Record and brief — McClure v. Reagan

Supreme Court brief1981

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

JUDLUD}LIS

jeuonsipsun¢

Office Suptema Court. U.S

UL 30 1981

—

|

81186 FILED

No.

*

In THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1981

JAMES A. MCCLURE, United States Senator,

Appellant,

; v.

ROWALD RE AGA

daMES- EARL CARTER, President of the United States

and ABNER J. MIKVA,

Appellee.

On Appeal from the District Court for the District of Idaho

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Davip H. MARTIN

SANTARELLI & GIMER

2033 M Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 466-6800

Counsel for Appellant

WILSON - Eres Print NG Co. INC. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON. D.C. 20001

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the three judge panel in the United States

District Court for the District of Idaho correctly held

that the plaintiff James A. McClure lacked standing to

challenge the appointment of Judge Abner J. Mikva to

the United States Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia Circuit on the grounds that said appointment

violated Article I, Section 6, Clause 2 of the United States

Constitution.

2. Whether the three judge panel correctly held that

the ;.aintiff’s claim should be dismissed as nonjusticiable

based on the separation of powers doctrine.

PARTIES TO THE CASE

Plaintiff—Senator James A. McClure of Idaho.

Defendants—The President of the United States, Ron-

ald Reagan substituted for former President, James Ear!

Carter; Abner J. Mikva.

(i)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

r ¼ ¼//—ü.. —

Grounds for Jurisdiction of This Court 8

Constitutional Provisions and Statutes Involved

,,

Substantial Questions Are Presented Which Require

e a ia emceiceaih

Appendix A Opinion of the Three-judge panel of the

United States District Court for the District of

ETRE LA TEI OLN» ART OEE

Appendix B Order of Dismissal by the Three-judge

Panel of the United District Court for the District

e ̃ũ A —— aro ee

Appendix C Notice of Appeal

Appendix D Riegel v. Federal Open Market Commit-

mittee, No. 80-1061, slip op. (D.C. Cir., filed June

EMS ical ae eee

(iii)

la

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES: Page

Ass’n of Data Proce .g Service Organization,

Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970) 10

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) 8, 14, 16, 17,

18, 19

Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) 14

Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (19688) 10, 13, 14

Gladstone Realtors v. Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91

„ f 13

Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 2 12. 19. 20

Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 303 U.S.

. re eh enn 14

Harrington v. Bush, 180 U.S. App. D.C. 45, 553

r 12

Kennedy v. Sampson, 167 U.S. App. D.C., 511 F.2d

T 8 12

Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972777 10

Linda R.S. „. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (19733 15

Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803 16

McClure v. Carter, 513 F. Supp. 265 (198177 8,15

McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 240 (1961) - 14

Miles v. Graham, 268 U.S. 501 (1925) 7

National T;easury Employees Union v. Nixon, 492

Lern 7

Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486 (1969) sees 16, 17, 18,

19

Public Citizen v. Sampson, 379 F. Supp. 622

r tsesdahieettiihineandiinisinindiiatabanietaleete 12

Reuss v. Balles, 73 F. R. D. 90 (D. D.C. 1976) 12

Riegle v. Federal Open Market Committee, No. 80-

1016 (D.C. Cir., filed June 24, 1981) ........ 10, 11, 12, 20

Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972)........... 15

Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Or-

ganization, 426 U.S. 26 (197) 10

United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)........ 16

United States v. Scrap, 412 U.S. 669 (1973 14

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975557 10

*

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS: Page

United States Constitution :

r sone ere eee 17

Article I, Section 6, Clause 2 1 1, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 16, 18

Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 3, 9, 11, 16

Article III, Sections 1 and 2 7, 10, 13, 14, 15

e clsmessie teeaecdepiciiaelastaccbesie 4

SEE 2,3

I .... 2,4

Federal Salary Act of 1967

44 — 4

Executive Salary Cost-Of-Living Adjustment Act

28 U.S.C. § 461 3 .

Federal Pay Comparability ‘Act of 1970

re 5

Public Law 96-86, 93 Stat. 656 (1979) § 101 (e) .. 2, 3, 6,

13, 15, 16 18

MISCELLANEOUS:

fT SS ree 9

McGowan, Congressmen in Court: The New Plain-

tiffs, 15 Georgia L. Rev. 24114 12

In THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OcTOBER TERM, 1981

No.

JAMES A. MCCLURE, United States Senator,

* Appellant,

JAMES EARL CARTER, President of the United States

and ABNER J. MIKVA,

Appellee.

On Appeal from the District Court for the District of Idaho

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Appellant submits herewith his jurisdictional statemen“

as required by Rule 15 of the Rules of the Supreme Court

of the United States.

OPINION BELOW

The three judge panel ef the United States District

Court for the District of Id. ho issued its order and deci-

sion on May 5, 1981. The decision is reported at 513 F.

Supp. 265.

GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT

(i) This is an appeal from a dismissal of an amended

complaint for declaratory relief arising out of Article I,

Section 6, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution. In

2

his original complaint, appellant invoked federal jurisdic-

tion pursuant to Title 28 United States Code Sections

1331 and 2201. In his amended complaint, plaintiff also

invoked federal jurisdiction pursuant to Section 101(c)

(2) of Public Law 96-86, 93 Stat. 656, which provides

in pertinent part that:

(1) Any Member of Congress, whether he voted to

confirm or not to confirm the appointment of any

judge appointed during the Ninety-Sixth Congress to

the United States Court of Appeals for the District

of Columbia, or whether he abstained from, or was

not present for such vote, may bring a civil action

in the United States District Court for the District

of Columbia or in any United States District Court

in the State he represents to contest the constitution-

ality o° the appointment and continuance in office of

said circuit judge on the grounds that such appoint-

ment and continuance in office is in violation of Ar-

ticle I, Section 6, Clause 2 of the Constitution;

(2) The designated United States district courts

shall have exclusive jurisdiction, without regard to

the sum or value of the matter in controversy, to

determine the validity of such appointment and con-

tinuance in office;

(3) Any action brought under this section shall be

heard and determined by a panel of three judges in

accordance with the provisions of Section 2284 of

Title 28, United States Code. Any appeal from the

action of a court convened pursuant to such section

shall lie to the Supreme Court; and

(4) Any judge designated to hear any action

brought under this section shall cause such action to

be in every way expedited.

(ii) The order and decision to be reviewed was en-

tered on May 5, 1981, by a three judge panel of the

United States District Court for the District of Idaho.

The Notice of Appeal was filed on June 9, 1981 in the

United States District Court for the District of Idaho.

(iii) The statutory provision conferring jurisdiction

on this Court is set forth in full above.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND

STATUTES INVOLVED

(i) Article I, Section 6, Clause 2 United States Con-

stitution:

No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time

for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil

Office under the Authority of the United States,

which shall have been created, or the Emoluments

whereof shall have been encreased during such time;

and no Person holding any Office under the United

States, shall be a Member of either House during his

Continuance in Office.

Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution:

He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and

Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided

two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he

shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Con-

sent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other

public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme

Court, and all other Officers of the United States,

whose Appointments are not herein otherwise pro-

vided for, and which shall be established by Law:

but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment

of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the

President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the

Heads of Departments.

(ii) Section 101(c) (2), Public Law 96-86, is set forth

above.

(iii) Title 28 United States Code Section 1331:

4

The district courts shall have original jurisdiction

of all civil actions arising under the Constitution,

laws or treaties of the United States.

(iv) 28 United States Code Section 2201:

In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdic-

tion, except with respect to Federal taxes, any court

of the United States, upon the filing of an appro-

priate pleading, may declare the rights and other

legal relations of any interested party seeking such

declaration, whether or not further relief is or could

be sought. Any such declaration shail have the force

and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be

reviewable as such.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case arises out of the appointment of then Con-

gressman Abner J. Mikva to the United States Court of

Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

On November 7, 1978, defendant Mikva was elected to

the United States House of Representatives for the term

commencing on January 3, 1979 and ending on January

3, 1981. On May 29, 1979, former President James E.

Carter nominated defendant Mikva to be a circuit judge

of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia. On September 25, 1979 the United States Sen-

ate, by majority vote, contrmed the nomination of Abner

J. Mikva, and on September 27, 1979 he took the oath of

office as a circuit judge.

Under the provisions of Title 28, Section 44(d) of the

United States Code, each circuit judge of the United

States receives a salary at an annual rate determined

under Section 225 of the Federal Salary Act of 1967, 2

U.S.C. §§ 351-361, as adjusted by Section 205(a) (10 of

the Executive Salary Cost-of-Living Adjustment Act. 28

U.S.C. § 461. Section 205(a)(1) provides that when an

adjustment in rates of pay in the General Schedule takes

effect under the Federal Pay Comparability Act of 1970

5 U.S.C. 88 5305 et seg., each salary rate subject to ad-

justment under Section 205(a)(1) shall be adjusted by

an amount equal to the percentage of such salary rate

which corresponds to the overall average percentage of

the adjustments in the rates of pay under such General

Schedule.

The Federal Pay Comparability Act requires that the

President, after considering the report of his agent and

the findings and recommendations of the Advisory Com-

mittee on Federal Pay, annually adjust the rates of pay

of each statutory pay system in accordance with the prin-

ciple of paying the same rate of pay for the same level

of work in private enterprise. The President is further

required annually to transmit to Congress a report of the

pay adjustment which shall specify the overall percentage

of the adjustment in the rates of pay in the General

Schedule and of the adjustment of the rates of pay under

the other statutory pay systems.

The President may, however, because of economic con-

ditions, adjust rates of pay at a lower percentage than

that recommended by the Advisory Committee and submit

that alternative plan to Congress. Such an adjustment

must be made prior to September Ist. The lower per-

centage increase becomes payable on the first day of the

first applicable pay period commencing on or after Oc-

tober 1 unless before the end of the first period of thirty

calendar days of continuous session of Congress after the

date on which the alternative plan is submitted, either

House adopts a resolution disapproving the alternative

plan. If such a resolution is adopted, the President is

required to readjust the rates of pay of the statutory

pay systems in accordance with the recommendations of

the Advisory Committee on Federal Pay, effective as of

the beginning of the first pay period commencing on or

after the date the resolution is adopted or on or after

October 1, whichever is later.

The President submitted, on August 31, 1979, an alter-

native pay adjustment plan and increased rates of pay of

the general schedule by an overall percentage of seven

(7) percent.

Neither House of Congress acted to disapprove the al-

ternative plan proposed by the President before October

1. 1979.

On September 25, 1979 the plaintiff filed a complaint

for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief claiming

that by virtue of the foregoing laws relating to federal

salary increases for circuit judges that the appointment

of Abner J. Mikva vioiated Article I, Section 6, Clause 2

of the Constitution. Plaintiff also filed on September 25,

1979 an application for an order requiring defendants,

the President of the United States and J. Stanley Kim-

mit, Secretary of the United States Senate, to show cause

why their actions in effecting the appointment of Abner

J. Mikva as circuit judge should not be enjoined. Al-

though the United States District Court for the District

of Idaho issued a show cause order, Abner J. Mikva was

sworn in as circuit judge before the order was timely

served.

Thereafter, on October 12, 1979, Congress passed and

the President signed into law Public Law 96-86, 93 Stat.

656 (1979), which contained Section 101(c) (2) authoriz-

ing members of Congress to challenge the constitutionality

of appointments made to the United States Court of Ap-

peals for the District of Columbia Circuit during the 96th

Congress, Piaintiff then filed an amended complaint for

declaratory relief on November 6, 1979, naming the Pres-

ident and Abner J. Mikva as defendants and seeking a

three judge court to hear his complaint that the appoint-

7

ment of Abner J. Mikva violated Article I, Section 6,

Clause 2 of the United States Constitution.

Plaintiff claimed that the actions required of the Presi-

dent by the federal salary laws are mandatory. In Na-

tional Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d

587 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the court held that under the fed-

eral salary scheme the President’s actions, are mandatory

and non-discretionary, i.e., he must, prior to September

Ist of each year, adjust the pay scales in accordance with

the increase proposed by his pay agent, or pursuant to

an alternative plan.

The compensation of a federal judge which “Shall not

be diminished during their Continuance in Office ( Article

III, Seccion 1, U.S. Constitution) is fixed when Congress

declares “what sum shall be received by each judge out

of the public funds and the times for payment.” Miles v.

Graham, 268 U.S. 501, 508-509 (1925). Thus, even

though the office to which defendant Mikva was appointed

did not commence receiving the increased compensation

until October 1, 1979, the compensation of the office of

circuit judge had been increased as of September 1, 1979,

during the term for which defendant Mikva had been

elected, thus barring him from that office.

Cross motions for summary judgment were filed by the

parties, in which the defendants argued that plaintiff

lacked standing, and that even if he did not, that the

appointment of Abner J. Mikva did not violate Article I,

Section 6, Clause 2 of the Constitution. The plaintiffs

argued conversely as described above.

On May 5, 1981 the three judge panel issued its order

and decision dismissing the case, holding that plaintiff

lacked standing to bring the lawsuit and that the claim

was nonjusticiable based on the separation of powers

doctrine.

SUBSTANTIAL QUESTIONS ARE PRESENTED

WHICH REQUIRE PLENARY CONSIDERATION

The decision of the three judge court in the United

States District Court for the District ot idaho presents

this Court with substantial federal questions regarding

standing and the separation of powers doctrine as they

relate to suits by legislators.

The three judge court held that the plaintiff lacked

standing either as a private ‘dividual or as a member

of the United States Senate to bring this action with or

without the jurisdictional statute, Section 101(c)(2) of

Public Law 96-86, because he did not present to the court

a distinct and palpable injury to himself. Therefore, un-

der this Court’s holding in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186

(1962), the three judge court decided that Senator Mc-

Clure did not have “such a persone! stake in the outcome

of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness

which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the

court so largely depends for illumination of difficult con-

stitutional questions.” Id. at 204.

The three judge court, moreover, concluded that Sec-

tion 101 (e) (2) of Public Law 96-86 was of no assistance

to the piaintiff because it implicated “special concerns

regarding the separation of powers.” McClure v. Carter,

513 F. Supp. 265, 268 (D. Idaho 1981). Therevyore, the

legislative branch, in seeking to grant authority to the

judicial branch to decide the constitutional issue, acted

improperly because of the separation of powers doctrine.

The three judge court reached this conclusion because it

decided that “[u]nder the Constitution, it was the duty

of Congress itself, in the first instance, to determine

Judge Mikva’s qualifications both on the merits and on

the issue of whether he was constitutionally eligible to

serve as a judge.” Id. at 271.

Plaintiff believes that the three judge court failed to

consider the unique injuries he, as a legislator, alleged.

Plaintiff also believes that the three judge court failed

to correctly interpret the decisions of this Court regard-

ing the separation of powers doctrine and the duty of

the judicial branch to decide constitutional issues.

(i) Standing

Senator McClure alleged the following injuries: (1)

To the Senate, and to himseif derivatively, because the

President, in nominating vudge Mikva, a person not

constitutionally eligible fur che office of circuit judge,

denied the Senate the opportunity to exercise its con-

stitutional duty under the Appointments Clause, Article

II, Section 2, Clause 2, to advise and consent to the

appointment of a constitutionally qualified nominee. This

injury is continuing.

Sine the appointment process “contemplates that only

such persons as are qualified to hold office shall be

nominated. . .”, 17 Ops. A.G. 522 (1883), it is implicit

in that process that the President must make the thresh-

old determination of a nominee’s constitutional eligibility

and that the Senate’s role is to approve or reject whom-

ever the President forwards for confirmation based solely

upon the Senate’s view of the nominee’s qualifications

to be a judge. Thus, when the President nominates a

person who is not constitutionally eligible for a judge-

ship, the Senate is unable to exercise its constitutional

duty to advise ard consent to the appointment of a con-

stitutionally eligible nominee, and its role is thereby

diminished. (2) To the Senate, and to himself deriva-

tively, since the Senate’s rights and duties under the

Constitution have, and will continue to be, diminished

because its acts are being, and will continue to be, inter-

preted and possibly held unconstitutional by an unquali-

fied person; (3) To the Senate, and himself derivatively,

since an appointment prohibited by Article I, Section 6,

Clause 2 suggests the presence of the very collusion the

10

constitutional provision was designed to prevent; and

(4) To himself, as an individual United States Senator,

since he was forced to cast his vote against defendant

Mikva to prevent an unconstitutional appointment, thus

nullifying his constitutional right to advise and consent

to the appointment of a nominee based solely on the

nominee’s qualifications to perform judicial functions.

This Court’s past decisions on standing demonstrate

clearly that [iln terms of Article III limitations on

court jurisdiction, the question of standing is related

only to whether the dispute sought to be adjudicated will

be presented in an adversary context and in a form

historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution.”

Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,101 (1968). A plaintiff must

allege injury in fact to an interest “arguably within

the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the

statute or constitutional guarantee in question.” Ass'n

of Data Processing Service Organization, Inc. v. Camp,

397 U.S. 150, 152-153 (1970). The injuries may be a

“specific present objective harm or a threat of future

specific harm.” Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 14 (1972).

A third requirement for standing is that the plaintiff

prove the injury was caused by the defendant’s actions

or in the alternative that prospective relief would re-

move the harm. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975);

Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organiza-

tion, 426 U.S. 26 (1976).

The unique issue of standing for congressional plain-

tiffs has been treated most frequently by the United

States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia

Circuit. That circuit’s most recent decision in Riegle v.

Federal Open Market Committee, et al., No. 80-1061

(D.C. Cir., filed June 24, 1981) App. at 17a and its

past decisions involving congressional plaintiffs leave this

crucial issue unsettled and makes its resolution particu-

larly appropriate for this Court. In the Riegle case, Sen-

ator Riegle challenged the constitutionality of the proce-

11

dures established by the Federal Reserve Act for the

appointment of the five Reserve Bank members of the

Federal Open Market Committee who were appointed but

not, pursuant to those procedures, subject to the advice

and consent of the Senate. Rather, the five members

whose appointments were challenged by Senator Riegle

were appointed subject to the approval of the Board of

Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The district

court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing. The

Court of Appeals, however, decided that Senator Riegle

had standing to make the challenge, but dismissed the

case on the grounds of the equitable discretion of the

court to avoid decisions which involve separation of pow-

ers considerations.

In finding standing for Senator Riegle the court stated

that “. . . assuming that the five Reserve Bank members

of the FOMC are officers who must be appointed with

the advice and consent of the Senate, Riegle’s inability

to exercise his right under the Appointments Clause of

the Constitution is an injury sufficiently personal to

constitute an injury in fact.” App. at 27a. Senator Rie-

gle, however, had inappropriately named the five members

of the Open Market Committee as defendants since their

actions had not caused the injuries alleged; rather, it

was the directors of the Federal Reserve Banks who had

appointed the five defendants who were the cause of the

injury. Even so, the court held that the causation re-

quirement of standing was satisfied because the prospec-

tive judicial relief would remove the harm. Finally, the

court held that the interest claimed by Senator Riegle to

be injured, that is, his right to advise and consent to

the appointment of officers of the executive branch, was

within the zone of interests protected by Article II, See-

tion 2, Clause 2, the Appointments Clause.

Earlier decisions of the District of Columbia Circuit

reflect the unsettled nature of the standing issue regard-

12

ing congressional plaintiffs. Two principles appear to

dominate the congressional plaintiff standing cases pre-

ceding the Riegle decision; first, that the requirements

of standing apply equally to congressional plaintiffs and

private plaintiffs, and second, that a congressional plain-

tiff must suffer an injury that his legislative colleagues

cannot redress.' These two principles have led the Dis-

trict of Columbia Circuit to make inconsistent applica-

tion of the standing principles. In the Riegle case, the

court recognized this by stating:

For example, in Public Citizen v. Sampson, 379 F.

Supp. 662 (D. D.C. 1974), aff'd mem., 169 U.S. App.

D.C. 301, 515 F.2d 1018 (1975), Harrington v.

Bush, supra at 212-214, and Reuss v. Balles, supra

at 468, standing was withheld from congressional

plaintiffs in part because their power to vote, i.e., to

enact legislation to cure the alleged injury, remained

unimpaired. Yet in Kennedy v. Sampson, supra, the

cou t conferred standing on Senator Kennedy to chal-

lenge the legality of an attempted pocket veto of a

bill for which he had voted. We reasoned that ex-

ecutive impairment of the Senator’s past vote had

nullified Kennedy’s legislative power. Id. at 436. The

Senator had, however, collegial remedies comparable

to those which negated standing in the Public Citi-

zen, Harrington, and Reuss cases; Senator Kennedy’s

power to reintroduce the relevant legislation in the

next session of Congress and to vote thereon re-

mained unimpaired. In Goldwater v. Carter, supra,

this court’s most recent opinion regarding congres-

sional standing, legislator plaintiffs were again

granted standing despite the presence of adequate

collegial remedies. App. at 29a.

Former Chief Judge Carl McGowan, United States Court of

Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit fully described the

case histories of Congressional-plaintiffs in Congressmen in Court:

The New Plaintiffs, 15 Georgia Law Review 241.

13

Using the traditional standing tests provided by this

Court plaintiff submits that he has satisfied those tests

and has standing to challenge the appointment of de-

fendant Mikva. Plaintiff has alleged injuries to interests

protected by the Constitution which are most certainly

capable of redress by the judiciary.

In addition, the language of Section 101(c) (2) of

Public Law 96-86 is a recognition by both the executive

and legislative branches of their apprehension that the

appointment of Mr. Mikva is constitutionally infirm and

that it is the responsibility of the judicial branch to

make the final determination of that matter. In partic-

ular, the language of subparagraph 1, Section 101(c),

recognizes under the particular facts of defendant Mikva’s

appointment that both the Senate and, derivatively, its

individual members, have suffered an injury.

Congress may eliminate all impediments to standing

save the minimal Article III requirements, and expand

“standing to the full extent permitted by Article III,”

Gladstone Realtors v. Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979).

The plaintiffs in Gladstone relied on the Fair Housing

Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. § 3612) as the statutory basis

to bring their action. The Court said that the Fair

Housing Act was intended by Congress to allow certain

agerieved citizens to bring such actions so long as they

could allege sorae minimal injury. Similarly, in P.L. 96-

86 Congress has recognized a small class of persons who

are aggrieved and provided a vehicle for resolving that

grievance. Cong ss intended that an action be brought

should one of its members so desire. Plaintiff need only

show the Article III requirement of minimum injury.

Even absent a specific statute authorizing legal action,

this Court has found that even a minimal or trifling

allegation of injury by a plaintiff will suffice to sustain

standing for Article III purposes. In Flast v. Cohen,

392 U.S. 82 (1968), the Court, in deciding whether tax-

14

payers had standing to challenge the expenditure of

public monies in violation of the Establishment Clause,

held that. . . in terms of Article III limitations on

federal court jurisdiction, the question of standing is re-

lated only to whether the dispute sought to be adjudicated

will be presented in an adversary context and in a form

historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution.”

(Emphasis added.) Id. at 101. The Court found, conse-

quently, that although there was a minimum injury to

constitutional rights (each taxpayer’s miniscule portion

of taxes apportioned by HEW to New York parochial

schools), since the constitutional principle (establish-

ment of religion) was paramount, the plaintiffs had

standing. Similarly, the Court found standing where the

allegations of injury were minimal and even trifling in

the following cases involving constitutional principles:

McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 240 (1961) (five dollar

fine and costs); Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,

303 U.S. 663 (1966) (one dollar and fifty cent poll

tax); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (choice of

presence or absence during school prayer); and Baker v.

Carr, 396 U.S. 196 (1962) (fraction of a vote).

Even an indirect general allegation of injury in the

absence of an authorizing statute was satisfactory to

sustain standing in United States v. Scrap, 412 U.S. 669

(1973), where plaintiffs alleged that failure to suspend

a freight surcharge would cause them economic, recrea-

tional and aesthetic harm. The complaint also alieged

that plaintiffs would generally have to pay more for

finished products and that the plaintiffs’ use of the rivers,

streams and recreation areas was adversely affected and

that air pollution in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan

area would increase. These alleged injuries, though spec-

ulative and attenuated, were adequate.

This Court has acknowledged a distinction between

those plaintiffs who invoke the judicial process under

15

statutory authorization and those plaintiffs who do not.

In Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) at 732,

the Court said “Where the party does not rely on any

specific statute authorizing invocation of the judicial

process, the question of standing depends upon whether

the party has alleged such a ‘personal stake in the out-

come of the controversy’... .” Similiarly, in Linda

R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973) at 617, the

Court said “Although the law of standing has greatly

changed in the last ten years, we have steadfastly ad-

hered to the requirements that, at least in the absence

of a statute expressly conferring standing, federal plain-

tiffs must allege some threatened or actual injury result-

ing from the pvtatively illegal action before a federal

court may assume jurisdiction.”

From the Court’s recognition of this distinction, it

can be concluded that where a statute authorizes the

invocation of a lawsuit, the Article III requirement of

injury is even less than the minimal injury necessary to

sustain standing when a plaintiff brings suit without

statutory authorization. Thus, the injury which plaintiff

here must allege to sustain standing must truly be only

the most minimal.

In sum, then, it is highly appropriate for this Court

to review this case because of the unsettled status of

standing for congressional litigants.

(ii) Separation Of Powers

The three judge court raised a substantial federal

question regarding the separation of powers doctrine

in interpreting Section 101(c)(2) of Public Law 96-86.

It concluded that the “vice of the statute .. is its

muddling of the reles, its blurring of the lines between

the branches of government.” McClure v. Carter, 513

F. Supp. 265, 271. It further concluded that the Congress

(the court here meant the Senate) determines not only

16

the judicial fitness of nominees to the federal bench,

but also makes a final and unreviewable determination

of their constitutional eligibility. Plaintiff argued to the

contrary that only the judiciary may, in the final in-

stance, decide what the law is and interpret the Con-

stitution, and that the Senate could, pursuant to Article

II, Section 2, Clause 2, only pass on the judicial fitness

of a nominee. The legislative and executive branches

agreed with the plaintiff by passing and signing into

law Section 101 (e) (2) of Public Law 96-86. Based on

this Court’s decisions in United States v. Nixon, 418

U.S. 683 (1974), Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486

(1969), and Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) the

plaintiff believes the three judge court erred in its

interpretation of the separation of powers doctrine and

that the case should have been decided on its merits.

The merits of this case involve a pure interpretation

of a constitutional provision, Article I, Section 6, Clause

2. Senator McClure contends that only the courts, in

the last instance, may decide the issue on the merits,

that is, the constitutionality of defendant Mikva’s ap-

pointment to the office of circuit judge; and that the

Senate, in consenting to the appointment, is constitu-

tionally competent to pass only upon the political and

judicial fitness of the President’s nominee.

The foregoing contention is not violative of but con-

sistent with, the separation of powers doctrine because

ilt is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial

department to say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madi-

son, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803).

This Court’s decision in Baker v. Carr, requires res-

olution of the following considerations to determine

whether there is a political question involving separation

of powers which makes a case nonjusticiable:

a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment

of the issue to a coordinate political department; or

17

a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable

standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of

deciding without an initial policy determination of

a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the im-

possibility of a court’s undertaking independent res-

olution without expressing lack of the respect due

coordinate branches of government; or an unusual

need for unquestioning adherence to a political deci-

sion already made; or the potentiality of embarrass-

ment from multifarious pronouncements by various

departments on one question. 369 U.S. at 217.

The most important one of those questions requiring reso-

lution here is whether there is a textually demonstrable

constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate

branch of government.

In Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) the

Court was faced with a similar issue in deciding an

elected Congressman’s right to his seat after having been

duly elected and then expelled from the House of Repre-

sentatives. Pursuant to Article I, Section 5, providing

that the House shall be the judge of the qualification of

its own members, the House had acted to expel Congress-

man Powell claiming that it was solely its constitutional

duty and power to make such a determination. The Court

disagreed and, citing Baker v. Carr, stated that d ſeeid-

ing whether a matter has in any measure been committed

by the Constitution to another branch of government, or

whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever au-

thority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise

in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of

this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.”

395 U.S. at 521. The Court then examined the constitu-

tional provision in question to determine the textual com-

mitment issue, and held that it must adjudicate Powell’s

claim.

18

The respondents in the Powell case also argued that

the other political question considerations made their case

nonjusticiable, particularly, that resolution of the claim

would produce a potentially embarassing confrontation

between coordinate branches of government. The Court,

however, responded that a determination of the merits of

petitioner’s claim:

. would require no more than an interpretation

of the Constitution. Such a determination falls with-

in the traditional role accorded courts to interpret

the law and does not involve a ‘lack of the respect

due [a] coordinate [branch] of government’ nor does

it involve an ‘initial policy determination of a kind

clearly for non-judicial discretion’ Baker v. Carr, 369

U.S. 186 at 217, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 at 686. Our system

of government requires that federal courts on occa-

sion interpret the Constitution in a manner at vari-

ance with the construction given the document by

another branch. The alleged conflict that such an

adjudication may cause cannot justify the courts’

avoiding their constitutional responsibility. (citations

omitted). 395 U.S. at 548-549.

Similar to Powell v. McCormack, this case is one of

constitutional interpretation; i.e., did the office to which

defendant Mikva was appointed receive an increase in

emoluments thereby causing his appointment to be in

violation of Article I, Section 6, Clause 2. Moreover, the

tests established by Powell would not bar the considera-

tion of this case by this Court. First, the matter is not

textually committed to any branch of government and,

thus, is appropriate for judicial resclution. Second, reso-

lution of the questions presented would not require the

Court to move beyond areas of judicial expertise. And,

finally, there certainly is no potential for embarrassment

if this Court interprets this case on its merits, for Con-

gress and the executive branch, in passing section 10(c)

(2) of P.L. 96-86, recognized the constitutional interpre-

19

tation could be made only by the judicial branch. Thus,

this Court need not consider this prudential limitation.

In Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979), this

Court did not address the standing of congressional plain-

tiffs even though that issue had been raised below and on

appeal. The Court, without a majorit; opinion, reversed

and remanded for dismissal] Senator Goldwater’s claim

of a right to vote on the termination of the United States

treaty with the Republic of China. Justice Rehnquist,

with Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and

Stevens, concluded that the case was political and, there-

fore, nonjusticiable because it involved the authority of

the President in the conduct of our nation’s foreign rela-

tions. Justice Powell, however, concluded that the case

should be dismissed because it was not ripe for considera-

tion, as the Senate had not passed a resolution stating its

position that their approval was necessary for termina-

tion. In his opinion, Justice Powell took issue with Jus-

tice Rehnquist’s opinion that the case was nonjusticiable

and concluded that if the case were ripe the Court should

consider the merits based on the precedents of Baker v.

Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) and Powell v. McCormack,

395 U.S. 486 (1969). Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 997.

Justice Powell examined the political question consid-

erations as set forth in Baker v. Carr, and determined

that the answer to each consideration would require the

Court to decide the case if it were ripe for consideration.

He reasoned that, though the issue touched on foreign

relations, it presented a constitutional question regarding

the authority to terminate treaties. Not a simple issue

to decide, but one requiring application of “. . . normal

principles of interpretation to the Constitutional provi-

sions at issue.” 444 U.S. at 997. Similarly, none of the

inquiries required to be determined with regard to the

political question issue bar this Court from deciding this

case on its merits.

In Riegle v. Federal Open Market Committee, No. 80-

1061 (D.C. Cir. filed June 24, 1981) App. at 17a, in reac-

tion to this Courts holding in the Goldwater case, the Dis-

trict of Columbia Circuit developed a new theory for

deciding congressional plaintiff cases. The Riegel court

concluded that “[w]here a congressional plaintiff could

obtain substantial relief from his fellow legislators

through the enactment, repeal or amendment of a statute,

this court should exercise its equitable discretion to dis-

miss the legislator’s action.” No. 81-1061, App. at 32a.

The court explained its theory that congressional plaintiff

cases should be dismissed only when “(i) the plaintiff

lacks standing under the traditional tests, or (ii) the

plaintiff has standing but could get legislative redress

and a similar action could be brought by a private plain-

tiff.” App. at 34a. Even under this theory, plaintiff be-

lieves this Court should hear his case inasmuch as he

certainly has no legislative redress at this point. And

even though a private plaintiff might be able to bring

the merits of the case to this Court, that proposition is

now speculative at best.

CONCLUSION

This case presents the Court with substantial federal

questions regarding standing and the separation of pow-

ers doctrine as they relate to suits by legislators which

need to be settled by this Court, not only because they

themselves are significant, but because unless this Court

decides that Senator McClure has standing to bring this

action, an alleged serious violation of the Constitution

may go unreviewed.

Based on the foregoing. therefore, plaintiff respect-

fully requests this Court to remand the case back to the

U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho for consid-

eration of the merits, or, in the alternative, to set the

case down for plenary review of the issue of standing and

the separation of powers doctrine, or plenary review of

21

the issue of standing, the separation of powers doctrine,

and for consideration on the merits.

Respectfully submitted,

Davip H. MARTIN

SANTARELLI & GIMER

2033 M Street, N.W.

Suite 700

Washington, D.C. 20036

Counsel for Appellant

On the Brief:

JAMES J. FEATHERSTONE

1600 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

RICHARD E. GARDINER

1600 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

APPENDICES

la

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF IDAHO

Civil No. 79-1340

JAMES A. MCCLURE, United States Senator, Idaho,

= Plaintiff,

JAMES EARL CARTER, PRESIDENT of the United States;

and ABNER J. MIKVA,

Defendants.

Filed May 5, 1981

DECISION

Before: FLETCHER, Circuit Judge, and MCNICHOLS and

TAYLOR, District Judges, sitting as a Special

Three-Judge District Court.

This case comes before this three-judge court on cross-

motions for summary judgment. The amended com-

plaint to which the motions are addressed challenges the

appointment of former Congressman Abner J. Mikva to

a position as a circuit judge for the United States Court

of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The

relevant portions of the statute under which the chal-

lenge is brought, Act of October 12, 1979, Pub. L. No.

96-86, § 101(c), 93 Stat. 656 (not codified), are set out

in the margin.' The plaintiff, Senator McClure, asserting

Section 101(c) provides in relevant part:

Any additional payment [to federal officials} under existing

law is not to be construed as an increase ip salary or emolu-

2a

that the salaries of federal judges were increased during

defendant Mikva’s term in Congress, claims that Judge

Mikva’s* nomination, confirmation, and appointment as

a circuit judge were in violation of article I, section 6,

clause 2 of the United States Constitution (the Ineligi-

bility Clause).* Senator McClure asks that we direct the

ments within the meaning of Article I, section 6, clause 2

of the Constitution, except that:

(1) Any Member of Congress, whether he voted to

confirm or not to confirm the appointment of any judge

appointed during the 96th Congress to the United States

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, or whether

he abstained from, or was not present for such vote, may

bring a civil action in the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia or in any United States Dis-

trict Court in the State he represents to contest the con-

stitutionality of the appointment and continuance in

office of said Circuit Judge on the ground that such ap-

pointment and continvance in office is in violation of

Article I, section 6, clause 2 of the Constitution;

(2) The designated United States District Court shall

have exclusive jurisdiction, without regard to the sum

or value of the matter in controversy, to determine the

validity of such appointment and continuance in office;

(3) Any action brought under this section shall be

heard and determined by a panel of three judges in ac-

cordance with the provisions of section 2284 of title 28,

United States Code. Any appeal from the action of a

court convened pursuant to such section shall lie to the

Supreme Court; and

(4) Any judge designated to hear any action brought

under this section shall cause such action to be in every

way expedited.

2 While plaintiff insists on referring to defendant Mikva as

“Mr.” his proper title is “Judge” until determined otherwise.

3 Article I, section 6, clause 2 of the United States Constitu-

tion provides in relevant part:

No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for

which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under

3a

President to notify defendant Mikva that his appointment

was in violation of the Constitution, and that we notify

defendant Mikva that his appointment was void ab

initio and that he must vacate his office. The threshold

question before us is whether we have jurisdiction to

hear the case. We cannot reach the merits of Senator

McClure’s challenge unless we answer that question

affirmatively.

BACKGROUND

The procedural posture of this case and the events

in its background provide a context that is helpful in

analyzing and attaching appropriate legal significance

to the contentions made by the parties. The procedural

steps taken and a summary of pertinent portions of the

pleadings are set forth in the margin.“

the Authority of the United States, which shall have been

created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased

during such time

* The original complaint was filed in the United States District

Court for the District of Idaho on September 25, 1979, by plaintiff

McClure, a United States Senator from the State of Idaho. Juris-

diction was alleged under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal question)

and 2201 (declaratory judgment). The original defendants were

James Earl Carter, President of the United States, and J. Stanley

Kimmitt, Secretary of the United States Senate. The complaint

sought a declaration that then-Congressman Abner J. Mikva was

constitutionally ineligible for appointment to the United States

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The suit

also sought an injunction against defendant Kimmitt to prevent

him from communicating the results of the United States Senate’s

vote of confirmation of Abner Mikva to the President.

On September 26, 1979, defendant Carter signed the commission

appointing Abner J. Mikva a United States Circuit Judge for the

District of Columbia Circuit. On October 16, 1979, the plaintiff

moved to dismiss defendant Kimmitt. The motion was granted.

The amended complaint was filed on November 6, 1979, once

more naming President Carter as a defendant and adding Abner

J. Mikva as a defendant. Jurisdiction was again premised on

28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 2201 but was additionally alleged under

4a

Congressman Abner J. Mikva was nominated by Presi-

dent Carter as eireuit judge for the Distriet of Columbia

Circuit. A number of senators, including Senator Me-

Clure, opposed the appointment. Indeed. a number of

these senators, again including Senator McClure, voiced

their opposition on the Senater floor, relying in their

section 101(c) of the Act of October 12, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-86,

93 Stat. 657 (not codified). Plaintiff requested a three-judge court

pursuant to the terms of section 101(c). The amended complaint

requested the relief described in the text of the opinion.

The defendant President answered the amended complaint and

requested that the action be dismissed. Defendant Mikva moved

to be dismissed as defendant based on his allegation that the court

lacked personal jurisdiction over him.

On December 13, 1979, the district judge originally assigned to

the case sent to the Honorable James R. Browning, Chief Judge

of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, a

Notification and Certificate that a three-judge district court should

be convened. On December 21, 1979, the President moved for

withdrawal of the Notification and Certificate. The motion was

denied and on February 4, 1980, Chief Judge Browning designated

a three-judge district court.

On February 25, 1980, the two defendants moved for summary

judgment, with defendant Mikva expressly reserving his defense

that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. The plaintiff

responded on March 28, 1980, by opposing the defendants’ motions

and himself moving for summary judgment. Oral argument was

heard on June 26, 1980. The court ruled from the bench that it

was properly convened as a three-judge court.

5 The constitutional question and the more general question of

Judge Mikva’s qualifications and fitness for judicial office were

extensively debated on the floor of the Senate, 125 Cong. Rec.

$13342-S13362 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1979). During the debate,

Senator Edward Kennedy introduced two detailed legal memoranda

prepared by the Justice Department on the constitutional ques-

tion, so that the senators would be fully informed. /d. at

$13360-S13362. Senator McClure made a speech attacking Con-

gressman Mikva’s political and social views and advised his col-

leagues that he would oppose the nomination specifically on that

basis, urging them to do the same. Id. at 813351-813353.

5a

arguments on their belief that then-Congressman Mikva

was philosophically unsuited to the job, as well as on

their view that he was constitutionally ineligible for

appointment because of the proscriptions of the Ineligi-

bility Clause. These arguments failed to persuade a

sufficient number of their fellow senators, and a majority

of the Senate voted to confirm defendant Mikva as judge

on September 25, 1979. 125 Cong. Rec. $1930% (daily ed.

Sept. 25, 1979).

After the Senate voted to confirm Judge Mikva, Sena-

tor McClure and others proposed to the Senate the juris-

dictional statute under which Senator McClure now sues.

The Senate attached the proposed statute as a rider to

an appropriation bill on October 10, 1979, 125 Cong. Rec.

814320, 814325 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1979), and the House

of Representatives agreed to it two days later. Jd. H9081

(daily ed. Oct. 12, 1979).

The jurisdictional statute is unusual in several re-

spects. First, it sets out a single substantive ground for

challenging a new judicial appointment—violation of the

Ineligibility Clause. A challenge to a judicial appoint-

ment on any other ground must be brought under some

other statute. Second, it limits both in time and by

institution the judicial appointments that may be chal-

lenged under the statute. It authorizes challenges to only

those judicial appointments made during the 96th Con-

gress and only those made to the United States Court of

Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. A chal-

lenge to a judge appointed during any other Congress or

to any other court must be brought under some other

statute. Perhaps not coincidentally, the only judicial

appointment that fits within the statute’s limitations and

might be subject to challenge on Ineligibility Clause

grounds is that of defendant Mikva. Third, the statute

authorizes suits by United States senators and members

of the House of Representatives, irrespective of whether

the senators voted for or against the appointment or,

6a

in the case of members of the House, voted at all. Fourth,

the stu.tute provides that suit may be brought either in

the United States District Court for the District of Co-

lumbia or in any federal district court in the state

which the senator or member of the House represents,

irrespective of the distance between that state and the

District of Columbia and irrespective of any connection

between that state and the judicial appointment sought

to be challenged.

In short, what the statute appears to authorize is a

mechanism whereby a senator or member of the House

of Representatives may challenge in a federal court in

his or her home state the validity of the judicial appoint-

ment of a single person, Judge Mikva. Such a statute

has, at one level, an entirely salutory purpose, for it

would be antithetical to the rule of law that all govern-

ment officials, and judges in particular, are pledged to

uphold if a federal judge were permitted to take office

in violation of the express terms of the United States

Constitution. The statute is, however, problematic at

quite another level, for under article III of the Con-

stitution federal courts may decide only cases and con-

troversies properly brought before them, by parties with

sufficient stake in the dispute to ensure that a decision

by the courts is not inconsistent with the limited role

the courts must play within our tripartite federal system

of government. The fact that the statute makes senators

and members of the House, and no others, “enforcers”

of the Constitution in the judicial forum implicates

special concerns regarding the separation of powers.

JUSTICIABILITY

The federal courts have consistently exercised care to

limit their jurisdiction to the case and controversy re-

quirement of article III. This governing principle is

more easily stated than applied, however, since compre-

7

hended within the limitations imposed by the terms

“cases” and “controversies” are concerns about the proper

functioning of courts in dispute resolution and the alloca-

tion of power among the three branches of government.

Our initial analysis of the unusual statute before us

embraced a full range of inquiry into the various aspects

of justiciability.“ We conclude, however, that one of

its aspects—the requirement of standing—is dispositive.

Article III requires that the parties to a lawsuit have

“such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy

as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens

the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely

depends for illumination of difficult constitutional ques-

tions.” Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, (1962). The

*The Supreme Court described the concept of justiciability in

Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 44-95 (1968) :

Embodied in the words “cases” and “controversies” are two

complementary but somewhat different limitations. In part

those words limit the business of federal courts to questions

presented in an adversary context and in a form historically

viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process.

And in part those words define the role assigned to the

judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power to assure that the

federal courts will not intrude into areas committed to the

other branches of government. Justiciability is the term of

art employed to give expression to this dual limitation placed

upon federal courts by the case-and-controversy doctrine.

One aspect of justiciability not raised by the parties, but which

gave this court some pause, is the possibility that this court has

been asked for an advisory opinion, an idea that is inconsistent

with the “case” or “controversy” requirement of the Constitution.

Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).

Although the statute the Senator relies on is facially similar

to the statute found ineffective in Muskrat, the differences are

signficant enough to remove the case from the proscriptions of

whatever remains of the Muskrat rationale. See, e. g., Northern

Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbreast, 425 U.S. 649 (1976); South Caro-

lina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). Thus, we are not asked

for an advisory opinion.

8a

issue confronting us is whether Senator McClure has such

a personal stake.

The interpretations of the doctrine of standing are

manifold. The Supreme Court has considered the issue

in numerous contexts and has expressed the standing

requirements in several formulations. Some of the for-

mulations leave one with the sense that standing can

never be determined until the case has been tried on

the merits; only at that point can one say with certainty

that the plaintiff did or did not have a protected legal

right or that he or she suffered a wrong for which the

law provides a remedy. The distinction between injury

“in fact” and injury “in law” and whether either or both

remain requirements for standing is not always clear.

The Court has at times required that a plaintiff show

a distinct “legal interest” before he or she may have

standing in federal court. E.g., Jenkins v. McKeithen,

395 U.S. 411, 423 (1969). More recently, the Court has

said that a plaintiff must merely be within the “zone of

interests” sought to be protected by the constitutional

or statutory guarantee in question. Association of Data

Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S.

150 (1970). In other cases, the Court has suggested that

a plaintiff need only show “injury in fact” to satisfy

the personal stake requirement of article III. E.g., Duke

Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc.,

438 UU 59 (1978); United States v. Students Challeng-

ing Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S.

669 (1973). A person may thus have standing, despite

the lack of a demonstrable legal right, if he can show an

injury in fact and, we would surmise, some colorable

legal claim. The law is less ciear that a person without

an injury in fact may have standing, although it appears

that at least in some limited circumstances a statute may

give such a person a cause of action based on a rationale

of enforcing the public interest through private persons

concerned about public questions. See, e.g., Sierra Club

9a

v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 n.3 (1972); Metropolitan

Washington Coalition for Clean Air v. District of Colum-

bia, 511 F.2d 809, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Clean Air Act,

42 U.S.C. § 7604 (Supp. II 1978) (authorizing civil

suits by “any person”). But in Warth v. Seldin, 422

U.S. 490, 501 (1975), the Court, in acknowledging that

Congress may grant an express right of action that

otherwise would be barred on prudential grounds, af-

firmed that “the plaintiff still must allege a distinct and

palpable injury to himself, even if it is an injury shared

by a large class of other possible litigants.”

In light of the foregoing, we now inquire whether

Senator McClure has standing to bring this suit con-

sistent with the requirements of article III. The analysis

must be two-fold. First, without reference to any partic-

ular statute, does Senator McClure, either as a private

individual or as a senator, have a sufficient personal

stake in the challenge to Judge Mikva’s appointment to

give him standing? Second, if Senator McClure does not

have a sufficient personal stake under that criterion, has

Congress, by the statute under which Senator McClure

seeks to sue, properly conferred a sufficient “right” upon

him to give him standing and to satisfy the case or

controversy requirement of article III?

Without reference to the statute under which Senator

McClure seeks to sue, we conclude that a United States

Senator, suing in either his individual capacity or his

official capacity as a senator, lacks standing to challenge

the validity of the appointment of a federal judge. In

Ex Parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937) (per curiam),

the Supreme Court denied a motion brought by a mem-

ber of the Supreme Court bar for an order to show cause

why Justice Black, then recently appointed to the Su-

preme Court, should be permitted to serve as a Justice.

The challenge was based on the Ineligibility Clause, the

same constitutional provision relied upon by Senator

10a

McClure in this suit. In denying the motion for lack

of standing, the court said that “[i]t is an established

principle that to entitle a private individual to invoke

the judicial power to determine the validity of executive

or legislative action he must show that he has sustained

or is immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury

as the result of that action and it is not sufficient that

he has merely a general interest common to all members

of the public.” 302 U.S. at 634. As a private individual,

then, it seems that Senator McClure does not have suffi-

cient personal interest in the validity of Judge Mikva’s

appointment to have standing in federal court.

Senator McClure contends, however, that his special

duties and repsonsibilities as senator gave him standing

to challenge the appointment. The precise nature of a

legislator’s standing to sue in federal court is a matter

of no small importance, for a readier access to courts

by legislators, as legislators, is likely to give the courts

increased opportunity and obligation to decide matters

of public importance that might previously have been

left to the legislative and executive branches. It is

nevertheless the case that, in at least some circum-

stances, a legislator does have standing to sue as a

legislator when he or she would not have standing as an

individual. The touchstone is whether the legislator’s

interest in “maintaining the effectiveness of [his] votes”

is sufficient to confer standing to challenge an action

imparing that effectiveness. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S.

433, 438 (1939). In Coleman, the Supreme Court held

that a group of Kansas legislators had standing to

challenge both the right of the state’s lieutenant governor

to break a tie vote in the state senate, and the efficacy

of the state’s attempted ratification of an amendment to

the United States Constitution which the state legislature

had previously rejected. This principle has re-emerged

in a recent case in the District of Columbia Circuit, in

which Senator Kennedy was held to have standing to

lla

challenge President Nixon’s pocket veto of a health care

bill during a congressional recess. Kennedy v. Sampson,

511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Senator Kennedy argued

that the bill could not validly have been pocket vetoed

during a recess, and that President Nixon’s action not

only deprived the Senator’s earlier vote in favor of the

bill of its effectiveness, but also deprived him of the op-

portunity to vote to override a normal veto.’

It is difficult to see how Senator McClure can argue

that the effectiveness of his vote is impaired by the

appointment of former-Congressman Mikva to the federal

bench. Senator McClure had the opportunity to persuade

his colleagues to vote against the confirmation and, in

the conscientious performance of his duties, Senator

McClure did just that.* That he and like-minded senators

did not prevail in the Senate does not mean that the

effectiveness of Senator McClure’s vote was impaired

within the meaning of Coleman v. Miller. It means

merely that he was on the losing side. Certainly no one

would contend, and we do not understand Senator Mc-

Clure to contend, that the losing senators in any vote

should automatically have the right to appeal to a federal

court for a determination of the correctness of the result

approved by the majority of their colleagues. If this

were the case, federal courts would on such occasions be

little more than legal advisors to the Congress, whose

counsel could be obtainted at the instance of any single

See also Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190 (DC. Cir. 1973)

(member of House of Representatives lacks standing to seek de-

claratory judgment prohibiting certain illegal activities by Central

Intelligence Agency) ; Harrington v. Schlesinger, 528 F.2d 455, 459

(4th Cir. 1975) (members of House of Representatives lack

standing to challenge expenditure of funds for military action in

Southeast Asia); Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1315

(2nd Cir. 1973) (member of House of Representatives lacks

standing to seek declaratory judgment prohibiting military action

in Cambodia).

See note 4, supra.

12a

member of that body. This would, of course, amount to

the giving of advisory opinions that, whatever their de-

sirability in a particular case, we are forbidden to pro-

vide. Thus, at least without a statute authorizing such

suits, Senator McClure lacks standing to challenge, either

as an individual or as a Senator, the appointment of

former Congressman Mikva to the Court of Appeals.

We must therefore consider the effect, if any, of the

jurisdictional statute under which Senator McClure seeks

to sue. It is difficult to see how this statute may, con-

sistent with article II’, confer upon a senator or member

of the House of Representatives a “right” to seek a deci-

sion from a federal court that such a senator or member

of the House would otherwise be powerless to procure.

The statute is not premised on protecting the effective-

ness of a legislator’s vote under the rationale of Coleman

v. Miller, for it purports to grant standing to senators

who voted for Judge Mikva as well as to those who

voted against him. Furthermore, the statute purports

to grant standing to members of the House of Repre-

sentatives, who had no vote on the appointment at all.

And we see no relevance, at least insofar as standing

for members of the House is concerned, in the fact that

Judge Mikva was, before his appointment to the bench,

himself a member of the House.

Thus, we hold that Senator McClure, even with aid

of the special jurisdictional statute on which he seeks

to rely, does not have standing to bring this suit. The

jurisprudential considerations go beyond simply setting

proper limits on judicial power and containing its exer-

cise within its rightful sphere. They serve also to protect

against other branches of government, no matter how

well-intentioned, voluntarily ceding to the federal judi-

ciary powers and responsibilities that rightfully belong

to the legislature or the executive. At bottom, the vice

of the statute before us is its muddling of the roles,

its blurring of the lines between the branches of govern-

ment.

13a

Members of Congress are the democratically-elected

representatives of the people, chosen by them to enact

the laws of the United States, to advise and consent to

the appointment of policy-makers in the executive branch

and judges in the judicial branch, and to perform cer-

tain other functions prescribed by the Constitution. The

statute under which & nator McClure brings this suit

casts members of Congress in the role of special attorneys

general, to plead before this court for a second opinion

as to whether their judgments were right in voting for

or against the confirmation of Judge Mikva. Under the

Constitution, it was the duty of Congress itself, in the

first instance, to determine Judge Mikva’s qualifications

both on the merits and on the issue of whether he was

constitutionally eligible to serve as a judge. To allow

members of Congress to change hats, as it were, to plead

the unconstitutionality of their own acts before this

court on the basis of an argument already debated in the

Senate but lost there by vote, would, we suggest, set a

dangerous precedent. We find that this court does not

have jurisdiction, and we according!y dismiss.“

/s/ Betty B. Fletcher

BErry B. FLETCHER

United States Cireuit Judge

/s/ Ray MeNichols

Ray McNICHOLS

United States District Judge

/s/ Fred M. Taylor

FRED M. TAYLOR

United States District Judge

* Since we have determined that plaintiff McClure does not have

standing to bring this suit, we do not reach the question of per-

sonal jurisdiction over Judge Mikva nor any of the other issues

raised by the parties.

14a

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF IDAHO

Civil No. 79-1340

James A. McCLurRE, United States Senator, Idaho,

. Plaintiff,

JAMES EARL CARTER, PRESIDENT of the United States;

and ABNER J. MIKVA,

Defendants.

Filed May 5, 1981

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Before: FLETCHER, Circuit Judge, and MCNICHOLS and

TAYLOR, District Judges, sitting as a Special

Three-Judge District Court.

The court having previously entered its decision that

the plaintiff lacks standing to bring this suit and that

the court therefore lacks jurisdiction over the subject

matter,

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

That the above entitled case be, and hereby is,

DISMISSED.

s Betty B. Fletcher

BETTY B. FLETCHER

United States Circuit Judge

s, Ray MeNichols

Ray McNICHOLS

United States District Judge

/s/ Fred M. Taylor

FRED M. TAYLOR

United States District Judge

15a

APPENDIX C

JOHN F. ADLARD, Esq.

RUNPFT, STECHER & COFFIN

Pest Office Box 953

420 West Bannock Street

Boise, Idaho 83701

Telephone: (208) 345-6521

Davip H. MARTIN, Ese.

2033 M Street, N.W.

Suite 700

Washington, D.C. 20036

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

Case No. 79-1340

JAMES A. MCCLURE, United States Senator, Idaho,

— Plaintiff,

JAMES EARL CARTER, PRESIDENT of the United States;

and ABNER J. MIKVA,

Defendants.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Notice is hereby given that JAMES A. McCLURE,

plaintiff above named, hereby appeals to the United

States Supreme Court as provided for in P.L. 96-86 and

28 United States Code Sections 2284 and 2101, from

the final judgment dismissing this case entered in this

action on the 5th day of May, 1981.

DATED: June 9, 1981.

RUNFT, STECHER & COFFIN, CTD.

By

Davw H. MarTIN, Esq. JOHN F. ADLARD, of the Firm

l6a

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that service of the within and

foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL was made this 9th day

of June, 1981, by mailing copies thereof, by United

States Mail, postage prepaid, to the following persons:

Ronald Reagan, President

United States of America

c/o Solicitor General

Washington, D.C. 20530

Hon. Abner Mikva

United States Court of Claims

c/o Solicitor General

Washington, D.C. 20530

Fred Fielding, Esq.

Counsel to the President

The White House

Washington, D.C. 20000

The Hon. Abner Mikva

United States Court of Claims

Washington, D.C. 20000

JOHN F. ADLARD

17a

APPENDIX D

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 80-1061

DONALD W. RIEGLE, JR., MEMBER,

U.S. SENATE,

V.

FEDERAL OPEN MARKET COMMITTEE, et al.

Appellees

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(D.C. Civil Action No. 79-1703)

Argued January 15, 1981

Decided June 24, 1981

Grasty Crews, III, for appellant.

Lewis K. Wise, Attorney, Department of Justice with

whom Alice Daniel, Assistant Attorney General, Charles

F. C. Ruff, United States Attorney and Anthony Stein-

meyer, Attorney, Department of Justice were on the

brief for appellees.

Before: Ropp and EDWARDS, Circuit Judges and

PENN *, United States District Judge for the

District of Columbia

* Sitting by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 292(a).

18a

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Ross.

Ross, Circuit Judge: This case presents the question

whether a United States Senator has standing to chal-

lenge the constitutionality of the procedures established

by the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 221 et seg.

(1976) for the appointment of the five Reserve Bank

members of the Federal Open Market Committee. A

corollary question is whether, assuming the Senator has

standing, this court should afford him relief. The com-

plaint of the appellant, Senator Donald W. Riegle, Jr.,

of Michigan, was dismissed by the United States District

Court for the District of Columbia on the ground that

the Senator lacked standing to seek injunctive relief

from the allegedly unconstitutional procedures authorized

by the Act. Riegle v. Federal Open Market Committee,

et al., 84 F.R.D. 114, 116 (D.D.C. 1979) (Gesell, J.).

We affirm on a ground different from that relied upon

below.

I.

The Federal Reserve System, which was created by

Congress in 1913 as this nation’s central bank, is com-

prised of public and private entities organized on a re-

gional basis with federal supervisory authority.“ The

System includes a seven-member Board of Governors,

the twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks, the FOMC,

the Federal Advisory Council, and approximately 5,500

privately-owned member commercial banks. (Br. of

FOMC at 4) The primary role of the System in the con-

duct of monetary policy is to facilitate the achievement

of national economic goals through influence on the avail-

1See Reuss v. Balles, 189 U.S.App.D.C. 303, 584 F.2d 461,

462-65, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978) for a description of the

Federal Reserve Sye 1, open market operations, and the evolu-

tion and functions of the FOMC. See also T. Mayer, J. DUESEN-

BERRY, & R. ALIBER, MONEY, BANKING, AND THE ECONOMY (1981) ;

“A look Inside Paul Volcker’s Fed,” N.Y. Times (May 3, 1981),

sec. 3, at 1, 8-9.

19a

ability and cost of bank reserves, bank credit, and money.

Three basic mechanisms employed by the System to im-

plement monetary policy are open market operations,

regulation of member bank borrowing from the Federal

Reserve Banks, and establishment of member bank re-

serve requirements. The most flexible and potentially

significant of these tools is open market transactions.

(Br. at FOMC at 6)

Open market trading, which consists of the purchase

and sale of government and other securities in the fi-

nancial markets by the Reserve Banks, is exclusively

directed and regulated by the FOMC. 12 U.S.C. § 263

(b) (1976). The FOMC, like the System as a whole, is

constituted to reflect both public and private interests.

Since 1935 the FOMC has been composed of the seven

members of the Board of Governors of the Federal Re-

serve System, 12 U.S.C. §241 (1976), who are ap-

pointed by the President with the advice and consent of

the Senate, and five representatives of the Federal Re-

serve Banks, who are elected annually by the boards of

directors of the Banks. 12 U.S.C. § 263(a) (1976). Since

1942 Congress has required that the five Reserve Bank

members of the FOMC be either presidents or first vice

presidents of the Reserve Banks. 12 U.S.C. § 263(a).

The Reserve Banks are private corporations whose stock

is owned by the member commercial banks within their

districts. 12 U.S.C. § 321 (1976). These member com-

mercial banks elect six of the nine members of the board

of directors of each Reserve Bank, and the Board of

Governors of the Federal Reserve System selects the re-

maining three. 12 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304 (1976). The presi-

dents and first vice presidents of the Reserve Banks,

although selected by the respective boards of directors, are

subject to the approval, suspension, and removal au-

thority of the Board of Governors. 12 U.S.C. §§ 341,

248 (1976). In short, the FOMC consists of seven mem-

bers who hold their offices by virtue of presidential ap-

pointments confirmed by the Senate, and five members

who are elected by the boards of directors of the Banks

and who hold their offices subject to the approval of

the Board of Governors. 12 U.S.C. § 263(a).

The securities transactions directed by the FOMC have

a significant effect on the financial markets. In 1974,

for example, the FOMC alone was responsible for ap-

proximately $19.4 billion in outright transactions in

U.S. Government Securities. (Br. of Riegle at 5) These

transactions potentially affect the value of the dollar,

foreign exchange rates, interest rates, investment, and

employment. Id. Approximately every 45 days, the

FOMC formulates its monetary policy objectives for the

immediate future by setting targets for growth rates in

the money supply and the range of variance in the Fed-

eral Funds rate (the member banks’ rate for overnight

loans of excess reserves to other banks). The FOMC

then issues a domestic policy directive to the Federal

Reserve Bank of New York for the management of the

System Open Market Account, which is a central entity

representing the open market transaction interests of the

twelve Reserve Banks. The manager of the Account, who

maintains daily contact with Federal Reserve staff mem-

bers in Washington, engages in financial transactions de-

signed to achieve the monetary conditions sought by the

FOMC. Reserve Banks are prohibited under the Act

from engaging in any open market transactions except

those directed by the FOMC through the Account. 12

U.S.C. § 263 (b).

Considering the substantial ecor mie power wielded

by the FOMC, it is not surprising that controversy over

the balance between public and private control of the

Committee has existed since its creation. As originally

constituted, the FOMC was privately dominated, consist-

ing solely of representatives of the twelve Reserve Banks.

Banking Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 162. This arrangement

2la

was unsatisfactory to those who favored greater govern-

mental control over disposition of Reserve Bank funds.

During debates on the Senate floor preceding passage of

the Banking Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 704, Chairman Carter

Glass of the Senate Banking Committee (a supporter of

Reserve Bank control of the FOMC) explained the legis-

lative compromise between public (Board of Governors)

and private (Reserve Bank) interests which produced

the present procedure for constituting the FOMC:

[We are] amazed to have it proposed that the Fed-

eral Reserve Board alone should constitute the open-

market committee of the system. The Govern-

ment of the United States has never contributed a

dollar to one of the Reserve Banks; yet it is pro-

posed to have the Federal Reserve Board, having not

a dollar of pecuniary interest in the Reserve funds

or the deposits of the Federal Reserve banks or of

the member banks . . . to make such disposition of

the reserve funds of the country, and in large meas-

ure the deposits of the member banks of the country,

as they may please .... [I]n order to reconcile

bitter differences there was yielding, and we have

now proposed an open-market committee composed

of all 7 members of the Federal Reserve Board and

5 representatives of the regional reserve banks.

79 Cong. Rec. 11778 (1935).

Despite the passage of the compromise represented by

the Banking Act of 1935, the debate over public and

private control of the FOMC has continued during the

past 48 years. The late Congressman Wright Patman,

Chairman of the House Banking Committee, asserted in

1938 that the Reserve Bank members of the FOMC did

not represent the “people’s interest.”* Mr. Patman’s

2 Hearings before the House Banking and Currency Com-

mittee on H.R. 7230, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 56 (1938).

successor, Congressman Henry S. Reuss, has made several

unsuccessful attempts, both in Congress by amendment

of 12 U.S.C. § 263(a) and in the federal courts, to re-

quire that the five Reserve Bank members of the FOMC

be appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate

pursuant to the Appointments Clause. United States

Constitution, Art. II, sec. 2, cl. 2. Based on his belief

that the work of the FOMC “is essentially a govern-

mental function, and should not be exercised by private

people.” * Mr. Reuss in 1976 introduced the “Federal Re-

serve Reform Act,” H.R. 12934, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.

(1976), which in part would have required that the five

Reserve Bank seats on the FOMC be limited to Bank

presidents appointed by the President with the advice

and consent of the Senate. The House Banking Com-

mittee defeated this provision on April 30, 1976. (Br.

of FOMC at 21) Mr. Reuss then brought an action in

federal court seeking, in part, to have 12 U.S.C. § 263

(a) declared unconstitutional. The District Court dis-

missed the action on the ground that the Congressman

lacked standing to sue either in his capacity as a con-

gressman or as a private bondholder. Reuss v. Balles,

73 F.R.D. 90 (D. D.C. 1976) (Parker, J.), aff'd, 189

U.S. App. D.C. 303, 584 F.2d 461, cert. denied, 439 U.S.

997 (1978). On April 1, 1980 Congressman Reuss in-

troduced another bill, H.R. 7001, which would amend 12

U.S.C. § 263(a) in the manner sought by Senator Riegle

in this case: a prohibition on voting by the five Reserve

Bank members of the FOMC. This legislation was not

enacted.‘ (Br. of FOMC at 21-22)

* Hearings before the Subcommittee on Domestic Finance of the

House Committee on Banking and Currency “The Federal Reserve

System After Fifty Years,” 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1964).

H. R. 7001, after consideration by the Subcommittee on Domestic

Monetary Policy, was forwarded as a clean bill, H.R. 8223, to the

Committee on Banking on October 1, 1980. The bill died within

this Committee.

23a

Senator Riegle instituted the present suit on July 2,

1979 (prior to the introduction of H.R. 7001 by Con-

gressman Reuss) in the United States District Court for

the District of Columbia, seeking injunctive relief in the

form of an absolute prohibition on voting by the Reserve

Bank members of the FOMC. (J.A. at 8) In an opinion

by District Judge Gesell, the court dismissed the action

for lack of standing. Riegle v. Federal Open Market

Committee, supra, at 116. The court reasoned that

Senator Riegle’s injury is of a political nature, de-

riving solely from the acts or omissions of his col-

leagues and not in any way from the actions of the

named defendants. Reuss v. Balles, supra 584 F.2d

at 468. What the Court must decide is whether

or not a Congressman from either chamber has

standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statu-

tory provision on which he has failed to persuade

his colleagues in the past and remains free to at-

tempt persuasion in the future. The Court concludes

that to confer standing upon such a Congressman

without more would improperly interfere with the

legislative process.

84 F.R.D. at 116 (citations omitted). The decision of

the District Court is now before us on appeal.

II.

Senator Riegle alleges that both the defendant indi-

viduals, [bly acting as officers of the United States

when their nominations have never been submitted to the

Senate,” and the defendant executive agency, “[b]y per-

mitting the defendant individuals to act as officers of

the United States when their nominations have never

been submitted to the Senate,” deprive him of his con-

stitutional right to vote in determining the advice and

consent of the Senate to the appointment of the five

Reserve Bank members of the FOMC. (Complaint, J.A.

24a

at 11) When ruling on a motion to dismiss for want of

standing, “both the trial and reviewing courts must ac-

cept as true all material allegations of the complaint,

and must construe the complaint in favor of the com-

plaining party.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501

(1975). We assume, therefore, that the procedure for

constituting the FOMC contained in 12 U.S.C. § 263 (a

of the Act results in a deprivation of Senator Riegle’s

constitutional right to advise and consent regarding the

appointment of the defendant officers of the executive

branch. Senator Riegle seeks not declaratory relief but

rather “an injunction against their [five Reserve Bank

members] voting as members of the FOMC, conduct

which deprives him of his right to vote in determining the

advice and consent of the Senate to the appointment of

officers at the highest level of government.” (Br. of Rie-

gle at 43) (Emphasis in original)

Two contradictory principles pervade the opinions of

this court concerning the standing of congressional plain-

tiffs. First, no distinctions are to be made between con-

g sional and private plaintiffs in the standing analysis.

As we stated in Harrington v. Bush, 180 U.S. App. D.C.

45, 553 F.2d 190, 204 (1977) (emphasis omitted),

“there are no special standards for determining Congres-

sional standing questions.” Second, this court will not

confer standing on a congressional plaintiff unless he is

suffering an injury that his colleagues cannot redress.

When congressional plaintiffs have sought to accomplish

in this court what they were unable to persuade their

colleagues to do, we have usually refused to confer stand-

ing because of our concern for non-interference in the

legislative process. See, e.g., Reuss v. Balles, supra; Har-

rington v. Bush, supra. Cf. Kennedy v. Sampson, 167

U.S. App. D.C. 192, 511 F.2d 430 (1974), holding that

nullification of a senator’s vote due to pocket veto of bill

by the President constitutes sufficient injury to confer

25a

standing; Goldwater v. Carter, 199 U.S. App. D.C. 115,

617 F.2d 430 (en banc), holding that disenfranchisement

of a senator because of the attempt by the President to

terminate the Taiwan Treaty without the advice and

consent of the Senate is injury sufficient to confer stand-

ing, judgment vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (mem.).

We believe that these two contradictory principles create

unnecessary confusion when applied to suits brought by

congressional plain*’ffs. As the former Chief Judge of

this court recently . oserved,

There can be no peaceful coexistence between, on

the one hand, the notion that legislators are treated

like any other plaintiff for standing purposes, and,

on the other, the idea that courts should rigorously

scrutinize whether the congressional plaintiff’s true

quarrel is with his colleagues, rather than the execu-

tive. There is no general requirement that a private

litigant employ self-help before seeking judicial re-

lief. Nor should there be, because an ordinary plain-

tiff, having suffered injury in fact within the con-

templation of the law he invokes, is entitled to his

day in court. If the plaintiff passes the standing

test and presents a justiciable dispute, it is assumed

that the political branches have decided to commit

such disputes to the judiciary and, barring extraor-

dinary circumstances, that is a judgment which

courts are bound to respect.

Hon. Carl McGowan, “Congressmen in Court: The New

Plaintiffs,” 15 Ga. L. Rev. 241, 254-255 (1981) (Me-

Gowan) (citations omitted). Accordingly we shall pro-

ceed by applying to this case the traditional standing

tests for non-congressional plaintiffs gleaned from opin-

ions of the Supreme Court. Thereafter, we shall exam-

ine what additional considerations, if any, must enter

26a

our analysis by virtue of the plaintiff's status as a

Member of the United States.“

The Supreme Court in Ass’n of Data Processing Serv-

ice Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970),

established a two-part test for standing: injury (i) in

fact and (ii) to an interest “arguably within the zone

of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute

or constitutional guarantee in question.” Id. at 152-53.

A causation requirement was added in Warth v. Seldin,

supra at 505: the plaintiff must prove that “the asserted

injury was the consequence of the defendants’ actions,

or that prospective relief will remove the harm.” This

causation requirement was elaborated upon in Simon v.

Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426

U.S. 26, 41-42, 45 (1976), where the Court observed that

“the ‘case or controversy’ limitation of Art. III still re-

quires that a federal court act orly to redress injury that

fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the de-

fendant, and not injury that results from the independ-

ent action of some third party not before the court.”

Again, however, the Court stated the causation require-

ment in the alternative, quoting Warth v. Seldin, supra:

the causation requirement is satisfied if the plaintiff es-

tablishes that the injury was “the consequence of the

defendants’ actions” or that exercise of the court’s reme-

dial powers would redress the injury. 426 U.S. at 45.

See also Duke Power Co. v. North Carolina Environ-

mental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 74 (1978). Al-

though recent cases have suggested a slight relaxation of

the above tests, see, e.g., Duke Power, supra at 80-81, the

5 By postponing consideration of this court’s congressional stand-

ing opinions until the latter part of the discussion, we seek to

illustrate the conceptual imprecision which results from attempts

to achieve through standing analysis the resolution of those

separstion-of-powers problems peculiar to congressional plaintiff

cases. See generally, McGowan, supra; Note, “Congressional Ac-

cess to the Federal Courts,” 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1632 (1977).

27a

three requirements stated above present the maximum

burden which a plaintiff must bear to attain standing:

establishment of (i) injury-in-fact (ii) to an interest

protected by the relevant law (iii) where the injury is

caused by defendants’ actions or capable of judicial re-

dress.

We think it may be argued plausibly that Senator

Riegle has met the above burden. First, assuming that

the five Reserve Bank members of the FOMC are officers

who must be appointed with the advice and consent of

the Senate, Riegle’s inability to exercise his right under

the Appointments Clause of the Constitution is an injury

sufficiently personal to constitute an injury-in-fact. As

the Court observed in Warth v. Seldin, supra at 498-99,

the plaintiff must allege “‘such a personal stake in the

outcome of the controversy’ as to warrant his invocation

of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of

the court’s remedial powers on his behalf.” Second, with

regard to the causation requirement, we note that the

named defendants in this action (the five Reserve Bank

members of the FOMC) are not the causes of the injury

to Senator Riegle. The five Reserve Bank members were

elected by the directors of the Federal Reserve Banks. It

is these directors, rather than the five FOMC members

in question, who are exercising an appointment power

which deprives Senator Riegle of his right to vote on

determining the advice and consent of the Senate to the

appointments of officers. Thus, the requirement that “the

asserted injury was the consequence of the defendants’

actions,” Warth v. Seldin, supra, has not been met. How-

ever, as noted above at page 10, the causation require-

ment can also be met by showing that “prospective

[judicial] relief will remove the harm.” Warth v. Seldin,

supra. Because it is within the power of this court to

redress the alleged injury by holding that 12 U.S.C.

§ 263(a) is unconstitutional, the causation requirement

has been satisfied despite the naming of inappropriate

defendants.“ Third, the interest which Riegle claims was

injured by defendants’ action (his right to advise and

consent to the appointment of officers of the executive

branch) is within the zone of interests protected by the

Appointments Clause of the Constitution, supra. In short,

although there is room for argument as to whether Sen-

ator Riegle clearly satisfies all requirements of the most

stringent version of the Supreme Court’s standing test,

we think it reasonable to hold that he has standing.’

* Although it can be argued that the Senate rather than the

directors of the Federal Reserve Banks has, through the passage

of 12 U.S.C. § 263(a) of the Act, caused Riegle’s injury, to con-

clude therefrom that the Senator would not satisfy the first for-

mulation of the causation test even had he named the Bank

directors as defendants would violate the principle of equality

between private and congressional plaintiffs in the standing in-

quiry. When a plaintiff alleges injury by unconstitutional action

taken pursuant to a statute, his proper defendants are those acting

unconstitutionally under the law (i.e., the Bank directors), and

not the legislature which enacted the statute. See generally,

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 175-80 (1803).

7 This case differs from Reuss v. Balles, supra at note 1, where

standing was denied to a congressman who claimed, in part, that

improper delegation of responsibilities to the FOMC resulted in

usurpation of his powers under Article I, sec. 8 of the Constitution

to coin and regulate the value of monev, to regulate commerce,

and to borrow money on the credit of the United States. /d. at 467.

The court noted in the Reuss case that judicial relief could not

possibly cure the alleged injury, for even were the court to re-

quire that all FOMC members be presidential appointees, the

Committee would retain delegated powers and the congressman's

role in setting monetary policy would not be enhanced by the

judicial relief he sought. In this case, on the other hand, judicial

relief in the form of invalidation of 12 U.S.C. 5 263(a) would

prevent the directors of the Banks from exercising their allegedly

unconstitutional appointments of the five Reserve Bank members

of the FOMC.

III.

Appellant's status as a Member of the United States

Senate, however, raises separation-of-powers concerns

which are best addressed independently of the standing

issue. As we observed supra at pages 8-9, the prineiple

that a legislator must lack collegial or “in-house” reme-

dies before this court will confer standing has been a

theme of our congressional plaintiff opinions. This prin-

ciple is a departure from traditional standing analysis

because it violates the principle of equality between legis-

lator and private plaintiffs; non-legislator plaintiffs are

not routinely denied standing because of the presence of

an alternative remedy. Moreover, the inappropriateness

of the collegial remedy principle as an aspect of congres-

sional standing analysis has resulted in its inconsistent

application in the case law of this court. For example,

in Public Citizen v. Sampson, 379 F. Supp. 662 (D.D.C.

1974), aff'd mem., 169 U.S. App. D.C. 301, 515 F.2d

1018 (1975), Harrington v. Bush, supra at 212-214, and

Reuss v. Balles, supra at 468, standing was withheld

from congressional plaintiffs in part because their power

to vote, i.e., to enact legislation to cure the alleged in-

jury, remained unimpaired. Yet in Kennedy v. Sampson,

supra, the court conferred standing on Senator Kennedy,

to challenge the legality of an attempted pocket veto of

a bill for which he had voted. We reasoned that execu-

tive impairment of the Senator’s past vote had nullified

Kennedy’s legislative power. Id. at 436. The Senator

had, however, collegial remedies comparable to those

which negated standing in the Public Citizen, Harring-

ton, and Reuss cases; Senator Kennedy’s power to re-

introduce the relevant legislation in he next session of

Congress and to vote thereon remained unimpaired. In

Goldwater v. Carter, supra, this court’s most recent opin-

ion regarding congressional standing, legislator plaintiffs

were again granted standing despite the presence of ade-

quate collegial remedies. The plaintiffs in the Goldwater

30a

case were a small group of senators and representatives

who asserted that President Carter could not terminate

the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan without either

a two-thirds vote of the Senate or a majority of both

houses of Congress. A majority of this court reasoned

that the plaintiffs had been “disenfranchised” by the

President’s action because a requisite number of senators

could never force an unwilling Senate to vote on a decla-

ration of their right to block rescission of the Taiwan

Treaty, nor was there any assurance that the President

would heed any Senate action. 617 F.2d at 702-703. Yet

collegial remedies existed because Senate resolutions re-

garding the Treaty were pending at the time. McGowan,

at 247-48. On appeal the Supreme Court vacated our

judgment on the grounds that the plaintiffs did not pose

a justiciable question. 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (mem.) The

Court ignored the standing concept altogether and, in

separate opinions by Justices Powell and Rehnquist,

neither of which gained a majority of the Court, relied

upon the doctrines of ripeness and political question, re-

spectively. Jd. at 997, 1002.

If, as the ultimate disposition of Goldwater v. Carter

suggests, the Supreme Court does not believe that the

standing doctrine is capable of reflecting the prudential

concerns raised by congressional plaintiff suits, this court

ought not persist in the attempt to make it do so. The

doctrinal difficulties presented by an attempt to reconcile

our denial of congressional standing in the Public Citi-

zen, Harrington, and Reuss cases, on the one hand, with

our conferral of legislator standing in the Kennedy and

Goldwater cases, on the other, suggest that

[t]he use of the standing doctrine to address the

separation-of-powers concerns arising when federal

legislators sue the executive branch in federal court

is fraught with difficulties both in theory and in

application. Although it has been the most popular

31a

method of judicial self-restraint in these cases, the

recent Supreme Court decision in Goldwater, which

made no use of the term, suggests that its day may

have passed insofar as these lawsuits are concerned.

McGowan, at 256. Moreover, we are convinced that the

doctrines of ripeness and political question are no “more

elegant in their conception [n]or more satisfying in their

execution” than the standing concept as a means of artic-

ulating our prudential concerns in congressional plaintiff

cases. McGowan, at 256-261. The political question doc-

trine justifies a finding of nonjusticiability primarily

when there is an explicit textual commitment of the

controversy to a non-judicial branch of government for

resolution. Jd. at 258. In the case under review, the

Appointments Clause of the Constitution has no such

textual commitment of the advice and consent issue ex-

clusively to the legislature.* On the contrary, “[n]othing

in articles II or III [of the Constitution] suggests that,

assuming the court has jurisdiction, anyone but the ju-

dicial branch should decide this question.” McGowan, at

258. In short, a clear constitutional or statutory prohibi-

tion of judicial review will surely not be present in many

cases where prudential concerns nevertheless warrant a

court in finding it improper for a congressional plaintiff

to invoke the judicial power. As to ripeness, one can

The Appointments Clause of the Constitution, Art. II, sec. 2,

cl. 2, reads as follows:

[The President} shall have Power, by and with the Advice

and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two

thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shal! nominate,

and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall

appoint Ambassadors, and other public Ministers and Consuls,

Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the

United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise

provided for, and which shall be established by Law; but the

Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior

Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the

Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.

32a

conceive of instances when executive action has been

taken which may create a situation ripe for judicial

review (this case, for example), but separation-of-powers

concerns justify judicial restraint. Neither the ripeness

nor political question doctrine, in summary, is sufficiently

catholic in formulation or flexible in application to re-

solve the prudential issues arising in congressional plain-

tiff cases.

The most satisfactory means of translating our sepa-

ration-of-powers concerns into principled decisionmaking

is through a doctrine of circumscribed equitable discre-

tion. Where a congressional plaintiff could obtain sub-

stantial relief from his fellow legislators through the

enactment, repeal, or amendment of a statute, this court

should exercise its equitable discretion to dismiss the leg-

islator’s action. For the reasons set forth below, this

test avoids the problems engendered by the doctrines of

standing, political question, and ripeness. The standard

would counsel the courts to refrain from hearing cases

which represent the most obvious intrusion by the judi-

ciary into the legislative arena: challenges concerning

congressional action or inaction regarding legislation.

Yet this standard would assure that non-frivolous claims

of unconstitutional action which could only be brought by

members of Congress will be reviewed on the merits.

The above standard would counsel dismissal of a con-

gressional plaintiff’s claim in cases concerning legislative

action or inaction because it is in these cases that the

plaintiff’s dispute appears to be primarily with his fel-

low legislators. In these circumstances, separation-of-

powers concerns are most acute. Judges are presented

not with a chance to mediate between two political

branches but rather with the possibility of thwarting

Congress’s will by allowing a plaintiff to circumvent the

processes of democratic decisionmaking. “This meddling

with the internal decisionmaking processes of one of the

33a

political branches extends judicial power beyond the limits

inherent in the constitutional scheme for dividing federal

power.” McGowan, at 251. See, e. g, Harrington v.

Bush, supra at 215; Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d

1307 (2d Cir. 1973). Thus, where a congressional plain-

tiff has standing to challenge the actions of those acting

pursuant to a statute which could be repealed or amended

by his colleagues, or where he alleges an injury which

could be substantially cured by legislative action, our

standard would counsel judicial restraint. In all such

cases, it is unlikely that an unconstitutional action or

statute would go unreviewed. While we discourage con-

gressional plaintiffs in such circumstances, it is probable

that a private plaintiff could acquire standing to raise

the issue of unconstitutionality before a court. Because

such a private plaintiff’s suit would not raise separation-

of-powers concerns, the court would be obliged to reach

the merits of the claim. In this case, for example, al-

though prudential considerations warrant the dismissal of

Senator Riegle’s claim, one can easily conceive of a

private plaintiff who could acquire standing to bring a

similar claim. A person with significant economic inter-

ests in the open securities markets and prime lending

rates, ¢.g., a major corporation, pension fund, or other

major investor, might qualify for standing to challenge

the constitutionality of a procedure which allegedly per-

mits improperly appointed officials to so substantially

influence the monetary policy of the United States, open

market trading, and prime rates.

When a congressional plaintiff brings a suit involving

circumstances in which legislative redress is not available

or a private plaintiff would likely not qualify for stand-

ing, the court would be counseled under our standard to

hear the case. Thus, such actions as impeachment, expul-

sion proceedings, impoundment, and certain acts of the

executive not subject to direct legislative redress or pri-

vate party challenge (e.g., the pocket veto in Kennedy v.

34a

Sampson, supra) would be subject to judicial review in

a congressional plaintiff case. These circumstances

(which are not intended to exhaust the possibilities) rep-

resent situations where absent congresisonal plaintiff

actions, it is possible that non-frivolous claims of uncon-

stitutional action would go unreviewed by a court.

In short, our standard would counsel dismissal of con-

gressional plaintiff actions only in case. in which (i) the

plaintiff lacks standing under the traditional tests, or (ii)

the plaintiff has standing but could get legislative redress

and a similar action could be brought by a private plain-

tiff. Nondiscriminatory application of standing principles

warrants dismissal of the action in the former circum-

stance; non-interference in the legislative process coun-

sels dismissal in the latter situation. We would welcome

congressional plaintiff actions involving non-frivolous

claims of unconstitutional action which, because they

could not be brought by a private plaintiff and are not

subject to legislative redress, would go unreviewed unless

brought by a legislative plaintiff. In this last situation,

there are no prudential considerations or separation-of-

powers concerns which would outweigh the mandate of

the federal courts to “say what the law is”. Marbury v.

Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).

In this case there can be no doubt that Senator Riegle’s

congressional colleagues are capable of affording him

substantial relief. Indeed, a bill which would accomplish

Senator Riegle’s objective was introduced in Congress as

recently as 1980. See note 4 supra. The Senator remains

free to attempt to persuade his fellow legislators of the

wisdom of his views. His colleagues, if so persuaded, are

empowered to redress the alleged inadequacies of 12

U.S.C. § 263 (a) of the Act through amending legislation.

Senator Riegle’s attempt to prohibit voting by the five

Reserve Bank members of the FOMC is yet another

skirmish in the war over public versus private control

35a

of the Committee which has been waged in the legislative

arena since 1933. It would be unwise to permit the fed-

eral courts to become a higher legislature where a con-

gressman who has failed to persuade his colleagues can

always renew the battle.

Assuming that the current procedure for constituting

the FOMC may be unconstitutional, we must nevertheless

weigh the danger of permitting such a statute to stand

against two countervailing concerns: (1) the potential

for misuse of the judicial system inherent in hearing a

case brought by this particular plaintiff, who, because of

his congressional status, has adequate collegial remedies;

and (2) the unwarranted interference in the legislative

process which judicial action would represent at this

time. We conclude that rendering a decision on the mer-

its in this case would pose a greater threat to the con-

stitutional system than would the principled exercise of

judicial restraint. As Judge Gesell perceptively recog-

nized, we should not “improperly interfere with the legis-

lative process.” 84 F.R.D., supra at 116.

We hold that Senator Riegle has standing to bring this

action but exercise our equitable discretion to dismiss the

case on the ground that judicial action would improperly

interfere with the legislative process.

The judgment dismissing the complaint is

Affirmed.

ul w 10

_ SSILUSIG

0} UOHOW

No. 81-186

OcTosper TERM. 1981

James A. McCLuRE, UNITED STATES SENATOR, APPELLANT

V.

RONALD REAGAN, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,

AND ABNER J. MIKVA

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES

DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

MOTION OF THE APPELLEES TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM

Rex E. Lee

Solicitor General

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

(202) 633-2217

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether this Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

1253 and Section 101(c) of Pub. L. No. 96-86, 93 Stat. 657,

to consider an appeal from an order of a three-judge district

court dismissing an action on standing grounds.

2. Whether appellant, a United States Senator, has

standing to challenge the appointment of a federal judge as

violating the Ineligibility Clause of the Constitution, Article

I, Section 6, Clause 2.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

neee ese es e e eee ls 1

r ͤ (ses l

PEE Sb 6bvenuddondidcc socéscedeuceddcdsoues 5

ö Tee TTT IT TTT TTT TTT Te 13

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

California Medical Assn v. Federal Election

Commission, No. 79-1952 (June 26, 1981) .... I1

Coleman v. Miller. 307 U.S. 4h33: 4. 8

Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood,

r neee 10. 11

Gonzales v. Automatic Employees Credit Union,

eee e 5-6

Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F. 2d 40) 8

Levitti. E parte, 302 U. S. 6. 4. 7. 8. 9. 10

Miles v. Graham, 268 U.S. Sol 12

MTM. Inc. v. Baxley, 420 U.S. 7 9õůh999999999 5

rn ee

Riegle v. Federal Open Market Committee,

petition for cert. pending, No. 81-398 ......... 8

Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the

eee eee 7. 10

Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 10

United States v. Richardson,

e eee ee 7-8, 10

IV

Page

Cases—(Continued):

United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 ... 2, II. 12, 13

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 ............. 10, 11

Constitution and statutes:

United States Constitution, Article I,

Section 6, Clause 2 (Ineligibility

„ 2. 7. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13

Act of Oct. 12, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-86,

eee esse ese 2

Section 101(c). 93 Stat. 657 .. 2-3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 10

Section 101(c)(3), 93 Stat. 688. 5. 7. 12

Executive Salary Cost-of-Living Adjustment Act,

Pub. L. No. 94-82, 89 Stat. 419 ............. 11

re. 12

Federal Pay Comparability Act of 1970, 5 U.S.C.

5101 et seq.:

re „ 12

e cccccccccccccsesccccesess 12

SUS hͤůhhhh h 12

eh . . 12

D UBL. SIRE) cc ccccccccscccccccevecces 12

oe 5. 6

ee a

BD UBM. GHEE „60 a

Be OBA, Baee ce Moccccccccccscenvcvcces 5. 6-7

Page

Miscellaneous:

125 Cong. Rec. $1 3342-S13362 (daily ed.

Sept. 25, 1 .nccccccsccccccccescccvccees 2

42 Op. Att'y Gen. 381 (09) 13

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OctToser Term, 1981

No. 81-186

James A. McCune, UNiTeD STATES SENATOR, APPELLANT

Vv.

RONALD REAGAN, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,

AND ABNER J. MIKVA

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES

DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

MOTION OF THE APPELLEES TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM

Pursuant to Rule 16.1 of the Rules of this Court, the

Solicitor General, on behalf of the appellees, moves that

this appeal be dismissed or, in the alternative, that the

judgment of the three-judge district court be affirmed.

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the district court (J. S. App. la-13a) is not

yet reported.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the district court was entered on May 5.

1981(J.S. App. 14a). A notice of appeal was filed on June 9.

1981 (J.S. App. 15a). The jurisdictional statement was filed

on July 30, 1981. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked

under 28 U.S.C. 1253 and Section 101(c) of Pub. L. No.

96-86, 93 Stat. 657.

2

STATEMENT

Appellant, a United States Senator from Idaho, asserts

that the district court erred in denying him standing to claim

that the appointment of appellee Mikva to be a judge of the

United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-

bia Circuit violated the Ineligibility Clause of the Constitu-

tion, Article I, Section 6, Clause 2.

Appellee Mikva was a member of the House of Represen-

tatives in May 1979, when President Carter nominated him

to be a judge of the District of Columbia Circuit. During the

Senate debate on the nomination, which took place on

September 25, 1979 (125 Cong. Rec. $13342-13362 (daily

ed.)), appellant and several other senators attacked Repre-

sentative Mikva's qualifications and political, social, and

philosophical views, and also argued that his appointment

violated the Ineligibility Clause (J. S. App. 4a-Sa & n.5). The

basis of this argument was that on August 31, 1979, Presi-

dent Carter had determined the amount subject to con-

gressional revision or disapproval—of a judicial salary

increase that was, under the terms of statutes passed during

previous Congresses, to go into effect automatically on

October |, 1979. See J.S. 4-6; United States v. Will, 449

U.S. 200, 203-205 (1980). Despite these arguments and the

dissenting votes of appellant and others, the Senate con-

sented to the appointment, and on September 26, 1979,

Judge Mikva took office (J.S. App. 3a n.4, Sa).

On October 12, 1979, Congress enacted Pub. L. No.

96-86, 93 Stat. 656, an appropriations act, which included a

rider (Section 101(c)) providing in part:

'The Ineligibility Clause provides in part:

No Senator of Representative shall during the Time for which

he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Author-

ity of the United States, which shall have been created, or the

Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during such time,

see

3

(1) Any member of Congress, whether he voted to

confirm or not to confirm the appointment of any

judge appointed during the 96th Congress to the

United States Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia [Circuit], or whether he abstained from, or

was not present for such vote, may bring a civil action

in the United States District Court for the District of

Columbia or in any United States District Court in the

State he represents to contest the constitutionality of

the appointment and continuance in office of said Cir-

cuit Judge on the ground that such appointment and

continuance in office is in violation of Article l. section

6, clause 2 of the Constitution,

(2) The designated United States District Courts

shall have exclusive jurisdiction, without regard to the

sum or value of the matter in controversy, to determine

the validity of such appointment and continuance in

office;

(3) Any action brought under this section shall be

heard and determined by a panel of three judges in

accordance with the provisions of section 2284 of title

28, United States Code. Any appeal from the action of

a court convened pursuant to such section shall lie to

the Supreme Court; and

(4) Any judge designated to hear any action brought

under this section shall cause such action to be inevery

way expedited.

As the district court noted, “[pJerhaps not coincidentally,

the only judicial appointment that fits within the statute's

limitations and might be subject to challenge on Ineligibility

Clause grounds is that of [Judge] Mikva. * * * In short,

what the statute appears to authorize is a mechanism where-

by a senator or member of the House of Representatives

may challenge ina federal court in his or her home state the

4

validity of the judicial appointment of a single person,

Judge Mikva“ (J. S. App. Sa-6a).

In November 1979, appellant sued President Carter and

Judge Mikva in the United States District Court for the

District of Idaho, alleging jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331

and 2201, and additionally under Section 101(c) of Pub. L.

No. 96-86, 93 Stat. 657 (J.S. App. 3a-4a n.4).? He sought

orders directing the President to notify Judge Mikva that

his appointment violated the Constitution and “notify{ing]

[Judge] Mikva that his appointment was void ab initio and

that he must vacate his office” (J. S. Ap. 2a-3a).

A three-judge district court dismissed the complaint for

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (J. S. 13a),? holding that

appellant did not have standing to suc. The court reasoned

that, leaving aside Section 101(c), Ex parte Le’vitt, 302 U.S.

633 (1937), barred appellant from suing as a citizen, and

that appellant's position as a senator did not entitle him to

sue because ‘the effectiveness of [his] vote[]’ ” was not

impaired (J.S. App. 9a-10a, quoting Coleman . Miller,

307 U.S. 433, 438 (1939)). The court explained (J.S. Ila;

footnote omitted):

It is difficult to see how [appellant] can argue that

the effectiveness of his vote is impaired by the appoint-

ment of former-Congressman Mikva to the federal

bench. [Appellant] had the opportunity to persuade his

colleagues to vote against the confirmation and, * * *

did just that. That he and like-minded senators did not

2Appellant first brought suit against the President and the Secretary

of the Senate in the District of Idaho on September 25, 1979. In

November 1979 appellant dismissed the Secretary of the Senate as a

defendant and amended his complaint to name Judge Mikva and assert

jurisdiction under Section 101(c) (J.S. App. 3a n.4).

‘Judge Mikva reserved, and the court did not reach, the defense of

lack of personal jurisdiction (J.S. App. 4a n.4, 13a n.9).

5

prevail in the Senate does not mean that the effective-

ness of [appellant's] vote was impaired * * *. It means

merely that he was on the losing side. Certainly no one

would contend * * * that the losing senators in any

vote should automatically have the right to appeal toa

federal court for a determination of the correctness of

the result approved by the majority of their colleagues.

The court then considered Section 101(c) and ruled that it

did not overcome these barriers to appellant's standing (J.S.

App. 12a), noting that Section !01(c) “is not premised on

protecting the effectiveness of a legislator’s vote“ * * for it

purports to grant standing to senators who voted for Judge

Mikva as well as those who voted against him. Further-

more, the statute purports to grant standing to members of

the House of Representatives, who had no vote on the

appointment at all“ (J. S. App. Ha).

ARGUMENT

1. There is a substantial question whether the Court has

jurisdiction of this appeal. Section 101(c) of Pub. I. No.

96-86, 93 Stat. 658, specifies that this action was to be

decided by a three-judge court “in accordance with the

provisions of [28 U.S.C.] 2284,” and adds that “[a]ny appeal

from the action of a court convened pursuant to such sec-

tion shall be to the Supreme Court.” Direct appeals to the

Supreme Court from three-judge district courts convened

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2284 are authorized by 28 U.S.C.

1253. It is clear that “a direct appeal will lie to this Court

under §1253 from the order of a three-judge federal court

denying * * * relief only where such an order rests upon

resolution of the merits of the constitutional claim pre-

sented below.” TM. Inc. v. Baxley, 420 U.S. 799. 804

(1975). In particular, under 28 U.S.C. 1253, an order dis-

missing a claim for lack of standing is appealable only to a

court of appeals, not to this Court. Gonzales v. Automatic

Employees Credit Union, 419 U.S. 90 (1974).

6

Strong arguments can be made in favor of applying the

same rule to appeals of orders entered under Section 101(c).

Such a rule would further “the overriding policy, histori-

cally encouraged by Congress, of minimizing the manda-

tory docket of this Court in the interests of sound judicial

administration.” Gonzales v. Automatic Employees Credit

Union, supra, 419 U.S. at 98. While the language of Section

101(c), on its face, permits appeal to this Court “from the

action of” a three-judge court, the language of Section 1253

also appears to be unequivocal; it authorizes appeal “from

an order granting or denying * * * an interlocutory or per-

manent injunction,” without distinguishing denials not

based on the merits.

The Court’s principal reason for not entertaining an

appeal from a decision by a three-judge court dismissing a

complaint for lack of standing is that under 28 U.S.C. 2284,

such an order may be entered by a single judge (Gonzales v.

Automatic Employees Credit Union, supra, 419 U.S. at

100-101; footnote omitted):

A three-judge court is not required where the district

court itself lacks jurisdiction of the complaint or the

complaint is not justiciable in the federal courts. See

Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30, 31 [1933]. It is now well

settled that“ * * dissolution of a three-judge court,

and dismissal of a complaint by a single judge are

orders reviewable in the court of appeals, not here. If

the three-judge court in the present case had dissolved

itself on grounds that “standing” was absent, and had

left subsequent dismissal of the complaint to a single

judge, this Court would thus clearly have lacked appel-

late jurisdiction over both orders. The same would

have been true if the dissolution and dismissal deci-

sions had been made simultaneously, with the single

judge merely adopting the action of a three-judge

court. The locus of appellate review should not turn on

such technical distinctions.

—

Since three-judge courts convened pursuant to Section

101(c) operate “in accordance with the provisions of” 28

U.S.C. 2284, the same reasoning applies here.“ Conse-

quently, it would appear that the Court should dismiss this

appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

2. If the Court disagrees with our jurisdictional submis-

sion, then the judgment of the district court should be

affirmed because, as we demonstrate below, appellant

plainly lacks standing to challenge Judge Mikva's

appointment.

In Ex parte Le vitt. 302 U.S. 633 (1937), a member of the

Bar of this Court moved to prevent Justice Black from

serving as Associate Judge, alleging that Justice Black's

appointment violated the Ineligibility Clause. The Court

denied the motion on the basis of the “established principle

that * * * to invoke the judicial power to determine the

validity of executive or legislative action [a private individ-

ual] must show that he has sustained or is immediately in

danger of sustaining a direct injury as the result of that

action and it is not sufficient that he has merely a general

interest common to all members of the public“ (id. at 634).

The correctness of the result in Le’vitt, and the constitu-

tional basis for the Court's holding, were expressly reaf-

firmed in Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the

War, 418 U.S. 208, 219-220 (1974), and United States v.

Richardson, 418 U.S. 166. 176-179 (1974). Appellant's

claim is substantively identical to that rejected in Le’vitt.

Nothing in the legislative history of Section 101(c) contradicts this

conclusion. Moreover, Section 101(c)(3) (93 Stat. 658). provides that an

“appeal from the action of a court convened pursuant to such section™

(emphasis added) meaning 28 U.S.C. 2284 all lie to the Supreme

Court.” This suggests that Congress meant only to reenact the pre-

viously existing authority to appeal from the decisions of three-judge

courts, presumably with the implied limitations on that authority rec-

ognized by this Court.

Appellant's status as a United States Senator does not

sufficiently distinguish him from the movant in Le’vitt. In

some cases, legislators have been allowed to sue to uphold

the alleged institutional prerogatives of the body of which

they are members. See, eg. Coleman v. Miller, supra;

Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F. 2d 430(D.C. Cir. 1974). But

as the district court pointed out, it is difficult to see how

appellant's prerogatives as a senator could have been

impaired by Judge Mikva's appointment when the Senate

consented to the appointment. Compare Riegle v. Federal

Open Market Committee, 656 F. 2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1981),

petition for cert. pending. >. 81-398. Appellant does not

claim that the Senate was s mehow misled or that its vote

was misconstrued. Appellant suggests that the law deve-

loped by the lower courts for determining the standing of a

member of Congress is “unsettled” (J. S. 11), but however

unsettled it may be, appellant cites no case in which a

member of Congress was allowed standing, in that capacity,

to attack an institutional action taken by the very body of

which he is a member.

Appellant (J. S. 9-10) and amicus (Am. Br. 3-4) nonethe-

less attempt to articulate specific injuries that appellant has

suffered because he is a senator. Appellant asserts that both

he and the Senate have been “denied * * * the opportunity

to exercise [the] constitutional duty * * * to advise and

consent to the appointment of a constitutionally qualified

nominee (J.S. 9) and that he “was forced to cast his vote

against [Judge] Mikva to prevent an unconstitutional

appointment, thus nullifying his constitutional right to

advise and consent to the appointment of a nominee based

“Am. Br.” refers to the brief of amicus curiae Washington Legal

Foundation.

9

solely on the nominee's qualifications to perform judicial

functions” (J.S. 10). But there is no such “constitutional

right”; the Constitution does not entitle members of Con-

gress to avoid the obligation of voting on the basis of

constitutional principles, instead of political considera-

tions, when their constitutional judgment differs from the

President's. If the interest alleged by appellant were suffi-

cient to confer standing, any member of Congress could

raise a constitutional challenge— presumably even before

passage—to any legislative proposal made by the President

or, perhaps, by a fellow member of Congress. Appellant

suggests no basis for such a radical reordering of the consti-

tutional scheme.

Similarly, appellant asserts that Judge Mikva's appoint-

ment injured the Senate and its members because legislation

passed by the Senate will be “interpreted and possibly held

unconstitutional by an unqualified person“ (J. S. 9). But a

legislator's interest in having a statute or the Constitution

interpreted correctly has never been thought sufficient to

confer standing. Moreover, many members of the public

can confidently predict that they, too, will be affected by

decisions in which Judge Mikva participates—or, for that

matter, by decisions made by Congress or the executive—

but there is no reason to suppose that the holding in Leit.

was limited to persons unlikely to be affected by any deci-

sion in which Justice Black participated, or that members of

the public should be allowed to challenge the qualifications

of the members of the other branches of government.

Finally, appellant asserts that he was injured because

Judge Mikva's appointment “suggests the presence of the

very collusion the [Ineligibility Clause] was designed to

prevent“ (J. S. 9-10). Appellant does not demonstrate how

the alleged collusion might injure either him or the Senate:

his argument appears to be that the Ineligibility Clause is

10

intended to prevent not only collusion but the

“suggest[ion]” or appearance of collusion. Even granting

this dubious premise, appellant does not explain why he has

been injured. He does not show why he should be allowed to

assert the Senate's interest in being free of an appearance of

collusion allegedly caused by the Senate's own action, nor

why the Ineligibility Clause gives him a personal right to be

free of any “stigma” (Am. Br. 4) associated with the Senate.

Even if the Clause does give him such a right, a legislator

ordinarily disassociates himself from an action that he

believes will discredit the body of which he is a member by

casting a dissenting vote. Appellant suggests no reason for

believing that that means of avoiding a taint was insufficient

in this case.

3. Appellant (J.S. 13-15) and amicus (Am. Br. 3-7) also

assert that appellant has standing by virtue of Section

101(c) of Pub. L. No. 96-86. But as they recognize (J.S. 13;

Am. Br. 7), Congress may not confer standing on a party

who lacks standing under Article III. See, e.g., Gladstone,

Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979).°

While the Court has suggested that Congress may eliminate

prudential constraints by extending standing even to those

who allege an injury “ ‘shared in substantially equal mea-

sure by all or a large class of citizens’ (Gladstone, Real-

tors v. Village of Bellwood, supra, 441 U.S. at 100, quoting

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)), it remains clear

that “a mere ‘interest in a problem’ is insufiicient to confer

standing; a plaintiff must show more than a desire to see

legal wrongs corrected. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405

U.S. 727, 739-740 (1972). Article II] requires a “palpable”

*As noted above, in Schlesinger v. Yeservists Committee to Stop the

War, supra, 418 U.S. at 220-221, and United - tates ». Richardson,

supra, 418 U.S. at 178, the Court made it clear that the limitation on

standing specified in Ex parte Le’vitt was imposed by Article III.

injury, not merely an ideological one. See Warth v. Seldin,

supra, 422 U.S. at 501. See also Gladstone, Realtors v.

Village of Bellwood, supra, 441 U.S. at 110-111, 114-115

(detailing social, professional and economic injuries to

establish standing under Article III).“

Appellant has failed to show any palpable injury to him-

self. As we explained above, appellant cannot allege any

personal injury deriving from the impairment of the

Senate’s institutional prerogatives. At most, appellant's

injuries consist in his displeasure at having to cast a negative

vote for constitutional, as opposed to non-constitutional,

reasons, and at being a member of an institution that

allegedly violated the Constitution. No such injury has ever

been held by this Court to be sufficient to satisfy Article III.

Moreover, to recognize such “injuries” would essentially

allow any member of Congress to obtain a constitutional

decision on any legislative action. Appellant advances no

reason for believing that Article Ill was intended to permit

such a result.

4. Appellant's substantive claim is also plainly without

merit; this is an additional reason for the Court to affirm the

district court's judgment. The mechanism by which Judge

Mikva's salary was increased is described in the Court's

opinion in United States v. Will, supra, 449 U.S. at 203-

205, 208-209. Essentially, the Executive Salary Cost-of-

Living Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 94-82, 89 Stat. 419,

Amieus cites an array of statutes containing broad grants of standing

(Am. Br. 4-7), but the Court has consistently interpreted these statutes

to contain the limitations imposed by Article III. See, eg. California

Medical Association v. Federal Election Commission, No. 79-1952

(June 26, 1981), slip op. 4 n. G. cited at Am. Br. 6. Moreover, the statutes

cited by amicus authorize “any person™ to seek redress of a statutory

violation. In such cases, Congress has created the legal right and accord-

ingly has more latitude to define the class of persons aggrieved by a

violation of that right. Appellant, by contrast, seeks to enforce a consti-

tutional provision.

12

enacted in 1975, provides (see 28 U.S.C. 461) that the sala-

ries of federal judges are subject to an annual adjustment

equal to the average percentage cost-of-living adjustment

made in General Schedule pay rates pursuant to the Federal

Pay Comparability Act of 1970, 5 U.S.C. 5301, 5305-5308.

This adjustment is recommended by an agent designated by

the President to compare the GS rates “with the rates of pay

for the same levels of work in private enterprise“ * *.” 5

U.S.C. S30S(a 1 (A). The President may, however, submit

an alternative plan for adjusting the salaries in view of

economic conditions or national emergency. 5 U.S.C.

5305(c)(1). If he does so, he must submit that alternative

plan to Congress by September | of the year in which it is to

become effective; unless it is overridden by Congress, it

becomes effective on October l. See 5 U.S.C. 5305(c).

In 1979, the President’s agent recommended an average

increase of 10.41%. On August 31, President Carter reduced

the proposed increase to 7% (United States v. Will, supra,

449 U.S. at 208-209; J. S. 6). When Congress did not disap-

prove the President's proposal, this increase took effect on

Octoder I- after Judge Mikva's appointment.

The Ineligibility Clause provides that no member of

Congress “shall * * * be appointed” to an office the emol-

uments of which “shall have been encreased” during the

member's term; by using the future tense in referring to the

appointment and the future perfect tense in referring to the

increase, the Framers made clear their intention to prohibit

only appointments that followed increases. Appellant

appears to concede this point, arguing instead (J.S. 6-7) that

President Carter's action on August 31 increased the salary

of the position to which Judge Mikva was appointed. But in

deciding the analogous question“ of whether a reduction in

*Appellant also treats it as analogous, but he cites (J.S. 7) the discre-

dited (see United States vy. Will, supra, 449 U.S. at 227 n.31) case of

Miles v. Graham, 268 U.S. 501 (1925).

13

the adjustment of a federal judge's salary, prior to the

effective date of the adjustment, violates the Compensation

Clause of Article IIl. Section |, this Court recently held that

“a salary increase ‘vests’ * * * only when it takes effect as

part of the compensation due and payable * * *.” United

States v. Will, supra, 449 U.S. at 229. In Judge Mikva’s

case, therefore, the increase did not “vest” until October l.

1979 (see id. at 208, 229). Until that time, there was only a

proposed increase that Congress was free to deny.

The Executive Branch has consistently taken the position

that a proposed salary increase that Congress may disap-

prove is not an increase within the meaning of the Ineligibil-

ity Clause. See 42 Op. Att'y Gen. 381 (1969). Indeed, it is

paradoxical to argue that President Carter“ action, which

decreased the salary that Judge Mikva would otherwise

have received, nonetheless “encreased” it for purposes of

the Ineligibility Clause. Appellant does not suggest that the

action of the President's agent—-who was carrying out a

statutory mandate and whose recommendation never took

effect—increased Judge Mikva's salary. Thus, even if a

proposed increase does fall within the Ineligibility Clause,

the source of the increase in this case would be a statute

passed in 1975— before the term Representative Mikva was

serving when he was appointed to the court, and therefore

outside the scope of the Ineligibility Clause.

CONCLUSION

The appeal should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. If

the Court concludes that the appeal is proper, the judgment

of the district court should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted.

Rex E. Lee

Solicitor General

OcToRER 1981

DOJ-1981-10

9

joug Ader

Seed

| Vilce Supreme Court, u.S

FILED

OCT 28 \98)

No. 81-186 ALEXANDER L. STévas

— — — |

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OcTOBER TERM, 1981

JaMeEs A. McCLur®, United States Senator,

Appellant,

v.

RONALD REAGAN, President of the United States

and ABNER J. MIKVA,

Appellees.

On Appeal from the District Court for the District of Idaho

BRIEF OPPOSING MOTION TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM

Davip H. MARTIN

SANTARELLI & GIMER

2033 M Street, N.W.

Suite 700

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 466-6800

Counsel for Appellant

WILSON - Eres Printine Co.. Inc. - 789-0096 - WasHiInGToN. D.C. 20001

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

E 1

r 4

r rade oneetaahcan 5

F 10

APPENDIX:

Memorandum of November 22, 1974 from Antonin

Scalia, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal

Counsel, to Hugh M. Durham, Office of —

Affairs, app. —— ............ la

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: Page

Ex Parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937777777 5

Gonzales v. Automatic Employees Credit Union,

e | SE 2

NAACP v. State of New York, 413 U.S. 345

r 3

National Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 492

r ccccstneseseccetecesscmcnssesnaten 6

United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980) ........ 6, 8, 9, 10

Constitution and Statutes:

United States Constitution, Article I, Section 6,

Clause 2 (Ineligibility Claus))) 8

United States Constitution, Article III, Section 1.... x

Act of October 12, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-86, 93 Stat.

ER ⅛˙* A hh 1,2

EE 1. 2, 8

Executive Salary Cost-of-Living Adjustment Act,

Pub. L. No. 94-82, 89 Stat. 41ĩ999 8

Federal Pay Comparability Act of 1979, 5 U.S.C.

r a NE a 8

Federal Salary Act of 1967, 2 U.S.C. § 351-361...... 8

Voting Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 89-110, 79

Stat. 488, 42 U.S.C. 19739 3

3

1

1

1

S

999 1. 2.

SS ————

3

9 ————p

Miscellaneous:

42 Op. Atty Gen. 881 (1969) .................................. 7

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1981

No. 81-186

JAMES A. MCCLURE, United States Senator,

y Appellant,

RONALD REAGAN, President of the United States

and ABNER J. MIKVA,

Appellees.

On Appeal from the District Court for the District of Idaho

BRIEF OPPOSING MOTION TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM

Pursuant to Rule 16.4 Appellant submits this brief

opposing Appellees’ motion to dismiss or affirm.

JURISDICTION

Appellant claimed jurisdiction under Title 28 United

States Code Sections 1331 and 2201 and Section 101(c)

of Public Law 96-86, 93 STAT. 656, set out in full in

Appellant’s Jurisdictional Statement at p. 2. Section 101

(e) (3) provides that any case brought pursuant to its

provisions “be heard and determined by a panel of three

judges in accordance with the provisions of Section 2284

of Title 28, United States Code,” and that “any appeal”

from such three-judge panel “shall lie to the Supreme

Court.” Appellant did not, contrary to Appellees’ asser-

tion, invoke Title 28 U.S. Code § 1253, as a jurisdic-

tional basis for this appeal. Such an erroneous assertion

is an attempt to direct the Court’s attention away from

the issues involved in the jurisdictional predicate actually

invoked by Appellant and to provide a basis for an in-

apposite request that the Court apply the rationale in

Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees Credit Union, 419 U.S.

90 (1974) to Section 101(c) of P.L. 96-86.

Appellees’ contention is, nonetheless, frivolous since the

very language of Title 28 United States Code Section

1253—“Except as otherwise provided by law, any party

may appeal to the Supreme Court. .”—precludes it

being a bar to a direct appeal to this Court. Section

101(c) (3), which Appellant did invoke, provides that

any appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. This lan-

guage thus clearly fits within the exception provided for

by Section 1253. In addition, Section 101(c) (4) of Pub-

lic Law 96-86, providing that “any judge designated to

hear any action brought under this section shall cause

such action to be in every way expedited,” demonstrates

a clear congressional mandate that this matter be ex-

pedited and heard by this Court without first going to

the court of appeals. In sum, the specific provisions of

Section 101(c) of Public Law 96-86, rather than the

general provisions of Section 1253, govern this appeal.

Apparently recognizing later in its brief that Appel-

lant has not invoked Section 1253, Appellees suggest that

strong arguments can be made in favor of applying

the [Gonzales] rule to appeals of orders entered under

Section 101(c).” Appellees’ Motion at 6. The Gonzales

case is inapplicable because its underlying rationale was

a determination by the Court that the purpose of statutes

convening three-judge panels was to save state and fed-

eral statutes from “doom” at the hands of one federal

district court judge. 419 U.S. at 97. Since a determina-

tion of standing was not related to the subject matter

which authorized tue empanelling of a three-judge court,

the Court decided that the appeal should be to the Court

of Appeals. Unlike the statute in Gonzales, however,

Section 101(c) has as its very purpose the expedited

judicial review of an action of the executive branch;

therefore, unlike Section 1253, which provides that

“any party may appeal to the Supreme Court . . ., See-

tion 101(c) provides that “any appeal” shall lie to the

Supreme Court.

This distinction was emphasized by this Court in

NAACP v. State of New York, 413 U.S. 345 (1973), an

action brought pursuant to the Voting Rights Act of

1965 which provided that its cases be heard by a three-

judge panel, and that “any appeal shall lie to the Su-

preme Court.” Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-

110, 79 STAT. 438, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a).

In the original action, the State of New York filed suit

against the United States. The NAACP then moved to

intervene, and its motion was denied; at the same time,

the State of New York’s motion for summary judgment

was granted. The NAACP appealed the denial of its

motion to intervene directly to this Court. The Court,

upon reviewing the Voting Rights Act and determining

Congress’ intent that decisions in voting rights cases

were to be expedited, held that the intervenor’s appeal

was directly to the Supreme Court. 413 U.S. at 354-355.

In reaching its conclusion, the Court compared the lan-

guage of 28 U.S.C. § 1253 with Section 4(a), of the Vot-

ing Rights Act which relates to “any appeal” as opposed

to § 1253 which relates only to “any party”. Noting that

Section 4(a) did not incorporate or refer to § 1253, the

Court concluded “The difference is obvious, and the

broader import of Congress under § 4(a) is manifest.”

413 U.S. at 356. Since Section 101(c) does not refer to

1253 and the language authorizing this appeal is iden-

tical to the language in § 4(a) of the Voting Rights Act,

the logic of the Court in NAACP v. State of New York,

supra, must prevail here, and a direct appeal to this

Court be allowed.

4

STANDING

Appellees have, throughout their discussion of this

case, misconstrued the subject of Appellant’s action.

That is, Appellees incorrectly think Appellant’s action is

against his colleagues in the Senate for advising and

consenting to the appointemnt of a constitutionally ineli-

gible nominee. Moreover, Appellant’s action is not, con-

trary to Appellees’ assertion, a challenge to a legislative

proposal made by the President or a fellow member of

Congress. Rather, Appellant challenges an executive ac-

tion; his action is against the President who nominated

and appointed a constitutionally ineligible person, and

against the appointee who benefited from that appoint-

ment. Appellees attempt to explain why the Appellant’s

injuries are not adequate to confer standing by noting

Appellant’s failure to cite cases in support of his posi-

tion. Yet Appellees cite no case law supporting their re-

jection of Appellant’s specific injuries. This lack of sub-

stantial case law in this area underscores Appellant's

contention that this area of the law is unsettled.

Appellees incorrectly contend Appellant had no consti-

tutional right to advise and consent to the appointment of

a constitutionally eligible nominee for circuit judge and,

thus did not suffer an injury even though the President

may have violated the Constitution. This is merely a

bald assertion by Appellees that the President’s uncon-

stitutional acts are not reviewable by the judicial branch.

If the Court finds Appellant has standing there would

be no radical reordering of the constitutional scheme

as Appellees claim at p. 9 of their motion; rather, the

Court would be in a position to carry out its constitu-

tional duty of being the ultimate arbiter of the Consti-

tution."

In th n, it should be noted that Appellant has not contended

that “the unstitution does not entitle members of Congress to

avoid the obligation of voting on constitutional principles, in-

stead of political considerations, when their constitutional judgment

Appellees assert that Appellant does not have stand-

ing based on his interest in avoiding interpretation of

laws by an unqualified person because “many members

of the public can confidently predict that they, too, will

be affected by decisions in which Judge Mikva par-

ticipates. . .” Appellees’ Motion at 9. Such an asser-

tion entirely miscomprehends the distinction between

Appellant, a United States Senator, and a member of

the public. Members of the public are not granted, by

the Constitution, the authority to enact legislation; thus,

while they may have an interest in the interpretation of

legislation, they do not occupy the same position as a

United States Senator with express constitutional duties.

Ex Parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937) is, therefore, not

controlling in this case because Appellant has alleged in-

juries not “common to the public.” 302 U.S. at 633.

As Appellant indicated in its Jurisdictional Statement

both the Legislative Branch and the Executive Branch

recognized, in enacting and signing P.L. 96-86, the possi-

ble constitutional infirmity in the appointment of Judge

Mikva. Thus, if the Court decides this case, it need not

fear that it will establish a precedent authorizing any

member of Congress to seek constitutional review of any

legislative action, as Appellees suggest at p. 11 of their

brief. Such suggestion is an overreaction and an attempt

to divert the Court’s attention in this case from the spe-

cific injuries and narrow issues to generalized issues of

review of legislative actions.

MERITS

Appellees assert that because Appellant’s claim is with-

out merit that it should be dismissed for lack of stand-

ing. Appellant did not choose to argue the merits of his

case in the Jurisdistional Statement but now feels com-

pelled to respond.

differs from the Presidents.” Appellees’ Motion at 9. Rather, Ap-

pellant only asks that the judicial branch be the final interpreter

of the Constitution.

6

Appellees’ explanations of the functioning of federal

salary increases pursuant to the Federal Pay Compar-

ability Act of 1970, and the Executive Salary Cost-of-

Living Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 94-82, 89 Srar.

419, and the decision in United States v. Will, 449 U.S.

200 (1980) are inaccurate. At pages 2 and 12 of their

motion Appellees state that the salary increase made by

President Carter on August 31, 1979, pursuant to the

foregoing salary laws, could be disapproved by Con-

gress. In fact, pursuant to the Federal Pay Compara-

bility Act, if either House of Congress disapproves of the

salary adjustment as made by the President, then the

higher rate recommended by the President’s pay agent

automatically becomes law. Therefore, when the Presi-

dent’s agent recommended an average increase in rates

of pay of 10.41%, and the President rejected that and

adjusted federal salaries by 7%, one of the two increases

was certain to become effective, i.c., due and payable,

on October 1, 1979. Had either House of Congress re-

jected the 7% increase, the President would have been

required to readjust salary rates by 10.41%. One House

of Congress could not, therefore, eliminate the federal

salary increase made by the President, but could only in-

crease the percentage to 10.41%; thus, after August 31,

1979 the pay increase was not a proposal that Congress

was free to deny.

In National Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 492

F.2d 587 (D.C. Cir. 1974) the court held that under the

present federal salary laws, the President’s actions are

mandatory and non-discretionary, te., he must adjust

federal pay in accordance with the increase proposed by

his pay agent, or pursuant to an alternative plan. In

the instant case, neither House of Congress took any

action, and although the increase was not effective until

October 1, 1979 the 7% increase became law at mid-

night on August 31, 1979.

The Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel

supports the foregoing view that distinguishes the date

7

of enactment or the date an increase becomes law, from

its effective date. In a memorandum opinion the Office

of Legal Counsel concluded that “the phrase ‘shall have

been increased in the Constitutional provision [Article

I, Section 6, Clause 2] refers to enactment of the in-

crease rather than its entering into effect,“ Memoran-

dum of November 22, 1974 from Antonin Scalia, As-

sistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, to

Hugh M. Durham, Office of Legislative Affairs, app. 4a).

Appellees, in an attempt to support their position with

regard to the date of enactment of salary increases, cite

an Opinion of the Attorney General, 42 Op. Att’y. Gen.

381 (1969), for the proposition “that a proposed salary

increase that Congress may disapprove is not an increase

within the meaning of the Ineligibility Clause” (em-

phasis added). Appellees’ Motion at 13. However, the

salary laws then in effect and being construed by the

Attorney General were quite different than those in the

instant case.

Under the federal salary laws in effect at that time,

the President had the option of deciding whether to

propose a pay increase. In addition, if he did propose

an increase, it could be disapproved by either House of

Congress prior to its effective date and no increase

would occur, whereas under the current federal salary

scheme, a rejection of the President’s adjustment would

result in the President’s being mandated to readjust fed-

eral salaries by the percentage recommended by his pay

agent. Thus, Attorney General Clark concluded, cor-

rectly, that under the salary laws in force, “the salaries

in question will not ‘have been increased’ within the

meaning of the Constitutional prohibition so long as

2In the context of its opinion, it is clear that the Office of the

Legal Counsel's use of the term “enactment” means the date an

increase occurs or becomes law, not the date the mechanism au-

thorizing the increase was enacted.

Congress may still exercise its power of disapproval.”

(42 Ops. Att’y Gen. at 382), clearly not a possibility

here since, under current law, congressional rejection

of the President's proposal results in a higher per-

centage increase.

Appellees are also incorrect in concluding that because

the source of the increase in this case “would be a statute

passed in 1975—before the term Representative Mikva

was serving when he was appointed to the court. . .”

that the increase in Judge Mikva’s salary is “outside

the scope of the Ineligibility Clause.” Appellees’ Motion

at 13. The Ineligibility Clause, by its plain language,

is concerned with appointments and increases in emolu-

ments during the term for which a member of Congress

was elected; it matters not that the mechanism author-

izing the increase preceded the term for which a member

was elected.

Appellees’ citation of United States v. Will, 449 U.S.

200 (1980) for the proposition that the effective date of

a salary increase is the date it is due and payable is

inapplicable under the facts of this case. In Will the

Court considered Article III, Section I of the Constitu-

tion, the Compensation Clause, in the context of the

Federal Salary Act of 1967 (2 U.S.C. § 351-361), the

Federal Pay Comparability Act of 1970 (5 U.S.C. § 5305

et seq.), and the Executive Salary Cost-of-Living Adjust-

ment Act (28 U.S.C. § 461). It did not construe Article

I, Section 6, Clause 2 of the Constitution, the Ineligi-

bility Clause. The Court determined that “a salary in-

crease ‘vests’ for purposes of the Compensation Clause

only when it takes effect as part of the compensation due

and payable to Article III judges.” 449 U.S. at 229.

The Court did not explicitly determine when, for pur-

poses of the Ineligibility Clause, an increase in emolu-

ments occurred pursuant to the -eheme embodied in

the current federal salary acts because it was un-

necessary to do so in construing the Compensation

Clause.

The Court did, however, implicitly recognize that fed-

eral salary increases had vecurred and became law prior

to the October 1 effective date of the increases. This is

evident from the Court’s description of the actions taken

by Congress with regard to salary increases in the four

years covered by the Will decision. The Court stated:

In four consecutive fiscal years, Congress, with re-

spect to these high-level Executive Branch, legisla-

tive, and judicial salaries, enacted statutes to stop

or reduce previously authorized cost-of-living in-

creases initially intended to be automatically opera-

tive under that statutory scheme, once the Executive

had determined the amount. 499 U.S. at 202-203.

The Court then commented on each year.

As to Year 1, when rates of pay were adjusted by

4.8% the import of the Legislative Branch Appropria-

tion Act, 1977, “was to prohibit paying the 4.8%

raise...” (emphasis added). 449 U.S. at 206.

As to Year 2, Congress acted to prevent the President

from adjusting pay increases before August 21st.

As to Year 3, the Court noted that the effect of the

Legislative Branch Appropriation Act of September 30,

1978, was “to prohibit paying the 5.5% increase author-

ized by the Adjustment Act for the fiscal year beginning

October 1, 1978.” (emphasis added). 449 U.S. at 208.

As to Year 4, the President, on August 31st, adjusted

salaries by 7%. The Court noted, moreover, that the Act

of September 30, 1978 dealing with Year 3 prohibited

paying the 5.5% increase for Year 3 only for one fiscal

year, and that therefore that increase took effect on

October 1 of Year 4 along with the 7% increase as

made by the President on August 31 of Year 4 ‘Year 4

is the year involved in the action); thus, as a result of

10

the Court’s decision in Will, the office of circuit judge,

on October 1, 1979, started to receive a 12.9% increase

in its rate of pay.

This is an express recognition by the Court of the

distinction between the date a salary increase occurs or

becomes law and the date it is paid out or effective.

For purposes of the Compensation Clause these increases

became effective on October 1, 1979, but for purposes of

the Ineligibility Clause, the adjustment of August 31,

1979 was an increase in emoluments whose date of

enactment preceded, and thus barred Judge Mikva’s

appointment.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court to remand

the case to the United States District Court for the

District of Idaho for consideration of the merits, or, in

the alternative, to set the case down for plenary review

of the issue of standing and the separation of powers

doctrine, or plenary review of the issue of standing, the

separation of powers doctrine, and for consideration

on the merits. —

Respectfully submitted,

Davip H. MARTIN

SANTARELLI & GIMER

2033 M Street, N. W“.

Suite 700

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 466-6800

Counsel for Appellant

On the Brief:

JAMES J. FEATHERSTONE

1600 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

RICHARD E. GARDINER

1600 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C, 20036

APPENDIX

la

APPENDIX

Hugh M. Durham

Chief, Legislative & Legal Section

Office of Legislative Affairs

Antonin Scalia

Assistant Attorney General

Office of Legal Counsel

Proposed bill to increase the salary of the

Attorney General

Prior to the nomination of Senator William B. Saxbe

to be Attorney General, a statute was enacted which

reduced the salary and other emoluments of the At-

torney General to those in effect on January 1, 1969.

See Public Law 93-178 (December 10, 1973). You have

orally requested our views on a proposed bill which

would repeal that reduction, effective at noon, Janu-

ary 2, 1975.

The proposal raises two separate issues. Our conclu-

sions are as follows: (1) Enactment of the proposed bill

during the current term of Congress would not affect

the legality of Mr. Saxbe’s appointment or tenure. (2)

Payment of the increased salary would apparently not

be prohibited by Article I, section 6, clause 2 of the

Constitution.

1. Effect of proposal upon Mr. Sarbe's holding office

Article I, section 6, clause 2 provides in part that:

No Senator or Representative shall, during the

Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any

I Office under the Authority of the United States,

which shall have been created, or the Emoluments

whereof shall have been encreased during such

2a

We are unaware of any court decision construing this

provision, although two suits challenging the constitu-

tionality of Mr. Saxbe’s appointment have been brought

under section 2 of Public Law 93-178 and remain

pending.“

It might be argued, in view of the language of the

emoluments clause, that enactment during 1974 of an

increase in the Attorney General’s salary wou!d have the

effect of (retrospectively) invalidating Mr. Saxbe’s ap-

pointment. This position is in our view unsound.

It is clear that the mer“ fact that the appointee was

not a member of the Congress when the legislative change

was effected will not prevent application of Article I,

section 6, clause 2. See 17 Ops. A.G. 365 (1882) (at-

tempted appointment of former Senator Kirkwood to

the Tariff Comnussion, which was legislatively estab-

lished after his resignation from the Senate). It would

not be sound constitutional interpretation, however, to

apply the provisions when the iaw in question is enacted

not merely after the affected person’s departure from

the Congress but also after his appointment to the posi-

tion in question.“ Otherwise, in contravention of the

President's power of remova’, the Congress might, by

the simple act of passing a pay raise, accomplish the

removal of a former Congressman.

A sin:ilar conclusion fcliows from a strict grammatical

reading of the language of tue constitutional provision.

By using the future tense when referring tu the ap-

pointment (“no Senator or Representative shall . . be

1Cardarett v. Sarbe, Civ. Action no. 73-4289.M, D. Mass.;

Cemmittee for Fair Play to Voters v. Serbe, Civ. Action No. 74

Civ943, S. D. N. V.

2 Of course this is only possible with respect to the “increase of

emoluments” portion of Article I, section 6, clause 2, and not the

rene of office” portion, since a person cannot be appointed to

an office before it has been created.

8a

appointed”) and the future perfect tense to refer to the

emoluments (“the emoluments whereof shall have been

encreased”) the provision displays the intention of void-

ing the appointment only when the increase of emolu-

ments precedes it.

Finally, the inability of this legislation to affect the

Attorney General’s appointment is supported by the

course of action taken with respect to appointment of

Secretary of Defense Laird and Attorney General

McGrath. The 1969 Attorney General’s opinion dealing

with the former and the 1949 Office of Legal Counsel

memorandum dealing with the latter concluded that

Article I, section 6, ela se 2 has no applicability what-

ever (much less any retroactively invalidating effect)

in the case of post-appointment salary increases. Since

the details of these cases are more relevant to the second

point considered in this memorandum, discussion of them

will be reserved for that section.

Of course, there may be situations involving actual

collusion between Members of the Congress and the Presi-

dent to increase the emoluments of a particular post

after one of the Members of Congress shall have been

appointed to it. In such a case, where actual connection

between the appointment and the subsequent increase

can be shown, the emolument clause might possibly be

held to render the appointment invalid, as having been

infected with unconstitutionality from its inception. But

at least absent such connection between the appointment

and the increase, it is our firm view that Article I, sec-

tion 6, clause 2, cannot be held retroactively to invalidate

an appointment.

2. Validity of the proposed bill

Aside from the question whether the proposed legisla-

tion will invalidate Mr. Saxbe’s appointment. there is the

question whether the legislation itself is ineffective be-

4a

cause it violates a prohibition implicit in Article I, sec-

tion 6, clause 2. In our view, the salary increase is

constitutionally permissible, although the matter is not

as free of doubt as the point first discussed.

First of all, it might be well to eliminate an apparent

misconception which the bill contains: The delay of its

effectiveness until noon, January 2, 1975 is evidently

intended to prevent any increase in salary with respect

to the term for which Mr. Saxbe was elected to the

Senate. It is not our view, however, that the 93d Con-

gress expires at noon, January 2, 1975. The pertinent

provisions of the Constitution, the Twentieth Amend-

ment, and 2 U.S.C. section 1, appear to indicate that the

dividing line is noon, January 3. This point does not

seem to us conclusive of the bill’s invalidity in its present

form—both for the reasons set forth below and also

because in our view the crucial factor is not the period

with respect to which the salary is increased but rather

the perio

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.