Opposition — Guidry v. Continental Oil Co.

Supreme Court brief1981

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nO. aes | Office - Supreme +. us.

es THE AUG 12 1861

ALEXANOPR L. STEVAS,

RK

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1981

MICHAEL GUIDRY,

Petitioner,

VERSUS

CONTINENTAL OIL COMPANY, ET AL.,

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT,

MARLIN DRILLING COMPANY, INC.

IN OPPOSITION TO CERTIORARI

Telephone: (318) 367 - 8517

ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT,

MARLIN DRILLING CO., INC.

_—<————————————————————————————————

QUESTION PRESENTED

Respondent Marlin Drilling Company, Inc. is dissatisfied

with the statement of the question as presented by petitioner.

Respondent would state the question presented in this man--~ ~—

ner:

Does the ruling of the Fifth Circuit conflict with the stan-

dard of care imposed on the shipowner by Scindia Steam

Navigation Co., Ltd. v. De Los Santos, US °

101 S. Ct. 1614, L. Ed. 2d (1981) where the

facts are beyond dispute petitioner’s injuries were caused

soley by an isolated act of negligence occurring within the

confines of an operation assigned to his employer, a specialist,

rather than by a dangerous condition on the ship or by de-

fective ship’s gear ?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases:

Santos v. Scindia Steam Navigation Company, 598 F. 2d

GED DG. 1979) sercieccvcicccvccgeserosccsevese 7

Scindia Steam Navigation Co., Ltd. v. De Los Santos,

101 S, Ct. 1614, (1981) ......... i, 2,6, 7, 8,9, 10,11, 12

Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494,

91S. Ct. 514, 27 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1971) ....... 6, 7, 8,9, 10

Statutes:

SRP DEER cs Sabibocecbcdvicsncdpbanecen vend 6, 10

irene 5s pc thhinees near res hphuhnse dans 1

Miscellaneous:

Restatement (Second) of Torts, 343A(1)............. 1,6,7

CONCISE STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. PROCEEDINGS BELOW

The original action of petitioner was against his employer

Offshore Casing Crews, Inc. (“Offshore”) under 46 U.S.C.

§688 (the Jones Act), Marlin Drilling Company, Inc. (“Re-

spondent”), the owner and operator of the drilling vessel

MARLIN 6 under the General Maritime Law, and Continental

Oil Company (“‘Continental’’) as the lease holder and contractor

of the services of Offshore under the General Maritime Law.

The District Court dismissed the claim against Offshore by

summary judgment on the finding that because petitioner

lacked permanent assignment to a vessel he was not a seaman.

The case was tried on the merits as to respondent and Con-

tinental. At the close of the petitioner’s case, the trial court

granted motions for directed verdicts in favor of both respon-

dents. As to Marlin, the trial court found the evidence was

“without any controversy whatever” that the cause of the

occurrence was not the condition of MARLIN 6 nor her ap-

pliances but the isolated act of negligence of petitioner.

The judgments of the lower court were sustained in their

entirety on appeal in the United States Court of Appeal for the

Fifth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit applied its jurisprudence which

embodies the Restatement (Second) of Torts standard for

landowners to decide the merits of the appeal against Marlin.

However, it also stated in dictum that even if the “‘reasonable

care” under the circumstances rule of the Ninth Circuit was

applied the trial court’s directed verdicts passed muster. The

Fifth Circuit agreed the evidence taken in the light most favor-

able to petitioner failed to indicate the accident was caused by

other than the negligence of the contractor (Offshore) within

the area of its operations.

Petitioner’s application for a writ of certiorari is based on

the contention the jurisprudence of the Fifth Circuit is contrary

to the holding of Scindia Steam Navigation Company, Ltd.

v. De Los Santos, supra, and since this jurisprudence was

accepted as controlling the appeal, the Fifth Circuit’s ruling

must be overturned. Respondent contends that whatever may

be the rule heretofore applied generally in the Fifth Circuit,

its ruling on petitioner’s appeal was not only entirely consistent

with Scindia but mandated by it. Under Scindia no other result

than the finding in favor of respondent would be permissible.

Respondent is dissatisfied with the statement of facts of

petitioner. In particular, respondent feels the phrasing of

the issue presented on certiorari in terms of “dangerous con-

dition” and “defective ship’s gear” and the corresponding

treatment of the facts by petitioner in those terms is misleading.

For these reasons respondent offers its own version of the facts

as being far more consistent with the findings of the trial court

and approved by the Fifth Circuit.

B. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Petitioner received personal injuries on July 6, 1976, on

board MARLIN 6 while employed by Offshore as the pusher of

a casing crew. Petitioner was an experienced, seasoned and

expert casing hand. The accident occurred during a rigging

up operation to run casing. In conformity with custom in the

industry based on the expertise and specialized nature of the

work of casing crews in general, the rigging up work was done

under the sole supervision of Offshore’s pusher, in this case,

the petitioner.

Casing is large, heavy pipe placed in an oil or gas well as

drilling progresses to prevent the hole from collapsing on it-

self. Offshore, the plaintiff's employer, is a specialist in the

setting and removal of such casing.

Casing is handled with specialty tools consisting of elevators,

baffle plates, spiders, tongs and a power unit to operate same,

all of which are supplied by the casing contractor. When a

casing operation is to be performed, a casing crew with tools is

contracted for. In this case, Continental as the owner of the

well, contracted for the services of Offshore. The casing crew

is informed of the size and length of the casing, and then

under the sole direction of the pusher, assembles its equip-

ment, rigs up and runs casing.

Petitioner worked on rigs situated on land and water in-

cluding fixed structures and drilling vessels. The evidence

at trial indicated and the Court found petitioner was not

permanently assigned to a vessel and was not a seaman. Petition-

er by failing to include in his application for certiorari any

request for relief from this finding has presumably abandoned

the contention he was a seaman. The employment history of

petitioner merits no further attention.

During July, 1976 Marlin was under contract to drill one or

more wells for Continental at East Cameron Block 42, OCS

(more than 3 miles off the coast of Louisiana). The drilling

operation was being conducted from Marlin Rig No. 6, a self-

elevating mobile drilling platform more commonly known as

a “jack-up rig” which is capable of floating from one location to

another. It is conceded to be a “vessel”.

The drill floor of the Marlin Rig 6 has an upset rotary table,

one which is not flush with the surrounding deck but elevated

some 6 - 8 inches. The draw works are situated at the rear of

the drill floor, the V - door, through which the drill pipe and

equipment is brought onto the drill floor is directly opposite

the draw works. On the drill floor are three lifting devices,

the principal one being the main drum of the draw works

from which the drill line, etc., is suspended. There are two

auxillary lifting devices, the catline which operates off of an

auxillary drum on the draw works and the air hoist, a separate

device, which is operated from a control console situated

adjacent to the V - door. The catline is operated from the

driller’s stand which is on the side of the draw works. From the

driller’s stand, the view of the drill floor and V - door is through

a “peep hole’. The view of the V - door and the drill floor

from the air hoist console is unrestricted, however.

At the appropriate time in the drilling of this well, the drill

pipe, in three thirty-foot section stands of ninety feet length

each, were removed from the hole, placed in the fingers of the

derrick and a casing crew was called out to the location. Peti-

tioner was in charge of the crew which was sent; the second in

command was another Offshore employee, Mike Hazlett.

After waiting one day, the casing crew was called to the drill

floor to start running casing. The casing crew was in complete

control of the floor once they started to rig up.

When the casing crew arrived on the drill floor, the Marlin

crane operator had already lifted the hydraulic unit onto the

drill floor and it was situated in the V - door. The petitioner

and one of his crew moved the hydraulic unit out of the V -

door with the use of a jerk line. The jerk line was rigged by

running the air hoist line through a snatch block attached to

one of the legs of the derrick which converted the vertical

lifting capability of the air hoist to a horizontal force. In about

10 minutes the unit was moved. Meanwhile, the Marlin crane

operator was placing in the V - door the balance of the casing

equipment consisting of the spider, baffle plate, elevator and

tongs. This equipment was unslung from the crane line by

petitioner’s co-employees and left in close proximity to each

other in the V - door.

The petitioner assisted in moving the hydraulic unit, but

then became aware Mike Hazlett, the second in command, was

moving the elevators into position for rig up. Hazlett had

previously dispatched one of his crew to operate the catline

and the latter was at the driller’s stand observing through

the peep hole. Because of the restricted view, Hazlett was

giving hand signals to the catline operator. Hazlett had al-

-4-

ready attached the catline to one of the ears of the elevator

and given the signal to pick up when petitioner first became

aware of the procedure. As the elevator was picked up, it

bound up on one side on either the spider or the horseshoe

which it was laying between. Hazlett was manually guiding

the elevator from a position outside the moment, that is, he

was not between the elevator and its center of gravity which

was roughly the hole in the rotary table. When the elevator

hung up, petitioner went to assist Hazlett. Unlike Hazlett, he

positioned himself within the moment of the elevator, that is,

between the center of gravity and the rotary table. Under

Hazlett’s constant signal, the catline operator continued lifting

the elevator until it suddenly twisted and pushed against peti-

tioner who slipped and lost his balance. The elevator swinging

free towards the center of gravity then trapped and smashed

petitioner’s foot against the upset rotary table.

At the time of the accident, the jerk line which had been

used to move a much heavier piece of equipment, the hydraulic

unit, was still rigged up. The jerk line could have been em-

ployed to separate the equipment in the V-door. Had this

been done, the elevator would not have bound up. The decision

not to use the jerk line or to separate the equipment was made

by Hazlett. However, Hazlett was positioned so that he was not

between the elevator and its center of gravity and the elevator

could not have swung in a direction which presented a danger

to him. Likewise, in a protected place, the restricted view of

the drill floor from the driller’s stand was not a factor in the

safe performance of the job. The operation was safe when

performed by Hazlett from his position outside the arc of

movement of the elevator.

Prior to the time Hazlett undertook to move the elevator

with the catline, the equipment in the V - door constituted

no danger to anyone including petitioner. All aspects of the drill

floor including the position of the elevator against the other

pieces of equipment was open and apparent. No piece of equip-

Ms

ment utilized in this rig up procedure failed to perform as it

was intended to. There was no defective gear. There was no ap-

pliance which was not reasonably fit for its intended purpose.

The cause of the accident was the isolated act of operational

negligence of either Hazlett in deciding to move the elevator

as it lay in the V - door instead of spacing out the equipment

alongside it, the negligence of petitioner in assuming a position

of danger between the elevator and its center of gravity or of

both in failing to adopt an alternate rig up chronology.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Both lower courts considered the evidence in the light

most favorable to petitioner and correctly concluded it was

caused by the operational negligence of petitioner or his co-

employees. There was no defective ship’s gear nor any unreason-

ably dangerous condition which caused or contributed to the

accident. Respondent was entitled to rely on the expertise of

the specialist, Offshore, and was under no obligation to super-

vise or inspect its work.

The rule of Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S.

949, 91 S. Ct. 514, 27 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1971) which holds that

a shipowner is not liable for an act of operational negligence

by a specialist was not abrogated by Scindia. The accident in

question occurred as the result of an act of operational negli-

gence by the specialist, thus Usner not Scindia is directly con-

trolling.

ARGUMENT

The decision of the Fifth Circuit insofar as it pertained to

respondent, was based on its prior jurisprudence interpreting

33 U.S.C. §905 (b). The Fifth Circuit had previously adopted

and ostensibly utilized in the decision of this case as its negli-

gence standard Section 343 A (1) of the Restatement (Second)

ys

of Torts. The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that the Ninth Circuit

had established a contrary standard in its decision in Santos v.

Scindia Steam Navigation Company, 598 F. 2d 480 (9th Cir.

1979), reversed, supra, by This Court on April 21, 1981.

However, it is important to note the Fifth Circuit stated that in

reviewing the facts before the lower court under either stan-

dard, its (the lower court’s) decision was correct. According to

the Fifth Circuit, under either the Restatement or the “‘reason-

able care under the circumstances” rule of the Ninth Circuit,

petitioner had failed to show respondent breached any duty

owed to him. Moreover, although not specifically referred to

as such, it is obvious the Fifth Circuit concluded the accident

arose from the operational negligence of the casing crew rather

than from a dangerous condition.

The great attention devoted by petitioner to the small

details of the accident do not change its character. All equip-

ment functioned as designed. The dangerousness arose only as

a result of the method of operation utilized by the specialist,

the casing crew. Therefore, the precise question presented to

The Court by this petition for certiorari is not that which was

presented in Scindia, namely when the shipowner discovers the

stevedore is continuing to use defective ship’s gear, does he have

a duty to intervene ? Rather, the real question is one which

This Court answered ten years ago, namely: Is the shipowner

liable for the isolated act of operational negligence of a spe-

cialist working aboard its vessel ?

Factually this case is a brother to Usner v. Luckenbach

Overseas Corp., supra, and only a distant relative of Scindia.

Usner squarely held that a shipowner was not liable for the

operational negligence of a stevedore. Scindia is an affirma-

tion of same with an exception which has no play in the facts

of this case.

In Usner a winch operator was lowering a fall to the plain-

tiff who then secured it to the cargo. On the occasion of the

Je

accident, the winch operator failed to lower the sling far enough

and the piaintiff motioned him to lower it further where-

upon the winch operator did so but too fast and caused the

plaintiff to be thrown to the deck. It was concluded the acci-

deni was caused by an operation, not a condition, and con-

sequently, the shipowner was free from fault.

The application of Usner or scindia to determine shipowner

liability is determined by the characterization of the injury

producing mechanism, operation or condition. That the case

at bar involved the former is revealed by an analysis of the

allegations of petitioner.

Petitioner expounds in great detail on the little or lesser

important aspects of the mechanics of the accident and he

consistently gives little consideration to the more significant

components. The sine qua non was not the (1) inadequate

peep hole; (2) the existence of ten thousand feet of drill pipe

in the V - door (sis) (the evidence was undisputed that it was

standing in the derrick); (3) mud and water on the drill floor;

(4) the placement of the casing equipment in the V - door;

(5) the placement of the power unit on the drill floor; or (6)

the upset rotary table. These details merely describe the phy-

sical location of the occurrence. The crux of the accident

lay in the method of operation selected by petitioner. Condi-

tions would never have coalesced into a dangerous condition

per se. The danger arose only when the elevators were lifted

while petitioner was positioned between them and their center

of gravity. The voluntary positioning of petitioner was the

great detail of the accident.

The six conditions alone or altogether were not important,

nor beyond the control of petitioner and his crew. Where the

condition was not itself correctable by petitioner, there were

alternatives available which would have avoided any danger.

The jerk line could have been used to space out the equipment

and then move the elevators. The operator of the jerk line

-8-

had an unrestricted view of the drill floor. The catline’s use

was neither improper nor dangerous if petitioner had put

himself where Hazlett was. The power unit was on a corner

of the drill floor; how it could have been a causative factor is

not readily apparent. Petitioner had control of the floor and

the means to clean it if he wanted; furthermore, the “mud

and water” was not the cause of the accident. The upset rotary

was an apparent condition and was not dangerous. It merely

furnished the locale for the accident. The central thesis of

respondent's position is simply that no dangerous condition

or defective gear existed. This position has received the impri-

matur of approval from the district and appellate courts.

Petitioner seeks to convert the “operation” to a “condition”

simply by calling it such.

Respondent submits the occurrence was from an operation,

not a condition, and Usner, not Scindia, is directly controlling.

Tee holding of Usner that a shipowner is not liable for the

a ~<<rse4 af ao ition of the stevedore was endorsed

in Scindia.

“The shipowner, within limits is entitled to rely

on the stevedore, and owes no duty to the longshore-

man to inspect or supervise the cargo operations.”

101 S. Ct. at 1624.

“If the effective cause was a simple act of operation-

al negligence by the crane operator or the hatch tender,

the vessel would not be liah'c in any event’’. Footnote

26, 101 S. Ct. 1627-28, citiig Usner.

The “more difficult and recurring issue” present in Scindia

does not present itself in this case because the facts do not

indicate any defective gear played a causative part in the oc-

currence. Scindia invites attention oniy by posing the ques-

9-

tion whether it should be extended by analogy to impose a

duty on the shipowner to intervene if he knows the specialist

will commit an unsafe act within the confines of operations

assigned to it ?

The knowledge by the shipowner of the continued use

of the defective winch by the longshoremen in Scindia deprived

it of the immunity which would have otherwise been afforded

it by recognition of its lack of a duty to supervise or inspect

the operations of the stevedore. That a shipowner had no duty

to discover and remedy an open and obvious dangerous con-

dition because it could rely on the expertise of the stevedore

was recognized. Only where there was a showing the stevedore

failed to correct it coupled with a showing the shipowner

knew of it, could the shipowner be found liable. The ingredients

to 905(b) shipowner liability under Scindia are (1) a dangerous

condition or defective gear, (2) actual knowledge of the con-

dition by the shipowner, and (3) knowledge the stevedore

has continued its operations in spite of the dangerous condition.

As stated above, Scindia itself does not apply per se to the

case at hand because there was no dangerous condition, no

defective ship’s gear. Moreover, Scindia, if it does announce

an exception to Usner would certainly require as a predicate to

the existence of a triable issue a showing of knowledge by

the shipowner of a continuing and unreasonably dangerous

method of operation by that contractor. The question of

Scindia application vel non where no defective ship’s gear is

present is raised only for the purpose of demonstrating the

striking dissimilarities between it and this case; without a show-

ing of actual knowledge of a danger, be it from a condition,

a piece of gear or an operation, Scindia neither by its literal

holding nor by analogical extension, indicates any conflict

with the ruling of the Fifth Circuit or the trial court. The

Fifth Circuit plainly found wanting any evidence of actual

knowledge on the part of respondent of any danger.

“Reviewing the facts in light of either or both of these

-10-

standards, -1/ Guidry has not shown Marlin (i) knew or

had reason to know of any unreasonably dangerous

condition, and (ii) failed to exercise reasonable care to

make the condition safe or warn him. The equipment

was sitting securely on the rig floor when Guidry

arrived on the rig floor. No Marlin employee was on the

rig floor at the time the accident occurred. Guidry

was the sole supervisory person on the rig floor when

he was injured. It was Guidry’s duty, not Marlin’s, to

assure his co-employees were conducting their work in

a safe manner. Guidry, under the circumstances of this

case, may not claim any actions taken by Marlin prior

to his arrival on the rig floor caused the accident. If

location of some of the tools afforded some obstacic

to a safe performance of the work, the condition was

perfectly apparent to all with no showing that the

condition or its hazards would not be known to Guidry

and his crew. Indeed, Guidry did not challenge this

fact, nor was there any sufficient showing that Marlin

should realize that it involved an unreasonable risk

to Offshore’s workers. Under such circumstances we

must deny Guidry recovery for it is well settled ‘[i]f

either the [contractor] or his employee is in [a] better

position to appreciate fully the [obvious] risk and

avoid the danger, particularly where the danger is

within the control of the [contractor’s] own em-

ployees’, the vessel owner will not be liable.” Id.

(quoting Stockstill v. Gypsum Transportation, 607

F. 2d 1112, 1117 (Sth Cir. 1979). (Emphasis supplied)

The Fifth Circuit’s holding obviously fits quite comfortably

1/ Comparing the Ninth Circuit’s standard in Scindia, 598 F. 2d 480

(1979) with the Fifth Circuit standard first announced in Gay v. Ocean

Transport & Trading, Ltd., 546 F. 2d 1233 (1977).

into the resolution by Scindia of the “easier” issue namely:

A shipowner is not liable for dangers not known to him which

have occurred within the confines of the independent con-

tractor’s operation. Thus, under another name like a rose which

would still smell as sweet, the ruling of the Fifth Circuit,

although announced under the aegis of a partially discarded

standard of care, is a ruling which should be left undisturbed

as representing a standard of care fully consistent with Scindia

based on the facts of this case.

CONCLUSION

A shipowner has no duty to supervise the operations of

independent contractors working aboard its vessel. A rule which

obliges a shipowner to repair defective ship’s gear if it knows

an independent contractor will utilize it in its operations with-

out repair and expose the contractor’s employees to unreason-

ably dangerous conditions does not have as its logical corrollary

the requirement the shipowner supervise the operations of

independent contractors to insure they will not bring into

play conditions not per se dangerous but with a dangerous

potential where reasonable alternatives are available. Since in

the first instance the shipowner is entitled to rely on the exper-

tise of an independent contractor holding itself out as an

expert, it is not incumbent on the shipowner to recognize

a condition not inherently dangerous but with a dangerous

potential and warn or supervise the employees of an expert

possessed of knowledge and skill at least equal to that of

the shipowner not to bring into play that dangerous conditions.

The shipowner who furnishes a reasonably safe place to

work, and reasonably safe appliances is not liable for the

unforseeable negligent use of same by an independent contrac-

tor. Absent proof of actual knowledge of misuse under Scindia,

the shipowner is entitled to a directed verdict in its favor.

-12-

Respectfully submitted:

GIBBENS AND BLACKWELL

P.O. Box 2236

New Iberia, Louisiana 70560

HN BLACKWELL

ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT,

MARLIN DRILLING CO., INC.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the above

and foregoing Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Cer-

tiorari have been served on the following counsel of record

in this case at the addresses shown by placing same in the

United States Mail, postage prepaid, on this the 12th day of

August, 1981:

J. Minos Simon

P.O. Box 52116

Lafayette, La. 70507

James T. Guglielmo

P.O. Drawer 393

Opelousas, La. 70570

Don Broussard

2014 Johnston St.

Lafayette, La. 70501

HN BLACKWELL

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