Opposition — Lopez v. California

ice « Supreme Court, U.S,

FILED

IN THE

NDER L. STEVAS.

ALEXA!

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED iti CLERK

October Term, 1980

GILBERT FRANK LOPEZ,

Petitioner,

vs.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, SECOND

APPELLATE DISTRICT

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

GEORGE DEUKMEJIAN, Attorney General

of the State of California

ROBERT H. PHILIBOSIAN, Chief

Assistant Attorney General

--Criminal Division

S. CLARK MOORE,

Assistant Attorney General

ROBERT F. KATZ,

FREDERICK GRAB,

Deputy Attorneys General

3580 Wilshire Boulevard

Los Angeles, California 90010

Telephone: (213) 736-2100

Attorneys for Respondent

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

l. Whether inspections of

pervasively regulated businesses,

traditionally permitted in the absence

of either a search warrant or probable

cause, are rendered constitutionally

impermissible solely by virtue of the

fact that the official conducting the

search is specifically seeking evidence

of crime.

2. Whether statutorily

authorized warrantless inspections of

automobiles, for the purpose of locating

stolen vehicles under circumstances

presenting articulable and reasonable

grounds’ for believing that theft-related

activity is occurring are consti-

tutionally impermissible.

TOPICAL INDEX

Page

Questions Presented ..ccccseccccccseeee i

Brief of Respondent in Opposition ......l

Constitutional and Statutory

ProvisSions at ISSUC wceseccccccsecseeeseed

Statement of the CaS€..ccccceescceseeeesd

Summary Of Argument ..cccccesecscessese OD

I

Since the Warrantless Inspection was

Justified Under the Regulated

Industries Exception, Neither a Warrant

Nor Probable Cause were Required .......7

II

The Inspection was Reasonable .....+++-21

Conclusion 96666650 O60 66S SOS OSes OOOO EE

ii.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page

Camara v. Municipal Court (1967)

387 U.S. 523 eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 22,27

Chambers v. Maroney (1970)

399 U.S. 42 eeeeeeeeeeeneeeeeeeeee 24

Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United

States (1970) 397 U.S. 72 cecccece 8

Delaware v. Prouse (1979)

440 U.S. 648 eeeee 20-21,23,26,27,28

Donovan v. Dewey (1981) U.S.

69 L.Ed. 2d 262 eeereeeeeeeeee 9-10,16

Dunaway v. New York (1979)

442 U.S. 200 eocccccccccccccccesagal

G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States

(1977) 429 U.S. 338 eeeeeeeneeeeneee 10

Jackson v. Superior Court

74 Cal.App.3d 361 eeeeeeeeeeee 18,24

Marshall v. Barlow's Inc. (1978)

436 U.S. 307 eccccccccccceDgh5 920223

Michigan v. Tyler (1978)

436 U.S. 499 eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 20,27

People v. Grubb, 63 Cal.2d 614 ....... 18

People v. Woolsey, 90 Cal.App.3d 994.. 14

Scott v. United States (1978)

436 UsSe 128 eeeeoeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 19

See v. City of Seattle (1967)

387 U.S. 541 eoeeeoeeeeeveeeeeeeeeeee 20

iii.

Page

State v. Galio (1979)

587 P.2d

Terry v. Ohio

392 U.S.

United States

406 U.S.

United States

433 U.S.

California Ve

Section

Section

Section

Section

Section

Section

Section

Section

Section

Stats. 1973,

United States

Fourth Amendment ...ecees

44 eeeeeoeveeveeeeeeeeeeeeeee

(1968)

Leococesesesuses 22,23,27,

v. Biswell (1972)

311 eereeee 8,10,14-15,16,

v. Chadwick (1977)

| eeeeveeveeveeeeevneeeeeeene 24,

Statutes

hicle Code

220 eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee

221 eeeeeeeeeeveeeeeeeeeee

320 eeeeeeee 7-8,11,12,17,

1662 eeeeeveveveeveeeeeeeeeee

2805 eeeeeeeee 7,13,17,21,

24,25,26,28,

4462 eeeeeeevoeoee eee eeeaeeee

9264 eoeeeoevoeveoevoeoeeeeeeeeeee

10656 eeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 12-

12951 eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeneee

Ch. 996, § l eeeeneeeeeeeneee

Constitutions

Constitution

iv.

20-21,23,

15

28

19

26

ll

ll

21

12

23

29

26

12

13

26

14

31

NO. 81-44

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1980

GILBERT FRANK LOPEZ,

Petitioner,

vs.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Respondent,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

Respondent, State of California,

respectfully requests that this Honorable

Court deny the Petition for Writ of

Certiorari in which petitioner’ seeks

review of the judgment of the Court of

Appeal of the State of California, Second

Appellate District, Division Two (2d Crim.

No. 37347), entered on March 6, 1981,

1.

affirming the judgment of con-

viction imposed by the Superior

Court of Los Angeles County.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS AT ISSUE

Amendment IV of the Constitution of the

United States:

"The right of the people to be secure

in their persons, houses, papers and

effects, against unreasonable

searches and seizures, shall not be

violated, and no warrants”~ shall

issue, but upon probable cause,

supported by oath or affirmation, and

particularly describing the place to

be searched, and the persons or

things to be seized."

California Vehicle Code section 320, which

at the time of the search at issue here

read, in salient part, as follows:

"“"Established place of business'

is a place actually occupied either

2.

continuously or at regular periods

by:

"(b) An automobile dismantler

where the books and records pertinent

to the type of business being

conducted are kept. ... The place

of business shall be open to

inspection of the premises, pertinent

records and vehicles by any peace

officer during business hours."

California Vehicle Code section 2805

which, at the time of the search at issue

here, read in salient part as follows:

"(a) For the purpose of

locating stolen vehicles, a mem-

ber of the California Highway

Patrol + « « May inspect any

vehicle of a type required to be

registered under this code on a

highway or in any public garage,

3.

repair shop, parking lot, new or used

car lot, automobile dismantlers lot,

vehicle shredding facility, vehicle

leasing or rental lot, vehicle

equipment rental yard, vehicle

salvage pool, or other similar

establishment, and may inspect the

title or registation of vehicles, in

order to establish the rightful

ownership or possession of the

vehicle.

"(c) Whenever possible, inspec-

tions conducted pursuant to sub-

division (a) or (b) shall be

conducted at a time and in a manner so as

to minimize any interference with, or

delay of, business operations."

zxkekk

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Respondent accepts the rendition

of the facts and proceedings presented by

petitioner commencing at page 2 of the

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, with the

following addition: Investigator Ririe

had been informed by Mr. Brodigan, Manager

of Color Glow Paint Store, that the cars

he had been painting for Sol Mizrahi were

"questionable." (R.T. p. 52.)2/

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Petition for Writ of

Certiorari should be denied. Under

longstanding authority, warrantless

inspections of pervasively regulated

businesses, of which the auto dismantling

ke "RP. y” | =6(6WhS refer to the

Reporter's Transcript, while "C.T." will

refer to the Clerk's Transcript included

as part of the record on appeal below.

5.

industry in California is an example, are

permissible in the absence of any showing

with regard to probable cause whatsoever.

It has been held that a proprietor of such

a business in effect consents’ to such

searches by choosing to enter a field in

which pervasive regulation, including

inspection, is established by statute.

The state of mind of, or degree of

information possessed by, the searching

official in no way undermines this result.

Furthermore, it has long been recognized

that intrusions which are specifically

limited in scope frequently invoke less

stringent protections under the Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution. On balance, the search at

issue here, limited in purpose and scope,

and conducted on the basis of articulable

and reasonable grounds to _ suspect theft

related activity, was reasonable and

therefore lawful.

ARGUMENT

I

Since the Warrantless Inspection

was Justified Under the Regulated

Industries Exception, Neither

a Warrant Nor Probable Cause were

Required

The warrantless inspection of

his business of which petitioner now

complains was held valid by the court

below under the provisions of sections 320

and 2805 of the California Vehicle

Code .2/ As the opinion of the California

Court of Appeal demonstrates, searches

under Vehicle Code section 2805, as

construed, must be made "‘under reasonable

circumstances, within constitutional

limitations.'" (Petn, for Writ of

Certiorari, Appen. A, p. 6.) Similarly,

searches effected under Vehicle Code

2. The salient portions of these

statutes are set forth above at pages 2 to

4.

7.

section 320, which must’ be made during

normal business hours, are permissible

without warrant because of the "'elaborate

provisions for registration and licensing

of businesses engaged. in dismantling

vehicles ....'‘" (Id., at p, 7.)

Petitioner appears to accept the validity

of warrantless inspections of heavily

regulated industries as enunciated in

United States v. Biswell (1972) 406 U.S.

31l, and Colonnade Catering Corp. v.

United States (1970) 397 U.S. 72, at least

with respect to "the inspection of a

business to determine compliance with

administrative regulations ...."

(Petn. p. 19.) It is respondent's posi-

tion that the search at issue here, when

considered in conjunction with Vehicle

Code section 320, does indeed fall within

the regulated industries exception, and

that this conclusion is dispositive of the

instant issue.

8.

It has long been recognized

that,

"Certain industries have such a

history of government oversight that

no reasonable expectation of privacy

» « « could exist for a proprietor

over the stock of such an

enterprise. ... [W]hen an entre-

preneur embarks upon such a business,

he has voluntarily chosen to subject

himself to a full arsenal of

government regulation. ... ‘The

businessman in a regulated industry

in effect consents’ to the

restrictions placed upon him.'"

(Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. (1978)

436 U.S. 307, 313.)

The concomitant reduction in reasonable

privacy expectation of the proprietor of a

regulated industry leads to the conclusion

that "legislative schemes authorizing

warrantless administrative searches of

9.

commercial property do not necessarily

violate the Fourth Amendment." (Donovan

v. Dewey (1981) __—s'Uw“S. _,:- 69 L.Ed. 2d

262, 268; United States v. Biswell, supra

(1972) 406 U.S. 311, 316.)

As noted in G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United

States (1977) 429 U.S. 338, 353, “a busi-

ness, by its special nature and voluntary

existence, may open itself to intrusions

that would not be permissible in a purely

private context."

There can be little doubt that

under the prevailing statutory scheme in

California, the auto dismantling industry

is "“pervasively regulated" within

the purview of this exception. (United

States v. Biswell, supra, 406 U.S. 3ll,

316.)2/ To begin with, an entire

3. While petitioner's business was

designated as an automobile body shop, the

Court of Appeal found, as a matter of

10. (cont. )

chapter of the Vehicle Code, comprising

twenty sections, is devoted to the subject

of automobile dismaatlers. (Div. 5, Ch.

3.) This chapter specifies the regula-

tions surrounding the granting, refusal,

and failure to obtain a license to operate

as an automobile dismantler. Other

pertinent reporting requirements are

included in this chapter.

The term “dismantler” itself is

defined and limited in sections 220 and

221 of the California Vehicle Code. Among

other miscellaneous provisions relating to

automobile dismantlers are sections

fact, that petitioner was engaged in the

business of auto dismantling, and that, by

virtue of this fact, California Vehicle

Code section 320 was applicable to him.

(Petn. Appen. A, p. 7.)

ll.

relating to renewal and alteration of

licenses (Cal. Veh. Code, § 9264),

defining the duties of the Department of

Motor Vehicles with respect to complaints

directed at automobile dismantlers (Cal.

Veh. Code, § 1662), and defining an

established place of business within the

meaning of the code. (Cal. Veh. Code, §

320). It is this same_ section, which

requires such place of business to “be

open to inspection of the premises,

pertinent records and vehicles by any

peace officer during business hours" which

was relied upon, in part, by the

California Court of Appeal below in

validating the search of petitioner's

place of business.

Similarly, section 10656 of the

Vehicle Code permits inspection of

“any vehicle of a type required to

be registered under this code in any

garage, repair shop, parking lot,

12.

used car lot, automobile dismantlers

lot, or other similar establishment

for the purpose of investigating the

title and registration of vehicles

and inspection of vehicles wrecked or

dismantled."

This provision is very similar in language

to Vehicle Code section 2805, which was

the other statutory basis upon which the

search in the instant case was sustained

below. Respondent will argue, in Argument

II below, that the provisions of section

2805 are reasonable in virtually every

conceivable circumstance in which it could

be applied under the construction given by

the courts of California. For the purpose

at hand, only searches and inspections

conducted at facilities, such as

petitioner's, actually engaged in auto-

mobile dismantling need be considered.

x*eekeet

13.

As noted in People Ve Woolsey

(1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 994, 1002, limited

inspections for the purpose of locating

stolen vehicles has been permitted under

California law since i935. Moreover, the

importance of the motor vehicle industry

to the welfare of California in general

cannot be seriously contested, In a

different context, the Legislature of

California found and declared that “the

distribution and sale of new motor

vehicles in the State of California

vitally affects the general economy of the

state and the public welfare ... ."

(Stats. 1973, Ch. 996, § l.)

It should be clear, then, that

petitioner, by choosing to engage in the

pervasively regulated business of

automobile dismantling, did so with a

reasonably reduced expectation of privacy

with respect to his business. (United

14.

States v. Biswell, supra, 406 U.S. at p.

416.) The fact that petitioner's entry

into the automobile dismantling business

was surreptitious and unlawful,

circumventing the mandatory licensing and

registration requirements, cannot change

this result in the slightest.

Petitioner's suggestion that this result

is undermined by the holding in State v.

Galio (1979) 587 P.2d 44, is unavailing.

(Petn. at p. 20.) In that case, it was

held that a New Mexico statute authorizing

warrantless inspections of what were

essentially automobile dismantlers was not

supported by an urgent governmental

interest, supposedly required under

Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., supra. While

respondent submits that Galio was

incorrectly decided, since it failed to

take into account the “single industry"

aspects of the Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.

decision (436 U.S, at p. 321), it is clear

15.

that the determination by a New Mexico

court with respect to the quantum of

governmental interest in the automobile

industry Of New Mexico is entirely ir-

relevant to the parallel determination in

California.

Similarly, it is entirely clear

from the decisions of this Court that the

requirement of a federal interest and

congressional regulation relates to

congressional competence to regulate in

the first instance, rather’ than to the

power of Congress to modify the scope of

Fourth Amendment protections. (Donovan v.

Dewey, supra, U.S. , 69 L.Ed.2d

at p. 269; United States v. Biswell,

supra, 406 U.S. at pp. 314-315.) It

should thus be apparent that the

"regulated industry" exception to the

warrant requirement cannot be the exclu-

sive domain of congressional enactments,

but that the states are likewise entitled

16.

to determine for themselves, within

reasonable limits, those industries which,

because of extreme importance or risk,

require pervasive regulation and, where

necessary, warrantless inspection.

Respondent submits that the in-

spection in the instant case was clearly

justified on the basis of the principles

set forth above. While petitioner was not

a licensed dismantler, reasonable grounds

existed to believe that he was engaged in

that activity at the time the inspection

was conducted. (R.T. p. 52.) The

existence of such reasonable grounds

rendered likewise reasonable the

application af California Vehicle Code

section 320 to petitioner, despite the fact

that his business was not licensed as an

automobile dismantler. Similarly, viewing

the search as authorized by Vehicle Code

section 2805, as construed by the courts

of California, requires the raising of

17.

"the probability” that activity relating

to automobile theft was taking place.

(People v. Grubb (1965) 63 Cal.2d 614,

618.) Furthermore, the search authorized

by that section is very limited in scope,

extending only to evidence of ownership of

the vehicle. (Jackson v. Superior Court

(1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 361, 367.) Thus, it

should be clear that ample statutory

authority, predicated upon ae requisite

degree of governmetal interest, justified

the inspection in the instant case.

Petitioner nevertheless main-

tains that where as here, the purpose of

an inspection or search is to secure evidence

of a crime, probable cause in the criminal

law sense, as well as a warrant, are

required (Petn. at p. 19). It should be

clear that the detection of crime, or at

least of statutorily prohibited conduct

subject to penalty, is always the likely

outcome of an administrative inspection.

18.

(See generally United States v. Biswell,

supra, 406 U.S. 311.) Indeed, the conduct

which resulted in the instant judgment is

precisely the type of activity which the

pervasive regulation scheme discussed

above was designed to prevent.

Finally, it has been held that

an officer's state of mind will not

invalidate a search "as long as_ the

circumstances, viewed objectively, justify

that action." (Scott v. United States

(1978) 436 U.S. 128, 138.) If, as

respondent has attempted to demonstrate,

the search of petitioner's place of

business was authorized by the valid

regulatory scheme, the propriety of that

search should not be undermined because of

the information possessed by the officers,

whether that information constitutes a

mere suspicion, probable cause to arrest,

or, as in the instant case, reasonable

grounds to believe criminal activity is

19.

taking place.

It should, perhaps, be noted in

this regard that the distinction which

grounds petitioner's assertions--namely

that between administrative searches and

searches conducted for the purpose of

criminal prosecution--does not in fact

exist under the decisions of this Court.

In other words, it has been "held that the

Fourth Amendment prohibition against un=

reasonable searches protects against war-

rantless intrusions during civil as well

as criminal investigations." (Marshall v.

Barlow's Inc., supra, 436 U.S. 312; see

also Michigan v. Tyler (1978) 436 U.S.

506; See v. City of Seattle (1967) 387

U.S. 541, 543.) Rather, the differing re-

sults achieved in various factual settings

must be seen as the product of the

appraisal which underlies all Fourth

Amendment adjudication, namely "balancing

20.

the public interest against the

individual's Fourth Amendment interests

+ « « «" (Delaware v. Prouse (1979) 440

U.S. 648, 657.)

II

The Inspection Was Reasonable

Respondent has attempted to

demonstrate above that the inspection,

without warrant, of petitioner's place of

business was justified under the regulated

industries exception to the warrant

requirement, especially when viewed from

the perspective of California Vehicle Code

section 320 relating to automobile

dismantlers. Alternately, respondent sub-

mits that limited searches for the purpose

of determining ownership of a motor

vehicle under reasonable and limited

circumstances, as authorized by Vehicle

Code section 2805 as construed by the

courts of California, represent "a sui

21.

generis ‘rubric of police conduct,'" which,

like the "'stop and frisk'" considered by

this court in Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392

U.S. 1, should be evaluated on the basis

of balancing of the limited intrusion

against the governmental interest support-

ing the search. (Dunaway v. New York

(1979) 442 U.S. 200, 209.)

| In Terry v. Ohio, this Court

identified "“the"central inquiry under the

Fourth Amendment--the reasonableness’ in

all the circumstances of the particular

governmental invasion... ." (392 U.S.

at p. 19.) In Camara v. Municipal Court

(1967) 387 U.S. 523, this Court noted the

absence of a "ready test for determining

reasonableness" other than a _ balance

between “the need to search" and “the

invasion which the search entails." (387

U.S. 537.) And in the specific context of

statutorily authorized warrantless

22.

searches, this Court has specifically held

that the reasonableness of such searches

depends "upon the specific enforcement

needs and privacy guarantees of each

statute." (Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,

supra, 436 U.S. 307, 321.)

It is readily apparent that the

instant search, when viewed as predicated

upon the provisions of Vehicle Code

section 2805, satisfies the requirements

of reasonableness as identified above. To

begin. with, this Court has_ repeatedly

noted that Fourth Amendment interests

in the balance identified above are, in

some rough way, proportional to the degree

of intrusion involved in the search.

(Delaware v. Prouse, supra, (1979) 440 U.S.

648, 656-657; Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392

U.S. 1, 25.) In addition, it has been

recognized that the longstanding rule

permitting warrantless searches of automo-~

biles where probable cause to believe

23.

contraband is present "has been based in

part on their inherent mobility," but

rests primarily on "the diminished expecta-

tion of privacy which surrounds’ the

automobile." (United States v. Chadwick

(1977) 433 U.S. 1, 12; Chambers v. Maroney

(1970) 399 U.S. 42, 50-51.)

As noted in Jackson v. Superior

Court, supra, 74 Cal.App.3d 361, 367,

judicial interpretation of Vehicle Code

section 2805 requires reasonable circum-

stances before the limited intrusion for

the purpose of investigating title or

registration will be sanctioned. Indeed,

in Jackson itself, it was held that police

entry to obtain registration information

must be preceded by an inquiry if the

vehicle is occupied. Clearly, the courts

of California have construed Vehicle Code

section 2805 within narrow and reasonable

limits in order to render the limited

24.

intrusion authorized thereunder compatible

with constitutional requirements.

In the instant case, it is clear

froh the r-cord that Officer Ririe

informed petitioner of his identity, the

purpose of his inspection, and the

statutory authority for it under Vehicle

Code section 2805. (C.T. pp. 199, 202.)

A “complete search of the premises" was

not conducted in the instant case, but

inspection was limited to paperwork and

vehicles or parts thereof. (C.T. p. 204.)

Petitioner does not assert, nor does the

instant record support the inference, that

the police inspection at any time exceeded

this limited scope.

It is well settled that, follow-

ing a relatively minor traffic infraction,

a motorist may be lawfully required to

furnish evidence of his right to operate a

motor vehicle and of the registration and

ownership of the vehicle he is driving.

25.

(Delaware v. Prouse, supra, 440 U.S. 648,

659.) Similarly, in the same case this

Court noted that prominent display of

license plates is required in many, if not

most states. (440 U.S. at p. 660; see

also United States v. Chadwick, supra, 433

U.S. at pp. 12-13.) These requirements

are implemented by statute in California.

(Cal. Veh. Code, §§ 4462; 12951.)

Respondent submits that the current

construction of Vehicle Code section 2805

is, if at all, but slightly more intrusive

than the statutes permitting inspection of

a driver's license or registration certif-

icate, The physical intrusion in the

instant case was clearly minimal: no

property was destroyed; no closed

containers were opened. And to the degree

to which incriminatory information was

obtained as a result of the inspection,

such is clearly and equally possible with

26.

respect to the request for a driver's

license or registration certificate.

This Court has’ recognized for

some time that the degree of protection to

be afforded an individual from government

intrusions--such as the necessity for a

judicial warrant or the requisite level of

knowledge or information possessed by the

officer or official--is a function of the

degree of intrusiveness implicit in the

search or inspection itself. (Dunaway v.

New York, supra, 442 U.S. 200, 210;

Michigan v. Tyler, supra, 436 U.S. 499,

506; Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, 387

U.S. 523, 538-539.) Thus, in at least two

situations, this Court has held that

warrantless intrusions of a limited nature

may be effecuated on less than traditional

probable cause. (Delaware v. Prouse,

supra, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (production of

license and registration); Terry v. Ohio,

supra, 392 U.S. 1, 21. (Weapons "pat-

27.

down"). In each of these cases, the court

has required only “specific and articulable

facts" which give rise to a reasonable sus-

picion warranting the particular

intrusion. (392 U.S. at p. 21, 440 U.S.

at p. 663.)

It is clear that in the instant

case, and in all cases likely to arise

under the current construction of

California Vehicle Code section 2805, the

requirement of “articulable and reasonable

suspicion" was, and will be, met. (Ibid.)

Specifically, in the instant case, Officer

Ririe had been informed by Sergeant Biller

of the Hollywood Division of the

Los Angeles Police Department that nu-

merous cars in apparently undamaged

condition were entering Daytona Auto Body

never to be seen again. (C.T. pp. 197-

198.) In addition, during an inves-

tigation concerning a confessed car thief

named Stradman, a refurbisher of cars of

28.

questionable origin named Sol Mizrahi was

linked to Daytona Auto Body. (C.T. p.

198; R.T. p. 46.) Finally, on the day

prior to the search at issue, investigator

Ririe was contacted by an investigator

Johnson in Alhambra, California who

indicated that he was’ investigating

insurance frauds involving Daytona Auto

Body. (C.T. p. 198.)

While respondent concedes’ that

this information did not meet the

requisite standards of specificity and

personal knowledge to amount to probable

cause for the issuance of a _ search

warrant, it is apparent that this

information provided the articulable and

reasonable suspicion required for the

limited inspection authorized under

Vehicle Code section 2805 and actually

conducted in the instant case. Indeed,

respondent submits that the nature of

29.

petitioner's enterprise--an unlicensed and

unlawful dismantler of, and dealer in,

stolen vehicles--further justifies the

utilization of limited warrantless inspec-

tions on less’ than traditional probable

cause.

Clearly, petitioner's enterprise

was sophisticated, including the leasing

of a three-story building, two floors of

which he subleased to a tenant, the

maintenance of elaborate facilities for

dismantling, reassembling, and painting

automobiles, and direct contact with

perspective buyers. Petitioner also

apparently employed several workers in his

enterprise. (R.T. pp. 53-58.) Moreover,

the speed with which petitioner was able

to conduct his activities is evidenced by

the fact that, in attempting to execute an

arrest warrant for petitioner, Officer

Ford impounded two additional vehicles in

various stages of reconstruction eight

30.

days after investigator Ririe conducted

the initial inspection. (C.T. pp. 224-

2253 229.) Clearly, the degree of speed

and sophistication demonstrated by

petitioner's enterprise renders both rea-

sonable and necessary the type of limited

warranted intrusion contested by

petitioner.

Since the inspection conducted

in the instant case was clearly reasonable

under longstanding principles of Fourth

Amendment adjudication, respondent submits

that this Court should therefore deny the

requested writ of certiorari to review the

denial of petitioner's motion to suppress

evidence.

xe ® &

31.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons,

respondent urges that the Petition for

Writ of Certiorari be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

GEORGE DEUKMEJIAN, Attorney General

of the State of California

ROBERT H. PHILIBOSIAN, Chief

Assistant Attorney General

--Criminal Division

S. CLARK MOORE,

Assistant Attorney General

ROBERT F. KATZ,

Deputy Attorney General

FREDERICK GRAB,

Deputy Attorney General

Attorneys for Respondent

32.