Amicus Brief — Diedrich v. Commissioner

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Office Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

No. 80-2204 NOV 19 1961

In the Supreme Court of the

October Term, 1981

VICTOR P. DIEDRICH and FRANCES T. DIEDRICH,

Petitioners,

vs

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

Respondent,

and

UNITED MISSOURI BANK OF KANSAS CITY, N.A.,

EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF FRANCES D. GRANT,

DECEASED,

Petitioner,

vs.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

Respondent.

AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF

On Behalf of Ralph Owen and Lulu H. Owen; John T.

Benson, Jr. and Jimmie L. Benson; J. C. Bradford,

Sr. and Eleanor Bradford; Joe C. Davis; and Estate of

Frances Hampton Currey

WILLIAM WALLER

(Counsel of Record)

WALLER LANSpEN Dortcu & Davis

2100 One Commerce Place

Nashville, Tennessee 37239

(615) 244-6380

Attorney for Amici Curiae

E. L. Menpennatt, Ixc., 926 Cherry Street, Kansas City, Mo. 64106, (816) 421-3030

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Interest of the Amici Curiae 2

Summary of Argument 8

Argument:

Structure of a Net Gift 10

The Commissioner’s Theory of Tax Liability ........ 12

The Tax Reform Act of 1976 14

The Crane Case 16

The Constitutional Concept of Income .................... 19

The Weight to Be Given the Tax Court Decisions 21

Conclusion 25

Table of Authorities

CAsxs

Arrousmith v. Commissioner, 344 U.S. 6, 12 (1952) 24

John T. Benson, Jr., et ux. v. Commissioner, T. C. Memo

1978-231 6

Eleanor A. Bradford v. Commissioner, 233 F.2d 935

(6th Cir. 1956) 20

J. C. Bradford, et ux. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 584

(1978) 6

Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406

(1932) 24

Cannon v. Apperson, 14 LEA (82 Tenn.) p. 553 ............ 12

Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 105-109 (1971) 25

Commissioner v. Rail Joint Co., 61 F.2d 751 (C. A. 2,

1932) 20, 21

Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947) 5, 8, 16,

17, 18, 19

Joe C. Davis v. Commissioner, 74 T. C. 881 (1980) .......... 6

II

Diedrich v. Commissioner, 643 F.2d 499 (8th Cir. 1981)

2 7,11

Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943) ...........-... 24

Edwards v. Cuba Railroad, 268 U.S. 628 (1924 21

Est. of Frances H. Currey v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo

1981-40 6

Est. of Davis v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1971-318,

(30 T.C.M. 1363), affd. 469 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1972)

4, 19, 22

Est. of Henry v. Commissioner, 69 T. C. 665 (1978) — 7

Est. of King v. Commissioner, 37 T. C. 973 (1962) 22

Evangelista v. Commissioner, 629 F. 2d 1218 (7th Cir.

1980) 12,17

Hanover Bank, Executor v. Commissioner, 369 U.S. 672

(1962) ae 25

Sarah Helen Harrison v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1350

eee 2, 11, 14

Hirsch v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1940) 20

Hirst v. Commissioner, 572 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1978),

rene. 4, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 25

Johnson v. Commissioner, 495 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir. 1974),

59 T. C. 791 (1973) 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 16, 18, 19

Krause v. Commissioner, 56 T. C. 1242 (1971) — 4, 6, 10,

14, 21

Magnolia Development Co. v. Commissioner, T. C. Memo

1960-177 (19 T. C. M. 934) 5, 12, 19

Millar v. Commissioner, 577 F.2d 212 (3rd Cir. 1978),

cert. denied 439 U.S. 1046 (1978) 18

National Bank v. Whitney, 103 U.S. (13 Otto) 99 (1880)

Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716

(1929) 5, 8, 13, 16

Owen, et ux. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1978-51, 652

F.2d 1271 (6th Cir. 1981) 6, 7, 10, 12, 18, 24

Reinecke v. Northern Trust Company, 278 U.S. 339

(1929)

Simon v. Commissioner, 285 F.2d 422 (3rd Cir. 1960),

affg. 32 PC. 935 5, 12, 19

Tufts v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir, 1981) .... 18

Turner v. Commissioner, 49 T. C. 356 (1968), affd. 410

F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1969) ..... 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 21, 24

United States v. Dyrum, 408 U.S. 126 (1972) ................ 22

STATUTES

Internal Revenue Code of 19 3ůꝶ999r2v2zi¶ĩ 8

Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (U.S. C.):

ere 19, 20

e ,,, ] ceeessalinpiaclisiavesl 9, 15

e .... 3, 4, 11, 21

e . 3, 4, 11, 21

D . 8, 16, 17

Section 1015 (d) (6) 16

e ..... 22

MISCELLANEOUS

Rev. Rul. 57-564, 1957-2, Cum. Bull. 328 3

Rev. Kul. 75-72, 1957-1, Cum. Bull. 310 3

Sixteenth Amendment 9, 19, 20, 21

Tax Reform Act of 1976:

e ,,... es

e naatccaptcensabenengipoasuctatinbio’ 16

Judicial Code Act of June 25, 1948, 36, 62 Stat. 991-992 24

Virginia Bill of Rights, 1776 Paragraph 15 ........................ 19

Iv

Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Trusts, Boris

J. Bittker (1981) para, 43.1 17

Ways and Means Committee Report: i

H. Rpt. No. 94-658, 94th Congress, Ist Sess., Nov.

. 14

H. Rpt. No. 94-1380, 94th Congress, 2d Sess., Au-

gust 2, 1976, p. 44 eee 16

Conference Report

H. Rpt. No. 94-1515, 94th Congress, 2d Sess., Sept.

een eee 15

No. 80-2204

In the Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1981

VICTOR P. DIEDRICH and FRANCES T. DIEDRICH,

Petitioners,

VS.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

Respondent,

and

UNITED MISSOURI BANK OF KANSAS CITY, N.A.,

EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF FRANCES D. GRANT,

DECEASED,

Petitioner,

vs.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

Respondent.

AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF

On Behalf of Ralph Owen and Lulu H. Owen; John T.

Benson, Jr. and Jimmie L. Benson; J. C. Bradford,

Sr. and Eleanor Bradford; Joe C. Davis; and Estate of

Frances Hampton Currey

MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT:

This amicus curiae brief is filed in support of the posi-

tion of Petitioners in this case on behalf of the following

2

appellees in cases pending in the Sixth Circuit Court of

Appeals:

Ralph Owen and Lulu H. Owen

John T. Benson, Jr. and Jimmie L. Benson

J.C. Bradford, Sr. and Eleanor Bradford

Joe C. Davis

Estate of Frances Hampton Currey

INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE

The interest of the amici curiae can best be seen from

the following historical survey.

The first reference to net gifts we find in court de-

cisions was in Sarah Helen Harrison v. Commissioner, 17

T. C. 1350 (1952), involving the amount of the gift tax.

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue contended that the

gift tax should be applied to the gross gift. In ruling for

the taxpayer the Tax Court said (p. 1357):

Respondent asserts that gift tax “is measured by

the value of the property passing from the donor.”

Regulations 108, section 86.3. This is true if the prop-

erty passes from the donor with all the elements of a

gift. Cf. Commissioner v. Hogle, 165 F.2d 352, 353, af-

firming 7 T.C. 986. One of the essential elements of

a gift is the donor’s intention to make the gift. Peti-

tioner did not intend that the amount of the value of

the property necessary for the gift tax liability would

be a gift to the trust. Therefore, in the absence of an

intent to give, this amount was not effective as prop-

erty passing from the donor, and not taxable as a gift.

As used in the brief and in the cited cases, a net gift

is a gift on condition that the donee pay the gift taxes or

that the donee agree to pay the gift taxes.“

In Rev. Rul. 57-564, 1957-2 Cum. Bull. 328, the Com-

missioner responded to a request.. . with respect to the

Federal income tax consequences to a donor, pursuant to

a trust instrument, requiring the donee trust to pay the

Federal gift tax ori the gift of such stock... .” The Com-

missioner ruled that. . income of the trust which is

applied by the trustee in satisfying the obligation incurred

to pay gift tax of the donor, is taxable to the dunor under

the provisions of Section 677 of the Code.” There was no

suggestion of any other “income tax consequences” and the

implication of this omission was that there were none.

Certainly there was no administrative construction of any

Federal tax law that there were such consequences prior

to the cases now to be referred to.

The first decided case in which the I.R.S. made the

contention that a capital gain was realized by a donor who

made a net gift where the gift tax exceeded the donor’s

basis in the donated property was Turner v. Commissioner,

49 T.C. 356 (1968). The Tax Court rejected the conten-

1. Assuming a gross gift of $1,000, and a Federal gift tax

25%, the formula to arrive at the amount of the net gift

would be: X + 25/100 X = 1,000; 125 X; = 100,000; X = 800.

The computation becomes more complicated when different gift

tax br are involved and when the gift is considered as

made one-half by the donor and one-half by his spouse. See Rev.

Rul. 75-72, 1957-1, Cum. Bull. 310. In this brief, for the sake

of simplicity, state gift taxes will be ignored.

2. The Commissioner argued for a capital gain tax only in the

case of a gift to an individual, conceding that there was none in

the case of a gift to a trust. The reason for the concession is un-

clear, but was possibly on the theory that the only income tax con-

sequences of a net to a trust were those based on Sections

671 and 677 of the . In later cases the Commissioner made

e e e ee ee ee tee oe een

4

tion; the Commissioner appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court

of Appeals, and that Court affirmed the Tax Court, 410

F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1969). The same contention was then

made and rejected by the Tax Court in Estate of Davis v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1971-318 (30 T.C.M. 1363); the

Commissioner appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-

peals, and that Court affirmed the Tax Court, 469 F.2d 694

(5th Cir. 1972). Then again in Krause v. Commissioner,

56 T. C. 1242 (1971), the Commissioner advanced the same

contention as an alternative to his contention that the use

of proceeds of sale of donated property for payment of the

gift taxes resulted in income to the donor. The Tax Court,

in an opinion reviewed by the Court, held with one judge

dissenting, that the taxpayers realized income under Sec-

tions 671 and 677 of the Code in the amount of the income

received by the trusts prior to the payment of the gift tax

liabilities, but unanimously held that they did not realize

any other income as a result of the payment of such taxes.

Both parties appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-

peals, but both parties then dismissed their appeals on

June 27, 1972.

There was no other case pending in any other circuit

in which the Commissioner was making the contention

now made, except Hirst v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 307

(1974). In view of the state of the law, it is likely that

the Commissioner would not have pursued the Hirst case

had it not been for a decision of the Sixth Circuit Court

of Appeals in Johnson v. Commissioner, 495 F.2d 1079, de-

cided April 9, 1974. This is the case on which the Eighth

Circuit Court of Appeals mainly relied in the instant cases.

The facts in Johnson were that the taxpayers, who owned

corporate stock of high value but a low tax basis, borrowed

money on non-recourse notes from a bank and then made

gifts of the stock to trusts, subject to the encumbrances of

the bank loans. The donors paid the gift taxes on the gross

gifts, using part of the proceeds of the bank loans to do so,

but were free to use these proceeds any way they chose.

Prior to the Johnson transactions, there had been at

least two decisions with facts almost identical in which the

Commissioner had prevailed. These were Simon v. Com-

missioner, 285 F.2d 422 (3rd Cir. 1960), affirming 32 T.C.

935, and Magnolia Development Company v. Commis-

sioner, T. C. Memo 1960-177 (19 T. C. M. 934). The factual

differences were that in Simon the gift was to a controlled

corporation and in Magnolia Development Co. the gift was

to a charity, so that in neither case were gift taxes in-

volved. In each case it was held that the fact that the

donor had borrowed the money and then transferred the

property was a matter of form rather than substance and

that the donee in each case was really buying the property

for the amount of the loan. These cases were presumably

known to the Johnson brothers or their tax counsel when

they engaged in the transactions in controversy, but by the

time deficiency notices were issued, Turner had been de-

cided, and they decided to contest the deficiencies on the

ground that they also had “in ubstance“ made net gifts.

The Tax Court disagreed, and they appealed to the Sixth

Circuit Court of Appeals, where they found a sympathetic

ear. The panel of that Court which heard the case, in an

opinion by Judge Celebrezze, affirmed the Tax Court, but

in doing so took occasion, in dicta, to disapprove Turner.

Reliance for this view was placed on Old Colony Trust Co.

v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929) and Crane v. Com-

missioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947). Neither of these cases had

been relied upon in Simon or in Magnolia Development

Co., although Judge Bruce, for the Tax Court in Johnson v.

Commissioner, 59 T.C. 791 (1973), had partially relied upon

Crane, saying that its “rationale” had been applied “in

situations analogous in many respects to the present case.”

(p. 810). As to Turner, Judge Bruce said that it was “dis-

tinguishable both on the facts and the issues presented.”

(p. 812). There was no one to urge the correctness of

Turner before the Johnson Court. The Commissioner

argued that its was incorrectly decided, and the taxpayers’

main thrust was that they should have the benefit of the

decision although they had not made net gifts.

It was in 1972 and 1973, after the dismissal of the ap-

peals in Krause, and prior to the decision in Johnson,

that the gifts of the taxpayers, who are the amici curiae

in these cases, were made. Solely as a result of the dicta

in Johnson, the Internal Revenue Service reactivated its

position that such gifts generated taxable income. Statu-

tory notices were duly issued, and petitions duly filed with

the Tax Court for redetermination of the deficiencies. The

opinions in the Tax Court, all in favor of the taxpayers on

this issue, were as follows:

Ralph Owen, et ux. No. 8960-75, T.C. Memo 1978-51

filed Feb. 6, 1978

John T. Benson, Jr., No. 5885-76, T. C. Memo 1978-231

et ux. filed June 21, 1978

J.C. Bradford, et ux. No. 5701-76, 70 T.C. 584 r-

filed July 31, 1978

Joe C. Davis No. 5831-76, 74 T. C. 881 vad

filed July 31, 1980

Estate of Frances F No. 2219-78, T.C. Memo 1981-40

Currey Feb. 2, 1981

The Tax Court did not hear the Hirst case until after

the decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in John-

son. It then reaffirmed its prior decisions in spite of

the dicta in Johnson upon which the Commissioner had

7

relied. The Commissioner appealed to the Fourth Circuit

Court of Appeals, which, after an en banc hearing, by a

vote of five to three, affirmed the Tax Court in an opinion

by Chief Judge Haynesworth, Hirst v. Commissioner, 572

F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1978). Subsequently, the Tax Court

decided the cases pending before it and the Commissioner

promptly appealed all of them. Oral argument was heard

in the Sixth Circuit in only one of these cases, Owen v.

Commissioner, No. 78-1341. This case was decided by the

Tax Court February 6, 1978, T.C. Memo 1978-51, and was

orally argued on appeal June 6, 1980, and finaliy decided

June 23, 1981 on the basis of stare decisis. Owen v. Com-

missioner, 652 F.2d 1271 (6th Cir. 1981). Meanwhile, in

the Eighti Circuit, the two cases now before the Court,

decided by the Tax Court on November 4, 1979, T.C.

Memo 1979-441, and February 27, 1980, T.C. Memo 1980-50,

respectively, were argued on January 15, 1981, with a de-

cision in favor of the Commissioner on March 4, 1981,

Diedrich v. Commissioner, 643 F.2d 499 (8th Cir. 1981).

In all the Sixth Circuit cases the Commissioner’s argument

both in the Tax Court and in the Court of Appeals has

been that the cases were “controlled by Johnson,” and in

the Eighth Circuit Johnson was strongly relied upon.

In addition to the cases of the amici curiae, there is also

pending in the Sixth Circuit the Commissioner’s appeal

from the Tax Court’s decision in Estate of Henry v. Com-

missioner, 69 T.C. 665, filed February 6, 1978. All of these

cases are being held in abeyance pending the decision of

this Court in the present cases. In the Owen case the court

has granted the Commissioner’s Petition to Rehear En Banc

and the case has been restored to the docket as a pending

appeal.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Where a donor makes a gift of appreciated property

to a donee in a lower tax bracket, e.g., a trust which dis-

tributes all its income except capital gains, and the donee

sells the property, or a part of it, his capital gain tax is

naturally less than the donor's tax would have been if the

donor had sold the same property. Hence, when a donor

makes a gift of appreciated property on condition that the

donee pay the gift taxes, or that he agree to pay them, and

the donee sells some of the property to raise the necessary

funds, the Internal Revenue Service collects a smaller

amount of capital gain taxes than if the donor had sold

the same property to pay the same gift taxes. This is

the tax advantage of making so-called net gifts.

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue contends in

these cases and in the cases involving the amici curiae that

where the gift taxes exceed the basis of the donated prop-

erty, the excess is a capital gain to the donor, relying

largely upon Old Colony Trust Company and Crane, which

were also relied upon by the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-

peals in the Johnson dicta disapproving Turner. Neither

of these cases support the Commissioner’s contention. Old

Colony involved the indirect payment of additional com-

pensation to an employee in the form of the payment of

his income taxes and the decision is applicable only in

such an income-generating context. It is not applicable

in non-commercial transactions between family members.

Crane involved a taxable “disposition” of property and de-

termined the “amount realized” under the provision of

the 1939 Code which corresponded with Section 1001(a)

of the 1954 Code. In the cases at bar, the “disposition”

of the property was not a taxable disposition, and Crane

is inapplicable. Moreover, Crane involved a sale of de-

preciable real estate on which the taxpayer had taken

sizable depreciation deductions over a period of years,

and this was said by the Court to be the “crux” of the

case. The Court was careful to point out what it was not

deciding. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals was in-

correct, in the cases at bar, in treating the Johnson type of

transaction the same as a pure net gift.

This Court should give great weight to the numerous

decisions of the Tax Court holding that net gifts do not

generate taxable income and to the fact that when these

gifts were made, all prior to the Johnson decision, the law

was well settled in favor of the taxpayers, both in the Tax

Court and in the Sixth Circuit where the amici curiae all

resided. Moreover, the concept of taxable income en-

visioned by the Johnson Court and the Eighth Circuit Court

of Appeals in these cases is contrary to the concept of in-

come under the Sixteenth Amendment.

At any rate, the remedy, if one was needed, was for

Congress to apply, and Congress, in the Tax Reform Act

of 1976, enacted such reforms as it considered necessary,

including the incorporation of Section 644 into the Internal

Revenue Code, imposing on donee trusts which sell prop-

erty within two years of the transfer of the property a spe-

cial (but non-retroactive) tax equivalent to any tax bracket

savings otherwise realized by the donee trust as compared

with the tax which would be imposed on the donor if the

donor had sold the same property. The Commissioner in

these cases seeks to have a special tax imposed by judicial

fiat, not on the donee, but on the donor, creating in the

case of net gifts to trusts an incongruous situation.

10

Finally, should the Court agree with the Commissioner

and affirm the reversals of the Tax Court by the Eighth

Circuit Court of Appeals, the reversals of the Tax Court

should be non-retroactive.

ARGUMENT

Structure of a Net Gift

The simplest form of a net gift is a gift of money. As-

suming a gift tax rate of 25%, the donor who makes a net

gift of $800 will make a gross gift of $1,000, and the addi-

tional $200 does not “vanish into thin air“, to use the lan-

guage of Judge Raum in Hirst (63 T.C. at p. 315); it goes

into the United States Treasury. Obviously, the tax conse-

quences are exactly the same whether the donor makes a

gift of $800 and pays the gift tax of $200, or makes a gift of

$1,000 conditioned on payment of the gift tax by the donee.

The next simplest form would be a gift of property,

plus enough money to pay the gift tax; eg. shares of stock

worth $800, plus $200 in money. Here, as pointed out by

Judge Featherston in Krause, the transfer of money in the

amount of the gift tax, and the use of the money for pay-

ment of the gift tax, would not generate taxable income.

The donee simply pays the money into the Treasury as

before. Again, the tax consequences are exactly the same

as if the donor had made a gift of the property only, and

paid the gift tax himself.

The usual form of net gift, however, would be (using

the same figures) a gross gift of shares of stock of a value

of $1,000, in which case the donee could sell $200 worth and

pay the gift tax. This was the form of net gift involved in

Owen, where the exact language of each of the trust agree-

ments was as follows:

11

(d) This gift is on the express condition that the

Trustee report and pay out of the trust estate all gift

taxes, both state and federal, which may be imposed

upon donor by virtue of this gift. The Trustee is

authorized to borrow the money with which to pay

said taxes, or any part thereof, and to repay said loan

or loans by selling, from time to time, property com-

prising a part of the trust estate. The interest on said

loan or loans may be paid out of the income of the

trust or by selling property in the trust estate, in the

sole discretion of the Trustee.

To avoid any impact of Sections 671 and 677 of the

Code, the trusts borrow the money for the gift taxes and

after payment sell enough of the property to repay the

loans. The only tax disadvantage to the Treasury is that

it receives less capital gain taxes than if the donor, in a

higher tax bracket, had made the sale to raise the necessary

funds for the gift taxes.

A variation of this form of net gift would be one in

which the donee pays the gift tax with his own funds,

which would probably be the residue of taxable income

after payment of income taxes. Such was the form of net

gift described in Sarah Helen Harrison, and also the form

of net gift in Hirst, where real e ate was donated.

In Diedrich, the Court said in Footnote 7, that the

characterization of a transaction for gift tax purposes is

irrelevant in a case involving income taxes. Obviously

the income tax consequences of a transaction are different

from the gift tax consequences, but the transaction itself is

the same. If the transaction is a non-commercial transac-

tion for gift tax purposes, it is also a non-commercial trans-

action for income tax purposes, and if the donee is merely

the conduit for the payment of the gift taxes in the gift

12

tax context, he remains merely a conduit in the income

tax context.

Another variation in the form of net gifts is that the

gift may be conditioned either on the payment of the gift

tax by the donee, or on the agreement of the donee to pay

the tax. Here we run into the distinction between a con-

dition and a covenant, and if the gift is conditional, the

distinction between a condition precedent and a condition

subsequent. It is submitted that the gift in Owen was on a

condition precedent. In other words, the gift was not a

completed gift until the payment of the gift tax. See Can-

non v. Apperson, 14 LEA (82 Tenn.) p. 553, opinion by

Judge William F. Cooper, one of Tennessee’s most dis-

tinguished jurists, holding that when a condition upon

which a legacy depends is precedent, the legatee has no

vested interest until the condition is performed.

The Commissioner’s Theory of Tax Liability

Prior to the decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of

Appeals in Johnson, the Commissioner consistently con-

tended in the net gift tax cases that the taxpayer made a

sale of the donated property for the amount of the gift

tax, and a gift to the extent that the market value of the

donated property exceeded the amount of the gift tax. One

difficulty with this approach, as indicated in the opinion of

Judge Raum in Hirst (63 T.C. at p. 315), was that if the

basis of the donated property exceeded the amount of the

gift tax, the taxpayer would have a recognizable loss.

This was also pointed out in Evangelista v. Commissioner,

629 F.2d 1218 (7th Cir. 1980).

Johnson was in all significant respects similar to Simon

v. Commissioner, supra, and Magnolia Development Com-

pany, supra, where the courts regarded the transactions as

part gifts, part sales. When Johnson reached the Sixth

13

Circuit Court of Appeals, however, that Court rejected the

part gift, part sale theory, and advanced a new theory,

which was apparently thought to satisfy both the Johnson

type of transaction and the net gift type of transaction;

viz. the theory of economic benefit, bottomed largely on

Old Colony Trust Company, where a corporate officer was

held to have derived additional compensation from the

payment of his income taxes by his employer. The Court

theorized that the donor is “primarily liable” for the gift

tax, and that if the donee pays the gift tax, this constitutes

income to the donor.

On this theory, however, the income would be the

amount of the gift tax without regard to the basis of the

donated property, and it would be ordinary income and

not capital gain. Nevertheless, the Commissioner contends

in such a case that the donor realizes taxable income to the

extent only that the amount of the gift tax exceeds the

adjusted basis in the donated property and that it is a

capital gain rather than ordinary income.

There are several other troubles with this theory.

In the first place, the payment of another’s tax liability

does not necessarily generate income. As pointed out by

Judge Haynesworth in Hirst (572 F.2d at p. 431) payment

of a tax for someone else may be a gift, depending on the

circumstances. For example, a parent may pay a daugh-

ter’s note at a bank as a gift to the daughter. The net gift

tax transaction could be characterized as reciprocal gifts,

which are netted out for gift tax purposes.

In the second place, it is incorrect to say that the donee

is paying the donor’s obligation. It is true that the donor

is liable for the gift tax if the donee fails to pay, but as

between donor and donee, the obligation to pay is that of

the donee, if there is any obligation at all. An accommoda-

14

tion maker of a note to a bank is primarily liable to the

bank, but the obligation is really that of the accommodated

party and if the latter pays the note, it would be incorrect

to say that he is paying the obligation of the accommoda-

tion maker. Moreover, in the case of the gift on the con-

dition precedent that the donee pay the gift tax, the gift

is not complete until the gift tax is paid and it would

therefore be incorrect to say that either the donor or the

donee has a prior obligation to pay the tax. The obligation,

the payment, and the completion of the gift are all simul-

taneous,

In the third place, the economic benefit to the donor

in a net gift transaction is simply that the donor has

made a smaller gift rather than a larger one. He is ob-

viously worse off economically than if he had made no

gift, but it would be farfetched to say that although one

is better off making a gift of $100 rather than a gift of

$200, he realizes taxable income and incurs an income

tax in so doing.

Finally, adopting the rationale of Sarah Helen Harrison

and Krause, the donee in a net gift transaction is merely

a conduit, The donor furnishes either the funds for pay-

ment of the gift taxes or the equivalent in property, which

the donee is free to sell to raise the funds.

The Tax Reform Act of 1976

In the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Public Law 94-455, one

of the concerns of Congress was “the possible tax abuse

where the grantor places in trust property which has un-

realized appreciation in order to shift the payment of any

capital gains tax to the trust at its lower progressive rate

structure.” Ways and Means Committee Report [H. Rpt.

No, 94-658, 94th Cong. Ist Sess. (November 12, 1975)] p.

183. The final result was Section 701(e) of the Act, incor-

15

porating a new Section 644 into the Code, whereby “the

trust is taxed at the grantor’s rate brackets on ‘built in’

gain occurring within 2 years of transfer to the trust.”

Conference Report [H. Rpt. No. 94-1515, 94th Cong. 2d

Sess. (September 13, 1976) ] p. 441.

It is significant that the Commissioner does not con-

tend in the cases under consideration, and has not con-

tended in any of the net gift cases, that the donor is the

real taxpayer where the donee sells a part of the donated

property to raise the funds for payment of the gift taxes.

There is no contention that the capital gain taxes incurred

by the donee should be mewsured by the donor’s tax

bracket rather than the @une< If such contention were

made, one conclusive answer * ould be, at least where the

donee is a trust, that Section 644 of the Code applies only

to transfers to trusts after May 21, 1976. As previously

shown, the difference in tax brackets of donor and donee

is the source of the Commissioner’s dissatisfaction with net

gifts and the correlative advantage to taxpayers. This is

not to say that in some cases there may not be a practical

reason for a net gift, as where the donor does not have the

funds to pay the gift taxes and does not want to sell any

part of the property, whereas the donee does have the

funds; e.g. in Hirst, where an 80 year old widow with lim-

ited liquid assets gave undeveloped land to her grown son

and his family on condition that he pay the gift taxes.

But the Commissioner has no just cause for dissatisfaction

in such a case because the funds used by the donee are

probably the residue of taxable income on which he has

previously paid (or will pay) the required income tax, at

perhaps a relatively high rate.

Congress was evidently concerned in the Tax Reform

Act of 1976 with reforms in this whole area of taxation.

Not only did it add Section 644 to the Code, but also by

16

Section 2005(c) of the Act added to Section 1015(d) of

the Code a new paragraph 6, providing a special rule for

gifts made after December 31, 1976, as to increased basis

for gift tax paid. Instead of increasing the donee’s basis

by the ‘ull amount of the gift tax paid there is added only

a proportionate amount bearing the same ratio to the

amount of tax paid as the net appreciation in value of the

gift bears to the amount of the gift.* This has the effect,

of course, of lowering the donee’s basis and increasing the

amount of his capital gain tax when he sells. But Congress

did not incorporate into this complex body of tax law the

incongruous concept advocated by the Commissioner in

these cases.

The Crane Case

In Johnson the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals relied

not only on Old Colony Trust Company, but on Crane.

Crane was cited for the proposition that a non-recourse

encumbrance must be included in the “amount realized on

the sale or other disposition of property under Section 1001

(a) of the Code.” This Court did make that holding as

applied to the facts of the particular case where there was

3. The reason for the change was given as follows by the

House Ways and Means Committee:

4. The basis of property acquired by gift generally is the

basis of the in the hands of the donor plus any gift

taxes 42 The purpose of the increase in basis

17

a sale of property which the taxpayer had inherited sub-

ject to a mortgage indebtedness. She had taken sizable

depreciation deductions prior to the sale, and then made

a sale subject to the mortgage indebtedness which had in-

creased because of accrued and unpaid interest. It does not

follow, however, that every “disposition” of property sub-

ject to an encumbrance is a taxable event. As pointed out

iu Evangelista, Section 1001 (a) simply provides for the

computation of the gain after it has been determined under

some other section of the Code that the disposition in ques-

tion was a taxable disposition.‘

The Court in Crane said that the “crux” of the case

was “whether the law permits her [the taxpayer] to ex-

clude allowable [depreciation] deductions from considera-

tion in computing gain.” (331 U.S. at p. 15). The deprecia-

tion deductions actually taken, according to the Tax Court

opinion aggregated $28,500, while the allowable deprecia-

tion was $28,045.10, which added to the $2,500 cash realiza-

tion would produce a taxable gain of $30,545.10. On the

theory that a non-recourse encumbrance is to be included

in the amount realized, the gain should have been the net

proceeds of sale plus the total amount of the encumbrance,

minus the adjusted basis: $2,500 + $270,857.71 — $233,-

197.40 = $40,160.31. The amount of the gain actually de-

termined was the net proceeds of sale plus the principal

(only) of the encumbrance, minus the adjusted basis:

$2,500 + $255,000 — $233,197.40 = $24,302.60. The Court

did not concern itself with the minutiae of the computation,

but contented itself with accepting the agent’s determina-

tion.

4. “This provision [61001 (a) ] be purely computational; it

leaves to other provisions the task of determining whether the

amount so computed is 3 * or N deductible recognized or not

recognized, capital or ordinary.“ Boris J. Bittker, Federal

Taxation of Income, Estates and Trusts (1981) 143.1.

18

The Court, in Crane, evidently realizing the potential

confusion likely to be engendered by the decision, was

careful to point out in Footnote 37 of the opinion what it

was not deciding. Nevertheless, some subordinate courts,

as well as commentators, have attempted to stretch the de-

cision beyond the limits imposed by the Court.“ Certainly

the Crane decision is completely inapposite in a case in-

volving a gift of non-depreciable property. Whether or not

such cases as Johnson were correctly decided is not here

at issue; however, if they were correctly decided, it would

not be on the authority of Crane, but on the principle that

one who borrows money on appreciated property, and then

makes a gift of it subject to the debt which is in excess of

the basis of the property, has realized income to the extent

of this excess. It is unnecessary to rely on Crane to reach

this decision.

The Commissioner is inconsistent in relying upon

Crane upon the merits and then asserting that the alleged

income is realized in the year that the donee pays the gift

taxes, rather than in the year of the transfer. Although the

Commissioner has made a labored attempt to escape this

dilemma, it is submitted that he cannot do so and that by

contending that the supposed income was realized in the

year of payment rather than in the year of transfer, he has

in effect abandoned his reliance on Crane. It is interesting

to note that the Commissioner at one time recognized the

complete inapplicability of Crane in the present situation.

In Johnson, the Solicitor General filed a Memorandum in

5. The first sentence in Footnote 7 in the Owen opinion (652

F.2d at p. 1275) is an example. The confusion engendered by

Crane is illustrated in two recent cases in which the courts reached

te conclusions: Millar v. Commissioner, 577 F.2d 212 (3rd

ir. 1978), cert. denied 439 U.S. 1046 (1978) and Tufts v. Com-

missioner, 651 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981), where the Court “de-

cline[d] to extend it [the Crane decision] beyond the facts of that

case.

19

opposition to the taxpayers’ petition for certiorari which

had been based, in part, upon an alleged conflict between

the Sixth Circuit decision in Johnson and the Fifth Circuit

decision in Estate of Davis. In arguing that there was no

conflict, the respondent said:

Moreover, unlike this case, Davis did not involve the

transfer of property subject to a pre-existing lien which

rendered the amount of the lien an “amount realized”

under this Court’s Crane decision.

Davis is, of course, on all fours with the cases at bar;

and if Davis was unlike Johnson, it follows that the cases at

bar are also unlike Johnson. In fact, as we see Johnson,

it bears little resemblance to the net gift type of transaction

here involved, but closely resembles such cases as Simon

and Magnolia Development Company.

The Constitutional Concept of Income

A “frequent recurrence to fundamental principles“ is

equally as essential in jurisprudence as in political and gov-

ernmental affairs. In Federal income tax cases, Congres-

sional authority stems from the Sixteenth Amendment,

and the Internal Revenue Code must be applied so as not

to violate the constitutional concept of income.’ It is a

fundamental principle, we submit, that a gift does not

6. Paragraph 15 of the Virginia Bill of Rights, 1776, reads

as follows:

That no free government, or the blessings of liberty, can be

preserved to any people, but by a firm adherence to justice,

moderation, temperance, frugality and virtue, and by frequent

recurrence to fundamental principles.

7. Cf., footnote 42 of Crane, 331 U.S. 1 at p. 15, supra, where

in referring to a hypothetical case, the Court said that it would

raise a question as to whether “either statutory or constitutional

income” would be realized by the hypothetical taxpayer. This

boa gear tag that constitutional concepts in income taxation are

not obsolete.

20

give rise to income, in the constitutional sense, either

to donor or donee. Nor has Congress undertaken to im-

pose such an income tax, thereby forcing the Commissioner

in this case to rely upon the general language of Section 61

that “gross income means all income from whatever source

derived.”

We respectfully submit that the derivation of income

from a transaction which leaves taxpayers “in fact poorer

by virtue of the entire transaction” (Commissioner v. Rail

Joint Co., 61 F.2d 751 (C.A. 2, 1932) ) is completely foreign

to the constitutional concept of income under either the

Sixteenth Amendment or Section 61 of the Code. The

Sixteenth Amendment authorizes the taxation of “income”

but it does not authorize the taxation of an integrated

transaction which merely leaves the taxpayer better off

than he might have been, although worse off than before

the transaction was entered into. Cf., Eleanor A. Bradford

v. Commissioner, 233 F.2d 935 (6th Cir. 1956) opinion by

Judge Stewart, later Mr. Justice Stewart. There have

been many definitions of “income”. Among the cases cited

in Bradford on that subject was Hirsch v. Commissioner,

115 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1940), from which we quote as

follows:

‘Income’ within the purview of the Revenue Acts,

has been defined to bo ‘gain derived from capital,

from labor, or from both combined,’ and includes ‘profit

gained through sale or conversion of capital.’ Bowers

v. Kerbaugh Empire Co., 271 U.S. 170, 46 S. Ct. 449,

451, 70 L.Ed. 886. ‘In determining the definition of

the word “income” thus arrived at, this Court has con-

sistently refused to enter into the refinements of lexi-

cographers or economists, and has approved, in the

definitions quoted, what it believed to be the commonly

understood meaning of the term which must have been

\

21

in the minds of the people when they adopted the Six-

teenth Amendment to the Constitution.’ Merchants’

L. & T. Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509, 519, 41 S. Ct.

386, 389, 65 L.Ed. 751, 15 A.L.R. 1305.

It cannot be plausibly argued that the word “income”

had, when the Sixteenth Amendment was adopted, the

meaning attributed to it by the Commissioner in the in-

stant cases. A donor has the right to determine for him-

self the extent of his generosity, and if he wishes only to

give the value of stock less the amount of the gift taxes

payable by reason of the gift, it is difficult to understand

how he can be said to have realized income merely because

the amount of the gift taxes exceeds the cost of the stock.

On the constitutional concept of income, we refer the

Court to Edwards v. Cuba Railroad, 268 U.S. 628 (1924),

where the Court said: “The Sixteenth Amendment, like

other laws authorizing or imposing ta:.es, is to be taken

as written and is not to be extended beyond the meaning

clearly indicated by the language used.” (p. 631). The

Court held that subsidy payments to the railroad company

“not made for services rendered or to be rendered” were

not “profits or gains from the use of the railroad, and do

not constitute income within the meaning of the Sixteenth

Amendment.” (p. 633).

The Weight to Be Given the Tax Court Decisions

1 At the time the transfers of the amici curiae were

;

made, the Commissioner had apparently abandoned, at

least in the Sixth Circuit, the contention that a net gift

results in the realization of income to the donor in any case

except one controlled by Code Sections 671 and 677. Hav-

ing appealed the decision of the Tax Court in Krause, he

permitted his appeal to be dismissed on June 27, 1972 for

want of prosecution. This left the decision in Turner as

the unchallenged authority on the issue in the Sixth Circuit.

Moreover, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had affirmed

Estate of Davis.

The rule of stare decisis is peculiarly applicable with

respect to judicial decisions affecting the business interests

of the country, estate planning, income taxation and the

like. The reason was aptly stated in United States v.

Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972), where the Commissioner, in a

case involving Section 2036(a)(2) of the Code, sought to

impose an estate tax on trust property on the ground that

the settlor retained voting control of corporations whose

stock was transferred, and was in position to select the

corporate directors who, in turn, passed on dividend policy.

Citing Reinecke v. Northern Trust Company, 278 U.S. 339

(1929) and Estate of King v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 973

(1962), the Court said (p. 134):

Essentially the power retained by Byrum is the

same managerial power retained by the settlors in

Northern Trust and in King. Although neither case

controls this one—Northern Trust, because it was not

decided under § 2036(a) (2) or a predecessor; and King,

because it is a lower court opinion—the existence of

such precedents carries weight. The holding of North-

ern Trust, that the settlor of a trust may retain broad

powers of management without adverse estate-tax

consequences, may have been relied upon in the draft-

ing of hundreds of inter vivos trusts. The modifica-

tion of this principle now sought by the Government

could have a seriously adverse impact, especially. upon

settlors (and their estates) who happen to have been

“controlling” stockholders of a closely held corporation.

Courts properly have been reluctant to depart from an

interpretation of tax law which has been generally

accepted when the departure could have potentially

far-reaching consequences. When a principle of taxa-

23

tion requires reexamination, Congress is better

equipped than a court to define precisely the type of

conduct which results in tax consequences. When

courts readily undertake such tasks, taxpayers may

not rely with assurance on what appear to be es-

tablished rules lest they be subsequently overturned.

Legislative enactments, on the other hand, although

not always free from ambiguity, at least afford the

taxpayers advance warning.

This was not a new application of stare decisis. In

National Bank v. Whitney, 103 U.S. (13 Otto) 99 (1880),

the Court was confronted with a contention that real estate

mortgages taken by national banks to secure future ad-

vances on loans were ultra vires and unenforceable. There

had been a decision two years previously to the effect

that the prohibitory clause of the banking law with respect

to loans on real estate did not vitiate real estate securities

taken for loans, but “only laid the association open to

proceedings by the government.” In the case before it,

the Court said:

The construction of the act of Congress thus given

has been acted upon by the national banks throughout

the country ever since it was published. It is not

unreasonable to suppose that they have conducted their

business and made loans to a large amount in reliance

upon it, and that in many cases great injury would

follow a departure from it. Judicial decisions affect-

ing the business interests of the country should not be

disturbed except for the most cogent reasons, certainly

not because of subsequent doubts as to their soundness.

The prosperity of a commercial community depends

in a great degree, upon the stability of the rules by

which its transactions are governed. If there should

be a change, the legislature can make it with infinitely

24

less derangement of those interests than would follow

a new ruling of the court, for statutory regulations

would operate only in the future.

The statement most often quoted on stare decisis is

that of Justice Brandeis in his dissenting opinion in Burnet

v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932).

“Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most

matters it is more important that the applicable rule of

law be settled than that it be settled right. This is com-

monly true even where the error is a matter of serious

concern, provided correction can be had by legislation.”

It is recognized, of course, that this Court has not

previously spoken on the issue presented, so that stare

decisis in the usual setting is not applicable. Nevertheless,

the principles of Federal tax law relied upon by the tax-

payers were firmly embedded in the court with special

expertise in tax matters,“ with the concurrence of two

Circuit Courts of Appeal, including that of the Circuit

where the amici curiae resided. Judge Edwards, of the

Sixth Circuit, in his dissenting opinion in Owen, apparently

recognized the inequity of a retroactive reversal of Turner,

and we urge upon the Court that should the decision be

to affirm the present cases from the Eighth Circuit, re-

versing the Tax Court, the reversal of the Tax Court should

8. Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting, in Arrowsmith v. Com-

missioner, 344 U.S. 6, * (1952): “Where the statute is so indecisive

and the importance of a particular holding lies in its rational and

— relation to the general — of the tax law, I think

is due the twice-expressed ju ent of the Tax

Kiels of the gelding of Dobson v. Commissioner, 320

U.S. 489 (1 by the recent revision of the Judicial Code, Act of

June 25, 1043 Ne 62 Stat. 5 I still think the Tax Court is a

more competent t and steady influence toward a tic — 1

of tax law than our sporadic omnipotence in a field beset wi

invisible boomerangs. I should reverse, in reliance upon the Tax

Court’s judgment more, 1 own.“ The Tax Court

has expressed its judgment e net gift issue in not less than

cases.

be non-retroactive. The criteria outlined in Chevron Oil

Company v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 105-109 (1971) are clearly

met.

This, however, is a case where the remedy, if one is

needed, should be with Congress—not with this Court.

Hanover Bank, Executor v. Commissioner, 369 U.S. 672

(1962). Actually, as previously shown, Congress has al-

ready, in the Tax Reform Act of 1976, adopted the reforms

it considered necessary, but the one proposed by the Com-

missioner was not one of them.

In 1974, Judge Raum commented in Hirst (63 T.C. at

p. 315) that it was “now too late to wipe the slate clean and

start all over again.” In view of the Tax Reform Act

of 1976, it is now impossible to wipe it clean and start

all over again. The petitioners in this case, and the

amici curiae, all followed both the statute law and the

judge-made law as it existed at the time they made their

gifts, and that is the law which should now be applied.

CONCLUSION

The decisions of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals,

reversing the Tax Court, should be reversed, but if af-

firmed, the reversals of the Tax Court should be non-

retroactive.

Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM WALLER

(Counsel of Record)

WALLER LANspEN Dortcu & Davis

2100 One Commerce Place

Nashville, Tennessee 37239

(615) 244-6380

Attorney for Amici Curiae

Dated: November 18, 1981

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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