Record and brief — Berman Enterprises, Inc. v. Local 333, United Marine Division, International Longshoremen's Ass'n

Supreme Court brief1981

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AUG 10 198!

In THE

Supreme Court of the United a4 ten ens 3,

Ocroser Term, 1981

Berman Enrerprises Inc., Stanparp Tank Cieanrne Corp.,

and GeseraL Marine Transporr Corp.,

Petitioners,

—vs.—

Locat 333, Unrrep Marve Division, [ytrernationaL LONGSHOREMEN’S

Association, Martne Towrne anp Transportation Empvorers’ As-

sociation, McAuurrer Broruers, Inxc., Diese. VesseL Operators,

Inc., Spentonsuse Transport Service, Inc., Moranta Or TANKER

Corporation, Bovcnarp Transportation Company, Inc., Moran

Tow1ne & T'ransportatTion Company, Inc., Potrnc Transportation

Corroration, ExLor Martve Corporation, Rep Star Marre Ser-

vices, Inc., Reryaver Transportation Companies, Ixc., and Ture-

camo CoastaL & Harsor Towrne Corporation,

Respondents.

————— OO

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

a —————————————————————_

Jarep STAMELL

488 Madison Avenue

New York, New York 10022

Attorney for Petitioners

Kevin J. McGu

Curton, Bupp, Burxe & DeMaria

Of Counsel

(LL

Questions Presented

i. Does a multiemployer collective bargaining associa-

tion and union engage in an anticumpetitive combination in

violation of Sherman Act §1, 15 U.S.C. §1, that exceeds the

scope of labor’s nonstatutory exemption from the antitrust

lews by (i) agreeing to force a non-union competitor, not

a member of the association, to become a party to and abide

by the association-union labor contract as an affiliate of a

member of the association, and (ii) agreeing not to provide

certain services to the non-union competitor unless it abides

by working conditions in the assuciation-union labor con-

tract, for the stated purpose of preventing the non-union

competitor from undercutting the prices charged by asso-

ciation members?

2. Does an agreement by a multiemployer association of

competitors and a union which requires a non-union affiliate

of an association member to recognize the union and become

party to the multiemployer labor contract against its will

exceed the scope of labor’s nonstatutory exemption from

the antitrust laws because questions of union representation

must be submitted to the National Labor Relations Board

for resolution under Section 9 of the National Labor Rela-

tions Act, 29 U.S.C. §159, and cannot lawfully be resolved

through multiemployer bargaining without violating Sec-

tion 8 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 4158?

3. Is the distinction between primary and secondary

labor activity that is applicable to violations of Section

8(b) (4)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.

§158(b)(4)(B), also applicable to violations of Section

8(b)(4)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.

$158(b)(4)(A), that involve union threats to strike with

the object of forcing an employer to join a multiemployer

organization?

ii

4. Does union pressure to restrain members of a multi-

employer collective bargaining association from providing

services to a non-union company with the object of forcing

the non-union company to abide by working conditions in

the association-union labor contract, constitute secondary

labor activity in violation of Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the

National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §158(b)(4)(B),

without regard to whether or not the union’s purpose is

work preservation and maintaining union standards?

5. When the injury alleged is loss of business from an

agreement to refuse to deal in violation of antitrust and

labor law, may defendants argue to a jury that increasing

salaries received by the management of plaintiff, a closely

held business, prove that plaintiff was not injured in its

business or property within the meaning of Clayton Act

§4, 15 U.S.C. §15, and Section 303 of the Labor Management

Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. $187?

Questions Presented

Table of Authorities .......

Citation to Opinion Below

Jurisdiction

Statutory Provisions Involved ....

Statement of the Case

Reasons for Granting the Writ _.......

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. The Decision Departs From Precedent in Hold-

Il.

ITI.

ing That Sherman Act §1 Was Not Violated by

the Clauses Included in the Multiemployer Con-

tract and Insulates Abuses of Multiemployer

Bargaining Associations of Competitors From

Judicial Scrutiny

The Decision Below Conflicts With the Decision

of Other Courts of Appeal Which Hold That

Under Section 8(b)(4)(A) of the NLRA an

Employer Has an Absolute Right to Refuse to

Become Party to a Multiemployer Contract ....

Union Pressure on Neutral Employers for the

Purpose of Achieving Changes in the Work

Practices of a Primary Employer Violates Sec-

tion 8(b)(4)(B) Without Regard to “Work

Preservation” or “Union Standards” Motives ..

13

16

22

PAGE

IV. Increasing Salaries Received by Management

of a Closely Held Business Are Irrelevant to

Whether or Not a Company Is Injured in Its

Business or Property Under Clayton Act §4

and Section 303 of the LMRA

ConcLusion

ApPrENDIxX—

Opinion of Court of Appeals

Order Denying Petition for Rehearing —............... 7

Bench Opinion of District Court ....

Opinion of District Court Denying Post-Trial

Motions ;

Judgment of District Court

PR Fey

Taste or AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Amaz Coal Co. v. NLRB, 614 F.2d 872 (3d Cir. 1980),

rev'd in part, —— U.S. ——, 49 U.S.L.W. 4869 (1981) 18n

Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S.

447 (1977) 15, 24

California State Council of Carpenters v. Associated

General Contractors of California, Inc., 648 F.2d 527

A a eo eT 19n

Carey v. Westinghouse, 375 U.S. 261 (1964) 19

Connell Construction Company, Inc. v. Plumbers and

Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975) 14

PAGE

Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp.,

370 U.S. 690 (1962) 10n

Federal Maritime Commission v. Pacific Maritime As-

sociation, 435 U.S. 40 (1978) 14, 16

Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S.

203 (1964) 22

Frito-Lay v. Teamsters Local Union 137, 623 F.2d 1354

(9th Cir. 1980) 14, 20

General Marine Transport Corp. v. NLRB, 619 F.2d

180 (2d Cir. 1980) 17n

General Warehouseman and Helpers vy. Standard

Brands, 579 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,

— US. ——, 99 8S. Ct. 2420 (1979) 18

Glendale Manufacturing Co. v. Local 520, ILGWU,

283 F.2d 936 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 336 U.S.

950 (1961) 18

Local Union 189 v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965) 18

Local 7-210, Oil, Chemical € Atomic Workers v. Union

Tanker Car Co., 475 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1973), cert.

denied, 414 U.S. 875 (1973) ‘ 18

Lone Star Steel Co. v. NLRB, 639 F.2d 545 (10th Cir.

1980), cert. denied, —— U.S. ——, 101 S. Ct. 1349

(1981) 18n

NLRB v. Local 542, Operating Engineers, 532 F.2d 902

(3rd Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1072 (1977) ... 18

NLRB v. Local 825, Operating Engineers, 400 U.S. 297

EE a Me ee 15, 22

National Society of Professional Engineers v. United

States, 435 U.S. 696 (1978) ... 17

South Prairie Construction Co. v. Local 627, Operating

Engineers, 518 F.2d 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev’d.,

425 U.S. 800 (1976) 14, 18,19

Sperry Rand Corp. v. NLRB, 492 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1974)

cert, denied, 419 U.S. 831 (1976) 18

St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Barry, 438

U.S. 531 (1978) 17

Union De Tronquistas De Puerto Rico v. Arlook, 586

F.2d 872 (1st Cir. 1978) 14, 20

United Marine Division, Local 333, 226 N.L.R.B. 1214

(1976) 7, 8, 23n

United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657

(1965) 13, 14, 16

United States v. Socony-Vacuum Co., 310 U.S. 150

(1940) 17

Statutes:

Clayton Act

Section 4, 15 U.S.C. §15 ii, 3, 5, 10, 15, 24

Section 16, 15 U.S.C. §26 3, 5, 10, 24, 24n

Labor Management Relations Act

Section 303, 29 U.S.C. §187 ..................-.....li, 5, 10, 15, 24

National Labor Relations Act

Section 8(b) (4) (A), 29 U.S.C. §158(b) (4) (A) ~..i, 8, 13,

14, 15, 20, 21

Section 8(b)(4)(B), 29 U.S.C. §158(b)(4)(B) ....i, ii, 3,

5, 7, 13, 14, 15, 20, 22, 23, 23n

Section 9, 29 U.S.C. $159 ..............--ccccersressenesessesees i, 4, 18

Sherman Act

Section 1, 15 U.S.C. §1

28 U.S.C. §1254(1)

PAGE

i, 2,5, 10, 11

2

Rules:

Federal Rules of Evidence

Rule 403

In THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Ocroser Term, 1981

Berman Enrterrries Ixe., Stanparp Tank Cieanino Corp,.

and GengraL Marine Transport Corp.,

Petitioners,

—Vs.—

Locau 333, Untrep Marine Division, Internationa, Lone-

SHOREMEN’s Association, Marine Tow1nG anp TRANSPOR-

tration Empvoyers’ Association, McA.Lister Broruers,

Inc., Diesen Vesse. Operators, Inc., Spentonsusn

Transport Service, Inc., Moranta Or. Tanker Corpora-

Ton, Boucnarp Transportation Company, Inc., Moran

Towrne & Transportation Company, Ino., Potanc Trans-

PoRTATION Corporation, Extor Marine Corporation, Rep

Star Marine Services, Inc., Rernaver Transportation

Companies, Inc., and TurecamMo CoastaL & Harsor Tow-

1nG CORPORATION,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Berman Enterprises Inc., General Marine Transport

Corp. and Standard Tank Cleaning Corp. petition for a

writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit entered

February 25, 1981, and an order denying a petition for

rehearing of said judgment, containing a suggestion for

2

rehearing e.1 banc, entered May 13, 1981, that affirmed a

judgment entered October 26, 1979, and an order denying

a new trial, judgment n.o.v. and injunctive relief entered

March 4, 1980, by the United States District Court of the

Southern District of New York in favor of respondents. ~

Citation to Opinion Below

The opinion of the Court of Appeals is reported at 644

F.2d 930 and is set out in the Appendix. The order of the

Court of Appeals denying the petition for rehearing is

unreported and is set out in the Appendix. The bench

opinion of the District Court dismissing certain claims, and

the opinion of the District Court denying petitioner’s post-

trial motions, are unreported and are set out in the Ap-

pendix.

Jurisdiction

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on

February 25, 1981. Following this judgment, petitioner

filed a timely petition for rehearing containing a suggestion

for rehearing en banc. On May 13, 1981, the Court of Ap-

peals denied the petition. Jurisdiction of this Court is

invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1254(1).

Statutory Provisions Involved

This case involves the following federal statutes :

a. 15 U.S.C. §1

Every contract, combination in the form of trust or

otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or com-

aferce among the several States, or the foreign nations,

is declared to be illegal... .

b. 15 U.S.C. §15

Any person who shall be injured in his business or

property by reason of anything forbidden in the anti-

trust laws may sue therefor in any district court of

the United States in the district in which the defendant

resides or is found or has an agent, without respect

to the amount in controversy, and shall recover three-

fold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of

suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.

*

ce. 15 U.S.C. §26

Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be

entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief, in any

court of the United States having jurisdiction over the

parties, against threatened loss or damage by a viola-

tion of the antitrust laws ... when and under the same

conditions and principles as injunctive relief against

threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage is

granted by courts of equity....

d. 29 U.S.C. §158(b)(4)

(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor

organization or its agents—

(4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any

individual employed by a person engaged in commerce

or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a

strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to

use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise

handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or

commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to

threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in

commerce or im an industry affecting commerce, where

in either case an object thereof is—

4

(A) forcing or requiring any employer or self-em-

ployed person to join any labor or employer organiza-

tion or to enter into any agreement which is prohibited

by subsection (e) of this section ;

(B) forcing or -equiring any person to cease using,

selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing

in the products of any other producer, processor, or

manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other

person, or forcing or requiring any other employer to

recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the

representative of his employees unless such labor or-

ganization has been certified as the representative of

such employees under the provisions of section 159 of

this title: Provided, That nothing contained in this

clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where

not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary

picketing ;

. 29 U.S.C. §159

(a) Representatives designated or selected for the

purpose of collective bargaining by the majority of

the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes,

shall be the exclusive representatives of all the em-

ployees in such unit for the purposes of collective bar-

gaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of

employment, or other conditions of employment... .

(b) The Board shall decide in each case whether,

in order to assure to employees the fullest freedom

in exercising the rights guaranteed by this subchapter,

the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bar-

gaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant

unit, or subdivision thereof... .

f. 29 U.S.C. §187

(a) It shall be unlawful, for the purpose of this

section only, in an industry or activity affecting com-

merce, for any labor organization to engage in any

activity or conduct defined ars an unfair labor practice

in section 158(b) (4) of this title.

(b) Whoever shal] be injured in his business or

property by reason of any violation of subsection (a)

of this section may sue therefor in any district court

of the United States subject to the limitations and

provisions of section 185 of thi: title without respect

to the amount in controversy, or in any other court

having jurisdiction of the parties, and shall recover

the damage by him sustained and the cost of the suit.

Statement of the Case’

1. Nature of the Case

This petition concerns the legality of labor practices ana

collective bargaining provisions in the marine transporta-

tion service industry under Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. §1,

and Section 8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act

(“NLRA”), 29 U.S.C. §8(b)(4). The jurisdiction of the

district court was invoked under Clayton Act §§ 4 and 16,

29 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26, and Section 303(b) of the Labor Mar-

agement Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 187(b).

Petitioners, the plaintiffs below, are three affiliated com-

panies, Berman Enterprises Inc. (“Berman”), General

Marine Transport Corp. (“General Marine”), and Stan-

dard Tank Cleaning Corp. (“Standard Tank”). They allege

antitrust violations by Marine Towing and Trensportation

' The statement of the case generally follows the opinion of the

court of appeals set out m the Appendix.

6

Employers’ Association (“Association”), a multiemployer

bargaining organization, certain of the Association’s mem-

bers, and Local 333, United Marine Division, International

Longshoremen’s Association (“Union”), a union repre-

senting vessel emp!oyees. Petitioners also allege labor law

violations by the Union.

At trial, the district court, after petitioner rested, dis-

missed all elements of the antitrust claim except that por-

tion alleging a conspiracy to refuse to deal with Berman.

The jury subsequently returned verdicts against Berman

and the companies affiliated with it on the remaining anti-

trust claim and on the labor claim. The court then denied

petitioners’ request for injunctive relief. On appeal the

three affiliated companies argued that the antitrust claims

should not have been dismissed, that the court should have

directed a verdict for the appellants on the labor claim,

and that evidence concerning salaries of Berman officers

should not have been the subject of argument to the jury

that Berman was not injured by the conspiracy alleged.

The court of appeals rejected these contentions and af-

firmed.

2. Facts

Berman, Geners! Marine, and Standard Tank are all

owned by Standard Marine Services, Inc., which in turn

is owned by Evelyn Berman Frank and her brothers. Ber-

man operates tugs, barges, and harbor tankers in New York

harbor; General Marine operates two ships which dispose

of sewage sludge produced by municipal customers; and

Standard Tank operates a vessel-cleaning facility and one

tank-cleaning vessel.

General Marine was a member of the Association at the

time the dispute in question arose, but Berman and Stan-

dard Tank were not and the Union did not represent their

7

employees. The Union and the Association have three

labor contracts covering employees on tugs, barges and

self-propelled tankers, respectively. Berman, or its pre-

decessor, and the Association member corporations have

for many years been customers as well as competitiors of

one another, hiring each other’s tugs or barges from time

to time, but also competing for business from third parties.

Berman operates with one man on a barge and four-man

tug crews, whereas members of the Association, pursuant

to acollective bargaining agreement with the Union, oper-

ate with two men on a barge and a six- or seven-man tug

crew.

Well before April 1, 1976, the date of the new collective

bargaining agreement with which we are concerned here,

the Union unsuccessfully sought to require Berman to

cease towing unmanned vegetable oil barges of MOTC

Acquisitions Corp. (MOTC).* The Union had decided that

all barges with less than a certain carrying capacity should

be manned by a crew of two. A federal district court,

however, enjoined the Union from so coercing Berman,

and the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) sub-

sequently found that the Union had engaged in a secondary

boycott unlawful under Section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA, 29

U.S.C. § 158(b) (4), as well as having violated other pro-

visions of the NLRA, United Marine Division Local 333,

226 N.L.R.B. 1214 (1976). Shortly thereafter the Union,

claiming that it had previously terminated its labor con-

tract, struck General Marine but again was unsuccessful;

a federal district court enjoined the strike and the court

of appeals upheld the injunction on appeal, General Marine

Transport Corp. v. Local 333, United Marine Division,

No. 75-7559 (2d Cir. Mar. 10, 1976). General Marine

? “Vegetable oil barges” included any barge under 55,000 bar-

rels used in the animal, vegetable or fish oil trades.

later obtained favorable holdings on this matter both

before the NLRB, which found violations of Sections 8(d),

8(b)(3) and 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA, United Marine

Division Local 333, 228 N.L.R.B. 1107 (1977), and before

an arbitrator.

In January 1976 the Union made certain demands upon

the Association for contract provisions to be incorporated

in the new collective bargaining agreement which was to

commence on April 1, 1976. The demands were designed

to achieve its goals for industry-wide barge manning stan-

dards and to prevent further resistance to such standards

by Berman. This was followed by a Union demand made

to General Marine that all the Berman companies’ crew

members, except those on the tank-cleaning vessel, join

the Union and that all hiring be done through the Union

hiring hall. Further negotiations, accompanied by the

litigation noted above, resulted in an impasse, with the

Union threatening to strike the Association unless it com-

plied with the demands. General Marine refused to resign

from the Association despite the Association bargaining

committee’s statement that unless it did so the Association

would enter into a contract that satisfied the Union.

Finally on March 26, 1976, the Union and the Association

entered into a Memorandum of Agreement containing what

we will call the “vegetable oil” and “affiliates” clauses. The

first clause in effect required two men to be aboard all

vegetable oil barges carrying less than 55,000 barrels, a

clause applicable to the Berman petroleum barges because

they could be cleaned to carry vegetable oil.? The second

* The “vegetable oil” clause read:

9. Section 29. Vegetable Oil Barges. No vessel operated

under this contract shall tow any barge under 55,000 barrels

used in the animal, vegetable, or fish oil trades unless there

are two men aboard the barge at all times.

9

clause required affiliates‘ of Association members to oper-

ate under the contract and provided for strikes against

noncomplying employers. In a column in a Union news-

paper, the Union president explained that the clauses had

been added to the Union-Association contract to prevent

companies that were not members of the Association from

undercutting the prices of companies abiding by the As-

sociation-Union contract and taking work away from

Association members.°

After the Union ratified the new contract, the Union

president wrote General Marine to demand compliance with

the affiliates clause and listed fourteen Berman-General

Marine vessels which he claimed were covered by the

Union-Association contract. At about the same time, in

early April 1976, the Union membership was informed

about and advised to enforce the vegetable oil clause, on

pain of discipline. Fou.lowing General Marine’s response

that the contract exceeded the scope of the Association’s

bargaining power and constituted a group boycott, the

Union again struck General Marine. The Union also ad-

vised Association members not to deal with Berman and

specifically not to tow Berman barges with less than two

men aboard. Some Association members issued orders to

*The affiliates clause read in part:

8. Section 1. Application of Agreement. This Agreement

applies only to all licensed and unlicensed Employees, em-

ployed on tugboats and self-propelled lighters owned or oper-

ated by the Employers, a subsidiary company, an affiliated

company or a company division in the Port of New York and

vicinity.

5 The Union president’s newspaper column stated:

For several years, we have been having problems with cer-

tain companies who have been trying every way possible to

duck our contracts and the wages, benefits and working con-

ditions our membership is entitled to under those contracts.

The actions of these companies, and some of the men employed

by them, have a ripple effect throughout the industry. The

10

their employees not to deal with Berman and Berman’s

business fell with respect to them.‘

Subsequently, in Jur~ 1976, Berman filed a petition with

the NLRB for an eleetion to determine whether its em-

ployees wanted to be represented by a labor union. The

Union opposed such an election, but the NLRB’s Regional

Director ordered an election and the Berman employees

chose as their union, and the NLRB certified, a rival union,

Marine Engineers Beneficia! Association (MEBA).

3. Proceedings Below

This suit by Berman, General Marine and Standard Tank

is in two counts. The first count charges all defendants

with a combination in restraint of trade under Sherman

Act §1, 15 U.S.C. §1, and seeks damages under Clayton

Act §4, 15 U.S.C. § 15, and an injunction under Clayton

Aet §16, 15 U.S.C. § 26. The second count charges the

Vuion alone with violation of Section 303 of the LMRA, 29

U.S.C. § 187, and seeks damages from the Union.

companies have been able to undercut the rates of companies

abiding by the contract, and thus expand and take work away

from others vesulting in a loss of jobs for our members. The

new clauses and clause revisions are designed to strengthen

the contract against this type of action, making the com-

panies competitively equal and thus providing greater job

security for our membership. I have said in the past that

knowing your contract is very important. It now becomes even

more important that every member know and abide by this

contract.

* The court of appeals explanation that the drop in the volume

of Berman’s business could be explained by other factors (App.

13) is irrelevant to this petition because judicial review of dis-

missal of claims for failure to state a cause of action requires all

factual inferences be made in petitioners’ favor. Continental Ore

Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962). The

distriet court itself found the evidence supported a conelusion that

the drop in the volume of Berman's business was caused by the

respondent corporations’ refusal to deal. (App. 21-22)

11

The district court held that the vegetable oil and affiliates

clauses, as well as the actions taken under them, did not

constitute antitrust violations because of labor’s nonstatu-

tory exemption to the antitrust laws, and, alternatively,

that the clauses did not have the anticompetitive purpose or

effect necessary to violate Sherman Act §1. (App. 21-22)

The district court dismissed Berman’s antitrust claims

based upon the clauses after petitioners rested and subse-

quently instructed the jury that the clauses were not illegal

and could be used only as evidence of a separate agree-

ment to refuse to deal, an agreement which the jury spe-

cially found did not exist. The jury also specially found

against Berman and its affiliated companies on three ques-

tions submitted under the labor law count.’ The district

court further allowed defendants to argue to the jury that

the increasing salaries paid to executives of Berman

showed that Berman had not been injured even if there

had been an agreement to refuse to deal. Following the

verdict, the trial judge denied motions for a new trial,

for judgment notwithstanding the verdict against the

Union on the labor law count, and for injunctive relief.

The court of appeals affirmed. The court held that the

vegetable oil clause—the agreement not to tow barges un-

less manned by two persons—was legitimate labor activity

and did not violate Sherman Action § 1 because it “was de-

signed to prevent erosion of manning standards by outside

7 The three questions, all answered negatively by the jury, were:

4. Did Local 333 induce or encourage its members to refuse

to work for their employers when asked to work on Berman

vessels or threaten, coerce or restrain the Association or the

corporate defendants in order to:

(a) Force Berman to become a member of the Association ?

(b) Foree Berman to recognize Local 333 as the repre-

sentative of its employees?

(e) Force the Association or the corporate defendants to

cease doing business with Berman?

12

economic pressure, to protect jobs and to promote safety

at sea.” (App. 10) The court also held that Union pres-

sure to prevent the barges from being towed did not violate

Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the NLRA because “the sometimes

competitive relationship between Berman barges and Asso-

ciation barges” meant that “Berman’s undermanned barges

may have taken jobs away from the bargaining unit”.

(App. 16)

The court of appeals found that the affiliates clause—the

agreement to force non-union Berman to abide by the As-

sociation-Union contract by virtue of its affiliation with

General Marine—was “more troublesome”. Berman was

not a member of the Association and the Union did not

represent its employees. Nonetheless, the court held that

although the agreement “may appear broader than neces-

sary to fulfill legitimate union objectives”, it was immune

from antitrust attack under the nonstatutory exemption

because Berman and General Marine constituted a single

employer as a result of employee interchange and “it was

a legitimate union objective to protect employees against

shifts of work days (and vessels) designed to avoid the

standards and wages established in the collective bargain-

ing agreement”. (App. 11-12) The court concluded that

existing Supreme Court decisions are “not applicable here

because they involved employer bargaining groups and

unions conspiring to injure truly separate concerns”.

(App. 12)

The court of appeals also held that the affiliates clause

did not have “either an anticompetitive purpose or an anti-

competitive effect” despite the Union president’s admission

that the purpose was to prevent non-members of the Asso-

ciation who did not operate in accordance with the Associa-

tion-Union labor contract from undercutting the prices of

Association members and taking work away from them.

13

The court held that the “true purposes” were “job preserva-

tion, maintenance of working conditions and safety, none

of which is anticompetitive in nature.” (App. 12-13) With

respect to the claim that the affiliates clause and efforts to

enforce it violated Section 8(b)(4)(A) of the NLRA be-

cause it required an employer, Berman, to become a mem-

ber of an employer’s organization, the Association, the

court held that the distinction between primary and sec-

ondary labor activity in Section 8(b)(4)(B) was applicable

to a violation of Section 8(b)(4)(A) and there was evi-

dence to support the view that the Union’s conduct was

primary. (App. 13-14) Finally, the court of appeals held

that the argument about salaries and antitrust injury was

one that a jury properly could consider.

Reasons for Granting the Writ

Association of competitors into multiemployer bargain-

ing organizations that negotiate labor contracts with unions

has become pervasive in American industry. Such organiza-

tions offer the opportunity for anticompetitive and other

abuses that this Court cautioned against in United Mine

Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 665 (1965) (“. . .

because they must bargain does not mean that the agree-

ment reached may disregard other laws”). This case, in

which a multiemployer association of competitors and a

union use self-help and economic coercion to impose labor

standards industry-wide, raises questions of exceptional

importance to competition and the appropriate limits of

multiemployer bargaining. The writ should be granted to

resolve these questions.

The judgment below authorizes a multiemployer associa-

tion and union to impose a labor contract on a non-union

company that the association does not represent and whose

14

employees the union does not represent. The rationale for

the result is that the imposition of uniform working con-

ditions eliminates labor cost competition from the non-unit

company and preserves the work available for association

members. The holding that the conduct does not violate

Sherman Act §1, and is within labor’s nonstatutory ex-

emption from the antitrust laws, conflicts with prior deci-

sions of this court including United Mine Workers v. Pen-

nington, supra, Connell Construction Company, Inc. v.

Plumbers and Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 US.

616 (1975), and Federal Maritime Commission v. Pacific

Maritime Association, 435 U.S. 40 (1978). The holding

would further permit a multiempoyer association and union

to determine unit questions and decide the bargaining

representative of the non-union employees thereby circum-

venting NLRB certification procedures. This conflicts with

the Court’s judgment in South Prairie Construction Co. v.

Local 627, Operating Engineers, 425 U.S. 800 (1976) (per

curiam).

Other courts of appeal and the NLRB hold that par-

ticipation in multiemployer contracts is voluntary. The

decision below conflicts with decisions that union threats

to strike with the object of forcing an employer to become

a party to a multiemployer labor contract violates Section

8(b)(4)(A) of the NLRA because an employer has an abso-

lute right to refuse to become so bound. See Frito Lay

v. Teamsters Local Union 137, 623 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir.

1980); Union De Tronquistas De Puerto Rico v. Arlook,

586 F.2d 872 (1st Cir. 1978). The decision holds instead

that the distinction between primary and secondary labor

activity in Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the NLRA applies to

violation of Section 8(b)(4)(A). The effect of the holding

is that an employer can be forced to participate in a multi-

employer labor contract against its will, a grant of excep-

tional authority to multiemployer associations of competi-

15

tors and unions. The writ should be granted to decide

whether the exercise of such authority can be lawful under

Section 8(b)(4)(A) and to resolve the conflict between

the circuits.

The decision also departs from this Court’s judgment in

NLRB v. Local 825, Operating Engineers, 400 U.S. 297

(1971), on the application of Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the

NLRA. The decision below holds that a union may pressure

members of a multiemployer association neutral to a dis-

pute to disrupt the business they do with a non-union com-

pany to force the non-union company to adopt union work

rules (barge manning standards). The court of appeals

holds that if a union’s purpose is “work preservation” and

the maintenance of “union standards”, it may try to in-

fluence the labor practices of the target company by pres-

suring neutral employers. The writ should be granted be-

cause the holding permits a union to impose its work rules

outside of the bargaining unit and thereby achieve in-

dustry-wide work rule goals without representing em-

ployees of the companies whose labor practices it wants

to change.

Finally, the judgment below allows defendants to use

financial information about management salaries unrelated

to the question of injury under Clayton Act §4 and Section

303 of the LMRA in violation of the decision in Brunswick

Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 447 (1977).

Antitrust injury is a question of causation. Salaries re-

ceived by management of the injured company are irrel-

evant to the statutory question of whether or not the un-

lawful conspiracy is the cause of the business disruption.

Salaries, whether they increase or decrease, cannot help

answer the injury question. The writ should be granted

because antitrust and labor cases frequently involve finan-

cial evidence that cannot be fairly weighed unless the par-

16

ties are restricted to contesting the statutory elements of

a violation and prohibited from making arguments to a

jury that have no legal or economic basis.

L

The Decision Departs From Precedent in Holding

That Sherman Act §1 Was Not Violated by the Clauses

Included in the Multiemployer Contract and Insulates

Abuses of Maltiemployer Bargaining Associations of

Competitors From Judicial Scrutiny.

The decision below permits a multiemployer association

of competitors and a union to pursue their self-interest at

the expense of a non-member competitor. The “affiliates”

clause is an anticompetitive agreement to impose a labor

contract on non-unit employers condemned in United Mine

Workers v. Pennington, supra. The “vegetable oil” clause

is a group boycott—an agreement among competitors to

deal with third parties only on certain terms and condi-

tions—a per se violation of Sherman Act 61. The holding

that the clauses are not anticompetitive despite the ad-

mission of the Union president that their purpose is to

restrain price competition by establishing industry-wide

labor costs makes the elimination of competition over labor

costs legitimate labor activity even when the union does

not represent the non-union target. However, agreements

to impose labor terms and conditions industry-wide are

against the policy of both antitrust and labor laws. United

Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 668. (“The anti-

competitive potential of such a combination is obvious.

...”); Federal Maritime Commission v. Pacific Maritime

Association, 435 U.S. at 62-3 (Union-Association imposi-

tion of labor terms on non-unit employers is anti:empeti-

tive). Excusing such industry-wide restraints because they

17

ensure “maintenance of working conditions” (App. 13)

and “prevent erosion of manning standards by outside

economic pressure” (App. 10), simply uses euphemisms to

state benefits that any cartel hopes to achieve from the

elimination of outside competition. Compare United States

v. Socony-Vacuum Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).

The decision that the “vegetable oil” clause is exempt

from Sherman Act §1 under the nonstatutory exemption

authorizes an agreement to boycott unless Berman does

what the Union wanted and manned its barges with two

men instead of one, a per se violation of Sherman Act §1.

See e.g. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Barry,

438 U.S. 531 (1978). The invocation of the nonstatutory

exemption on the grounds that bargaining unit jobs would

be preserved since “Berman’s undermanned barges may

have taken jobs away from the bargaining unit” (App. 16)

makes the elimination of competition a virtue whenever the

union and multiemployer allegedly perceive a threat to

bargaining unit standards. However, the preservation of

“standards” does not make it legitimate to engage in con-

duct which eliminates competition. See National Society of

Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 696

(1978).

The decision that the “affiliates” clause is exempt from

Sherman Act §1 under the nonstatutory labor exemption

on the grounds that Berman and General Marine are a

single employer is a failure to apply to antitrust cases

a long line of decisions under the NLRA about the appro-

priate scope of collective bargaining.* Even when there is

a “single employer”, union proposals to impose labor terms

on unrepresented employees are nonmandatory subjects of

* The decision also departs from an earlier decision of a differ-

ent panel of the same court which stated that Berman is distinct

from General Marine. See General Marine Transport Corp. v.

NLRB, 619 F.2d 180, 187-88 (2d Cir. 1980).

18

bargaining.’ This is so even though the union’s motive is

to protect the standards and wages established in a collec-

tive bargaining agreement from the competition of the un-

represented group. Sperry Rand Corp. v. NLRB, 492 F.2d

63 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 831 (1976); NLRB

v. Local 542, Operating Engineers, 532 F.2d 902, 907 (3d

Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1072 (1977); Glendale

Manufacturing Co. v. Local 520, ILGWU, 283 F.2d 936

(4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 950 (1961) ; General

Warehousemen and Helpers v. Standard Brands, 579 F.2d

1282, 1291 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2420

(1979) ; Local 7-210, Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers v.

Union Tank Car Co., 475 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1973), cert.

denied, 414 US. 875 (1973). Nonmandatory subjects of

bargaining are not entitled to an exemption from the anti-

trust laws. Local Union 189 v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676

(1965).

The decision below that the “affiliates” clause was legiti-

mate labor activity because some General Marine employ-

ees also worked on Berman vessels allows a union and

multiemployer association to absorb non-union employers

and employees without resort to NLRB certification pro-

cedures. This conflicts with this Court’s judgment in South

Prairie Construction Co. v. Local 627, Operating Engineers,

425 U.S. 800 (1976) (per curiam), that the scope of the

bargaining unit can only be deter:nined by the NLRB

under Section 9 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.\’. §159. Many com-

panies with subsidiaries or divisions are single employers,

yet it has never been suggested that this requires a single

* Courts hold that an “affiliates” clause is not a mandatory sub-

ject of bargaining even when the union represents the iate’s

employees. A union violates Section 8(b)(3) of the NLRA, 29

U.S.C. §158(b) (3), when it coerees an employer to agree to such a

clause. Lone Star Steel Co. v. NLRB, 639 F.2d 545 (10th Cir.

1980), cert. denied, US. . 101 8. Ct. 1349 (1981) ; Amaz

Coal Co. v. NLRB, 614 F.2d 872, 883-84 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd in

part on other grounds, —— U.S. ——, 49 U.S.L.W. 4869 (1981).

19

bargaining unit or that such a unit can be forced upon an

employer. The decision in South Prairie, 518 F.2d 1040

(D.C. Cir. 1975), rev’d, 425 U.S. 800 (1976) (per curiam),

is exactly on point because it was the “interchange” and

“fungibility” of employees on which the District of Colum-

bia circuit relied. This “ourt reversed. The decision’s

claim that Berman was not “truly” separate from General

Marine thus permits an association of competitors and a

union to impose an entire contract on Berman and its un-

represented employees allegedly to stop transfer of crew

members and vessels between affiliates (App. 11-12) when

a simple grievance filed under General Marine’s contract

with the Union would have sufficed without having an

adverse impact on Berman.

The decision below licenses the forceful imposition of

labor contracts on “single employers” even when their

unrepresented employees do not wish to be represented by

a union—a dangerous rule. Congress has designated the

NLRB to be the exclusive agency to setile questions con-

cerning the representation of employees. Carey v. Westing-

house, 375 U.S. 261 (1964). Petitioner submits that the

correct analysis is to leave questions of representation to

the NLRB and not to a multiemployer association of com-

petitors, and to apply traditional antitrust principles. Too

much is at stake in terms of industry competition and labor

relations to do »therwise.** These issues recur" because of

1° For example, the New York Times reports that in the 1979

negotiations between the Association and Union, the Union insisted

on expanding the scope of the “affiliates” clause so that it affected

the Association generally. The Union wanted the 1976 “affiliates”

clause expanded to include operations from Virginia to Maine and

not just the Port of New York. A three-month strike costing the

New York economy $1.5 billion resulted. N.Y. Times, June 12,

1979, §B at 4, col. 3; id., June 13, 1979, §B at 4, col. 3; id., June

14, 1979, $A at 1, col. 2.

~

" See e.g. California State Council of Carpenters v. Associated

Se ea 648 F.2d 527 (9th Cir.

1980).

the prevalence of multiemployer bargaining and the writ

should be granted to resolve them.

Il.

The Decision Below Conflicts With the Decision of

Other Courts of Appeal Which Hold That Under Sec-

tion 8(b)(4)(A) of the NLRA an Employer Has an

Absolute Right to Refuse to Become Party to a Multi-

employer Contract.

The words of Section 8(b)(4)(A) of the NLRA preclude

the judgment below. The decision holds that the distinction

between primary and secondary labor activity, which is

found in the proviso in Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the NLRA,

is also part of Section 8(b)(4)(A) which contains no such

proviso. In Frito-Lay v. Teamsters Local Union 137, supra,

the Ninth Cireuit concluded after thorough analysis that

an employer had an absolute right to refuse to become

party to a multiemployer contract. The First Circuit’s

conclusion was the same in Union De Tronquistas De

Puerto Rico v. Arlook, supra. The Ninth Cireuit’s analysis

of the legislative history of Section 8(b)(4)(A) in Frito-

Lay shows that “because of congressional concern over

industry-wide employer bargaining in general—and its per-

ceived evils, such as crippling industry-wide strikes, collu-

sion, stifling of competition and ‘shocking restraints of

trade’ ”’, Section 8(b)(4)(A) was enacted to guarantee that

no business would be forced to become a party to a multi-

employer contract against its will. 623 F.2d at 1358-59

(citation omitted). The “work preservation” motivation,

which frequently determines the primary or secondary

nature of conduct under Section 8(b)(4)(B), is irrelevant

under Section 8(b)(4)(A).

The decision below conflicts with these other decisions.

Berman was not a member of the Association and the Union

21

did not represent Berman’s employees. (App. 3) Nonethe-

less, the decision holds that the Union couid threaten the

Association with a strike to foree Berman to become party

to the multiemployer contract against its will because

“*,.. section 8(b)(4)(A) ... of the NLRA [is] intended to

prohibit not agreements or actions directed toward the

primary employer, but secondary objeciives. ...” (App.

13-14) The court is wrong because the statute is very clear:

pressure on Berman, the primary employer, to force it to

abide by the multiemployer contract violates Section 8(b)

(4)(A). A fortiori, pressure applied to neutral employers,

i.e., Association members, for the same purpose, violates

Section 8(b)(4)(A).

To grant multiemployer organizations and unions the

power to force unwilling employers to join in their

contracts raises questions of exceptional importance to

industry-wide collective bargaining. In addition, because

industry generally and the industry involved here, oper-

ates in the jurisdiction of several courts of appeal, the

conflict between the circuits will result in differing treat-

ment of the same parties depending on the forum. For

example, the parties here operate in the jurisdiction of at

least the First, Second, and Third circuits and there is

presently the conflict between the First and Second circuits.

The writ should be granted to resolve the question of statu-

tory interpretation and to eliminate the conflict in the cir-

cuits.

iil.

Union Pressure on Neutral Employers for the Pur-

pose of Achieving Changes in the Work Practices of a

Primary Employer Violates Section 8(b)(4)(B) With-

out Regard to “Work Preservation” or “Union Stan-

dards” Motives.

The decision holds that Union pressure to restrain mem-

bers of the Association from towing Berman’s barges unless

they were manned by two persons does not violate Section

8(b)(4)(B) as a matter of law because there was evidence

from which a jury could find that the Union’s motive was

“work preservation” and “maintaining union standards”.

(App. 15-16) However, this Court’s decision in NLRB v.

Local 825, Operating Engineers, 400 U.S. 297 (1971), holds

that once it is shown that the union’s object is to force the

primary employer to change its policy on work assignments,

union pressure upon neutral employers violates Section

8(b) (4) (B).

The decision below avoids the Local 825, Operating Engi-

neers rule by drawing an analogy to cases that authorize

restrictions on subcontracting of unit work negotiated by a

union and employer. (App. 15-16) The analogy to sub-

contracting is erroneous because restricting the way in

which an employer subcontracts unit work is fundamentally

different from restraining the way in which an employer

conducts its business.

In Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 US.

203, 215 (1964), this Court cautioned that the duty to bar-

gain over an employer’s subcontracting out of unit work

is not authority for restrictions on “other forms of ‘con-

tracting out’ or ‘subcontracting’ which arise daily in our

complex economy.” The invocation of cases involving the

23

subcontracting of unit work to authorize the Union’s pres-

sure on Association members not to tow Berman’s barges

unless they met Union manning standards is a dangerous

analogy because it authorizes union disruption of business

dealings between two companies in the absence of sub-

contracting. If the Union can act to advance its industry-

wide goals for uniform working conditions by preventing

the towing of non-union barges unless they are manned to

its liking, then any union can restrict the basis on which its

members will work when they come into contact with an-

other union.”

The writ should be granted to decide whether the law

announced in subcontracting cases under Section 8(b) (4)

(B) can properly be applied generally in this manner. The

question is of exceptional importance because union de-

mands on employers to restrict business practices for the

union’s benefit are an everyday part of labor relations and

the far-reaching restrictions authorized by the decision

below will cause substantial disruption unless prohibited.

12 See United Marine Division, Local 333, 226 NLRB 1214

(1976) in which the NLRB held that the identical conduct vio-

lated Section 8(b)(4)(B) and Section 8(b)(3) of the NLRA.

Although the court of appeals noted the MOTC decision, it did

not explain why its decision departed from it.

24

IV.

Increasing Salaries Received by Management of a

Closely Held Business Are Irrelevant to Whether or Not

a Company Is Injured in Its Business or Property Under

Clayton At §4 and Section 303 of the LMRA.

The decision below holds that the jury could properly

consider the claim that salaries received by Berman’s man-

agement showed Berman was not injured as an exercise of

trial court discretion under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules

of Evidence. However, to treat such an argument as an

exercise in discretion allows juries to decide cases on a

ground irrelevant to whether or not a business is injured

within the meaning of Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 16 and

Section 303 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 187. Injury under

the antitrust and labor laws is a specific and logical chain

of causation between the violation and the injury alleged

and plaintiffs are prohibited from a claim of injury not so

causally connected to the violation. Brunswick Corp. v.

Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977). Here, the

injury is Berman’s loss of business from, and inability to

hire the services of, the defendant corporations. Defen-

dants should have been restricted to arguing whether or

not the injury claimed occurred and prevented from argu-

ing to a jury that increasing salaries to management show

no injury. The decision below means that a business in-

jured by an antitrust violation but, nevertheless, able to

pay substantial salaries in spite of the injury, has no

remedy" for the violations because a jury is in no position

13 Petitioners’ post-trial request for injunctive relief under

Clayton Act §16, 15 U.S.C. §26, relief that depends on threatened

injury, was also denied.

25

to determine the legal and economical falseness of such an

argument.'* The writ should be granted for this reason.

CONCLUSION

Wuenrerore, petitioners Berman Enterprises Inc., Stan-

dard Tank Cleaning Corp., and General Marine Transport

Corp., respectfully pray that a writ of certiorari be issued

to review the decision of the United States Court of Ap-

peals for the Second Circuit in this case.

Respectfully submitted,

Jarep STAMELL

488 Madison Avenue

New York, New York 10022

(212) 794-8772

Attorney for Petitioners

Kevin J. McG

Currtoy, Bupp, Burke & DeMaria

Of Counsel

“The error of the a ent is emphasized by the evidence

to have made it relevant: the only way the salaries

could have been relevant is if they showed an alternative explana-

tion of why defendants refused to deal. For example, if there

were evidence that the defendants learned that Berman’s execu-

tives were receiving increasing salaries and refused to deal not as

a result of an agreement with the union, but because they were

offended by the size of the salaries, then there would be a causal

connection to the injury claimed for the jury to consider.

Decisions of the Courts Below

Opinion of Court of Appeals

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FoR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

>

No. 112—September Term, 1980

(Argued December 3, 1980 Decided February 25, 1981)

Docket No. 80-7260

—

BERMAN ENTERPRISES INC., STANDARD TANK CLEANING

Corer, and GENERAL MARINE TRANSPORT Corp,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

—_—V.—

Loca 333, UNITED MARINE DIVISION, INTERNATIONAL

LONGSHOREMEN’S ASSOCIATION, MARINE TOWING AND

TRANSPORTATION EMPLOYERS’ ASSOCIATION, MCALLIS-

TOR BrRoTHerRS, INc., DieSseL VESSEL OPERATORS, INC.,

SPENTONBUSH TRANSPORT SERVICE, INC., MORANIA

Oi. TANKER CORPORATION, BOUCHARD TRANSPORTA-

TION COMPANY, INC., MORAN TOWING & TRANSPORTA

TION COMPANY, INC., POLING TRANSPORTATION CORPO-

RATION, EKLOF MARINE CORPORATION, RED STAR

MARINE SERVICES, INC., REINAUER TRANSPORTATION

COMPANIES, INC., and TURECAMO COASTAL & HARBOR

TOWING CORPORATION,

Defendants-Appellees.

7

Before:

Oakes and MESKILL, Circuit Judges, and

WerkKeER, District Judge.*

~

° Of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New

York, sitting by designation.

la

2a

Opinion of Court of Appeals

Oakes, Circuit Judge:

This appeal concerns labor practices and collective

bargaining provisions in the marine transportation service

industry. Appellants are three affiliated companies, Ber-

man Enterprises Inc. (Berman), General Marine Trans-

port Corp. (General Marine), and Standard Tank Clean-

ing Corp. (Standard Tank). They allege antitrust viola-

tions by Marine Towing and Transportation Employers’

Association (Association), a multiemployer bargaining

organization, certain of the Association’s members, and

Local 333, United Marine Division, International Long-

shoremen’s Association (Union), a union representing

vessel employees. Appellants also allege labor law viola-

tions by the Union. The United States District Court for

the Southern District of New York, Robert W. Sweet,

Judge, at the conclusion of the evidence dismissed all

elements of the antitrust claim except that portion alleg-

ing conspiracy to refuse to deal with Berman. Thereafter

the jury returned verdicts against Berman and the compa-

nies affiliated with it on the remaining antitrust claim and

on the labor claim. The court then denied the appellants’

request for injunctive relief. On appeal the three affiliated

companies argue that the antitrust claim should not have

been dismissed, that the court should have directed a

verdict for the appellants on the labor claim, and tha

evidence concerning salaries of Berman’s officers should

neither have been admitted nor have been the subject of

an argument about Berman’s damages. We cannot accept

these contentions and, accordingly, affirm the judgment

below.

3a

Opinion of Court of Appeals

I. FACTS

Berman, General Marine, and Standard Tank are ali

owned by Standard Marine Services, Inc., which in turn is

owned by Evelyn Berman Frank and her brothers. Ber-

man operates tugs, barges, and harbor tankers in New

York harbor; General Marine operates two ships which

dispose of sewage sludge produced by municipal cus-

tomers; and Standard Tank operates a vessel-cleaning

facility and one tank-cleaning vessel.

General Marine was a member of the Association at the

time the dispute in question arose, but Berman and

Standard Tank were not and the Union did not represent

their employees.' The Union and the Association have

three labor contracts covering employees on tugs, barges,

and self-propelled tankers, respectively. Berman, or its

predecessor, and the appellee Association member corpo-

rations have for many years been customers as well as

competitors of one another, hiring each other’s tugs or

barges from time to time, but also competing for business

from third parties. Berman operates with one man on a

barge and four-man barge crews, whereas members of the

Association, pursuant to a collective bargaining agree-

ment with the Union, operate with two men on a barge

and a six- or seven-man barge crew.

Well before April 1, 1976, the date of the new collective

bargaining agreement with which we are concerned here,

the Union unsuccessfully sought to require Berman to

! When General Marine employees worked on Berman vessels,

General Marine made payments to the Union-Association pension

funds but the employees worked according to Berman wages and

working conditions. Since January 1977 Berman employees’ bargain-

ing representative has been Marine Engineers Beneficial Association

(MEBA).

4a

Opinion of Court of Appeals

cease towing unmanned vegetable oil barges? of MOTC

Acquisitions Corp. (MOTC). The Union had decided that

all barges with less than a certain carrying capacity should

be manned by a crew of two. A federal district court,

however, enjoined the Union from so coercing Berman,

and the National Labor Relations Board subsequently

found that the Union had engaged in a secondary boycott

unlawful under section 8(b)(4) of the National Labor

Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4), as well as

having violated other provisions of the NLRA, United

Marine Division Local 333, 226 N.L.R.B. 1214 (1976).

Shortly thereafter the Union, claiming that it had pre-

viously terminated its labor contract, struck General

Marine but again was unsuccessful; a federal district

court enjoined the strike and this court upheld the injunc-

tion on appeal, General Marine Transport Corp. v. Local

333, United Marine Division, No. 75-7559 (2d Cir. Mar.

10, 1976). General Marine later obtained favorable hold-

ings on this matter both before the Board, which found

violations of sections 8(d), 8(b)(3), and 8(b)(1)(A) of the

NLRA, United Marine Division Local 333, 228 N.L.R.B.

1107 (1977), and before an arbitrator.

In January 1976 the Union made certain demands upon

the Association for contract provisions to be incorporated

in the new collective bargaining agreement, which was to

commence on April 1, 1976. This was followed by a

Union demand made to General Marine that all the

Berman companies’ crew members, except those on the

tank-cleaning vessel, join the Union and that all hiring be

done through the Union hiring hall. Further negotiations,

accompanied by the litigation noted above, resulted in an

“Vegetable oil barges” included any barge under $5,000 barrels \.sed

in the animal, vegetable, or fish oil trades.

5a

Opinion of Court of Appeals

impasse, with General Marine refusing to resign from the

Association despite the Association bargaining commit-

tee’s statement that unless General Marine resigned, the

Association would enter into a contract that satisfied the

Union. Finally on March 26, 1976, the Union and the

Association entered into a Memorandum of Agreement

containing what we will call the “vegetable oil” and the

“affiliates” clauses, the first in effect requiring two men

on vegetable oil barges carrying less than 55,000 barrels’

and the second requiring affiliates of Association mem-

bers to operate under the contract.‘

After the Union ratified the new contract, the Union

president wrote General Marine to demand compliance

with the affiliates clause and to list fourteen Berman-

General Marine vessels which he claimed were covered by

the Union-Association contract. At about the same time,

in early April 1976, the Union membership was informed

about and advised to enforce the vegetable oil clause, on

pain of discipline. Following General Marine’s response

that the contract exceeded the scope of the Association’s

5 The “vegetable oil” clause read:

9. Section 29. Vegetable Oil Barges. No vessel operated under

this contract shall tow any barge under $5,000 barrels used in the

animal, vegetable, or fish oil trades unless there are two men

aboard the barge at all times.

This Clause was applicable to the Berman petroleum barges because

they could be cleaned to carry vegetable oil.

4 The “affiliates” clause read in part:

8. Section |. Application Agreement

This Agreement applies only to all licensed and unlicensed Em-

ployees, employed cn tugboats and self-propelled lighters owned or

operated by the Employers, a subsidiary company, an affiliated

company or a company division in the Port of New York and

vicinity.

It went on to provide for strikes against noncomplying employers.

6a

Opinion of Court of Appeals

bargaining power and constituted a group boycott, the

Union again struck General Marine. The Union also

advised Association members not to deal with Berman

and specifically not to tow Berman barges with less than

two men aboard.’ Subsequently, in June 1976, Berman

filed a petition with the Board for an election to deter-

mine whether its employees wanted to be represented by a

labor union. The Union opposed such an election, but the

Board’s Regional Director ordered an election and the

Berman employees chose Marine Engineers Beneficial

Association (MEBA) as their union.

This suit by Berman, General Marine, and Standard

Tank is in two counts—the first charges all defendants

with a combination in restraint of trade under section | of

the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, and seeks damages

under section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, and

an injunction under section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15

U.S.C. § 26. The second count charges the Union alone

with participation in a secondary boycott in violation of

section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act

$ In a column in a Union newspaper, the Union president further

explained the Union-Association contract:

For several years, we have been having problems with certain

companies who have been trying every way possible to duck our

contracts and the wages, benefits and working conditions our

membership is entitled to under those contracts. The actions of

these companies, and some of the men employed by them, have a

ripple effect throughout the industry. The companies have been able

to undercut the rates of companies abiding by the contract, and

thus expand and take work away from others resulting in a loss of

jobs for our members. The new clauses and clause revisions are

designed to strengthen the contract against this type of action,

making the companies competitively equal and thus providing

greater job security for our membership. | have said in the past that

knowing your contract is very important. It now becomes even

more important that every member know and abide by this con-

tract.

Ta

Opinion of Court of Appeals

(LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 187, and seeks damages from the

Union.

The court below held that the vegetable oil and the

affiliates clauses, as well as the actions taken under them,

were not themselves antitrust violations in light of the

so-called “labor exemption” to the antitrust laws,* and,

alternatively, that these clauses did not have the anticom-

petitive purpose or effect necessary to violate section | of

the Sherman Act, though they could be used as evidence

of an agreement to refuse to deal, an agreement which the

jury specially found did not exist. The jury also specially

found against Berman and its affiliated companies on

three questions submitted under the labor law count.’

6 As explicated in Adams, Rav & Rosenbere ». William Morris

Agency, 411 F. Supp. 403, 407-08 (C.D. Cal. 1976), where litigation

involves only union activities, the union may claim a statutory exemr-

tion under sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act, 1§ U.S.C. § 17 and 29

U.S.C. § $2, and under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-

115; where litigation involves the activities of a umion and employers,

the defendants may claim a “nonstatutory exemption,” Connell Con-

struction Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622-23 (1975). See

generally, R. Mann, B. Powers & B. Roberts, The Accommodatnon

Between Antitrust and Labor Law: The Antitrust Labor Exemption, 9

Seton Hall L. Rev. 744 (1978).

? The three questions, all answered negatively by the jury, were:

4. Did Local 333 induce or encourage its members to refuse to

work for their employers when asked to work on Berman vessels or

threaten, coerce or restrain the Association or the corporate defen-

dants in order to:

a. Force Berman to become a member of the Association?

b. Force Berman to recognize Local 333 as the representative of

its employees?

¢. Force the Association or the corporate defendants to cease

doing business with Berman?

Following the verdict, the trial judge denied motions for a new trial,

for judgment notwithstanding the verdict against the Umon on the

labor law count, and for injunctive relief.

8a

Opinion of Court of Appeals

Il. DISCUSSION

A. Antitrust Claim

Berman argues that the vegetable oil and the affiliates

clauses had the purpose of restraining Berman from

charging lower prices and from taking work away from

Union members, and that the clauses had the effect of

excluding Berman as a competitor of Association mem-

bers and restricting the conditions under which Berman

could hire an Association tug.

Berman begins with the assertion that the nonstatutory

labor exemption is not available to protect a combina-

tion, between a union and a nonlabor group, that has an

anticompetitive purpose or effect on the business of

another, Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S.

797, 809-10 (1945), particularly in light of the narrow

construction to be given exemptions from the antitrust

laws, Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Ruyu' Drug

Co., 440 U.S. 205, 231 (1979). This argument has two

prongs. The first is that the agreement here imposed

wages, hours, and working conditions on nonparty em-

ployers and, accordingly, was not exempt from the anti-

trust laws. Federal Maritime Commission v. Pacific

Maritime Association, 435 U.S. 40 (1978) (upheld Federai

Maritime Commission finding that multiemployer bar-

gaining unit-union contract requiring nonparties to com-

ply with fringe benefit programs and other work rules for

hiring-hall work force members is not protected by the

nonstatutory exemption and is subject to section 15 of the

Shipping Act, 46 U.S.C. § 814, which regulates anticom-

petitive agreements in certain maritime industries); United

Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 665-66 (1965)

(union forfeits its exemption from antitrust laws when it

agrees with one set of employers to impose a wage scale

9a

Opinion of Court of Appeals

on other bargaining units). The second prong relies on the

analysis in Local 189, Amaigamated Meat Cutters v.

Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689-90 (1965),* and Connell

Construction Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616,

622-23 (1975), which concludes that agreements reached

on nonmandatory subjects of bargaining—matters other

than wages, hours, and working conditions—are not

within the nonstatutory exemption if they constitute re-

straints on competition in a business market. See also

Commerce Tankers Corp. v. National Maritime Union,

553 F.2d 793, 801 (2d Cir.) (Jewel Tea-Connell analysis

followed), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 923 (1977). Thus Ber-

man’s point is that the challenged agreement fell outside

the scope of the nonstatutory labor exemption to the

antitrust laws: it failed the Pennington test because it set

employment terms for nonparty employers and it failed

under the Jewel Tea-Connell analysis because it embraced

nonmandatory subjects of collective bargaining. We dis-

agree. x

Both of the disputed clauses represented legitimate

union objectives because they dealt either with working

conditions, Jewel Tea,’ or job preservation, /ntercon-

tinental Container Transport Corp. v. New York Shipping

Association, 426 F.2d 884, 886-88 (2d Cir. 1970) (contract

8 Although Justice White spoke for only a three-person plurality, his

statement in Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 689-90, is considered to be a classic

formulation of the standard for determining applicability of the labor

exemption. According to Justice White, the issue is whether the subject

matter of the restriction

is SO intimately related to wages, hours and working conditions that

the unions’ successful attempt to obtain that provision through

bona fide, arm’s-length bargaining in pursuit of their own labor

union policies, and not at the behest of or in combination with

nonlabor groups, falls within the protection of the national labor

policy and is therefore exempt from the Sherman Act.

9 See note 8 supra.

10a

Opinion of Court of Appeals

held exempt from the antitrust laws under the labor

exemption because the union had a right to preserve the

jobs of its members). Any indirect effect upon Berman

was permissible, especially because the contract did not

forbid the use of nonunion members. See California

Dump Truck Owners Association v. Associated General

Contractors, 562 F.2d 607, 613-14 (9th Cir. 1977) (clause

valid even though it might have some effect on the hiring

of nonunion members, because it did not preclude the

hiring of these members). The vegetable oil clause did not

impose any requirements on any nonparty to the collec-

tive bargaining agreement. Rather, it was directed at

union employers (as discussed further in section II. B. of

this opinion) and was designed to prevent erosion of

manning standards by outside economic pressure, to

protect jobs, and to promote safety at sea.'°

The affiliates clause is more troublesome. There is case

law holding that broad clauses such as this one deal with

nonmandatory subjects, at least when they go beyond the

language “necessary to accomplish the legitimate Union

goal of protecting employees against a shift of production

to another [place] to evade standards and wages at the

[present place of employment].” Lone Star Steel Co. v.

NLRB, No. 77-1667, slip op. at 33 (10th Cir. Jul. 28,

1980) (clause applying contract to all facilities presently

owned or hereafter acquired by the employer and facili-

ties owned by subsidiaries and affiliates, upon recognition

of the union, whether or not such operations compete

with the work of unit employees, was not a mandatory

subject), cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3456 (U.S. Dec. 10,

1980) (No. 80-940); see also Amax Coal Co. v. NLRB,

10 There was evidence that tug boat crews felt that unmanned barges

were unsafe to tow. This suggests that barges manned by a single

person might also be unsafe.

lla

Opinion of Court of Appeals

614 F.2d 872, 883-84 (3d Cir. 1980) (clause applying

contract to employees who work in other than the certi-

fied unit and who select the union held not to be a

mandatory subject), cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3353 (U.S.

Oct. 27, 1980) (No. 80-692). Appellees would distinguish

Lone Star Steel and Amax Coal from the instant case on

the basis that the former are bargaining cases under

section 8(b)(3) of the LMRA. But the Jewe/ Tea-Connell

analysis relates us back to the issue of mandatory versus

nonmandatory subjects of bargaining and, thus, these

cases are relevant.

Although the language in the affiliates clause here may

appear broader than necessary to fulfill legitimate union

objectives, as applied to Berman the clause served legiti-

mate goals of the Union. The reason for this is that

General Marine and Berman treated employees as fungi-

ble, that is to say, the two affiliate’? companies used

employees interchangeably.'' There was also some trans-

ferring back and forth of vessels between General Marine

and Berman. Berman was not an independent, unrelated

" Mrs. Frank, president of all three affiliated companies, testified as

follows:

Q. The directors of Berman and the directors of General Marine

are the same people, are they not?

A. That's right.

Q. You as the chief operating officer of Berman and of General

Marine use the employees of Berman and General Marine fungibly

[sic] and interchangeably, is that correct?

A. That's correct.

Q. You have Berman employees doing General Marine work and

General Marine employees doing Berman work, is that correct?

A. I would say mostly it was General Marine doing Berman

work.

Q. In any event, you did use them fungibly [sic] and interchange-

ably, is that correct?

A. That's right, with union consent.

12a

Opinion of Court of Appeals

employer. Under these circumstances, there was in reality

but a single employer, with interrelated operations, com-

mon management, and centralized control of labor rela-

tions, see South Prairie Construction Co. v. Local 627,

Operating Engineers, 425 U.S. 800, 802 n.3 (1976) (quot-

ing Radio Union v. Broadcast Service of Mobile, Inc.,

380 U.S. 255, 256 (1965)), and the affiliates clause vitally

affected working conditions and wages of the Union

members. At least for purposes of application of the

antitrust exemption, it was a legitimate union objective to

protect employees against shifts of work days (and ves-

sels) designed to avoid the standards and wages es-

tablished in the collective bargaining agreement Further-

more, cases such as Federal Maritime Commission and

Pennington are not applicable here because they involved

employer bargaining groups and unions conspiring to

injure truly separate concerns. Berman’s underlying fac-

tual premise that it was am unconnected nonparty is

simply not true.

We also agree with the court below, in the alternative,

that even if the vegetable oil and the affiliates clauses do

not fall within the labor exemption, there was no proof of

an antitrust violation under the rule of reason, which

would be applicable here. See, e.g., National Society of

Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,

687-88 (1978); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania

Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 & n.16, 58-59 (1977). Despite the

Union newspaper column’s language quoted in the

margin,'? we fail to discern either an anticompetitive

purpose or an anticompetitive effect. The Supreme

Court, in National Society of Professional Engineers, 435

U.S. at 687-88, made it clear that the inquiry under the

2 See note 5 supra.

13a

Opinion of Court of Appeals

rule of reason is directed at the challenged restraint’s

overall impact on competitive conditions, rather than

whether a particular party has been restrained by the

conduct at issue. In the instant case, neither the vegetable

oil nor the affiliates clause constituted an unreasonable

restraint of trade. There was a good deal of testimony to

establish that the true purposes behind the clauses were

job preservation, maintenance of working conditions,

and safety, none of which is anticompetitive in nature. As

for the effect of the clauses, they were in effect for only a

short period of time, and to the extent that Berman

suffered any drop in the volume of its business, the

evidence clearly demonstrated that it was due to condi-

tions unrelated to this dispute. See generally VD. Leslie,

Principles of Labor Antitrust, 66 U. Va. L. Rev. 1183

(1980) (suggesting that an antitrust violation may be

found only if the union’s use of a restraint is part of a

scheme to regulate a product market by controlling

prices, Outputs, or market allocations).

B. Labor Law Claim

In light of the special jury verdicts set forth in the

margin,'? Berman’s labor law claim must be based essen-

ially on establishing that it was entitled to a directed

verdict on the secondary boycott issue and that the jury

charge confused lawful primary activity with unlawful

secondary activity. The alleged violation of section 303 of

the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 187, depends on whether the

Union violated section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C.

§ 158(b)(4).

Under National Woodwork Manufacturers Association

v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967), it is now well settled that

3 See note 7 supra.

l4a

Opinion of Court of Appeals

section 8(b)(4)(A) (which incorporates by reference sec-

tion 8(e)) and section 8(b)(4)(B) of the NLRA are in-

tended to prohibit not agreements or actions directed

toward the primary employer, but secondary objectives

such as the exertion of pressure on a neutral employer.

The key question, therefore, is whether the provisions

that the Union sought were aimed at preserving work and

maintaining working conditions or whether they were

tactically calculated by the Union to saiisfy its objectives

elsewhere. /d. at 644-45. In NLRB v. International Long-

shoremen’s Association, 48 U.S.L.W. 4765, 4769 (U.S.

June 20, 1980), the Supreme Court stated that

a lawful work preservation agreement must pass two

tests: First, it must have as its objective the preserva-

tion of work traditionally performed by employees

represented by the union. Second, the contracting

employer must have the power to give the employees

the work in question—the so-called “right of con-

trol” test... .

And the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia,

discussing contract clauses analogous to the “two men on

a barge” requirement in the instant case, noted that

[t]he test as to the “primary” nature of a subcontrac-

tor clause in an agreement with a general contractor

has been phrased by scholars as whether it “will

directly benefit employees covered thereby,” and

“seeks to protect the wages and job opportunities of

the employees covered by the contract.” We have

phrased the test as whether the clauses are “germane

to the economic integrity of the principal work unit,”

and seek “to protect and preserve the work and

standards [the union] has bargained for,” or instead

15a

Opinion of Court of Appeals

“extend beyond the [contracting] employer and are

aimed really at the union’s difference with another

employer.”

Painters District Council 48 v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 534, 538

(D.C. Cir. 1964) (footnotes omitted). Although Berman

claims that the Union’s conduct fails these tests, the

evidence does not sustain this argument.

Berman complains about Union pressure on the Asso-

ciation to force Association members not to tow Berman

barges or to hire its tugs. Berman asserts that the history

of the relationship between it and the Union shows that

pressure on Association members not to tow Berman

barges was exerted solely to impose manning and other

labor requirements on nonunit vessels and nonunion

employees. Indeed, Berman contends that any work pres-

ervation argument regarding this point is frivolous be-

cause when Berman hired an Association member’s tug to

tow a Berman barge, Berman gave work to, rather than

took work away from, Association members’ employees.

But this is all a one-sided interpretation of the facts.

The “idle tugs”'* and the “two men on a barge”

requirements were designed to preserve jobs for the bar-

gaining unit, protect Union tugmen from exposure to

serious safety risks, and prevent erosion of contractual

manning standards, see NLRB v. International Long-

shoremen’s Association, 48 U.S.L.W. at 4769; NLRB vy.

National Maritime Union, 486 F.2d 907, 912 (2d Cir.

1973) (“subcontracting clauses . . . which restrict sub-

contracting to those who observe certain pay scales and

conditions of employment, are valid”), cert. denied, 416

14 This refers to the Union effort to obtain a commitment from

employers not to hire outside tugs when their own tugs stood idle.

léa

Opinion of Court of Appeals

U.S. 970 (1974); Painters District Council 48, 328 F.2d at

538-39 (“ ‘to limit the work to employers maintaining

labor standards commensurate with those required by the

Union’ was within ‘the area of legitimate union claim’ ”).

And as for Berman’s claim that it was giving work to

Association employees, this ignores the sometimes com-

petitive relationship between Berman barges and Associa-

tion barges, and the fact that use of Berman’s under-

manned barges may have taken jobs away from the

bargaining unit. In short, as the Union points out, the

Union’s effort to secure the “idle tugs” rule was to

preserve work and its pressure for the “two men on a

barge” requirement was analogous to a legitimate “union

standards” objective rather than to a prohibited “union

signatory” purpose, see National Maritime Union, 486

F.2d at 912. The Union's conduct also is not vulnerable to

Berman’s “right to control” argument because the Union

did not coerce Association members to obtain work for

the Union that the members had no right or power to

assign, NLRB v. Enterprise Association of Pipefitters,

429 U.S. 507, 521-28 (1977).

Certainly there was ample evidence to support this view

that the Union’s objectives were primary rather than

secondary and thus, in our opinion, the trial judge prop-

erly sent the labor law issue to the jury. Furthermore, the

jury charge correctly stated that if the Union’s sole

purpose was work preservation then the activity was

primary and protected, but that if the Union’s purpose

was to force Berman to recognize the Union or to require

Berman to join the Association then the jury had to find

in favor of Berman. See National Woodwork, 386 U.S. at

644-45.

17a

Opinion of Court of Appeals

C. Evidence on Salaries

The final issue is an evidentiary one. Berman claims

that the court erroneously permitted the appellees to

present evidence about the salaries of Berman’s officers

to demonstrate that Berman had not been injured by the

alleged antitrust and labor law violations and that this

evidence unfairly prejudiced the jury. We cannot agree

with this contention. The evidence on salaries was rele-

vant to Berman’s operations because Berman was a close

corporation; it was also admissible to impeach the credi-

bility of Berman’s president, Mrs. Frank. It was within

the trial judge’s discretion to decide that the probative

value cy the evidence was not outweighed by unfair

prejudice, see Fed. R. Evid. 403. As for the cases cited by

Berman, see, ¢.g., United States v. Stahl, 616 F.2d 30,

31-33 (2d Cir. 1980); Koufakis v. Carvel, 425 F.2d 892,

900-05 (2d Cir. 1970), they are inapposite. In each of

those cases the plaintiff had gone to great lengths to

appeal to class prejudice in characterizing the defendant

as a very rich man. Here, the salary information was

simply one of many pieces of evidence and it was submit-

ted for limited purposes, without either undue emphasis

or unscrupulous references.

Judgment affirmed.

18a

Petition for Rehearing

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

Szconp Crecurr

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals

in and for the Second Circuit, held at the United States

Court House, in the City of New York, on the 13th day of

May 13, one thousand nine hundred and eighty-one.

No. 80-7260

Berman Enterprises Inc., Stanparp Tank

Creanine Corp., and Genera, Manine Transport Corp.,

Plaintiff s-Appellants,

vs.

Locat 333, Unrrep Marve Division, IvrerwationaL Lone-

SHOREMEN’s Association, Marine Towtnc anp TRanspor-

tation Emptoyvers’ Association, McAuuister BrotHers,

Inc., Dresetr Vessexr Operators, Inc., Spentonsusx

Transport Service, Inc., Morantua Or Tanker Corpora-

tion, Boucnarp Transportation Company, Inc., Moran

Tow1nc & Transportation Company, Inc., Potine Trans-

PoRTATION Corporation, ExLor Marine Corporation, Rep

Stan Marine Services, Inc., Retwaver Transportation

Companies, Inc., and Turecamo Coastat & Harsor Tow-

tno CoRPORATION,

Defendants-Appellees.

A petition for rehearing containing a suggestion that the

action be reheard in banc having been filed herein by coun-

19a

Petition for Rehearing

sel for the plaintiffs-appellants, Berman Enterprises, Inc.,

Standard Tank Cleaning Corp., and General Marine Trans-

port Corp.,

Upon consideration by the panel that heard the appeal,

it is

Orperep that said petition for rehearing is Dentep.

It is further noted that the suggestion for rehearing in

banc has been transmitted to the judges of the court in

regular active service and to any other judge on the panel

that heard the appeal and that no such judge has requested

that a vote be taken thereon.

/8/ A. Dante Fusaro

A. Daniel Fusaro, Clerk

20a

Bench Opinion of District Court

£1169]

Ocroser 11, 1979

By How. Rosert W. Sweer

on Derenpants’ Motion To Dismiss

The Court: Gentlemen, first of all, I want to thank you

all very much for the very helpful briefs that you have

given me and also for the argument which was again very

useful. And I want to hasten to say what I guess will be-

come obviou~ in the course of these remarks, and that is

that I don’t regard this as a pro forma motion to dismiss,

and it’s been apparent, I think, all along that that was the

case.

Also I should say, by way of preface, I’m sure all of you

are very familiar with the views of the Court of Appeals

on the subject o* motions to dismiss, and there is obviously

an important factor in a case, in any case, but in particular

in a case like this, particularly in an area as difficult as

this one, the risk of precluding the Court of Appeals from

having a full record on which they can make a determina-

tion is [1170] obviously a factor which has to be taken

into consideration, and I take that very seriously, and that

is one of the elements of this decision.

The Court of Appeals, so far as the circuit has indicated

to us in Commerce Tankers v. NMU, and the difficulty

which faces me now, that there Judge Feinberg stated,

“Both these assertions”—that is, the assertions under a

factual situation similar to this—“raise extremely complex

and significant questions on the interaction between the

federal labor and antitrust laws. The accommodation of

these conflicting policies reflected in these laws has aptly

been called a troublesome and unruly issue.”

2la

Bench Opinion of District Court

And I certainly find it so.

Now, with respect to the events relating to the MOTC

strike, the difficulty with the union, with respect to that

difficulty, with respect to the vegetable clause in the 76

contract, and with respect to the affiliation clause in the "76

contract, and those are all shorthands which you gentlemen

understand, I conclude that those are properly subject to

the labor exemption, and were I wrong in that assumption

I would still reach the conclusion that a cause is not set

forth as a result of those elements [1171] alone, for there

has been, in my view, an insufficient showing of any anti-

competitive purpose or effect under the rule of reason

which would apply, if I were wrong, and they could be

considered to be antitrust violations.

However, that in my view does not end the case, although

I recognize that there is argument to the contrary. It seems

to me that there remains a problem, and that is as to

whether or not there is enough to go to the jury on a charge

of a refusal to deal.

In that regard, let me say that I believe the case—I will

grant the motion with respect to Eklof, Diesel and Bou-

chard, for I feel that there has been no showing, even if it

be assumed for the sake of this motion, that a cause has

been set forth, that is, that there is a violation, there has

been on the numbers an insufficient showing of any proxi-

mate cause of injury resulting from that violation, if the

violation were to be found.

Mr. Pollack: Turecamo also, your Honor?

The Court: No. Turecamo is in a different situation

because there the numbers can be argued to create an in-

jury, in my view.

[1172] Now, that leaves you with where we are at the

moment. I also believe that an agreement, if you will, and

22a

Bench Opinion of District Court

using “agreement” to mean a contract, combination, re-

straint of trade, etc., etc., between the Association and the

union or between the union and individual companies to

establish the manning procedures on the barges, that is, to

refuse to tow unmanned barges, I believe that also is

covered by the labor exemption. However, that still, in my

mind, although I think it is difficult, does not necessarily

dispose of the case; and, incidentally, I would propose

that—I will try to frame instructions for the jury some-

what along the lines of what I am now telling you all when

it becomes necessary to do that, for I do think that there

is a case to go to the jury, and that is as to whether or not

there is an agreement or contract or combination in re-

straint of trade to refuse to deal with Berman.

The evidence which I see from which the jury might, it

seems to me, infer such a refusal to deal is the Cornette

conversation with Elzer, the O’Hare conversation with

Bushey, the clauses in the contract, though I believe that

they are part of the labor exemption, I also believe that

they could [1173] be evidence of an intent, and the arguable

loss of business and the fact of the refusal to deal.

Now, I have been troubled by the fact that there has uot

been a totality uf a refusal to deal. Obviously there have

been dealings, but I believe that there is enough from which

the jury might infer that there has been a diminution of

business constituting a refusal to deal.

In reaching that decision, I, of course, am compelled to

view the facts in the most favorable light possible for the

plaintiffs, and, indeed, I may have done so even in a more

favorabe light than the plaintiffs chemselves, but nonethe-

less, that is what I have decided, gentlemen, that there will

be a case of a refusal to deal that will go to the jury as I

23a

Bench Opinion of District Court

have indicated. But there will be instructions with respect

to labor exemptions when the time comes.

Now, how are we going to proceed this afternoon? Ob-

viously we have got these preliminary matters, and then

after that.

Mr. Bernstein: Well, I have these—

The Court: Yes, I say, preliminary matters, exhibits,

whatever you want to call them.

Oh, by the way, yes, my clerk points out to [1174] me

I didn’t say anything about the Labor-Management Rela-

tions Act. Obviously from what I have said, I believe that

there is an issue that should go to the jury as to whether

or not the union sought to compel Berman either to join

the Association or to compel its empleyees to join the

union.

Yes. Mr. Waldman?

Mr. Waldman: Your Honor, I guess I am thinking out

loud now, I have to have some time to consider how I want

to proceed. I had prepared—I guess there is no point in

keeping it secret because it isn’t a secret—my intent was

to go forward this afternoon with witnesses who would

deal with the question of the safety implications of the

one-man-on-a-barge situation, bearing in mind that we have

argued thus far the manning requirement, the job preserva-

tion, there was a second arrow in that quiver, and that was

safety. It strikes me that the court’s ruling may make that

academic unless I want to be sure I have a stronger record

on appeal—

The Court: You do what you want, but despite my deter-

mination I would not consider it irrelevant.

Mr. Waldman: But your present inclination, [1175] or

your ruling is you will not allow that issue to go to the jury.

24a

Bench Opinion of District Court

The Court: No, I will instruct the jury that if they find

that the purpose of the union and the defendants was to

enforce the manning provision, the unmanned-barge pro-

vision, forgive me if the language isn’t proper, but if that

was the purpose of the refusal to deal, if they find a refusal

to deal, they must find for the defendants.

25a

Opinion of District Court

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Souruern Disrrict or New York

77 Civ. 272 (RWS)

Berman Er rerpnises, Inc., Stanparp Tank

Cuieanine Corp., and GeneraL Marine Transport Corp.,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

Locat 333, Unrrep Martve Division,

INTERNATIONAL LoNGSHOREMEN’S Assoc1aTIoN, et al.,

Defendants.

Sweet, D.J.

Plaintiffs Berman Enterprises, Inc. (“Berman”), Stan-

dard Tank Cleaning Corp. (“Standard Tank”), and General

Marine Transport Corp. (“General Marine”) have moved

for a new trial on all issues under Rule 59, Fed.R.Civ.P., for

a directed verdict against defendant Local 333, United

Marine Division, International Longshoremen’s Association

(“Local 333”) under Rule 50, Fed.R.Civ.P., and for entry

of findings of fact, conclusions of law and an injunction

against certain activities by the defendants. The motions

are denied.

The motions under Rules 50 and 59 for a new trial and

for a directed verdict present no facts or legal theories

which were not carefully reviewed and adjudicated at trial.

In the absence of new grounds for relief, the court declines

to alter its rulings on these admittedly complex legal is-

26a

Opinion of District Court

sues, or to disturb the findings reached by the jury after

careful deliberation. Accordingly, these motions are

denied.

Berman has also moved for entry of factual findings and

conclusions of law in accordance with Rule 52, Fed.R.Civ.P.

Berman claims that the court must consider separately a

legal theory which was not presented to the jury and which

calls for entry of injunctive relief independently of the

jury’s verdict. The defendants have submitted pro) osed

findings of fact, but continue to oppose the motion.

Although Berman’s suit is for injunctive relief as well as

damages, Berman is not entitled to separate factual conclu-

sions by the court in this case. It has been consistently held

that where legal claims are combined with equitable claims,

“the legal issues are to be tried first and the findings of the

jury are binding on the trier of the equitable claims.” GTE

Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 986

n. 7 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd, 433 U.S. 36 (1977). See also

Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959); Com-

mercial Iron & Metal Co. v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 581

F.2d 246 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1229

(1979) ; Southland Reship, Inc. v. Flegel 534 F.2d 639, reh.

denied, 539 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1976); Robime v. Ryan, 310

F.2d 797 (2d Cir. 1962).

Berman demanded a jury trial on all issues. The jury

found that there was no agreement, combination or con-

spiracy among the defendants to refuse to deal with Ber-

man in violation of the antitrust laws. The jury also found

that Local 333 did not induce or encourage its members

to refuse to work on Berman vessels or threaten, coerce or

restrain either the Marine Towing and Transportation Em-

ployees’ Association (the “Association”) or the corporate

defendants in order to force Berman to become a member

27a

Opinion of District Court

of the Association, to recognize Local 333 as the represen-

tative of its employees or to force the Association or the

corporate defendants to cease doing business with Berman.

In short, the jury found against Berman on ali factual is-

sues which could provide a predicate for the issuance of

injunctive relief in this case. The jury’s conclusions are

amply supported by the evidence adduced during this three

week trial.

Under these circumstances, there is no basis for entry of

factual findings, conclusions of law or an injunction which

would necessarily contradict the explicit findings of fact

reached by the jury. Therefore the motion under Rule 52

is denied.

Ir Is So Onperep:

/8/ Roserr W. Sweet, U.S_D.J.

Dated: New York, New York

March 3, 1980

Judgment

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SoutHern District or New Yorx

77 Civil 272 (RWS)

Berman Enrerpnises, Iwc., et al,

Plaintiffs,

—against—

Locau 333 Unirep Martye Drvistox,

I~TerNaTIONAL LonosHOREMEN’s Association, et al.,

Defendants.

The issues in the above entitled action having been

brought on regularly for trial, before the Honorable Robert

W. Sweet, United States District Judge, and a jury, on

September 26, October 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, 11, 15, 17, 18 and 19,

1979, and defendants Diesel Vessel Operators, Bouchard

Transportation and Eklof Marine Corp., having moved to

dismiss, and said motion having been granted, and at the

conclusion of the evidence the jury having returned a ver-

dict in favor of the defendants, it is,

Orperep, Apsupcep and Decreep: That the complaint be

and it is hereby dismissed in its entirety.

Dated: New York, N.Y.

October 26, 1979

/s/ Samvet F. Burenarpr, Clerk

L

uol}ISOddG

, on Ollice -Supresas Court, |

No. 81-279 FILED

I SEP 28 1981

N THE

Supreme Court of the United States *- © NBER L STEM!

Octoser Term, 1981 a

BerMaN Enterprises, Inc., STANDARD TANK CLEANING CorP.,

and GENERAL Marine Transport Corp.,

Petitioners,

Vv.

LocaL 333, Unrrep Marine Division, INTERNATIONAL LONGSHORE-

MEN’s ASSsOciIATION, MARINE TOWING AND TRANSPORTATION EM.

PLOYERS AssociaTION, McA.uister Brotuers, INnc., Diesen

VessEL Operators, INc., SPENTONBUSH TRANSPORT SERVICE,

Inc., Moranta Om Tanker Corporation, Boucnarp TRraNns-

PORTATION CoMPANY, INc., Moran Tow1rne & TRANSPORTATION

Company, Inc., Potinc Transportation Corporation, EKLOF

Marine Corporation, Rep Star Marine Services, [nc., Reww-

AUER TRANSPORTATION CoMPANIES, INC., and TurEcAMO CoasTAL

& Harsor Towine Corporation,

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR LOCAL 333,

UNITED MARINE DIVISION,

INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN’S ASSOCIATION

IN OPPOSITION

Seymour M. WaLpMAN

501 Fifth Avenue

New York, N. Y. 10017

(212) 661-1230

Attorney for Respondent Local 333,

United Marine Division,

International Longshoremen’s Association

Wartpman & WatpMay, P.C.

Of Counsel

Questions Presented

1. (a) Whether the courts below properly held that an

employer association and a Union did not violate the Sher-

man Act as a matter of law in voluntarily agreeing to

apply their collective bargaining agreement to subsidiaries

2ud affiliates of contracting employers, when the evidence

showed that the commonly owned and operated plaintiff

corporations—one of which was an Association member

and the other of which was not—interchanged vessels and

employees at will, made fringe benefit contributions for

some but not all employees on both sets of vessels, formed

new vessel-owning or operating companies without inform-

ing the Union and the Association, and in general frus-

trated the Union’s ability to know which vessels and per-

sonnel were covered by the contract and to enforce the

agreed-upon terms and conditions.

(b) Whether the courts below correctly held that this

challenged contract provision did not, in any event, have

the requisite anticompetitive purpose or effect, when it

was never applied to plaintiff Berman, never affected Ber-

man’s operations, caused Berman no damage, and was

shortly rendered ineffective as a matter of law through

an NLBB representation proceeding under which another

union was certified to represent Berman’s employees.

2. (a) Whether the courts below properly held that a

negotiated collective bargaining provision providing that

employers in the contracting Association would not tow

vegetable oil barges without two persons aboard did not

violate the Sherman Act as a matter of law, when the

evidence showed that the Association members operating

vegetable oil barges had two employees aboard, the Union

was concerned about maintenance of that standard man-

ii

ning scale, and the use of less than two persons created

safety hazards to employees in the Union’s bargaining unit.

(b) Whether the courts below correctly held that this

challenged contract provision did not, in any event, have

the requisite anticompetitive purpose and effect, when Ber-

man never operated vegetable oil barges and the challenged

provision was never applied to Berman, never affected its

operations, caused Berman no damage, and shortly after

its adoption was formally deleted from the collective bar-

gaining agreement,

3. Whether the trial court properly submitted to the

jury, under unchallenged instructions, the issue whether

the Union’s efforts to maintain its long-standing contrac-

tual manning standard of two employees aboard petroleum

barges, constituted work preservation which was not vio-

lative of Section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA or a secondary

boycott violative of that Section.

4. Whether the trial court properly permitted defendants

to show the large, increasing salaries paid to the several

family members employed as officers and executives of

Berman, after Berman’s officers had testified to the losses

allegedly incurred by it, its declining credit standing, its

cash flow problems, its recourse to borrowing from friends,

and the personal sacrifices of its principal owner and Pres-

ident in selling her own home.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

Questions Presented i

Table of Authorities iii

Statement of the Case —................ 1

Nature of the Case ........................... 1

The “Subsidiaries and Affiliates” Clause .................... 3

See I RE IID ccc cetcccccecesctnrceneeeniccoinie 6

“Two Men on a Barge”’ .............. a Lae

The Trial Court’s Rulings and Instructions .............. 10

Reasons for Denying the Writ 2.2.2.0. oeeeccceeeeeeees 12

I. The “Subsidiaries and Affiliates” Clause Was Not

Unlawful as a Matter of Law and Had No Anti-

competitive Purpose or Effect 2.02.2... 13

II. The “Vegetable Oil” Clause, an Abortive Effort to

Protect Union Standards and Prevent Safety

Hazards, Did Not Violate the Sherman Act ........ 15

III. The Trial Judge Properly Submitted to the Jury,

Under the Section 303 Count, the Issue Whether

the Union’s Conduct, Including the Negotiation

of the 1976 Contract Provisions, Was Primary or

Fee 17

IV. The “Two Men on a Barge” Effort Was Directed

at Maintenance of Union Standards, the Preser-

vation of Unit Work, and the Prevention of Un-

safe Working Conditions, and, Therefore, Did

Not Violate Section 8(b)(4)(B) as a Matter of

iv

Taste or AUTHORITIES

Cases: PAGE

Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940) ........ 16

Artists & Associates, Inc. H.A. v. Actors’ Equity Asso-

ciation, —— U.S. ——, 45 USLW 4557 (decided May

8 RNR a ane oe ae ae er mo 13

Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421

U.S. 616 (1975) sali ciaicinnsaiancetipioniansldiaibdiaiaiiiell 15, 16

Douds v. ILA, 241 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1957), affirming

147 F.Supp. 108 ...................... 13

Federal Maritime Commission v. Pacific Maritime

Association, 435 U.S. 40 (1978) 14

ILA v. NLRB, 277 F.2d 681 (D.C. Cir. 1960) —.............. 13

NLRB v. ILA, 447 U.S. 490 (1980) _............. 16

NLRB v. Local 825 Operating Engineers, 400 U.S. 297

(1971) 18

NLRB v. NMU, 486 F.2d 907 (2d Cir. 1973), cert.

den’d, 416 U.S. 970 15

NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46 (1974) -................... 18

National Woodwork Manufacturers Ass’n v. NLRB,

IID» istcteecnsniestosccstecestncenanssiuillinten 16, 17

Painters District Council v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 534 (D.C.

PS ie 15

Radio Union v. Broadcast Service of Mobile, Inc., 380

Tain nh cceteirhannieseeneetscilieniiattatanseiieinlgeiniiiida) 13

South Prairie Construction Co. v. Local 627, Operating

Engineers, 425 U.S. 800 (1976) 2. eeeeeeeneceeenneeee 13

Teamsters Local 179 (Alexander Warehouse & Sales

Co.), 128 NLRB 916 (1960) 0... " 17

PAGE

Teamsters Local 560 (Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc.),

248 NLRB No. 156 (1980) 17

UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965) 14

Statutes:

Labor Management Relations Act

Section 303, 29 U.S.C. §187 _.... 2

National Labor Relations Act

Section 8(B)(4)(A), 29 U.S.C. §158(b)(4)(A) —..... 17

Section 8(B)(4)(B), 29 U.S.C. §158(b)(4)(B) ... 17

In THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Ocrosper Term, 1981

No. 81-279

Berman Ewnrerpnises, Ixc., Stanparp Tank CLEANING

Corp., and General Marine Transport Corr.,

Petitioners,

v.

Loca, 333, Unrrep Marine Division, LyrernationaL Lone-

SHOREMEN’s AssociaTiION, Marine Towine anv Trans-

PORTATION EMp Lovers’ Association, Mca.uister Broru-

ens, Inc., Diesen Vesser Orerators, Ixc., SpeNtonsusH

Transport Service, Inc., Morantra Ow. Tanker Cor-

poration, Bovcuarp Transportation Company, Iwnc.,

Moran Tow1rne & Transportation Company, Inc., Potine

Transportation Corporation, Extor Marine Corpora-

tion, Rep Stan Marine Services, Inc., Remnaver Trans-

PorTATION Companies, Inc., and Turecamo CoastaL &

Harsor Tow1rne Corporation,

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR LOCAL 333,

UNITED MARINE DIVISION,

INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN’S ASSOCIATION

IN OPPOSITION

Statement of the Case

Nature of the Case.

In a two-count complaint, plaintiffs' charged all defen-

dants with a concerted refusal to deal in violation of the

‘Only Berman sought damages in this action. The other two

plaintiffs sought only injunctive relief against the contract clauses.

By the time of trial the injunction claim had long since been

mooted.

2

Sherman Act and charged defendant Local 333 with a

secondary boycott in violation of Section 302 of the Labor-

Management Relations Act of 1947, based on identical

allegations.

After a three-week trial, both claims were submitted to

the jury under a series of special verdict questions to

which plaintiffs took no exception. The jury decided

against plaintiffs on all issues (A 1584-1585).*

Plaintiffs raise no question as to the correctness of the

District Judge’s charge to the jury. Their petition centers

on two clauses included in the 1976 collective bargaining

agreement between Local 333 and the multi-employer Asso-

ciation with which the Union negotiates. The petition

creates the misleading impression that these clauses were

the subject of a separate antitrust claim which the trial

court refused to submit to the jury. That is not so. Plain-

tiffs alleged a single antitrust count, the thrust of which

w is that the defendant corporations, at the instigation of

the Union, refused to do business with Berman; and that

was the burden of their case throughout the lawsuit (A

19-20). The contract clauses were simply two items of

evidence adduced in support of that claim.

Neither contract provision, if applied to Berman, would

have caused Berman’s business with the other defendants

to have ceased or diminished or had any other effect al-

leged in the complaint. But neither clause was ever applied

to Berman or enforced against it. Plaintiff's own President

and principal stockholder testified flatly that neither clause

had any impact upon Berman. One of the two clauses was

deleted from the collective agreements less than three

months after its negotiation and the other was ineffective

* Numbers preceded by “A” refer to page numbers in the Joint

Appendix in the Court of Appeals. Numbers followed by “a” refer

to the Appendix to the petition.

from the outset and soon thereafter became inapplicable

as a matter of law. Accordingly, the trial Judge correctly

charged that these clauses in and of themselves, could not

constitute an actionable Sherman Act violation, although

he specifically instructed the jury that it could consider

them as evidence of an antitrust combination.

Both the District Court and Court of Appeals also held,

in full consonance with the decisions of this Court and

the Courts of Appeals, that neither clause, in the cireum-

stances of this case, violated the Sherman Act.

The only other contention pressed by plaintiff relates

to what was termed the “two men on a barge” issue. Al-

though their position is not made clear, they seem to urge

that this Union effort entitled Berman to a directed verdict

on the secondary boycott claim as a matter of law. Again,

they do not challenge the jury instructions which faithfully

mirrored the terms of the governing statute and the deci-

sions of this Court.

The “Subsidiaries and Affiliates” Clause.

In 1969, several vears before the incorporation of plain-

tiff Berman, General Marine, then the vessel-operating

company: of the Berman family, recognized Local 333 as

the collective bargaining representative for the crew mem-

bers aboard five named vessels (A 1564-1565, 1187). Gen-

eral Marine was a member of the Association and bound

by its collective agreements with the Union (A 1241, 1189-

1190). Several years later, the family formed Berman

Enterprises, Inc., but gave the Union no notice of this

fact and continued to deal with the Union—and other com-

panies as well—in the name of General Marine (.\ 417-418,

456, 603-604, 1498-1525).

The plaintiff companies were commonly owned, managed

and operated as an integrated enterprise; Evelyn Berman

4

Frank, President and principal stockholder, conducted the

labor relations of all three. Corporate officers were paid

salaries by one company to cover their work for all, and

funds were shared by all entities as needed (A 528, 552-

554, 669-671).

Mrs. Frank transferred both vessels and personnel back

and forth between her operating companies “fungibly and

interchangeably” (A 554, 556-558). When boats were shift-

ed from one company to another, the Union was not ad-

vised (A 456-457, 603). Contributions to the collectively

bargained pension and insurance funds were made in the

name of General Marine, with no consistency, not only for

crews aboard the sludge vessels—the nominal General

Marine boats—but for employees on Berman tugs, barges

and tankers as well (A 855, 861-862, 1498-1525).

The Union never knew which vessels and employees were

within the bargaining unit covered by its Association

agreement and which were not; and Union officials made

no secret of their frustration on this score. Because of

the confused status fostered by plaintiffs’ mode of opera-

tion, the Union experienced difficulty in enforcing the

agreement; and the employment conditions aboard plain-

tiffs’ vessels did not comply with those prescribed by the

collective agreement (A 290-291, 337).

Prompted at least in part by the elusive nature of the

Berman-General Marine enterprise, the Union included

among its contract demands in 1976 a proposal that “sub-

sidiaries and affiliates” of Association companies be cov-

ered by the new agreement. During the course of negotia-

tions, Mrs. Frank was offered the opportunity to withdraw

from the Association so that her companies would not be

bound by the contract; she was advised that, in light of

Union pressures, the Association would probably agree to

this demand (A 1280, 272-273, 279-282, 285-287). The Union

indicated that it would acquiesce in General Marine’s with-

drawal from the negotiations (A 299-294), although other-

wise untimely under NLRB doctrine (A 1189); but Mrs.

Frank declined to do so (A 319-320). After extensive nego-

tiations, the clause was included in the 1976 agreement.

In early April, 1976, shortly after the making of the

new contract, General Marine formally repudiated it, con-

tending that the “subsidiaries and affiliates” clause con-

stituted an improper attempt to enlarge the bargaining unit

without its consent. Berman took the position that as a

nonmember of the Association, it was not bound by the

Association agreement, and Berman never adhered to the

terms of that agreement (A 573-574, 1187-1189, 1530-1536).

In mid-April 1976, two weeks after the new agreement

became effective, Berman recognized a rival labor organ-

ization, the Marine Engineers Beneficial Association

(MEBA) as exclusive bargaining representative of all its

employees. There followed a flurry of Labor Board ac-

tivity: an unfair labor practice charge by Local 333; a

settlement agreement by which Berman rescinded the recog-

nition of MEBA and agreed not to recognize any union

unless certified by the Board; a simultaneous representation

petition filed by Berman; and a lengthy representation

proceeding during which Berman maintained that its

NLBB settlement precluded it from dealing with any union.

In December 1976, the Regional Director ordered an elec-

tion which was held in January 1977. MEBA won and has

thereafter been representing Berman’s employees (A 625-

630, 1484, 1531-1536, 1567-1568). Since the NLRB certifica-

tion of MEBA in January 1977—the very day this action

was commenced—the Association-Local 333 agreement, in-

cluding the “subsidiaries and affiliates” clause, could not

be applied to Berman as a matter of law. There is no evi-

dence that anyone sought to do so.

Thus, at no time since the effective date of the new Asso-

ciation-Local 333 agreement, April 1, 1976, has that con-

tract been applied to Berman, been observed by Berman,

or governed the terms and conditions of employment of

Berman’s employees. Understandably, Mrs. Frank testified

that this clause never affected Berman (A 573-575).

The “Vegetable Oil” Clause.

For many years Local 333 has had separate bargaining

relationships with a company called Manhattan Oil Trans-

port Co, (“MOTC”), which operated barges carrying

vegetable oil, not petroleum products, and one tug, the

Michael Tracy, which was covered by MOTC’s Local 333

agreement and supplied about 95% of its towing needs

(A 217-220). Unlike the great bulk of towing and tranis-

portation employees in New York Harbor, MOTC’s barge-

men were represented by a labor organization other than

Local 333 (A 175). That organization, while insisting that

two bargemen be aboard during transfer of cargo, per-

mitted the barges to travel unmanned, a condition which

Local 333 considered hazardous to its tugmen (A 182-183).

Securing unmanned barges to tugs required tug deckhands

to jump from tug to barge and back again, across open

water, from one slippery level to another, often in the

dark. When barges are manned, lines are tossed or handed

from the employee stationed aboard one vessel to the em-

ployee aboard the other (A 308-311, 340-341, 198-200).

Local 333 has one other company under contract which

operates vegetable oil barges; that company keeps two men

aboard its barges at all times, and the Union feared that

it would seek the same reduced manning as MOTC (A 175-

177, 302-304, 306). Accordingly, for safety reasons and

manning scale preservation, the Union sought, unsuccess-

fully as it turned out, to insure that tugs crewed by Local

7

333 members were not required to tow unmanned MOTC

barges.

As a result of a Union bargaining demand, the 1976 Asso-

ciation-Local 333 agreement included a new provision that

no tug covered by the agreement would tow any vegetable

oil barge of specified capacity without two bargemen

aboard (A 1212). That clause had no effect, was never

applied to Berman, and was soon deleted from the contract.

In early April, 1976 having concluded the Association

agreement, the Union began negotiations with MOTC,

pressing the same demand for the tug Michael Tracy.

MOTC resisted, tied up the Michael Tracy, locked out its

Local 333 tug crew, successfully operated its barges with

the aid of Berman tugs, and forced the Union to accept

an agreement which did not require two men aboard vege-

table oil barges towed by the Local 333 tug Michael Tracy.

Meanwhile the NLRB Regional Director was considering

an unfair labor practice charge filed by plaintiffs under

§ 8(e) of the NLRA against the “vegetable oil” clause in

the Association-Local 333 contract. Rather than litigate

the issue—particularly in light of its failure to obtain a

similar provision covering the tug performing 95% of

MOTC towing—the Union agreed to delete the clause in

the Association’s collective agreement. On June 15, 1976,

the Union wrote the Association confirming the parties’

understanding that this clause would no longer be imple-

mented or enforced against anyone (A 1496). Since then,

the clause has in fact been a dead letter; and Berman has

never contended otherwise. Mrs. Frank testified that the

“vegetable oil” clause, like the “subsidiaries and affiliates”

clause, did not affect or injure plaintiffs (A 570-575).

“Two Men on a Barge”.

The principal economic activity of the towing industry

is the transportation of petroleum products; and the “two

men on a barge” issue relates to the towing of oil barges.

The considerations underlying the Union’s position were

similar to those prompting the vegetable oil controversy,

but even more compelling.

Petroleum products, unlike vegetable oils, are highly

combustible, with the ever-present hazard of fire or explo-

sion (A 221). Moreover, although vegetable oil transfers

generally take place only during normal business hours

(A 221-222), petroleum barges operate around the clock,

seven days a week. They may make a number of trips

during each 24-hour day, with loading or discharge of oil

being accomplished several times during this span. When

a barge is being loaded or discharged, a bargeman must

be on duty, under Coast Guard regulations as well as basic

safety requirements (A 473-474, 597, 838-839).

The Association-Local 333 collective bargaining agree-

ment covering oil barges has long provided that they shall

have a four-man crew, two of whom shall be on duty at

all times, while the other two are at home on earned vaca-

tion time (A 1349). The two bargemen spell each other

during the round-the-clock operation, so that each is ade-

quately rested (A. 473-474). Furthermore, during heavy

seas, it is often necessary to have two bargemen on duty

to insure the safety of the tow and of the tugboat crew.

For at such times, to prevent vessel damage, the barge,

that is, it is towed at the end of a long rope or hawser.

that is, it is towed at the end of a long rope on hawser.

If a barge has but a single employee, the change in towing

configuration requires a tugboat employee to jump from

tug to barge, and back again, while both boats are in

transit, across rongh seas, with slippery decks at hoth ends

9

of the leap. With two men aboard the barge, this is un-

necessary (A 555, 829-832, 834, 840-844, 846-849).

Contrary to the universal practice aboard the Associa-

tion member barges, Berman sought to operate its barges

with only one aboard, or with no one aboard, Berman

barges had one employee assigned to them, usually for a

full week, around the clock; and he generally remained

aboard at all times during his assignment (A 555, 836-840,

902-907). This often resulted in round-the-clock assign-

ments with virtually no rest (A 834-840, 919-925, 927-930),

imperiling not only the bargeman’s own safety but that

of the tug crew dependent upon his alertness.

This practice of Berman’s also posed a serious threat

to the Union’s contract standards. With only half the

crew of an Association barge, Berman’s barge labor costs

were substantially lower; and on the basis cf labor costs,

Berman could take work away from Local 333 contract

barges. Moreover, Association members, faced with the

choice of using their own barges or Berman’s, would have

a strong economic incentive to contract out the work to

Berman. Thus Berman’s lower labor costs—or those of any

other company seeking to operate undermanned barges—

threatened to diminish the work opportunities and earn-

ings of Loca] 333 bargemen and generate pressure to lower

the manning scale for barges under the Local 333 collec-

tive agreement, thus impairing the Union’s most basic con-

tract standards. The Association members were fully

aware of these cost differentials resulting from under-

manning and did in fact hire Berman barges extensively.

The Union and its members took the position that in

order to prevent Local 333 employees from being exposed

to unnecessary safety hazards and to protect their contract

standards and preserve the work opportunities of the bar-

gaining unit, Local 333 contract tugs should not tow under-

10

manned barges. This position was not confined to Berman

nor was it initiated after the April 1, 1976 agreement (A

367-368, 434-435, 1306).

However, the evidence also established that this Union

effort was directed at maintaining manning scales within

its contract bargaining unit and not at achieving some

other objective vis-a-vis Berman. In asking its own con-

tract employers not to tow Berman barges without two

men aboard, the Union made no other demands. It did not

say that Berman should join the Association, that its

vessels should employ Local 333 members, or that Berman

should adhere to any other contract terms. And, most sig-

nificantly, when a second man was placed aboard, the opera-

tion proceeded without protest or hindrance (A 505, 519,

524-525).

The Trial Court’s Rulings and Instructions

After extensive argument on the motion to dismiss at

the end of plaintiffs’ case, the trial Court ruled that al-

though the question was close, both claims should be sub-

mitted to the jury. On the Sherman Act claim, the Court

stated that the “subsidiaries and affiliates” and “vegetable

oil” clauses were subject to the labor exemption and, alter-

natively, were not independently actionable because of “an

insufficient showing of anticompetitive purpose or effect”

(A 814-815). He stated, however, that the jury could con-

sider these contract clauses as “evidence of intent” (A

816-817).

With respect to the secondary boycott claim, the Court

stated only that “there is an issue that should go to the

jury as to whether the union sought to compel Berman

either to join the Association or to compel its employees

to join the union” (A 817-818).

ll

In his charge to the jury, the Court treated the two con-

tract clauses as follows (A 1128):

“The insertion in the collective bargaining agree-

ment between Local 333 and the Association of the

vegetable oil clause, about which you have heard testi-

mony, and the affiliates clause purporting to include

Berman in the collective bargaining agreement, the in-

sertion of those clauses in and of themselves is not

sufficient to show a violation of the antitrust laws.

However, you may consider those clauses and their

insertion in the collective bargaining agreement as

evidence of an illegal contract, combination or con-

spiracy as alleged by the plaintiff.”

In his charge on the secondary boycott claim, the trial

Judge did not specifically mention the contract clauses;

nor did he instruct the jury that the “two men on a barge”

effort constituted protected activity as a matter of law.

The Court charged that if the Union’s sole purpose was

to preserve manning standards on the barges—that is,

work preservation for members of the bargaining unit—

then the activity was primary and protected. On the other

hand, the Court on two occasions emphasized that if the

Union’s purpose—or more specifically, if an objective—

was to have the Union become representative of Berman

employees, or to require Berman to join the Association,

or to coerce the corporate defendants to cease doing busi-

ness with Berman, then the jury must find for plaintiffs

(A 1136-1140, 1585). His Sherman Act charge on the

labor exemption was to the same effect (A 1134-1135).

The jury found that there was no agreement, combina-

tion or conspiracy to refuse to deal with Berman in viola-

tion of the antitrust laws and thus was not required to

address the ensuing question as to the applicability of the

labor exemption (A 1584). It also found against Berman

on the secondary boycott claim.

12

Reasons for Denying the Writ

The decision of the Court of Appeals is correct, in ac-

cord with the decisions of this Court and other Circuit

Courts of Appeals, and presents no issue of general im-

portance. Both the District Court and the Second Circuit

properly held that the two challenged contract provisions

were not illegal under the Sherman Act in and of them-

selves. The special facts which informed these holdings—

particularly plaintiffs’ own practice of shuttling crew

members and vessels, on an interchangeable, fungible basis,

between General Marine and Berman—are unlikely to be

replicated. Moreover even if these rulings presented an

issue of importance—which they do not—the alternative

holding based on the ineffectiveness and deletion of the

challenged contract provisions makes this case a particu-

larly inappropriate vehicle for review.

The “two men on a barge” issue also presents no re-

viewable issue. There was ample evidence that this Union

effort was aimed at maintaining union manning and safety

standards and preserving work for bargaining unit em-

ployees through eliminating competition based on labor

costs. Accordingly, that issue was properly submitted to

the jury under unchallenged instructions.’

*Tn our view, the admissibility of evidence as to the large in-

creases in the substantial Berman family salaries, following plain-

tiffs’ evidence of corporate fiseal problems and personal

so clearly presents a garden variety trial ruling of no general

importance that we will not discuss it further and will rely on the

record and decisions below and the brief of the association and

the defendant corporations.

13

The “Subsidiaries and Affiliates” Clause Was Not

Unlawful as a Matter of Law and Had No Anticompeti-

tive Purpose or Effect.

The Courts below properly held that under the facts of

this case, with “but a single employer, with interrelated

operations, common management and centralized control

of labor relations” (12a), the principles of South Prairie

Construction Co. v, Local 627, Operating Engineers, 425

U.S. 800 (1976) and Radio Union v. Broadcast Service of

Mobile, Inc., 380 U.S, 255 (1965) govern. Berman was not

an “unconnected nonparty” (Jbid); and there was ample

evidence that the General Marine-Berman tactics frustrat-

ed the Union’s efforts to enforce the agreement. Accord-

ingly, as the Court of Appeals held, “for purposes of the

antitrust exemption, it [this contract provision] was a

legitimate union objective to protect employees against

shifts of work days (and vessels) designed to avoid the

standards and wages established in the collective bargain-

ing agreement.” (Ibid). See Artists & Associates, Inc.

H.A. v. Actors’ Equity Association, -—- U.S. ——, 45

USLW 4557 (decided May 26, 1981).

Moreover, even if this be deemed an enlargement of the

bargaining unit, which realistically it was not, there was

no antitrust violation, for employers and their contracting

union, by mutual agreement, may lawfully accomplish that

objective. ILA v. NLRB, 277 F.2d 681 (D.C. Cir. 1960) ;

Douds v. ILA, 241 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1957), affirming 147

F. Supp. 103, Here, moreover, General Marine, the Asso-

ciation member, was given the opportunity to withdraw

from the Association and from any ensuing agreement

after being advised of the likely inclusion of the “subsidi

aries and affiliates” clause, and chose, instead, to remain.

14

The cases cited in the petition are not inconsistent with

the decision below. As the Second Circuit correctly noted

(12a), UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965) and Fed-

eral Maritime Commission v. Pacific Maritime Association,

435 U.S. 40 (1978) involved labor-management combina-

tions to injure truly separate, unrelated concerns. This

is not such a case. The Court of Appeals cases cited at

page 18 of the petition involved other provisions of the

labor law and totally dissimilar facts; there the bargaining

units were separate and distinct, with no substantial inter-

changeability of employees, no elusive shifting of person-

nel in and out of the agreement, and no common labor

relations control.

Finally, the Courts below correctly held that the “sub-

sidiaries and affiliates” provision did not have the requisite

anticompetitive purpose or effect, a ruling that raises no

issue worthy of review by this Court. The purpose of the

provision was to prevent evasion of the agreement by

practices fully established in the record. If enforced, it

would not have led to a refusal to deal with Berman, the

sole anticompetitive restraint alleged in the complaint.

But, under the particular sequence of events shown through

official NLRB records and admitted by plaintiffs’ Pres-

ident, it was never enforced, had no impact whatever, and

soon became legally ineffective. In these circumstances, it

could not have served as the basis of antitrust liability,

bet, at most, an item of evidence to be considered by the

jury in determining whether an actionable combination

existed. That is precisely how it was treated.

15

The “Vegetable Oil” Clause, an Abortive Effort to

Protect Union Standards and Prevent Safety Hazards,

Did Not Violate the Sherman Act.

Firmly rooted in labor and antitrust law is the distine-

tion between protecting union standards and restricting

dealing to union signatories. The former is valid under

both bodies of law, for it represents a legitimate union

effort to preserve the negotiated wages, benefits, and work-

ing conditions against lower labor labor costs that threaten

to undermine those established standards. Union signatory

restraints are disapproved, because they rest not on the

protection of union standards but on the mere existence

of a union contract; and non-signatories may maintain la-

bor standards and labor costs at least as favorable to

employees as a union signatory. This distinction under-

lies the antitrust analysis in Connell Construction Co. v.

Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975) and has been

consistently recognized by the NLRB and the Courts.

NLRB v. NMU, 486 F.2d 907, 912 (2d Cir. 1973), cert.

den’d, 416 U.S. 970; Painters Distrcit Council v. NLRB,

328 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir. 1964).

The “vegetable oil” clause, short-lived and ineffective as

it was, clearly constituted a “union standards” not a “un-

ion signatory” provision. Embodied in a collective bargain-

ing agreement, it governed the conduct of contract em-

ployers and the tugs which they operated; and its require-

ment as to the crewing of barges towed by those unit tugs

had direct relationship to maintaining the manning stan-

dards of unit vegetable oil barges and preserving safe

working conditions. There was no requirement that the

barge-owner be under contract to any union or that the

bargemen be union members. Accordingly, the Court of

16

Appeals’ conclusion that this clause did not constitute an

actionable antitrust boycott but was protected by the labor

exemption fully accords with governing law.

The petition errs profoundly in arguing that collective

bargaining agreements between a union and employers

may not validly restrict dealings between the contracting

employers and outside companies. Such restrictions are

routinely and validly imposed by union standards pro-

visions, no-subcontracting provisions, and many other

forms of legitimate work preservation. National Wood-

work Manufacturers Ass’n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967);

NLRB vy. ILA, 447 U.S. 490 (1980).

This Court has long held that a union’s efforts to elimi-

nate labor cost competition between its contract employ-

ers and other concerns do not violate the Sherman Act,

even though they may affect business relationships between

the two sets of companies. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,

310 U.S. 469 (1940); Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers

Local 100, supra. Connell makes clear that “labor policy

requires tolerance for the lessening of business competi-

tion based on differences in wages and working conditions”

even though “standardizing wages ultimately will affect

price competition among employers”; otherwise “the goals

of federal labor law could never be achieved.” 421 U.S.

at 622.

Moreover, the Courts below also correctly recognized,

as an alternative ground for their decision, that the vege-

table oil clause never impacted on Berman or anyone

else, was never applied to any vegetable oil operation,

and was soon deleted from the agreement. This alterna-

tive holding, sufficient to justify the trial court’s ruling

and charge, presents no reviewable issue.

17

The Trial Judge Properly Submitted to the Jury,

Under the Section 303 Count, the Issue Whether the

Union’s Conduct, Including the Negotiation of the 1976

Contract Provisions, Was Primary or Secondary.

Point II of the petition appears to urge that the Union’s

conduct in the 1976 negotiations, whether deemed primary

or secondary, entitled Berman to a directed verdict

because “the distinction between primary and secondary

labor activity” is relevant only to Section 8(b)(4)(B) and

not to Section 8(b)(4)(A) of the }.URA (Petition p. 20).

This argument, which was not made at trial, is untenable

for several reasons, none of which merit review by this

Court. First and foremost, the contention that Section

8(b)(4)(A) of the NLRA does not embody the distinction

between primary and secondary labor activity was ex-

pressly rejected by this Court in National Woodwork

Manufacturers Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967). Sec-

ond, as indicated above, Berman was not an independent,

unrelated company but part of a single integrated mari-

time operation, commonly owned, managed and staffed.

One corporate half of a common employer cannot invoke

Section 8(b)(4) against an effort to apply a collective

agreement to its corporate twin. See Teamsters Local 560

(Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc.), 248 NLRB No. 156

(1980); Teamsters Local 179 (Alexander Warehouse &

Sales Co.), 128 NLR 916 (1960). Particularly is this so

when General Marine elected to remain in the Association,

declining the opportunity to withdraw, with knowledge that

the “affiliates” clause would be included in the new agree-

ment.

Moreover, Berman was not subjected to “coercion, threat

or restraint” in connection with this clanse, so the initial

prerequisite of a Section 8(b)(4) violation was lacking,

18

NLRB vy. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. at 46 (1974); or at least

the jury could so find; and a directed judgment, therefore,

would have been error on that account. Indeed, inasmuch

as plaintiffs’ President admitted that the “affiliates” clause

caused Berman no damage, that essential element of a

Section 303 claim was also lacking. Finally, as shown

above, the clause was ineffective in fact, and shortly after-

wards, as a matter of law.

IV

The “Two Men on a Barge” Effort Was Directed at

Maintenance of Union Standards, the Preservation of

Unit Work, and the Prevention of Unsafe Working

Conditions, and, Therefore, Did Not Violate Section

8(b) (4) (B) as a Matter of Law.

Berman argues that the “two men on a barge” issue

should not have gone to the jury. In light of the extensive

evidence as to the labor cost advantages accruing to Ber-

man from its substandard manning, the Association mem-

bers’ appreciation of the lower barge charter fees resulting

from this labor cost differential, the extent to which Asso-

ciation members did hire Berman barges, and the Union’s

willingness to tow Berman barges when manned by two

crewmen, the only serious issue was whether Berman, not

the Union, had shown enough to merit a jury submission.

The authorities cited in Point IT above in connection with

the “vegetable oil” clause refute any claim that the “two

men on a barge” effort constituted a secondary boycott

as a matter of law.

NLRB vy, Local 825 Operating Engineers, 400 U.S. 297

(1971), on which petitioners rely, is wholly inapposite and

presents no inconsistency with the decision below. That

ease did not involve the protection of union standards at

19

all, but rather classic union signatory pressure. The union

struck to force certain employers to sign a contract which

would bind unrelated employers and require the employ-

ment of union members on the disputed work. In its “two

men on a barge” effort, Local 333 did not attempt to have

its members assigned aboard Berman barges, and the jury

was instructed to find for Berman if it concluded this to

be the Union’s objective. The notion that Berman was

entitled to a directed judgment is based on both an erro-

neous view of the controlling law and what the Court of

Appeals aptly characterized as “a one-sided interpretation

of the facts.” (15a)

CONCLUSION

This Court should deny the Petition for a Writ of

Certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

Seymour M. WaLpMas

501 Fifth Avenue

New York, N.Y. 10017

(212) 661-1230

Attorney for Respondent

Local 333, United Marine

Division, International

Longshoremen’s Association

Watpman & Wautpmay, P.C.

Of Counsel

Tn el eee eee i | ie |

G

uonisoddo

gie

MLEXANDER L STEVAS

CLERK

OCTOBER TERM, 1981

~~

BERMAN ENTERPRISES INC., STANDARD TANK CLEANING CORP,

and GENERAL MARINE TRANSPORT CORP,

Petitioners,

—_V¥i§.—

LOCAL 333, UNITED MARINE DIVISION, INTERNATIONAL LONGSHORE.

MEN’S ASSOCIATION, MARINE TOWING AND TRANSPORTATION EM.

PLOYERS’ ASSOCIATION, MCALLISTER BROTHERS, INC., DIESEL VES.

SEL OPERATORS, INC., SPENTONBUSH TRANSPORT SERVICE, INC.,

MORANIA OIL TANKER CORPORATION, BOUCHARD TRANSPORTATION

COMPANY, INC., MORAN TOWING & TRANSPORTATION COMPANY,

INC., POLING TRANSPORTATION CORPORATION, EKLOF MARINE Cor.

PORATION, RED STAR MARINE SERVICES, INC., REINAUER TRANSPOR.

TATION COMPANIES, INC., and TURECAMO COASTAL & HARBOR TOW.

ING CORPORATION,

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR AWRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

———_—_—

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO CERTIORARI

DANIEL A. POLLACK

MARTIN I. KAMINSKY

61 Broadway (Suite 2500)

New York, New York 10006

(212) 952-0330

Counsel for Respondents

Marine Towing and Transporta-

tion Employers’ Association, et al.

POLLACK & KAMINSKY

Of Counsel

(For List of Company Counsel see pages 23-24)

Questions for Review

Re: Petitioners’ Point I

A. Was the court of appeals correct in affirming the

district court’s ruling that the vegetable oil clause and the

affiliates clause in the 1976 labor contract between the

Association and Local 333 were within the labor exemp-

tion to the antitrust laws?

B. Even if the court of appeals was not correct regard-

ing the applicability of the labor exemption, was the court

of appeals nevertheless correct in affirming the decision

of the district court because there was no proof of an

antitrust violation under the rule of reason?

Re: Petitioners’ Point IV

C. Was the court of appeals correct in affirming the

district court’s ruling that it was permissible for defen-

dants to adduce evidence of the salaries of officers of the

plaintiff corporations for the purpose of impeaching

credibility?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SD BOP TD ok nc ck cccccconccccccsccces

GEES oboe ccc cccesenedccsececees

i - <. 4 ce PNieseGed 6eehe HeNeeesenuseeees

Counterstatement of the Case... .........0.00065

Counterstatement of the Facts ..............005-

Response to Point I—

The vegetable oil and affiliates clauses fall

within the labor exemption to the antitrust

laws and, even if they do not, there was no

proof of an antitrust violation .............

Response to Point IV—

The salary evidence was admissible to im-

SE ES ok ceUcbcncccesccecscusces

EB GRE te

13

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: PAGE

Borger v. Yamaha Internatl. Corp., 625 F.2d 390

SE eee 17, 18n.

Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429

EE EE eT eer Pee 21

Chicago Board oj Trade v. United States, 246 U.S.

SSR a eee 18

Commerce Tankers Corp. v. National Maritime

Union of America, 553 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1977)... 16n.

Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433

i es 650th onkitededsebecsusene 15, 16, 18

Federal Maritime Commission v. Pacific Maritime

Association, 435 U.S. 40 (1978) ............... 13

GAF Corp. v. Circle Floor Co., 463 F.2d 752 (2d

Cir. 1972), cert. dismissed, 413 U.S. 901 (1973) .20, 21

Jacobi v. Bache & Co., Inc., 377 F.Supp. 86

(S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 1231 (2d Cir.

1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1053 (1976) ....... 20

Kestenbaum v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 575 F.2d

Ey EN 6 5h bbbe bs 406 606Kkeebeedess 17

Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.

dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977) ................ 16n.

Murphy Tugboat Co. v. Crowley, 454 F.Supp. 847

CR ee er ere 20, 21

National Society of Professional Engineers v.

United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) ............ 15, 17

iv

PAGE

Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356

SE v o6kbsscdevewn sceepeusrenehehes 16

Radio Union v. Broadcast Service, 380 U.S. 255

ee er ee 14

South Prairie Construction Co. v. Local 627,

Operating Engineers, 425 U.S. 800 (1976) (per

eer err err? Pr rrr tre re 14

Uniroyal, Inc. v. Jetco Auto Service, Inc., 461

F.Supp. 350 G.D.B.Y. FOE)... cc cccccccccces 20, 21

United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657

Dintccalddretetinsscedatebsesscees eueees 13

Other Authorities:

Areeda, Antitrust Violations Without Damage Re-

coveries, 89 Harv.L.Rev. 1127 (1976) .......... 21

Handler, Labor and Antitrust: A Bit of History, 40

cde TED 0 0.6 ohabe6 eee secenseds 16n.

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1981

No. 81-279

i ae

BERMAN ENTERPRISES INC., STANDARD TANK CLEANING

Core, and GENERAL MARINE TRANSPORT Corp,

° Petitioners,

. -—V¥3.—

Loca 333, UNITED MARINE DIVISION, INTERNATIONAL

LONGSHOREMEN’S ASSOCIATION, MARINE TOWING AND

TRANSPORTATION EMPLOYERS’ ASSOCIATION, MCALLIS-

TER BROTHERS, INC., DIESEL VESSEL OPERATORS, INC.,

SPENTONBUSH TRANSPORT SERVICE, INC., MORANIA

O1t TANKER CORPORATION, BOUCHARD TRANSPORTA

TION COMPANY, INC., MORAN TOWING & TRANSPORTA

TION COMPANY, INC., POLING TRANSPORTATION CORPO-

RATION, EKLOF MARINE CORPORATION, RED STAR

MARINE SERVICES, INC., REINAUER TRANSPORTATION

COMPANIES, INC., and TURECAMO COASTAL & HARBOR

TOWING CORPORATION,

Respondents.

>

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO CERTIORARI*

This brief in opposition to certiorari is submitted on

behalf of the Marine Towing and Transportation Employ-

ers’ Association (“the Association”) and all of the com-

pany defendants. Local 333, the other defendant, is

separately represented. Since Points II and III of the

petition relate to labor law claims not asserted against the

Association or the company defendants, they are not

addressed in this brief.

2

Summary

The petition for certiorari should be denied: the spe-

cific considerations for the grant of certiorari set forth in

Rule 19 are not present in this case, nor is there any other

important or special reason for this court to review this

case. Petitioners’ claim (Petition, p. 13) that this case

“raises questions of exceptional importance to competi-

tion and the appropriate limits of multiemployer bargain-

ing” is incorrect. The court of appeals and the district

court both correctly concluded that the two challenged

clauses in the contract were within the labor exemption to

the antitrust laws (thus raising no antitrust issues) and,

even if they were not, “there was no proof of an antitrust

violation under the rule of reason.” (A. 12a). Since the

result in both courts below was bottomed on a failure of

proof, there is no compelling reason for this Court to

review the correctness of the ruling relating to the applica-

bility of the labor exemption—that ruling was not essen-

tial to the result below. The other issue tendered by

petitioners, an evidentiary ruling by the district court,

hardly requires review by the highest court in the land.

Counterstatement of the Case

Plaintiffs,* three companies engaged in the marine

transportation business under common ownership, sued

all defendants under the antitrust laws and one defen-

dant—Local 333—under the labor laws. Defendants are

of three categories: (a) the Marine Towing and Transpor-

tation Employers’ Association (the “Association”), a

group of companies operating tugs and barges in and

outside New York harbor, (b) a number of the member

The term “plaintiffs” is used throughout this brief to refer to

petitioners.

3

companies of the Association, and (c) Local 333, the

union representing the seamen working on the tugs and

barges.

The antitrust claim, which is the only claim asserted

against the Association and the member company defen-

dants, charged an agreement and conspiracy among all

defendants to prevent plaintiffs from providing marine

transportation services in New York harbor, in violation

of Sherman Act, Section 1.

At the close of plaintiffs’ case, the district court (Judge

Robert W. Sweet) dismissed that portion of plaintiffs’

antitrust claim based on the 1976 labor contract between

the Association and Local 333. The district court held

that the inclusion of the two challenged clauses in the

contract was protected by the labor exemption to the

antitrust laws and, even if it were not, plaintiffs had

failed to make any showing that either clause violated the

antitrust laws.

The balance of plaintiffs’ antitrust claim—i.e., alleged

concerted refusal to deal—went to the jury. At the conclu-

sion of a three-week trial, during which all issues were

thoroughly aired, the jury rendered a special verdict

rejecting plaintiffs’ claim. The jury was asked this ques-

tion and gave this answer:

“Was there an agreement, combination or con-

spiracy among two or more of the defendants to

refuse to deal with plaintiff Berman Enterprises, Inc.

(‘Berman’) in violation of the antitrust laws?

Yes _.__

No X .”

All post-trial motions by plaintiffs were denied by the

district court.

4

The court of appeals (Oakes, Meskill, Werker) unani-

mously affirmed. Rehearing was sought and denied.

Counterstatement of the Facts

The parties

The three plaintiffs are all companies engaged in the

inarine transportation business in New York harbor

(526a-28a).* All three companies are owned and operated

by Evelyn Berman Frank, her brothers and children

(522a-54a). In the harbor, th. companies are known as

“the Berman companies” or simply as “Berman” (612a-

13a, 337a-38a, 1257a).

The Marine Towing and Transportation Employe-s As-

sociation (the “Association”) is an ovganization whose

main function is to represent the tugboat and barge

companies in New York harbor in the triennial! com-act

negotiations with Local 333, the union which represents

the men on the tugboats and barges (tr. 109, 27a; see also:

1459a).

The member company defendants—McaAllister, Mora-

nia, Bouchard, Moran, Eklof, Red Star (and its affiliates

Diesel Vessel and Spentonbush), Reinauer and Ture-

camo—are all engaged in the ousiness of marine transpor-

tation services, i.e. they operate tugboats and barges, in

and/or outside New York harbor (396a, 412a-13a, 436a-

37a, 453a, 507a). The member company defendants are

merely ten of over 30 members of the Association (345Sa-

46a). General Marine, one of the plaintiffs, is also a

member of the Association (565a, *67a-68a, 588a, 1466a,

1468a-69a).

C tions in this brief are to the record in the court of appeals,

except those preceded by capital “A”, which are to the Appendix in this

court.

5

Local 333, as indicated above, is the union which

represents the seamen on the tugboats and barges (16a,

37a, tr. 371-72, 543a). The head of the union at the time

of the events of this case was Captain Joseph O’ Hare (tr.

421).

The confusion over plaintiffs’ identity

Mrs. Frank, by her own admission, used ihe men and

crews on the vessels of her different companies “fungibly

and interchangeably” (554a), and also used her tugboats

interchangeably between Be.man and Genera! Marine

(556a-57a). The three plaintiff companies also inter-

changed funds on a daily basis (669a).

At the time Mrs. Frank created Berman in 1971, she

did not tell Local 333 that she had done so (604a, 337a),

but rather left the union in the dark about which of her

vessels were covered by the labor agreement (337a-339a,

290a-91a; cf. 1564a-65a). Local 333 was not aware of the

dit.erent corporations comprising the Berman companies

(337a-38a, 1257a; Exhs. 26 and D-36). Mrs. Frank filed

union pension reports for several employees of Berman

who worked a substantial portion of their (ime on vessels

which she claimed were not covered by the labor agree-

ment (6lla-12a, 606a, 29la, 1498a-1525a). This further

confused the union as to which vessels and which employ-

ees were Operating under the labor agreement (337a-38a,

290a-9la, 1257a).

The MOTC controversy in 1974 and 1975

In 1975 and 1975, Local 333 was engaged in a labor

controversy with Manhattan Oil Transport Corporation

(“MOTC”). The nub of the controversy was whether

Local 333-manned tugboats should tow MOTC barges

with less than two men aboard (180a, tr. 163-65, 1281a).

6

In spite of the controversy between MOTC and Local

333 over manning, Berman ccntinued to tow MOTC

barges with less than two men aboard (208a; see also:

228a).

The MOTC dispute resulted in strikes and litigation

between Local 333 and MOTC, in which Berman was

sometimes joined as a party or was otherwise involved

(223a).*

The 1975 pension dispute

In mid-1975, General Marine fell into approximately

$50,000 in arrears in its union pension fund payments

(569a, 632a). As a result thereof, Local 333 sought to

terminate its contract with General Marine (1294a, 632a,

1492a). Litigation ensued between Local 335 and the

plaintiffs in this action (1294a-95a, 1492a, 632a-33a). The

pension dispute also led to a strike by Local 333 at

plaintiffs’ place of business, but this strike was enjoined

by a judge of the United States District Court two days

later (1294a-95a, 821a, 1492a).

The 1976 collective bargaining

The 1973 agreement between the Association and Local

333 expired March 31, 1976 (Exhs. 8 and 50, 1246a,

1451a). Following extensive, hard bargaining that com-

menced early in the year, the new collective bargaining

agreement was signed for the period April 1, 1976

- Berman benefited handsomely from the MOTC dispute. Berman

received the overwhelming preponderance of MOTC’s outside towing

business in consideration of its backing MOTC in iis dispute with

Local 333 (225a, 227a-28a).

-

through March 31, 1979 (1246a, 1197a, 1309a). Plaintiffs’

petition involves two clauses in the 1976 labor agreement.

In anticipation of the 1976 negotiations, the Associa-

tion had called a meeting early in January 1976 to select a

Bargaining Committee to negotiate with Local 3.?

(145la). Notice of that meeting was sent to and received

by plaintiffs (588a).

Mrs. Frank signed and delivered to the Association a

Confirmation of Bargaining Authority, authorizing the

Bargaining Committee “to negotiate and conclude with

the union renewals of present collective bargaining agree-

ments upon such terms and for such period of time as the

Association Bargaining Committee deems to be in the

best interests of the membership” (1468a-69a, 565a-67a,

568a).

At the meeting of the Association in January 1976 a

Bargaining Committee was duly elected (1195a, 346a-

47a). The Bargaining Committee was elected by nomina-

tion from the floor and election was open to all members

of the Association (348a). The Bargaining Committee

consisted of representatives from 20 of the 36 members of

the Association (343a).

At the outset of the negotiations, Local 333 presented

to the Association a series of 10 demands which they

sought to have incorporated into the new labor agreement

(1280a). The union’s demands were the subject of exten-

sive, good-faith bargaining by the Bargaining Committee

and Local 333 during the first quarter of 1976 (1470a-75a,

1464a-6Sa).

The vegetable oil clause

Among the demands which Local 333 made was the

demand for a provision known as the “vegetable oil

clause,” which provided that vegetable oil barges would

not be towed unless at least two men were aboard the

barges (1257a).

Local 333 explained to the Association that it wanted

this clause for the safety of its members, since it was

dangerous for the men to have to climb aboard the barges

from the tugs while the vessels were at sea (256a-57a,

308a-lla, 340a-41a, 934a-35a). In demanding the vegeta-

ble oil clause, Local 333 was also interested in job

preservation for its members who worked on barges

(303a-0Sa).

As a result of good-faith collective bargaining between

the Association and Local 333, the vegetable oil clause

was included in the 1976 agreement (1254a, 1212a). This

clause, however, was never honored by the plaintiffs

(57la, 574a) nor did Local 333 ever attempt to enforce

this clause against plaintiffs (334a-35a). Accordingly,

plaintiffs did not suffer and could not possibly have

suffered any damage as a result of the inclusion of this

clause in the 1976 labor agreement.

The affiliates clause

Another clause demanded by Local 333 in the 1976

negotiations was “the affiliates clause,” or, more for-

mally, the “Application of Agreement.” This provided

that affiliated companies and subsidiaries of signatories

of the contract would also be bound by the contract

(1280a). Local 333 demanded this clause (a) to eliminate

the dispute and confusion which plaintiffs had engen-

9

dered over which of their vessels would adhere to the

agreement, (b) to standardize wages, hours and working

conditions for all of its members, and (c) to protect the

jobs of members of Local 333 (257a, 290a-9la, 328a-29a,

1473a).

Before agreeing to the affiliates clause, which Mrs.

Frank opposed, the Bargaining Committee advised Mrs.

Frank that it felt it had to agree to the inclusion of the

clause because Local 333 was threatening to strike if the

clause was not included in the agreement (272a-7S5a,

279a-83a, 285a-86a). The vast majority of the companies

in the Association did not feel that they could or should

be asked to take a strike over this issue (287a, 282a,

275a). The Bargaining Committee gave Mrs. Frank an

opportunity to withdraw from the Association before the

new agreement was signed, to permit her to avoid being

party to an agreement which contained that clause, but

she declined to do so (272a-75a, 279a-83a, 285a-86a). In

effect, Mrs. Frank sought to force all other companies in

the Association to take a strike over a clause which she,

virtually alone, wanted to avoid.

As with the vegetable oil clause, plaintiffs never ac-

cepted or honored the affiliates clause (574a). Berman did

not regard the 1976 labor agreement as binding upon

itself or its sibling companies, and did not honor the

terms of the 1976 labor agreement (574a).* Accordingly,

plaintiffs did not suffer and could not possibly have

suffered any damage as a result of the inclusion of this

clause in the 1976 labor agreement.

- In 1976 a labor election was held with respect to the employees of

Berman resulting in the selection of a different union, MEBA (1480a-

83a). Local 333 has accepted the results of that election and has

(1531a-34a), since that time, made no effort to organize Berman or to

enforce its contract against Berman.

10

The labor dispute between plaintiffs and Local 333

In 1975 and 1976, plaintiffs were engaged in a continu-

ing labor dispute with Local 333 (562a, 620a, 304a, 517a,

1556a-57a). The labor dispute involved the manning of

vessels by plaintiffs, their failure to pay overtime to

members of Local 333, their failure to pay the union’s

wage scale, their continued attempts to mislead Local 333

as to which of their vessels were honoring the labor

agreement and their delinquency to the union pension

fund (256a-58a, 262a-63a, 303a-04a, 328a-29a, 336a-37a,

587a, 592a-98a, 1257a, 1497a, Exhs. 26 and D-36).

The labor dispute erupted into extensive litigation with

charges and countercharges between Local 333 and plain-

tiffs (620a, 1556a-57a, 1480a-84a). As Mrs. Frank testi-

fied (620a):

. . there were so many charges filed back and

forth, I don’t know which was which.”

The labor dispute spilled over into the dealings between

plaintiffs and the member company defendants because,

on several occasions, Local 333 men working on vessels

sent out by the member company defendants to work

with Berman vessels declined to tow or work with un-

manned or undermanned barges and tugs (247a, 372a-

73a, 398a-400a, 433a, 503a-04a, S5i6a, 520a-22a, 859a-

60a).

Absence of concerted refusal to deal

The member company defendants did not cease dealing

with plaintiffs, and have continued dealing with plaintiffs

to this day (1457a-58a, SO0la-02a, 505a, 400a, 383a, 582a-

83a; see also: 576a, 896a-98a). In the few instances in

which vessels of the member company defendants de-

clined to work for or with Berman, that was because the

seamen on the vessels, in their capacity as union mem-

bers, declined to do so (247a, 372a-73a, 398a-400a, 433a,

503a-04a, 516a, 520a-22a). As Fred Baum, Vice President

of Morania, testified ($12a-22a):

“Q. The point was not that the company, Mora-

nia, was saying that they would not tow without two

men on a barge but rather that the union men on the

tugs who worked for you said that they refused to

tow a barge that did not have two men on it, is that

correct?

A. That’s exactly right.”

In addition, a number of the member company defen-

dants were dissatisfied with the conditions of plaintiffs’

vessels and crews: the vessels operated by Berman ranged

in age from 29 years to 55 years old (558a, 560a), and

several were in a state of disrepair (tr. 790). Berman

vessels and crews were considered inadequate to do much

of the work of the member companies (418a-19a, 447a,

385a-89a, 47la-73a, 482a, 484a-88a). In truth, Berman

was relegated to doing “slough-off” work (613a-14a) and

was not Operating in direct competition with the member

company defendants (cf. 398a, 495a, 508a-09a).

The record is devoid of evidence that the Association or

the member company defendants desired or intended to

injure Berman or the other plaintiffs. Indeed, the evi-

dence from plaintiffs’ own witnesses is directly to the

contrary (216a, 212a, 210a, 245a, 247a, 359a, 280a,

§21a). Edwin Elzer, President of MOTC, called by the

plaintiffs as a witness, testified as follows (216a):

12

“Q. Now, Mr. Elzer, do you know of any act or

any statement by the Association or any member

company of the Association indicating a design or a

desire to hurt or injure Berman in any way, sir?

A. There was nothing ever conveyed to me that

anybody was out to hurt Evelyn. Period.

Q. I take it that the answer to the question is no,

is that correct, sir?

A. No; positively.”

And Berman’s own seaman, James Pease, testified as

follows (245a, 247a):

“Q. To your knowledge, did the companies ever

refuse to deal with Berman?

A. Not to my knowledge.

* * *

Q. . . . Do you know of any wrong conduct by

any company towards Berman during this five-year

period of time.

A. Not that I can say, no.”

Not a single witness testified to any facts supporting a

concerted refusal to deal.

Insofar as there was any decline in business done with

plaintiffs by the member company defendants, it was due

to factors extraneous to any “conspiracy.” Morania, one

of the biggest customers of Berman, lost its underlying

contract with Con Edison and went out of the sand and

gravel business in 1975 (879a-83a)—this accounted for

and fully explains the decline in its business with Berman

after 1974 (882a-83a). Similarly, McAllister was losing

13

important customers, including New England Petroleum

(469a-7!a), thereby virtually eliminating its need for out-

side towing assistance. Indeed, there was a general decline

in business in New York harbor in the mid-1970’s (881la,

883a, 214a, 1470a), and most companies tended increas-

ingly to do their own work, rather than refer business out

to fringe outfits like Berman.

In sum, as the jury found, there was no conspiracy

between or among the defendants to restrain plaintiffs

from competing in the marine transportation industry in

New York harbor. Similarly, as the district court and the

court of appeals held, the two challenged clauses in the

1976 labor agreement provide no basis for an award of

antitrust damages against defendants.

Repon

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Record and brief — Berman Enterprises, Inc. v. Local 333, United Marine Division, International Longshoremen's Ass'n · 454 U.S. 965 | Frix