Record and brief — Casbah, Inc. v. Thone

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| Oftice- Supreme Cour, US.

81-415 dhe wis:

AUG 81 198]

No. ALEXANO: 2 L. STEVAS,

a CLERK

In the Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1981

THE CASBAH, INC., et al.,

Petitioners,

vs.

CHARLES THONE, et al.,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

To The United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

Davip C. WEINER, Counsel of Record

Frep P. SCHWARTZ

Armonp D. BupIsH

HAHN, LOESER, FREEDHEIM, DEAN &

WELLMAN

800 National City E. 6th Building

Cleveland, Ohio 44114

(216) 621-0150

Counsel for Petitioners

Of Counsel:

DonaLp B. FIEDLER

300 Keeline Building

Omaha, Nebraska 68102

-— — —— ——- ——

THE GATES LEGAL PUBLISHING CO., CLEVELAND, OHIO—TEL. (216) 621-5647

|

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the Eighth Circuit usurped the function

of the Nebraska legislature by substantially revising a

state law.

2. Whether the Nebraska law is vague and overbroad

and invites discriminatory enforcement in violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.

3. Whether the Nebraska law fails to satisfy basic

principles of due process by improperly creating per-

missive inferences and/or permissive presumptions.

4. Whether the Nebraska law is an unreasonable regu-

lation in violation of the due process clause of the Four-

teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

5. Whether the prohibition on advertising in the Ne-

braska law impermissibly penalizes speech protected by

the First Amendment to the Constitution.

LIST OF ALL PARTIES

Petitioners herein, Appellants in Case Number 80-1925

and Appellees in Case Number 80-2033 below, are The

Casbah, Inc., The Disc Counter, Inc., Jeff Ferber, d/b/a

H & D Sales, Greg Hasselhorst, d/b/a Euphoria, Eric Listou,

d/b/a Joint Venture Novelty Snop, Pipe Dream Inc., and

Dennis Robinson, d/b/a The Joynt (hereinafter collectively

referred to as the “Merchants” or “Appellants”). Respon-

dents herein, Appellees in Case Number 80-1925 and Ap-

pellants in Case Number 80-2033 below, are Charles Thone,

Governor for the State of Nebraska, Paul Douglas, Attor-

ney General for the State of Nebraska, Elmer Kohmepsher,

Colonel in Charge of the Nebraska State Patrol, and Donald

L. Knowles, County Attorney for Douglas County, Ne-

braska (hereinafter collectively referred to as “the State” or

“Nebraska’’).

Ill

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED .

LIST OF ALL PARTIES

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

OPINIONS BELOW ...................

FEIT -cxnscnesesncsrsanecsestermnemmensensens

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES

INVOLVED

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .

A. Prior Proceedings

B. The Nebraska Law ...

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. THE JUDGMENT OF THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

DIRECTLY CONFLICTS WITH THE DECI-

SIONS OF OTHER COURTS DECLARING

UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND _ STRIKING

DOWN LAWS BASED UPON THE MODEL

DRUG PARAPHERNALIA ACT

II. THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED ARE OF EX-

TREME IMPORTANCE, THE RESOLUTION

OF WHICH WILL HAVE NATIONWIDE IM-

PACT

Ill. THE DECISION OF THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

IS CLEARLY IN ERROR AND SHOULD BE

REVERSED

A. The Eighth Circuit Improperly Usurped

the Function of the Nebraska Legislature

by Substantially Revising the Nebraska

Law in an Attempt to Remedy Its Con-

stitutional Defects .........................0..-...

B. The Definition of “Drug Paraphernalia”

Is Vague and Overbroad and, in Conjunc-

tion With the Offense Provisions, Fails

—memec Fw

ao wNnw NWN =

11

11

IV

to Provide Adequate Notice and Enforce-

ment Guidelines in Violation of the Four-

teenth Amendment to the Constitution .... 13

1. The definition of “drug paraphernalia”

in the Nebraska Law is unconstitution-

ally vague and overbroad in violation

of due process standards 14

2. The definition of “drug paraphernalia,”

in conjunction with the offense pro-

visions, fails to provide adequate notice

and enforcement guidelines in viola-

tion of the Fourteenth Amendment .... 18

C. The Eighth Circuit Erred in Failing to

Hold That the Nebraska Law Created Per-

missive Inferences in Violation of Due

Process Standards ............... 20

D. The Eighth Circuit Erred in Not Finding

the Nebraska Law an Unreasonable Reg-

ulation Calculated to Stifle and Inter-

fere With Legitimate Commercial Rela-

tions in Violation of Constitutional Due

E. The Eighth Circuit Erred in Failing to

Hold That the Nebraska Law Impermissi-

bly Penalizes Speech Protected by the

First Amendment to the Constitution ........ 26

IEE. cscrtsssceirnsscnressccnsinnnsensemstenanenedesisniectescetanteneeaes 30

APPENDIX:

Appendix A. Opinion of the United States Court

of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (June 8, 1981) Al

Appendix B. Memorandum Opinion of the United

States District Court (September 26, 1980) ........ A24

Appendix C. Legislature of Nebraska Eighty-

Sixth Legislature, Second Session, Legislative

Bill 991 A53

Vv

Appendix D. Ordinances of the City of Parma,

Ohio, Ordinance No. 242-79 (December 17,

| vee nee A63

Appendix E. Ordinances of City of Lakewood,

Ohio, Ordinance No. 5-80 .................c-ccsccscsecsecseeseeee A74

Appendix F. Ordinance of the City of North Olm-

sted, Ohio, City of North Olmsted Ordinance

No. 80-28 A90

Appendix G. Model Drug Poseshemnaie Act ........ A98

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) ... 11

Back Door Records v. City of Jacksonville, No. LR-C-

80-314 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 8, 1981) -....................cecccseeseeeeeees 8, 16

Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837 (1973) .................... 22

Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) ........ 24

Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) ............ 8, 24, 27, 28

Blonder-Tongue Labs, Inc. v. Univ. of Illinois Founda-

tion, 402 U.S. 313 (1971) ...... 29

Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) -............... 25

Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 US.

663 (1974) 25

The Casbah, Inc. v. Charles Thone, No. 30-0-271 (D.

Neb. Sept. 26, 1980), rev’d in part, Nos. 80-1925 and

80-2033 (8th Cir. June 8, 1981), rehearing denied,

GS SE 3, 15, 19, 26, 29

Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service

Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) -.............. 7, 26,

Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) .......... 11

Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979) . 14

County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140

(1979) 21, 22, 24

vI

The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. v. Village of Hoff-

man Estates, 639 F.2d 373 (7th Cir., prob. juris,

noted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3893 (No. 80-1681 June 1, 1981)

alii tiadiaiceninaiteapian _ 9, 10, 16, 17

Florida Businessmen for Free Enterprise v. City of

Hollywood, 648 F.2d 956 (5th Cir. 1981) ~.............. 9

Gaffey v. Babb, 50 Or. App. 617, 624 P.2d 616 (Ct. App.

RESETS SE 9, 16,17

Geiger v. City of Egan, 618 F.2d 26 (8th Cir. 1980) ... 16

General Stores, Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, No. 81-

0027-M (D.N.M. March 23, 1981) 8, 17, 21

Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972) 20. 11

Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) ........ 12,14

Hemmontree v. Phelps, 605 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1979) ... 23

Hejira Corp. v. MacFarlane, No. 80-2062 (10th Cir.

May 5, 1981) ...... 9

High OV Times, Inc. v. Busbee, 621 F.2d 135 (5th Cir.

1980) 12

Hynes v. Mayor of the Borough of Oradell, 425 U.S.

IIE ‘aitididipctadittnriitincscstansidesanienmncianinpadtnijusabicnegsitinte 11,19

Indiana Chapter, NORML, Inc. v. Sendak, No. TH 75-

142-C (S.D. Ind. Feb. 4, 1980), vacated as moot at

time of appeal, No. 80-1305 (7th Cir. July 22, 1980)

‘ 6, 15,17

Information Management Services, Inc. v. Borough of

' Pleasant Hills, 512 F. Supp. 1066 (W.D. Pa. 1981) ... 8

Keyjishian v. Board of Regents of New York, 385 U.S.

SET Ae 25

Knoedler v. Roxbury Township, 485 F. Supp. 990 (D.

N.J. 1980) 20

Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939) —............. 14

Lazy J., Ltd. v. Borough of State College, No. 80-1167

SR, CES GER TIED civecsntenscsancsossenithnenimensenencensed 8, 16, 21

Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) 22

Mackenzie v. State, 76 Ohio St. 369, 81 N.E. 638 (1907) 12

vil

McInerney v. Berman, 473 F. Supp. 187 (D. Mass.

1979), aff'd, 621 F.2d 20 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 101

BO i I III. scasbsencciihinsessabesensennpensnns a

Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1922) secisiteasiasenitiuiibaii 24

Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)

ditealicailitaldatianidipendsicnenl 24-25

Music Stop, Inc. v. City of Ferndale, 488 F. Supp. 390

(E.D. Mich. 1980) 16

New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) ........ 28

Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156

(1972) >

Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1924) ...........- 24, 25

Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) 25

Record Revolution No. 6, Inc. v. City of Parma, Ohio,

638 F.2d 916 (6th Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded

only as to Case Nos. 80-3308 and 80-3352, 49 U.S.L.W.

3882 (May 26, 1981) ................ 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 15, 16, 19, 20,

21, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29

Sawyer v. Sandstrom, 615 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1980) ... 22

Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) —............ 20

Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974) —.................... 11,14

Spence v. Washington, 413 U.S. 405 (1974) —.....0000....... 19

State v. Shreveport News Agency, Inc., 287 So. 2d 464

(La. 1973) 11

State v. Wedelstedt, 213 N.W.2d 652 (Iowa 1973) ........ 12

Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503

(1969) 19

The Town Tobacconist v. Degnan, No. C-2198-80

(Super. Ct. Ch. N.J. March 12, 1981) ~......000.......... 9,17

Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Coun-

cil, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) 24

Weiler v. Carpenter, 507 F. Supp. 837 (D.N.M. 1981)

8, 16, 17, 19, 21

Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948) —................ 14

vir

Constitution of the United States

First Amendment ...................... i 1, 1, 26, 28, 29

USC. § 36 .......................

20

1

28 U.S.C. § 1331 ...... 3

28 U.S.C. § 1343 3

SEE AE SRD tie Se 3

3

3

3

3

28 U.S.C. § 2202

42 US.C. § 1983

42 U.S.C. § 1985

42 U.S.C. § 1988

Nebraska Revised Statutes

Legislative Bill 991, 1980 Neb. Laws, codified at Neb.

Rev. Stat. §§ 28-101, 28-431, and 28-439 to 28-444

(Supp. 1980) sibcnabiineeadhieiinntiiinsetantiabaasl passim

Codified Ordinances of the City of Lakewood

Section 513.01 2

EEE SET ee OC a

Codified Ordinances of the City of North Olmsted

Section 513.01 ..................- Pineseiiannien ‘ie 2

Section 513.04 7 2

Codified Ordinances of the City of Parma

Section 620.01 2

Section 620.06 ..........-.-c-c-nsecsescsese0se 2

The Merchants’ petition for a writ of certiorari to re-

view the final judgment of the United States Court of Ap-

peals for the Eighth Circuit, which judgment upheld in its

entirety a law of the State of Nebraska which had enacted

the “Model Drug Paraphernalia Act” drafted by the Drug

Enforcement Agency of the federal gov-.nment. The Ne-

braska law seeks to make it a criminal offense to possess,

use, manufacture, disseminate or advertise so-called “drug

paraphernalia.” The Eighth Circuit erred in failing to de-

clare the Nebraska law unconstitutional.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Eighth Circuit has not been officially reported.

The opinion is in Appendix A (App. 1).

The opinion of the United States District Court for

the District of Nebraska has not been officially reported.

The opinion is in Appendix B (App. A24).

JURISDICTION

The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (“Eighth

Circuit”) filed its judgment on June 8, 1981. On July

9, 1981, the Eighth Circuit denied the Merchants’ Petition

for Rehearing En Banc. The Eighth Circuit granted the

Merchants’ Motion for Stay of the Mandate on July 30,

1981.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES

INVOLVED

1. The First Amendment to the Constitution of the

United States provides that “Congress shall make no law

... abridging the freedom of speech . .. .”

2

2. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution, Section 1, provides:

No State shall make or enforce any law which shall

abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of

the United States; nor shall any State deprive any

person of life, liberty, or property, without due process

oflaw....

3. Legislative Bill 991, 1980 Neb. Laws, codified at

Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 28-101, 28-431, and 28-439 to 28-444

(Supp. 1980), is set forth in Appendix C (App. A53).

4. City of Parma, Ohio Ordinance No. 242-79, codi-

fied at §§ 620.01 and 620.04 of the Codified Ordinances

of the City of Parma; City of Lakewood, Ohio Ordinance

No. 5-80, codified at §§ 513.01 and 513.04 of the Codified

Ordinances of the City of Lakewood; and City of North

Olmsted, Ohio Ordinance No. 80-28, codified at §§ 513.01

and 513.04 of the City of North Olmsted Codified Ordi-

nances are set forth consecutively in Appendices D-F (App.

A63).

5. The Model Drug Paraphernalia Act is set forth

in Appendix G (App. A98).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Prior Proceedings.

The Merchants display, sell, and advertise recorded

and taped music, magazines, jewelry, T-shirts, smoking

accessories, and a variety of novelty items. On April

23, 1980, the Merchants filed an action in the United States

Dis.; ict Court for the District of Nebraska (“District

Court”) against the State of Nebraska and several of its

officials (hereinafter collectively referred to as the

“State”). The Merchants challenged the constitutionality

of Legislative Bill 991, 1980 Neb. Laws (“Nebraska Law”),

3

seeking declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 28

US.C. §§ 1331, 1343, 2201 and 2202, and 42 U.S.C. §§

1983, 1985, and 1988.

On April 23, 1980 the District Court entered an order

temporarily restraining the enforcement of the Nebraska

Law. On September 26, 1980, following an evidentiary

hearing, the District Court rendered an opinion in The

Casbah, Inc. v. Charles Thone, No. 80-0-271 (D. Neb. Sept.

26, 1980) (App. at A24). The District Court found central

portions of the Nebraska Law in violation of the Constitu-

tion. However, rather than strike down the Nebraska Law,

the District Court severed certain phrases and substantially

altered the plain meaning or scope of other language.

The Merchants and the State cross-appealed to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

on October 16, 1980, the Eighth Circuit stayed the judgment

of the District Court pending determination of the appeals,

and on June 8, 1981, it affirmed in part and reversed in part

the judgment of the District Court (App. at Al). On July

9, 1981, the Eighth Circuit denied the Merchants’ Petition

for Rehearing En Banc. On July 30, 1981, the Eighth Cir-

cuit granted the Merchants’ Motion for Stay of the Man-

date.

B. The Nebraska Law.

The Nebraska Law was based upon, and is virtually

identical to, the Model Drug Paraphernalia Act drafted

by the Drug Enforcement Agency of the Department of

Justize (“Model Act”). The Nebraska Law and the Model

1. The Casbah, Inc. v. Thone, Nos. 80-1925 & 80-2033, slip op.

at 4 & n.4 (8th Cir. June 8. 1981) (hereinafter cited as “Slip Op.”).

4

Act prohibit the possession,’ use,’ delivery.‘ manufacture®

and advertisement® of “drug paraphernalia.” “Drug para-

»hernalia” is defined in both the Nebraska Law and the

Modei Act as any item “used, intended for use, or designed

for use” in drug-related activities.” Listed in the Nebraska

Law and the Model Act are legislatively designated ex-

amples of “drug paraphernalia’*® and factors which law

enforcement officers, judges and juries are instructed to

consider in determining whether particular items are illicit

“drug paraphernalia.”

The Nebraska Law and Model Act impose ‘criminal’®

and civil forfeiture" penalties for the possession, use, sale,

dissemination, manufacture or advertisement of so-called

“drug paraphernalia.” An individual violating the Ne-

braska Law for the first time by selling an item deemed

to be “drug paraphernalia” is subject to a jail sentence

of up to six (6) months or a fine of up to one thousand

dollars ($1,000) or both. If a person delivers “drug para-

2. Nebraska Law Section 3 (App. at A56); Model Act Article

Il, Section (A) (App. at Al03).

3. Nebraska Law Section 3 (App. at A56); Model Act Article

Ti, Section (A) (App. at A103).

4. Nebraska Law Section 4 (App. at A56); Model Act Article

II, Section (B) (App. at A104).

5. Nebraska Law Section 4 (App. at A56); Model Act Article

Il, Section (B) (App. at A104).

6. Nebraska Law Section 6 (App. at A57); Model Act Article

II, Section (D) (App. at A104).

7. Nebraska Law Section 1 (App. at A53); Model Act Article

I (App. at A99).

8. Nebraska Law Section 1(4)(a)-(m) (App at A54-55);

Model Act Article I (App. at A101-102).

9. Nebraska Law Section 2 (App. at A55-56); Model Act

Article I (App. at A102-103).

10. Nebraska Law Section 4(2) (App. at A56); Model Act

Article II, Section (B) (App. at A103-104).

11. Nebraska Law Section 7 (App. at 57-58); Model Act

Article III (App. at A105).

5

phernalia” to a juvenile, that person is subject to a jail

sentence of up to one (1) year or a fine of up to one

thousand dollars ($1,000) or both.

REASONS FOR GRANTING TKE WRIT

I, THE JUDGMENT OF THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

DIRECTLY CONFLICTS WITH THE DECISIONS

OF OTHER COURTS DECLARING UNCONSTI-

TUTIONAL AND STRIKING DOWN LAWS

BASED UPON THE MODEL DRUG PARA-

PHERNALIA ACT.

The judgment of the Eighth Circuit is in direct conflict

with a number of recent decisions of federal and state

courts which have declared unconstitutional and struck

down laws based upon the Model Act. Most important,

the decision of the Eighth Circuit is in stark conflict with

the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Sixth Circuit (“Sixth Circuit”) in Record Revolution

No. 6, Inc. v. City of Parma, Ohio, 638 F.2d 916 (6th

Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded only as to Case Nos.

80-3308 and 80-3352, 49 U.S.L.W. 3882 (May 26, 1981)."*

Both the Eighth and Sixth Circuits were presented

with constitutional challenges to laws virtually identical

12. The third consolidated case decided by the Sixth Circuit,

The Right Place, Inc. v. City of North Olmsted, Ohio, No. 80-3353,

was not appealed to the Supreme Court. Accordingly, the Sixth

Circuit’s opinion in Record Revolution No. 6, Inc., became final

in that case and stands as the law governing the Sixth Circuit.

The decision of the Sixth Circuit in consolidated cases Record

Revolution No. 6, Inc. v. City of Parma, Ohio, No. 80-3308, and

Alexander J. Luka d/b/a Daystar Boutique v. City of Lakewood,

Ohio, No. 80-3352, was vacated and remanded for consideration

of a single issue of state law which arose following entry of the

im of the Sixth Circuit. See 49 U.S.L.W. 3882 (May 26,

1981).

to each other and to the Model Act. Record Revolution,

638 F.2d at 919**; App. at 4 & n.4.

The Sixth Circuit found a number of constitutional

defects in the Ohio Ordinances and, therefore, permanently

enjoined their enforcement. The Eighth Circuit, explicitly

rejecting the analysis of the Sixth Circuit, upheld the

constitutionality of the Nebraska Law in its entirety.

The opinions of the Sixth and Eighth Circuits present

at least five significant areas of direct conflict. The first

direct conflict between the Sixth and Eighth Circuits in-

volves the analysis of the definition of “drug parapher-

nalia.” In particular, the Sixth Circuit determined that de-

fining “drug paraphernalia” as items “designed for use” in

drug-related activities fails to give any “ ‘hint to those at-

tempting to comply with [the statute] what is included in

the definition,’ ” Record Revolution, 638 F.2d at 930 (quoting

Indiana Chapter, NORML, Inc. v. Sendak),’* and creates

a serious “danger of arbitrary and discriminatory enforce-

ment” in violation of the Constitution. Record Revolution,

638 F.2d at 931. The Eighth Circuit, on the other hand, ex-

pressly rejected the holding of the Sixth Circuit and, after

revising the language, found the same statutory definition

of “drug paraphernalia” to pass constitutional muster. App.

at All-13.

The Ohio Ordinances and the Nebraska Law make

it a crime to deliver, possess with intent to deliver, manu-

facture, or manufacture with intent to deliver drug para-

13. The municipal ordinances challenged before the Sixth

Circuit were City of Parma Ordinance No. 242-79, amended by

No. 103-80; City of Lakewood Ordinance No. 5-80; and City of

North Olmsted Ordinance No. 80-28 (hereinafter collectively re-

ferred to as the “Ohio Ordinances”). The Ohio Ordinances are

reprinted at Appendices D-F, at A63-A97.

14. No. TH 75-142-C (S.D. Ind. Feb. 1980), vacated as

moot at time of appeal, No. 80-1305 (7th Cir. July 22, 1980).

7

phernalia, “knowing, or under circumstances where one

reasonably should know”, that it will be used with con-

trolled substances. Record Revolution, 638 F.2d at 934;

App. at A56. Focusing upor the “reasonably should

know” language, the Sixth Circuit found this offense provi-

sion vague and overbroad in violation of due process stan-

dards. Record Revolution, 638 F.2d at 935-36. This same

offense provision was effectively excised from the Ne-

braska Law by the Eighth Circuit and thereafter upheld

against constitutional attack. App. at A16-17.

The third area of direct conflict between the decisions

of the Sixth and Eighth Circuits concerns the list of factors

which law enforcement officers, judges and juries are in-

structed to consider in determining the guilt of an individ-

ual. The Sixth Circuit found that those factors permit

the “potential arrest, prosecution, or conviction of a person

on the impermissible theory of guilt by association.” Rec-

ord Revolution, 638 F.2d at 933. The Eighth Circuit again

rejected the opinion of the Sixth Circuit, instead holding

that “the enumerated factors themselves pose no constitu-

tional problem, and are valuable guides in determining

what items are prohibited.” App. at Al4.

Another significant conflict between the Sixth and

Eighth Circuit opinions involves the prohibition of advertis-

ing which promotes, in whole or in part, the use or sale

of “drug paraphernalia”. Both courts applied the analysis

recently set forth by this Court in Central Hudson Gas

& Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n of New York,

447 U.S. 557 (1980), but with differing results. The Sixth

Circuit struck down the provision finding that the Ohio

Ordinances banned speech protected by the First Amend-

ment to the Constitution and that the reach of the Ohio

Ordinances was more extensive than necessary to serve the

regulatory interest of the Ohio municipalities. Record

Revolution, 638 F.2d at 936-37. The Eighth Circuit, after

“construing” the advertising proscription, found that the

Nebraska Law only prohibited advertisements solely pro-

moting illegal activity and therefore upheld the Nebraska

Law. App. at A20-23."

Finally, the Sixth Circuit refused to substantially re-

vise the Ohio Ordinances in an attempt to remedy their

constitutional defects, holding that federal courts are not

permitted to usurp the states’ and municipalities’ legislative

function. Record Revolution, 638 F.2d at 926-27. The

Eighth Circuit, while recognizing that “a federal court

must take a state statute as written end cannot find the

statute constitutional by remedying the defects which ren-

der it imprecise”, App. at A8, nonetheless judicially re-

drafted the Nebraska Law and then found the redrafted

law to be constitutional.

The decision of the Eighth Circuit is also in direct

conflict with a number of other federal and state courts.

Since the Sixth Circuit rendered its well-reasoned judg-

ment, every court, except the Eighth Circuit, presented

with a challenge to a “drug paraphernalia” law based

upon the Model Act has followed the precedent of the

Sixth Circuit in striking down the law. E.g., Information

Management Services, Inc. v. Borough of Pleasant Hills,

512 F. Supp. 1066 (W.D. Pa. 1981); General Stores, Inc.

v. City of Albuquerque, No. 81-0027-M (D.N.M. March

23, 1981); Weiler v. Carpenter, 507 F. Supp. 837 (D.N.M.

1981); Lazy, J., Ltd. v. The Borough of State College,

No. 80-1167 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 1981); Back Door Records

v. City of Jacksonville, No. LR-C-80-314 (E.D. Ark. Jan.

15. The Eighth Circuit decision conflicts not only with the

Sixth Circuit decision but also with the opinion of Court in

Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), which involved circum-

stances very similar to those involved herein. See discussion at

pages 24-29, infra.

8, 1981); Gaffey v. Babb, 50 Or. App. 617, 624 P.2d 616

(Ct. App. Or. 1981); The Town Tobacconist v. Degnan,

No. C-2198-80 (Super. Ct. Ch. N.J. March 12, 1981).**

Il. THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED ARE OF SUB-

STANTIAL IMPORTANCE, THE RESOLUTION

OF WHICH WILL HAVE NATIONWIDE IM-

PACT.

The Model Act, virtually identical to the Nebraska

Law was drafted by the Drug Enforcement Agency

of the Department of Justice and a large number of states

and municipalities throughout the country have adopted

laws based upon it. As stated in the Brief of Arkansas,

Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Indiana,

Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Marylane. Nebraska, Nevada,

New Jersey, New Mexico, North VJarolina, Oklahoma,

Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, and Washington as Amici

Curiae, filed in Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside,

Hoffman Estates, Inc., prob. juris. noted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3893

(No. 80-1681 June 1, 1981) (“States’ Brief”), at least

twenty-one states and numerous localities have enacted

laws based upon the Model Act. States’ Brief at 2-3 &

n.l. Moreover, many other governmental units have con-

sidered enacting laws based upon the Model Act and have

refrained from so doing because in their considered opinion

the Model Act is unconstitutional and/or pending the

16. Florida Businessmen for Free Enterprise v. City of Holly-

wood, 648 F.2d 956, 959 (5th Cir. 1981) stayed enforcement of

a municipal ordinance based upon the Model Act pending appeal.

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted that the appel-

lants, asserting that the municipal ordinance was unconstitutional,

had me a “substantial likelihood of success on the

merits.”

It should also be noted that Hejira Corp. v. MacFarlane, No.

80-2062 (10th Cir. a > 5, =. % i a = law against

constitutional attack. law, while bearing some

resemblance to portions rx the S Model Act, ‘significantly differs in

material respects from the Model Act. See App. at A23 n.20 at 22.

10

ultimate resolution by this Court of the issues presented

herein. A resolution of the conflict between the Sixth

and Eighth Circuits regarding the constitutionality of laws

based upon the Model Act will have a substantial impact

upon merchants in states and municipalities across the

nation.

This Court apparently has recognized the importance

of issues presented by statutes and ordinances banning

“drug paraphernalia” by noting probable jurisdiction in

The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. v. Village of Hoffman

Estates, Illinois, 639 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1981), prob. juris.

noted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3893 (No. 80-1681 June 1, 1981). The

instant action is equally or more appropriate for considera-

tion by this Court than is Village of Hoffman Estates.

The States’ Brief in Village of Hoffman Estates -onfirms

that, of the various legislative formulations banning or

regulating “drug paraphernalia,” the Model Act is by far

the most frequently adopted of such laws. See States’

Brief at 3-5. Village of Hoffman Estates, however, has

at issue a sui generis formulation unlike the Model Act

in almost every particular save one portion of the defini-

tion of “drug paraphernalia.” 639 F.2d 373, 376. There-

fore, a decision in Village of Hoffman Estates cannot re-

solve all of the important constitutional issues presented

herein concerning laws based upon the Model Act since

they are simply not presented by the language of the

ordinance at issue in that case. Accordingly, this Court

should grant the Merchants’ Petition for Certiorari and

consider or consolidate this action with the Village of

Hoffman Estates.

17. Village of Hoffman Estates Ordinance No. 969-1978 in-

cludes the phrase “designed for use” with illegal drugs. As did

the Sixth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found

that phrase unconstitutionally vague. 639 F.2d at 386.

11

Ill. THE DECISION OF THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT IS

CLEARLY IN ERROR AND SHOULD BE RE-

VERSED.

A. The Eighth Circuit Improperly Usurped the

Function of the Nebraska Legislature by Sub-

stantially Revising the Nebraska Law in an

Attempt to Remedy Its Constitutional Defects.

The Eighth Circuit improperly usurped the legislative

function by substantially rewriting the Nebraska Law.

That federal courts lack the power to construe state statutes

or municipal ordinances is well-described in the opinion

of the Sixth Circuit:

[A] federal court must take the state statute or mu-

nicipal ordinance as written and cannot find the stat-

ute or ordinance constitutional on the basis of a limit-

ing construction supplied by it rather than a state

court. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611,

614 (1971). As stated in Hynes v. Mayor and Council

of the Borough of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 622 (1976),

“[e]ven assuming that a more explicit limiting inter-

pretation of the ordinance could remedy the flaws

we have pointed out . . . we are without power to

remedy the defects by giving the ordinance constitu-

tionally precise content.” See also Smith v. Goguen,

415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 US.

518, 520 (1972).

Record Revolution, 638 F.2d at 926 (footnote and parallel

citations omitted) ."*

18. The lack of judicial power to rewrite laws in order to

uphold their constitutionality also applies to federal courts pre-

sented with challenges to federal laws, see Aptheker v. Secretary

of State, 378 U.S. 500, 515 (1964), and to state courts confronted

with challenges to state laws, see, e.g., State v. Shreveport News

Agency, Inc., 287 So. 2d 464, 469-70 (La. 1973) (court will not con-

strue state law to make it constitutional under federal constitu-

(Continued on following page)

12

The Eighth Circuit recognized the federal courts’ lack

of power to rewrite state legislation. App at A8-9. Yet,

under the guise of “extrapolating allowable meaning,” the

Eighth Circuit substantially revised the Nebraska Law”

in an attempt to remedy the law’s constitutional defects.”

In particular, the Eighth Circuit exceeded its powers

primarily by:

(1) Revising the definition of “drug paraphernalia”

so as constructively to add the bracketed terms:

“Drug paraphernalia” means all items which

are used, intended [by the defendant] for

use [by another], or [intentionally] designed

[by the defendant] for use [by another]

in drug-related activities.

App. at All1-13.

Footnote continued—

tional dictates); State v. Wedelstedt, 213 N.W.2d 652, 656 (Iowa

a (same) ; Mackenzie v. State, 76 Ohio St. 369, 374, 81 N.E.

638 (1907) (court cannot, by forced construction, modify or

amend a state statute).

19. The Eighth Circuit relied on Grayned v. City of Rock-

ford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972), for the proposition that a federal

court may “extrapolate” the meaning of a state or municipal law

so as to uphold its constitutionality. App. at A9. However,

the Court in ee distinguished ween “extrapolation” and

“Extrapolation, ” of course, is a delicate boy for it is not

within our power to construe and narrow state laws.

408 U.S. at 110 (emphasis added). The Court in Grayned did not

add, delete or narrow any statutory terms, as opposed to the ac-

tions taken by the Eighth Circuit herein which did all three to a

substantial degree.

20. The Eighth Circuit correctly stated that state courts

could not construe the Nebraska Law so as to “significantly alter

the federal constitutional issues”. App. at A6-7 n.6. t is

paraphernalia”,

was reversed by the Court of APP for Fifth Circuit.

High OV Times, Inc. v. Busbee, 621 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1980).

3

(2) Amending the offense provision by rendering

meaningless the italicized language:

It is unlawful for any person to deliver, pos-

with intent to deliver, or manufacture

with intent to deliver, drug paraphernalia,

knowing, or under circumstances where one

reasonably should know, that it will be used

with a controlled substance.

App. at A15-16.

(3) Deleting the italicized language from the adver-

tising prohibition:

It shall be unlawful for any person to place

any advertisement, the purpose of which, in

whole or in part, is to promote the sale of

drug paraphernalia.

App. at A22-23.

The foregoing examples demonstrate the substantial

judicial legislation undertaken by the Eighth Circuit in

an attempt to change the entire import of the Nebraska

Law. This Court should not condone such rewriting of

state legislation by federal courts. For the reasons dis-

cussed above, the Eighth Circuit exceeded the scope of

its powers by substantially revising the Nebraska Law.

B. The Definition of ‘Drug Paraphernalia” Is

Vague and Overbroad and, in Conjunction

With the Offense Provisions, Fails to Provide

Adequate Notice and Enforcement Guidelines

in Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to

the Constitution.

The definition of “drug paraphernalia” in the Nebraska

Law fails to meet the due process standards of the Four-

14

teenth Amendment to the Constitution in two respects:

(1) the definition of “drug paraphernalia” is vague and

overbroad, and (2) in conjunction with the offense provi-

sions, the definition of “drug paraphernalia” fails to provide

adequate notice and enforcement guidelines to law enforce-

ment officers, judges and juries.

1. The definition of ‘drug paraphernalia’”’ in

the Nebraska Law is unconstitutionally

vague and overbroad in violation of due

process standards.

The Sixth Circuit succinctly set forth the well-settled

dictates of due process:

The void-for-vagueness doctrine commands any statute

to give persons of common intelligence fair notice

of the persons covered and the conduct proscribed.

Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 390-91 (1979). Fun-

damental fairness, as well as a proper regard for pre-

venting the deterrence of constitutionally protected

conduct, requires that persons not be compelled to

guess at their own peril the meaning and application

of a statute. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 US.

104, 108 (1972); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S.

451, 453 (1939). Ascertainable standards of guilt are

imperative in order to protect against arbitrary, erra-

tic, and discriminatory arrests, prosecutions and con-

victions. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405

U.S. 156, 162 (1972); Winters v. New York, 333 US.

507, 515 (1948). Unless the statute itself prescribes

sufficiently precise standards, basic policy decisions

are impermissibly delegated to the personal predilec-

tions of the police, prosecutors and juries. Smith v.

Goguen, 415 U.S. at 575 (1974); Grayned v. City of

Rockford, 408 U.S. at 108. “Legislators may not so

abdicate their responsibilities for setting the standards

of the criminal law.” 415 U.S. at 575.

15

Record Revolution, 638 F.2d at 927 (parallel cites omitted).

Accord, App. at Al0-11 & n.8.

The Nebraska Law defines “drug paraphernalia” as

any item which is “used, intended for use, or designed

for use” in drug-related activities. This definition is so

overly inclusive as potentially to include virtually any

innocent item. Therefore, the Nebraska Law fails to give

proper notice of illicit items and permits innocent persons

to be arrested, prosecuted and convicted on the basis of

an act or state of mind of another person.

The unrebutted evidence introduced in the District

Court established that practically any everyday item can

be and has been used in drug-related activities. “[T]he

only limit on what can be used to introduce a controlled

substance into the body is imagination.” App. at A34. Ac-

cord, Record Revolution, 638 F.2d at 930-31.

Defining “drug paraphernalia” in terms of the “design”

of items is impermissible due to the lack of any design

characteristics that distinguish items with lawful uses from

items with unlawful uses. Record Revolution, 638 F.2d

at 930-31; The Casbah, Inc., District Court, App. at A34-35.

The court in Indiana Chapter, NORML, Inc. v. Sendak,

slip op. at 12-14, in an opinion relied upon and quoted

by the Sixth Circuit, Record Revolution, 638 F.2d at 930,

held that a definition of “drug paraphernalia” relying upon

design characteristics is unconstitutionally vague:

The term “designed” could signify only devices

that have no use or function other than as a means to

ingest a controlled substance. Alternatively, “de-

signed” could include any devices that have a legiti-

mate function but could be used for ingestion of drugs.

That is, the term “designed” could sweep into the

definition of paraphernalia any device that could be

16

altered from its normal function to become a make-

shift drug device, such as a paper clip, tie bar, hand

mirror, spoon, or piece of aluminum foil. The defini-

tion “designed for drug use” gives no hint to those

attempting to comply with [the statute] what is in-

cluded in the definition.”

Accord, The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. v. Village of

Hoffman Estates, 639 F.2d at 380-81, 386 & n.32; Weiler

v. Carpenter, 507 F. Supp. 837, 843 (D.N.M. Feb. 11, 1981);

Lazy, J., Ltd. v. Borough of State College, No. 80-1167,

slip op. at 4-7 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 1981); Back Door Records

v. City of Jacksonville, No. LR-C-80-314, slip op. at 4-

5 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 8, 1981); Gaffey v. Babb, 50 Or. App.

617, 624 P.2d 616, 622 (Ct. App. Or. 1981).

The definition of “drug paraphernalia” as items “used”

or “intended for use” in drug-related activities also violates

due process by failing to give fair notice to those subject

to its strictures:

The statute includes in its definition of paraphernalia

instruments “used” and “intended for use.” This

means that a person could be deemed a dealer in

paraphernalia because the buyer of his product intends

to use the item to administer drugs. ... A maker of

pipes, spoons, or hand mirrors could be found to be

21. The Sixth Circuit recognized that the term “designed”

is not limited to items solely designed to be “drug paraphernalia”:

The comments to the Model Act indicate that the ordinances

would apply to items which are not solely designed to be

drug paraphernalia. App. 1237. Vagueness enters in our case

once the ordinances begin to define drug paraphernalia in

terms of the primary adaption or dominant purpose of the

design. Then the definition begins to upon the in-

drug users. Geiger v. City of Egan, 618 F.2d 26 (sth % Cir.

1980); Music Stop, Inc. v. City of Ferndale, 488 F. Supp. 390

(E.D. Mich. 1980).

Record Revolution, 638 F.2d at 930.

17

in violation of the statute because his legitimate prod-

ucts are bought by a middleman who intends to ad-

vertise and sell the product as drug devices or who

sells them simply as pipes or spoons but to someone

who later uses the items to ingest drugs. Thus, some-

one can be considered to be dealing in paraphernalia

because of the intent of someone once, twice, or even

several times removed. The same problem of lack of

notice faces a seller who may sell items such as pipes

or spoons or paper clips to someone who intends to use

the items for the ingestion of drugs rather than for

their legitimate functions.

Indiana Chapter, NORML, Inc. v. Sendak, slip op. at 16-

17. Accord, General Stores, Inc. v. City of Albuquerque,

No. 81-0027-M, slip op. at 4-5 (D.N.M. March 23, 1981);

Weiler v. Carpenter, 507 F. Supp. 837, 842 (D.N.M. 1981);

Gaffey v. Babb, 50 Or. App. 617, 624 P.2d 616, 623-24

(Ct. App. Or. 1981); The Town Tobacconist v. Degnan,

No. C-2198-80, slip op. at 7-8 (Super. Ct. Ch. N.J. March

12, 1981).”

22. The court in The Town Tobacconist, slip op. at 7-8,

clearly described the constitutional defects in the phrases “used”

and “intended for use”:

Objects are not used or intended for use in an unpop-

ulated vacuum. The use or intention for use envisioned by

the statute must be by someone. It is not facially clear

whether “used” means frequently used or used by someone

in particular against whom enforcement may be aimed and

whether “intended for use” means inten by its manu-

facturer, its seller or its ultimate possessor for use... .

It is not the seller’s intent that is at issue. If it were,

then an item would not be drug paraphernalia unless the re-

tailer intended that his customer use it unlawfully. It is plain

that the retailer’s intent is to sell the item. .. .

The phrase “used or intended for use”, that appears a

dozen times renders the definition of drug paraphernalia un-

lawfully vague. It is ble for any retailer to know

whose use or whose inten he must be aware of. If it is

“frequent” use, he can not tell how frequent it must be, or

(Continued on following page)

18

For these reasons, the defin‘tion of “drug parapherna-

lia” is vague and overbroad in violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment to the Constitution. Therefore, the Eighth

Circuit erred in concluding that the definition of “drug

paraphernalia” in the Nebraska Law passes constitutional

muster.”

2. The definition of ‘‘drug paraphernalia,”’ in

conjunction with the offense provisions,

fails to provide adequate notice and en-

forcement guidelines in violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment.

The offense provisions of the Nebraska Law violate

due process by setting a negligence standard which re-

quires a seller of virtually any item to guess, at his peril,

at the intended or actual use to be made of an item by

another individual. A wrong guess may be crirainally

punished. Therefore, the Neb.aska Law violates due pro-

cess.

The Nebraska Law makes it a criminal violation for

a person to sell virtually any item “knowing, or under

circumstances where one reasonably should know,” that

it will be used by another person for drug-velated activ-

ities. All that is necessary under the Nebraska Law for

Footnote continued—

among what groups of people. If it is the cust:.aer’s in-

tentio ype before the customer arrives, the retailer cannot

tell if he is unlawfully stocking drug paraphernalia. The prior

an utting the item on his shelves would become unlawful

ter, after the intentions of the yet unidentified cus-

19

a law enforcement officer to arrest a vendor is probable

cause to believe that some imaginary “reasonable seller”

should have known in the circumstances that the purchaser

would use the item for drug-related activity at some time

in the future. Similarly, a judge or jury is permitted

under the Nebraska Law to convict a seller on a finding

that a hypothetical “reasonable seller” should have known

that the buyer would use the item with a controlled sub-

stance. The offense sections provide no requirement that

a vendor have any criminal intent or guilty knowledge.

“Because most uses of the outlawed items are lawful and

common, the ‘reason to know’ standard is too open-ended

and too susceptible to misapplication to satisfy the dictates

of due process.” Record Revolution, 638 F.2d at 935-36

(footnotes omitted). Accord, Weiler v. Carpenter, 507 F.

Supp. at 841.

For the reasons discussed above, the definition of “drug

paraphernalia,” in conjunction with the offense provisions,

violates due process.* The Eighth Circuit erred in failing

to so hold.*

Footnote continued—

Spence v. Washington, 413 U.S. 405 (1974); Tinker v. Des Moines

School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).

Furthermore, heightened precision is — when a law

on first amendment values. E.g., Hynes v. Mayor and

Council of the Borough of Oradell, 423° US. 610, 620 (1976).

The Nebraska Law fails utterly to accord with that requirement.

24. The District Court reco the constitutional defects

in the negligence standard. The Casbah, Inc., District Court, App.

at A41-42. However, rather than strike down the Nebraska

Law, the District Court severed the “reasonably should know”

language from the law. Id. at 43. The Eighth Circuit reversed this

portion of the District Court’s judgment, preferring to construe

this vision so as effectively to have no meaning apart from

the tion of “drug paraphernalia.” App. at A15-A17.

25. The attempted reading of an intent element into the

definition of “drug Se by the Eighth Circuit, even

if permitted, does not cure the unconstitutional vagueness of

the law. First, if that reading is upheld it creates a constitutionally

(Continued on following page)

20

C. The Eighth Circuit Erred in Failing to Hold

That the Nebraska Law Created Permissive

Inferences in Violation of Due Process Stan-

dards.

The Eighth Circuit erred in upholding against a due

process challenge the list of various factors which law

enforcement officers, judges and juries are instructed to

Footnote continued—

offensive inconsistency with another part of the law. The defi-

nition and offense sections of the Nebraska Law set forth sep-

arate elements. The negligence standard in the offense sections

is distinct from, and contrary to, the implication of an intent

es mea into the definition section. As the District Court

Under the reasonably should know standard a conviction can

be had without a showing of general criminal intent; that is,

without establishing that the defendant specifi intended

to violate the statute. As a result, the reasonably should

know standard viola.es the prophylactic effect of the scienter

requirement in the definition of drug paraphernalia. The

statute cannot constitutionally take away with one hand

what it gives with another.

The Casbah, Inc., District Court, App. at A41-42. Accord, Record

Revolution, 638 F.2d at 934-36.

Second, even if the definition and offense sections are

deemed to set forth a single element, as the Eighth Circuit suggests,

see Slip. Op. at 17-18, rather than two separate elements, that

too fails to cure the unconstitutional vagueness of the Nebraska

Law. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945), relied upon

by courts considering the constitutionality of “drug para

laws, identifies further constitutional defects in the Tdoube law.

Screws upheld the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. 8 52, now

codified at 18 U.S.C. § 242, which makes it a crime to

subject” an individual to a deprivation of AL. — 4s or legal

rights, privileges, or immunities. Discussing whether intent will

cure an otherwise vague enactment, this Court stated:

Jhe presence of a bad purpose or evil intent alone may not

sufficient. We do say that a requirement of a specific

intent to deprive a of a federal right made definite by

decision or other eee cee ee

unconstitutionality on grounds of vagueness.

Id. at 103 (emphasis added).

(Continued on following page)

21

consider in determining the guilt of an individual.** Most

of those factors permit the “potential arrest prosecution,

or conviction of a person on the impermissible theory of

guilt by association.” Record Revolution, 638 F.2d at 933.

See App. at Al5. Therefore, those factors create per-

missive inferences in violation of due process standards.

There is not a sufficient connection between proof of those

factors and the guilt of the accused so as to satisfy require-

ments of due process. E.g., General Stores, Inc. v. City

of Albuquerque, slip op. at 5-6, 7; Weiler v. Carpenter,

507 F. Supp. at 843-44; Lazy, J., Ltd. v. Borough of State

College, slip op. at 8-9.

A permissive inference:

allows—but does not require—the trier of fact to infer

the elemental fact [i.e., sale or possession of ‘drug

paraphernalia’] from proof by the prosecutor of the

basic one [i.e., sale or possession of an item listed in

the Nebraska Law as a common item of ‘drug para-

phernalia’] and that places no burden of any kind on

the defendant.

County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157

(1979) (bracketed language added). Accord, Hammontree

v. Phelps, 605 F.2d 1371, 1374-75 (5th Cir. 1979).

Footnote continued—

Unlike the law upheld in Screws, implication of an intent ele-

ment into the Nebraska Law, even as revised by the Eighth

Circuit, fails to cure its fatal vagueness. Contrast 18 US.C.

§ 52, which made it a crime to willfully violate a definite feccral

right, with the Nebraska Law, which makes it a crime to in-

tentionally sell an otherwise innocent item. The former provides

law enforcement personnel, judges and juries with guidelines

to recognize a statutory violation (i.e., violation of a definite federal]

right), while the latter does not (i.e., sale of any item). There-

fore, the substantial revision by the Eighth Circuit, even were it

within its powers, fails to cure the Nebraska Law of its constitu-

tional defects. Accord, Lazy, J., Ltd. v. Borough of State College,

No. 80-1167, slip op. at 7-8 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 1981).

26. Nebraska Law Section 2 (App. at A55-56).

22

A permissive inference violates due process unless it

can be said with “substantial assurance that the presumed

fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact

on which it is made to depend.” 442 US. at 165-66 & n.28.

See also Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 842, 843

(1973); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 33 (1969); Mc-

Inerney v. Berman, 473 F. Supp. 187, 188 (D. Mass. 1979),

aff'd, 621 F.2d 20 (ist Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 201

(1980).

The listing of circumstantial factors in the Nebraska

law creates permissive inferences in violation of due

process:

The factors include the proximity in time and

space to a direct violation of the drug laws or to the

presence of controlled substances, the statements of

others, and the advertising of others. Thus, a re-

tailer, for example, to avoid arrest, prosecution, or

conviction, must continuously police the national

and local media and the activities and statements

of persons in the area of his store. The retailer

could be safe from arrest on Monday morning when no

one congregated near his store or the local narcotics

dealer was on the other side of town, yet be very sus-

ceptible to arrest Monday afternoon when, unknown

to the retailer, the narcotics dealer arrived around the

corner from his store, attracting a group of persons

who bought marijuana or other controlled substances

and then came into his retail store to buy rolling papers,

alligator clips, or pipes. In short, the ordinances permit

events beyond the control of the retail owner to de-

termine his guilt.... It is well established that guilt

must be based on personal action, statements, or

knowledge, not on association with other persons

suspected of criminal conduct. Sawyer v. Sandstrom,

615 F.2d 211, 316-17 (5th Cir. 1980).

23

Record Revolution, 638 F.2d at 933 (footnote omitted.)*’

The Nebraska Law also permits, for example, the guilt of

a vendor to be inferred from proof that a high percentage

of the vendor’s sales are pipes or alligator clips* or from

proof that the vendor had been convicted many years

earlier of possession of marijuana.” Moreover, the Ne-

braska Law permits a vendor to be arrested if not deemed

by law enforcement officers to be a “legitimate” business.*°

It cannot be said with substantial assurance that a

vendor is selling items which will be used with controlled

substances merely from proof of the various factors dis-

cussed above. Therefore, it is clear that the permissive in-

ferences created by the list of circumstantial factors in the

Nebraska Law violate due process standards. The Eighth

Circuit erred™ in holding otherwise.**

27. Find that Ohio law incorporates principles of due

process, the S Circuit declined to hold the list of circumstantial

factors violative of the federal constitution. 638 F.2d at 933-34.

28. Nebraska Law Section 2(12) (App. at A56).

29. Nebraska Law Section 2(2) (App. at A55).

30. Nebraska Law Section 2(11) (App. at A56).

31. The th Circuit misconceives the “prosecutorial

scheme” of the Nebraska Law, stating that, “If third party ac-

tions as referred to in Section 2, tend to indicate that an item is

to the nt phernalia, the focus of inquiry must necessarily shift

intent of the individual involved.” App. at Al5. How-

the language of the Nebraska Law clearly states that it is

the gy other bie : x i ~ 4 i.

w an object " parapher-

” i.e., used, intended for use, or designed for use in drug-

related activity. App. at A55-56. (Emphasis supplied) There

is no shift, or two-tiered intent determination in the Nebraska

Pret which the Eighth Circuit found necessary to convict the

32. The Nebraska Law lists in Section 1(4)(a =), 5 items

deemed to be “common forms of paraphe cord

Revolution, 638 F.2d at 932. Accord, App. at Al3 n.10. That list-

ing also creates permissive inferences in violation of due process

standards allowing law enforcement officers, judges and

juries to ny from possession, sale or manufacture of an

item listed

(Continued on following page)

24

D. The Eighth Circuit Erred in Not Finding the

Nebraska Law an Unreasonable Regulation

Calculated to Stifle and Interfere With Legiti-

mate Commercial Relations in Violation of

Constitutional Due Process.

The Eighth Circuit erred in failing to find the Nebraska

Law to be an unreasonable regulation calculated to destroy

the Merchants’ businesses in violation of the due process

clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Pierce v. So-

ciety of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535-36 (1924); Meyer v.

Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1922).

This Court has recently reemphasized that a state may

not enact arbitrary or unreasonable laws simply because

the activities aimed at involve “mundane commercial trans-

action[s].” Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 364

(1977). See also Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Con-

sumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976); and Bigelow v. Vir-

ginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).

However, legitimate the state’s alleged purpose in reg-

ulating private activity—use of controlled substances here

—that purpose cannot reasonably be achieved by sup-

pressing the sale of neutral items of commerce. Constitu-

tional concepts of “liberty” and “property” are not so nar-

row™ that the state may destroy a legitimate business,

Footnote continued—

Because there are no design characteristics of objects which

distinguish objects intended for lawful use from objects intended

for unlawful use, “the object by itself does not provide any basis

for an inference of its intended use.” Record Revolution, 638 F.2d

at 933. Therefore, the permissive inferences created b ~ 4. in

the Nebraska Law common forms of “drug paraphernalia” clearly

violate due process. See County Court of Ulster County, supra.

33. As this Court found, in Moore v. City of East Cleveland:

“Due process has not been reduced to any formula; -

content cannot be determined by reference to any code. .

(Continued on following page)

25

Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535-36, or impose a complete disability

to pursue an occupation. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408

U.S. 564, 573-74 (1972); accord, Keyishian v. Board of

Regents of New York, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).

Under the Nebraska Law, since innocent items become

“drug paraphernalia” only if an illicit intent is attached

to the item, there is nothing that distinguishes a sale of

drug paraphernalia from a sale of any other merchandise

except an element wholly in the mind of the buyer or

seller. District Court Op. at 7-8, 10,14. The police officer’s

speculation about this incorporeal element—unaided by any

objective factor consistent with guilt—will determine

whether a shop owner’s business is padlocked,* and the

owner is hauled before a magistrate.

To be safe from the ruin of their businesses and their

own incarceration, the Merchants would simply have to

Footnote continued—

It is a —_— continuum which, broadly speaking, includes

a freedom from all — arbitrary impositions and

purposeless restraints, .

431 U.S. 494, 538-39 (1977) citing Justice Harlan’s dissenting

opinion in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-43 (1961).

34. Section 7 of the Act contains a forfeiture penalty for

items defined as drug ~~ a which the Eighth Circuit

upheld based on Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416

S. 663 (1974). Slip. Op. at 20. Unlike the direct act of trans-

porting contraband in alero-Toledo, the Nebraska Law pro-

scribes an act which is in itself legal—sale, manufacture, delivery

or use of certain items—but which becomes illegal by virtue of

a third party’s actions.

Further, this Court in Calero-Toledo made it — clear that

seizure and forfeiture had to be “directly necessary to secure an

as governmental or general suilie interest” 416 U.S. at

678. The Nebraska Law would only indirectly accomplish Ne-

braska’s aim of stemming drug abuse, if at all. Id. Here, unlike

Calero-Toledo, there is no special need for very prompt action.

Rather, the Merchant’s inventory is merely sitting on shelves

awaiting purchase. Finally, this Court insisted there must be

clear standards under a narrowly drawn statute, id., which the

Nebraska Law simply does not provide.

shut down. By confronting the Merchants with these con-

sequences, the Nebraska Law exceeds permissible bounds

for regulating private activity and chills the legitimate rela-

tionship of merchant and customer. This Nebraska Law

which mandates an unreasonable and arbitrary inhibition

on neutral activity violates constitutional due process.

E. The Eighth Circuit Erred in Failing to Hold

That the Nebraska Law Impermissibly Pen-

alizes Speech Protected by the First Amend-

ment to the Constitution.

The Nebraska Law prohibits advertising which pro-

motes, in whole or in part, the use or sale of “drug para-

phernalia.”* The Eighth Circuit erred in holding that the

bar on advertising withstands constitutional challenge

under the First Amendment.”

The applicable analysis was set forth by this Court in

Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n

of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980):

In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part an-

alysis has developed. At the outset, we must determine

whether the expression is protected by the First

Amendment. For commercial speech to come within

that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity

and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the as-

serted governmental interest is substantial. If both

inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine

whether the regulation directly advances the govern-

mental interest asserted, and whether it is not more

extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.

35. Nebraska Law Section 6 (App. at A57).

36. For the reasons discussed above, the prohibition on ad-

vertising is also and overbroad for its use of the term “drug

ay ae and the “reasonably should know” criterion. See

Revolution, 638 F.2d at 937 n.32.

37. App. at A20.

27

The advertising banned by the Nebraska Law does not

concern only unlawful activity. The Sixth Circuit, an-

alyzing an identical provision in the Ohio Ordinances,

stated:

The ordinances, as now drafted, could infringe on pro-

tected speech in at least three different ways. First,

the ordinances could be enforced against advertisers or

publishers who place advertisements in printed media

that circulates in other cities as well as Parma, Lake-

wood, and North Olmsted. Second, the ordinances

could prevent the residents of these three cities from

receiving information about the availability of items,

defined by the ordinances as drug paraphernalia, in

other cities that do not prohibit the use, sale or manu-

facture of those items. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 US.

809, 824-25 (1975). Third, the ordinances use of the

words “promote in part” may allow the ban of speech

discussing the reform of drug laws or speech glorifying

the drug culture.

Record Revolution, 638 F.2d at 936-37 (citation omitted).

Therefore, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the Ohio Or-

dinances did unconstitutionally penalize protected speech.

Record Revolution, 638 F.2d at 937.

The Nebraska Law, similarly, infringes on protected

speech by flatly barring all advertisements which have as

one purpose (of many potential lawful purposes) the pro-

motion of the sale of “drug paraphernalia.” By use of the

words “promote in part,” the Nebraska Law casts a net so

widely that it places a ban on speecl: containing factual

matters of public interest.

Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), which in-

volved circumstances similar to those involved herein,

struck down a Virginia statute which prohibited advertise-

ments encouraging or promoting abortions, which are com-

mercial transactions, because the advertisements there pro-

hibited contained “factual matter of clear ‘public inter-

est.’””** Since the scope of the proscription of the Nebraska

Law is not limited to advertisements with the sole purpose

of promoting commercial transactions, that law is also in-

valid under the First Amendment. Accord, Central Hudson

Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n of New York,

447 U.S. at 564-65; New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.

254 (1964).

The ban of the Nebraska Law is also “geographically

overbroad,” reaching advertisements promoting the sale of

“drug paraphernalia” in areas beyond the geographic

boundaries of Nebraska, many of which legally permit the

sale of items which Nebraska officials might consider to be

“drug paraphernalia.” Again, the decision of this Court

in Bigelow controls the instant action:

The Virginia Legislature could not have regulated the

advertiser’s activity in New York, and obviously could

not have proscribed the activity in that state... .

Neither could Virginia prevent its residents from trav-

eling to New York to obtain those services or, as the

state conceded, . . . prosecute them for going there

421 U.S. at 822-24 (footnote omitted). The prohibition of

the Nebraska Law is as fatally broad in geographic scope

as the Virginia statute declared unconstitutional in Bigelow.

See Record Revolution, 638 F.2d at 937.°

38. 421 US. at 822.

39. The Eighth Circuit, while noting that “there may be merit

to the geographical overbreadth argument,” . at A23 n.19,

improperly refused to decide this issue, ho that proper

eee ee ee ee The Nebraska Law would

infringe not only the First Amendment rights of out-of-state

merchants, but also the rights of Nebraska “advertisers or pub-

(Continued on following page)

29

Application of the remaining factors set forth by the

Court in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Ser-

vice Comm’n of New York necessarily results in a con-

clusion that the Nebraska Law violates the First Amend-

ment right of free speech. The suppression of protected

speech worked by the Nebraska Law is more extensive

than necessary to further any legitimate interest of the

State. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 564-

66. See Record Revolution, 638 F.2d at 937. Accordingly,

the Eighth Circuit erred in upholding the constitutionality

of the prohibition on advertising in the Nebraska Law.

ing information about the availability of items, defined by the

| an law] as drug paraphernalia, in other [states] that

not prohibit the use, sale or manufacture of these items.” Id.

See, e.g. Trial Transcript 43-45, 47-49, 60, 69-73, 75, 93-95, 133,

135, 142-143, 173-176, 187, 214, 270.

The — Circuit also incorrectly held that the Merchants

failed to this issue on appeal. App. at A23 n.19. The Mer-

ment in the District Court, see, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Pre-Trial Brief at

14-17, and the District Court dealt with that issue in its opinion.

See The Casbah, Inc., District Court, App. at A45-46 & n.20. The

Merchants incorporated their prior arguments by reference into

Sey See Deo 2 See De Regardless of whether or not

sider the geographical overbreadth argument. Public policy and

oblige and allow consideration of important

w even if not fully briefed and argued below.

ongue Labs, Inc. v. Univ. of Illinois Foundation, 402

313, 320 n.6 (1971). The Nebraska Civil Liberties Union,

ch granted permission to file a brief amicus curiae by

fully briefed the geographical overbreadth

ts again raised the geographical overbreadth

in Support of the Petition for a New Hearing

the Eighth Circuit, at pages 12-13.

Merchants, some of whom conduct a multi-state business,

whom advertise, and all of whom are interested in read-

availability in other

banned in Nebraska, see, e.g., Trial

, 69-73, 75, 93-95, 133, 135, 142-43,

may properly raise the geographical over-

Tat

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CONCLUSION

The judgment of the Eighth Circuit directly conflicts

with the decisions of other courts declaring unconstitu-

tional and striking down laws, virtually identical to the

Nebraska Law, based upon the Model Drug Paraphernalia

Act. The questions presented herein are of substantial im-

portance, the resolution of which will have nationwide im-

pact. Moreover, the opinion of the Eighth Circuit is plainly

in error. For these reasons, this Court should grant the

Merchants’ Petition for Certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

Davin C. Werner, Counsel of Record

Frep P. SCHWARTZ

Armonp D. BupIsH

Haun, Loeser, FREEDHEIM, DEAN &

WELLMAN

800 National City E. 6th Building

Cleveland, Ohio 44114

(216) 621-0150

Counsel for Petitioners

Of Counsel:

Donatp B. FIEDLER

300 Keeline Building

Omaha, Nebraska 68102

Al

APPENDIX A

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

(Filed June 8, 1981)

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 80-1925

Tue Caspan, Inc.; THe Disc Counter, INc.; AND JEFF

Ferber, D/B/A H & D Sates; Grec HASSELHORST, D/B/A

EupnoriA; Eric LisTou, D/B/A JOINT VENTURE NOVELTY

Suop, Prre Dream, Inc.; DENNIS ROBINSON,

D/B/A THE JOYNT,

Appellants,

v.

CHARLES THONE, GOVERNOR FOR THE STATE OF NEBRASKA;

Pau. Doucias, ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF

NEBRASKA; ELMER KOHMEPSHER, COLONEL IN CHARGE

OF THE NEBRASKA STATE PATROL; DonALp L. KNOWLEs,

County ATTORNEY FoR DoucLas County,

NEBRASKA

Appellees.

No. 80-2033

Tue Caspan, Inc.; THe Disc Counter, INc.; AND JEFF

Ferber, D/B/A H & D Sates; Grec HASSELHORST, D/B/A

EvupuoriA; Eric Listou, p/B/A JOINT VENTURE NOVELTY

Suop, Pree Dream, Inc.; DENNIS ROBINSON,

D/B/A THE JOYNT,

Appellees,

A2

v.

CHARLES THONE, GOVERNOR FOR THE STATE OF NEBRASKA;

Paut Doucias, ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF

NEBRASKA; ELMER KOHMEPSHER, COLONEL IN CHARGE

OF THE NEBRASKA STATE PaTROL; DonaLp L. KNOWLES,

County ATTorNEY FoR Douctas County,

NEBRASKA

Appellants.

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Nebraska.

Before Hentey, Circuit Judge, Bennett,* Court of Claims

Judge, and McMutu1an, Circuit Judge.

Hentey, Circuit Judge.

This action ic before the court on an appeal and cross-

appeal involving the cu..stitutionality of a recently enacted

Nebraska statute, Legislative Bill 991, 1980 Neb. Laws

(“LB 991”),’ which prohibits the use, sale and manufac-

ture of “drug paraphernalia.” Plaintiffs, appellants here,

are wholesale distributors and retail merchants. Defen-

dants, appellees here, include Charles Thone, the Governor

of Nebraska; Paul Douglas, Attorney General for the State

of Nebraska; Elmer Kohmetscher (alternately identified

as Elmer Kohmepsher) of the Nebraska State Patrol; and

Donald L. Knowles, County Attorney for Douglas County,

Nebraska.

*Marion T. Bennett, Judge, United States Court of Claims,

nn

Legislative Bill 991 was enacted April 23, 1980 and be-

ey 1980. The statute is codified at Neb.

Rev. Stat. §§ 28-101, 28-431, and 28-439 to 28-444. (Supp. 1980).

A3

The district court* sustained the constitutionality of

the statute after severing certain phrases and construing

the meaning of other language. With due respect for the

district court’s thoughtful opinion, we reverse those por-

tions of the court’s ruling severing phrases as unconsti-

tutional and hold LB 991 constitutional as against the

challenges we are called upon to consider and determine.

A. Proceedings Below.

Appellants on April 23, 1980 filed their action in dis-

trict court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief pur-

suant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 US.C. §§ 2201, 2202

on the grounds that LB 991 abridges fundamental consti-

tutional rights protected by the first, fourth, fifth and

fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution.

Pursuant to an agreement of counsel, the district court

on the same date entered an order temporarily restraining

the enforcement of LB 991 pending a final determination

on the merits. On September 4, 1980 the court held a

consolidated hearing on the application for preliminary

and permanent injunctions, with the result that by lengthy

memorandum filed September 26, 1980 the court found

the statute constitutional as construed. Pursuant to this

memorandum of opinion, the court’s temporary restraining

order was dissolved. This court granted appellants’ appli-

cation for stay of judgment pending appeal.

B. LB 991.

LB 991 is based on the Model Drug Paraphernalia Act

(Model Act) drafted by the Drug Enforcement Adminis-

tration (DEA) of the United States Department of Justice.

2. The Honorable Richard E. Robinson, United States Senior

District Judge for the District of Nebraska.

A4

In a Prefatory Note to the Model Act, the DEA acknowl-

edged that the Model Act was drafted with the aim of

overcoming constitutional infirmities that have rendered

other drug paraphernalia laws subject to constitutional at-

tack.* In the present appeal, we are essentially asked to

decide whether this effort has been successful.‘

The structure of LB 991 is somewhat comnlex and

deserves summary here. Sections 1 and 2 are definitional.

In Section 1, drug paraphernalia is defined as “all equip-

ment, products, and materials of any kind which are used,

intended for use, or designed for use” in manufacturing or

ingesting controlled substances. A lengthy list of e:.amples

follows, with each example restating the requirement

that the named object be “used, intended for use, or de-

signed for use” in drug-related activities. The list of ex-

amples concludes with the catchall category of “objects

used, intended for use, or designed for use in ingesting, in-

haling, or otherwise introducing marijuana, cocaine, hashish,

or hashish oil into the human body,” followed by another

list of thirteen exemplary items such as pipes of various

types, miniature cocaine spoons, and roach clips. Although

our othe oa Fagan, 618 F.2d 26 (8th Cis, 1980), "Record Hie nd

v. ; r. : ea

Corp. v. Sachen, 498 F.Supp. 88 (E.D. Wis. 1980); Magnani v. City

of Ames, Ia., 493 F . 1003 (S.D. Ia. 1980); Music Stop, Inc. v.

City of Ferndale, 488 ‘Supp. 390 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Knoedler v.

Roxbury Township, 485 F.Supp. 990 (D. NJ. 1980); Record

Museum v. Lawrence Township, 481 F.Supp. 768 (D. N.J. 1979);

Bambu Sales, Inc. v. Gibson, 474 F.Supp. 1297 (D. N.J. 1979);

Smith v. Roark, No. 80-2110 (S.D. W.Va. May 13, 1980); Indiana

em, a Inc. v. Sendak, No. TH 75-142-C (S.D. Ind.

» 4 .

4. LB 991 tracks the Model Act while omitting those por-

ty. tft, ~~h- of

AS

the enumeration of specific items is similar to that found in

statutes which have been held unconstitutional,* LB 991

is significantly different in coupling the named items to

the mental element of intent.

Section 2 of LB 991 names fourteen factors which “a

court or other authority shall consider, in addition to all

other logically relevant factors,” in determining whether

an object is drug paraphernalia.

Section 3 defines the substantive criminal offense of

using, or possessing with intent to use, drug paraphernalia.

Section 4 defines the substantive criminal offense of

delivery, possession with intent to deliver, or manufacture

with intent to deliver drug paraphernalia, when the de-

liverer, possessor or manufacturer knows or ressonably

should know that the drug paraphernalia will be used with

controlled substances.

Section 5 makes delivery of drug paraphernalia to a

minor a special offense.

Section 6 makes criminal the placing of any written

advertisement when one knows or reasonably should know

that the purpose of the advertisement is to promote the

sale of objects designed or intended for use as drug para-

phernalia.

Finally, LB 991 contains a civil forfeiture section and

a severability section.

The district court, in an as-yet unpublished opinion,

The Casbah, Inc. v. Thone, Civ. No. 80-0-271 (D. Neb. Sept.

26, 1980), held the statute to be constitutional after severing

statutes in Geiger v. City , supra, 618 F.2d at 28-29;

supra, 488 F.Supp. at 391;

Record Museum v. Sit of Ferndale, supra, supra, 481 F.Supp. at 771;

Smith v. Roark, supra, slip op. at 4-5.

A6

subsection (11) of Section 2, which requires courts and law

enforcement officials to consider whether a person is a

“legitimate supplier” of like items. Also severed as uncon-

stitutionally vague was the provision in Sections 4 and 6

for prosecution where the defendant “reasonably should

know” the effects of his actions.

C. Issues on Appeal.

Appellants raise four issues on appeal. First, they con-

tend that the district court erved in failing to review the

Nebraska statute under a strict scrutiny standard of re-

view. Second, they contend that the district court usurped

the legislature’s function by substantially rewriting the

statute. Appellants’ third contention is that the statute

as written is impermissibly vague and overbroad. Finally,

appellants contend that the district court erred in finding

that the statute does not violate fourth amendment rights

The Nebraska Civil Liberties Union appears as amicus

curiae for the limited purpose of arguing that Sections 6 and

7 of the statute, pertaining to advertising and civil for-

feiture of written materials, offend the first amendment.

Appellees by cross-appeal allege that the district court

erred in holding the “legitimate supplier” provision of Sec-

tion 2(11) unconstitutionally vague, and in holding the

“reasonably should know” standard in Sections 4 and 6 un-

constitutionally vague.

We have jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1291. The parties have raised no challenge on

jurisdictional grounds and have not asked us to abstain.*

Hunt v. Roth, No. 80-2067 (8th Cir. May 13, 1981).

6. We Save considered, however, whether the branch of ab-

stention dum ine elaborated in Railroad Commission v. Pullman

Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), requires abstention. We conclude that

(Continued on following page)

AT

D. Standard of Review.

In dealing with the merits of appellants’ constitutional

challenge, we have considered the standard of review to

be applied. Appellants contend that a standard of strict

scrutiny applies because LB 991 implicates first amendment

rights and “a right to privacy under the fourth amend-

ment.”

We omit for the moment the matter of first amend-

ment rights, reserving this issue for Section V, infra.

Appellants’ argument regarding the right to privacy is

wholly without merit. It is true that the fourth amend-

ment embraces the right to be free from unreasonable

governmental intrusions into traditionally private areas,

Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980); United States

Footnote continued—

it does not. See generally Coley v. Clinton, 635 F.2d 1364, 1373

ro” 1980), and George v. Parratt, 602 F.2d 818 (8th Cir.

questions presen

state court in tions. Record Revolution No. 6, Inc. v

of 638 F.2d 916, 925-26 (6th Cir. 1980), vacated cond

49 U.S.L.W. 3882 (U.S. May 26, 1981 Pus 80-1507);

Mid-Atlantic Accessories Trade tion v. 4 500 F.Supp.

834, 841 (D. Md. 1980), cf. High OV Times, Inc. v. Busbee, 621 F.2d

135, 141 (Sth Cir. 1980) (district court held to have abused its

Kye By decision in challenge to

similar to Model Act); Head Inc. v. Olson, 416 FSupp. 368

(D. N.D. 1979 Pee oe Sore & challenge to statute

similar to Act). We concur in the reasoning of these cases,

Moreover, since this is not a case which raises difficult or

obscure state law questions, the second factor cited in Pullman

as supportive of abstention is absent here. Id. at 499. Abstention

A8

v. Houle, 603 F.2d 1297, 1300-01 (8th Cir. 1979) (and cita-

tions therein). Here, however, for reasons indicated in

Section IV, infra, neither fourth amendment rights nor

privacy rights are implicated in LB 991. LB 991 on its

face creates no classifications and applies equally to every-

one. Where no suspect classifications are involved and

no fundamental rights, the question under equal protection

analysis is whether the legislation is reasonably related

to a legitimate state purpose. Massachusetts Board of

Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976); Mid-

Atlantic Accessories Trade Association v. Maryland, supra,

500 F.Supp. at 849. Similarly, we apply here the rational

basis standard of review.

Two considerations are basic to our decision on the

merits. The first is our belief that we are empowered

to articulate the meaning of the drug paraphernalia statute

in a manner which supports a finding of constitutionality.

The second is our conclusion that the element of intent

saves the Nebraska statute from unconstitutional vague-

ness. On each matter, after careful consideration, we

reach a different conclusion from that of the Sixth Circuit,

the only other Court of Appeals to have considered the

Model Act. Record Revolution No. 6, Inc. v. City of Parma,

supra, 638 F.2d 916.

Appellants’ first contention is that the district court

exceeded its authority in construing and severing the

Nebraska statute so as to render it constitutional.

We recognize that a federal court must take a state

statute as written and cannot find the statute constitu

tional by remedying the defects which render it imprecise.

Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 622 (1976). See

also Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974); Gooding

Ag

v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520 (1972). Only the state courts

may authoritatively construe state legislation. Id.; United

States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369

(1971). We are not prevented, however, from “extrap-

olat[ing] allowable meaning.” Grayned v. City of Rock-

ford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972). Obviously, a federal court

must determine what a state statute means before judging

its facial constitutionality. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413

US. 601, 618 n. 16 (1973).

Viewing LB 991 as a whole and construing its facial

terms within the limits of our judicial powers, we conclude

that the statute is constitutional. But see Record Revolu-

tion No. 6, Inc. v. City of Parma, supra, 638 F.2d at 927

(Sixth Circuit opinion is shaped by the court’s “lack of

power to put a limiting construction on the municipal

ordinances.”). We conclude that the language of the Model

Act supports a saving construction which we are empow-

ered to articulate, cf. Florida Businessmen for Free Enter-

prise v. Florida, 499 F.Supp. 346, 352 (N.D. Fla. 1980)

(statute offered no language to support judicial restruc-

turing) and we are obliged to favor an interpretation which

renders the statute constitutional. United States v. Vuitch,

402 U.S. 62 (1971); Turchick v. United States, 561 F.2d

719, 723-24 (8th Cir. 1977); Tollett v. United States, 485

F.2d 1087, 1098 (8th Cir. 1973).

The heart of appellants’ case is the contention that

LB 991 is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, in viola-

tion of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.

The issues of vagueness and overbreadth have been exten-

sively discussed in nearly every case involving the Model

Act. For this reason, our discussion is abbreviated. We

rely upon the reasoning of those courts which have con-

Ald

cluded that the Act survives these constitutional chal-

lenges.’

We turn first to the issue of vagueness. As this court

recognized in Geiger v. City of Eagan, supra, 618 F.2d at

28, due process has two requirements: that laws provide

notice to the ordinary person of what is prohibited and

that they provide standards to law enforcement officials

to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.’ Ap-

7. Cases holding the Model Act or a modified version of the

Model Act not vague or overbroad include Tobacco Accessories

& Novelty Craftsmen Merchants Ass’n v. Treen, 501 F.Supp. 168

= La. yt Mid-Atlantic Accessories Trade Ass'n v. Md.,

500 F.Su 834; Delaware Accessories Trade Ass’n v.

Gebe , 497 ‘F Supp. 289 (D. Del. 1980); World Imports, Inc. v.

Woodbridge Township, 493 F.Supp. 428 (D. N.J. 1980); New Eng-

land Accessories Trade Association, Inc. v. City of Nashua, Civ.

No. 80-530-D (D. N.H. Dec. 8 1980); Florida Businessmen for

Free Enterprise v. City of Hollywood, No. 80-6157-Civ-HCR (S.D.

Fla. Aug. 29, 1980).

Cf. cases upholding legislation based on the Model Act after

severing thought to be impermissibly vague or over-

broad. Businessmen for Free Enterprise v. Fla., supra,

499 F.Supp. 346 (offense of possession, without mens rea of in-

tent, severed as unconstitutional); New England Accessories Trade

Ass’n v. Browne, 502 F.Supp. 1245 (D. Conn. 1980) (“reasonably

should know” standard severed).

But see cases holding that particular phrases in the Model

Act are im i> waeen, Gnd Geet ths entive inoidation fs

infected pA. = vague portions. Record rhe ag og No. 6, Inc. v.

p F.2d 916; Jon 50 v. Borough of

81-0027- Civil (D. N.Mex. March 23, A (modified version

of Model ); Weiler v. Ca er, 507 F.Supp. 837 (D. N.Mex.

1981); Brache v. oe eS estchester, 507 F.Supp. 566 (S.D.

Ps 1981) (modified of Model Act); Indiana Chapter,

N.O.R.M.L. v. Sendak, supra, No. TH 75-142-C (S.D. Ind. Feb. 4,

1980) (modified version of Model Act).

8. This standard is set forth more fully in Grayned v. City

of Rockford, supra, 408 U.S. at 108-09 (footnotes omitted):

Vague laws offend several important values. First, because

we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and un-

lawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary

intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is pro-

All

pellants contend that numerous phrases in LB 991 violate

one or both of these constitutional criteria.

A. “Intended for Use.”

Appellants argue first that the definition of drug para-

phernalia in Section 1 as including “ail equipment, prod-

ucts, and materials of any kind intended for use” (emphasis

added) with controlled substances is impermissibly vague

because the statute does not specify whose intent is relevant.

The problem is characterized as one of “transferred intent,”

insofar as the intent of a second party could allegedly be

attributed to an innocent party as a basis for prosecution.

Appellants contend, for example, that the statute would

permit prosecution of an innocent seller or manufacturer

of an innocuous item such as a spoon, if the item were in-

tended by a buyer for use with controlled substances.

We cannot subscribe to this interpretation of the statu-

tory language. A fair reading of the statute as a whole

indicates that the intent referred to is that of the person

alleged to have violated the statute. What seems at first

glance to be a deficiency in draftsmanship is explained by

the fact that the definitional section is intended to draw

four categories of persons (manufacturers, wholesalers, re-

tailers and purchasers) within the reach of the legislation.

Sections 3 end 4, in defining substantive offenses, provide

Footnote continued—

hibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may

trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if

arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented,

laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply

them. A law impermissibly delegates basic policy

matters LF cemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an

ad hoc subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of

arbitrary and discriminatory application.

See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Papachristou v.

City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).

Al2

clarity by linking the requirement of intent with the per-

son whose activity is forbidden:

It shall be unlawful for any person to use, or to possess

with intent to use, drug paraphernalia. [Section 3]

It shall be unlawful for any person to deliver, possess

with intent to deliver, or manufacture with intent to

deliver, drug paraphernalia. [Sectie: 4]

In sum, the Nebraska statute adequately defines the

mental state required to render an item drug paraphernalia

and refers to the intent of the person charged with viola-

tion. Accord, Record Revolution No. 6, Inc. v. City of

Parma, supra, 638 F.2d at 928 & n.14; New England Ac-

cessories Trade Association v. Browne, supra, 502 F.Supp.

at 1251; Mid-Atlantic Accessories Trade Association v.

Maryland, supra, 500 F.Supp. at 844; Delaware Accessories

Trade Association v. Gebelein, supra, 497 F.Supp. at 292-93.

B. “Designed for Use.”

Appellants renew their argument regarding trans-

ferred intent in contending that paraphernalia cannot con-

stitutionally be defined as items “designed for use” with

controlled substances. Again, this definition is said to be

defective in failing to specify whose design is relevant.

The same reasoning that saves the phrase “intended for

use” applies to the phrase “designed for use.” There is no

9. While we find the intent requirement of the Nebraska

ordinance constitutional, we note the greater clarity of an In-

diana statute approved in Nova Records, Inc. v. Sendak, 504 F.

non Dae 938, 940-41 — Ind. 1980). The ‘Indiana statute does not

= a ‘laundry list of objects which, coupled with the requisite

tent, constitute drug ernalia. Id. at 944. Rather, the

statute utilizes specific intent only in defining the statutory of-

fenses. The offenses of manufacture or design, delivery, and

possession are each separately defined, along with the intent

relevant to each.

Al3

basis for holding that the legislation escapes vagueness

with respect to “intended for use” but fails with “designed

for use.” Mid-Atlantic Accessories Trade Association v.

Maryland, supra, 500 F.Supp. at 845; Brache v. County of

Westchester, supra, 507 F.Supp. at 577; but see Record

Revolution No. 6, Inc. v. City of Parma, supra, 638 F.2d at

930.

Appellants also argue that the word “designed” refers

to the physical attributes of an object rather than to the

‘ntent of the person charged with violation. The Sixth

Circuit in Record Revolution No. 6, Inc. v. City of Parma,

supra, 638 F.2d at 930-31, found this argument persuasive,

and held that drug paraphernalia could not be adequately

defined in terms of unique design characteristics.

We cannot agree that the term “designed” refers to the

structure of an object. The comments to the Model Act

expressly indicate the contrary, specifying that items are -

innocent until coupled with the intentional act of design.

Accord, New England Accessories Trade Association, Inc.

v. Browne, supra, 502 F.Supp. at 1251; Mid-Atlantic Ac-

cessories Trade Association v. Maryland, supra, 500 F.Supp.

at 844-45; Delaware Accessories Trade Association v. Ge-

belein, supra, 497 F.Supp. at 291-92.

C. Exemplary Drug Paraphernalia.

Appellants also assert that the list of items exemplary

of drug paraphernalia in Section 1” is vague and over-

broad because it includes numerous innocent items, such

as a diabetic’s syringe and lactose used in infant formula.

10. We conclude, for reasons amply spelled out oy the Sixth

Circuit in Record Revolution No. 6, Inc. v. City of Parma, su

638 F.2d at 932, that the listed items are exemplary only and

are not irrebuttably presumed to be drug paraphernalia.

Al4

We find no flaw in the list of exemplary items because

no item is drug paraphernalia absent the requisite intent

to use it with controlled substances. Cf. Record Museum

v. Lawrence Township, supra, 481 F.Supp. 768 (list of

paraphernalia, absent requirement of intent, was imper-

missibly vague, as there was no provision for distinguishing

between innocent and non-innocent use). The language

of intent is expressly reiterated in the list of items in

Section 1(1)-(4).

D. Factors Relevant to Determining Drug Paraphernalia.

Appellants next attack Section 2 of the statute, which

sets forth fourteen factors that must be considered in

determining whether an object is drug paraphernalia. We

find it unnecessary to reiterate the specifics of appellants’

attack on each of the fourteen factors. Appellants con-

tend essentially (1) that the reference to “other authority”

is vague, and (2) that several of the factors would permit

conviction based on transferred intent and guilt by asso-

ciation.

There is no perceptible problem in the statutory refer-

ence to authorities other than the courts who may utilize

the list of enumerated factors in determining what is drug

paraphernalia. “Other authority” certainly refers to law

enforcement personnel. The fact that the statute attempts

to guide such personnel in their enforcement duties lessens,

rather than increases, the danger of arbitrary enforcement.

The enumerated factors themselves pose no constitu-

tional problem, and are valuable guides in determining

what items are prohibited. New England Accessories

Trade Association v. Browne, supra, 502 F.Supp. at 1251.

Admittedly, the actions of third parties are relevant in

Al5

determining what is drug parap ." However, ap-

pellants overstate the problems of transferred intent and

guilt by association by contending that third party actions

are sufficient for conviction. In fact, evidence regarding

third party actions is but one step in the prosecutorial

scheme. If third party actions as referred to in Section 2,

tend to indicate that an item is drug paraphernalia, the

focus of inquiry must necessarily shift to the intent of

the individual involved. Mid-Atlantic Accessories Trade

Association v. Maryland, supra, 500 F.Supp. at 846-47;

but see Record Revolution No. 6, Inc. v. City of Parma,

supra, 638 F.2d at 933-34 (the list of logically relevant

factors might permit conviction on the impermissible theory

of guilt by association, but for due process requirement

under Ohio law that guilt be based on personal action).

E. “Reasonably Should Know.”

The final prong of appellants’ vagueness argument in-

volves the definition of substantive offenses in Sections 4

and 6. These sections make it unlawful to deliver, possess

with intent to deliver, manufacture with intent to deliver

or advertise drug paraphernalia in circumstances where

one knows or “reasonably should know” that the items

will be used with drugs (Section 4) or that the purpose

of the advertisement is to promote the sale of drug para-

phernalia (Section 6). Appellants allege, and the district

court agreed, that the phrase “reasonably should know”

will permit conviction under an impermissibly vague negli-

gence standard, and will leave innocent sellers in the un-

11. For example, Section 2(3) poovttes that authorities shall

consider “[t]he proximity of the object to any controlled sub-

stance.” us the proximity of marijuana in the hands of smokers

outside of a store to roach clips inside the store might be con-

sidered as one factor in assessing whether the clips were intended

as ~~ by the store owner. See also Section 2(1),

ay. (6).

Al6

tenable posture of trying to divine the intentions of their

buyers.

In addressing this contention, we cannot do better than

to adopt the cogent reasoning of Judge Stapleton in Dela-

ware Accessories Trade Association v. Gebelein, supra,

which we set forth in the margin.” Essentially, Judge

Stapleton noted that a seller must already have intended

that the item be sold for drug use before his knowledge

of its use by a buyer comes into play. Accord, Mid-Atlantic

Accessories Trade Association v. Maryland, supra, 500 F.

Supp. at 845. In these circumstances, it is not constitu-

tionally improper that the seller be required to open his

eyes to the objective realities of the sale. id. As more

than one court has noted, there are many statutes which

utilize a “reasonably should know” or similar standard”

12. In the context of an alleged sale or delivery of drug

paraphernalia, the Act requires the state to prove both (1)

that the defendant intended that an item would be used for

the production or consumption of controlled substances and

also (2) that he either knew, or that he acted in a set of

circumstances from which a reasonable person would know,

need

about the purpose of the buyer based upon the surround-

ing circumstances. The dealer, on the other hand, who sells

innocuous items with the intent that they be used wi

is, in effect, put on notice by the illicit nature of his activity

that he must be careful to conform his conduct to law

sible, as plaintiffs would suggest, for guessing what is in

the mind of a buyer. The seller is safe as long

actually know the buyer’s purpose and as long as the obj

tive facts that are there for him to observe do not give fair

notice that illegal use will ensue.

497 F.Supp. at 294.

13. 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a) (2); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 1397,

1916, 2068, 2614; 18 U.S.C. §§ 491, 922, 954, 1384, 2154, 2423, 2512:

26 U.S.C. § 999; 42 U.S.C. §§ 263j, 5409; 46 U.S.C. § 1461.

Al7

and which have withstood constitutional attack. Delaware

Accessories Trade Association v. Gebelein, supra, 497 F.

Supp. at 294, citing Selzman v. United States, 268 U.S.

466 (1925); United States v. Featherston, 461 F.2d 1119

(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972).™

IV

Appellants’ fourth amendment argument requires only

cursory discussion.

Appellants allege, first, that the Nebraska statute

would allow a police officer to seize an innocent item such

as a pipe without probable cause. This argument ignores

both the requirement of intent in the definition of drug

paraphernalia, and the factors in Section 2 which an officer

must consider in determining whether an object is drug

paraphernalia. There is simply nothing in LB 991 which

alters the requirement that searches and seizures be based

on probable cause. Delaware Accessories Trade Associa-

tion v. Gebelein, supra, 497 F.Supp. at 296; see also Mid-

Atlantic Accessories Trade Association v. Maryland, supra,

500 F.Supp. at 848-49.

Secondly, appellants object to the provision for civil

forfeiture of drug paraphernalia." Section 7 of LB 991

Finally, we address appellants’ overbreadth argument to

gee ctinet Gt ths ee en ene

This is merely a species of the vagueness ar t. Given the

requirement of intent, no innocent item be impermissibly

brought within the state’s control.

15. also object to certain sections of Neb. Rev.

Stat. § 1 (Supp. 1978) which predate LB 991, particularly

subsections (1)(b), (1)(d) and (2) of Section 28-431. These

subsections —~ fre seizure of “raw materials, prod-

ucts, and equipment Bh ee — yp a BL

page mag (1) (b)), and of “con eee or intended

in transporting any con’ substance” ( 1(d)).

Als

adds “drug paraphernalia” to the list of items which are

subject to civil forfeiture under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-431

(1) (Supp. 1978), as follows:

(1) The following shall be seized without war-

rant by an officer of the Division of Drug Control

or by any peace officer, and the same shall be subject

to forfeiture: ... (f) all drug paraphernalia defined

in section 1 of this act.

The basis for appellants’ objection to this provision

is somewhat unclear. Insofar as the just compensation

and due process provisions of the fifth and fourteenth

amendments may allegedly be implicated in civil for-

feiture, however, we note that forfeiture which helps to

render illegal behavior unprofitable, without prior notice

and hearing, has been approved by the Supreme Court

in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S.

663 (1974). The Supreme Court of Nebraska has also

specifically approved as constitutional the provision for

forfeiture of conveyances involved in drug traffic under

to whether the “equipment” subject to forfeiture under sub-

4.4 (1) (b) of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-431 (Supp. 1978) includes

drug as defined by 991. Arguably it does

since § males aepavate peovisien for the obvi teutaitace

Gen Gdipied ta Releed Combis v. Pulinan Ca, supra. 212

would decline to reach tu

seeeeene oy and (1)(d) and (2) of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-

Al9

the predecessor’* of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-431 (Supp. 1978).

State v. One 1968 Volkswagen, 198 Neb. 45, 251 N.W.2d

666 (1977); State v. One 1970 2-Door Sedan Rambler

(Gremlin), 191 Neb. 462, 215 N.W.2d 849 (1974). The

provision for seizure of drug paraphernalia is analogous,

and in our view, constitutional."

Vv

The final challenge ta the Nebraska statute, raised

by the Nebraska Civil Liberties Union (NCLU), is that

first amendment interests are implicated in Sections 6

and 7.

The NCLU objects to subsection (1) (e) of Section 7,

which permits the warrantless seizure of

books, records, and research, including formulas, mi-

crofilm, tapes, and data which are used, or intended

for use in violation of the provisions of this article.

The validity of this provision is open to serious ques-

tion. Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 417 (1971); Freedman

v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965). The statute does not

provide for prompt judicial review of this prior restraint

16. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-4, 135 (1943).

law enforcemen ‘ 7

( . 1978). 1p hy limit allows the forfeiture provision to

of without ty for prior

Calero- v. ~~ Co., supra, 416 U

A20

on expression, nor does it place the burden of initiating

judicial review on censoring personnel. Southeastern Pro-

motions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559-60 (1975); Blount

v. Rizzi, supra; cf. United States v. Thirty-Seven Photo-

graphs, supra, 402 U.S. 363.

We do not, however, reach these misgivings. Sub-

section (1) (e) belongs to preexisting law, Neb. Rev. Stat.

§ 28-431 (Supp. 1978), and «vas not added to the Nebraska

Code by LB 991. For the reasons indicated in n.15, supra,

we decline to consider this statutory material.

First amendment objections are also raised to Section

6, which prohibits advertising that promotes, in whole or

in part, the sale of objects designed or intended for use

as drug paraphernalia. Although the issue may be close,

we conclude that this ban withstands constitutional chal-

lenge. Our conclusion is based on three considerations:

(1) the statute circumscribes only commercial speech; (2)

the speech embraced by the statute directly promotes an

illegal activity; and (3) the overbreadth doctrine does not

apply to commercial speech to the same extent as it does

to non-commercial speech.

We begin our analysis with the question whether the

statute reaches only commercial speech. Since the stat-

utory prohibition applies to “advertisement[s],” the an-

swer might appear to be self-evident. However, we pro-

ceed mindful of a lack of a clear definition of commercial

speech from the Supreme Court. See Central Hudson

Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447

U.S. 557, 561, 562 (1980) (commercial speech is character-

ized alternately as “expression related solely to the eco-

nomic interests of the speaker and its audience” and

“speech proposing a commercial transaction”); but see id.

at 579 (Stevens, J., and Brennan, J. concurring) (major-

ity’s description of commercial speech is both too broad

A21

and too narrow); Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.

Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,

771 n.24 (1976) (commercial speech proposes a commer-

cial transaction); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 821

(1975); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission

on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 384, 385 (1973) (speech

is not rendered commercial by mere fact that it relates

to an advertisement; critical feature is whether it pro-

poses a commercial transaction).*

Here, the Nebraska statute forbids only “advertise-

ment[s]” which promote the “sale of objects” designed

or intended for use as drug paraphernalia. The statute

facially does not reach speech which merely glorifies the

drug culture without direct invitation to purchase specific

items. Accordingly, we conclude that the statute regulates

commercial speech in its narrowest sense, that is, speech

which proposes a commercial transaction. But see Record

Revolution No. 6, Inc. v. City of Parma, supra, 638 F.2d

at 937. Such commercial speech is entitled to lesser pro-

tection than other constitutionally guaranteed expression.

Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service

Commission, supra, 447 U.S. at 563 & n.5; Wickens v.

White, 536 F.2d 802, 804 (8th Cir. 1976) (per curiam);

Millstone v. O’Hanlon Reports, Inc., 528 F.2d 829, 832-33

(8th Cir. 1976).

The next step in first amendment analysis is to in-

quire whether the proscribed commercial speech involves

a lawful activity. Commercial speech which promotes an

illegal activity may be restricted without subjecting the

restriction to scrutiny under a balancing test. Central

18. See also Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amend-

ment , 74 Nw. U. L. Rev. 372, 389-90 & nn. 75-77 (1979);

Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process

and the First Amendment, 65 Va. L. Rev. 1, 14-25 (1979); Com-

ment, First Amendment Protection for Commercial Advertising:

The New Constitutional Doctrine, 44 U. Chi L. Rev. 205 (1976).

A22

Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission,

supra, 447 U.S. at 563-64, 566; Pittsburgh Press Co. v.

Pittsburgh Commission on Human Rights, supra, 413 U.S.

at 388; cf. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)

(outside of commercial speech context, speech advocating

violation of the law may be proscribed only where di-

rected to inciting or producing imminent lawless action);

see also Carey v. Population Services International, 431

U.S. 678, 701 (1977) (advertisements could not be charac-

terized as inciting or producing imminent lawless action);

Comment, First Amendment Protection for Commercial

Advertising, supra, 44 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 220, 242 n.197,

243 n.203.

Here, advertising promoting the sale of drug parapher-

nalia encourages activities which are otherwise crimes

under Nebraska law. Such speech is analogous to adver-

tisements promoting the sale of narcotics or soliciting

prostitution, and may constitutionally be prohibited. Pitts-

burgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Rela-

tions, supra, 413 U.S. at 388. It would be illogical to

permit Nebraska to prohibit the sale and possession of

drug paraphernalia while not allowing the state to regulate

advertising which encourages these same crimes.

We acknowledge some difficulty in upholding the

phrase “in part,” which in Section 6 prohibits advertise-

ments that only “in part” have the purpose of promoting

the sale of drug paraphernalia. Arguably, this statutory

language reaches into the protected area of advertising

concerning lawful activity.

We are obliged, however, to presume a legislative

intent to act within constitutional bounds. Turchick v.

United States, supra, 561 F.2d at 723-24. Accordingly,

we conclude that where drug paraphernalia is advertised

along with innocent items, obviously the statute must

forbid only that part of the advertisement relating to drug

A23

paraphernalia. The remainder of the advertisement is not

condemned.”

In sum, we affirm in part and reverse in part the

judgment of the district court. As indicated, we hold

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. CCURT OF APPEALS,

EIGHTH CIRCUIT.

not decide whether the Nebraska statute is infirm

of “geographical overbreadth,” that is, on the

While there may be merit to the geographica’ overbreadth

see Record Revolution No. 6, Inc. v. Cy of Parma,

pont Tay F.2%. at 937, this

the interests of out-of-state merchants. The interests

a

8

-

é

5

3

s

overbreadth doctrine, construed as a standing,

v. United States, supra, 561 F.2d at 722, can be extended so far.

The Court has specifically

1 was but before it could be published, the Tenth

A24

APPENDIX B

Memorandum Opinion of the United States

District Court

(Filed September 26, 1980)

Civil No. 80-0-271

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

For THE District or NEBRASKA

THE CASBAH, INC.; THE DISCO-COUNTER, INC.;

JEFFREY FERBER, d/b/a H.&D. SALES; GREGORY

HASSELHORST, d/b/a EUPHORIA; ERIC LISTOU,

d/b/a JOINT VENTURE NOVELTY SHOP; PIPE

DREAM, INC.; and DENNIS ROBINSON,

d/b/a THE JOYNT,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

CHARLES THONE, Governor of the State of Nebraska;

PAUL DOUGLAS, Attorney General for the State of

Nebraska; ELMER KOHMEPSHER, Colonel in Charge of

the Nebraska State Patrol; and DONALD L. KNOWLES,

County Attorney for Douglas County, Nebraska.

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

Rosrnson, Senior Judge.

In this action, the plaintiffs challenge the constitu-

tionality of L.B.991, a Nebraska statute regulating the

use, distribution and advertisement of “drug parapher-

nalia.” In their verified complaint, the plaintiffs seek

declaratory and injunctive relief. The Court has juris-

A25

diction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, 2201 and 2202.

This Memorandum constitutes the Court’s findings of fact

and conclusions of law.

On April 23, 1980 this Court, pursuant to an agree-

ment of counsel, entered an Order [Filing #6] temporarily

restraining the enforcement of L.B.991 pending a final

determination on the merits. Commencing on Septem-

ber 4, 1980, plaintiffs’ application for a preliminary and

permanent injunction was tried to the Court. See Rule

65(a) (2) Fed.R.Civ.Pro. For the reasons setout below,

the Court finds that L.B.991 is constitutional as it is

construed in this Memorandum.

The plaintiffs in this action are wholesale distributors

and retail merchants who sell various gifts and novelty

items including what are euphemistically referred to as

accessories.? The defendants include Charles Thone, the

Governor for Nebraska, Elmer Kohmepsher, of the Ne-

braska State Patrol, Paul Douglas, the Nebraska Attorney

General, and Donald Knowles, the Douglas County At-

torney.

L.B.991 was passed by the Nebraska Unicameral on

April 18, 1980 and signed into law five days later by Gov-

ernor Thone. The Bill amends various sections of the

Nebraska Criminal Code*® and provides in pertinent part

as follows:

Section 1. As used in this act, unless the context

otherwise requires, drug paraphernalia shall mean all

equipment, products, and materials of any kind which

are used, intended for use, or designed for use, in man-

ufacturing, injecting, ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise

introducing into the human body a controlled sub-

stance in violation of this act or the Uniform Con-

A26

trolled Substances Act. It shall include, but not be

limited to, the following:

(1) Diluents and adulterants, such as qui-

nine hydrochloride, mannitol, mannite, dextrose,

and lactose, used, intended for use, or designed for

use in cutting controlled substances;

(2) Separating gins and sifters used, in-

tended for use, or designed for use in removing

twigs and seeds from, or in otherwise cleaning or

refining marijuana;

(3) Hypodermic syringes, needles, and other

objects used, intended for use, and designed for

use in parenterally injecting controlled substances

into the human body; and

(4) Objects used, intended for use, or de-

signed for use in ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise

introducing marijuana, cocaine, hashish, or hashish

oil into the human body, which shall include but

not be limited to the following:

(a) Metal, wooden, acrylic, glass, stone,

plastic, or ceramic pipes with or without

screens, permanent screens, hashish heads, or

punctured metal bowls;

(b) Water pipes;

(c) Carburetion tubes and devices;

(d) Smoking and carburetion masks;

(e) Roach clips, meaning objects used

to hold burning ‘material, such as a mari-

juana cigarette, which has become too small

or too short to be held in the hand;

A27

(f) Miniature cocaine spoons, and co-

caine vials;

(g) Chamber pipes;

(h) Carburetor pipes;

(i) Electric pipes;

(j) Air-driven pipes;

(k) Chillums;

(1) Bongs; and

(m) Ice pipes or chillers.

Section 2. In determining whether an object is

drug paraphernalia, a court or other authority shall

consider, in addition to all other logically relevant

factors, the following:

(1) Statements by an owner or by anyone

in control of the object concerning its use;

(2) Prior convictions, if any, of an owner,

or of anyone in control of the object, under any

state or federal law relating to any controlled sub-

stance;

(3) The proximity of the object, in time and

space, to a direct violation of this act;

(4) The proximity of the object to any con-

trolled substance;

(5) The existence of any residue of a con-

trolled substance on the object;

(6) Direct or circumstantial evidence of the

intent of an owner, or of anyone in control of the

object, to deliver it to any person whom he or she

knows, or should reasonably know, intends to use

A28

the object to facilitate a violation of this act. The

innocence of an owner, or of anyone in control of

the object, as to a direct violation of this act shall

not prevent a finding that the object is intended

for use, or designed for use as drug paraphernalia;

(7) Instructions, oral or written, provided

with the object concerning its use;

(8) Descriptive materials accompanying the

object which explain or depict its use;

(9) National and local advertising concern-

ing its use;

(10) The manner in which the object is dis-

played for sale;

(11) Whether the owner, or anyone in con-

trol of the object, is a legitimate supplier of like

or related items to the community, such as a li-

censed distributor or dealer of tobacco products;

(12) Direct or circumstantial evidence of

the ratio of sales of the object or objects to the

total sales of the business enterprise;

(13) The existence and scope of any legiti-

mate use for the object in the community; and

(14) Expert testimony concerning its use.

Section 3. (1) It shall be unlawful for any per-

son to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug para-

phernalia to manufacture, inject, ingest, inhale, or

otherwise introduce into the human body a controlled

substance in violation of this act.

(2) Any person who violates this section shall

be guilty of an infraction.

*

A29

Section 4. (1) It shall be unlawful for any per-

son to deliver, possess, with intent to deliver, or manu-

facture with intent to deliver, drug paraphernalia,

knowing, or under circumstances where one reason-

ably should know, that it will be used to manufacture,

inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise be used to introduce

into the human body a controlled substance in viola-

tion of this act.

(2) Any person who violates this section shall be

guilty of a Class II misdemeanor.

Section 5. Any person eighteen years of age or

older who violates section 4 of this act by delivering

drug paraphernalia to a person under eighteen years

of age who is at least three years his or her junior shall

be guilty of a Class I misdemeanor.

Section 6. (1) It shall be unlawful for any per-

son to place in any newspaper, magazine, handbill, or

other publication any advertisement, knowing, or under

circumstances where one reasonably should know, that

the purpose of the advertisement, in whole or in part,

is to promote the sale of objects designed or intended

for use as drug paraphernalia.

(2) Any person who violates this section shall be

guilty of a Class III misdemeanor.

Section 7 of L.B.991 amends § 28-431 of the Ne-

braska Revised Statutes in that it adds drug parapher-

nalia to the list of items subject to civil forfeiture.

The relevant portion of Section 7 provides:

That section 28-431, . . . be amended to read as

follows: 28-431. (1) The following shall be

seized without a warrant by an officer of the Di-

vision of Drug Control or by any peace officer,

and the same shall be subject to forfeiture:

A30

(a) All controlled substances which have been

manufactured, distributed, dispensed, acquired, or

possessed in violation of the provisions of this

article; ... (f) all drug paraphernalia defined in

section 1 of this act.

Section 10 of L.B.991 is a severability provision:

If any section in this act or any part of any sec-

tion shall be declared invalid or unconstitutional,

such declaration shall not affect the validity or

constitutionality of the remaining portions thereof.

L.B.991 is similar to legislation passed in other juris-

dictions aimed at regulating or prohibiting the sale of

items used to ingest controlled substances.‘ Without ex-

ception, these laws are intended to aid in the struggle

against drug abuse, particularly among young people.’ Tes-

timony concerning the extent of the drug problem was

presented at the public hearings on LB.991. An

adolescent psychiatrist employed by the Nebraska Psychi-

atric Institute testified that “as many as one out of nine

of our high school students are using [marijuana] daily.’

He pointed out that there are severe emotional and phys-

ical ailments associated with chronic marijuana use. Ob-

serving that certain devices used to smoke marijuana make

it possible to bring concentrated marijuana smoke into

the body, the psychiatrist noted that daily marijuana use

with these devices was extremely damaging to the lungs

and promoted respiratory ailments including bronchitus,

emphysema and cancer.’

There is no doubt that the State of Nebraska .a pro-

tecting the health and welfare of its citizens may legiti-

mately enact legislation intended to curtail illicit drug

use. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 664 (1962).

If it is properly drawn, legislation dealing with the acute

A31

problem of drug abuse may prohibit the sale of “drug

related devices.” Geiger v. City of Egan, 618 F.2d 26,

28 (8th Cir.1980).

Despite its laudable purpose, legislation banning drug

paraphernalia must pass constitutional muster. Elsewhere,

lawmakers have rushed to pass laws banning paraphernalia

and in the process have trampled upon a host of rights

protected by the Constitution. See eg. Geiger ». City

of Egan, supra; Knoedler v. Roxbury Township, 485

F.Supp. 990 (D.N.J.1980); Magnani v. City of Ames, No.

80-229-A (S.D.Iowa 1980).

The Nebraska statute differs from the laws invalidated

in the above cases in that it is patterned after the “Model

Drug Paraphernalia Act” (hereinafter Model Act). The

Model Act was drafted by the Drug Enforcement Adminis-

tration of the United States Department of Justice and

seeks to avoid the constitutional infirmities which have

plagued other paraphernalia laws. Notwithstanding its

similarities to the Model Act, the plaintiffs assail the con-

stitutionality of L.B.991 on several fronts. They claim

that the statute places an impermissible burden on inter-

state commerce, violates the First and Fourth Amendments,

is vague and overbroad, and lacks the specific intent

required by due process.

Before considering each of plaintiffs’ contentions, it

is helpful to review the general principles which obtain

whenever it is claimed that a statute is facially unconsti-

tutional. In Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 US.

205, 216 (1975) the facial validity of a city ordinance

was challenged. There, the Court set out several principles

which are applicable here:

A32

[W]hen considering a facial challenge it is necessary

to proceed with caution and restraint, as invalidation

may result in urnecessary interferences with a state

regulatory program. ... [A] state statute should

not be deemed facially invalid unless it is not readily

subject to a narrowing construction by the state

See Sawyer v. Sandstrom, 615 F.2d 311, 315 (5th Cir.1980).

It should also be remembered that when a criminal

statute is susceptible to different interpretations, the Court

should favor an interpretation which supports constitu-

tionality. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 98 (1945);

Record Revolution No. 6, Inc. v. City of Parma, No. C80-

38 (N.D.Qhio 1980). The Supreme Court recognized over

ninety years ago that all statutes should be given a sensible

construction and judicial common sense requires that

“[g]eneral terms should be so limited in their application

as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd conse-

quence.” Church of the Holu Trinitu v. United States.

143 U.S. 457, 461 (1892). This insight is still good law

today and is particularly applicable when a court is asked

to construe a drug paraphernalia law. See The Flipside

v. Village of Hoffman, No. 78C 2114 p. 10 (N.D.I11.1980);

Levas v. Village of Antioch, No. 80C 1574 (N.D.I11.1980);

Record Revolution No. 6, Inc. v. City of Parma, supra,

at 8.

There is no question that L.B.991 seeks to dam the

swell of drug abuse by outlawing those devices which

facilitate illicit drug use.* If the statute can be interpreted

in a manner which is both consistent with this pur-

pose and faithful to the Constitution, then the Court is

bound to articulate that interpretation. Accordingly, in

considering the arguments advanced by the plaintiffs, the

A33

statute will be construed with a view toward identifying

a constitutional construction which will meet the legislative

purpose.

Ill

A. Vagueness.

It is contended that L.B.991 is unconstitutional because

it violates the due process concept of “void for vagueness.”

Simply put, a criminal statute, like L.B.991, must give

notice of what conduct the statute prohibits so that the

ordinary citizen may act accordingly. The Constitution

will not permit a statute to impose criminal sanctions

unless it first gives notice of what conduct will result

in liability. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453

(1939). In Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 194

(1972), the Court articulated the reasons for the vagueness

doctrine:

Vague laws offend several important values. First,

because we assume that man is free to steer between

lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give

the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable op-

portunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may

act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent

by not providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary

and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented,

laws must provide explicit standards for those who

apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates

basic policy matters to policemen, judges and juries

for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with

the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory

applications.

Id. at 108-09. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has

fairly summarized what due process requires in the con-

text of construing a drug paraphernalia ordinance. As

A34

the Court said in Geiger, “[d]ue process has two require-

ments: that laws provide notice to the ordinary person

of what is prohibited and that they provide standards

to law enforcement officials to prevent arbitrary and dis-

criminatory enforcement.” Supra at 28. This is the stan-

dard against which L.B.991 must be measured.’

The plaintiffs’ vagueness objections «»n be broken

down into three parts. First, the plaintiffs assert that

the definition of drug paraphernalia in section one is vague

because virtually anything can be drug paraphernalia un-

der the statute. Even a cursory reading of section one,

confirms plaintiffs’ observation. Section one of L.B.991

provides in part that “drug paraphernalia shall mean all

equipment, products, and materials of any kind which

are used, intended for use, or designed for use . . . [to

introduce] into the human body a controlled substance. . . .”

(emphasis added). In addition, plaintiffs’ evidence at trial

made tediously clear that the only limit on what can

be used to introduce a controlled substance into the body

is imagination. The evidence established that a variety

of otherwise innocent items can be used to ingest controlled

substances. For example, the plaintiffs demonstrated that

an aluminum can or a piece of fruit can be used to smoke

marijuana.” If section one did no more than outlaw

any item which might be used with illegal drugs, then

plaintiffs’ first vagueness argument would find its mark

and the statute would be fatally flawed. A statute which

simply prohibited the sale of all such items would be

unconstitutionally vague. See, Parma v. Record Revolu-

tion, Inc., supra at 8 (citing United States v. Brunnet, 53

F.2d 219 (W.D.Mo.1931). It would fail both prongs of

the due process test; it would not give notice of what

is prohibited and would invite discriminatory enforcement.

Drug paraphernalia as defined in section one of L.B.991

is any item which is used, intended for use, or designed

A35

for use in ingesting a controlled substance. This definition

is not vague because it defines drug paraphernalia with

reference to the intent of the person charged with an

offense under the statute. The inclusion of intent in the

definition of drug paraphernalia is crucial; it permits the

law to identify “innocent” objects as paraphernalia when

they are used with a controlled substance and at the same

time exculpates otherwise “suspicious” items which are

in fact used for innocent purposes." The intent require-

ment renders plaintiffs concern that “anything” can be

paraphernalia unnecessary.

The drafters of the Model Act point out that:

To insure that innocently possessed objects are not

classified as drug paraphernalia, [the definition]

makes the knowledge of criminal intent of the person

in control of an object a key element of the definition.

Needless to say, inanimate objects are neither “good”

nor “bad,” neither “lawful” nor “unlawful.” ‘nani-

mate objects do not commit crimes. But, when an

object is controlled by people who use it illegally,

or who design or adapt it for illegal use, the object

can be subject to control and the people subjected

to prosecution. [The definition] requires, therefore,

that an object be used, intended for use, or designed

for use in connection with illicit drugs before it can

be controlled as drug paraphernalia.

Model Act Comment pp. 6-7 (1979). (Emphasis added).

Intent saves the definition of drug paraphernalia from

being unconstitutionally vague. It provides notice of what

the statute prohibits—all items used, intended for use,

or designed for use with * controlled substance—and it

puts those charged with enforcing the statute on notice

that a determination of what constitutes paraphernalia

can be made only by identifying the intent of the suspect.

A36

Plaintiffs claim that the “designed for use” phrase

in the definition of drug paraphernalia is vague. They

cite an Indiana drug paraphernalia case where the judge

was troubled by the term. Indiana Normal v. Sendak, No.

TH 75-142-C p. 13 (S.D.Ind.1980). The Court finds that

the term is not vague when it is read in the context

of the entire statute. “Designed for use” in L.B.991 refers

not to the physical characteristics of an object but to

the subjective intent or plan of the person controlling

the object. The whole tenor of the statute makes clear

that any object, depending upon its use, can be drug para-

phernalia. In fact, section two of the statute sets out

fourteen factors which are to be considered in determining

if any given object is paraphernalia; those factors focus

not on the physical features of the suspected item but

on the context in which the item is found. The factors

are an aid in determining whether a person “designed”

the object as paraphernalia. The physical properties of

an item may not offer a clue about its illicit use. As

the court in Delaware Accessories Trade Assn. v. Gebelein,

No. 80-285 p. 5 (D.Del.1980) said “the statute itself indicates

that ‘designed for use’ refers not to structure but to intent.”

In short, when “designed for use” is integrated into the

statute it is not vague nor even easily susceptible to misun-

derstanding.

Plaintiffs’ second vagueness argument is more trouble-

some. It is contended that the definition of drug para-

phernalia does not indicate whose intent is relevant. This,

says the plaintiffs, makes it possible for an innocent person

to be prosecuted under the statute for the unlawful intent

of another’* See Indiana Normal v. Sendak, No. TH

75-142-C (S.D.Ind.1980). Section one of L.B.991 does not

explicitly state whose intent should be considered in de-

termining if an object is drug paraphernalia. If section

A37

one is read in isolation, plaintiffs’ argument is plausible.

However, if section one is read, as it must be, with all

of the other sections of the statute it becomes clear that

no transfer of intent is possible. Sections 3, 4, 5 and

6 of L.B.991 proscribe certain conduct vis a vis drug para-

phernalia. Generally, section 3 prohibits possession, sec-

tion 4 prohibits delivery or possession with intent to de-

liver, section 5 provides a more severe penalty for deliver-

ing drug paraphernalia to a minor, and section 6 makes

it unlawful to advertise the sale of drug paraphernalia.

An essential element of each offense is that the person

knew or reasonably should have known that the object

in question will be used to introduce a controlled substance

into the body. A common sense reading of this require-

ment makes clear that it refers to the person who is

charged with the violation. It is fundamental that to

violate a criminal statute there must be an act coupled

with the requisite criminal intent. “The existence of a

mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to,

the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence.”

Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951). The

comments to the Model Act indicate that the definition

of drug paraphernalia makes reference to intent “to insure

that innocently possessed objects are not classified as drug

paraphernalia.” In light of the statute’s mens rea require-

ment and the inclusion of intent in the definition of drug

paraphernalia only an absurd construction of the statute

would trap an innocent user or purchaser because of the

guilty intent of a seller. To avoid any uncertainty, the

Court specifically finds that the intent element in the

definition of drug paraphernalia applies to the person

charged with violating the statute. Accord, Record Revolu-

tion v. City of Parma, supra at 11; Delaware Accessories

Trade Assn. v. Gebelein, No. 80-285 pp. 7-8 (D.Del.1980);

A38

Florida Businessmen For Free Enterprise v. City of Holly-

wood, No. 80-6157-Civ-NCR pp. 7-8 (S.D.Fla.1980).

Finally, plaintiffs argue that section two of L.B.991 is

unconstitutionally vague. Section two sets out fourteen

factors which must be considered in determining whether

an object is drug paraphernalia. It is claimed that the

factors are vague and therefore lawmaking is impermissi-

bly left “to the moment-to-moment judgment of the police-

man on his beat.” Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S.

111, 120 (1969) (Black, J. concurring). A vague statute

violates due process, in part, because it magnifies the po-

tential for discriminatory enforcement. Geiger v. City

of Egan, supra, at 29.

In this case, the factors which are objected to do

not encourage arbitrary enforcement. On the contrary,

they provide law enforcement officials with a valuable

guide in determining what items are prohibited by the stat-

ute. It is significant that the factors listed must be used

in identifying drug paraphernalia. The fact that enforce-

ment officials are obliged to consider the factors listed

in section two minimizes the danger that an object will er-

roneously be identified as paraphernalia. It is important

to keep in mind that under L.B.991 there are no objects

which are per se drug paraphernalia. As a result, those

charged with enforcing the law must be given adequate

notice of what circumstances bring an item under the

proscriptions of the statute.

With one exception, that notice is provided in section

two of the statute. The exception is factor (11) which

provides that in determining whether an object is drug

paraphernalia the following should be considered:

Whether the owner, or anyone in control of the object,

is a legitimate supplier of like or related items to

the community, such as a licensed distributor or dealer

of tobacco products. ... (emphasis added).

A39

This language was struck from a virtually identical law

in the Parma case supra. For the reasons given there,

the Court severs factor (11) from the statute."* In Parma,

Judge Manos said:

This portion of the Ordinance fails the second test

of vagueness; the reference to “legitimate” suppliers

creates a danger of arbitrary and discriminatory en-

forcement. Because the provisions of this Ordinance

apply to all who use, distribute or advertise even

an innocent item with the requisite intent, the term

“legitimate” supplier is imprecise and misleading. (ci-

tations omitted) (emphasis original).

Except for factor (11), section two provides just the sort

of criteria which judges, juries, and law enforcement of-

ficials need to make an objective decision in determining

if an object falls under the statute.

B. Overbreath [sic].

While the terms vagueness and overbreath are often

used together, they are distinct concepts. A statute is im-

permissibly vague when its prohibitions are not clearly

defined. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S.

385, 391 (1926). Even a clear and precise law may suffer

from overbreath if its sweep is unnecessarily broad and

it invades the area of protected freedoms. Zwickler v.

Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 250 (1967). The overbreath doctrine

generally arises in a First Amendment context because

the “First Amendment needs breathing space and statutes

attempting to restrict or burden the exercise of First

Amendment rights must be narrowly drawn and represent

a considered legislative judgment that a particular mode

of expression has to give way to other compelling needs

of society.” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612-13

(1973). See e.g. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972);

A40

Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Cox v. Louisi-

ana, 379 U.S. 336 (1965).

In this case, plaintiffs’ overbreath claim is not grounded

in the contention that L.B.991 abridges First Amendment

freedoms.'® Rather, plaintiffs claim that the statute is

overbroad because “it draws in Articles whose major

uses are overwhelmingly lawful.” Plaintiffs’ Pre-trial

Brief at 38. Plaintiffs complain that the statute imper-

missibly outlaws innocent items and punishes their in-

nocent users because of the criminal intent of others.

This is nothing more than another rendition of the vague-

ness arguments previously discussed. The short answer

to plaintiffs’ overbreath objection is that no item is drug

paraphernalia per se under the statute. Only when an ob-

ject is used, intended for use, or designed for use with a

controlled substance does it become prohibited. An ex-

ample of how the statute operates is found in the comments

to the Model Act. A spoon, a hypodermic syringe, and a

length of surgical tubing all have legitimate uses in the

community. ‘“[W]hen these objects are manufactured, de-

livered and possessed in lawful commerce, they are not

considered paraphernalia. But if these same objects are

assembled and used by an addict to illegally melt heroin

and inject it into the body, they become drug parapher-

nalia.” Comments to the Model Act p. 7 (1979). L.B.991

is not overbroad because it discriminates between lawful

and prohibited objects by scrutinizing the intent of the

possessor or user.

C. Specific Intent.

The plaintiffs argue that L.B.991 violates the due

process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it

permits a person to be convicted without a showing of

criminal intent. They point specifically to the “reason-

A4l

ably should know” standard in sections 4 and 6 of the

statute. Section 4 provides that:

It shall be unlawful for any person to deliver, possess

with intent to deliver or manufacture with intent to

deliver, drug paraphernalia, knowing, or under cir-

cumstances where one reasonably should know, that

it will be used . . . to introduce [a controlled sub-

stance into the body]. (Emphasis added).

It is contended that this constructive knowledge standard

is at odds with the scienter requirement in the definition

of drug paraphernalia. Plaintiffs correctly point out that

it is inconsistent to say that intent saves the definition

of drug paraphernalia from vagueness and then permit a

person tc convicted of delivering “drug paraphernalia”

because he or she incorrectly guessed that the item would

not be used with illicit drugs. To say that before an ob-

ject can be drug paraphernalia it must be used, intended

for use, or designed for use with a controlled substance is

to say that the definition of drug paraphernalia includes an

element of general criminal intent. Faced with a nearly

identical statute a Federal Court in Ohio said:

The Court construes each of these three elements

[used, intended for use, designed for use] as implying

and requiring the existence of general criminal intent

by the defendant. Thus, the criminal defendant’s vol-

untary and intentional use of an item with illegal drugs

makes it drug paraphernalia within the meaning of

this Ordinance. ... Adding the element of general in-

tent not only narrows the scope of the ordinance, it

insures that no one will be convicted by mistake, ac-

cident or innocent reason. Parma, supra, at 11.

Under the reasonably should know standard a conviction

can be had without a showing of general criminal intent;

that is, without establishing that the defendant specifically

A42

intended to violate the statute. As a result, the reasonably

should know standard vitiates the prophylactic effect of

the scienter requirement in the definition of drug para-

phernalia. The statute cannot constitutionally take away

with one hand what it gives with another.

In finding the reasonably should know standard un-

constitutional in a Roxbury drug paraphernalia ordinance,

the Court offered a cogent example of its defect:

[T]he seller faced with the Roxbury Ordinance has to

. . . determine what the customer intends to do with

the items of purchase. Certainly in a case where the

purchaser announces his or her intention to utilize the

paraphernalia purchased for an illegal purpose, the

seller would be placed in no dilemma; however, the

question arises as to what would create a reasonably

belief in the mind of the seller in the absence of such

an unlikely announcement by the purchaser. Does

the purchaser’s age, sex, mannerisms or dress afford

to a seller reason to believe that the paraphernalia

will be used for an illegal purpose? Or should the

nature of the purchaser’s companions or the items he

or she carries be determinative? These questions in-

dicate the difficulty that a merchant, as well as a

law enforcement officer, would have, in the absence

of an admission by the purchaser, in determining what

gives rise to a reasonable belief that a purchaser in-

tends to utilize the paraphernalia for an illegal pur-

pose. An additional concern is whether it is proper

to charge an owner of a department store, or any

other store, with responsibility for a sales clerk’s de-

termination as to whether the person purchasing an

item, especially an innocuous one such as a weight

scale or a spoon, intends to utilize it for some improper

and illegal purpose.

A43

Knoedler v. Roxbury Township, 485 F.Supp. 990, 993 (D.

N.J.1980). The reasonably should know standard is un-

constitutional. It fails to give notice of what is forbidden

and it forces law enforcement personnel to guess about

when a seller has violated the statute. Therefore, the

Court severs the reasonably should know standard wher-

ever it appears in L.B.991."*

Recently, other courts have upheld the constructive

knowledge requirement in construing other laws based on

the Model Act. Delaware Trade Assn. v. Gebelein, No.

80-280 p. 11 (D.Del.1980). In Delaware Trade Assn. it is

said that “‘the seller is safe so long as he does not actually

know the buyer’s purpose and so long as the objective

facts that are there for him to observe do not give fair

notice that illegal use will ensue.” This analysis begs the

question. The issue is precisely what set of facts do give

notice of a buyer’s illicit intentions. If a man wearing

a business suit purchases a hookah” from a gift shop

saying “I'll enjoy this pipe with my friends tonight,”

should the merchant know that the pipe will be used to

ingest a controlled substance? Suppose the man en-

tered the gift shop unshaven in jeans and a t-shirt and

said the same thing. Is the merchant now on notice

that the item will be used to ingest a controlled substance?

Should the man’s age or his mannerisms change the mer-

chant’s conclusion? Obviously, it is difficult to articulate

when a merchant should reasonably know that an item he

sells will be used to ingest a controlled substance. The

reasonably should know standard simply ca”inot be justi-

fied on the theory that a merchant’s “objective” observa-

tions about his customers will keep him «ut of harms way.

The defendants point out that the reasonably should

know standard is currently found in a number of criminal

statutes at both the state and federal level."* That the

standard is pervasive does not make it constitutional in

A44

this instance. The reasonably should know standard vio-

lates due process in this case because of the unique nature

of the statute at hand. To be effective, a drug parapher-

nalia statute must regulate a myriad of items which have

a lawful purpose. Unlike other statutes, it cannot base its

proscriptions on the physical characteristics of the items

in question. Rather, regulation—to be both effective and

constitutional—must concentrate on the intent of the ac-

cused. To avoid imposing sanctions for innocent possession

or use, a statute must provide that the accused specifically

intended to violate its provisions. Where lawmakers have

attempted to draft drug paraphernalia statutes without suf-

ficiently considering the pivotal element of intent, they

have found that the laws do not survive judicial scrutiny

because they are vague and over inclusive. See e.g. Mag-

nani v. City of Ames, No. 80-229A (S.D.Iowa 1980); Record

Museum v. Lawrence Township, No. 79-3352 (D.N.J.1979) ;

Weingart v. Town of Oyster Bay, No. 79C 2932 (E.D.N.Y.

1979). The Nebraska statute is constitutional only when

specific intent is required to obtain a conviction under

its provisions.

Requiring the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt

that a prohibited act was done “knowingly” minimizes the

danger that a person will be convicted for an innocent act.

An act is done knowingly if it is done voluntarily and in-

tentionally, and not because of mistake or accident or in-

nocent reason. See United States v. Sirhan, 504 F.2d 818

(9th Cir.1974); Devitt & Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice

and Instructions § 14.04 (1977). The knowledge of the

use to which an object will be put may be difficult for

the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Neverthe-

less, it is precisely this rigorous requirement which saves

the statute from vagueness. See Boyce Motor Lines v.

United States,’* 342 U.S. 337 (1952).

A45

D. The First Amendment.

Section 6 of L.B.991 makes it illegal to promote the

sale of drug paraphernalia by advertising in any publica-

tion.” The plaintiffs argue that this section suppresses

the content of speech in violation of the First Amendment.

Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U. S. 809 (1975) is cited for

the propusition that the state cannot restrict advertise-

ments solely because of their content. In Bigelow, the

Supreme Court overturned the conviction of a Virginia

newspaper editor for publishing an advertisement con-

taining information about abortion services available in

New York. While observing that advertising “enjoys a

degree of First Amendment protection” the Court made

clear that not all advertisements are immune from regula-

tion. “Advertising, like all public expression, may be

subject to reasonable regulation that scrves a legitimate

public interest.” Id. at 826. The advertisement was pro-

tected by the First Amendment in Bigelow because it pro-

vided factual information of a clear public interest about

activity which “pertained to constitutional interests.”

In the present case, neither of those factors are pres-

ent. An advertisement promoting the sale of drug para-

phernalia does not contain factual information in the same

sense as an advertisement describing the availability of

abortion services. There is certainly no “constitutional

interest” in the possession of drug paraphernalia. Cf. Roe

v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Hu-

man Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) is dispositive of plain-

tiffs’ First Amendment argument. There, the Court up-

held a Pennsylvania ordinance forbidding newspapers from

carrying purely commercial help wanted advertisements in

sex-designated columns. The Court noted that under the

ordinance “[dJiscrimination in employment is not only

A446

commercial activity, it is illegal commercial activity.” Id.

at 388. The fact that the commercial activity was itself

illegal was critical to the Court’s holding:

‘Any First Amendment interest which might be served

by advertising an ordinary commercial purpose and

which might arguably outweigh the governmental

interest supporting the regulation is altogether absent

when the commercial activity itself is illegal and the

restriction on advertising is incidental to a valid lim-

itation on economic activity.

Id. at 389. As in Pittsburgh Press, the commercial activity

in this case is illegal. L.B.991 makes the delivery, pos-

session and use of drug paraphernalia illegal. Clearly the

statute’s restriction on the advertisement of drug para-

phernalia is merely incidental to its proscription. It would

be strange indeed to find that the First Amendment pro-

tects the solicitation of otherwise criminal activity. The

Court in Pittsburgh Press made clear that it does not. In

short, L.B.991 can constitutionally prohibit the advertise-

ment of what it otherwise proscribes.

E. The Fourth Amendment.

Plaintiffs vigorously contend that L.B.991 violates the

Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches

and seizures. They fear that the statute permits searches

without the requisite showing of probable cause. Ac-

cording to plaintiffs, a police officer who sees one of the

items listed in section 1 could, without more, seize it.

“The real danger of the Act is that it permits searches

based upon a police officer’s sighting of any article listed

in Section 1 which items ‘sitting in the air’ are not illegal.”

Plaintiffs Post Trial Brief at 8. This argument completely

ignores both the statute’s definition of drug paraphernalia

and the fourteen factors listed in section 2 which a police

A47

officer must consider in determining if an object is drug

paraphernalia. Under the statute, no item “sitting in

the air” is paraphernalia. To determine if a particular

object is outlawed an officer is compelled by the statute to

consider the various elements set out in section 2. When

Delaware’s Model Drug Paraphernalia Act was challenged

on Fourth Amendment grounds, the Court pointed out that:

Nothing in the Act . . . dilutes the Fourth Amendment

probable cause standard and there is no reason to

believe that its application will be any more difficult

or uncertain in the context of the Act than in the

context of any of the other multitvde of statutes that

proscribe otherwise innocent cond ct when accom-

panied by the intent to commit or facilitate a crime.

Delaware Accessories Trade Assn. v. Gebelein, supra at 17.

There is simply nothing in L.B.991 which alters the require-

ment that searches and seizures must be based upon prob-

able cause.

Nor can there be any serious objection to the forfeiture

provisions set out in section 7 of the Act. That section

provides for the seizure and forfeiture of all drug para-

phernalia. Any question about the constitutionality of

civil forfeiture was laid to rest by the Supreme Court in

Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663

(1974). In that case, the Court upheld the seizure and

forfeiture of a Yacht which was carrying a controlled sub-

stance. The seizure occurred without prior notice or hear-

ing and without the lessor even being aware that the lessee

was using the vessel for an unlawful purpose. The State

of Nebraska has a significant interest in preventing drug

abuse. In furtherance of that interest the State may

seize and confiscate the instrumentalities which facilitate

illicit drug use.

A48

F. The Commerce Clause.

It is contended that L.B.991 will unreasonably burden

interstate commerce in violation of the commerce clause

of the United States Constitution. Article I, Section 8,

Clause 3. The applicable law is found in Pike v. Eruce

Church, Inc. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).

Although the criteria for determining the validity of

state statutes affecting interstate commerce have been

variously stated, the general rule that emerges can

be phrased as follows: Where the statute regulates

evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public in-

terest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only

incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden im-

posed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation

to the putative local benefits. If a legitimate local pur-

pose is found then the question becomes one of degree.

And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated

will of course depend on the nature of the local in-

terest involved, and on whether it could be promoted

as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.

Occasionally the Court has candidly undertaken a

balancing approach in resolving these issues. . . .

(citations omitted). Pike sets out a three tiered inquiry.

Does the statute evenhandedly serve a legitimate local pub-

lic interest; does the legislation have only an incidental

affect on interstate commerce; and, does the local public

interest justify the statute’s impact on interstate commerce.

When this test is applied to L.B.991 it is clear that

the statute does not impermissibly burden interstate com-

merce. The first part of the test is met because the state,

in providing for the welfare of its citizens, may legitimately

regulate both illicit drugs and drug related devices. Geiger,

supra. The second tier is met because the statute has only

A49

an incidental affect on interstate commerce. L.B.991 only

regulates items which the statute defines as drug para-

phernalia; namely, those items which are used, intended

for use, or designed for use with a controlled substance.

It has no affect on any item which is used in a legitimate

manner—plaintiffs concede that practically all drug para-

phernalia can be used for some legal purpose. Thus, the

definition of drug paraphernalia limits not only the reach

of the statute but its impact on interstate commerce.

Finally, the Court concludes that the public interest in cur-

tailing the now chronic probleza of drug abuse far out-

weighs the statute’s de minimis impact on interstate com-

merce. L.B.991 does not impermissibly burden commerce

between the several states.

CONCLUSION

L.B.991 may not be easy to enforce nor is it likely that

it will singlehandedly ameliorate the problem of drug

abuse. Nonetheless, as it is construed herein, the statute

does not run afoul of the Federal Constitution. This Court

does not inquire further.

Counsel for the defendants shall prepare and submit a

formal decree and judgment in accordance with this Memo-

randum and submit same to counsel for the plaintiffs for

approval as to form only. Said decree and judgment shall

be submitted to the Court on or before five (5) days of

the date hereof.

Dated this 26th day of September, 1980.

3. Neb.Rev.State. §§ 28-101 and 28-434.

4. For example, legislation similar to L.B.991 has been

enacted by Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Louisi-

ana, Mary New Jersey, New York, and South Carolina. City

ordinances to ban ban drug paraphernalia ha ~_—t, —1,

numerous communities including Overland Park, Kansas; Parma,

Ohio; Lawrenceville, New Jersey; Antioch, Illinois; and Oyster

Bay, New York.

5. peop pe te Ap ey --

oe ant Oe & paraphernalia, a Kansas district court

observed: Cy of Overland Park: in response to a serious

the promo

minors.” Cardarella v. City of Overland Park, No. 86246 p. 2

a

Hearings on L.B.991 before the Judiciary Committee of

oe. AA (March 11, 1980), at 116.

7. The devices referred to are bongs [see e.g., defendants’

exhibit 24] and “power hitters” [defendants’ exhibit C-2].

9. Sn ES Co conte Gus prom enate

should employ a “strict scrutiny” rather than a “rational basis”

test. The argument is that L.B.991 violates the fundamental rights

A51

by the First and Fourth Amendments and therefore the

protected

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A52

marijuana, as he intended to do when he made the purchase.

That intention of “A” translates the pipe into drug paraphernalia

for purposes of invoking the sanctions of this law against the

merchant. Plaintiffs’ Pre-trial Brief at 31.

13. L.B.991 specifically provides for severability:

Section 10. aay Sate Sie Dat or cap pest of ony

section shall be declared invalid or unconstitutional, such

declaration shall not affect the validity or constitutionality of

the remaining portions thereof.

There is ample authority for severing the unconstitutional section

of a statute while allowing the constitutional portion to stand.

See «e.g. Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission, 286

U.S. 210 (1932); Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286 (1924).

14. The term “legitimate” also appears in factor (13):

The existence and scope of any legitimate use for the object

in the community. .

Legitimate in this case refers not to a person, ie., a supplier,

as it did in factor (11) but to the way an object is used. Oo jects,

of course, are inately neither legitimate not illegitimate. To de-

scribe the use of an object as “legitimate” is to say nothing more

than it has a lawful use. To similarly describe a person conjures

a variety of images some of which invite discrimination.

timate” is acceptable in ‘actor (13) but not in (11) because

the statute provides sanctions against people not objects.

15. For an analysis of how L.B.991 impacts on the First

t see pages 14-16 infra.

16. See note 13 supra. The reasonably should know language

is found in sections 4 and 6 of the statute and applies by im-

plication to section 5.

17. A hookah is an ornate pipe. See plaintiffs’ exhibit 107.

18. See e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78 (dealing with the Foreign Cor-

rupt Practices Act); 15 U.S.C. Ar ( with toxic sub-

stances); Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-417(g) (dealing with controlled sub-

pw me Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-515(3) (dealing with tele-communi-

cations).

19. The Court noted, however, that it is not “unfair to require

that one who deliberately goes perilously close to an area of

proscribed conduct shall take the risk that he may cross the

line.” Boyce Motor Lines at 340.

20. It is possible that L.B.991 will have a chilling effect on

First Amendment freedoms. For example, there is the danger

that a publication advertising drug paraphernalia which originates

in a state where the paraphernalia is legal will be offered for sale

in Nebraska. To avoid prosecution in this state an

might well decide to forego his solicitation. It is not difficult to

imagine other circumstances where the statute might dissuade

the expression of protected speech. Nevertheless, the statute is

susceptible to a narrow interpretation by state courts and thus

should not be declared facially unconstitutional here. See Erznoz-

nik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Broadrick k

Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973). Section 6 could logically be

construed as lying only to advertisements which indicate that

vaibble wn Nebraska.

A53

APPENDIX C

LB991

LEGISLATURE OF NEBRASKA

EIGHTY~SIXTH LEGISLATURE

SECOND SESSION

LEGISLATIVE BILL 991

FINAL READING

Introduced by Law Enforcement and Justice Advisory

Committee, Nichol, 48, Chmn.; Stoney, 4; Venditte, 7;

Reutzel, 15; Wagner, 41; Pirsch, 10

Read first time February 27, 1980

Rereferred to Judiciary

A BILL

FOR AN ACT to amend sections 28-101 and 28-431, Revised

Statutes Supplement, 1978, relating to drugs and nar-

cotics; to define a term; to prohibit the sale and use

of drug paraphernalia as prescribed; to provide a pen-

alty; to provide duties for the Revisor of Statutes; to

provide for severability; to repeal the original sections;

and to declare an emergency.

Be it enacted by the people of the State of Nebraska,

Section 1. As used in this act, unless the context

otherwise requires, drug paraphernalia shall mean all

equipment, products, and materials of any kind which are

used, intended for use, or designed for use, in manufactur-

ing, injecting, ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing

into the human body a controlled substance in violation of

this act or the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. It shall

include, but not be limited to, the following:

A54

(1) Diluents and adulterants, such as quinine hydro-

chloride, mannitol, mannite, dextrose, and lactose, used,

intended for use, or designed for use in cutting controlled

substances;

(2) Separation gins and sifters used, intended for

use, or designed for use in removing twigs and seeds from,

or in otherwise cleaning or refining, marijuana;

(3) Hypodermic syringes, needles, and other ob-

jects used, intended for use, and designed for use in

parenterally injecting controlled substances into the human

body; and

(4) Objects used, intended for use, or designed for

use in ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing mari-

juana, cocaine, hashish, or hashish oil into the human body,

which shall include but not be limited to the following:

(a) Metal, wooden, acrylic, glass, stone, plastic, or

ceramic pipes with or without screens, permanent screens,

hashish heads, or punctured metal bowls;

(b) Water pipes;

(c) Carburetion tubes and devices;

(d) Smoking and carburetion masks;

(d) Roach clips, meaning objects used to hold burn-

ing material, such as a marijuana cigarette, which has be-

come too small or too short to be held im the hand;

(f) Miniature cocaine spoons, and cocaiiie vials;

(g) Chamber pipes;

(h) Carburetor pipes;

(i) Electric pipes;

(j) Air-driven pipes;

(k) Chillums;

(lt) Bongs; and

(m) Ice pipes or chillers.

Sec. 2. In determining whether an object is drug

paraphernalia, a court or other authority shall consider, in

addition to all other logically relevant factors, the follow-

ing:

(1) Statements by an owner or by anyone in control

of the object concerning its use;

(2) Prior convictions, if any, of an owner, or of any-

one in control of the object, under any state or federal law

relating to any controlled substance;

(3) The proximity of the object, in time and space, to

a direct violation of this act;

(4) The proximity of the object to any controlled

substance;

(5) The existence of any residue of a controlled sub-

stance on the object;

(6) Direct or circumstantial evidence of the intent

of an owner, or of anyone in control of the object, to

deliver it to any person whom he or she knows, or should

reasonably know, intends to use the object to facilitate

a violation of this act. The innocence of an owner, or

of anyone in control of the object, as to a direct violation

of this act shall not prevent a finding that the object

is intended for use, or designed for use as drug parapher-

nalia;

(7) Instructions, oral or written, provided with the

object concerning its use;

(8) Descriptive materials accompanying the object

which explain or depict its use;

A56

(9) National and local advertising concerning its use;

(10) The manner in which the object is displayed

for sale;

(11) Whether the owner, or anyone in control of

the object, is a legitimate supplier of like or related items

to the community, such as « licensed distributor or dealer

of tobacco products;

(12) Lvrect or circumstantial evidence of the ratio

of sales of the object or objects to the total sales of the

business enterprise;

(13) The existence and scope of any legitimate use

for the object in the community; and

(14) Expert testimony concerning its use.

Sec. 3. (1) It shall be unlawful for any person to

use, or to possess with intent to use, drug paraphernalia

to manufacture, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise intro-

duce into the human body a controlled substance in viola-

tion of this act.

(2) Any person who violates this section shall be

guilty of an infraction.

Sec. 4. (1) It shall be unlawful for any person to

deliver, possess with intent to deliver, or manufacture

with intent to deliver, drug paraphernalia, knowing, or

under circumstances where one reasonably should know,

that it will be used to manufacture, inject, ingest, inhale,

or otherwise be used to introduce into the human body

a controlled substance in violation of this act.

(2) Any person who violates this section shall be

guilty of a Class II misdemeanor.

Sec. 5. Any person eighteen years of age or older

who violates section 4 of this act by delivering drug para-

A57

phernalia to a person under eighteen years of age who

is at least three years his or her junior shall be guilty

of a Class I misdemeanor.

Sec. 6. (1) It shall be unlawful for any person to

place in any newspaper, magazine, handbill, or other publi-

cation any advertisement, knowing, or under circumstances

where one reasonably should know, that the purpose of

the advertisement, in whole or in part, is to promote the

sale of objects designed or intended for use as drug para-

phernalia.

(2) Any person who violates this section shall be

guilty of a Class II

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