Record and brief — Casbah, Inc. v. Thone
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| Oftice- Supreme Cour, US.
81-415 dhe wis:
AUG 81 198]
No. ALEXANO: 2 L. STEVAS,
a CLERK
In the Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1981
THE CASBAH, INC., et al.,
Petitioners,
vs.
CHARLES THONE, et al.,
Respondents.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
To The United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
Davip C. WEINER, Counsel of Record
Frep P. SCHWARTZ
Armonp D. BupIsH
HAHN, LOESER, FREEDHEIM, DEAN &
WELLMAN
800 National City E. 6th Building
Cleveland, Ohio 44114
(216) 621-0150
Counsel for Petitioners
Of Counsel:
DonaLp B. FIEDLER
300 Keeline Building
Omaha, Nebraska 68102
-— — —— ——- ——
THE GATES LEGAL PUBLISHING CO., CLEVELAND, OHIO—TEL. (216) 621-5647
|
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether the Eighth Circuit usurped the function
of the Nebraska legislature by substantially revising a
state law.
2. Whether the Nebraska law is vague and overbroad
and invites discriminatory enforcement in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
3. Whether the Nebraska law fails to satisfy basic
principles of due process by improperly creating per-
missive inferences and/or permissive presumptions.
4. Whether the Nebraska law is an unreasonable regu-
lation in violation of the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
5. Whether the prohibition on advertising in the Ne-
braska law impermissibly penalizes speech protected by
the First Amendment to the Constitution.
LIST OF ALL PARTIES
Petitioners herein, Appellants in Case Number 80-1925
and Appellees in Case Number 80-2033 below, are The
Casbah, Inc., The Disc Counter, Inc., Jeff Ferber, d/b/a
H & D Sales, Greg Hasselhorst, d/b/a Euphoria, Eric Listou,
d/b/a Joint Venture Novelty Snop, Pipe Dream Inc., and
Dennis Robinson, d/b/a The Joynt (hereinafter collectively
referred to as the “Merchants” or “Appellants”). Respon-
dents herein, Appellees in Case Number 80-1925 and Ap-
pellants in Case Number 80-2033 below, are Charles Thone,
Governor for the State of Nebraska, Paul Douglas, Attor-
ney General for the State of Nebraska, Elmer Kohmepsher,
Colonel in Charge of the Nebraska State Patrol, and Donald
L. Knowles, County Attorney for Douglas County, Ne-
braska (hereinafter collectively referred to as “the State” or
“Nebraska’’).
Ill
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED .
LIST OF ALL PARTIES
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
OPINIONS BELOW ...................
FEIT -cxnscnesesncsrsanecsestermnemmensensens
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
INVOLVED
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .
A. Prior Proceedings
B. The Nebraska Law ...
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
I. THE JUDGMENT OF THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
DIRECTLY CONFLICTS WITH THE DECI-
SIONS OF OTHER COURTS DECLARING
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND _ STRIKING
DOWN LAWS BASED UPON THE MODEL
DRUG PARAPHERNALIA ACT
II. THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED ARE OF EX-
TREME IMPORTANCE, THE RESOLUTION
OF WHICH WILL HAVE NATIONWIDE IM-
PACT
Ill. THE DECISION OF THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
IS CLEARLY IN ERROR AND SHOULD BE
REVERSED
A. The Eighth Circuit Improperly Usurped
the Function of the Nebraska Legislature
by Substantially Revising the Nebraska
Law in an Attempt to Remedy Its Con-
stitutional Defects .........................0..-...
B. The Definition of “Drug Paraphernalia”
Is Vague and Overbroad and, in Conjunc-
tion With the Offense Provisions, Fails
—memec Fw
ao wNnw NWN =
11
11
IV
to Provide Adequate Notice and Enforce-
ment Guidelines in Violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution .... 13
1. The definition of “drug paraphernalia”
in the Nebraska Law is unconstitution-
ally vague and overbroad in violation
of due process standards 14
2. The definition of “drug paraphernalia,”
in conjunction with the offense pro-
visions, fails to provide adequate notice
and enforcement guidelines in viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment .... 18
C. The Eighth Circuit Erred in Failing to
Hold That the Nebraska Law Created Per-
missive Inferences in Violation of Due
Process Standards ............... 20
D. The Eighth Circuit Erred in Not Finding
the Nebraska Law an Unreasonable Reg-
ulation Calculated to Stifle and Inter-
fere With Legitimate Commercial Rela-
tions in Violation of Constitutional Due
E. The Eighth Circuit Erred in Failing to
Hold That the Nebraska Law Impermissi-
bly Penalizes Speech Protected by the
First Amendment to the Constitution ........ 26
IEE. cscrtsssceirnsscnressccnsinnnsensemstenanenedesisniectescetanteneeaes 30
APPENDIX:
Appendix A. Opinion of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (June 8, 1981) Al
Appendix B. Memorandum Opinion of the United
States District Court (September 26, 1980) ........ A24
Appendix C. Legislature of Nebraska Eighty-
Sixth Legislature, Second Session, Legislative
Bill 991 A53
Vv
Appendix D. Ordinances of the City of Parma,
Ohio, Ordinance No. 242-79 (December 17,
| vee nee A63
Appendix E. Ordinances of City of Lakewood,
Ohio, Ordinance No. 5-80 .................c-ccsccscsecsecseeseeee A74
Appendix F. Ordinance of the City of North Olm-
sted, Ohio, City of North Olmsted Ordinance
No. 80-28 A90
Appendix G. Model Drug Poseshemnaie Act ........ A98
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) ... 11
Back Door Records v. City of Jacksonville, No. LR-C-
80-314 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 8, 1981) -....................cecccseeseeeeeees 8, 16
Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837 (1973) .................... 22
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) ........ 24
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) ............ 8, 24, 27, 28
Blonder-Tongue Labs, Inc. v. Univ. of Illinois Founda-
tion, 402 U.S. 313 (1971) ...... 29
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) -............... 25
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 US.
663 (1974) 25
The Casbah, Inc. v. Charles Thone, No. 30-0-271 (D.
Neb. Sept. 26, 1980), rev’d in part, Nos. 80-1925 and
80-2033 (8th Cir. June 8, 1981), rehearing denied,
GS SE 3, 15, 19, 26, 29
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service
Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) -.............. 7, 26,
Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) .......... 11
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979) . 14
County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140
(1979) 21, 22, 24
vI
The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. v. Village of Hoff-
man Estates, 639 F.2d 373 (7th Cir., prob. juris,
noted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3893 (No. 80-1681 June 1, 1981)
alii tiadiaiceninaiteapian _ 9, 10, 16, 17
Florida Businessmen for Free Enterprise v. City of
Hollywood, 648 F.2d 956 (5th Cir. 1981) ~.............. 9
Gaffey v. Babb, 50 Or. App. 617, 624 P.2d 616 (Ct. App.
RESETS SE 9, 16,17
Geiger v. City of Egan, 618 F.2d 26 (8th Cir. 1980) ... 16
General Stores, Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, No. 81-
0027-M (D.N.M. March 23, 1981) 8, 17, 21
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972) 20. 11
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) ........ 12,14
Hemmontree v. Phelps, 605 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1979) ... 23
Hejira Corp. v. MacFarlane, No. 80-2062 (10th Cir.
May 5, 1981) ...... 9
High OV Times, Inc. v. Busbee, 621 F.2d 135 (5th Cir.
1980) 12
Hynes v. Mayor of the Borough of Oradell, 425 U.S.
IIE ‘aitididipctadittnriitincscstansidesanienmncianinpadtnijusabicnegsitinte 11,19
Indiana Chapter, NORML, Inc. v. Sendak, No. TH 75-
142-C (S.D. Ind. Feb. 4, 1980), vacated as moot at
time of appeal, No. 80-1305 (7th Cir. July 22, 1980)
‘ 6, 15,17
Information Management Services, Inc. v. Borough of
' Pleasant Hills, 512 F. Supp. 1066 (W.D. Pa. 1981) ... 8
Keyjishian v. Board of Regents of New York, 385 U.S.
SET Ae 25
Knoedler v. Roxbury Township, 485 F. Supp. 990 (D.
N.J. 1980) 20
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939) —............. 14
Lazy J., Ltd. v. Borough of State College, No. 80-1167
SR, CES GER TIED civecsntenscsancsossenithnenimensenencensed 8, 16, 21
Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) 22
Mackenzie v. State, 76 Ohio St. 369, 81 N.E. 638 (1907) 12
vil
McInerney v. Berman, 473 F. Supp. 187 (D. Mass.
1979), aff'd, 621 F.2d 20 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 101
BO i I III. scasbsencciihinsessabesensennpensnns a
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1922) secisiteasiasenitiuiibaii 24
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)
ditealicailitaldatianidipendsicnenl 24-25
Music Stop, Inc. v. City of Ferndale, 488 F. Supp. 390
(E.D. Mich. 1980) 16
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) ........ 28
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156
(1972) >
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1924) ...........- 24, 25
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) 25
Record Revolution No. 6, Inc. v. City of Parma, Ohio,
638 F.2d 916 (6th Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded
only as to Case Nos. 80-3308 and 80-3352, 49 U.S.L.W.
3882 (May 26, 1981) ................ 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 15, 16, 19, 20,
21, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29
Sawyer v. Sandstrom, 615 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1980) ... 22
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) —............ 20
Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974) —.................... 11,14
Spence v. Washington, 413 U.S. 405 (1974) —.....0000....... 19
State v. Shreveport News Agency, Inc., 287 So. 2d 464
(La. 1973) 11
State v. Wedelstedt, 213 N.W.2d 652 (Iowa 1973) ........ 12
Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503
(1969) 19
The Town Tobacconist v. Degnan, No. C-2198-80
(Super. Ct. Ch. N.J. March 12, 1981) ~......000.......... 9,17
Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Coun-
cil, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) 24
Weiler v. Carpenter, 507 F. Supp. 837 (D.N.M. 1981)
8, 16, 17, 19, 21
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948) —................ 14
vir
Constitution of the United States
First Amendment ...................... i 1, 1, 26, 28, 29
USC. § 36 .......................
20
1
28 U.S.C. § 1331 ...... 3
28 U.S.C. § 1343 3
SEE AE SRD tie Se 3
3
3
3
3
28 U.S.C. § 2202
42 US.C. § 1983
42 U.S.C. § 1985
42 U.S.C. § 1988
Nebraska Revised Statutes
Legislative Bill 991, 1980 Neb. Laws, codified at Neb.
Rev. Stat. §§ 28-101, 28-431, and 28-439 to 28-444
(Supp. 1980) sibcnabiineeadhieiinntiiinsetantiabaasl passim
Codified Ordinances of the City of Lakewood
Section 513.01 2
EEE SET ee OC a
Codified Ordinances of the City of North Olmsted
Section 513.01 ..................- Pineseiiannien ‘ie 2
Section 513.04 7 2
Codified Ordinances of the City of Parma
Section 620.01 2
Section 620.06 ..........-.-c-c-nsecsescsese0se 2
The Merchants’ petition for a writ of certiorari to re-
view the final judgment of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit, which judgment upheld in its
entirety a law of the State of Nebraska which had enacted
the “Model Drug Paraphernalia Act” drafted by the Drug
Enforcement Agency of the federal gov-.nment. The Ne-
braska law seeks to make it a criminal offense to possess,
use, manufacture, disseminate or advertise so-called “drug
paraphernalia.” The Eighth Circuit erred in failing to de-
clare the Nebraska law unconstitutional.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit has not been officially reported.
The opinion is in Appendix A (App. 1).
The opinion of the United States District Court for
the District of Nebraska has not been officially reported.
The opinion is in Appendix B (App. A24).
JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (“Eighth
Circuit”) filed its judgment on June 8, 1981. On July
9, 1981, the Eighth Circuit denied the Merchants’ Petition
for Rehearing En Banc. The Eighth Circuit granted the
Merchants’ Motion for Stay of the Mandate on July 30,
1981.
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
INVOLVED
1. The First Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States provides that “Congress shall make no law
... abridging the freedom of speech . .. .”
2
2. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, Section 1, provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
oflaw....
3. Legislative Bill 991, 1980 Neb. Laws, codified at
Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 28-101, 28-431, and 28-439 to 28-444
(Supp. 1980), is set forth in Appendix C (App. A53).
4. City of Parma, Ohio Ordinance No. 242-79, codi-
fied at §§ 620.01 and 620.04 of the Codified Ordinances
of the City of Parma; City of Lakewood, Ohio Ordinance
No. 5-80, codified at §§ 513.01 and 513.04 of the Codified
Ordinances of the City of Lakewood; and City of North
Olmsted, Ohio Ordinance No. 80-28, codified at §§ 513.01
and 513.04 of the City of North Olmsted Codified Ordi-
nances are set forth consecutively in Appendices D-F (App.
A63).
5. The Model Drug Paraphernalia Act is set forth
in Appendix G (App. A98).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Prior Proceedings.
The Merchants display, sell, and advertise recorded
and taped music, magazines, jewelry, T-shirts, smoking
accessories, and a variety of novelty items. On April
23, 1980, the Merchants filed an action in the United States
Dis.; ict Court for the District of Nebraska (“District
Court”) against the State of Nebraska and several of its
officials (hereinafter collectively referred to as the
“State”). The Merchants challenged the constitutionality
of Legislative Bill 991, 1980 Neb. Laws (“Nebraska Law”),
3
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 28
US.C. §§ 1331, 1343, 2201 and 2202, and 42 U.S.C. §§
1983, 1985, and 1988.
On April 23, 1980 the District Court entered an order
temporarily restraining the enforcement of the Nebraska
Law. On September 26, 1980, following an evidentiary
hearing, the District Court rendered an opinion in The
Casbah, Inc. v. Charles Thone, No. 80-0-271 (D. Neb. Sept.
26, 1980) (App. at A24). The District Court found central
portions of the Nebraska Law in violation of the Constitu-
tion. However, rather than strike down the Nebraska Law,
the District Court severed certain phrases and substantially
altered the plain meaning or scope of other language.
The Merchants and the State cross-appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
on October 16, 1980, the Eighth Circuit stayed the judgment
of the District Court pending determination of the appeals,
and on June 8, 1981, it affirmed in part and reversed in part
the judgment of the District Court (App. at Al). On July
9, 1981, the Eighth Circuit denied the Merchants’ Petition
for Rehearing En Banc. On July 30, 1981, the Eighth Cir-
cuit granted the Merchants’ Motion for Stay of the Man-
date.
B. The Nebraska Law.
The Nebraska Law was based upon, and is virtually
identical to, the Model Drug Paraphernalia Act drafted
by the Drug Enforcement Agency of the Department of
Justize (“Model Act”). The Nebraska Law and the Model
1. The Casbah, Inc. v. Thone, Nos. 80-1925 & 80-2033, slip op.
at 4 & n.4 (8th Cir. June 8. 1981) (hereinafter cited as “Slip Op.”).
4
Act prohibit the possession,’ use,’ delivery.‘ manufacture®
and advertisement® of “drug paraphernalia.” “Drug para-
»hernalia” is defined in both the Nebraska Law and the
Modei Act as any item “used, intended for use, or designed
for use” in drug-related activities.” Listed in the Nebraska
Law and the Model Act are legislatively designated ex-
amples of “drug paraphernalia’*® and factors which law
enforcement officers, judges and juries are instructed to
consider in determining whether particular items are illicit
“drug paraphernalia.”
The Nebraska Law and Model Act impose ‘criminal’®
and civil forfeiture" penalties for the possession, use, sale,
dissemination, manufacture or advertisement of so-called
“drug paraphernalia.” An individual violating the Ne-
braska Law for the first time by selling an item deemed
to be “drug paraphernalia” is subject to a jail sentence
of up to six (6) months or a fine of up to one thousand
dollars ($1,000) or both. If a person delivers “drug para-
2. Nebraska Law Section 3 (App. at A56); Model Act Article
Il, Section (A) (App. at Al03).
3. Nebraska Law Section 3 (App. at A56); Model Act Article
Ti, Section (A) (App. at A103).
4. Nebraska Law Section 4 (App. at A56); Model Act Article
II, Section (B) (App. at A104).
5. Nebraska Law Section 4 (App. at A56); Model Act Article
Il, Section (B) (App. at A104).
6. Nebraska Law Section 6 (App. at A57); Model Act Article
II, Section (D) (App. at A104).
7. Nebraska Law Section 1 (App. at A53); Model Act Article
I (App. at A99).
8. Nebraska Law Section 1(4)(a)-(m) (App at A54-55);
Model Act Article I (App. at A101-102).
9. Nebraska Law Section 2 (App. at A55-56); Model Act
Article I (App. at A102-103).
10. Nebraska Law Section 4(2) (App. at A56); Model Act
Article II, Section (B) (App. at A103-104).
11. Nebraska Law Section 7 (App. at 57-58); Model Act
Article III (App. at A105).
5
phernalia” to a juvenile, that person is subject to a jail
sentence of up to one (1) year or a fine of up to one
thousand dollars ($1,000) or both.
REASONS FOR GRANTING TKE WRIT
I, THE JUDGMENT OF THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
DIRECTLY CONFLICTS WITH THE DECISIONS
OF OTHER COURTS DECLARING UNCONSTI-
TUTIONAL AND STRIKING DOWN LAWS
BASED UPON THE MODEL DRUG PARA-
PHERNALIA ACT.
The judgment of the Eighth Circuit is in direct conflict
with a number of recent decisions of federal and state
courts which have declared unconstitutional and struck
down laws based upon the Model Act. Most important,
the decision of the Eighth Circuit is in stark conflict with
the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit (“Sixth Circuit”) in Record Revolution
No. 6, Inc. v. City of Parma, Ohio, 638 F.2d 916 (6th
Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded only as to Case Nos.
80-3308 and 80-3352, 49 U.S.L.W. 3882 (May 26, 1981)."*
Both the Eighth and Sixth Circuits were presented
with constitutional challenges to laws virtually identical
12. The third consolidated case decided by the Sixth Circuit,
The Right Place, Inc. v. City of North Olmsted, Ohio, No. 80-3353,
was not appealed to the Supreme Court. Accordingly, the Sixth
Circuit’s opinion in Record Revolution No. 6, Inc., became final
in that case and stands as the law governing the Sixth Circuit.
The decision of the Sixth Circuit in consolidated cases Record
Revolution No. 6, Inc. v. City of Parma, Ohio, No. 80-3308, and
Alexander J. Luka d/b/a Daystar Boutique v. City of Lakewood,
Ohio, No. 80-3352, was vacated and remanded for consideration
of a single issue of state law which arose following entry of the
im of the Sixth Circuit. See 49 U.S.L.W. 3882 (May 26,
1981).
to each other and to the Model Act. Record Revolution,
638 F.2d at 919**; App. at 4 & n.4.
The Sixth Circuit found a number of constitutional
defects in the Ohio Ordinances and, therefore, permanently
enjoined their enforcement. The Eighth Circuit, explicitly
rejecting the analysis of the Sixth Circuit, upheld the
constitutionality of the Nebraska Law in its entirety.
The opinions of the Sixth and Eighth Circuits present
at least five significant areas of direct conflict. The first
direct conflict between the Sixth and Eighth Circuits in-
volves the analysis of the definition of “drug parapher-
nalia.” In particular, the Sixth Circuit determined that de-
fining “drug paraphernalia” as items “designed for use” in
drug-related activities fails to give any “ ‘hint to those at-
tempting to comply with [the statute] what is included in
the definition,’ ” Record Revolution, 638 F.2d at 930 (quoting
Indiana Chapter, NORML, Inc. v. Sendak),’* and creates
a serious “danger of arbitrary and discriminatory enforce-
ment” in violation of the Constitution. Record Revolution,
638 F.2d at 931. The Eighth Circuit, on the other hand, ex-
pressly rejected the holding of the Sixth Circuit and, after
revising the language, found the same statutory definition
of “drug paraphernalia” to pass constitutional muster. App.
at All-13.
The Ohio Ordinances and the Nebraska Law make
it a crime to deliver, possess with intent to deliver, manu-
facture, or manufacture with intent to deliver drug para-
13. The municipal ordinances challenged before the Sixth
Circuit were City of Parma Ordinance No. 242-79, amended by
No. 103-80; City of Lakewood Ordinance No. 5-80; and City of
North Olmsted Ordinance No. 80-28 (hereinafter collectively re-
ferred to as the “Ohio Ordinances”). The Ohio Ordinances are
reprinted at Appendices D-F, at A63-A97.
14. No. TH 75-142-C (S.D. Ind. Feb. 1980), vacated as
moot at time of appeal, No. 80-1305 (7th Cir. July 22, 1980).
7
phernalia, “knowing, or under circumstances where one
reasonably should know”, that it will be used with con-
trolled substances. Record Revolution, 638 F.2d at 934;
App. at A56. Focusing upor the “reasonably should
know” language, the Sixth Circuit found this offense provi-
sion vague and overbroad in violation of due process stan-
dards. Record Revolution, 638 F.2d at 935-36. This same
offense provision was effectively excised from the Ne-
braska Law by the Eighth Circuit and thereafter upheld
against constitutional attack. App. at A16-17.
The third area of direct conflict between the decisions
of the Sixth and Eighth Circuits concerns the list of factors
which law enforcement officers, judges and juries are in-
structed to consider in determining the guilt of an individ-
ual. The Sixth Circuit found that those factors permit
the “potential arrest, prosecution, or conviction of a person
on the impermissible theory of guilt by association.” Rec-
ord Revolution, 638 F.2d at 933. The Eighth Circuit again
rejected the opinion of the Sixth Circuit, instead holding
that “the enumerated factors themselves pose no constitu-
tional problem, and are valuable guides in determining
what items are prohibited.” App. at Al4.
Another significant conflict between the Sixth and
Eighth Circuit opinions involves the prohibition of advertis-
ing which promotes, in whole or in part, the use or sale
of “drug paraphernalia”. Both courts applied the analysis
recently set forth by this Court in Central Hudson Gas
& Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n of New York,
447 U.S. 557 (1980), but with differing results. The Sixth
Circuit struck down the provision finding that the Ohio
Ordinances banned speech protected by the First Amend-
ment to the Constitution and that the reach of the Ohio
Ordinances was more extensive than necessary to serve the
regulatory interest of the Ohio municipalities. Record
Revolution, 638 F.2d at 936-37. The Eighth Circuit, after
“construing” the advertising proscription, found that the
Nebraska Law only prohibited advertisements solely pro-
moting illegal activity and therefore upheld the Nebraska
Law. App. at A20-23."
Finally, the Sixth Circuit refused to substantially re-
vise the Ohio Ordinances in an attempt to remedy their
constitutional defects, holding that federal courts are not
permitted to usurp the states’ and municipalities’ legislative
function. Record Revolution, 638 F.2d at 926-27. The
Eighth Circuit, while recognizing that “a federal court
must take a state statute as written end cannot find the
statute constitutional by remedying the defects which ren-
der it imprecise”, App. at A8, nonetheless judicially re-
drafted the Nebraska Law and then found the redrafted
law to be constitutional.
The decision of the Eighth Circuit is also in direct
conflict with a number of other federal and state courts.
Since the Sixth Circuit rendered its well-reasoned judg-
ment, every court, except the Eighth Circuit, presented
with a challenge to a “drug paraphernalia” law based
upon the Model Act has followed the precedent of the
Sixth Circuit in striking down the law. E.g., Information
Management Services, Inc. v. Borough of Pleasant Hills,
512 F. Supp. 1066 (W.D. Pa. 1981); General Stores, Inc.
v. City of Albuquerque, No. 81-0027-M (D.N.M. March
23, 1981); Weiler v. Carpenter, 507 F. Supp. 837 (D.N.M.
1981); Lazy, J., Ltd. v. The Borough of State College,
No. 80-1167 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 1981); Back Door Records
v. City of Jacksonville, No. LR-C-80-314 (E.D. Ark. Jan.
15. The Eighth Circuit decision conflicts not only with the
Sixth Circuit decision but also with the opinion of Court in
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), which involved circum-
stances very similar to those involved herein. See discussion at
pages 24-29, infra.
8, 1981); Gaffey v. Babb, 50 Or. App. 617, 624 P.2d 616
(Ct. App. Or. 1981); The Town Tobacconist v. Degnan,
No. C-2198-80 (Super. Ct. Ch. N.J. March 12, 1981).**
Il. THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED ARE OF SUB-
STANTIAL IMPORTANCE, THE RESOLUTION
OF WHICH WILL HAVE NATIONWIDE IM-
PACT.
The Model Act, virtually identical to the Nebraska
Law was drafted by the Drug Enforcement Agency
of the Department of Justice and a large number of states
and municipalities throughout the country have adopted
laws based upon it. As stated in the Brief of Arkansas,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Indiana,
Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Marylane. Nebraska, Nevada,
New Jersey, New Mexico, North VJarolina, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, and Washington as Amici
Curiae, filed in Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside,
Hoffman Estates, Inc., prob. juris. noted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3893
(No. 80-1681 June 1, 1981) (“States’ Brief”), at least
twenty-one states and numerous localities have enacted
laws based upon the Model Act. States’ Brief at 2-3 &
n.l. Moreover, many other governmental units have con-
sidered enacting laws based upon the Model Act and have
refrained from so doing because in their considered opinion
the Model Act is unconstitutional and/or pending the
16. Florida Businessmen for Free Enterprise v. City of Holly-
wood, 648 F.2d 956, 959 (5th Cir. 1981) stayed enforcement of
a municipal ordinance based upon the Model Act pending appeal.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted that the appel-
lants, asserting that the municipal ordinance was unconstitutional,
had me a “substantial likelihood of success on the
merits.”
It should also be noted that Hejira Corp. v. MacFarlane, No.
80-2062 (10th Cir. a > 5, =. % i a = law against
constitutional attack. law, while bearing some
resemblance to portions rx the S Model Act, ‘significantly differs in
material respects from the Model Act. See App. at A23 n.20 at 22.
10
ultimate resolution by this Court of the issues presented
herein. A resolution of the conflict between the Sixth
and Eighth Circuits regarding the constitutionality of laws
based upon the Model Act will have a substantial impact
upon merchants in states and municipalities across the
nation.
This Court apparently has recognized the importance
of issues presented by statutes and ordinances banning
“drug paraphernalia” by noting probable jurisdiction in
The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. v. Village of Hoffman
Estates, Illinois, 639 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1981), prob. juris.
noted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3893 (No. 80-1681 June 1, 1981). The
instant action is equally or more appropriate for considera-
tion by this Court than is Village of Hoffman Estates.
The States’ Brief in Village of Hoffman Estates -onfirms
that, of the various legislative formulations banning or
regulating “drug paraphernalia,” the Model Act is by far
the most frequently adopted of such laws. See States’
Brief at 3-5. Village of Hoffman Estates, however, has
at issue a sui generis formulation unlike the Model Act
in almost every particular save one portion of the defini-
tion of “drug paraphernalia.” 639 F.2d 373, 376. There-
fore, a decision in Village of Hoffman Estates cannot re-
solve all of the important constitutional issues presented
herein concerning laws based upon the Model Act since
they are simply not presented by the language of the
ordinance at issue in that case. Accordingly, this Court
should grant the Merchants’ Petition for Certiorari and
consider or consolidate this action with the Village of
Hoffman Estates.
17. Village of Hoffman Estates Ordinance No. 969-1978 in-
cludes the phrase “designed for use” with illegal drugs. As did
the Sixth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found
that phrase unconstitutionally vague. 639 F.2d at 386.
11
Ill. THE DECISION OF THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT IS
CLEARLY IN ERROR AND SHOULD BE RE-
VERSED.
A. The Eighth Circuit Improperly Usurped the
Function of the Nebraska Legislature by Sub-
stantially Revising the Nebraska Law in an
Attempt to Remedy Its Constitutional Defects.
The Eighth Circuit improperly usurped the legislative
function by substantially rewriting the Nebraska Law.
That federal courts lack the power to construe state statutes
or municipal ordinances is well-described in the opinion
of the Sixth Circuit:
[A] federal court must take the state statute or mu-
nicipal ordinance as written and cannot find the stat-
ute or ordinance constitutional on the basis of a limit-
ing construction supplied by it rather than a state
court. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611,
614 (1971). As stated in Hynes v. Mayor and Council
of the Borough of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 622 (1976),
“[e]ven assuming that a more explicit limiting inter-
pretation of the ordinance could remedy the flaws
we have pointed out . . . we are without power to
remedy the defects by giving the ordinance constitu-
tionally precise content.” See also Smith v. Goguen,
415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 US.
518, 520 (1972).
Record Revolution, 638 F.2d at 926 (footnote and parallel
citations omitted) ."*
18. The lack of judicial power to rewrite laws in order to
uphold their constitutionality also applies to federal courts pre-
sented with challenges to federal laws, see Aptheker v. Secretary
of State, 378 U.S. 500, 515 (1964), and to state courts confronted
with challenges to state laws, see, e.g., State v. Shreveport News
Agency, Inc., 287 So. 2d 464, 469-70 (La. 1973) (court will not con-
strue state law to make it constitutional under federal constitu-
(Continued on following page)
12
The Eighth Circuit recognized the federal courts’ lack
of power to rewrite state legislation. App at A8-9. Yet,
under the guise of “extrapolating allowable meaning,” the
Eighth Circuit substantially revised the Nebraska Law”
in an attempt to remedy the law’s constitutional defects.”
In particular, the Eighth Circuit exceeded its powers
primarily by:
(1) Revising the definition of “drug paraphernalia”
so as constructively to add the bracketed terms:
“Drug paraphernalia” means all items which
are used, intended [by the defendant] for
use [by another], or [intentionally] designed
[by the defendant] for use [by another]
in drug-related activities.
App. at All1-13.
Footnote continued—
tional dictates); State v. Wedelstedt, 213 N.W.2d 652, 656 (Iowa
a (same) ; Mackenzie v. State, 76 Ohio St. 369, 374, 81 N.E.
638 (1907) (court cannot, by forced construction, modify or
amend a state statute).
19. The Eighth Circuit relied on Grayned v. City of Rock-
ford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972), for the proposition that a federal
court may “extrapolate” the meaning of a state or municipal law
so as to uphold its constitutionality. App. at A9. However,
the Court in ee distinguished ween “extrapolation” and
“Extrapolation, ” of course, is a delicate boy for it is not
within our power to construe and narrow state laws.
408 U.S. at 110 (emphasis added). The Court in Grayned did not
add, delete or narrow any statutory terms, as opposed to the ac-
tions taken by the Eighth Circuit herein which did all three to a
substantial degree.
20. The Eighth Circuit correctly stated that state courts
could not construe the Nebraska Law so as to “significantly alter
the federal constitutional issues”. App. at A6-7 n.6. t is
paraphernalia”,
was reversed by the Court of APP for Fifth Circuit.
High OV Times, Inc. v. Busbee, 621 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1980).
3
(2) Amending the offense provision by rendering
meaningless the italicized language:
It is unlawful for any person to deliver, pos-
with intent to deliver, or manufacture
with intent to deliver, drug paraphernalia,
knowing, or under circumstances where one
reasonably should know, that it will be used
with a controlled substance.
App. at A15-16.
(3) Deleting the italicized language from the adver-
tising prohibition:
It shall be unlawful for any person to place
any advertisement, the purpose of which, in
whole or in part, is to promote the sale of
drug paraphernalia.
App. at A22-23.
The foregoing examples demonstrate the substantial
judicial legislation undertaken by the Eighth Circuit in
an attempt to change the entire import of the Nebraska
Law. This Court should not condone such rewriting of
state legislation by federal courts. For the reasons dis-
cussed above, the Eighth Circuit exceeded the scope of
its powers by substantially revising the Nebraska Law.
B. The Definition of ‘Drug Paraphernalia” Is
Vague and Overbroad and, in Conjunction
With the Offense Provisions, Fails to Provide
Adequate Notice and Enforcement Guidelines
in Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution.
The definition of “drug paraphernalia” in the Nebraska
Law fails to meet the due process standards of the Four-
14
teenth Amendment to the Constitution in two respects:
(1) the definition of “drug paraphernalia” is vague and
overbroad, and (2) in conjunction with the offense provi-
sions, the definition of “drug paraphernalia” fails to provide
adequate notice and enforcement guidelines to law enforce-
ment officers, judges and juries.
1. The definition of ‘drug paraphernalia’”’ in
the Nebraska Law is unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad in violation of due
process standards.
The Sixth Circuit succinctly set forth the well-settled
dictates of due process:
The void-for-vagueness doctrine commands any statute
to give persons of common intelligence fair notice
of the persons covered and the conduct proscribed.
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 390-91 (1979). Fun-
damental fairness, as well as a proper regard for pre-
venting the deterrence of constitutionally protected
conduct, requires that persons not be compelled to
guess at their own peril the meaning and application
of a statute. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 US.
104, 108 (1972); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S.
451, 453 (1939). Ascertainable standards of guilt are
imperative in order to protect against arbitrary, erra-
tic, and discriminatory arrests, prosecutions and con-
victions. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405
U.S. 156, 162 (1972); Winters v. New York, 333 US.
507, 515 (1948). Unless the statute itself prescribes
sufficiently precise standards, basic policy decisions
are impermissibly delegated to the personal predilec-
tions of the police, prosecutors and juries. Smith v.
Goguen, 415 U.S. at 575 (1974); Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. at 108. “Legislators may not so
abdicate their responsibilities for setting the standards
of the criminal law.” 415 U.S. at 575.
15
Record Revolution, 638 F.2d at 927 (parallel cites omitted).
Accord, App. at Al0-11 & n.8.
The Nebraska Law defines “drug paraphernalia” as
any item which is “used, intended for use, or designed
for use” in drug-related activities. This definition is so
overly inclusive as potentially to include virtually any
innocent item. Therefore, the Nebraska Law fails to give
proper notice of illicit items and permits innocent persons
to be arrested, prosecuted and convicted on the basis of
an act or state of mind of another person.
The unrebutted evidence introduced in the District
Court established that practically any everyday item can
be and has been used in drug-related activities. “[T]he
only limit on what can be used to introduce a controlled
substance into the body is imagination.” App. at A34. Ac-
cord, Record Revolution, 638 F.2d at 930-31.
Defining “drug paraphernalia” in terms of the “design”
of items is impermissible due to the lack of any design
characteristics that distinguish items with lawful uses from
items with unlawful uses. Record Revolution, 638 F.2d
at 930-31; The Casbah, Inc., District Court, App. at A34-35.
The court in Indiana Chapter, NORML, Inc. v. Sendak,
slip op. at 12-14, in an opinion relied upon and quoted
by the Sixth Circuit, Record Revolution, 638 F.2d at 930,
held that a definition of “drug paraphernalia” relying upon
design characteristics is unconstitutionally vague:
The term “designed” could signify only devices
that have no use or function other than as a means to
ingest a controlled substance. Alternatively, “de-
signed” could include any devices that have a legiti-
mate function but could be used for ingestion of drugs.
That is, the term “designed” could sweep into the
definition of paraphernalia any device that could be
16
altered from its normal function to become a make-
shift drug device, such as a paper clip, tie bar, hand
mirror, spoon, or piece of aluminum foil. The defini-
tion “designed for drug use” gives no hint to those
attempting to comply with [the statute] what is in-
cluded in the definition.”
Accord, The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. v. Village of
Hoffman Estates, 639 F.2d at 380-81, 386 & n.32; Weiler
v. Carpenter, 507 F. Supp. 837, 843 (D.N.M. Feb. 11, 1981);
Lazy, J., Ltd. v. Borough of State College, No. 80-1167,
slip op. at 4-7 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 1981); Back Door Records
v. City of Jacksonville, No. LR-C-80-314, slip op. at 4-
5 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 8, 1981); Gaffey v. Babb, 50 Or. App.
617, 624 P.2d 616, 622 (Ct. App. Or. 1981).
The definition of “drug paraphernalia” as items “used”
or “intended for use” in drug-related activities also violates
due process by failing to give fair notice to those subject
to its strictures:
The statute includes in its definition of paraphernalia
instruments “used” and “intended for use.” This
means that a person could be deemed a dealer in
paraphernalia because the buyer of his product intends
to use the item to administer drugs. ... A maker of
pipes, spoons, or hand mirrors could be found to be
21. The Sixth Circuit recognized that the term “designed”
is not limited to items solely designed to be “drug paraphernalia”:
The comments to the Model Act indicate that the ordinances
would apply to items which are not solely designed to be
drug paraphernalia. App. 1237. Vagueness enters in our case
once the ordinances begin to define drug paraphernalia in
terms of the primary adaption or dominant purpose of the
design. Then the definition begins to upon the in-
drug users. Geiger v. City of Egan, 618 F.2d 26 (sth % Cir.
1980); Music Stop, Inc. v. City of Ferndale, 488 F. Supp. 390
(E.D. Mich. 1980).
Record Revolution, 638 F.2d at 930.
17
in violation of the statute because his legitimate prod-
ucts are bought by a middleman who intends to ad-
vertise and sell the product as drug devices or who
sells them simply as pipes or spoons but to someone
who later uses the items to ingest drugs. Thus, some-
one can be considered to be dealing in paraphernalia
because of the intent of someone once, twice, or even
several times removed. The same problem of lack of
notice faces a seller who may sell items such as pipes
or spoons or paper clips to someone who intends to use
the items for the ingestion of drugs rather than for
their legitimate functions.
Indiana Chapter, NORML, Inc. v. Sendak, slip op. at 16-
17. Accord, General Stores, Inc. v. City of Albuquerque,
No. 81-0027-M, slip op. at 4-5 (D.N.M. March 23, 1981);
Weiler v. Carpenter, 507 F. Supp. 837, 842 (D.N.M. 1981);
Gaffey v. Babb, 50 Or. App. 617, 624 P.2d 616, 623-24
(Ct. App. Or. 1981); The Town Tobacconist v. Degnan,
No. C-2198-80, slip op. at 7-8 (Super. Ct. Ch. N.J. March
12, 1981).”
22. The court in The Town Tobacconist, slip op. at 7-8,
clearly described the constitutional defects in the phrases “used”
and “intended for use”:
Objects are not used or intended for use in an unpop-
ulated vacuum. The use or intention for use envisioned by
the statute must be by someone. It is not facially clear
whether “used” means frequently used or used by someone
in particular against whom enforcement may be aimed and
whether “intended for use” means inten by its manu-
facturer, its seller or its ultimate possessor for use... .
It is not the seller’s intent that is at issue. If it were,
then an item would not be drug paraphernalia unless the re-
tailer intended that his customer use it unlawfully. It is plain
that the retailer’s intent is to sell the item. .. .
The phrase “used or intended for use”, that appears a
dozen times renders the definition of drug paraphernalia un-
lawfully vague. It is ble for any retailer to know
whose use or whose inten he must be aware of. If it is
“frequent” use, he can not tell how frequent it must be, or
(Continued on following page)
18
For these reasons, the defin‘tion of “drug parapherna-
lia” is vague and overbroad in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution. Therefore, the Eighth
Circuit erred in concluding that the definition of “drug
paraphernalia” in the Nebraska Law passes constitutional
muster.”
2. The definition of ‘‘drug paraphernalia,”’ in
conjunction with the offense provisions,
fails to provide adequate notice and en-
forcement guidelines in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The offense provisions of the Nebraska Law violate
due process by setting a negligence standard which re-
quires a seller of virtually any item to guess, at his peril,
at the intended or actual use to be made of an item by
another individual. A wrong guess may be crirainally
punished. Therefore, the Neb.aska Law violates due pro-
cess.
The Nebraska Law makes it a criminal violation for
a person to sell virtually any item “knowing, or under
circumstances where one reasonably should know,” that
it will be used by another person for drug-velated activ-
ities. All that is necessary under the Nebraska Law for
Footnote continued—
among what groups of people. If it is the cust:.aer’s in-
tentio ype before the customer arrives, the retailer cannot
tell if he is unlawfully stocking drug paraphernalia. The prior
an utting the item on his shelves would become unlawful
ter, after the intentions of the yet unidentified cus-
19
a law enforcement officer to arrest a vendor is probable
cause to believe that some imaginary “reasonable seller”
should have known in the circumstances that the purchaser
would use the item for drug-related activity at some time
in the future. Similarly, a judge or jury is permitted
under the Nebraska Law to convict a seller on a finding
that a hypothetical “reasonable seller” should have known
that the buyer would use the item with a controlled sub-
stance. The offense sections provide no requirement that
a vendor have any criminal intent or guilty knowledge.
“Because most uses of the outlawed items are lawful and
common, the ‘reason to know’ standard is too open-ended
and too susceptible to misapplication to satisfy the dictates
of due process.” Record Revolution, 638 F.2d at 935-36
(footnotes omitted). Accord, Weiler v. Carpenter, 507 F.
Supp. at 841.
For the reasons discussed above, the definition of “drug
paraphernalia,” in conjunction with the offense provisions,
violates due process.* The Eighth Circuit erred in failing
to so hold.*
Footnote continued—
Spence v. Washington, 413 U.S. 405 (1974); Tinker v. Des Moines
School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
Furthermore, heightened precision is — when a law
on first amendment values. E.g., Hynes v. Mayor and
Council of the Borough of Oradell, 423° US. 610, 620 (1976).
The Nebraska Law fails utterly to accord with that requirement.
24. The District Court reco the constitutional defects
in the negligence standard. The Casbah, Inc., District Court, App.
at A41-42. However, rather than strike down the Nebraska
Law, the District Court severed the “reasonably should know”
language from the law. Id. at 43. The Eighth Circuit reversed this
portion of the District Court’s judgment, preferring to construe
this vision so as effectively to have no meaning apart from
the tion of “drug paraphernalia.” App. at A15-A17.
25. The attempted reading of an intent element into the
definition of “drug Se by the Eighth Circuit, even
if permitted, does not cure the unconstitutional vagueness of
the law. First, if that reading is upheld it creates a constitutionally
(Continued on following page)
20
C. The Eighth Circuit Erred in Failing to Hold
That the Nebraska Law Created Permissive
Inferences in Violation of Due Process Stan-
dards.
The Eighth Circuit erred in upholding against a due
process challenge the list of various factors which law
enforcement officers, judges and juries are instructed to
Footnote continued—
offensive inconsistency with another part of the law. The defi-
nition and offense sections of the Nebraska Law set forth sep-
arate elements. The negligence standard in the offense sections
is distinct from, and contrary to, the implication of an intent
es mea into the definition section. As the District Court
Under the reasonably should know standard a conviction can
be had without a showing of general criminal intent; that is,
without establishing that the defendant specifi intended
to violate the statute. As a result, the reasonably should
know standard viola.es the prophylactic effect of the scienter
requirement in the definition of drug paraphernalia. The
statute cannot constitutionally take away with one hand
what it gives with another.
The Casbah, Inc., District Court, App. at A41-42. Accord, Record
Revolution, 638 F.2d at 934-36.
Second, even if the definition and offense sections are
deemed to set forth a single element, as the Eighth Circuit suggests,
see Slip. Op. at 17-18, rather than two separate elements, that
too fails to cure the unconstitutional vagueness of the Nebraska
Law. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945), relied upon
by courts considering the constitutionality of “drug para
laws, identifies further constitutional defects in the Tdoube law.
Screws upheld the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. 8 52, now
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 242, which makes it a crime to
subject” an individual to a deprivation of AL. — 4s or legal
rights, privileges, or immunities. Discussing whether intent will
cure an otherwise vague enactment, this Court stated:
Jhe presence of a bad purpose or evil intent alone may not
sufficient. We do say that a requirement of a specific
intent to deprive a of a federal right made definite by
decision or other eee cee ee
unconstitutionality on grounds of vagueness.
Id. at 103 (emphasis added).
(Continued on following page)
21
consider in determining the guilt of an individual.** Most
of those factors permit the “potential arrest prosecution,
or conviction of a person on the impermissible theory of
guilt by association.” Record Revolution, 638 F.2d at 933.
See App. at Al5. Therefore, those factors create per-
missive inferences in violation of due process standards.
There is not a sufficient connection between proof of those
factors and the guilt of the accused so as to satisfy require-
ments of due process. E.g., General Stores, Inc. v. City
of Albuquerque, slip op. at 5-6, 7; Weiler v. Carpenter,
507 F. Supp. at 843-44; Lazy, J., Ltd. v. Borough of State
College, slip op. at 8-9.
A permissive inference:
allows—but does not require—the trier of fact to infer
the elemental fact [i.e., sale or possession of ‘drug
paraphernalia’] from proof by the prosecutor of the
basic one [i.e., sale or possession of an item listed in
the Nebraska Law as a common item of ‘drug para-
phernalia’] and that places no burden of any kind on
the defendant.
County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157
(1979) (bracketed language added). Accord, Hammontree
v. Phelps, 605 F.2d 1371, 1374-75 (5th Cir. 1979).
Footnote continued—
Unlike the law upheld in Screws, implication of an intent ele-
ment into the Nebraska Law, even as revised by the Eighth
Circuit, fails to cure its fatal vagueness. Contrast 18 US.C.
§ 52, which made it a crime to willfully violate a definite feccral
right, with the Nebraska Law, which makes it a crime to in-
tentionally sell an otherwise innocent item. The former provides
law enforcement personnel, judges and juries with guidelines
to recognize a statutory violation (i.e., violation of a definite federal]
right), while the latter does not (i.e., sale of any item). There-
fore, the substantial revision by the Eighth Circuit, even were it
within its powers, fails to cure the Nebraska Law of its constitu-
tional defects. Accord, Lazy, J., Ltd. v. Borough of State College,
No. 80-1167, slip op. at 7-8 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 1981).
26. Nebraska Law Section 2 (App. at A55-56).
22
A permissive inference violates due process unless it
can be said with “substantial assurance that the presumed
fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact
on which it is made to depend.” 442 US. at 165-66 & n.28.
See also Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 842, 843
(1973); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 33 (1969); Mc-
Inerney v. Berman, 473 F. Supp. 187, 188 (D. Mass. 1979),
aff'd, 621 F.2d 20 (ist Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 201
(1980).
The listing of circumstantial factors in the Nebraska
law creates permissive inferences in violation of due
process:
The factors include the proximity in time and
space to a direct violation of the drug laws or to the
presence of controlled substances, the statements of
others, and the advertising of others. Thus, a re-
tailer, for example, to avoid arrest, prosecution, or
conviction, must continuously police the national
and local media and the activities and statements
of persons in the area of his store. The retailer
could be safe from arrest on Monday morning when no
one congregated near his store or the local narcotics
dealer was on the other side of town, yet be very sus-
ceptible to arrest Monday afternoon when, unknown
to the retailer, the narcotics dealer arrived around the
corner from his store, attracting a group of persons
who bought marijuana or other controlled substances
and then came into his retail store to buy rolling papers,
alligator clips, or pipes. In short, the ordinances permit
events beyond the control of the retail owner to de-
termine his guilt.... It is well established that guilt
must be based on personal action, statements, or
knowledge, not on association with other persons
suspected of criminal conduct. Sawyer v. Sandstrom,
615 F.2d 211, 316-17 (5th Cir. 1980).
23
Record Revolution, 638 F.2d at 933 (footnote omitted.)*’
The Nebraska Law also permits, for example, the guilt of
a vendor to be inferred from proof that a high percentage
of the vendor’s sales are pipes or alligator clips* or from
proof that the vendor had been convicted many years
earlier of possession of marijuana.” Moreover, the Ne-
braska Law permits a vendor to be arrested if not deemed
by law enforcement officers to be a “legitimate” business.*°
It cannot be said with substantial assurance that a
vendor is selling items which will be used with controlled
substances merely from proof of the various factors dis-
cussed above. Therefore, it is clear that the permissive in-
ferences created by the list of circumstantial factors in the
Nebraska Law violate due process standards. The Eighth
Circuit erred™ in holding otherwise.**
27. Find that Ohio law incorporates principles of due
process, the S Circuit declined to hold the list of circumstantial
factors violative of the federal constitution. 638 F.2d at 933-34.
28. Nebraska Law Section 2(12) (App. at A56).
29. Nebraska Law Section 2(2) (App. at A55).
30. Nebraska Law Section 2(11) (App. at A56).
31. The th Circuit misconceives the “prosecutorial
scheme” of the Nebraska Law, stating that, “If third party ac-
tions as referred to in Section 2, tend to indicate that an item is
to the nt phernalia, the focus of inquiry must necessarily shift
intent of the individual involved.” App. at Al5. How-
the language of the Nebraska Law clearly states that it is
the gy other bie : x i ~ 4 i.
w an object " parapher-
” i.e., used, intended for use, or designed for use in drug-
related activity. App. at A55-56. (Emphasis supplied) There
is no shift, or two-tiered intent determination in the Nebraska
Pret which the Eighth Circuit found necessary to convict the
32. The Nebraska Law lists in Section 1(4)(a =), 5 items
deemed to be “common forms of paraphe cord
Revolution, 638 F.2d at 932. Accord, App. at Al3 n.10. That list-
ing also creates permissive inferences in violation of due process
standards allowing law enforcement officers, judges and
juries to ny from possession, sale or manufacture of an
item listed
(Continued on following page)
24
D. The Eighth Circuit Erred in Not Finding the
Nebraska Law an Unreasonable Regulation
Calculated to Stifle and Interfere With Legiti-
mate Commercial Relations in Violation of
Constitutional Due Process.
The Eighth Circuit erred in failing to find the Nebraska
Law to be an unreasonable regulation calculated to destroy
the Merchants’ businesses in violation of the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Pierce v. So-
ciety of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535-36 (1924); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1922).
This Court has recently reemphasized that a state may
not enact arbitrary or unreasonable laws simply because
the activities aimed at involve “mundane commercial trans-
action[s].” Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 364
(1977). See also Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Con-
sumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976); and Bigelow v. Vir-
ginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
However, legitimate the state’s alleged purpose in reg-
ulating private activity—use of controlled substances here
—that purpose cannot reasonably be achieved by sup-
pressing the sale of neutral items of commerce. Constitu-
tional concepts of “liberty” and “property” are not so nar-
row™ that the state may destroy a legitimate business,
Footnote continued—
Because there are no design characteristics of objects which
distinguish objects intended for lawful use from objects intended
for unlawful use, “the object by itself does not provide any basis
for an inference of its intended use.” Record Revolution, 638 F.2d
at 933. Therefore, the permissive inferences created b ~ 4. in
the Nebraska Law common forms of “drug paraphernalia” clearly
violate due process. See County Court of Ulster County, supra.
33. As this Court found, in Moore v. City of East Cleveland:
“Due process has not been reduced to any formula; -
content cannot be determined by reference to any code. .
(Continued on following page)
25
Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535-36, or impose a complete disability
to pursue an occupation. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 573-74 (1972); accord, Keyishian v. Board of
Regents of New York, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
Under the Nebraska Law, since innocent items become
“drug paraphernalia” only if an illicit intent is attached
to the item, there is nothing that distinguishes a sale of
drug paraphernalia from a sale of any other merchandise
except an element wholly in the mind of the buyer or
seller. District Court Op. at 7-8, 10,14. The police officer’s
speculation about this incorporeal element—unaided by any
objective factor consistent with guilt—will determine
whether a shop owner’s business is padlocked,* and the
owner is hauled before a magistrate.
To be safe from the ruin of their businesses and their
own incarceration, the Merchants would simply have to
Footnote continued—
It is a —_— continuum which, broadly speaking, includes
a freedom from all — arbitrary impositions and
purposeless restraints, .
431 U.S. 494, 538-39 (1977) citing Justice Harlan’s dissenting
opinion in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-43 (1961).
34. Section 7 of the Act contains a forfeiture penalty for
items defined as drug ~~ a which the Eighth Circuit
upheld based on Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416
S. 663 (1974). Slip. Op. at 20. Unlike the direct act of trans-
porting contraband in alero-Toledo, the Nebraska Law pro-
scribes an act which is in itself legal—sale, manufacture, delivery
or use of certain items—but which becomes illegal by virtue of
a third party’s actions.
Further, this Court in Calero-Toledo made it — clear that
seizure and forfeiture had to be “directly necessary to secure an
as governmental or general suilie interest” 416 U.S. at
678. The Nebraska Law would only indirectly accomplish Ne-
braska’s aim of stemming drug abuse, if at all. Id. Here, unlike
Calero-Toledo, there is no special need for very prompt action.
Rather, the Merchant’s inventory is merely sitting on shelves
awaiting purchase. Finally, this Court insisted there must be
clear standards under a narrowly drawn statute, id., which the
Nebraska Law simply does not provide.
shut down. By confronting the Merchants with these con-
sequences, the Nebraska Law exceeds permissible bounds
for regulating private activity and chills the legitimate rela-
tionship of merchant and customer. This Nebraska Law
which mandates an unreasonable and arbitrary inhibition
on neutral activity violates constitutional due process.
E. The Eighth Circuit Erred in Failing to Hold
That the Nebraska Law Impermissibly Pen-
alizes Speech Protected by the First Amend-
ment to the Constitution.
The Nebraska Law prohibits advertising which pro-
motes, in whole or in part, the use or sale of “drug para-
phernalia.”* The Eighth Circuit erred in holding that the
bar on advertising withstands constitutional challenge
under the First Amendment.”
The applicable analysis was set forth by this Court in
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n
of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980):
In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part an-
alysis has developed. At the outset, we must determine
whether the expression is protected by the First
Amendment. For commercial speech to come within
that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity
and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the as-
serted governmental interest is substantial. If both
inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine
whether the regulation directly advances the govern-
mental interest asserted, and whether it is not more
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.
35. Nebraska Law Section 6 (App. at A57).
36. For the reasons discussed above, the prohibition on ad-
vertising is also and overbroad for its use of the term “drug
ay ae and the “reasonably should know” criterion. See
Revolution, 638 F.2d at 937 n.32.
37. App. at A20.
27
The advertising banned by the Nebraska Law does not
concern only unlawful activity. The Sixth Circuit, an-
alyzing an identical provision in the Ohio Ordinances,
stated:
The ordinances, as now drafted, could infringe on pro-
tected speech in at least three different ways. First,
the ordinances could be enforced against advertisers or
publishers who place advertisements in printed media
that circulates in other cities as well as Parma, Lake-
wood, and North Olmsted. Second, the ordinances
could prevent the residents of these three cities from
receiving information about the availability of items,
defined by the ordinances as drug paraphernalia, in
other cities that do not prohibit the use, sale or manu-
facture of those items. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 US.
809, 824-25 (1975). Third, the ordinances use of the
words “promote in part” may allow the ban of speech
discussing the reform of drug laws or speech glorifying
the drug culture.
Record Revolution, 638 F.2d at 936-37 (citation omitted).
Therefore, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the Ohio Or-
dinances did unconstitutionally penalize protected speech.
Record Revolution, 638 F.2d at 937.
The Nebraska Law, similarly, infringes on protected
speech by flatly barring all advertisements which have as
one purpose (of many potential lawful purposes) the pro-
motion of the sale of “drug paraphernalia.” By use of the
words “promote in part,” the Nebraska Law casts a net so
widely that it places a ban on speecl: containing factual
matters of public interest.
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), which in-
volved circumstances similar to those involved herein,
struck down a Virginia statute which prohibited advertise-
ments encouraging or promoting abortions, which are com-
mercial transactions, because the advertisements there pro-
hibited contained “factual matter of clear ‘public inter-
est.’””** Since the scope of the proscription of the Nebraska
Law is not limited to advertisements with the sole purpose
of promoting commercial transactions, that law is also in-
valid under the First Amendment. Accord, Central Hudson
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n of New York,
447 U.S. at 564-65; New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964).
The ban of the Nebraska Law is also “geographically
overbroad,” reaching advertisements promoting the sale of
“drug paraphernalia” in areas beyond the geographic
boundaries of Nebraska, many of which legally permit the
sale of items which Nebraska officials might consider to be
“drug paraphernalia.” Again, the decision of this Court
in Bigelow controls the instant action:
The Virginia Legislature could not have regulated the
advertiser’s activity in New York, and obviously could
not have proscribed the activity in that state... .
Neither could Virginia prevent its residents from trav-
eling to New York to obtain those services or, as the
state conceded, . . . prosecute them for going there
421 U.S. at 822-24 (footnote omitted). The prohibition of
the Nebraska Law is as fatally broad in geographic scope
as the Virginia statute declared unconstitutional in Bigelow.
See Record Revolution, 638 F.2d at 937.°
38. 421 US. at 822.
39. The Eighth Circuit, while noting that “there may be merit
to the geographical overbreadth argument,” . at A23 n.19,
improperly refused to decide this issue, ho that proper
eee ee ee ee The Nebraska Law would
infringe not only the First Amendment rights of out-of-state
merchants, but also the rights of Nebraska “advertisers or pub-
(Continued on following page)
29
Application of the remaining factors set forth by the
Court in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Ser-
vice Comm’n of New York necessarily results in a con-
clusion that the Nebraska Law violates the First Amend-
ment right of free speech. The suppression of protected
speech worked by the Nebraska Law is more extensive
than necessary to further any legitimate interest of the
State. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 564-
66. See Record Revolution, 638 F.2d at 937. Accordingly,
the Eighth Circuit erred in upholding the constitutionality
of the prohibition on advertising in the Nebraska Law.
ing information about the availability of items, defined by the
| an law] as drug paraphernalia, in other [states] that
not prohibit the use, sale or manufacture of these items.” Id.
See, e.g. Trial Transcript 43-45, 47-49, 60, 69-73, 75, 93-95, 133,
135, 142-143, 173-176, 187, 214, 270.
The — Circuit also incorrectly held that the Merchants
failed to this issue on appeal. App. at A23 n.19. The Mer-
ment in the District Court, see, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Pre-Trial Brief at
14-17, and the District Court dealt with that issue in its opinion.
See The Casbah, Inc., District Court, App. at A45-46 & n.20. The
Merchants incorporated their prior arguments by reference into
Sey See Deo 2 See De Regardless of whether or not
sider the geographical overbreadth argument. Public policy and
oblige and allow consideration of important
w even if not fully briefed and argued below.
ongue Labs, Inc. v. Univ. of Illinois Foundation, 402
313, 320 n.6 (1971). The Nebraska Civil Liberties Union,
ch granted permission to file a brief amicus curiae by
fully briefed the geographical overbreadth
ts again raised the geographical overbreadth
in Support of the Petition for a New Hearing
the Eighth Circuit, at pages 12-13.
Merchants, some of whom conduct a multi-state business,
whom advertise, and all of whom are interested in read-
availability in other
banned in Nebraska, see, e.g., Trial
, 69-73, 75, 93-95, 133, 135, 142-43,
may properly raise the geographical over-
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CONCLUSION
The judgment of the Eighth Circuit directly conflicts
with the decisions of other courts declaring unconstitu-
tional and striking down laws, virtually identical to the
Nebraska Law, based upon the Model Drug Paraphernalia
Act. The questions presented herein are of substantial im-
portance, the resolution of which will have nationwide im-
pact. Moreover, the opinion of the Eighth Circuit is plainly
in error. For these reasons, this Court should grant the
Merchants’ Petition for Certiorari.
Respectfully submitted,
Davin C. Werner, Counsel of Record
Frep P. SCHWARTZ
Armonp D. BupIsH
Haun, Loeser, FREEDHEIM, DEAN &
WELLMAN
800 National City E. 6th Building
Cleveland, Ohio 44114
(216) 621-0150
Counsel for Petitioners
Of Counsel:
Donatp B. FIEDLER
300 Keeline Building
Omaha, Nebraska 68102
Al
APPENDIX A
Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
(Filed June 8, 1981)
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
No. 80-1925
Tue Caspan, Inc.; THe Disc Counter, INc.; AND JEFF
Ferber, D/B/A H & D Sates; Grec HASSELHORST, D/B/A
EupnoriA; Eric LisTou, D/B/A JOINT VENTURE NOVELTY
Suop, Prre Dream, Inc.; DENNIS ROBINSON,
D/B/A THE JOYNT,
Appellants,
v.
CHARLES THONE, GOVERNOR FOR THE STATE OF NEBRASKA;
Pau. Doucias, ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF
NEBRASKA; ELMER KOHMEPSHER, COLONEL IN CHARGE
OF THE NEBRASKA STATE PATROL; DonALp L. KNOWLEs,
County ATTORNEY FoR DoucLas County,
NEBRASKA
Appellees.
No. 80-2033
Tue Caspan, Inc.; THe Disc Counter, INc.; AND JEFF
Ferber, D/B/A H & D Sates; Grec HASSELHORST, D/B/A
EvupuoriA; Eric Listou, p/B/A JOINT VENTURE NOVELTY
Suop, Pree Dream, Inc.; DENNIS ROBINSON,
D/B/A THE JOYNT,
Appellees,
A2
v.
CHARLES THONE, GOVERNOR FOR THE STATE OF NEBRASKA;
Paut Doucias, ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF
NEBRASKA; ELMER KOHMEPSHER, COLONEL IN CHARGE
OF THE NEBRASKA STATE PaTROL; DonaLp L. KNOWLES,
County ATTorNEY FoR Douctas County,
NEBRASKA
Appellants.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the District of Nebraska.
Before Hentey, Circuit Judge, Bennett,* Court of Claims
Judge, and McMutu1an, Circuit Judge.
Hentey, Circuit Judge.
This action ic before the court on an appeal and cross-
appeal involving the cu..stitutionality of a recently enacted
Nebraska statute, Legislative Bill 991, 1980 Neb. Laws
(“LB 991”),’ which prohibits the use, sale and manufac-
ture of “drug paraphernalia.” Plaintiffs, appellants here,
are wholesale distributors and retail merchants. Defen-
dants, appellees here, include Charles Thone, the Governor
of Nebraska; Paul Douglas, Attorney General for the State
of Nebraska; Elmer Kohmetscher (alternately identified
as Elmer Kohmepsher) of the Nebraska State Patrol; and
Donald L. Knowles, County Attorney for Douglas County,
Nebraska.
*Marion T. Bennett, Judge, United States Court of Claims,
nn
Legislative Bill 991 was enacted April 23, 1980 and be-
ey 1980. The statute is codified at Neb.
Rev. Stat. §§ 28-101, 28-431, and 28-439 to 28-444. (Supp. 1980).
A3
The district court* sustained the constitutionality of
the statute after severing certain phrases and construing
the meaning of other language. With due respect for the
district court’s thoughtful opinion, we reverse those por-
tions of the court’s ruling severing phrases as unconsti-
tutional and hold LB 991 constitutional as against the
challenges we are called upon to consider and determine.
A. Proceedings Below.
Appellants on April 23, 1980 filed their action in dis-
trict court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief pur-
suant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 US.C. §§ 2201, 2202
on the grounds that LB 991 abridges fundamental consti-
tutional rights protected by the first, fourth, fifth and
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution.
Pursuant to an agreement of counsel, the district court
on the same date entered an order temporarily restraining
the enforcement of LB 991 pending a final determination
on the merits. On September 4, 1980 the court held a
consolidated hearing on the application for preliminary
and permanent injunctions, with the result that by lengthy
memorandum filed September 26, 1980 the court found
the statute constitutional as construed. Pursuant to this
memorandum of opinion, the court’s temporary restraining
order was dissolved. This court granted appellants’ appli-
cation for stay of judgment pending appeal.
B. LB 991.
LB 991 is based on the Model Drug Paraphernalia Act
(Model Act) drafted by the Drug Enforcement Adminis-
tration (DEA) of the United States Department of Justice.
2. The Honorable Richard E. Robinson, United States Senior
District Judge for the District of Nebraska.
A4
In a Prefatory Note to the Model Act, the DEA acknowl-
edged that the Model Act was drafted with the aim of
overcoming constitutional infirmities that have rendered
other drug paraphernalia laws subject to constitutional at-
tack.* In the present appeal, we are essentially asked to
decide whether this effort has been successful.‘
The structure of LB 991 is somewhat comnlex and
deserves summary here. Sections 1 and 2 are definitional.
In Section 1, drug paraphernalia is defined as “all equip-
ment, products, and materials of any kind which are used,
intended for use, or designed for use” in manufacturing or
ingesting controlled substances. A lengthy list of e:.amples
follows, with each example restating the requirement
that the named object be “used, intended for use, or de-
signed for use” in drug-related activities. The list of ex-
amples concludes with the catchall category of “objects
used, intended for use, or designed for use in ingesting, in-
haling, or otherwise introducing marijuana, cocaine, hashish,
or hashish oil into the human body,” followed by another
list of thirteen exemplary items such as pipes of various
types, miniature cocaine spoons, and roach clips. Although
our othe oa Fagan, 618 F.2d 26 (8th Cis, 1980), "Record Hie nd
v. ; r. : ea
Corp. v. Sachen, 498 F.Supp. 88 (E.D. Wis. 1980); Magnani v. City
of Ames, Ia., 493 F . 1003 (S.D. Ia. 1980); Music Stop, Inc. v.
City of Ferndale, 488 ‘Supp. 390 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Knoedler v.
Roxbury Township, 485 F.Supp. 990 (D. NJ. 1980); Record
Museum v. Lawrence Township, 481 F.Supp. 768 (D. N.J. 1979);
Bambu Sales, Inc. v. Gibson, 474 F.Supp. 1297 (D. N.J. 1979);
Smith v. Roark, No. 80-2110 (S.D. W.Va. May 13, 1980); Indiana
em, a Inc. v. Sendak, No. TH 75-142-C (S.D. Ind.
» 4 .
4. LB 991 tracks the Model Act while omitting those por-
ty. tft, ~~h- of
AS
the enumeration of specific items is similar to that found in
statutes which have been held unconstitutional,* LB 991
is significantly different in coupling the named items to
the mental element of intent.
Section 2 of LB 991 names fourteen factors which “a
court or other authority shall consider, in addition to all
other logically relevant factors,” in determining whether
an object is drug paraphernalia.
Section 3 defines the substantive criminal offense of
using, or possessing with intent to use, drug paraphernalia.
Section 4 defines the substantive criminal offense of
delivery, possession with intent to deliver, or manufacture
with intent to deliver drug paraphernalia, when the de-
liverer, possessor or manufacturer knows or ressonably
should know that the drug paraphernalia will be used with
controlled substances.
Section 5 makes delivery of drug paraphernalia to a
minor a special offense.
Section 6 makes criminal the placing of any written
advertisement when one knows or reasonably should know
that the purpose of the advertisement is to promote the
sale of objects designed or intended for use as drug para-
phernalia.
Finally, LB 991 contains a civil forfeiture section and
a severability section.
The district court, in an as-yet unpublished opinion,
The Casbah, Inc. v. Thone, Civ. No. 80-0-271 (D. Neb. Sept.
26, 1980), held the statute to be constitutional after severing
statutes in Geiger v. City , supra, 618 F.2d at 28-29;
supra, 488 F.Supp. at 391;
Record Museum v. Sit of Ferndale, supra, supra, 481 F.Supp. at 771;
Smith v. Roark, supra, slip op. at 4-5.
A6
subsection (11) of Section 2, which requires courts and law
enforcement officials to consider whether a person is a
“legitimate supplier” of like items. Also severed as uncon-
stitutionally vague was the provision in Sections 4 and 6
for prosecution where the defendant “reasonably should
know” the effects of his actions.
C. Issues on Appeal.
Appellants raise four issues on appeal. First, they con-
tend that the district court erved in failing to review the
Nebraska statute under a strict scrutiny standard of re-
view. Second, they contend that the district court usurped
the legislature’s function by substantially rewriting the
statute. Appellants’ third contention is that the statute
as written is impermissibly vague and overbroad. Finally,
appellants contend that the district court erred in finding
that the statute does not violate fourth amendment rights
The Nebraska Civil Liberties Union appears as amicus
curiae for the limited purpose of arguing that Sections 6 and
7 of the statute, pertaining to advertising and civil for-
feiture of written materials, offend the first amendment.
Appellees by cross-appeal allege that the district court
erred in holding the “legitimate supplier” provision of Sec-
tion 2(11) unconstitutionally vague, and in holding the
“reasonably should know” standard in Sections 4 and 6 un-
constitutionally vague.
We have jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291. The parties have raised no challenge on
jurisdictional grounds and have not asked us to abstain.*
Hunt v. Roth, No. 80-2067 (8th Cir. May 13, 1981).
6. We Save considered, however, whether the branch of ab-
stention dum ine elaborated in Railroad Commission v. Pullman
Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), requires abstention. We conclude that
(Continued on following page)
AT
D. Standard of Review.
In dealing with the merits of appellants’ constitutional
challenge, we have considered the standard of review to
be applied. Appellants contend that a standard of strict
scrutiny applies because LB 991 implicates first amendment
rights and “a right to privacy under the fourth amend-
ment.”
We omit for the moment the matter of first amend-
ment rights, reserving this issue for Section V, infra.
Appellants’ argument regarding the right to privacy is
wholly without merit. It is true that the fourth amend-
ment embraces the right to be free from unreasonable
governmental intrusions into traditionally private areas,
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980); United States
Footnote continued—
it does not. See generally Coley v. Clinton, 635 F.2d 1364, 1373
ro” 1980), and George v. Parratt, 602 F.2d 818 (8th Cir.
questions presen
state court in tions. Record Revolution No. 6, Inc. v
of 638 F.2d 916, 925-26 (6th Cir. 1980), vacated cond
49 U.S.L.W. 3882 (U.S. May 26, 1981 Pus 80-1507);
Mid-Atlantic Accessories Trade tion v. 4 500 F.Supp.
834, 841 (D. Md. 1980), cf. High OV Times, Inc. v. Busbee, 621 F.2d
135, 141 (Sth Cir. 1980) (district court held to have abused its
Kye By decision in challenge to
similar to Model Act); Head Inc. v. Olson, 416 FSupp. 368
(D. N.D. 1979 Pee oe Sore & challenge to statute
similar to Act). We concur in the reasoning of these cases,
Moreover, since this is not a case which raises difficult or
obscure state law questions, the second factor cited in Pullman
as supportive of abstention is absent here. Id. at 499. Abstention
A8
v. Houle, 603 F.2d 1297, 1300-01 (8th Cir. 1979) (and cita-
tions therein). Here, however, for reasons indicated in
Section IV, infra, neither fourth amendment rights nor
privacy rights are implicated in LB 991. LB 991 on its
face creates no classifications and applies equally to every-
one. Where no suspect classifications are involved and
no fundamental rights, the question under equal protection
analysis is whether the legislation is reasonably related
to a legitimate state purpose. Massachusetts Board of
Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976); Mid-
Atlantic Accessories Trade Association v. Maryland, supra,
500 F.Supp. at 849. Similarly, we apply here the rational
basis standard of review.
Two considerations are basic to our decision on the
merits. The first is our belief that we are empowered
to articulate the meaning of the drug paraphernalia statute
in a manner which supports a finding of constitutionality.
The second is our conclusion that the element of intent
saves the Nebraska statute from unconstitutional vague-
ness. On each matter, after careful consideration, we
reach a different conclusion from that of the Sixth Circuit,
the only other Court of Appeals to have considered the
Model Act. Record Revolution No. 6, Inc. v. City of Parma,
supra, 638 F.2d 916.
Appellants’ first contention is that the district court
exceeded its authority in construing and severing the
Nebraska statute so as to render it constitutional.
We recognize that a federal court must take a state
statute as written and cannot find the statute constitu
tional by remedying the defects which render it imprecise.
Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 622 (1976). See
also Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974); Gooding
Ag
v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520 (1972). Only the state courts
may authoritatively construe state legislation. Id.; United
States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369
(1971). We are not prevented, however, from “extrap-
olat[ing] allowable meaning.” Grayned v. City of Rock-
ford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972). Obviously, a federal court
must determine what a state statute means before judging
its facial constitutionality. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413
US. 601, 618 n. 16 (1973).
Viewing LB 991 as a whole and construing its facial
terms within the limits of our judicial powers, we conclude
that the statute is constitutional. But see Record Revolu-
tion No. 6, Inc. v. City of Parma, supra, 638 F.2d at 927
(Sixth Circuit opinion is shaped by the court’s “lack of
power to put a limiting construction on the municipal
ordinances.”). We conclude that the language of the Model
Act supports a saving construction which we are empow-
ered to articulate, cf. Florida Businessmen for Free Enter-
prise v. Florida, 499 F.Supp. 346, 352 (N.D. Fla. 1980)
(statute offered no language to support judicial restruc-
turing) and we are obliged to favor an interpretation which
renders the statute constitutional. United States v. Vuitch,
402 U.S. 62 (1971); Turchick v. United States, 561 F.2d
719, 723-24 (8th Cir. 1977); Tollett v. United States, 485
F.2d 1087, 1098 (8th Cir. 1973).
The heart of appellants’ case is the contention that
LB 991 is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, in viola-
tion of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The issues of vagueness and overbreadth have been exten-
sively discussed in nearly every case involving the Model
Act. For this reason, our discussion is abbreviated. We
rely upon the reasoning of those courts which have con-
Ald
cluded that the Act survives these constitutional chal-
lenges.’
We turn first to the issue of vagueness. As this court
recognized in Geiger v. City of Eagan, supra, 618 F.2d at
28, due process has two requirements: that laws provide
notice to the ordinary person of what is prohibited and
that they provide standards to law enforcement officials
to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.’ Ap-
7. Cases holding the Model Act or a modified version of the
Model Act not vague or overbroad include Tobacco Accessories
& Novelty Craftsmen Merchants Ass’n v. Treen, 501 F.Supp. 168
= La. yt Mid-Atlantic Accessories Trade Ass'n v. Md.,
500 F.Su 834; Delaware Accessories Trade Ass’n v.
Gebe , 497 ‘F Supp. 289 (D. Del. 1980); World Imports, Inc. v.
Woodbridge Township, 493 F.Supp. 428 (D. N.J. 1980); New Eng-
land Accessories Trade Association, Inc. v. City of Nashua, Civ.
No. 80-530-D (D. N.H. Dec. 8 1980); Florida Businessmen for
Free Enterprise v. City of Hollywood, No. 80-6157-Civ-HCR (S.D.
Fla. Aug. 29, 1980).
Cf. cases upholding legislation based on the Model Act after
severing thought to be impermissibly vague or over-
broad. Businessmen for Free Enterprise v. Fla., supra,
499 F.Supp. 346 (offense of possession, without mens rea of in-
tent, severed as unconstitutional); New England Accessories Trade
Ass’n v. Browne, 502 F.Supp. 1245 (D. Conn. 1980) (“reasonably
should know” standard severed).
But see cases holding that particular phrases in the Model
Act are im i> waeen, Gnd Geet ths entive inoidation fs
infected pA. = vague portions. Record rhe ag og No. 6, Inc. v.
p F.2d 916; Jon 50 v. Borough of
81-0027- Civil (D. N.Mex. March 23, A (modified version
of Model ); Weiler v. Ca er, 507 F.Supp. 837 (D. N.Mex.
1981); Brache v. oe eS estchester, 507 F.Supp. 566 (S.D.
Ps 1981) (modified of Model Act); Indiana Chapter,
N.O.R.M.L. v. Sendak, supra, No. TH 75-142-C (S.D. Ind. Feb. 4,
1980) (modified version of Model Act).
8. This standard is set forth more fully in Grayned v. City
of Rockford, supra, 408 U.S. at 108-09 (footnotes omitted):
Vague laws offend several important values. First, because
we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and un-
lawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is pro-
All
pellants contend that numerous phrases in LB 991 violate
one or both of these constitutional criteria.
A. “Intended for Use.”
Appellants argue first that the definition of drug para-
phernalia in Section 1 as including “ail equipment, prod-
ucts, and materials of any kind intended for use” (emphasis
added) with controlled substances is impermissibly vague
because the statute does not specify whose intent is relevant.
The problem is characterized as one of “transferred intent,”
insofar as the intent of a second party could allegedly be
attributed to an innocent party as a basis for prosecution.
Appellants contend, for example, that the statute would
permit prosecution of an innocent seller or manufacturer
of an innocuous item such as a spoon, if the item were in-
tended by a buyer for use with controlled substances.
We cannot subscribe to this interpretation of the statu-
tory language. A fair reading of the statute as a whole
indicates that the intent referred to is that of the person
alleged to have violated the statute. What seems at first
glance to be a deficiency in draftsmanship is explained by
the fact that the definitional section is intended to draw
four categories of persons (manufacturers, wholesalers, re-
tailers and purchasers) within the reach of the legislation.
Sections 3 end 4, in defining substantive offenses, provide
Footnote continued—
hibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may
trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented,
laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply
them. A law impermissibly delegates basic policy
matters LF cemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an
ad hoc subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of
arbitrary and discriminatory application.
See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Papachristou v.
City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
Al2
clarity by linking the requirement of intent with the per-
son whose activity is forbidden:
It shall be unlawful for any person to use, or to possess
with intent to use, drug paraphernalia. [Section 3]
It shall be unlawful for any person to deliver, possess
with intent to deliver, or manufacture with intent to
deliver, drug paraphernalia. [Sectie: 4]
In sum, the Nebraska statute adequately defines the
mental state required to render an item drug paraphernalia
and refers to the intent of the person charged with viola-
tion. Accord, Record Revolution No. 6, Inc. v. City of
Parma, supra, 638 F.2d at 928 & n.14; New England Ac-
cessories Trade Association v. Browne, supra, 502 F.Supp.
at 1251; Mid-Atlantic Accessories Trade Association v.
Maryland, supra, 500 F.Supp. at 844; Delaware Accessories
Trade Association v. Gebelein, supra, 497 F.Supp. at 292-93.
B. “Designed for Use.”
Appellants renew their argument regarding trans-
ferred intent in contending that paraphernalia cannot con-
stitutionally be defined as items “designed for use” with
controlled substances. Again, this definition is said to be
defective in failing to specify whose design is relevant.
The same reasoning that saves the phrase “intended for
use” applies to the phrase “designed for use.” There is no
9. While we find the intent requirement of the Nebraska
ordinance constitutional, we note the greater clarity of an In-
diana statute approved in Nova Records, Inc. v. Sendak, 504 F.
non Dae 938, 940-41 — Ind. 1980). The ‘Indiana statute does not
= a ‘laundry list of objects which, coupled with the requisite
tent, constitute drug ernalia. Id. at 944. Rather, the
statute utilizes specific intent only in defining the statutory of-
fenses. The offenses of manufacture or design, delivery, and
possession are each separately defined, along with the intent
relevant to each.
Al3
basis for holding that the legislation escapes vagueness
with respect to “intended for use” but fails with “designed
for use.” Mid-Atlantic Accessories Trade Association v.
Maryland, supra, 500 F.Supp. at 845; Brache v. County of
Westchester, supra, 507 F.Supp. at 577; but see Record
Revolution No. 6, Inc. v. City of Parma, supra, 638 F.2d at
930.
Appellants also argue that the word “designed” refers
to the physical attributes of an object rather than to the
‘ntent of the person charged with violation. The Sixth
Circuit in Record Revolution No. 6, Inc. v. City of Parma,
supra, 638 F.2d at 930-31, found this argument persuasive,
and held that drug paraphernalia could not be adequately
defined in terms of unique design characteristics.
We cannot agree that the term “designed” refers to the
structure of an object. The comments to the Model Act
expressly indicate the contrary, specifying that items are -
innocent until coupled with the intentional act of design.
Accord, New England Accessories Trade Association, Inc.
v. Browne, supra, 502 F.Supp. at 1251; Mid-Atlantic Ac-
cessories Trade Association v. Maryland, supra, 500 F.Supp.
at 844-45; Delaware Accessories Trade Association v. Ge-
belein, supra, 497 F.Supp. at 291-92.
C. Exemplary Drug Paraphernalia.
Appellants also assert that the list of items exemplary
of drug paraphernalia in Section 1” is vague and over-
broad because it includes numerous innocent items, such
as a diabetic’s syringe and lactose used in infant formula.
10. We conclude, for reasons amply spelled out oy the Sixth
Circuit in Record Revolution No. 6, Inc. v. City of Parma, su
638 F.2d at 932, that the listed items are exemplary only and
are not irrebuttably presumed to be drug paraphernalia.
Al4
We find no flaw in the list of exemplary items because
no item is drug paraphernalia absent the requisite intent
to use it with controlled substances. Cf. Record Museum
v. Lawrence Township, supra, 481 F.Supp. 768 (list of
paraphernalia, absent requirement of intent, was imper-
missibly vague, as there was no provision for distinguishing
between innocent and non-innocent use). The language
of intent is expressly reiterated in the list of items in
Section 1(1)-(4).
D. Factors Relevant to Determining Drug Paraphernalia.
Appellants next attack Section 2 of the statute, which
sets forth fourteen factors that must be considered in
determining whether an object is drug paraphernalia. We
find it unnecessary to reiterate the specifics of appellants’
attack on each of the fourteen factors. Appellants con-
tend essentially (1) that the reference to “other authority”
is vague, and (2) that several of the factors would permit
conviction based on transferred intent and guilt by asso-
ciation.
There is no perceptible problem in the statutory refer-
ence to authorities other than the courts who may utilize
the list of enumerated factors in determining what is drug
paraphernalia. “Other authority” certainly refers to law
enforcement personnel. The fact that the statute attempts
to guide such personnel in their enforcement duties lessens,
rather than increases, the danger of arbitrary enforcement.
The enumerated factors themselves pose no constitu-
tional problem, and are valuable guides in determining
what items are prohibited. New England Accessories
Trade Association v. Browne, supra, 502 F.Supp. at 1251.
Admittedly, the actions of third parties are relevant in
Al5
determining what is drug parap ." However, ap-
pellants overstate the problems of transferred intent and
guilt by association by contending that third party actions
are sufficient for conviction. In fact, evidence regarding
third party actions is but one step in the prosecutorial
scheme. If third party actions as referred to in Section 2,
tend to indicate that an item is drug paraphernalia, the
focus of inquiry must necessarily shift to the intent of
the individual involved. Mid-Atlantic Accessories Trade
Association v. Maryland, supra, 500 F.Supp. at 846-47;
but see Record Revolution No. 6, Inc. v. City of Parma,
supra, 638 F.2d at 933-34 (the list of logically relevant
factors might permit conviction on the impermissible theory
of guilt by association, but for due process requirement
under Ohio law that guilt be based on personal action).
E. “Reasonably Should Know.”
The final prong of appellants’ vagueness argument in-
volves the definition of substantive offenses in Sections 4
and 6. These sections make it unlawful to deliver, possess
with intent to deliver, manufacture with intent to deliver
or advertise drug paraphernalia in circumstances where
one knows or “reasonably should know” that the items
will be used with drugs (Section 4) or that the purpose
of the advertisement is to promote the sale of drug para-
phernalia (Section 6). Appellants allege, and the district
court agreed, that the phrase “reasonably should know”
will permit conviction under an impermissibly vague negli-
gence standard, and will leave innocent sellers in the un-
11. For example, Section 2(3) poovttes that authorities shall
consider “[t]he proximity of the object to any controlled sub-
stance.” us the proximity of marijuana in the hands of smokers
outside of a store to roach clips inside the store might be con-
sidered as one factor in assessing whether the clips were intended
as ~~ by the store owner. See also Section 2(1),
ay. (6).
Al6
tenable posture of trying to divine the intentions of their
buyers.
In addressing this contention, we cannot do better than
to adopt the cogent reasoning of Judge Stapleton in Dela-
ware Accessories Trade Association v. Gebelein, supra,
which we set forth in the margin.” Essentially, Judge
Stapleton noted that a seller must already have intended
that the item be sold for drug use before his knowledge
of its use by a buyer comes into play. Accord, Mid-Atlantic
Accessories Trade Association v. Maryland, supra, 500 F.
Supp. at 845. In these circumstances, it is not constitu-
tionally improper that the seller be required to open his
eyes to the objective realities of the sale. id. As more
than one court has noted, there are many statutes which
utilize a “reasonably should know” or similar standard”
12. In the context of an alleged sale or delivery of drug
paraphernalia, the Act requires the state to prove both (1)
that the defendant intended that an item would be used for
the production or consumption of controlled substances and
also (2) that he either knew, or that he acted in a set of
circumstances from which a reasonable person would know,
need
about the purpose of the buyer based upon the surround-
ing circumstances. The dealer, on the other hand, who sells
innocuous items with the intent that they be used wi
is, in effect, put on notice by the illicit nature of his activity
that he must be careful to conform his conduct to law
sible, as plaintiffs would suggest, for guessing what is in
the mind of a buyer. The seller is safe as long
actually know the buyer’s purpose and as long as the obj
tive facts that are there for him to observe do not give fair
notice that illegal use will ensue.
497 F.Supp. at 294.
13. 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a) (2); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 1397,
1916, 2068, 2614; 18 U.S.C. §§ 491, 922, 954, 1384, 2154, 2423, 2512:
26 U.S.C. § 999; 42 U.S.C. §§ 263j, 5409; 46 U.S.C. § 1461.
Al7
and which have withstood constitutional attack. Delaware
Accessories Trade Association v. Gebelein, supra, 497 F.
Supp. at 294, citing Selzman v. United States, 268 U.S.
466 (1925); United States v. Featherston, 461 F.2d 1119
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972).™
IV
Appellants’ fourth amendment argument requires only
cursory discussion.
Appellants allege, first, that the Nebraska statute
would allow a police officer to seize an innocent item such
as a pipe without probable cause. This argument ignores
both the requirement of intent in the definition of drug
paraphernalia, and the factors in Section 2 which an officer
must consider in determining whether an object is drug
paraphernalia. There is simply nothing in LB 991 which
alters the requirement that searches and seizures be based
on probable cause. Delaware Accessories Trade Associa-
tion v. Gebelein, supra, 497 F.Supp. at 296; see also Mid-
Atlantic Accessories Trade Association v. Maryland, supra,
500 F.Supp. at 848-49.
Secondly, appellants object to the provision for civil
forfeiture of drug paraphernalia." Section 7 of LB 991
Finally, we address appellants’ overbreadth argument to
gee ctinet Gt ths ee en ene
This is merely a species of the vagueness ar t. Given the
requirement of intent, no innocent item be impermissibly
brought within the state’s control.
15. also object to certain sections of Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 1 (Supp. 1978) which predate LB 991, particularly
subsections (1)(b), (1)(d) and (2) of Section 28-431. These
subsections —~ fre seizure of “raw materials, prod-
ucts, and equipment Bh ee — yp a BL
page mag (1) (b)), and of “con eee or intended
in transporting any con’ substance” ( 1(d)).
Als
adds “drug paraphernalia” to the list of items which are
subject to civil forfeiture under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-431
(1) (Supp. 1978), as follows:
(1) The following shall be seized without war-
rant by an officer of the Division of Drug Control
or by any peace officer, and the same shall be subject
to forfeiture: ... (f) all drug paraphernalia defined
in section 1 of this act.
The basis for appellants’ objection to this provision
is somewhat unclear. Insofar as the just compensation
and due process provisions of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments may allegedly be implicated in civil for-
feiture, however, we note that forfeiture which helps to
render illegal behavior unprofitable, without prior notice
and hearing, has been approved by the Supreme Court
in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S.
663 (1974). The Supreme Court of Nebraska has also
specifically approved as constitutional the provision for
forfeiture of conveyances involved in drug traffic under
to whether the “equipment” subject to forfeiture under sub-
4.4 (1) (b) of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-431 (Supp. 1978) includes
drug as defined by 991. Arguably it does
since § males aepavate peovisien for the obvi teutaitace
Gen Gdipied ta Releed Combis v. Pulinan Ca, supra. 212
would decline to reach tu
seeeeene oy and (1)(d) and (2) of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-
Al9
the predecessor’* of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-431 (Supp. 1978).
State v. One 1968 Volkswagen, 198 Neb. 45, 251 N.W.2d
666 (1977); State v. One 1970 2-Door Sedan Rambler
(Gremlin), 191 Neb. 462, 215 N.W.2d 849 (1974). The
provision for seizure of drug paraphernalia is analogous,
and in our view, constitutional."
Vv
The final challenge ta the Nebraska statute, raised
by the Nebraska Civil Liberties Union (NCLU), is that
first amendment interests are implicated in Sections 6
and 7.
The NCLU objects to subsection (1) (e) of Section 7,
which permits the warrantless seizure of
books, records, and research, including formulas, mi-
crofilm, tapes, and data which are used, or intended
for use in violation of the provisions of this article.
The validity of this provision is open to serious ques-
tion. Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 417 (1971); Freedman
v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965). The statute does not
provide for prompt judicial review of this prior restraint
16. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-4, 135 (1943).
law enforcemen ‘ 7
( . 1978). 1p hy limit allows the forfeiture provision to
of without ty for prior
Calero- v. ~~ Co., supra, 416 U
A20
on expression, nor does it place the burden of initiating
judicial review on censoring personnel. Southeastern Pro-
motions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559-60 (1975); Blount
v. Rizzi, supra; cf. United States v. Thirty-Seven Photo-
graphs, supra, 402 U.S. 363.
We do not, however, reach these misgivings. Sub-
section (1) (e) belongs to preexisting law, Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 28-431 (Supp. 1978), and «vas not added to the Nebraska
Code by LB 991. For the reasons indicated in n.15, supra,
we decline to consider this statutory material.
First amendment objections are also raised to Section
6, which prohibits advertising that promotes, in whole or
in part, the sale of objects designed or intended for use
as drug paraphernalia. Although the issue may be close,
we conclude that this ban withstands constitutional chal-
lenge. Our conclusion is based on three considerations:
(1) the statute circumscribes only commercial speech; (2)
the speech embraced by the statute directly promotes an
illegal activity; and (3) the overbreadth doctrine does not
apply to commercial speech to the same extent as it does
to non-commercial speech.
We begin our analysis with the question whether the
statute reaches only commercial speech. Since the stat-
utory prohibition applies to “advertisement[s],” the an-
swer might appear to be self-evident. However, we pro-
ceed mindful of a lack of a clear definition of commercial
speech from the Supreme Court. See Central Hudson
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447
U.S. 557, 561, 562 (1980) (commercial speech is character-
ized alternately as “expression related solely to the eco-
nomic interests of the speaker and its audience” and
“speech proposing a commercial transaction”); but see id.
at 579 (Stevens, J., and Brennan, J. concurring) (major-
ity’s description of commercial speech is both too broad
A21
and too narrow); Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
771 n.24 (1976) (commercial speech proposes a commer-
cial transaction); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 821
(1975); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission
on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 384, 385 (1973) (speech
is not rendered commercial by mere fact that it relates
to an advertisement; critical feature is whether it pro-
poses a commercial transaction).*
Here, the Nebraska statute forbids only “advertise-
ment[s]” which promote the “sale of objects” designed
or intended for use as drug paraphernalia. The statute
facially does not reach speech which merely glorifies the
drug culture without direct invitation to purchase specific
items. Accordingly, we conclude that the statute regulates
commercial speech in its narrowest sense, that is, speech
which proposes a commercial transaction. But see Record
Revolution No. 6, Inc. v. City of Parma, supra, 638 F.2d
at 937. Such commercial speech is entitled to lesser pro-
tection than other constitutionally guaranteed expression.
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission, supra, 447 U.S. at 563 & n.5; Wickens v.
White, 536 F.2d 802, 804 (8th Cir. 1976) (per curiam);
Millstone v. O’Hanlon Reports, Inc., 528 F.2d 829, 832-33
(8th Cir. 1976).
The next step in first amendment analysis is to in-
quire whether the proscribed commercial speech involves
a lawful activity. Commercial speech which promotes an
illegal activity may be restricted without subjecting the
restriction to scrutiny under a balancing test. Central
18. See also Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amend-
ment , 74 Nw. U. L. Rev. 372, 389-90 & nn. 75-77 (1979);
Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process
and the First Amendment, 65 Va. L. Rev. 1, 14-25 (1979); Com-
ment, First Amendment Protection for Commercial Advertising:
The New Constitutional Doctrine, 44 U. Chi L. Rev. 205 (1976).
A22
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission,
supra, 447 U.S. at 563-64, 566; Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Commission on Human Rights, supra, 413 U.S.
at 388; cf. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)
(outside of commercial speech context, speech advocating
violation of the law may be proscribed only where di-
rected to inciting or producing imminent lawless action);
see also Carey v. Population Services International, 431
U.S. 678, 701 (1977) (advertisements could not be charac-
terized as inciting or producing imminent lawless action);
Comment, First Amendment Protection for Commercial
Advertising, supra, 44 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 220, 242 n.197,
243 n.203.
Here, advertising promoting the sale of drug parapher-
nalia encourages activities which are otherwise crimes
under Nebraska law. Such speech is analogous to adver-
tisements promoting the sale of narcotics or soliciting
prostitution, and may constitutionally be prohibited. Pitts-
burgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Rela-
tions, supra, 413 U.S. at 388. It would be illogical to
permit Nebraska to prohibit the sale and possession of
drug paraphernalia while not allowing the state to regulate
advertising which encourages these same crimes.
We acknowledge some difficulty in upholding the
phrase “in part,” which in Section 6 prohibits advertise-
ments that only “in part” have the purpose of promoting
the sale of drug paraphernalia. Arguably, this statutory
language reaches into the protected area of advertising
concerning lawful activity.
We are obliged, however, to presume a legislative
intent to act within constitutional bounds. Turchick v.
United States, supra, 561 F.2d at 723-24. Accordingly,
we conclude that where drug paraphernalia is advertised
along with innocent items, obviously the statute must
forbid only that part of the advertisement relating to drug
A23
paraphernalia. The remainder of the advertisement is not
condemned.”
In sum, we affirm in part and reverse in part the
judgment of the district court. As indicated, we hold
Attest:
CLERK, U. S. CCURT OF APPEALS,
EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
not decide whether the Nebraska statute is infirm
of “geographical overbreadth,” that is, on the
While there may be merit to the geographica’ overbreadth
see Record Revolution No. 6, Inc. v. Cy of Parma,
pont Tay F.2%. at 937, this
the interests of out-of-state merchants. The interests
a
8
-
é
5
3
s
overbreadth doctrine, construed as a standing,
v. United States, supra, 561 F.2d at 722, can be extended so far.
The Court has specifically
1 was but before it could be published, the Tenth
A24
APPENDIX B
Memorandum Opinion of the United States
District Court
(Filed September 26, 1980)
Civil No. 80-0-271
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
For THE District or NEBRASKA
THE CASBAH, INC.; THE DISCO-COUNTER, INC.;
JEFFREY FERBER, d/b/a H.&D. SALES; GREGORY
HASSELHORST, d/b/a EUPHORIA; ERIC LISTOU,
d/b/a JOINT VENTURE NOVELTY SHOP; PIPE
DREAM, INC.; and DENNIS ROBINSON,
d/b/a THE JOYNT,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
CHARLES THONE, Governor of the State of Nebraska;
PAUL DOUGLAS, Attorney General for the State of
Nebraska; ELMER KOHMEPSHER, Colonel in Charge of
the Nebraska State Patrol; and DONALD L. KNOWLES,
County Attorney for Douglas County, Nebraska.
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM
Rosrnson, Senior Judge.
In this action, the plaintiffs challenge the constitu-
tionality of L.B.991, a Nebraska statute regulating the
use, distribution and advertisement of “drug parapher-
nalia.” In their verified complaint, the plaintiffs seek
declaratory and injunctive relief. The Court has juris-
A25
diction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, 2201 and 2202.
This Memorandum constitutes the Court’s findings of fact
and conclusions of law.
On April 23, 1980 this Court, pursuant to an agree-
ment of counsel, entered an Order [Filing #6] temporarily
restraining the enforcement of L.B.991 pending a final
determination on the merits. Commencing on Septem-
ber 4, 1980, plaintiffs’ application for a preliminary and
permanent injunction was tried to the Court. See Rule
65(a) (2) Fed.R.Civ.Pro. For the reasons setout below,
the Court finds that L.B.991 is constitutional as it is
construed in this Memorandum.
The plaintiffs in this action are wholesale distributors
and retail merchants who sell various gifts and novelty
items including what are euphemistically referred to as
accessories.? The defendants include Charles Thone, the
Governor for Nebraska, Elmer Kohmepsher, of the Ne-
braska State Patrol, Paul Douglas, the Nebraska Attorney
General, and Donald Knowles, the Douglas County At-
torney.
L.B.991 was passed by the Nebraska Unicameral on
April 18, 1980 and signed into law five days later by Gov-
ernor Thone. The Bill amends various sections of the
Nebraska Criminal Code*® and provides in pertinent part
as follows:
Section 1. As used in this act, unless the context
otherwise requires, drug paraphernalia shall mean all
equipment, products, and materials of any kind which
are used, intended for use, or designed for use, in man-
ufacturing, injecting, ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise
introducing into the human body a controlled sub-
stance in violation of this act or the Uniform Con-
A26
trolled Substances Act. It shall include, but not be
limited to, the following:
(1) Diluents and adulterants, such as qui-
nine hydrochloride, mannitol, mannite, dextrose,
and lactose, used, intended for use, or designed for
use in cutting controlled substances;
(2) Separating gins and sifters used, in-
tended for use, or designed for use in removing
twigs and seeds from, or in otherwise cleaning or
refining marijuana;
(3) Hypodermic syringes, needles, and other
objects used, intended for use, and designed for
use in parenterally injecting controlled substances
into the human body; and
(4) Objects used, intended for use, or de-
signed for use in ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise
introducing marijuana, cocaine, hashish, or hashish
oil into the human body, which shall include but
not be limited to the following:
(a) Metal, wooden, acrylic, glass, stone,
plastic, or ceramic pipes with or without
screens, permanent screens, hashish heads, or
punctured metal bowls;
(b) Water pipes;
(c) Carburetion tubes and devices;
(d) Smoking and carburetion masks;
(e) Roach clips, meaning objects used
to hold burning ‘material, such as a mari-
juana cigarette, which has become too small
or too short to be held in the hand;
A27
(f) Miniature cocaine spoons, and co-
caine vials;
(g) Chamber pipes;
(h) Carburetor pipes;
(i) Electric pipes;
(j) Air-driven pipes;
(k) Chillums;
(1) Bongs; and
(m) Ice pipes or chillers.
Section 2. In determining whether an object is
drug paraphernalia, a court or other authority shall
consider, in addition to all other logically relevant
factors, the following:
(1) Statements by an owner or by anyone
in control of the object concerning its use;
(2) Prior convictions, if any, of an owner,
or of anyone in control of the object, under any
state or federal law relating to any controlled sub-
stance;
(3) The proximity of the object, in time and
space, to a direct violation of this act;
(4) The proximity of the object to any con-
trolled substance;
(5) The existence of any residue of a con-
trolled substance on the object;
(6) Direct or circumstantial evidence of the
intent of an owner, or of anyone in control of the
object, to deliver it to any person whom he or she
knows, or should reasonably know, intends to use
A28
the object to facilitate a violation of this act. The
innocence of an owner, or of anyone in control of
the object, as to a direct violation of this act shall
not prevent a finding that the object is intended
for use, or designed for use as drug paraphernalia;
(7) Instructions, oral or written, provided
with the object concerning its use;
(8) Descriptive materials accompanying the
object which explain or depict its use;
(9) National and local advertising concern-
ing its use;
(10) The manner in which the object is dis-
played for sale;
(11) Whether the owner, or anyone in con-
trol of the object, is a legitimate supplier of like
or related items to the community, such as a li-
censed distributor or dealer of tobacco products;
(12) Direct or circumstantial evidence of
the ratio of sales of the object or objects to the
total sales of the business enterprise;
(13) The existence and scope of any legiti-
mate use for the object in the community; and
(14) Expert testimony concerning its use.
Section 3. (1) It shall be unlawful for any per-
son to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug para-
phernalia to manufacture, inject, ingest, inhale, or
otherwise introduce into the human body a controlled
substance in violation of this act.
(2) Any person who violates this section shall
be guilty of an infraction.
*
A29
Section 4. (1) It shall be unlawful for any per-
son to deliver, possess, with intent to deliver, or manu-
facture with intent to deliver, drug paraphernalia,
knowing, or under circumstances where one reason-
ably should know, that it will be used to manufacture,
inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise be used to introduce
into the human body a controlled substance in viola-
tion of this act.
(2) Any person who violates this section shall be
guilty of a Class II misdemeanor.
Section 5. Any person eighteen years of age or
older who violates section 4 of this act by delivering
drug paraphernalia to a person under eighteen years
of age who is at least three years his or her junior shall
be guilty of a Class I misdemeanor.
Section 6. (1) It shall be unlawful for any per-
son to place in any newspaper, magazine, handbill, or
other publication any advertisement, knowing, or under
circumstances where one reasonably should know, that
the purpose of the advertisement, in whole or in part,
is to promote the sale of objects designed or intended
for use as drug paraphernalia.
(2) Any person who violates this section shall be
guilty of a Class III misdemeanor.
Section 7 of L.B.991 amends § 28-431 of the Ne-
braska Revised Statutes in that it adds drug parapher-
nalia to the list of items subject to civil forfeiture.
The relevant portion of Section 7 provides:
That section 28-431, . . . be amended to read as
follows: 28-431. (1) The following shall be
seized without a warrant by an officer of the Di-
vision of Drug Control or by any peace officer,
and the same shall be subject to forfeiture:
A30
(a) All controlled substances which have been
manufactured, distributed, dispensed, acquired, or
possessed in violation of the provisions of this
article; ... (f) all drug paraphernalia defined in
section 1 of this act.
Section 10 of L.B.991 is a severability provision:
If any section in this act or any part of any sec-
tion shall be declared invalid or unconstitutional,
such declaration shall not affect the validity or
constitutionality of the remaining portions thereof.
L.B.991 is similar to legislation passed in other juris-
dictions aimed at regulating or prohibiting the sale of
items used to ingest controlled substances.‘ Without ex-
ception, these laws are intended to aid in the struggle
against drug abuse, particularly among young people.’ Tes-
timony concerning the extent of the drug problem was
presented at the public hearings on LB.991. An
adolescent psychiatrist employed by the Nebraska Psychi-
atric Institute testified that “as many as one out of nine
of our high school students are using [marijuana] daily.’
He pointed out that there are severe emotional and phys-
ical ailments associated with chronic marijuana use. Ob-
serving that certain devices used to smoke marijuana make
it possible to bring concentrated marijuana smoke into
the body, the psychiatrist noted that daily marijuana use
with these devices was extremely damaging to the lungs
and promoted respiratory ailments including bronchitus,
emphysema and cancer.’
There is no doubt that the State of Nebraska .a pro-
tecting the health and welfare of its citizens may legiti-
mately enact legislation intended to curtail illicit drug
use. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 664 (1962).
If it is properly drawn, legislation dealing with the acute
A31
problem of drug abuse may prohibit the sale of “drug
related devices.” Geiger v. City of Egan, 618 F.2d 26,
28 (8th Cir.1980).
Despite its laudable purpose, legislation banning drug
paraphernalia must pass constitutional muster. Elsewhere,
lawmakers have rushed to pass laws banning paraphernalia
and in the process have trampled upon a host of rights
protected by the Constitution. See eg. Geiger ». City
of Egan, supra; Knoedler v. Roxbury Township, 485
F.Supp. 990 (D.N.J.1980); Magnani v. City of Ames, No.
80-229-A (S.D.Iowa 1980).
The Nebraska statute differs from the laws invalidated
in the above cases in that it is patterned after the “Model
Drug Paraphernalia Act” (hereinafter Model Act). The
Model Act was drafted by the Drug Enforcement Adminis-
tration of the United States Department of Justice and
seeks to avoid the constitutional infirmities which have
plagued other paraphernalia laws. Notwithstanding its
similarities to the Model Act, the plaintiffs assail the con-
stitutionality of L.B.991 on several fronts. They claim
that the statute places an impermissible burden on inter-
state commerce, violates the First and Fourth Amendments,
is vague and overbroad, and lacks the specific intent
required by due process.
Before considering each of plaintiffs’ contentions, it
is helpful to review the general principles which obtain
whenever it is claimed that a statute is facially unconsti-
tutional. In Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 US.
205, 216 (1975) the facial validity of a city ordinance
was challenged. There, the Court set out several principles
which are applicable here:
A32
[W]hen considering a facial challenge it is necessary
to proceed with caution and restraint, as invalidation
may result in urnecessary interferences with a state
regulatory program. ... [A] state statute should
not be deemed facially invalid unless it is not readily
subject to a narrowing construction by the state
See Sawyer v. Sandstrom, 615 F.2d 311, 315 (5th Cir.1980).
It should also be remembered that when a criminal
statute is susceptible to different interpretations, the Court
should favor an interpretation which supports constitu-
tionality. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 98 (1945);
Record Revolution No. 6, Inc. v. City of Parma, No. C80-
38 (N.D.Qhio 1980). The Supreme Court recognized over
ninety years ago that all statutes should be given a sensible
construction and judicial common sense requires that
“[g]eneral terms should be so limited in their application
as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd conse-
quence.” Church of the Holu Trinitu v. United States.
143 U.S. 457, 461 (1892). This insight is still good law
today and is particularly applicable when a court is asked
to construe a drug paraphernalia law. See The Flipside
v. Village of Hoffman, No. 78C 2114 p. 10 (N.D.I11.1980);
Levas v. Village of Antioch, No. 80C 1574 (N.D.I11.1980);
Record Revolution No. 6, Inc. v. City of Parma, supra,
at 8.
There is no question that L.B.991 seeks to dam the
swell of drug abuse by outlawing those devices which
facilitate illicit drug use.* If the statute can be interpreted
in a manner which is both consistent with this pur-
pose and faithful to the Constitution, then the Court is
bound to articulate that interpretation. Accordingly, in
considering the arguments advanced by the plaintiffs, the
A33
statute will be construed with a view toward identifying
a constitutional construction which will meet the legislative
purpose.
Ill
A. Vagueness.
It is contended that L.B.991 is unconstitutional because
it violates the due process concept of “void for vagueness.”
Simply put, a criminal statute, like L.B.991, must give
notice of what conduct the statute prohibits so that the
ordinary citizen may act accordingly. The Constitution
will not permit a statute to impose criminal sanctions
unless it first gives notice of what conduct will result
in liability. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453
(1939). In Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 194
(1972), the Court articulated the reasons for the vagueness
doctrine:
Vague laws offend several important values. First,
because we assume that man is free to steer between
lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give
the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable op-
portunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may
act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent
by not providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented,
laws must provide explicit standards for those who
apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates
basic policy matters to policemen, judges and juries
for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with
the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory
applications.
Id. at 108-09. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has
fairly summarized what due process requires in the con-
text of construing a drug paraphernalia ordinance. As
A34
the Court said in Geiger, “[d]ue process has two require-
ments: that laws provide notice to the ordinary person
of what is prohibited and that they provide standards
to law enforcement officials to prevent arbitrary and dis-
criminatory enforcement.” Supra at 28. This is the stan-
dard against which L.B.991 must be measured.’
The plaintiffs’ vagueness objections «»n be broken
down into three parts. First, the plaintiffs assert that
the definition of drug paraphernalia in section one is vague
because virtually anything can be drug paraphernalia un-
der the statute. Even a cursory reading of section one,
confirms plaintiffs’ observation. Section one of L.B.991
provides in part that “drug paraphernalia shall mean all
equipment, products, and materials of any kind which
are used, intended for use, or designed for use . . . [to
introduce] into the human body a controlled substance. . . .”
(emphasis added). In addition, plaintiffs’ evidence at trial
made tediously clear that the only limit on what can
be used to introduce a controlled substance into the body
is imagination. The evidence established that a variety
of otherwise innocent items can be used to ingest controlled
substances. For example, the plaintiffs demonstrated that
an aluminum can or a piece of fruit can be used to smoke
marijuana.” If section one did no more than outlaw
any item which might be used with illegal drugs, then
plaintiffs’ first vagueness argument would find its mark
and the statute would be fatally flawed. A statute which
simply prohibited the sale of all such items would be
unconstitutionally vague. See, Parma v. Record Revolu-
tion, Inc., supra at 8 (citing United States v. Brunnet, 53
F.2d 219 (W.D.Mo.1931). It would fail both prongs of
the due process test; it would not give notice of what
is prohibited and would invite discriminatory enforcement.
Drug paraphernalia as defined in section one of L.B.991
is any item which is used, intended for use, or designed
A35
for use in ingesting a controlled substance. This definition
is not vague because it defines drug paraphernalia with
reference to the intent of the person charged with an
offense under the statute. The inclusion of intent in the
definition of drug paraphernalia is crucial; it permits the
law to identify “innocent” objects as paraphernalia when
they are used with a controlled substance and at the same
time exculpates otherwise “suspicious” items which are
in fact used for innocent purposes." The intent require-
ment renders plaintiffs concern that “anything” can be
paraphernalia unnecessary.
The drafters of the Model Act point out that:
To insure that innocently possessed objects are not
classified as drug paraphernalia, [the definition]
makes the knowledge of criminal intent of the person
in control of an object a key element of the definition.
Needless to say, inanimate objects are neither “good”
nor “bad,” neither “lawful” nor “unlawful.” ‘nani-
mate objects do not commit crimes. But, when an
object is controlled by people who use it illegally,
or who design or adapt it for illegal use, the object
can be subject to control and the people subjected
to prosecution. [The definition] requires, therefore,
that an object be used, intended for use, or designed
for use in connection with illicit drugs before it can
be controlled as drug paraphernalia.
Model Act Comment pp. 6-7 (1979). (Emphasis added).
Intent saves the definition of drug paraphernalia from
being unconstitutionally vague. It provides notice of what
the statute prohibits—all items used, intended for use,
or designed for use with * controlled substance—and it
puts those charged with enforcing the statute on notice
that a determination of what constitutes paraphernalia
can be made only by identifying the intent of the suspect.
A36
Plaintiffs claim that the “designed for use” phrase
in the definition of drug paraphernalia is vague. They
cite an Indiana drug paraphernalia case where the judge
was troubled by the term. Indiana Normal v. Sendak, No.
TH 75-142-C p. 13 (S.D.Ind.1980). The Court finds that
the term is not vague when it is read in the context
of the entire statute. “Designed for use” in L.B.991 refers
not to the physical characteristics of an object but to
the subjective intent or plan of the person controlling
the object. The whole tenor of the statute makes clear
that any object, depending upon its use, can be drug para-
phernalia. In fact, section two of the statute sets out
fourteen factors which are to be considered in determining
if any given object is paraphernalia; those factors focus
not on the physical features of the suspected item but
on the context in which the item is found. The factors
are an aid in determining whether a person “designed”
the object as paraphernalia. The physical properties of
an item may not offer a clue about its illicit use. As
the court in Delaware Accessories Trade Assn. v. Gebelein,
No. 80-285 p. 5 (D.Del.1980) said “the statute itself indicates
that ‘designed for use’ refers not to structure but to intent.”
In short, when “designed for use” is integrated into the
statute it is not vague nor even easily susceptible to misun-
derstanding.
Plaintiffs’ second vagueness argument is more trouble-
some. It is contended that the definition of drug para-
phernalia does not indicate whose intent is relevant. This,
says the plaintiffs, makes it possible for an innocent person
to be prosecuted under the statute for the unlawful intent
of another’* See Indiana Normal v. Sendak, No. TH
75-142-C (S.D.Ind.1980). Section one of L.B.991 does not
explicitly state whose intent should be considered in de-
termining if an object is drug paraphernalia. If section
A37
one is read in isolation, plaintiffs’ argument is plausible.
However, if section one is read, as it must be, with all
of the other sections of the statute it becomes clear that
no transfer of intent is possible. Sections 3, 4, 5 and
6 of L.B.991 proscribe certain conduct vis a vis drug para-
phernalia. Generally, section 3 prohibits possession, sec-
tion 4 prohibits delivery or possession with intent to de-
liver, section 5 provides a more severe penalty for deliver-
ing drug paraphernalia to a minor, and section 6 makes
it unlawful to advertise the sale of drug paraphernalia.
An essential element of each offense is that the person
knew or reasonably should have known that the object
in question will be used to introduce a controlled substance
into the body. A common sense reading of this require-
ment makes clear that it refers to the person who is
charged with the violation. It is fundamental that to
violate a criminal statute there must be an act coupled
with the requisite criminal intent. “The existence of a
mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to,
the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence.”
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951). The
comments to the Model Act indicate that the definition
of drug paraphernalia makes reference to intent “to insure
that innocently possessed objects are not classified as drug
paraphernalia.” In light of the statute’s mens rea require-
ment and the inclusion of intent in the definition of drug
paraphernalia only an absurd construction of the statute
would trap an innocent user or purchaser because of the
guilty intent of a seller. To avoid any uncertainty, the
Court specifically finds that the intent element in the
definition of drug paraphernalia applies to the person
charged with violating the statute. Accord, Record Revolu-
tion v. City of Parma, supra at 11; Delaware Accessories
Trade Assn. v. Gebelein, No. 80-285 pp. 7-8 (D.Del.1980);
A38
Florida Businessmen For Free Enterprise v. City of Holly-
wood, No. 80-6157-Civ-NCR pp. 7-8 (S.D.Fla.1980).
Finally, plaintiffs argue that section two of L.B.991 is
unconstitutionally vague. Section two sets out fourteen
factors which must be considered in determining whether
an object is drug paraphernalia. It is claimed that the
factors are vague and therefore lawmaking is impermissi-
bly left “to the moment-to-moment judgment of the police-
man on his beat.” Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S.
111, 120 (1969) (Black, J. concurring). A vague statute
violates due process, in part, because it magnifies the po-
tential for discriminatory enforcement. Geiger v. City
of Egan, supra, at 29.
In this case, the factors which are objected to do
not encourage arbitrary enforcement. On the contrary,
they provide law enforcement officials with a valuable
guide in determining what items are prohibited by the stat-
ute. It is significant that the factors listed must be used
in identifying drug paraphernalia. The fact that enforce-
ment officials are obliged to consider the factors listed
in section two minimizes the danger that an object will er-
roneously be identified as paraphernalia. It is important
to keep in mind that under L.B.991 there are no objects
which are per se drug paraphernalia. As a result, those
charged with enforcing the law must be given adequate
notice of what circumstances bring an item under the
proscriptions of the statute.
With one exception, that notice is provided in section
two of the statute. The exception is factor (11) which
provides that in determining whether an object is drug
paraphernalia the following should be considered:
Whether the owner, or anyone in control of the object,
is a legitimate supplier of like or related items to
the community, such as a licensed distributor or dealer
of tobacco products. ... (emphasis added).
A39
This language was struck from a virtually identical law
in the Parma case supra. For the reasons given there,
the Court severs factor (11) from the statute."* In Parma,
Judge Manos said:
This portion of the Ordinance fails the second test
of vagueness; the reference to “legitimate” suppliers
creates a danger of arbitrary and discriminatory en-
forcement. Because the provisions of this Ordinance
apply to all who use, distribute or advertise even
an innocent item with the requisite intent, the term
“legitimate” supplier is imprecise and misleading. (ci-
tations omitted) (emphasis original).
Except for factor (11), section two provides just the sort
of criteria which judges, juries, and law enforcement of-
ficials need to make an objective decision in determining
if an object falls under the statute.
B. Overbreath [sic].
While the terms vagueness and overbreath are often
used together, they are distinct concepts. A statute is im-
permissibly vague when its prohibitions are not clearly
defined. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S.
385, 391 (1926). Even a clear and precise law may suffer
from overbreath if its sweep is unnecessarily broad and
it invades the area of protected freedoms. Zwickler v.
Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 250 (1967). The overbreath doctrine
generally arises in a First Amendment context because
the “First Amendment needs breathing space and statutes
attempting to restrict or burden the exercise of First
Amendment rights must be narrowly drawn and represent
a considered legislative judgment that a particular mode
of expression has to give way to other compelling needs
of society.” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612-13
(1973). See e.g. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972);
A40
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Cox v. Louisi-
ana, 379 U.S. 336 (1965).
In this case, plaintiffs’ overbreath claim is not grounded
in the contention that L.B.991 abridges First Amendment
freedoms.'® Rather, plaintiffs claim that the statute is
overbroad because “it draws in Articles whose major
uses are overwhelmingly lawful.” Plaintiffs’ Pre-trial
Brief at 38. Plaintiffs complain that the statute imper-
missibly outlaws innocent items and punishes their in-
nocent users because of the criminal intent of others.
This is nothing more than another rendition of the vague-
ness arguments previously discussed. The short answer
to plaintiffs’ overbreath objection is that no item is drug
paraphernalia per se under the statute. Only when an ob-
ject is used, intended for use, or designed for use with a
controlled substance does it become prohibited. An ex-
ample of how the statute operates is found in the comments
to the Model Act. A spoon, a hypodermic syringe, and a
length of surgical tubing all have legitimate uses in the
community. ‘“[W]hen these objects are manufactured, de-
livered and possessed in lawful commerce, they are not
considered paraphernalia. But if these same objects are
assembled and used by an addict to illegally melt heroin
and inject it into the body, they become drug parapher-
nalia.” Comments to the Model Act p. 7 (1979). L.B.991
is not overbroad because it discriminates between lawful
and prohibited objects by scrutinizing the intent of the
possessor or user.
C. Specific Intent.
The plaintiffs argue that L.B.991 violates the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it
permits a person to be convicted without a showing of
criminal intent. They point specifically to the “reason-
A4l
ably should know” standard in sections 4 and 6 of the
statute. Section 4 provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person to deliver, possess
with intent to deliver or manufacture with intent to
deliver, drug paraphernalia, knowing, or under cir-
cumstances where one reasonably should know, that
it will be used . . . to introduce [a controlled sub-
stance into the body]. (Emphasis added).
It is contended that this constructive knowledge standard
is at odds with the scienter requirement in the definition
of drug paraphernalia. Plaintiffs correctly point out that
it is inconsistent to say that intent saves the definition
of drug paraphernalia from vagueness and then permit a
person tc convicted of delivering “drug paraphernalia”
because he or she incorrectly guessed that the item would
not be used with illicit drugs. To say that before an ob-
ject can be drug paraphernalia it must be used, intended
for use, or designed for use with a controlled substance is
to say that the definition of drug paraphernalia includes an
element of general criminal intent. Faced with a nearly
identical statute a Federal Court in Ohio said:
The Court construes each of these three elements
[used, intended for use, designed for use] as implying
and requiring the existence of general criminal intent
by the defendant. Thus, the criminal defendant’s vol-
untary and intentional use of an item with illegal drugs
makes it drug paraphernalia within the meaning of
this Ordinance. ... Adding the element of general in-
tent not only narrows the scope of the ordinance, it
insures that no one will be convicted by mistake, ac-
cident or innocent reason. Parma, supra, at 11.
Under the reasonably should know standard a conviction
can be had without a showing of general criminal intent;
that is, without establishing that the defendant specifically
A42
intended to violate the statute. As a result, the reasonably
should know standard vitiates the prophylactic effect of
the scienter requirement in the definition of drug para-
phernalia. The statute cannot constitutionally take away
with one hand what it gives with another.
In finding the reasonably should know standard un-
constitutional in a Roxbury drug paraphernalia ordinance,
the Court offered a cogent example of its defect:
[T]he seller faced with the Roxbury Ordinance has to
. . . determine what the customer intends to do with
the items of purchase. Certainly in a case where the
purchaser announces his or her intention to utilize the
paraphernalia purchased for an illegal purpose, the
seller would be placed in no dilemma; however, the
question arises as to what would create a reasonably
belief in the mind of the seller in the absence of such
an unlikely announcement by the purchaser. Does
the purchaser’s age, sex, mannerisms or dress afford
to a seller reason to believe that the paraphernalia
will be used for an illegal purpose? Or should the
nature of the purchaser’s companions or the items he
or she carries be determinative? These questions in-
dicate the difficulty that a merchant, as well as a
law enforcement officer, would have, in the absence
of an admission by the purchaser, in determining what
gives rise to a reasonable belief that a purchaser in-
tends to utilize the paraphernalia for an illegal pur-
pose. An additional concern is whether it is proper
to charge an owner of a department store, or any
other store, with responsibility for a sales clerk’s de-
termination as to whether the person purchasing an
item, especially an innocuous one such as a weight
scale or a spoon, intends to utilize it for some improper
and illegal purpose.
A43
Knoedler v. Roxbury Township, 485 F.Supp. 990, 993 (D.
N.J.1980). The reasonably should know standard is un-
constitutional. It fails to give notice of what is forbidden
and it forces law enforcement personnel to guess about
when a seller has violated the statute. Therefore, the
Court severs the reasonably should know standard wher-
ever it appears in L.B.991."*
Recently, other courts have upheld the constructive
knowledge requirement in construing other laws based on
the Model Act. Delaware Trade Assn. v. Gebelein, No.
80-280 p. 11 (D.Del.1980). In Delaware Trade Assn. it is
said that “‘the seller is safe so long as he does not actually
know the buyer’s purpose and so long as the objective
facts that are there for him to observe do not give fair
notice that illegal use will ensue.” This analysis begs the
question. The issue is precisely what set of facts do give
notice of a buyer’s illicit intentions. If a man wearing
a business suit purchases a hookah” from a gift shop
saying “I'll enjoy this pipe with my friends tonight,”
should the merchant know that the pipe will be used to
ingest a controlled substance? Suppose the man en-
tered the gift shop unshaven in jeans and a t-shirt and
said the same thing. Is the merchant now on notice
that the item will be used to ingest a controlled substance?
Should the man’s age or his mannerisms change the mer-
chant’s conclusion? Obviously, it is difficult to articulate
when a merchant should reasonably know that an item he
sells will be used to ingest a controlled substance. The
reasonably should know standard simply ca”inot be justi-
fied on the theory that a merchant’s “objective” observa-
tions about his customers will keep him «ut of harms way.
The defendants point out that the reasonably should
know standard is currently found in a number of criminal
statutes at both the state and federal level."* That the
standard is pervasive does not make it constitutional in
A44
this instance. The reasonably should know standard vio-
lates due process in this case because of the unique nature
of the statute at hand. To be effective, a drug parapher-
nalia statute must regulate a myriad of items which have
a lawful purpose. Unlike other statutes, it cannot base its
proscriptions on the physical characteristics of the items
in question. Rather, regulation—to be both effective and
constitutional—must concentrate on the intent of the ac-
cused. To avoid imposing sanctions for innocent possession
or use, a statute must provide that the accused specifically
intended to violate its provisions. Where lawmakers have
attempted to draft drug paraphernalia statutes without suf-
ficiently considering the pivotal element of intent, they
have found that the laws do not survive judicial scrutiny
because they are vague and over inclusive. See e.g. Mag-
nani v. City of Ames, No. 80-229A (S.D.Iowa 1980); Record
Museum v. Lawrence Township, No. 79-3352 (D.N.J.1979) ;
Weingart v. Town of Oyster Bay, No. 79C 2932 (E.D.N.Y.
1979). The Nebraska statute is constitutional only when
specific intent is required to obtain a conviction under
its provisions.
Requiring the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that a prohibited act was done “knowingly” minimizes the
danger that a person will be convicted for an innocent act.
An act is done knowingly if it is done voluntarily and in-
tentionally, and not because of mistake or accident or in-
nocent reason. See United States v. Sirhan, 504 F.2d 818
(9th Cir.1974); Devitt & Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice
and Instructions § 14.04 (1977). The knowledge of the
use to which an object will be put may be difficult for
the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Neverthe-
less, it is precisely this rigorous requirement which saves
the statute from vagueness. See Boyce Motor Lines v.
United States,’* 342 U.S. 337 (1952).
A45
D. The First Amendment.
Section 6 of L.B.991 makes it illegal to promote the
sale of drug paraphernalia by advertising in any publica-
tion.” The plaintiffs argue that this section suppresses
the content of speech in violation of the First Amendment.
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U. S. 809 (1975) is cited for
the propusition that the state cannot restrict advertise-
ments solely because of their content. In Bigelow, the
Supreme Court overturned the conviction of a Virginia
newspaper editor for publishing an advertisement con-
taining information about abortion services available in
New York. While observing that advertising “enjoys a
degree of First Amendment protection” the Court made
clear that not all advertisements are immune from regula-
tion. “Advertising, like all public expression, may be
subject to reasonable regulation that scrves a legitimate
public interest.” Id. at 826. The advertisement was pro-
tected by the First Amendment in Bigelow because it pro-
vided factual information of a clear public interest about
activity which “pertained to constitutional interests.”
In the present case, neither of those factors are pres-
ent. An advertisement promoting the sale of drug para-
phernalia does not contain factual information in the same
sense as an advertisement describing the availability of
abortion services. There is certainly no “constitutional
interest” in the possession of drug paraphernalia. Cf. Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Hu-
man Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) is dispositive of plain-
tiffs’ First Amendment argument. There, the Court up-
held a Pennsylvania ordinance forbidding newspapers from
carrying purely commercial help wanted advertisements in
sex-designated columns. The Court noted that under the
ordinance “[dJiscrimination in employment is not only
A446
commercial activity, it is illegal commercial activity.” Id.
at 388. The fact that the commercial activity was itself
illegal was critical to the Court’s holding:
‘Any First Amendment interest which might be served
by advertising an ordinary commercial purpose and
which might arguably outweigh the governmental
interest supporting the regulation is altogether absent
when the commercial activity itself is illegal and the
restriction on advertising is incidental to a valid lim-
itation on economic activity.
Id. at 389. As in Pittsburgh Press, the commercial activity
in this case is illegal. L.B.991 makes the delivery, pos-
session and use of drug paraphernalia illegal. Clearly the
statute’s restriction on the advertisement of drug para-
phernalia is merely incidental to its proscription. It would
be strange indeed to find that the First Amendment pro-
tects the solicitation of otherwise criminal activity. The
Court in Pittsburgh Press made clear that it does not. In
short, L.B.991 can constitutionally prohibit the advertise-
ment of what it otherwise proscribes.
E. The Fourth Amendment.
Plaintiffs vigorously contend that L.B.991 violates the
Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches
and seizures. They fear that the statute permits searches
without the requisite showing of probable cause. Ac-
cording to plaintiffs, a police officer who sees one of the
items listed in section 1 could, without more, seize it.
“The real danger of the Act is that it permits searches
based upon a police officer’s sighting of any article listed
in Section 1 which items ‘sitting in the air’ are not illegal.”
Plaintiffs Post Trial Brief at 8. This argument completely
ignores both the statute’s definition of drug paraphernalia
and the fourteen factors listed in section 2 which a police
A47
officer must consider in determining if an object is drug
paraphernalia. Under the statute, no item “sitting in
the air” is paraphernalia. To determine if a particular
object is outlawed an officer is compelled by the statute to
consider the various elements set out in section 2. When
Delaware’s Model Drug Paraphernalia Act was challenged
on Fourth Amendment grounds, the Court pointed out that:
Nothing in the Act . . . dilutes the Fourth Amendment
probable cause standard and there is no reason to
believe that its application will be any more difficult
or uncertain in the context of the Act than in the
context of any of the other multitvde of statutes that
proscribe otherwise innocent cond ct when accom-
panied by the intent to commit or facilitate a crime.
Delaware Accessories Trade Assn. v. Gebelein, supra at 17.
There is simply nothing in L.B.991 which alters the require-
ment that searches and seizures must be based upon prob-
able cause.
Nor can there be any serious objection to the forfeiture
provisions set out in section 7 of the Act. That section
provides for the seizure and forfeiture of all drug para-
phernalia. Any question about the constitutionality of
civil forfeiture was laid to rest by the Supreme Court in
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663
(1974). In that case, the Court upheld the seizure and
forfeiture of a Yacht which was carrying a controlled sub-
stance. The seizure occurred without prior notice or hear-
ing and without the lessor even being aware that the lessee
was using the vessel for an unlawful purpose. The State
of Nebraska has a significant interest in preventing drug
abuse. In furtherance of that interest the State may
seize and confiscate the instrumentalities which facilitate
illicit drug use.
A48
F. The Commerce Clause.
It is contended that L.B.991 will unreasonably burden
interstate commerce in violation of the commerce clause
of the United States Constitution. Article I, Section 8,
Clause 3. The applicable law is found in Pike v. Eruce
Church, Inc. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
Although the criteria for determining the validity of
state statutes affecting interstate commerce have been
variously stated, the general rule that emerges can
be phrased as follows: Where the statute regulates
evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public in-
terest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden im-
posed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation
to the putative local benefits. If a legitimate local pur-
pose is found then the question becomes one of degree.
And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated
will of course depend on the nature of the local in-
terest involved, and on whether it could be promoted
as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.
Occasionally the Court has candidly undertaken a
balancing approach in resolving these issues. . . .
(citations omitted). Pike sets out a three tiered inquiry.
Does the statute evenhandedly serve a legitimate local pub-
lic interest; does the legislation have only an incidental
affect on interstate commerce; and, does the local public
interest justify the statute’s impact on interstate commerce.
When this test is applied to L.B.991 it is clear that
the statute does not impermissibly burden interstate com-
merce. The first part of the test is met because the state,
in providing for the welfare of its citizens, may legitimately
regulate both illicit drugs and drug related devices. Geiger,
supra. The second tier is met because the statute has only
A49
an incidental affect on interstate commerce. L.B.991 only
regulates items which the statute defines as drug para-
phernalia; namely, those items which are used, intended
for use, or designed for use with a controlled substance.
It has no affect on any item which is used in a legitimate
manner—plaintiffs concede that practically all drug para-
phernalia can be used for some legal purpose. Thus, the
definition of drug paraphernalia limits not only the reach
of the statute but its impact on interstate commerce.
Finally, the Court concludes that the public interest in cur-
tailing the now chronic probleza of drug abuse far out-
weighs the statute’s de minimis impact on interstate com-
merce. L.B.991 does not impermissibly burden commerce
between the several states.
CONCLUSION
L.B.991 may not be easy to enforce nor is it likely that
it will singlehandedly ameliorate the problem of drug
abuse. Nonetheless, as it is construed herein, the statute
does not run afoul of the Federal Constitution. This Court
does not inquire further.
Counsel for the defendants shall prepare and submit a
formal decree and judgment in accordance with this Memo-
randum and submit same to counsel for the plaintiffs for
approval as to form only. Said decree and judgment shall
be submitted to the Court on or before five (5) days of
the date hereof.
Dated this 26th day of September, 1980.
3. Neb.Rev.State. §§ 28-101 and 28-434.
4. For example, legislation similar to L.B.991 has been
enacted by Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Louisi-
ana, Mary New Jersey, New York, and South Carolina. City
ordinances to ban ban drug paraphernalia ha ~_—t, —1,
numerous communities including Overland Park, Kansas; Parma,
Ohio; Lawrenceville, New Jersey; Antioch, Illinois; and Oyster
Bay, New York.
5. peop pe te Ap ey --
oe ant Oe & paraphernalia, a Kansas district court
observed: Cy of Overland Park: in response to a serious
the promo
minors.” Cardarella v. City of Overland Park, No. 86246 p. 2
a
Hearings on L.B.991 before the Judiciary Committee of
oe. AA (March 11, 1980), at 116.
7. The devices referred to are bongs [see e.g., defendants’
exhibit 24] and “power hitters” [defendants’ exhibit C-2].
9. Sn ES Co conte Gus prom enate
should employ a “strict scrutiny” rather than a “rational basis”
test. The argument is that L.B.991 violates the fundamental rights
A51
by the First and Fourth Amendments and therefore the
protected
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A52
marijuana, as he intended to do when he made the purchase.
That intention of “A” translates the pipe into drug paraphernalia
for purposes of invoking the sanctions of this law against the
merchant. Plaintiffs’ Pre-trial Brief at 31.
13. L.B.991 specifically provides for severability:
Section 10. aay Sate Sie Dat or cap pest of ony
section shall be declared invalid or unconstitutional, such
declaration shall not affect the validity or constitutionality of
the remaining portions thereof.
There is ample authority for severing the unconstitutional section
of a statute while allowing the constitutional portion to stand.
See «e.g. Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission, 286
U.S. 210 (1932); Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286 (1924).
14. The term “legitimate” also appears in factor (13):
The existence and scope of any legitimate use for the object
in the community. .
Legitimate in this case refers not to a person, ie., a supplier,
as it did in factor (11) but to the way an object is used. Oo jects,
of course, are inately neither legitimate not illegitimate. To de-
scribe the use of an object as “legitimate” is to say nothing more
than it has a lawful use. To similarly describe a person conjures
a variety of images some of which invite discrimination.
timate” is acceptable in ‘actor (13) but not in (11) because
the statute provides sanctions against people not objects.
15. For an analysis of how L.B.991 impacts on the First
t see pages 14-16 infra.
16. See note 13 supra. The reasonably should know language
is found in sections 4 and 6 of the statute and applies by im-
plication to section 5.
17. A hookah is an ornate pipe. See plaintiffs’ exhibit 107.
18. See e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78 (dealing with the Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act); 15 U.S.C. Ar ( with toxic sub-
stances); Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-417(g) (dealing with controlled sub-
pw me Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-515(3) (dealing with tele-communi-
cations).
19. The Court noted, however, that it is not “unfair to require
that one who deliberately goes perilously close to an area of
proscribed conduct shall take the risk that he may cross the
line.” Boyce Motor Lines at 340.
20. It is possible that L.B.991 will have a chilling effect on
First Amendment freedoms. For example, there is the danger
that a publication advertising drug paraphernalia which originates
in a state where the paraphernalia is legal will be offered for sale
in Nebraska. To avoid prosecution in this state an
might well decide to forego his solicitation. It is not difficult to
imagine other circumstances where the statute might dissuade
the expression of protected speech. Nevertheless, the statute is
susceptible to a narrow interpretation by state courts and thus
should not be declared facially unconstitutional here. See Erznoz-
nik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Broadrick k
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973). Section 6 could logically be
construed as lying only to advertisements which indicate that
vaibble wn Nebraska.
A53
APPENDIX C
LB991
LEGISLATURE OF NEBRASKA
EIGHTY~SIXTH LEGISLATURE
SECOND SESSION
LEGISLATIVE BILL 991
FINAL READING
Introduced by Law Enforcement and Justice Advisory
Committee, Nichol, 48, Chmn.; Stoney, 4; Venditte, 7;
Reutzel, 15; Wagner, 41; Pirsch, 10
Read first time February 27, 1980
Rereferred to Judiciary
A BILL
FOR AN ACT to amend sections 28-101 and 28-431, Revised
Statutes Supplement, 1978, relating to drugs and nar-
cotics; to define a term; to prohibit the sale and use
of drug paraphernalia as prescribed; to provide a pen-
alty; to provide duties for the Revisor of Statutes; to
provide for severability; to repeal the original sections;
and to declare an emergency.
Be it enacted by the people of the State of Nebraska,
Section 1. As used in this act, unless the context
otherwise requires, drug paraphernalia shall mean all
equipment, products, and materials of any kind which are
used, intended for use, or designed for use, in manufactur-
ing, injecting, ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing
into the human body a controlled substance in violation of
this act or the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. It shall
include, but not be limited to, the following:
A54
(1) Diluents and adulterants, such as quinine hydro-
chloride, mannitol, mannite, dextrose, and lactose, used,
intended for use, or designed for use in cutting controlled
substances;
(2) Separation gins and sifters used, intended for
use, or designed for use in removing twigs and seeds from,
or in otherwise cleaning or refining, marijuana;
(3) Hypodermic syringes, needles, and other ob-
jects used, intended for use, and designed for use in
parenterally injecting controlled substances into the human
body; and
(4) Objects used, intended for use, or designed for
use in ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing mari-
juana, cocaine, hashish, or hashish oil into the human body,
which shall include but not be limited to the following:
(a) Metal, wooden, acrylic, glass, stone, plastic, or
ceramic pipes with or without screens, permanent screens,
hashish heads, or punctured metal bowls;
(b) Water pipes;
(c) Carburetion tubes and devices;
(d) Smoking and carburetion masks;
(d) Roach clips, meaning objects used to hold burn-
ing material, such as a marijuana cigarette, which has be-
come too small or too short to be held im the hand;
(f) Miniature cocaine spoons, and cocaiiie vials;
(g) Chamber pipes;
(h) Carburetor pipes;
(i) Electric pipes;
(j) Air-driven pipes;
(k) Chillums;
(lt) Bongs; and
(m) Ice pipes or chillers.
Sec. 2. In determining whether an object is drug
paraphernalia, a court or other authority shall consider, in
addition to all other logically relevant factors, the follow-
ing:
(1) Statements by an owner or by anyone in control
of the object concerning its use;
(2) Prior convictions, if any, of an owner, or of any-
one in control of the object, under any state or federal law
relating to any controlled substance;
(3) The proximity of the object, in time and space, to
a direct violation of this act;
(4) The proximity of the object to any controlled
substance;
(5) The existence of any residue of a controlled sub-
stance on the object;
(6) Direct or circumstantial evidence of the intent
of an owner, or of anyone in control of the object, to
deliver it to any person whom he or she knows, or should
reasonably know, intends to use the object to facilitate
a violation of this act. The innocence of an owner, or
of anyone in control of the object, as to a direct violation
of this act shall not prevent a finding that the object
is intended for use, or designed for use as drug parapher-
nalia;
(7) Instructions, oral or written, provided with the
object concerning its use;
(8) Descriptive materials accompanying the object
which explain or depict its use;
A56
(9) National and local advertising concerning its use;
(10) The manner in which the object is displayed
for sale;
(11) Whether the owner, or anyone in control of
the object, is a legitimate supplier of like or related items
to the community, such as « licensed distributor or dealer
of tobacco products;
(12) Lvrect or circumstantial evidence of the ratio
of sales of the object or objects to the total sales of the
business enterprise;
(13) The existence and scope of any legitimate use
for the object in the community; and
(14) Expert testimony concerning its use.
Sec. 3. (1) It shall be unlawful for any person to
use, or to possess with intent to use, drug paraphernalia
to manufacture, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise intro-
duce into the human body a controlled substance in viola-
tion of this act.
(2) Any person who violates this section shall be
guilty of an infraction.
Sec. 4. (1) It shall be unlawful for any person to
deliver, possess with intent to deliver, or manufacture
with intent to deliver, drug paraphernalia, knowing, or
under circumstances where one reasonably should know,
that it will be used to manufacture, inject, ingest, inhale,
or otherwise be used to introduce into the human body
a controlled substance in violation of this act.
(2) Any person who violates this section shall be
guilty of a Class II misdemeanor.
Sec. 5. Any person eighteen years of age or older
who violates section 4 of this act by delivering drug para-
A57
phernalia to a person under eighteen years of age who
is at least three years his or her junior shall be guilty
of a Class I misdemeanor.
Sec. 6. (1) It shall be unlawful for any person to
place in any newspaper, magazine, handbill, or other publi-
cation any advertisement, knowing, or under circumstances
where one reasonably should know, that the purpose of
the advertisement, in whole or in part, is to promote the
sale of objects designed or intended for use as drug para-
phernalia.
(2) Any person who violates this section shall be
guilty of a Class II
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