). This Court held that Congress may not exer-
cise its power Over interstate commerce “to force directly
upon the States its choices as to how essential decisions
regarding the conduct of integral governmental functions
are to be made.” 426 U.S. at 855. In Usery the extension of
the Fair Labor Standard Act’s minimum wage and max-
imum hour provisions to state employees was held invalid;
to require state compliance would be an impermissible in-
trusion into the protected area of state sovereignty. The
power to determine the hours and wages of state
employees was an “integral” state function, essential to the
separate and independent existence of the states. Applica-
tion of the standards usurped state discretion and displac-
ed state policies regarding the manner in which the
delivery of governmental services would be structured.
The decision confirms that the principle of federalism em-
bodied within the Tenth Amendment restricts the manner
in which the commerce power may be exercised.
In the case at bar the federal court, under the auspices
of the Clean Water Act, enforced the provisions that Act
10
in a manner that drastically invaded state sovereignty.
Under the Usery doctrine the decision may not stand.
The issue is narrower than the Court of Appeals would
have it appear. Certainly the federal government has
plenary power over environmental protection, including
water pollution, and the federal court had authority to re-
quire user jurisdictions of the Blue Plains facility to devise
a plan to dispose of sludge in order to comply with federal
requirements. However, the question at the heart of the
conflict, and the one with which the state court was in-
timately involved, was simply where in Montgomery
County the composting facility should be developed. The
question of whether such a facility should be built was
properly resolved by the federal court; the question of
where it should be located was purely a state issue.
The state court sought to wrestle with issues concerning
the effect the proposed use of Site 2 would have on its
citizens, including health and environmental safety, waste
of public funds, and breach of public trust. But the federal
court usurped the state’s ability to make the above con-
siderations. Using the Clean Water Act as a theoretical
and jurisdictional basis, the federal court went beyond the
limits of its authority under that Act, as limited by Usery
and the Tenth Amendment. It ordered that these funds be
expended for the acquisition of Site 2, regardless of the
waste of public funds which might be entailed should that
site not be usable for its public purpose. Finally, the
federal court prohibited further challenges to the develop-
ment of Site 2 in the state courts, thereby eliminating the
power of the state to consider vital concerns for the public
health and safety of its citizens which surround the pur-
chase and use of the site for its proposed purpose.
The federal order leaves no discretion to the State of
Maryland, its agencies (such as the WSSC), or its political
11
subdivisions. WSSC must provide funds to acquire Site 2;
the tract land in Montgomery Industrial Park must be con-
demned; this land must be developed as a sludge com-
posting facility. Any state or county concerns are preclud-
ed. Surely the federal court’s authority to enforce the
Clean Water Act does not extend so intrusively into in-
trastate concerns. This is similar to the type of interference
with “integral government functions” which this Court
found abhorrent in Usery.
The federal court’s actions appear even more intrusive
when considered in light of the federal/state interplay con-
templated by Congress in enacting the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act of 1973. While Congress did indeed
establish a “comprehensive program for controlling and
abating water pollution,” City of Milwaukee vy. Illinois
and Michigan, _._. U.S. ___., 101 S.Ct. 1784, 1793
(1981), citing Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 37
(1975), the Act is not “exclusive. Rather, it “contemplates
a shared authority between the Federal government and
the individual States.” City of Milwaukee v. [linois and
Michigan, supra., 101 S.Ct. at 1805 (Justice Blackmun,
dissenting). Its purpose is stated this way:
“The states shall lead the national effort to pre-
vent, control and abate water pollution . . . the
Federal role has been limited to support of, and
assistance to, the States.” Senate Report No.
92-414, 92nd Congress, Ist Session, p. ! (1971).
The Act has been interpreted to grant concurrent jurisdic-
tion over water pollution to both state and federal courts.
Town of Sutton v. Water Supply and Pollution Control
Commission, 116 N.H. 154, 355 A.2d 867 (1976); Kegonsa
Joint Sanitary District v. City of Stoughton, 87 Wis.2d
131, 274 N.W.2d 598 (1979).
The reliance by the Court of Appeals on the balancing
12
test espoused in Justice Blackmun’s concurring opinion in
Usery is misplaced, for it ignores the unambiguous deci-
sion of the Court. Even if Justice Blackmun’s view is
adopted, however, it cannot be used to justify the intrusive
federal court actions taken in the present case. As Justice
Blackmun interprets the Usery decision, a balancing ap-
proach is mandated: states are protected from federal in-
trusion only where the state interest is outweighed by the
federal interest -— where the federal interest is
“demonstrably greater and where state compliance with
imposed federal standards is essential.” 326 U.S. at 856.
Here there was no violation of federal standards. On the
contrary, there is every indication that the state courts
were taking measures to enable the counties and WSSC to
comply fully with federal standards. If Site 2 had been
purchased and the quagmire of anticipated problems
arisen to prevent its development or use for sludge
disposal, the federal purpose would have been frustrated
and federal standards violated. If, instead, the state courts
had been allowed to anticipate and resolve such problems,
effective and more immediate compliance would be en-
sured. In other words, state court resolution of the permit,
budget and covenant disputes might have led to the con-
clusion that an alternative location be selected for the
disposal of Montgomery County’s proportionate share of
sludge from Blue Plains. It might have led to the conclu-
sion that Site 2 was appropriate for this purpose. Either
way, the state court is simply assisting the federal court in
its quest that a suitable disposal site be made operational
as soon as possible. There is no conflict with federal stan-
dards. There is no contradiction between state and federal
interests. Both can, and should, be permitted to coexist,
each without interference from the other.
It is desirable that this Court review the decision of the
13
Court of Appeals to determine the extent to which a
federal court may intrude on the sovereignty of the state in
order to effect compliance with the Clean Water Act, an
act promulgated under the commerce power of the United
States Congress.
Il.
The Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, provides:
“A court of the United States may not grant an
injunction to stay proceedings in a state court ex-
cept as expressly authorized by Act of Congress,
or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to
protect or effectuate its judgments.”
The purpose of the Act, which rests on the fundamental
constitutional independence of the states and their courts,
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281, 287 (1970), is to
“prevent needless friction betwen state and federal
courts.” Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 232, n. 10
(1972), citing Oklahoma Packing Co. V. Oklahoma Gas &
Electric Co., 309 U.S. 4, 9 (1940). Its prohibition forms a
“formidable barrier” to the use of federal court injunc-
tions to stay state court proceedings. Reines Distributors,
Inc. v. Admiral Credit Corp., 182 F.Supp. 226, 227
(S.D.N.Y. 1960), reversed on other grounds, 319 F.2d 609
(2nd Cir. 1963).
This court has consistently and emphatically required
strict compliance with the statute, describing it as an “ab-
solute prohibition” against any injunction of any state
court proceeding that does not fall within one of the three
specifically defined exceptions to the Act. Vendo Co.v.
Lekiro-Vend Corp., 443 U.S. 623, 630 (1977). Any doubts
about the propriety of a federal injunction against a state
14
court proceeding “should be resolved in favor of permit-
ting the state courts to proceed in an orderly fashion to
finally determine the controversy.” At/antic Coast Line R.
Co., supra., 398 U.S. at 297. It is “clear beyond cavil that
the prohibition is not to be whittled away by judicial im-
provisation.” Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America
v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511, 514 (1955).
a.
The “protect or effectuate its judgments” exception to
§ 2283 was used by the district court as a basis for issuing
the June 27, 1980 order enjoining compliance with a state
court injunction and enjoining the initiation and prosecu-
tion of state court proceedings. Known also as the
“relitigation” exception, there is some question as to its
breadth and intent.
The exception has been described as a means of protec-
ting the party who succeeded in federal court from being
put through the expense and inconvenience of relitigating
the same issue. Baker v. Gotz, 415 F.Supp. 1243, 1250
(D.Del. 1976). Its intent, it has been said, is to affirm the
power of the federal courts to enjoin the relitigation of
cases in state courts which have been “fully and finally”
adjudicated at the federal level. Reviser’s Note to 28
U.S.C. § 2283; 7 Moore’s FEDERAL Practice ¢ 60, 39(2)
at 627 (2nd ed. 1979); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225
Roth v. Bank of the Commonwealth, 583 F.2d 527 (6th
Cir. 1978) citing Lamb Enterprises v. Kiroff, 549 F.2d
1052, 1061 (6th Cir. 1977).
For the most part the courts are clear in their applica-
tion of the exception. It is used simply to solve the pro-
blem of multiple litigation of the same cause of action.
Where allegedly conflicting lawsuits in both state and
federal courts present essentially different issues and dif-
ferent causes of action, an injunction to stay the state
15
court proceedings will not lie. State of Oklahoma ex rel.
Wilson v. Blankenship, 447 F.2d 687, 692 (10th Cir. 1971);
Woods Exploration & Production Co. v. Aluminum Co.
of America, 438 F.2d 1286 (Sth Cir. 1971); Samuel C. En-
nis & Co., Inc. v. Woodmar Realty Co., 542 F.2d 45 (7th
Cir. 1976). As Justice Reed wrote in his dissenting opinion
in Toucey v. New York Life Insurance Co., 314 U.S. 118
(1941), these injunctions are tolerated only because, in the
alternative:
“... a federal judgment entered perhaps after
years of expense in money and energy and after
the production of thousands of pages of evidence
comes to nothing that is final. It is to be only the
basis for a plea of res judicata which is to be ex-
amined by another court, unfamiliar with the
record already made, to determine whether the
issues were or were not settled by the former *.d-
judication.” 314 U.S. at 144.
If this interpretation of the intent and application of the
“protect and effectuate” exception had been applied to the
case at bar, it would have been clear that the state court was
not relitigating issues which had been “fully and finally”
adjudicated at the federal court. The causes of action dif-
fered in each court. In the federal suit the cause of action
was to prevent violations of the Clean Water Act caused
by the discharge of pollutants from the Blue Plains Plant.
The controversies with which the state court was involved
included protection of public revenues, enforceability and
compensability of covenants under state law, and the
siatutory right of counties to approve the budget of a state
agency. None of these issues was considered by the federal
court.
Certainly none of these state issues had been “fully and
16
finally” adjudicated by the federal court. Although the
district court order of July 10, 1978 did address Site 2, the
reference was made out of deference to Montgomery
County’s designation of this particular site. The 1978
order was result-oriented, not site-oriented.® The result it
sought to achieve was the disposal of sludge from Blue
Plains so that the Clean Water Act would not be violated;
its focus was not on where the disposal sites would be
located. The order provided for compliance with state law,
and the implication was clear that if Site 2 did not pass
muster under state law, an alternative site could be chosen.
Judge Goldberg of the Fifth Circuit describes the “pro-
tect and effectuate” exception as a means of assuring the
winner in federal court that he “will not be deprived of the
fruits of his victory by a later contrary state
judgment. . . .” Woods Exploration & Pro. Co., supra.,
438 F.2d at 1312. The heart of the 1978 federal court
order, the “fruit” if you will, is that Montgomery County
proceed expeditiously to develop and begin operating a
sludge disposal site. Any state court decisions would be
collateral, and not contrary, to that order, and would
deprive neither Montgomery County nor the WSSC of the
“fruits” of their 1978 federal victory. The absence of a
relitigation problem, therefore, precludes an injuction of
state court proceedings.
The Court of Appeals in the case at bar did not adopt
this interpretation of the “protect and effectuate” excep-
tion. Instead of looking to determine whether the issues
raised in the state court had already been raised and fully
litigated at the federal level, the court looked to the effect
*Although the April 25 and June 4, 1980 orders of the district court
did refer specifically to Site 2 in mandating that WSSC include funds
for its purchase in the budget, these orders were allegedly attempts on-
ly to enforce the 1978 order.
17
of the state proceeding on the prior federal judgment. It
apparently found support for this position in this language
from Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., supra, 398 U.S. at 295:
“Both exceptions to the general prohibition of
§ 2283 imply that some federal injunctive relief
may be necessary to prevent a state court from so
interfering with a federal court’s consideration or
disposition of a case as to seriously impair the
federal court’s flexibility and authority to decide
that case.”
This language, however, follows a lengthy discussion of
the “in aid of jurisdiction” exception to § 2283, and it is
doubtful that it was intended to expand the interpretation
of the “protect or effectuate” exception. In context the
language in Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. appears simply to
illuminate the “in aid of” exception, showing its
similarities with the “protect and effectuate” exception and
reasserting its restrictive application.
The Court of Appeals’ reliance on Doe v. Ceci, 517 F.2d
1203 (7th Cir. 1975) is also misplaced, for that case merely
reasserts the long-standing view that injunctions may issue
only to prevent relitigation of matters that have been final-
ly decided by the federal court. In Doe a county hospital’s
policy prohibited the performance of elective abortions.
The federal court enjoined enforcement of the policy as
violative of the Fourteenth Amendment, ordering the defen-
dants to make hospital facilities available for elective
abortions, particularly for Jane Doe, the original, and in-
digent, plaintiff. A state court issued an injunction
restraining the disbursement of county funds to pay for
abortions of indigent women. The federal court then
issued an injunction, preventing the state court judge from
enforcing his injunction against payments. The court’s ra-
tionale was that the original federal order, issued on
behalf of an indigent patient, necessarily contemplated
and required payment for elective abortions from county
funds. The issue of payment, then, had been fully litigated
and the state action could be enjoined.
The case at bar is distinguishable from Doe. Again, the
1978 district court order was resuit-oriented rather than
site-oriented. It anticipated compliance with state law re-
quirements in the purchase and development of Site 2. The
state court’s June 17 temporary injunction on the purchase
of Site 2 until certain state law issues could be resolved did
not, therefore, conflict with the federal court order. Since
these state law issues had not (and could not have) been
litigated, either explicitly or impliedly, in the federal court,
there was no relitigation problem.
Even if a broad interpretation of the “relitigation” ex-
ception is accepted, it cannot be stretched to the limits
adopted by the Court of Appeals in the present case. By
upholding a federal injunction against state court pro-
ceedings which concerned different issues, had not been
litigated in the federal arena, and had only a tangential
relationship to prior federal court orders, the Court of Ap-
peals enlarged the “protect and effectuate” exception to
§ 2283. This Court has warned against such “loose
statutory construction.” Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.,
supra., 398 U.S. at 287.
The Court of Appeals considered it sufficient that the
state court was enjoining one course of conduct which
would have complied with the federal court order (the pur-
chase and development of Site 2). However, other courses
of conduct were available which would have equally com-
plied, namely, the purchase and development of an alter-
native site. It was within the realm of the state court’s
19
jurisdiction to make this determination. The mere fact
that both state and federal courts entertained litigation
concerning Site 2, and that this overlap of jurisdiction pro-
vided an arena in which conflict may have occurred, does
not justify the federal court’s injunction. Denver-Greeley
Valley Water Users Association v. McNeil, 131 F.2d 67, 71
(10th Cir. 1942); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., supra., 398
U.S. at 295 (even unmistakable interference with federal
rights does not justify an injunction of state court pro-
ceedings).
It is desirable that this Court review the analysis, inter-
pretation and application of the “protect and effectuate”
exception to the Anti-Injunction Act applied by the Court
of Appeals to determine if that court has unduly broaden-
ed the exception.
b.
The Court of Appeals added, in a footnote, that the “in
aid of jurisdiction” exception to the Anti-Injunction Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2283, also justified issuance of the June 27,
1980 district court order. This Court has stated that in
order fo# the exception to apply, it is not enough that the
requested injunction be related to the federal jurisdiction
— it must be “necessary in aid of” that jurisdiction. Atlan-
tic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281, 296 (1970) (em-
phasis in the original).
Traditionally the exception has been interpreted to
mean that if an action is in rem, a federal court first ob-
taining jurisdiction over the res can enjoin suits in state
courts involving the same res. 17 WRIGHT, MILLER &
CoopeR, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4225
(1978); Vendo Co. v. Lektro Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623
20
(1977). In the instant case, both federal and state actions
are in personam, therefore, this rationale is inapplicable.
The exception has been extended in recent years in
school desegregation cases, where the federal court has
“taken the controversy in hand and will exercise continu-
ing jurisdiction over it.” 17 WriGHTt, MILLER & CooPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4225 (1978), citing
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,
501 F.2d 383 (4th Cir. 1974) and Grenchik v. Mandel, 373
F.Supp. 1289 (D.Md. 1973). The underlying rationale for
issuing injunctions in these cases, however, is that the
issues being litigated in the state courts could not be
separated from the issues and relief involved in the federal
suits. See Swann, supra. 501 F.2d at 384. This is certainly
not the situation in the present case, and the exception
should not be so extended.
The general rule, which should be applied here, is that in
personam actions may proceed concurrently in state and
federal courts, each without interference from the other.
Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., supra., 433 U.S. at 643.
Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U.S. 226, 230
(1922). It matters not that the same subject-matter is in-
volved, provided each court has jurisdiction over its
respective complaints. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., supra.,
398 U.S. at 297.
Here the state courts properly assumed jurisdiction over
intrastate issues. The federal court had no authority to in-
tervene and the “in aid of jurisdiction” exception to the
Anti-Injunction Act is inapplicable.
CONCLUSION
The Constitution of the United States recognizes and
preserves the autonomy and independence of the states —
21
independence in their judicial as well as legislative depart-
ments. From the beginning this country has maintained
two essentially separate legal systems, each of which pro-
ceeds independently of the other. The rank and authority
of both are equal, and any interference of one by the
other, except as specifically authorized, is an invasion of
the authority of the other. When the federal courts en-
croach on the rights and privileges of state courts, a denial
of state independence is suggested.
In the present case the federal court overstepped the
dividing line and encroached on areas within the realm of
the Maryland courts. Because this amounted to a viola-
tion of both the principles of federalism embodied in the
Tenth Amendment and the Anti-Injunction Act, a writ of
certiorari should issue.
Respectfully submittted,
ROBERT B. CSTROM
County Attorney
MICHAEL O. CONNAUGHTON
Deputy County Attorney
ROBERT H. DRUMMER
Associate County Attorney
xipueddy
etesee 7
81-479 SEP 8 198
No. a ae
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1981
PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY, MARYLAND
Petitioners
Vv.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.
Respondents
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
APPENDIX
ROBERT B. OSTROM
County Attorney, Counsel of Record
MICHAEL O. CONNAUGHTON
Deputy County Attorney
ROBERT H. DRUMMER
Associate County Attorney
Attorneys for Petitioner
5104 County Administration Building
Upper Marlboro, Maryland 20870
(301) 952-4124
THE CASILLAS PRESS. INC. -1717 K Street NW —Wastungton, 0. C.-273-1220
APPENDIX
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Order and Opinion of the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia Circuit,
I ores so i eee ues eeueneee
Order of the Court of Appeals consolidating cases,
PEE cha dbadkocceveckctcendoeeccioeseueonse
Order of the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia denying motion to stay,
Gs Sa es iw Jeulet vie men ae nae o4
Order of the District Court enjoining state proceedings,
ee es ee eee
Order of the District Court to show cause,
i iE ITI SES ee SP a OD eT eRe pry ee
Order of the District Court denying motion to stay,
June 19, 1980 ....... Oe casa akan bien ue so ie
Order of the Circuit Court for Prince George's County,
Maryland, issuing temporary injunction,
PIE 06 do neU CORED E NV WEse TEs eebnnasdecewnén’s
Order of the District Court denying motion for contempt
and ordering reinsertion of funds in budget,
PEE 646 G chen tabard one dneees cogBhrecrene see
Order of the District Court to insert funds in budget,
TE MEE a ca biksduvedeevescsesdeisssiseeccsons
Order of the District Court to designate and develop
sludge disposal facilities,
EA ne ee ee ee eee
Order of the District Court to designate sites,
PE cckene panda uneeden ss iNeeueabaenmokadse
Page
eS
cone ae
Ty
ee
sone ue
(ii)
Consent Decree of the District Court incorporating
Blue Plains Treatment Plant Agreement of 1974,
PEE VoudsRReRCsvereeceveesetcceseucasexesasaue 5Sa
Constitutional Provisions
Tenth Amendment, United States Constitution ................ 80a
Statutes
EEE VOCRdnssddsccissvesepcatesscenceseseseces 80a
PEE SdbeKhedecocecescscecncceeeedseessoueseen 80a
SCT ED uocteterenvedovescccccssecescusescuussscs 83a
EE Cite nS dcaduwderunesesendarenetdncucuesuns 87a
ET di dgindedsdusthiesdsndeNenddnctedcceesens 98a
EE ine navubcudedeconseneveseccessesseees 104a
TD 6 eee ccesecesesccccecccessecesevceveseses 106a
la
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication
in the Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested
to notify the Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be
made before the bound volumes go to press.
United States Court of Apprals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 80-1495
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Vv.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ET AL.
PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MARYLAND,
(INTERVENOR-DEFT.), APPELLANT
No. 80-1496
STATE WATER CONTROL BOARD, ET AL.
Vv.
WASHINGTON SUBURBAN SANITARY COMMISSION, ET AL.
PRINCE GEORGR’S COUNTY, MARYLAND,
(INTERVENOR-DEFT.), APPELLANT
Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment. The
court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out of time.
2a
No. 80-1653
STATE WATER CONTROL BOARD, AN AGENCY OF
THE COMMONWEAL /H OF VIRGINIA, ET AL.
v.
WASHINGTON SUBURBAN SANITARY COMMISSION, ET AL.
PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY, MARYLAND,
(INTERVENOR-DEFT.) , APPELLANT
No. 80-1654
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Vv.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ET AL.
PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY, MARYLAND, APPELLANT
No. 80-1718
STATE WATER CONTROL BOARD, ET AL.
Vv.
WASHINGTON SUBURBAN SANITARY COMMISSION, ET AL.
PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY, MARYLAND, APPELLANT
No. 80-1719
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
¥.
DISTRICT OF COLI™MBIA, ET AL.
PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MARYLAND, APPELLANT
3a
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(D.C. Civil Action Nos. 77-1929 and 1813-73)
Argued April 9, 1981
Decided June 10, 1981
Robert B. Ostrom, County Attorney, Prince George's
County with whom Richard S. Alper and Robert H.
Drummer, Associate County Attorneys were on the brief
for appellant.
Thomas A. Deming, Assistant Attorney General, State
of Maryland for appellee, State of Maryland.
John P. Arness with whom Curtis FE. von Kann, Allan
D. Windt and Henderson J. Brown, 1V, were on the brief
for appellee, Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission.
Rosanne Mayer, Attorney, Department of Justice with
whom James W. Moorman, Assistant Attorney General,
Anne S. Almy and Patrick J. Cafferty, Jr., Attorney, De-
partment of Justice were on the brief, for appellee, United
States of America. Angus Macheth and Donald W.
Stever, Attorney, Department of Justice also entered ap-
pearances for appellee, United States of America.
Marshall Coleman, Attorney General, James E. Ryan,
Jr., Deputy Attorney General and Frederick S. Fisher,
Assistant Attorney General, Commonwealth of Virginia
were on the brief for appellee, Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia, State Water Control Board.
Robert G. Tobin, Jr. Deputy County Attorney, Nathan
J. Greenbaum, Assistant County Attorney, Montgomery
County were on the brief for appellee, Montgomery
County, Maryland.
da
Frank W. Stearns and David T. Stitt, Assistant County
Attorneys also entered appearances for appellee, Fairfax
County, Virginia.
Judith W. Rogers, Corporation Counsel, Joyce M. No-
tarius, Richard G. Wise and Edward L. Curry, Assist-
ant Corporation Counsel were on the brief for appellee,
District of Columbia.
Before: MCGOWAN, TAMM and WALD, Circuit Judges
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WALD.
WALD, Circuit Judge: This appeal is the latest chapter
in an eight-year-old controversy concerning disposal of
sewage sludge generated at the Blue Plains Sewage
Treatment Plant in the District of Columbia. Since the
early 1970’s, the parties to this appeal have struggled
to devise a plan for sludge disposal at sites within the
Washington area jurisdictions which use the Blue Plains
facility. Appellant Prince George’s County (“P.G.
County”) opposes appellee Montgomery County’s selec-
tion of one such site (“Site 2”) for its sludge disposal.
The district court, however, endorsed the selection of
Site 2 in 1978 and ordered the budgeting of funds for
its implementation on April 25, 1980, and June 4, 1980.
In an effort to block that implementation, P.G. County
then instituted a series of state court actions. The dis-
trict court responded by enjoining further state court
proceedings on June 27, 1980. P.G. County argues here
that ie district court orders of April 25 and June 4
exceeucd the court’s authority under the Clean Water
Act, and that the order of June 27, 1980, violates the
Anti-Injunction statute. For the reasons stated below,
we disagree.
I. BACKGROUND
On September 24, 1973, the Virginia Water Control
Board, Fairfax County, and the District of Columbia
brought suit in the United States District Court for the
Sa
District of Columbia against the Washington Suburban
Sanitary Commission (“WSSC")' (Civil Action No.
1813-73). The complaint alleged that WSSC, in violation
of regional agreements, was exceeding its allotted use
of the Blue Plains sewage treatment plant in D.C., thus
causing the plant to discharge inadequately treated sew-
age into the Potomac River.
The United States intervened as a party-plaintiff, al-
leging that excess flow from the WSSC was causing
pollution of the Potomac in violation of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act of 1970, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 ef seq.
Montgomery County, P.G. County, and the State of
Maryland intervened as parties defendant. Plaintiffs
then amended their complaint to request that P.G. and
Montgomery Counties be ordered to comply with another
provision of the regional agreement by designating and
providing sites for the disposal of sludge * generated at
the Blue Plains facility.
Prior to trial the parties entered into the Blue Plains
Sewage Treatment Plant Agreement, which was subse-
quently incorporated into a Consent Decree dated July
29, 1974. The decree provided that the court would re-
tain jurisdiction to enforce the agreement and required
'The WSSC is an agency formed under the laws of Mary-
land to serve the sewage and water supply needs of Mont-
gomery and Prince George’s Counties. The Commission's
policies are determined by six Commissioners, three from
each county. See Section 1-1 of the WSSC Code. Budgets
adopted by the WSSC are subject to the approval of both
county governments. Sections 1-4, 7-1.
* Sludge is the byproduct of the sewage treatment process.
Disposal methods include entrenchment in designated areas
and the composting process for which Site 2 was designated.
The end product of composting may be used as a fertilizer
or compost. The 1974 agreement contemplated that the Blue
Plains plant would generate 2,400 tons per day of sludge
requiring disposal. Joint Appendix at 108.
6a
court approval for any modification of it. The agree-
ment established limits on flows to the plant and pro-
vided that the user jurisdictions in the Washington
metropolitan area would devise a permanent equitable
plan for the disposal of sludge produced at Blue Plains
by June 30, 1976, and would implement the plan by
December 31, 1977. During the interim period the
parties agreed to dispose of sludge in proportion to their
share of sewage flow to the plant.
Despite the requirements of the Consent Decree, the
parties failed to agree on a permanent sludge disposal
plan. On the eve of the expiration date for the interim
plan, the United States filed a complaint in district court
(Civil Action No. 77-1929) on November 9, 1977, alleg-
ing that the District of Columbia, the WSSC, Mont-
gomery County, P.G. County, and Fairfax County had
violated the court’s 1974 order by failing to devise a
permanent sludge management plan. The complaint fur.
ther alleged that the impasse over sludge disposal would
cause the Blue Plains plant to curtail or eliminate treat-
ment of sewage, thus resulting in increased discharges
of pollutants into the Potomac River in violation of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act. Like its prede-
cessor, the 1977 suit led to negotiations culminating in
a consent order, dated January 24, 1978, which extended
the date of the interim period under the 1974 agree-
ment to September 21, 1978, and extended the deadline
for submission of a permanent sludge plan to January
15, 1978.
The user jurisdictions again failed to agree on a
permanent plan. On May 18, 1978, upon motion of the
United States and after hearing, the district court en-
tered an order requiring each jurisdiction to file a re-
port designating a site within its boundaries for disposal
of sludge. Montgomery County submitted a report desig-
nating two sites for disposal of raw sludge, one of which
7a
was an undeveloped tract of land adjacent to the Mont-
gomery Industrial Park on the Montgomery County-
Prince George’s County border (Site 2). Site 2 was
designated as a composting site, where sludge would be
mixed with wood chips and aerated for periods of 35-45
days. The Calverton Citizens Association, representing
residents of the area surrounding Site 2, submitted a
report to the court, alleging that the proposed use of
Site 2 would subject them toa health hazard.
On July 10, 1978, the court entered an order requiring
the user jurisdictions to proceed to develop their desig-
nated sites for sludge disposal. In particular, Montgom-
ery County was ordered to have the Site 2 composting
facility operational by July 1, 1979. The court ordered
WSSC to take all necessary action, including acquisition
of property rights and obtaining all necessary permits.
The court also ordered that the user jurisdictions take
no action unrelated to protection of the public health to
prevent the sludge disposal measures ordered. Noting
the concerns expressed by the Calverton Citizens Associa-
tion, the court ordered that Montgomery County through
the WSSC take all measures necessary to protect the
public health in the implementation of Site 2. P.G.
County, which had made known its objections to Site 2
in a letter to the court dated June 28, 1978, did not
appeal the July 10 order.”
The WSSC and Montgomery County then proceeded
with the development of Site 2 as required by the 1978
order. The WSSC filed condemnation proceedings to ac-
quire Site 2 in the Circuit Court for Montgomery
*The District of Columbia appealed that portion of the
July 10 order requiring it to construct a compost facility
at the Blue Plains plant. This court affirmed the contested
portion of the order in an unpublished opinion. State Water
Control Bd. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission,
No. 78-1671 (D.C. Cir. June 7, 1979).
County, and obtained the requisite permit from the Mary-
land Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. In
May 1979 the WSSC adopted a budget for fiscal year
1980 which inciuded $16.9 million for the acquisition and
construction of the Site 2 facility.
P.G. County opposed implementation of Site 2 on sev-
eral fronts outside the forum of the district court. The
County unsuccessfully appealed the issuance of the health
permit to the Board of Review of the Maryland State
Health Department. It also brought suit in the Circuit
Court for Prince George’s County sceking to enjoin acqui-
sition of Site 2 on gruunds it had never given the requi-
site approval to WSSC funds allotted to Site 2.‘ The
Circuit Court dismissed the complaint, and P.G. County
appealed.
In March 1980 implementation of Site 2 encountered
more severe obstacles. First, the three WSSC Commis-
sioners from P.G. County blocked*funding for Site 2 in
SSC’s budget for fiscal year 1981. In addition, the
WSSC learned that a title search of the Site 2 land
conducted in connection with the condemnation proceed-
ing had revealed that the land was burdened by restric-
tive covenants * which appeared inconsistent with a com-
post facility and which might cost millions of dollars to
acquire. By letter dated March 18, 1980, the WSSC in-
formed the district court of the budget impasse and the
covenants.
* Prince George’s County v. WSSC, No. E-7692 (Circuit
Court for Prince George’s County, Maryland, filed Nov. 27,
1979).
* The covenants preclude use of the land in any manner
which would create objectionable odors, generate dense smoke
or high levels of noise, or constitute a “dump or sanitary
landfill.” P.G. County argued that because the covenants
run not only to owners of adjacent properties but also to
property owners “in the general neighborhood,” a lengthy
judicial determination of the composition of the penne
class would be required.
9a
Montgomery County then filed a motion in district
court on April 4 to compel the WSSC to restore funds
for Site 2 to its budget. After a hearing at which P.G.
County opposed the motion, the court issued an order
on April 25 requiring the WSSC to restore the funds
and to take all actions necessary to place Site 2 into
operation at the earliest practicable date. On May &
P.G. County noted an appeal from this order, the first
of this group of consolidated cases.
Despite the April 25 order, the three P.G. County WSSC
Commissioners declined to vote to reinsert funds for Site
2 in the budget. Consequently on May 14, 1980, Mont-
gomery County moved the district court to cite the three
Commissioners for contempt. The Commissioners de-
fended on grounds that the restoration of funds ordered
on April 25 was a purely niinisterial act which required
no Commission vote. After a hearing the district court
on June 4 denied the contempt motion but, finding that
reinsertion of the funds was a ministerial act, ordered the
General Manager of the WSSC to perform it. On June
5 P.G. County sought a stay from the district court of its
April 25 and June 4 orders, and on June 10 it noted an
appeal from the June 4 order." The district court denied
the motion for stay on June 19,
Meanwhile P.G. County had filed two new suits in
state court seeking to block implementation of the Site
2 facility. One suit alleged that the state sewage sludge
permit was invalid and that Site 2 constituted a_pros-
pective nuisance.’ The second suit alleged that because of
“On November 19, 1980, a motions panel of this court
summarily affirmed that portion of the June 4 order which
declined to hold the P.G. Commissioners in contempt. Sce
United States v. District of Columbia, No. 80-1495 (D.C.
Cir. Nov. 19, 1980) (per curiam order).
* Calverton County Association v. Buck, No. E-70934
(Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland, filed April
16, 1980).
10a
the restrictive covenants, acquisition of Site 2 would be
so costly as to render the WSSC Commissioners liable
for breach of fiduciary duty.’ In this second suit, the
Prince George’s County Circuit Court on June 17, 1980,
issued a temporary injunction forbidding the WSSC from
proceeding with the acquisition of Site 2 and ordering it
to withdraw a purchase offer it had made to the owners.
WSSC then moved in the district court for an order
to protect and effectuate the court’s prior judgments,
orders and decrees. Following a hearing, the district
court on June 27 issued an order which enjoined WSSC
from complying with the state court order and further
ordered WSSC to proceed expeditiously with development
of Site 2; ordered P.G. County to withdraw from the
three state court suits relating to Site 2; enjoined all
parties from initiating any state court proceeding which
would frustrate the district court’s orders; and ordered
any party believing modification of the court’s orders
was required to seek such modification only in the dis-
trict court or in this court.
The !ast of this group of consolidated cases is P.G.
County’s appeal of the June 27 order. P.G. County’s re-
quest for a stay of the order was denied first by the
district court on the same day and then by this court
on July 3. Two such requests for stay were later denied
by the Supreme Court. WSSC has proceeded to comply
with the April 25 and June 4 orders, has acquired legal
title té Site 2 and has let contracts for the construction of
the compost facility.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Tenth Amendment Objections
P.G. County argues that the three challenged district
court orders violate principles of federalism embodied in
* Prince George’s County v. WSSC, No. E-8512 (Circuit
Court for Prince George’s County, Maryland, filed April 16,
1980).
the tenth amendment and affirmed in Nationa! Leaque
of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Appellant al-
leges that the April 25 and June 4 orders of the district
court usurped the power of the WSSC to control its own
budget, thereby intruding upon an integral function of
a state agency. It further alleges that the June 27 order,
by prohibiting further collateral challenges to Site 2 in
state courts, usurped the power of the state of Maryland
to protect the public health and safety of its citizens.
Arguing that the Clean Water Act allocated the pri-
mary responsibility for eliminating water pollution to
the states, appellant concludes that the broad control
over the development of Site 2 asserted by the district
court exceeded both its powers under the Act and its
equity jurisdiction. We find these arguments without
merit.
In National League of Cities v. Usery, the Supreme
Court held that extension of the Fair Labor Standard
Act’s minimum wage and maximum hour provisions to
state employees was an impermissible exercise of the
commerce power because it impaired state sovereignty
guaranteed by the tenth amendment. In a plurality opin-
ion the Court held that the power to determine the
wages and hours of employees was an “integral” state
function, essential to the separate and independent exist-
ence of the states. Justice Blackmun, concurring, inter-
preted the plurality opinion as mandating a balancing
approach, protecting states from federal intrusion only
where the federal interest did not outweigh the state
interest. Justice Blackmun thought it apparent that Na-
tional League of Cities “does not outlaw federal power
in areas such as environmental protection, where the
federal interest is demonstrably greater and where state
compliance with imposed federal standards would be es-
sential.” 426 U.S. at 856.
We agree that whatever the precise limits of the
state sovereignty doctrine set forth in National League
l2a
of Cities,* it clearly does not control where, as here, the
federal interest has long been recognized as overriding."”
* The lower courts have limited National League of Cities
to legislation which is based on the commerce clause. Thus
the Second Circuit has held that the Federal Railway Labor
Act, which permits strikes by railroad employees, must yield
under Usery to a state statute barring strikes by public
employees, see United Transportation Union v. Long Island
Rail Road Co., 634 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1980), and the Sixth
Circuit has held that employees of a municipal airport were
not covered hy the Fair Labor Standards Act because opera
tion of the airport was an integral function of city govern-
ment, see Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033
(6th Cir. 1979). Compare State of New Hampshire v. Mar-
shall, 616 F.2d 240 (1st Cir.), appeal dismissed, 101 S. Ct.
53 (1980) (rejecting tenth amendment challenge to amend-
ments to Federal Unemployment Tax Act extending benefits
to state employees on grounds that statute was enacted under
spending power, not commerce power); Cantwell v. County
of San Mateo, 631 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
101 S. Ct. 1703 (1981) (holding federal statute governing
retirement pay for reserve military personnel must prevail
over state statute, despite Usery, because federal statute
enacted under Congressional war power) ; Usery v. Charleston
County School District, 558 F.2d 1169 (4th Cir. 1977), and
Usery v. Allegheny County Institution District, 544 F.2d 148
(3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Allegheny County In-
stitution District v. Marshall, 430 U.S. 946 (1977) (rejecting
tenth amendment challenges to application of Equal Pay Act
to state and local governments on grounds Act was exercise
of Congressional power under Fourteenth Amendment).
In Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972), the
Court, in an opinion recognizing the existence of a federal
common law concerning interstate water pollution, stated:
Th: “ederal \ -ter Pollution Control act in § 1(b) de-
clares that it is federal policy “to recognize, preserve,
and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of
the States in preventing and controlling water pollu-
tion.” But the Act makes clear that it is federal, not
state, law that in the end controls the pollution of inter-
state or navigable waters.
Id. at 102 (footnote omitted).
l3a
The Supreme Court has recently described the 1972
amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
as “a comprehensive program for controlling and abating
water pollution.” City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 49
U.S.L.W. 4445, 4449 (April 28, 1981) (quoting Train
v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 37 (1975)). While
it is clear that Congress contemplated that the states
would play an active role in this effort, it is equally
clear it did not contemplate that a subdivision of one
state would have the power to block a regional plan for
sewage disposal, thereby causing injury not only to its
own siate government but to neighboring states as well.
Cf. United States v. Duracell International, Ine., No.
80-1017 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 16, 1981) (rejecting tenth
amendment challenge to provision of Clean Water Act
holding liable any state which prevents municipality from
complying with Act).
The courts have recognized the breadth of this federal
interest and have upheld federal environmental legisla-
tion which, like the Clean Water Act, requires state im-
plementation while leaving the states latitude to make
essential choices. See United States v. Ohio Department
of Highway Safety, 635 F.2d 1195 (6th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3801 (April 28, 1981) (up-
holding authority of EPA under Clean Air Act to require
a state to deny registration to vehicles which have not
passed mandatory inspection); District of Columbia v.
Train, 521 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated as moot
sub nom. EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977) (same)."
' At issue in District of Columbia v. Train was an EPA
transportation control plan under the Clean Air Act for the
National Capital Region. This court affirmed the regulations
in part but struck down a portion of the plan which required
area jurisdictions to adopt automobile inspection and main-
tenance programs and to retrofit certain vehicles with pollu-
tion control dev ces. The court held that that portion of the
regulations, by substituting compelled state regulation for
l4a
When necessary the courts have exercised broad equitable
powers to ensure state compliance with federal environ-
mental laws, even where the exercise of such powers has
necessitated the bypassing of normal state decisional
processes. Thus after Detroit failed to comply with a
consent decree concerning sewage disposal, the district
court appointed the Mayor of Detroit as administrator
of the treatment plant, and directed him to act “without
the necessity of any actions on the part of the Common
Council of the City of Detroit when in the judgment
of the Administrator the same might unavoidably delay
or impede” compliance. United States v. City of Detroit,
476 F. Supp. 512, 515 (E.D. Mich. 1979); ef. Washing-
ton v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing
Vessel Assn., 443 U.S. 658 (1979) ‘sanctioning district
court’s direct supervision of state fisheries where neces-
sary to secure compliance with its order recognizing
Indian rights).
The weakness of appellant’s federalism argument is
underscored by the fact that it, along with other regional
jurisdictions, agreed that the district court should have
continuing authority to enforce the 1974 consent decree.
P.G. County voluntarily intervened in the initial suit
permissible federal regulation, exceeded the scope of the
commerce power, 521 F.2d at 992, and was such a “drastic”
invasion of state sovereignty as to violate the tenth amend-
ment, id. at 994. Appellant invokes Train to argue that the
district court orders in this case are likewise an impermis-
sibly “drastic” invasion of state sovereignty. We find the
analogy unpersuasive. The Train court emphasized that the
regulations invalidated there forced “unconsenting” states
to administer and enforce a federal program. /d. at 992. In
this case, however, appellant, along with other area juris-
dictions, entered into a consent decree and agreed that the
district court should retain power to enforce it. In addition,
the nature of state action required by the district court in this
case is significantly less intrusive on state sovereignty than
the ongoing state regulatory program invalidated in Train.
lSa
in 1973 and was a signatory to the consent decree which
emerged from that suit. Like the other parties to that
agreement, appellant failed to comply with the deadiines
it had agreed to meet, thereby necessitating enforcement
of the agreement by the district court. The tenth amend-
ment cannot be used to bar the very enforcement mech-
anism agreed to in 1974. Cf. Brown v. Necb, 25 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cases 267 (Lab. Rel. Rep. BNA) (6th Cir.
Mar. 3, 1981) (affirming district court order requiring
city, which had ordered layoffs from fire department due
to budget crisis, to comply with prior consent decree con-
cerning hiring of minorities by making layoffs propor-
tionate to racial composition of the department, even
though collective bargaining agreement and state law
provided that layoffs should be on basis of seniority).
Thus we find that the district court did not exceed
its statutory or equitable authority and that no interest
protected by the tenth amendment has been infringed.
B. Anti-Injunction Act Objections
Appellant’s second contention is that the district
court's order of June 27 violates the Anti-Injunction Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2283, which provides:
A court of the United States may not grant an in-
junction to stay proceedings in a state court except
as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where
necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or te protect or
effectuate its judgments.
The Supreme Court has noted that the purpose of the
Act, which rests on the fundamental constitutional inde-
pendence of the states and their courts,"* is to prevent
' Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Loco-
motive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281, 287 (1970).
l6a
“needless friction between state and federal courts.” "
The Court has applied the Act strictly," stating that
it is an “absolute prohibition” against any injunction
of any state court proceedings that does not fall within
one of the three specifically defined exceptions in the Act."
The issue for decision, then, is whether the June 27 order
falls within one of the thre’ exceptions.
The distri* court relied primarily, as do appellees
before this court, on the last of tue three exceptions,
which permits a federal court to enjoin a state proceed-
ing in order to “protect or effectuate” its judgments."
'"™ Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 233 (1972), quoting
Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co., 309
U.S. 4, 9 (1939).
7 Moore’s Federal Practice ‘ 60.39[2], at 657 (2d ed.
1979).
" Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 630
(1977). The United States has argued before this court that
the Act does not apply where, as here, one of the litigants
seeking to enjoin state proceedings is the federal gov-
ernment. The Supreme Court so held in two cases, rea-
soning that the policy behind the Act is far less compelling
where a stay is sought to protect “superior federal interests.”
See National Labor Relations Bd. v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S.
138, 146 (1971); Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352
U.S. 220, 226 (1957). The status of this implied exception
is left unclear in other decisions of the Court which stress
that the three specific statutory exceptions are exclusive and
“should not be enlarged by loose statutory construction.”
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Loco-
motive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281, 287 (1970). Because this
issue is raised for the first time on appeal and because its
resolution is unnecessary to our disposition of this case,
we express no view on whether the participation of the fed-
eral government in this case renders § 2283 inapplicable.
' The district court also adverted to, and the appellees
secondarily rely on, the second exception, which permits an
injunction “in aid of” the federal court’s jurisdiction. The
Reviser’s Note to § 2283 states that the “in aid of” language
17a
Known as the “relitigation” exception, the “protect or
effectuate” language was intended to affirm the power
of federal courts to enjoin the relitigation of cases and
controversies fully adjudicated by such courts." The
Supreme Court has construed the exception to mean
that a state court may be prevented “from so interfering
with a federal court’s consideration or disposition of a
case as to seriously impair the federal court's flexibility
and authority to decide that case.” Aflantic Coast Line
Railroad Co. Vv. Brotherhood of Locomotive Enqincers,
398 U.S. 281, 295 (1970).
was intended “to conform to section 1651 of this title [the
All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651] and to make clear the recog-
nized power of the Federal courts to stay proceedings in
state cases removed to the district courts.” The “in aid of”
exception has also been construed to allow a federal court to
protect its prior jurisdiction over a res by enjoining a state
proceeding that interferes therewith. 1A Moore's Federal
Practice ‘ 0.225, at 2617 (2d ed. 1981): 17 Wright, Miller
& Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4225 (1978).
Professor Wright has suggested that the “in aid of” excep-
tion also encompasses cases “where a district court has taken
a controversy in hand and will exercise continuing jurisdic-
tion,” jd., reasoning that state court intervention in such a
controversy would seriously impair the power of the district
court to decide the case, and citing Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education, 501 F.2d 383 (4th Cir.
1974), and Grenchik v. Mandel, 373 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Md.
1973). Because the Supreme Court has indicated that there
is some overlap between the “protect or effectuate” and “in
aid of” exceptions, see Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281, 295
(1970). we believe that either of the exceptions provides
ample justification for the June 27 order.
'’ Reviser’s Note to 28 U.S.C. § 2283. The exception was
intended to overrule Toucey v. New York Life Insurance Co.,
314 U.S. 118 (1941), in which the Supreme Court had held
that federal courts lacked the power to enjoin relitigation in
state court of controversies adjudicated in federal court.
Appellant argues that this exception should be read
narrowly to permit an injunction only where the state
proceeding involves the same cause of action as did the
federal proceeding. Appellant contrasts the cause of ac-
tion in the federal suit, to ensure compliance with the
Clean Water Act by providing for sludge disposal, with
the causes of action in the enjoined state proceedings,
which involve issues such as compensability of restrictive
covenants under Maryland property law. Appellant con-
cludes that the state suits se collateral to, rather than
duplicative of, the federal suit and that therefore the
relitigation exception does not apply.
We believe, however, that Atlantic Coast Line man-
dates an examination of the effect a state proceeding
would have on a prior federal judgment, rather than a
comparison of formal causes of action. Where a state
court enjoins a course of conduct which is necessary to
comply with a prior federal court order, the federal court
has authority to effectuate its order by enjoining the
state proceeding. In Doe v. Ceci, 517 F.2d 1203 (7th
Cir. 1975), a federal district court had enjoined a county
hospital from refusing to permit its medical personnel to
perform elective abortions within the hospital. Subse-
quently a state court entered an order restraining county
officials from disbursing any county funds for elective
abortions. The district court enjoined enforcement of
the state court order and the Seventh Circuit affirmed
on grounds that such action was “necessary to effectuate
the earlier order of the federal court and thus not in
contravention of 28 U.S.C. § 2283.” Id. at 1204. See also
Henry Vv. First National Bank of Clarksdale, 595 F.2d
291, 306-07 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom.
Clethorne Hevrdware Co. v. Henry, 444 US. 1074
(1980); Thomason v. Cooper, 254 r.2d 808 (8th Cir.
1958); Baker v. Gotz, 415 F. Supp. 1243 (D. Del.),
aff'd mem., 546 F.2d 415 (3d Cir. 1976). Thus the dis-
trict court plainly acted within its authority in enjoining
19a
the WSSC from complying with the June 17 order of the
Cireuit Court for Prince George's County.
The State of Maryland, while acknowledging the power
of the district court to stay the Prince George’s Circuit
Court injunction, joins appellant in arguing that the
June 27 order was overly broad in enjoining both pend-
ing state proceedings which had not progressed to final
judgment and prospective state litigation concerning Site
2. The law is clear, however, that a federal court is not
required to await a final judgment by a state court be-
fore acting to protect its own decrees.'*
Where proceedings in a federal court have been on-
going for several years, as they have here, state pro-
ceedings which would frustrate the federal court’s effec-
tive disposition of the case have frequently been enjoined
even where the state proceedings have not yet progressed
to final judgment. Many of these cases have involved
school desegregation orders. See Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education, 501 F.24 383 (4th
Cir. 1974) ; Grenchik v. Mandel, 373 F. Supp. 1298 (D.
'SIn Brown v. O’Brien, 469 F.2d 563 (D.C. Cir.), vacated
as moot, 409 U.S. 816 (1972), the Credentials Committee of
the Democratic Party had ruled that challenged delegates
from Illinois should be unseated and replaced. The unseated
delegates challenged this action in suits filed in both state
and federal court. In the federal suit, the defendant Demo-
cratic Party filed a counterclaim, seeking to enjoin prosecu-
tion of the state court action. The district court upheld the
action of the Credentials Committee but denied an injunction.
This court affirmed the judgment dismissing the complaint
but remanded for an injunction against the state court pro-
ceeding, finding that an injunction was necessary to prevent
the state court from “taking any action in any other court
that would impair the effectiveness and the integrity of the
judgments of this Court.” 469 F.2d at 574. See also Donelon
v. New Orleans Terminal Co., 474 F.2d 1108 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 855 (1973).
20a
Md. 1973)."" In New York State Association for Re-
tarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 456 F. Supp. 85
(E.D.N.Y. 1978), the district court enjoined a state pro-
ceeding which would have interfered with its disposition
of a civil rights case over which it had acquired juris-
diction five years earlier, noting that the state court
plaintiffs’ claims would properly have been brought be-
fore the federal court. Jd. at 97. In this case, too, we
believe that if P.G. County believed changed circum-
stances required modification of the 1978 order, it was
obligated to seek such modification in the district court,
w:.ivh ordere' the implemen.ation ef Site 2 in 1978.
Thus we conclude that it was within the district court’s
discretion to enjoin P.G. County’s participation in the
three pending proceedings in Maryland state courts in
which the relief sought would have frustrated the district
court’s “flexibility and authority” to enforce its 1978
order. The injunction against prospective state court liti-
gation concerning Site 2, being outside the scope of
§ 2283,”° is likewise valid. In sum, we find no violation
' Appellant argues that the foregoing cases are distinguish-
able because they involve protection of individual constitu-
tional rights, as to which the federal injunctive power is
singularly broad. Whatever the validity of this suggestion
as a general proposition, it has no relevance in the context
of § 2283, which allows a federal court to enjoin state pro-
ceedings in order to “protect or effectuate” its judgments in
any type of proceeding. See Samuel C. Ennis & Co. v. Wood-
mar Realty Co., 542 F.2d 45 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1096 (1977) (action in state court against trustee
in bankruptcy enjoined by federal court which had conducted
bankruptcy proceeding years earlier); Baker v. Gotz, 415
F. Supp. 1243 (D. Del.), aff'd mem., 546 F.2d 415 (3d Cir.
1976) (enjoining state court sequestration of notes which
conflicted with prior district court determination that se-
questration was not an available remedy).
* Section 2283 bars injunctions only of existing state court
proceedings and has no application before such proceedings
2la
of the Anti-Injunction Act or of equitable principles in
the June 27 injunction order.
Ill. CONCLUSION
We find that neither the tenth amendment nor the
Anti-Injunction Act was violated by the three district
court orders challenged here. We also find appellant's
other arguments, that evidentiary hearings were re-
quired before issuance of the orders and that the June 27
injunction was unwarranted under traditional equitable
criteria, without merit. We believe that the actions taken
by the district court were necessary to effectuate its 1978
order and to ensure the long overdue implementation of
a regional sludge management plan. Accordingly, the
judgment of the district court is
Affirmed.
have begun. In a case where equitable principles warrant
relief, a party may be enjoined from instituting proceedings
in a state court. 1A Moore’s Federal Practice * 0.208[3.-1],
at 2316 (2d ed. 1981): 17 Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 4222 (1978).
22a
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 80-1495 September Term, 1979
United States of America CA 77-1929
Vv.
( nited Mates Court
District of Columbia, et al. a
Columbia Cigcuit
; : Filed JUL 25 1980
Prince George’s County, Maryland sinzn
GEORGE A. F.
(Intervenor-deft.), Clerk
Appellant
No. 80-1496 “a CA 1813-73
State Water Control Board, et al.
Vv.
Washington Suburban Sanitary
Commission, et al.
Prince George’s County, Maryland,
(Intervenor-deft.),
Appellant
No. 80-1653 CA 1813-73
State Water Control Board, An
Agency of the Commonwealth of
Virginia, et al.
Vv.
Washington Suburban Sanitary
Commission, et al.
Prince George’s County, Maryland,
(Intervenor-deft.), ;
Appellant
23a
No. 80-1654 CA 77-1929
United States of America
v.
District of Columbia, et al.
Prince George’s County Maryland,
Appellant
24a
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 80-1718 September Term, 1979
State Water Control Board, et al. CA 1813-73
v.
Washington Suburban Sanitary
Commission, et al.
Prince George’s County Maryland,
Appeiilant
and consolidated case No. 80-1719
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED, sua sponte, that these cases are con-
solidated.
For the Court:
GEORGE A. FISHER, Clerk
By: /s/
Daniel M. Cathey
First Deputy Clerk
25a
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
STATE WATER CONTROL BOARD, et al.,:
Plaintiffs,
Vv. : Civil Action
: No. 1813-73
WASHINGTON SUBURBAN SANITARY :
COMMISSION, et al., :
: FILED
Defendants. ; JUN 27 1980
7 ee 5” eee it * JAMES F. DAVEY,
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
Vv. : Civil Action
: No. 77-1929
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER
Upon consideration of the Motion of Prince George’s
County, Maryland, for a Stay of the Court’s June 27,
1980, Order, and the oral arguments of its counsel and the
counsel for Washington Suburbai Sanitary Commission,
it is hereby found by this Court that the Motion for Stay is
without merit. This Court’s June 27, 1980, Order, enjoin-
ing the parties io this case from attempting to circumvent
this Court’s prior judgments, orders and decrees, is
manifestly justified and necessary.
26a
This Court has both the power and the responsibility to
enjoin the parties before it from petitioning various state
courts to obtain equitable relief allowing them to ignore
portions of this Court’s decrees or compelling others to ig-
nore portions of this Court’s decrees. In the absence of
such an Order, this Court’s decrees will be rendered mean-
ingless, the comprehensive metropolitan area sewage plan
created by this Court over the past six years will be
destroyed, and the public interest will suffer.
Prince George’s County, therefore, has failed to
demonstrate any reason why a stay should be granted.
Moreover, the public health and welfare require that the
long overdue and much needed composting facility be con-
structed without delay. It is, accordingly,
ORDERED, this 27th day of June, 1980, that the Mo-
tion for Stay, filed by Prince George’s County, Maryland,
is denied.
John Lewis Smith, Jr.
United States District Court
8:30 o.m.
June 27, 1980
27a
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
STATE WATER CONTROL BOARD, et al.,:
Plaintiffs,
v. : Civil Action
: No. 1813-73
WASHINGTON SUBURBAN SANITARY
COMMISSION, et al.,
; FILED
Defendants. : /¢ N27 !9s8e
at i i A a ale i a ae * JAMES F. DAVEY,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v. : Civil Action
: No. 77-1929
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER
Upon consideration of the Motion of Defendant
Washington Subu: an Sanitary Commission for Entry of
an Order to Protect and Effectuate this Court's
Judgments, Orders, and Decrees and memorandum in
support thereof, arguments of counsel presented at a hear-
ing on June 27, 1980, and the entire record herein, and it
appearing to the Court that:
(1) Jurisdiction of this Court in the instant cause has
been invoked pursuant to, infer alia, the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 301, e/ seq.
28a
(2) Prince George’s County, Maryland, Montgomery
County, Maryland, and the State of Maryland all
sought and received permission to intevene as parties
defendant.
(3) On July 29, 1974, with the consent of all parties
hereto, including Prince George’s County, Maryland,
Montgomery County, Maryland, and the State of
Maryland, this Court entered a Consent Decree which,
inter alia,
(a) Contained a comprehensive agreement and
plan regarding management of sewage produced in
the respective party-jurisdictions, including detailed
provisions concerning disposition of digested and un-
digested sludge.
(b) Clearly stated that the provisions of the decree
applied to, and were binding upon, the parties, their
agents, servants, successors, and all persons, firms
and corporations acting under, through or for them
and upon those persons, firms and corporations in ac-
tive concert or participation with them.
(c) Provided that this Court retain jurisdiction in
order to enforce the provisions of this Decree and to
order any appropriate relief for violation thereof.
(4) On July 10, 1978, due to the failure of the parties
to agree on a method for disposition of the sewage
sludge generated at the Blue Plains Treatment Plant
after September 21, 1978, and finding that there existed
an emergency affecting ithe health and safety of the
residents of the Washington metropolitan area, this
Court, in pursuance of its jurisdiction under the 1974
Consent Decree, entered an order which, inter alia,
(a) Ordered that sludge disposal be conducted at
29a
certain locations specified in the order, including Site
2 in Montgomery County.
(b) Directed that the Washington Suburban
Sanitary Commission (WSSC) take all actions
necessary to manage sludge on the Maryland sites
designated in the order, including, but not limited to,
acquisition of property rights, obtaining of all re-
quired permits, design, construction and operation.
(c) Required all parties to take all steps necessary
to expedite review and processing of permit applica-
tions of the parties, their agents or contractors.
(d) Prohibited all user jurisdictions from taking
any action, unrelated to the protection of public
health, to prevent the disposal or composting of
sludge from the Blue Plains Plant under this order.
(e) Confirmed review of the submission of the
Calverton Citizens Associations and provided that
Montgomery County, through the WSSC take the
measures necessary to assure protection of the public
health, safety and welfare in the implementation of
Site 2.
(5) On April 25, 1980, in view of the failure of WSSC
Commissioners from Prince George’s County to join in
approving the inclusion of Site 2 in the WSSC budget,
this Court ordered all parties to continue to adhere to
the order of July 10, 1978 and ordered the Washington
Suburban Sanitary Commission (i) to put Site 2 back in-
to its budget, (ii) to take all actions necessary to manage
sludge on Site 2, including, but not limited to, acquiring
all property rights, and (iii) to place Site 2 into operation
at the earliest practicable date.
(6) On June 4, 1980, upon motion of Montgomery
County to hold the WSSC Commissioners from Prince
30a
George’s County in contempt for failure to vote Site 2
back into the WSSC budget, this Court ordered the
General manager of the Commission to include Site 2 in
the WSSC capital and operating budgets.
(7) Prince George’s County has appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Col-
umbia Circuit from entry of this Court’s orders of April
25, 1980 and June 4, 1980.
(8) Prince George’s County did not appeal this
Court’s orders of July 10, 1978 and did not seek stay of
this Court’s orders of April 25, 1980 and June 4, 1980
until June 4, 1980 when it filed a motion for stay which
was oposed by other parties and denied by this Court on
June 19, 1980.
(9) Prince George’s County, in concert with the
Calverton Citizens Association and certain residents of
the Calverton area, both of which are represented by the
same counsel who made written submissions to this
Court on behalf of the Calverton Citizens Association
in connection with this Court’s order of July 10, 1978,
has recently filed various actions in the Circuit Courts
for Prince George’s County and Montgomery County
seeking relief which, if granted, would impede and
frustrate the WSSC and other parties hereto from com-
plying with this Court’s orders of July 10, 1978, April
25, 1980, and June 4, 1980.
(10) On June 17, 1980, in one of the actions brought
by Prince George’s County, the Circuit Court for Prince
George’s County entered an order which, inter alia, en-
joined the WSSC from expending any funds on Site 2
and directed the WSSC to seek a continuance of the
Site 2 condemnation trial, scheduled to commence in
Montgomery County Circuit Court on June 30, 1980.
3la
Dissolution of this order is necessary in aid of this
Court's jurisdiction in this matter and to protect and ef-
fectuate its judgments, decrees, and orders.
(11) If the parties to this case are allowed to pursue in
various state courts collateral attacks on this Court's
orders, judgments, and decrees, effectuation of the
comprehensive regional sewage program established by
the 1974 Consent Decree and subsequent implementing
orders will be impossible. Further pollution of the
Potomac River and violations of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act will inevitably follow. The public
interest clearly necessitates that all challenges and objec-
tions to that comprehensive program be heard and
decided in this Court and, if necessary, in the United
States Court of Appeals in order to avoid the delay, ex-
pense, and inconsistent adjudications incident to litiga-
tion of these issues in diverse state and federal forums.
IT IS, THEREFORE, THIS 27TH DAY OF JUNE,
1980, ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
(1) Defendant Washington Suburban Sanitary Com-
mission is hereby enjoined from complying with the
June 17, 1980 Order of the Circuit Court for Prince
George’s County, entered in Equity No. E-8512, and is
further enjoined to proceed expeditiously with condem-
nation proceedings, purchase negotiations, and all other
actions necessary to acquire Site 2 and establish there a
sludge composting facility at the earliest practicable
date.
(2) No later than June 30, 1980, intervenor-
defendant Prince George’s County, Maryland, shail file
appropriate papers in the Circuit Courts for Prince
George’s and Montgomery Counties (a) advising both
courts of the entry and the exact content of the instant
32a
order; (b) affirming its intent to fully comply with the
instant order unless and until it is stayed or reversed;
(c) moving the Circuit Court for Prince George’s Coun-
ty for dissolution of its June 17, 1980 order on grounds
that that order threatens to frustrate and impede orders
entered by this Court in these proceedings; and (d)
withdrawing the complaints that it has filed against
other parties to this action for relief which, if granted,
would impede or frustrate effectuation of any orders
entered by this Court in these proceedings. The state
court actions embraced by this paragraph include, but
are not limited to, Prince George’s County v.
Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission (Equity
No. E-7692, Circuit Court for Prince George’s County);
Prince George’s County, et al., v. Washington Subur-
ban Sanitary Commission (Equity No. E-8512, Circuit
Court for Prince George’s County); and Calverton
Citizens Association, Inc., et al., v. Buck, et al. (Equity
No. E-70934, Circuit Court for Montgomery County).
(3) All parties to this action, and all persons, firms,
and corporations in active concert or participation with
them, are hereby enjoined from taking any actions, in-
cluding initiation or continuation of any state court pro-
ceedings against other parties to this action, which
would frustrate or impede effectuation of this Court’s
judgments, decrees, and orders, or interfere with its
jurisdiction herein.
(4) Any party which believes it has good ground for
seeking modification of or relief from any of this
Court’s orders herein, including, but not limited to, its
orders of July 10, 1978, April 25, 1980, and June 4,
1980, shall seek such judicial action only in this Court or
in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit.
33a
(5S) Any person, firm or corporation, not a party
hereto, who believes there exists good ground for
modification or rescission of any order entered herein,
including, but not limited to, a contention that changed
circumstances since July 10, 1978 dictate that another
site be substituted for Site 2 in this Court's order of that
date, or believes it has other interests pertinent to the
proceedings herein, may seek such action herein by fil-
ing a motion for limited intervention outlining the
nature of the proposed intervenor’s interest, the action
desired by this Court, and the reasons and evidence in
support thereof.
John Lewis Smith, Jr.
United States District Court
6/27/80
34a
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
STATE WATER CONTROL BOARD, et al.,:
Plaintiffs,
Vv. : Civil Action
: No. 1813-73
WASHINGTON SUBURBAN SANITARY =:
COMMISSION, et al., :
é FILED
Defendants. : %U% 20 1980
So * JAMES FE. DAVEY,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
Vv. : Civil Action
: No. 77-1929
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., :
Defendants.
ORDER
This Court, having been advised of the entry on June
17, 1980, of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County,
Maryland, Order, attached as Appendix A hereto, and it
appearing to the Court that that Order threatens to
frustrate and impede certain parties, including the
Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission, from com-
plying with this Court’s Order of April 25, 1980, it is, this
20 day of June, 1980,
ORDERED, that the parties to this action and those ad-
ditional persons designated on Appendix B hereto are
38a
directed to appear before this Court at 11:00 a.m. on June
27, 1980, to show cause why this Court should not take
immediate, appropriate action to ensure that its Order of
April 25, 1980 will be fully and effectively implemented.
John Lewis Smith, Jr.
United States District Judge
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing proposed
order were served, via first-class mail, postage prepaid,
this 19th day of June, 1980, on all persons listed on the
service list attached to the order as Appendix B.
John P Arness
Attorney for Washington
Suburban Sanitary Commission
36a
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
STATE WATER CONTROL BOARD, et al., )
)
)
)
Plaintiffs,
Vv. ) Civil Action
) No. 1813-73
WASHINGTON SUBURBAN SANITARY )
COMMISSION, )
) FILED
Defendants. ) ‘UN '9 !98°
--) JAMES F. DAVEY.
) Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
: )
Plainuif, )
v. ) Civil Action
) No. 77-1929
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., )
Defendants. )
ORDER
Upon consideration of Prince George’s County’s motion
for stay of the order of court of April 25 and June 4, 1980
pending appeal, the memoranda in opposition filed
thereto by Montgomery County and United States of
America, it is by the Court this 19 day of June 1980
ORDERED that the motion for stay is denied.
United States District Judge
37a
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE’S
COUNTY, MARYLAND
PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY,
MARYLAND
Petitioners
Equity
v. : 3 Ne. E-8512
WASHINGTON SUBURBAN SANITARY : ORDER
COMMISSION
Respondent : _ FILED
JUNE 17, 1980
Upon consideration of the pleadings, affidavit, and
representations of counsel, it is this 17th day of June 1980,
by the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County,
Maryland, sitting in Equity
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
WSSC, its officers, employees and agents be and hereby
are temporarily enjoined from appropriating or expending
any funds for the acquisition of Montgomery County Site
Two; and it is further
ORDERED that the WSSC is temporarily enjoined
from taking any further actions relating to Law Nos.
50,304, 50,305 in the Montgomery County Court which
are inconsistent with this Order, and it is further
ORDERED that the WSSC shall immediately withdraw
the offer made to the property owners in the condemna-
tion actions on June 13, and it is further
ORDERED that the parties shall if possible, complete
all discovery by July 22, and it is further
38a
ORDERED that a pre-trial conference is scheduled for
July 23 at 8:30 a.m., and it is further
ORDERED that all motions to be filed in the case shall
be set in on July 23, 1980, if it can be arranged with the
Assignment Office on June 17, and it is further
ORDERED that a hearing on the merits shall be set in
August, 1980, and it is further
ORDERED that the WSSC shall seek to continue the
hearing set for June 30 in Law Nos. 50,304 and 50,305 in
the Montgomery County Circuit Court and it is further
ORDERED that the parties shall fix the dates described
herein with the Assignment Office on June 17.
/s/
JUDGE
TRUE COPY-TEST
/s/
No. 56 6/17/80
39a
SERVICE LIST
Nathan J. Greenbaum, Esquire
Assistant County Attorney
County Office Building
Rockville, Maryland 20850
Counsel for Montgomery County, Md.
Frank W. Stearns, Esquire
Assistant County Attorney
4100 Chain Bridge Road
Fairfax, Virginia 22030
Counsel for Fairfax County, Va.
Frederick S. Fisher, Esquire
11 South Twelfth Street, Suite 308
Richmond, Virginia 23219
Counsel for State Water Control Board of Virginia
Richard Alper, Esquire
Prince George’s County Attorney’s office
5104 County Administration Building
Upper Marlboro, Maryland 20870
Counsei for Prince George’s County, Md.
Edward Curry, Esquire
Corporation Counsel’s Office
District Building
Washington, D.C. 20004
Counsel for District of Columbia
Patrick Cafferty, Esquire
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20430
counsel for United States of America
40a
Benjamin Bialek, Esquire
Maryland Environmental Services
Tawes State Office Building
Annapolis, Maryland 21401
Counsel for Maryland Environmental Services
Robert L. Collings, Esquire
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Sixth and Walnut Streets
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106
Counsel for U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Joseph B. Blocher, Esquire
8720 Georgia Avenue, Fifth Floor
Silver Spring, Maryland 20910
Counsel for Present Owners of Site 2
John Nolan, Esquire
Steptoe & Johnson
1250 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
Counsel for Commissioners Norris, Vislosky,
and Brooks
Aaron L. Handelman, Esquire
1120 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Tenth Floor
Washington, D.C. 20036
Counsel for Individual Plaintiffs in Prince George’s
County Circuit Court Action, Equity No. E-8512
dia
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
STATE WATER CONTROL BOARD, et
| a E
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) Civil Action
) No. 1813-73
WASHINGTON SUBURBAN SANITARY )
COMMISSION, et al., )
) FILED
Defendants. ) %UN4 1980
we eee ee ee ee ee ee ee Se eee eee rere
) JAMES F. DAVEY.
) Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
Vv. ) Civil Action
) No. 77-1929
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., )
Defendants. )
ORDER
Having considered the pleadings and papers, and
arguments of counsel, on the motion cf Montgomery
County to cite Washington Suburban Sanitary Commis-
sioners Johanna S. Norris, Andrew M. Vislosky, and
Lawrence L. Brooks for contempt, the Court concludes:
(1) The inclusion of Site 2 in the FY 1981-86 CIP and
the FY 1981 Capital and Operating Budgets of the
Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission was required
42a
by the Court’s order of July 10, 1978, as specifically reaf-
firmed by the Court’s order of April 25, 1980; and
(2) Paragraph (a) of the Court’s order of April 25,
1980, required only ministerial steps for its implementa-
tion and the General Manager of the Commission is
hereby directed to include Site 2 in the FY 1981-86 CIP
and the FY 1981 Capital and Operating Budgets.
For these reasons, the Court has determined that Mon-
tgomery County’s motion to cite for contempt should be
denied. Therefore,
IT IS ORDERED that the motion of Montgomery
County to cite Washington Suburban Sanitary Commis-
sioners Johanna S. Norris, Andrew M. Vislosky, and
Lawrence L. Brooks for contempt of the order of April
25, 1980, is hereby denied.
United States District Judge
Dated: June 4, 1980
43a
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
STATE WATER CONTROL BOARD, et al.
oD
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) Civil Action
) No. 1813-73
WASHINGTON SUBURBAN SANITARY )
COMMISSION, et al., )
) FILED
Defendants. ) “PRIL 25, 1980
EEE
) JAMES FE. DAVEY.
) Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
Vv. ) Civil Action
) No. 77-1929
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., )
Defendants. )
ORDER
Upon consideration of Montgomery County’s Motion
to Compel the WSSC to Comply with the Order of Court
dated July 10, 1978, all pleadings, the entire record herein,
and argument of counsel, it is by the Court this 25 day of
April 1980
ORDERED that all parties continue to adhere to the
Order filed by this Court on July 10, 1978, and it is further
ORDERED that the Washington Suburban Sanitary
Commission:
dda
(a) put Site 2 back into the FY 1981-86 CIP and FY
1981 Capital and Operating Budgets; and
(b) take all actions necessary to manage sludge on
Site 2, including, but not limited to, acquiring all property
rights including any covenant enforcement rights, obtain-
ing all required design, construction, and operation per-
mits as required by this Court in the July 10 Order; and
(c) place Site 2 into operation at the earliest practicable
date; and
(d) promptly notify the Court and all parties of the
dates necessary property rights are acquired, construction
commences, and operation begins.
/s/
United states District Judge
45a
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
STATE WATER CONTROL BOARD;
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA;
FAIRFAX COUNTY, VIRGINIA;
and DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
Plaintiffs,
and
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Intervenor-Plaintiff,
ee
Vv. ) Civil Action
) No. 1813-73
WASHINGTON SUBURBAN SANITARY )
COMMISSION, et al., FILED
JUN 10 1980
Defendants.
JAMES b. DAVEY.
Clerk
and
)
)
)
)
)
)
MONTGOMERY COUNTY and PRINCE _)
GEORGE’S COUNTY, MARYLAND )
Intervenor-Defendants. )
)
)
)
)
)
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
Vv. ) Civil Action
) No. 77-1929
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., )
Defendants. )
46a
ORDER
Due to the failure of the users of the Blue Plains Sewage
Treatment Plant to agree on a method for disposition of
the sewage sludge generated at the plant after September
21, 1978, the District of Columbia will be forced to curtail
or eliminate treatment of sewage at the Blue Plains Plant
after that date unless the users are required to dispose of
the sludge from the plant. It is beyond dispute that the cur-
tailment or elimination of the treatment processes at the
plant would violate Section 301(a) of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a), and cause
substantial harm to the Potomac River into which the
plant discharges. The user jurisdictions are presently in
violation of the Court’s order of January 1978 amending
its order of July 29, 1974, requiring that they agree on a
permanent metropolitan-wide sludge disposal plan by
January 15, 1978. The user jurisdictions’ failure to agree
on such a plan is the major cause of the current emergency
situation which raises the possibility of a shutdown of the
Blue Plains Plant. On the basis of this factual
background, the Court has directed, by orders dated May
18 and June 12, 1978, that feasibility reports be prepared
by the user jurisdiction and sites be designated by them for
disposition of the sludge from the Blue Plains Plant for a
pericd of at least one year beginning September 21, 1978.
Upon consideration of the reports, designations, and
other submissions of the parties, the parties; oral presenta-
tions, and other materials in the record of these cases and
on the basis of the existence of #n emergency affecting the
health and safety on the residents of the Washington
metropolitan area, it is hereby ordered that the District of
Columbia, Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission
(the WSSC), Montgomery County, Prince George’s Coun-
ty, and Fairfax County shall take the following actions to
47a
accomplish composting or disposal of sewage sludge from
the Blue Plains Treatment Plant in a safe, environmentally
acceptable manner after September 21, 1978 for a period
of at least one year:
1. Undigested Sludge
a. Beginning on September 21, 1978 and continuing
through December 3, 1978, Prince George’s County,
through the WSSC, shall dispose of quantities of un-
digested sludge from the Blue Plains Plant at its P.G. 4 site
equal to its proportional share, its proportional share of
the District’s proportional share, Montgomery County’s
proportional share and Montgomery County’s propor-
tional share of the District’s proportiona! share of the un-
digested sludge from the Blue Plains Treatment Plant.
b. Beginning on December 4, 1978 and continuing
through the date on which the District of Columbia’s com-
posting facility at the Blue Plains Denitrification site is
completed or February 15, 1979, whichever occurs first,
Montgomery County, through the WSSC, shall dispose of
quantities of undigested sludge from the Blue Plains Plant
equal to its proportional share, its proportional share of
the District’s proportional share, Prince George’s County’s
proportional share, and Prince George’s County’s propor-
tional share of the District’s proportional share of the un-
digested sludge from the plant on approximateiy 30 acres
of a side owned by Montgomery County, Maryland, and
located between Shiloh Church Road and Interstate 70
near Clarksburg in Montgomery County, Maryland, or at
a site owned by the State of Maryland and located near
Seneca along the Potomac River in Montgomery County,
Maryland.
c. After completion of the District’s composting facility
at the Blue Plains denitrification site or February 15, 1979,
48a
whichever occurs first, Montgomery County and Prince
George’s County shall no longer be responsible for manag-
ing the District of Columbia’s proportional share of un-
digested sludge from the plant. However, Montgomery
County, through the WSSC, shall continue to dispose of
such amounts of undigested sludge to “reimburse” Prince
George’s County for the Montgomery County’s propor-
tional share and Montgomery County’s proportional share
of the District’s proportional share disposed of by Prince
George’s County under paragraph a above and at suc-
cessor facilities, as well as such amounts needed to attain
parity for amounts disposed of prior to September 21,
1978. Montgomery County, through the WSSC, shall con-
tinbue to manage the remainder at the above-described
sites and at composting facilities at a site owned by Contee
Sand and Gravel Company and Montgomery Industrial
Park, Inc., and located adjacen t to the Montgomery In-
dustrial Park on Route 29 in Montgomery County,
Maryland. Montgomery County, through the WSSC, shall
have said composting facilities operational by July 1,
1979.
d. The District of Columbia shall begin construction
immediately and shall complete by February 15, 1979 con-
struction of composting facilities located at the Blue
Plains Plant on the area currently reserved for the
denitrification process units. Beginning on that date the
District shall compost its proportional share of the un-
digested sludge from the Blue Plains Plant, plus additional
quantities to “reimburse” the other user jurisdictions in
kind for disposal by them of the District of Columbia’s
proportional share of una.zested sludge from the plant
between September 21, 1978 and the commencement of
operations of the District’s composting facilities.
e. Beginning on September 21, 1978 and continuing un-
49a
til September 21, 1979, Fairfax County, Virginia shall
dispose of quantities of undigested sludge from the plant
by incineration, in accordance with the County’s June 5,
1978 submission, equal to its proportional share of un-
digested sludge from the Blue Plains Plant. The County
shall also dispose of its proportional share of the District
of Columbia’s share of undigested sludge from the plant
until the District of Columbia’s composting facilities at the
Blue Plains denitrification site are prepared for use, or
February 15, 1979, whichever occurs first.
2. Digested Sludge:
a. Montgomery and Prince George’s Counties, through
the WSSC, and Fairfax County shall dispose of their pro-
portional shares of digested sludge from the Blue Plains
Plant in accordance with their submissions filed with the
Court, beginning on September 21, 1978 and continuing
through September 21, 1979. In addition, each of said par-
ties shall dispose of their respective proportional shares of
the District of Columbia’s proportional share of digested
sludge from the plant from September 21, 1978 through
February 15, 1979 or completion of the District’s com-
posting facility, whichever occurs first.
b. Thereafter, through September 21, 1979, the District
of Columbia shall compost its proportional share of
digested sludge from the plant to the maximum extent
feasible at its Blue Plains Plant composting facility after
its undigested sludge has been composted at the site. The
other user jurisdictions shall dispose of any portion of the
District’s proportional share of digested sludge which can-
not be composted at the Blue Plains composting site, with
each user jurisdiction disposing of its respective propor-
tional share of the excess digested sludge.
50a
3. The Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission
shall take all actions necessary to manage sludge on the
Maryland site: designated in this order, including but not
limited to, acq 1isition of property rights, obtaining of all
required permits, design, construction and operation.
4. The District of Columbia shall continue to be
responsible for the transportation of sludge to all sites
designated in this order in accordance with current prac-
tices.
5. The parties, including the Counties, the District of
Columbia, the WSSC, the State Water Control Board of
Virginia and the State of Maryland, shall take all steps
necessary to expedite review and processing (issuance or
denial) of permit applications of the parties, their agents
or contractors, required for the implementation of the
sludge management measures required by the foregoing
paragraphs. In the event the processing of a permit for any
of the said sites is delayed, the regulatory agency responsi-
ble for the delay shall, at the request of any party to these
proceedings, show cause to this court why such permit
shold not be expeditiously processed. No user jurisdiction
shall be excused from the responsibility for disposing or
composting of its share of the digested and undigested
sludges from the Blue Plains Plant because of denial of a
permit for a proposed facility.
6. No user jurisdiction shall take any action which is
not related to the protection of the public’s health to pre-
vent the disposal or composting of sludges from the Blue
Plaias Plant under this order.
7. The Calverton Citizens Association has filed submis-
sions with the Court concerning Monigomery County’s
Site 2 on Route 29. The Court has reviewed this informa-
tion, as well as the submissions of Montgomery County.
Sla
As required by this order, Montgomery County, through
the WSSC, must take the measures necessary to assure
that the public health, safety and welfare will be protected
in the implementation of Site 2. All the parties shall
similarly take steps to protect the public’s health in im-
plementing this order.
8. Each user jurisdiction shall immediately notify all
parties in writing of any circumstances or conditions
which come to its attention that may cause or may in any
way lead to a failure by it or another party hereto to meet
the requirements of this order.
9. It is understood that several parties to the ad-
judicatory hearing on the Blue Plains Plant NPDES Per-
mit are sec::sing to appeal to the Administrator of the En-
vironmental Protection Agency the decision of the
Regional Administrator not to require denitrification at
the plant in that permit. (In re NPDES permit No. D.C.
00021199, Docket No. DC-AH-001, Appeal No. 78-4). If
the Administrator decides to require installation of
denitrification units at the Blue Plains Plant, the District
of Columbia shall advise this Court as to whether such ac-
tion necessitates the relocation of the composting facility
required to be constructed by paragraph 1d of this order.
Should the Court find that such action is necessary, said
composting facility shall be relocated to a site specified by
the Court.
Dated: July 10, 1978
/s/
Unitd States District Judge
52a
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
STATE WATER CONTROL BOARD;
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA;
FAIRFAX COUNTY, VIRGINIA;
and DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
Plaintiffs,
and
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Intervenor-Plaintiff,
lll i i i i
Vv. ) Civil Action
) No. 1813-73
WASHINGTON SUBURBAN SANITARY )
COMMISSION, et al., ) FILED
) MAY 18 1978
Defendants. ) j,wes e. pavev.
Clerk
and
MONTGOMERY COUNTY and PRINCE
GEORGE’S COUNTY, MARYLAND
Intervenor-Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
Vv. ) Civil Action
) No. 77-1929
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., )
Defendants. )
S3a
ORDER
Upon motion of the United States and after a hearing
thereon, it is hereby ordered that the District of Columbia,
Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission, Mont-
gomery County, Prince George’s County, and Fairfax
County shall take the following actions to accomplish
composting or disposal or sewage sludge from the Blue
Plains Treatment Plant after September 21, 1978:
(1) That each of the above-named parties shall
evaluate potential sites for composting or disposal of
digested and undigested sludge from the Blue Plains Treat-
ment Plant within each respective party’s boundaries.
Each party shall evaluate sites with capacity sufficient to
compost or dispose of sludge for a least one year and shall
prepare a report on the feasibility of composting or
disposing of sludge at each of the sites evaluated by June
5, 1978. Sites of less than one year disposal capacity
should also be evaluated if they can be prepared for use by
September 21, 1978, and other larger sites cannot be
prepared by that date.
(2) Each of the aforesaid parties, excluding the
Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission, shall
designate in writing to the Court by June 5, 1978 a site or
sites within its boundaries for composting or disposal of
its proportionate share of digested and undigested sludge
from the Blue Plains Treatment Plant for a period of at
least one year beginning on September 21, 1978.
(3) Each party shall take all steps necessary for com-
posting or disposal of its proportionate share of sludge
from the Blue Plains Treatment Plant at the designated
site in a safe, environmentally acceptable manner by
September 21 1978, and shall begin composting or dispos-
ing of its share of sludge on that date.
54a
It is further ordered that each party shall submit to the
Court and to all other parties on June 5, 1978 at a status
call at 10:30 A.M. its site feasibility report for sludge
disposal in that jurisdiction and its designation of a site or
sites for composting or disposal of sludge after September
21, 1978.
Dated: May 18, 1978
/s/
United States District Judge
5Sa
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
STATE WATER CONTROL BOARD;
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA;
FAIRFAX COUNTY, VIRGINIA;
and DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
Plaintiffs,
and
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Intervenor-Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action
No. 1813-73
WASHINGTON SUBURBAN SANITARY
COMMISSION,
Defendant
FILED
JULY 30, 1974
and
MONTGOMERY COUNTY and PRINCE
GEORGE’S COUNTY, MARYLAND
Intervenor-Defendants.
JAMES E. DAVEY,
Clerk
ee ee ee ee ee ee ee
DECREE
The Complaint having been filed herein on September
24, 1973 and with Plaintiffs, Intervenor-Plaintiff, Defend-
ant and Intervenor-Defendants by their respective at-
torneys having consented without trial or adjudication of
any issue of fact or law herein to the entry of this Decree,
and without this Decree constituting any evidence or ad-
56a
mission by any party hereto with respect to any issue of
fact or law herein:
NOW, THEREFORE, Before the taking of any
testimony, upon the pleadings, and without adjudication
of any issue of fact or law herein, and upon consent of the
parties hereto, to is Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed as
follows:
This Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter herein
and of the parties hereto.
The provisions of this Decree shall apply to and be bin-
ding upon the parties hereto, their agents, servants, suc-
cessors, and all persons, firms and corporations acting
under, through or for them and upon those persons, firms
and corporations in active concert or participation with
them.
The parties hereto incorporate their Agreement of June
13, 1974, (attached hereto as Exhibit A) into this Decree
and agree to comply fully with their obligations stated
thereunder. The above-named Agreement is fully en-
forceable hereunder and may only be revised by order of
the Court. Any revision of said Agreement is null and void
until approved by order of the Court. Implementation of
the provisions of paragraph 8(c) of the Agreement
attached hereto and incorporated herein shall not con-
stitute a revision for which the approval of the Court is re-
quired hereunder.
IV
The Decree is not and shall not be interpreted to be a
permit for the discharge of pollutants pursuant to Section
57a
402 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33
U.S.C. sec. 1342, or any other federal law, nor shall it in
any way affect any obligation of the parties hereto to
secure such a permit.
Vv
This Decree shall in no way relieve the parties hereto of
their obligations to comply with any local, state, or federal
law.
Vi
This Court shall have the power to amend this Decree
only upon application by one or more of the parties
hereto, upon proper notification and hearing as required
by the rules of the Court.
Vil
This Court shall retain jurisdiction in order to enforce
the provisions of this Decree and to order any appropriate
relief for violation thereof.
July 29, 1974
/s/
United States District Judge
We hereby consent to the entry of the foregoing Decree
without further notice.
STATE WATER CONTROL BOARD
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA,
Plaintiff,
ANDREW P. MILLER
Attorney General of Virginia
58a
GERALD L. BALILES
Deputy Attorney Gencrai
By:/s/ mel .
JAMES E. RYAN, JR.
Assistant Attorney General
FAIRFAX COUNTY, VIRGINIA
Plaintiff,
By:/s/ wae!
FREDERICK LEE RUCK
County Attorney
JOHN F. RICK
Assistant County Attorney
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
Plaintiff,
C. FRANCIS MURPHY
Corporation Counsel
District of Columbia
IVERSON O. MITCHELL III
Assistant Corporation Counsel
a eae
JOHN C. SALYER
Assistant Corporation Counsel
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Intervenor-Plaintiff,
By: /s/___ . —
WALLACE H. JOHNSON
Assistant Attorney General
Land and Natural Resources
Division
WALTER KIECHEL, JR
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
MARTIN GREEN
Chief, Pollution Control Section
JOHN E. VARNUM
Attorney, Land and Natural
Resources Division
Department of Justice
WASHINGTON SUBURBAN SANITARY
COMMISSION,
Defendant,
59a
JOHN B. KENKEL .-
General Counsel
J. EUGENE CLEARY
Assistant General Counsel
By: /s/
CURTIS E. VON KANN
HOGAN AND HARTSON
Attorneys for Washington Suburban
Sanitary Commission
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAND,
Intervenor-Defendant,
By: /s/
Richard S. McKernon
County Attorney
STEPHEN P. JOHNSON
Assistant County Attorney
JOHN B. WALSH, JR.
Assistant County Attorney
60a
APPENDIX A
BLUE PLAINS
SEWAGE TREATMENT
PLANT AGREEMENT
(Appendices Omitted)
June, 1974
BLUE PLAINS SEWAGE TREATMENT PLANT
AGREEMENT
Recognizing that further measures are required to en-
sure that the Blue Plains sewage treatment plant will func-
tion adequately until the current expansion of the sewage
treatment facilities there is completed, the parties hereto
enter into the following agreement which shall be incor-
porated into the consent decree to be submitted to the
Court in the suit captioned State Water Control Board, et
al. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission, et al.,
Civil Action No. 1813-73, which is currently pending in
the District Court for the District of Columbia.
The parties hereto agree that the terms of this Agree-
ment supplement but, except as provided below, shall not
alter the terms and conditions of the 1970 Memorandum
of Understanding or the 1971 Interim Treatment Program
Agreement.
1. Definitions
(a) Flow - For the purpose of this Agreement, “flow”
means the average flow for any twelve con-
secutive months, hereinafter referred to as the
rolling annual average flow.
(b) Where the term “100,000 pounds per day of
BOD;”is used herein and in the agreement of
October 18, 1971, it means the total discharge of
(c)
(d)
6la
BOD, as measured on a monthly average basis
from the Blue Plains Treatment Plant including
any discharge from the Bolling Field overflow.
For the purposes of this Agreement “interim
chemical addition program” means the chemical
addition program, as defined in the 1971 Interim
Treatment Program Agreement, at the Blue
Plains Plant during the “interim period.” The im-
plementation of this program shall enable the
Plant to reduce the pollutant load to the River to
a maximum of BOD; 100,000 pounds per day or
less, as required at any time by the discharge per-
mit issued pursuant to § 402 of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act.
Interim Period -The “interim period” means that
period of time beginning with the date of execu-
tion of this Agreement and ending with the date
on which the advanced waste treatment facilities
at Blue Plains are fully operational or the date on
which permanent sludge handling facilities at
Blue Plains are fully operational, or December
31, 1977, whichever date occurs first.
Allotted Flows
The parties hereto agree as follows:
(a)
For the period until the expanded secondary
treatment process with full plant chemical addi-
tion is placed into operation at the Blue Plains
Plant, the allocation of flows shall be based upon
the following premises:
(1)The allocation of flows to each user jurisdic-
tion, as established in the 1971 Interim
Chemical Agreement, is expressly conditioned
upon the successful implementation of the in-
(b)
(c)
62a
terim chemical addition program, which
necessarily includes the satisfactory marketing
and/or disposal of sludge which is produced
by that program. It is anticipated that this pro-
gram. It is anticipated that this program will
initially generate approximately 400 tons per
day of che.nical sludge.
(2f the interim chemical addition program is
successfully implemented, a total flow of 299
MGD shall be permitted to the Blue Plains
Plant. See Appendix A which is attached
hereto and incorporated herein.
(3)The allocation of that 299 MGD flow among
the user jurisdictions for any month shall be
that allocation set forth in Table | of Appen-
dix A.
After the expanded secondary treatment process
with full plant chemical addition is placed into
operation, a total flow of 309 MGD shall be per-
mitted to the Blue Plains Plant. The allocation of
that 309 MGD among the user jurisdictions shall
be that allocation set forth in Table 2 of Appen-
dix A.
(1Prince George’s and Montgomery Counties
agree to work out the allocation of flows
available to each through the Washington
Suburban Sanitary District to the Blue Plains
Sewage Treatment Plant at 309 MGD. The
allocation between Prince George’s and Mont-
gomery Counties shall cover the period be-
tween the completion of the Anacostia Force
Main and the completion and commencement
of operation of the advanced wastewater treat-
ment plant at Dickerson, Maryland. In the
(d)
63a
event that the counties fail to reach such an
agreement by diligent negotiation and analysis
of the future needs of both counties within 45
days from the date of this Agreement, officials
of these two counties agree to have the Gover-
nor of the State of Maryland decide the issue
and they also agree to accept his decision when
so made. In the event the Governor is called
upon to make such a decision, he will give due
consideration to the unmet development needs
in the Prince George’s portion of th Anacosti
Basin.
(2Following the completion and commence-
ment of operation of the Dickerson Plant, the
flow share between Prince George’s and
Montgomery Counties to the Blue Plains
Treatment Plant shall be on a equal basis.
Numerically, this sharing will allocate 76.6fi
MGD of the 309 MGD Blue Plains capacity
to each of the said counties
The storm water portion of the combined flows
from the District of Columbia which are
pumped to Blue Plains for treatment, (approx-
imately 90% receiving secondary treatment)
shall deducted from the total District of Colum-
bia flow, and shall not count in computation of
the allotted flow of the District of Columbia.
The storm water portion of these combined
flows shall be calculated as shown on Appendix
B, which is attached hereto and incororated
herein. When the 309 MGD advanced waste
treatment process is completed at Blue Plains,
there will be capacity to provide primary treat-
ment and disinfection for an additional 289
MGD of combined flow over and above the
3.
(a)
(b)
64a
combined flow referred to above. The District
of Columbia agrees to vigorously pursue a pro-
gram for the collection and treatment of all
combined flows.
Control of Sewage Flows
All parties hereto agree that the following cow ‘i-
tions shall be met:
For each -user jurisdiction, except the
Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission,
the sum of its “actual” flows plus all its “com-
mitted” flows shall at no lime exceed its allotted
flows as set forth in Appendix A. See Sample
Calculation #1 in Appendix C, which is attach-
ed hereto and incorporated herein.
For the purposes of computations made pur-
suant to paragraph 3(a), “actual flows” means
the highest rolling annual average flow recorded
for any month during the twelve consecutive
months ending with the month for which the
computation is made.
For purposes of computations made pursuant
to paragraph 3(a) “committed flows” means
those flows which have received all required ap-
provals to enter the sewerage System.
Recognizing that it has present sewer service
commitments outstanding under existing
regulatory orders and procedures, the
Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission
agrees to comply with all the following re-
quirements:
(1)fhe Commission shall defer, as necessary,
the connections of the present outstanding
65a
commitments made to its sewerage system
such that the requirements set forth in sub-
paragraphs 3.(b)(2), 3.(b)(3) and 3.{b}(4)
below are met at all times.
(2During the period from the date of this
Agreement until January 1, 1975, the Com-
mission shall control the flows within, and
the connections to, its sewerage system such
that, for each month, the “actual” flows
within its sewerage system (i.e., defined for
this time period to mean the rolling annual
average flow for the month for which the
computation is made) shall not exceed the
Commission’s allotment for that month as set
forth in Table 1 of Appendix A. (See Sample
Calculation #2 in Appendix C.)
(3During the period from January |, 1975, un-
til such time as the expanded secondary treat-
ment process with full plant chemical addi-
tion is placed into operation at the Blue
Plains Plant, the Commission shall control
the flows within, and the connections to, its
sewerage system such that, for each month,
the “actual” flows within its sewerage system
(i.e., defined for this time period to mean the
highest rolling annual average flow recorded
for any month within the twelve consecutive
months which immediately precede the
month for which the computation is made)
plus the flows attributable to the connections
made during the month for which the com-
putation is made shall not exceed 144 MGD.
(See Sample Calculation #3 in Appendix C.)
(4)After such time as the expanded secondary
treatment process with full plant chemical ad-
(c)
66a
dition is placed into operation at the Blue
Plains Plant, the Commission shall control
the sewer service commitments it makes, the
flows within, and the connections to, its
sewerage system such that, for each month,
the “actual” flows within its sewerage system
(i.e., defined for this time period to mean the
highest rolling annual average flow recorded
for any month within the twelve consecutive
months ending with the month for which the
computation is made) plus the total flows at-
tributable to all outstanding commitments to
provide sewerage service where such flows
will be treated at the Blue Plains Plant shal!
not exceed 153.294 MGD. (See Sample
Calculation #4 in Appendix C.)
If, for any reason, any user jurisdiction violates
any condition or any requirement set forth
above which is applicable to it, that user
jurisdiction shall immediately stop making any
further hook-ups, connections and extensions
to its sewerage system. The sole exceptions to
this ban shall be:
Elimination of an alternative method of
sewage disposal which is certified to be a
public health hazard by the chief officer of
the State health agency or his designated local
representative this certification shall only be
made on a parcel by parcel basis.
Public service buildings, which includes
schools, hospitals, nursing homes, medical
and dental clinics, churches and synagogues,
and structures used by public agencies in pro-
67a
viding essential services for public health and
welfare.
iii. Those buildings which have received sewer
service commitments, and for which the
footings had been poured and finally in-
spected as of the date that the ban on further
hook-ups is imposed.
Such user jurisdiction agrees to make no further
hook-ups, connections or extensions until three
consecutive months have passed during which
that user jurisdiction has complied, for each of
those months, with all conditions and re-
quirements set forth above applicable to it.
Flow Reporting
Each user jurisdiction agrees to submit to the
District of Columbia each month a report which
sets forth that user jurisdiction’s actual flows,
committed flows and total flows attributable to
all actual connections made during that month.
Such report shall contain a break down of total
committed flows by sewer sheds and by calendar
year during which such flows are expected to be
connected to the system. Such report shall fur-
ther set forth the total flows attributable to any
connections and hookups made pursuant to the
exceptions contained in 3.c. above. The District
of Columbia shall consolidate each month the
reports of all new jurisdictions and furnish
copies of such consolidated report to each party
hereto.
Flow Measuring and Monitoring
A committee will be established by E.P.A., the
68a
District, WSCC, Fairfax County, and other user
jurisdictions, to develop a metering program
which shall include, but not be limited to,
maintenance, calibration, monitoring, replace-
ment, location of additional meters, and repor-
ting. The District of Columbia shall be the
responsible party to install, replace, calibrate,
record, and otherwise maintain all flow meters
(35 at present) presently used to compute flows
tributary to Blue Plains and those additional
meters which may be installed for this purpose.
Each user jurisdiction shall bear the actual cost,
as billed by the District of Columbia, for the
above services actually received by that user
jurisdiction.
Reduction of Flows
The parties hereto agree to take action necessary
to reduce and control flows in the collector and
interceptor systems tributary to Blue Plains.
Such action shall include, but not be limited to,
the following:
(a)
(b)
Infiltration and Inflow Abatement - All user
jurisdictions signatory hereto agree to expedite
studies and to take all necessary corrective ac-
tion as soon as possible to reduce infiltration
and inflows into the system to within acceptable
limits.
Water Conservation Methods - All user
jurisdictions signatory hereto agree, subject to
existence of requisite legal authority, to adopt
water conservation procedures in their respec-
tive jurisdictions similar in objective to those
69a
recommended by the Metropolitan Washington
Council of Governments.
7. Correction of Raw Sewage Overflows
(a) The District and WSCC agree to the following
(b)
schedule to stop all overflows in the Cabin John
Basin. The existing valve on the relief sewer to
the Maryland Potomac Interceptor has been fu-
ly opened and this flow is being metered by
WSSC. A permanent connection (the size of
which is to be determined within one month
after the date of this Agreement by the District
and WSCC) to the Potomac Interceptor (Dulles
Interceptor) will be permitted by the District so
long as it is metered and does not affect the flow
allocation of other Potomac Interceptor users
and flow through that connection shall be
counted as part of the total WSSC allocatino to
Blue Plains. The permanent connection will be
completed within 300 days after the necessary
permits have been granted by the National Park
Service.
To relieve overflows of raw sewage into the
Anacostia River, the WSSC and District of Col-
umbia agree to expedite the construction of a
sewer interceptor from Bladensburgh to Blue
Plains. The initial segments of such interceptor
shall be constructed within fifteen months
following the completion of all necessary ad-
ministrative actions, with a temporary connec-
tion to an existing District of Columbia sewer at
the Penn Central railroad crossing as stated in
the Interim Chemical Agreement of October 18,
1971. EPA and the other parties to this Agree-
ment agree to coordinate and cooperate, within
70a
their respective statutory powers, toward
resolution of all applicable administrative ac-
tions required to expedite the construction of
this interceptor. Such administrative actions in-
clude but are not limited to, obtaining necessary
rights-of-way, obtaining all necessary permits,
and arrangement of the necessary financing.
(c) To mitigate the overflows at Bolling Field,
the District agrees to maintain a sewage
screen at the outlet of this overflow. Further
reduction of wet weather overflows at this
location will result when the new primary
sedimentation tanks are placed in operation
at Blue Plains.
Sludge Management
The parties hereto recognize that the successful
operation of the Blue Plains Plant necessitates
the management and distribution of sludges,
both digested and undigested, from the
wastewater treatment process. The parties fur-
ther recognize that during the past year Prince
George’s County has received most of the
digested sludge from the Blue Plais Plant
(184,000 tons). Additionally, Fairfax County has
received the majority of the refuse (260,000 tons)
from the District of Columbia. The parties also
agree that the interim chemical addition program
cannot be successfully implemented unless ade-
quate sludge management capability is secured.
In the spirit of regional cooperation, the parties
hereto agree to manage and accept both the
digested and undigested sludges in the following
manner:
Tla
(a) Digested Sludge
(1) Digested sludge is produced at a rate of
up to 310 tons per day (approximately
20% solids by weight). Digested sludge
has agricultural value as a soil condi-
tioner and fertilizer, and will be manag-
ed by such methods as land spreading
and burial to the extent tht the sludge
cannot be made available for beneficial
reuse through composting, thermal
dehydration, or other acceptable
methods. Within 10 days of the execu-
tion of this Agreement, Montgomery,
Prince George’s, and Fairfax Counties
(the latter representing all Virginia
flows during the interim period) agree
to designate sites for the receipt of
digested sludge on a proportionate
basis in accordance with allocated flows
to the Blue Plains Plant at the 309
MGD level, except as provided in
paragraph 8(b)(4), which provides for
an additional quantity of digested
sludge to be allocated to Fairfax Coun-
ty.
(2) Except as provided in paragraph 8(b)(4),
each of the above-mentioned Counties is re-
quired to receive its proportionate share of
all digested sludge, by flows, and a propor-
tionate share of the District of Columbia's
proportionate share of the digested sludge,
by flows, during the interim period. The
receipt of the District of Columbia’s propor-
tionate share of the digested sludge by the
(b)
72a
suburban jurisdictions recognizes that the
District of Columbia has exhausted all sites
for land containment within its boundaries.
It is intended that the distribution of
digested sludge be rotated at least every 90
days, in the most efficient manner available
to the District of Columbia. For accounting
purposes, all sludge distributed to a county
shall be credited to its proportionate share.
The District of Columbia shall render
quarterly reports to all parties on the
distribution of digested sludge pursuant to
this paragraph.
Undigested Sludge
(1) Undigested sludge will be produced in-
itially at a rate of approximately 400
tons per day (approximately 20% solids
by weight) resulting from the addition
of chemicals to the wastewater.
(2) Recognizing that the prime responsibili-
ty for the operation of the Blue Plains
Plant rests with the District of Colum-
bia, the State of Maryland, operating
through the Maryland Environmental
Service (MES), agrees to assist the
District by providing for management
and disposal of all undigested solids
resulting directly from the interim
chemical treatment of sewage at the
Blue Plains Plant. The proposed
method of undigested sludge manage-
ment and disposal will include one or
more of such methods as: thermal
(3)
73a
dehydration; composting; and land
containment. The MES has programm-
ed thermal dehydration facilities at
Blue Plains with a nominal initial
capacity of 240 tons per day of un-
digested sludge. Expansion of that
system, as well as composting of un-
digested sludge, will depend upon
testing currently underway by the U.S.
Department of Agriculture, MES, and
the District of Columbia, and upon
testing of the thermal dehydration units
at Blue Plains. A site or combination of
sites for land containment is needed as
a backup form of undigested sludge
management, in case the thermal
dehydration, composting or other alter-
native Operations are not sucessful.
The MES, in cooperation with Mon-
tgomery County and Prince George’s
County, will conduct the appropriate
studies to select the necessary sites, and
the transport routes thereto. The MES
will prepare and release the final site
selection report within a period of 50
days after the date of this Agreement.
Montgomery County and Prince
George’s County each agree to select
and approve a site or combination of
sites, including the transportation
routes thereto, within 50 days after the
release of the MES report. The MES
agrees to acquire the rights necessary to
use said sites and to place into opera-
(4)
74a
tion on said sites undigested sludge
disposal and/or handling facilities
within 50 days after said sites have been
selected and approved.
Begining 150 days after the date of this
Agreement, and to the extent that ther-
mal dehydration and/or composting
have not been successful in disposing of
all of the undigested sludge, Mon-
tgomery County, Prince George Coun-
ty, and Fairfax County will each receive
its proportionate share of all undigested
sludge, by flow allocation, and a pro-
portionate share of the District of Col-
umbia’s sludge, by flow allocation, dur-
ing the interim period, except that Fair-
fax County will receive its propor-
tionate share of undigested sludge in
the form of digested sludge. The Fair-
fax County share of undigested sludge
will be accepted by Montgomery and
Prince Georges Counties proportional-
ly, by flow allocation, in adition to
their own shares as defined above. In
return, Fairfax County will accept, in
addition to the amount of digested
sludge specified as its share in Section
8(a)(2), an amount of digested sludge
equal in quantity to the Fairfax County
share of undigested sludge, as defined
in this paragraph; this additional quan-
tity of digested sludge will be subtracted
from the proportional shares of Mon-
(5)
7Sa
tgomery and Prince Georges Counties,
as defined in paragraph 8(a)(2) on a
proportional basis, by flow allocation.
Accordingly, all of the undigested
sludges shall be received and disposed
of in Montgomery and Prince Georges
Counties; and the amounts of digested
sludges to be received by Montgomery
and Prince Georges Counties in accor-
dance with the terms of paragraph
8(a)(2) will be reduced proportionally
by the receipt of additional digested
sludges by Fairfax County. See Appen-
dix D attached hereto and incorporated
herein. In the event that the thermal
dehydration or composting operations
are successful and the resultant pro-
ducts are unmarketable, those products
shall be distributed on the same basis.
Operational decisions to achieve the
proportionate sharing of undigested
sludge will rest with the MES, which
shall make quarterly reports thereon to
each party hereto.
All costs of sludge handling and
disposal, and all costs attributable to
the interim chemical program, in-
cluding costs for acquisition of proper-
ty rights necessitated pursuant to this
Agreement, shall be borne by the user
jurisdictions on the ratio of their
respective monthly flows to the total of
the monthly flows to the Plant. The
District of Columbia shall be responsi-
ble for the collection and disbursement
(c)
(d)
76a
of all money required to implement the
provisions of this paragraph.
(6) The user jurisdictions signatory hereto
recognize the need to resolve the matter
of recovery of costs and values of pro-
perty acquired for sludge disposal, and,
accordingly, agree to enter negotiations
and to resolve this issue by July 1, 1976.
The District of Columbia, MES, and their
agents and all persons, firms or corpora-
tions acting under, through or for them, by
contract or otherwise, shall deliver and app-
ly all undigested and digested sludge in ac-
cordance with formal procedures establish-
ed by the respective receiving jurisdictions;
provided, however, that such procedures
shall not alter the distribution of sludges
among the respective jurisdictions as set
forth herein.
The parties hereto recognize that a regional
agreement in required prior to the com-
mencement of operation of the advance
wastewater treatment processes at the Blue
Plains Plant in order to dispose adequately
of the digested and undigested sludge which
will be generated from the additional treat-
ment processes at the Plant. It is anticipated
that the installation and operation of all
AWT treatment at the Blue Plains Plant will
generate approximately 2,400 tons per day
of sludge. The parties will agree, on or
before July 1, 1976, on a permanent
metropolitan-wide equitable disposal plan
which will require the parties hereto to ac-
77a
cept sludge, whether digested, undigested,
or both, on a fair share basis to be affective
as soon as possible a*ter said Agreement is
achieved, but no later than December 31,
1977.
(e) In the event that there is any dispute as to
the distribution of raw and/or digested
sludges, or unmarketable products produc-
ed therefrom, among Montgomery, Prince
George’s and Fairfax Counties during the in-
terim period, the algebraic expressions set
forth in Appendix D shail control such
distribution.
Conference Procedure
Technical representatives of all parties shall meet
in the first week of January, April, July and Oc-
tober of each year to review the watewater treat-
ment programs within the Washington
Metropolitan Area. The october meeting will in-
clude the principals of the parties hereto. The
quarterly meetings shall be arranged by the Ex-
ecutive Director of the Metropolitan Washington
Council of Governments. By written notice of at
least 5 days, any of the parties hereto may call a
special meeting if it feels conditions warrant im-
mediate action. The user jurisdictions signatory
hereto agree to meet, as provided above, before
any future litigation concerning the subject mat-
ter of this Agreement is commenced by any user
jurisdiction signatory hereto against any other
party hereto. No meeting shall be required as a
condition precedent to litigation if such a
meeting cannot be held within 30 calendar days
78a
of the date on which the request for the meeting
was made to all parties hereto.
10. As a signatory party to this Agreement, the En-
vironmental Protection Agency in no respect
waives its authority or obligations under the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251, ef seq., including its authority under
Subsection 402(h) of that Act, or any other ap-
plicable Federal statute. This Agreement shall
not affect nor alter the terms of any National.
Pgliutant Discharge Elimination System Permit
which may be issued for the discharge or
discharge which are the subjects of this Agree-
ment.
This Agreement shall become effective on June 13,
1974.
WITNESS the following signatures of the parties by
their duly-authorized agents.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
By: /s/ Illegible Date: June 13, 1974
illegible June 13, 1974
WASHINGTON SUBURBAN SANITARY
COMMISSION
By: /s/ Illegible Date: June 10, 1974
Ilegible June 13, 1974
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAND
By: /s/ Illegible Date: June 13, 1974
Illegible June 14, 1974
PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY, MARYLAND
79a
By: /s/ Illegible Date: June 14, 1974
Illegible June 17, 1974
STATE OF MARYLAND
By: /s/ Illegible Date: June 13, 1974
MARYLAND ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES
By: /s/ Illegible Date: June 13, 1974
FAIRFAX COUNTY, VIRGINIA
By: /s/ Illegible Date: June 13, 1974
Illegible June 13, 1974
STATE WATER CONTROL BOARD,
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
By: /s/ Illegible Date: June 13, 1974
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY
By: /s/ Illegible Date: June 13, 1974
Illegible June 13, 1974
80a
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES
AND ORDINANCES
Constitutional Provisions
AMENDMENT X
The powers not delegated to the United States by th
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reser
ed to the States respectively, or to the people.
Statutes
28 U.S.C. §2283. Stay of State Court Proceedings
A court of the United States may not grant an injun
tion to stay proceedings in a State court except as express
authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in a
of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effeciuate its jud
ments. (June 25, 1948. c. 646, §1, 62 Stat. 968)
33 U.S.C. §1251. Congressional declaration of goals ai
policy
(a) The objective of this Act is to restore and maintain t
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Natio1
8la
waters. In order to achieve this objective it is hereby
declared that, consistent with the provisions of this Act —
(1) it is the national goal that the discharge of
pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by
1985;
(2) it is the national goal that wherever attainable, an
interim goal of water quality which provides for the pro-
tection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife
and provides for recreation in and on the water be
achieved by July 1, 1983;
(3) it is the national policy that the discharge of toxic
pollutants in toxic amounts be prohibited;
(4) it is the national policy that Federal financial
assistance be provided to construct publicly owned
waste treatment works;
(5) it is the national policy that areawide waste treat-
ment management planning processes be developed and
implemented to assure adequate control of sources of
pollutants in each State; and
(6) it is the national policy that a major research and
demonstration effort be made to develop technology
necessary to eliminate the discharge of pollutants into
the navigate waters, waters of the contiguous zone, and
the oceans.
(b) It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve,
and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of
States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, to plan
the development and use (including restoration, preserva-
tion, and enhancement) of land and water resources, and
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to consult with the Administrator in the exercise of his
authority under this Act. It is the policy of Congress that
the States manage the construction grant program under
this Act and implement the permit programs under sec-
tions 402 and 404 of this Act [33 USC §§ 1342, 1344]. It is
further the policy of the Congress to support and aid
research relating to the prevention, reduction, and
elimination of pollution, and to provide Federal tech-
nical services and financial aid to State and interstate
agencies and municipalities in connection with the preven-
tion, reduction, and elimination of pollution.
(c) It is further the policy of Congress that the President,
acting through the Secretary of State and such national
and international organizations as he determines appro-
priate, shall take such action as may be necessary to insure
that to the fullest extent possible all foreign countries shall
take meaningful action for the prevention, reduction, and
elimination of pollution in their waters and in interna-
tional waters and for the achievement of goals regarding
the elimination of discharge of pollutants and the im-
provement of water quality to at least the same extent as
the United States does under its laws.
(d) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency
(hereinafter in this Act called “Administrator”) shall ad-
minister this Act.
(e) Public participation in the development, revision, and
enforcement of any regulation, standard, effluent limita-
tion, plan, or program established by the Administrator or
any State under this Act shall be provided for, encourag-
ed, and assisted by the Administrator and the States. The
Administrator, in cooperation with the States, shall de-
velop and publish regulations specifying minimum guide-
lines for public participation in such process.
83a
(f) It is the national policy that to the maximum extent
possible the procedures utilized for implementing this Act
shall encourage the drastic minimization of paperwork
and interagency decision procedures, and the best use of
available manpower and funds, so as to prevent needless
duplication and unnecessary delays at all levels of govern-
ment.
(g) It is the policy of Congress that the authority of each
State to allocate quantities of water within its jurisdiction
shall not be superseded, abrogated or otherwise impaired
by this Act. It is the further policy of Congress that
nothing in this Act shall be construed to supersede or
abrogate rights to quantities of water which have been
established by any State. Federal agencies shall co-operate
with State and local agencies to develop comprehensive
solutions to prevent, reduce and eliminate pollution in
concert with programs for managing water resources.
(June 30, 1948, ch 758, Title 1, § 101, as added, Oct. 18,
1972, P.L. 92-500, § 2, 86 Stat. 816; Dec. 27, 1977, P.L.
95-217, §§ 5(a), 26(b), 91 Stat. 1567.)
33 USC § 1252. Comprehensive programs for water
pollution control
(a) Preparation and development. The Administrator
shall, after careful investigation, and in cooperation with
other Federal agencies, State water pollution control agen-
cies, interstate agencies, and the municipalities and in-
dustries involved, prepare or develop comprehensive pro-
grams for preventing, reducing, or eliminating the pollu-
tion of the navigable waters and ground waters and im-
proving the sanitary condition of surface and under-
ground waters. In the development of such comprehensive
programs due regard shall be given to the improvements
84a
which are necessary to conserve such waters for the protec-
tion and propagation of fish and aquatic life and wildlife,
recreational purposes, and the withrawal of such waters
for public water supply, agricultural, industrial, and other
purposes. For the purpose of this section, the Adminis-
trator is authorized to make joint investigations with any
such agencies of the condition of any waters in any State
or States, and of the discharges of any sewage, industrial
wastes, or substance which may adversely affect such
waters.
(b) Planning for reservoirs; storage for regulation of
streamflow. (1) In the survey or planning of any reser-
voir by the Corps of Engineeers, Burcau of Reclama-
tion, or other Federal agency, consideration shall be
given to inclusion of storage for regulation of stream-
flow, except that any such storage and water releases
shall not be provided as a substitute for adequate treat-
ment or other methocs of controlling waste at the
source.
(2) The need for and the value of storage for regulation
of streamflow (other than for water quality) ir cluding
but not limited to navigation, salt water intrusion,
recreation, aesthetics, and fish and wildlife, shall be
determined by the Corps of Engineers, Bureau of Recla-
mation, or other Federal agencies.
(3) The need for, the value of, and the impact of,
storage for water quality control shall be determined by
the Administrator, and his views on these matters shail
be set forth in any report or presentation to Congress
proposing authorization or construction of any reser-
voir including such storage.
(4) The value of such storage shall be taken into ac-
count in determinilng the economic value of the entire
85a
project of which it is a part, and costs shall be allocasted
to the purpose of regulation of streamflow in a manner
which will insure that all project purposes, share equi-
tably in the benefits of multiple-purpose construction.
(5) Costs of regulation of streamflow features incor-
porated in any Federal reservoir or other impoundment
under the provisions of this Act shall be determined and
the beneficiaries identified and if the benefits are
widespread or national in scope, the costs of such
features shall be nonreimbursable.
(6) No license granted by the Federal Power Commis-
sion [Federal Energy Regulatory Commission] for a hy-
droelectric power project shall include storage for
regulation of streamflow for the purpose of water quali-
ty control unless the Administrator shall recommend its
inclusion and such reservoir storage capacity shall not
exceed such proportion of the total storage required for
the water quality control plan as the drainage area of
such reservoir bears to the drainage area of the river
basin or basins involved in such water quality control
plan.
(c) Basins; grants to State agencies. (1) The Admin-
istrator shall, at the request of the Governor of a State,
or a majority of the Governors when more than one
State is involved, make a grant to pay not to exceed 50
per centum of the administrative expenses of a planning
agency for a period not to exceed three years, which
period shall begin after the date of enactment of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972 [enacted Oct. 18, 1972], if such agency provides
for adequate representation of appropriate State, in-
terstate, local, or (when appropriate) international in-
terests in the basin or portion thereof involved and is
capable of developing an effective, comprehensive
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water quality control plant for a basin or portion
thereof.
(2) Each planning agency receiving a grant under this
subsection shall develop a comprehensive pollution con-
trol plan for the basin or portion thereof which —
(A) is consistent with any applicable w
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