Opposition — New Jersey v. Ryan

Supreme Court brief1981

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

Suet cll

ORIGINAL seit

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

ase SUPREME COURT, U.S.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1981

NO. 80-2151

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

East Orange, New Jersey 07018

THE NATURE OF THE CASE

The New Jersey Attorney General's Office argues that the

Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not prevent the

imposition of an increased term of imprisonment subsequent to and

during the execution of the original sentence of imprisonment.

oF.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

As a result of the entry of retraxit pleas of guilty to two

Monmouth County Indictments (Nos. 1388-72 and 1389-72) and one Accusa-

tion (No. A-253-72) charging him in five counts with breaking and entering

with intent to steal and three counts of larceny, on January 4, 1974, Mr.

Ryan was sentenced by the Honorable Alton V. Evans, J.S.C., to the

New Jersey State Prison for concurrent terms, the longest being three

to five years. Six months later, on July 2, 1974, Mr. Ryan was granted

a motion for transfer to a drug treatment program pursuant to R.

3:21-10(b), which was to became effective a: August 1, 1974, after Mr.

Ryan had served same seven months in custody on the sentences imposed.

The Court order further provided that the originally imposed sentences

be suspended, and that defendant enter a narcotic treatment program and

remain on probation for a period of two years.

On February 25, 1977, having pled guilty to two of three charges

of violating probation and pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:168-4, the Honorable

Thomas L Yaccarino, J.S.C., sentenced Mr. Ryan to various concurrent

sentences of five to seven and two to three years, respectively, for

the crimes charged in the original indictments and accusation. Thus, at

this-resentencing Mr. Ryan received a sentence which, in aggregate is two

years greater than the sentence originally imposed.

On appeal to the Appellate Division Mr. Ryan

contended that the imposition of a greater sentence

after execution of his original sentence had

begun--contravened the double jeopardy clauses of the United States

Constitution! and the Constitution of New Jersey. In addition he

1. U.S. Const., Amend. V.

2. N.J. Const., Art. I, par. 11 (1947).

-2-

contended that the history surrounding the pramgation of R. 3:21-10(b)

supported his contention that if an offender violates probation received

pursuant to the grant of a R. 3:21-10(b) motion, he can only be returned

to prison to serve the reaminder of his tern.

On December 4, 1979, in an wneninous opinion the Appellate Division

affirmed Mr, Ryan's convictions. Relying primarily upon State v. Cunning-

ham, 143 N.J. Super. 415 (App. Div. 1976), the Appellate Division con-

cluded that traditional principles of double jeopardy are inapplicable

when an offender is resentenced for violation of probation, even when

probation is imposed subsequent to execution of a prison term, State v.

Edward Ryan, unpub. opinion, App. Div., Docket No, A-2843-76 (1979),

appended hereto as Pa3 to Pal7, Pa6é to ll. In reaching this decision the

appellate court suggested that defendant's increased sentence was proper

because he had initiated the proceeding by which probation was granted, and

further than his violation per se justified upward revision of his sentence.

Id. at PaS and Paé.

A Notice of Petition for Certification was filed in this matter

on December 24, 1979.

On April 20, 1981, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the

decision of the Appellate Division, vacated the increased term of five to

seven years and reinstated the original sentence of three to five

years. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that double jeopardy consider-

ati ns militate against increasing a defendant's prison sentence

after violation of probation when he has already served a portion of

that custodial term. The court distinguished United States v. DiFrancesco,

449 U.S. _, 66 L. Ed. 2d 328 (1980) as not addressing the issue of

partial execution of sentence. The New Jersey

Supreme Court further distinguished DiFrancesco by noting that, unlike

the defendant in DiFrancesco, respondent here had no reason to expect that

his sentence was not final at the time it was imposed and his imprison-

ment began.

In a dissenting opinion, Justice Sidney Schreiber found that

application of the facts and holding of DiFrancesco to the factual

pattern of the instant matter indicated the absence of a double jeopardy

cbstacle. Justice Schreiber argued that the pronouncement of sentence has

never carried the finality that attaches to a judgment of acquittal,

particularly where the State legislature has removed any expectation of

finality by providing for an increased term of imprisonment following a

violation of probation.

On May 4, 1981, petitioner moved in the New Jersey Supreme Court

for a stay of judgment pending the filing of a petition for certiorari

to this Court. On May 20, 1981, petitioner's motion for a stay pending

determination of its petition for certioari to this Court was granted.

(A40).

The State of New Jersey now petitions this Court for a writ of

certioari to review the decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court.

-4-

DN i a a hr pee

The State of New Jersey in its petition for certiorari invokes

this Court's jurisdiction by way of 28 U.S.C. Section 1257(3). ‘The

State of New Jersey argues that the New Jersey Supreme Court in its

opinion below improperly concluded that New Jersey probation statutes,

and their legislative history, did not apply to the procedure which

resulted in Mr. Ryan's increased sentence.3 This Court has held on

numerous occasions that it is “bound to accept the interpretations of

(state law) by the highest court of the State." Hortonville Dist. v.

Hortonville Ed. Assn., 426 U.S, 482 (1976); Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400

U.S. 505 (1971); Garner v. Louisianna, 368 U.S. 157 (1961), Kingsley

Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959). In order to show the

error of petitioner's argument it is necessary to give a brief review

lynchpin of the decision is the Court's examination first of state statutes

and second defendant's conduct. Having concluded that no applicable

—— oe Se ee

state statute existed and that defendant's conduct did not constitute

a form of voluntary waiver the New Jersey Supreme Court then addressed

the issue of double jeopardy. 4

The New Jersey Supreme Court in reversing the trial court's

increase of Mr. Ryan's original senterm : and the New Jersey Appellate

Division affirmance of that action held;

“...that jeopardy attached as soon as

defendant commenced serving his prison

term, hence principles of double

foreclose the imposition of

any increased term after violation of

probation." State v. Ryan, __ N.J.

Although there is no holding by this Court directly on point there can be

no question that this holding is in full accord with a long line of

double jeopardy cases beginning with Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.)

163 (1974) and ending with United States v. DiFrancesco, 499 U.S. __, 66

L. Ed. 2d 328 (1980) and Bullington v. Missouri, _U.S. __, 49 U.S.L.W.

4481 (1981). In Ex parte Lange, supra at 173 the Court observed

"If after judgment has been rendered an

the conviction, and the sentence of that

judgment executed on the criminal, he can

be again sentenced on that conviction to

another and different punishment... is the

constitutional restriction (against double

jeopardy) of any value? Is not its intent

and its spirit in such a case as much vio-

lated as if a new trial had been had, and

on a second conviction a second punishment

inflicted?”

Having posed the question this Court resolved it with the following comment

"...we do not doubt that the constitution

was designed as much to prevent the

4. Petitioner's brief seems to be under the mistaken belief that the

N.J.S.C. first decided the double jeopardy question and then the

statutory issues. Their confusion can be explained in part by the

structure of the opinion below in which, because of the thrust of

the dissenting opinion, the majority felt it necessary to addr

the double jeopardy issue at greater length.

-~6-

Ph dee ee eee

criminal fran being twice punished for the

same offense as fram being twice tried for it."

Ex parte Lange, supra, at 173.

This Court again addressed the issue of mltiple punishment in United States

v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 307-8 (1931) wherein it reaffirme’ the holding in Ex

parte Lange. ° Although the rule of both Ex parte Lange and Benz was held

to be limited to their specific facts in United States v. DeFrancisco, ___

U.S. at i, 66 L. Ed. 24 328 at 347 (1981) it is clear fram the following

comment by Justice Blackman that the prohibition against multiple punishment

still remains.

"This accounts for the established practice in

the federal courts that the sentencing judge

may recall the defendant and increase his sen-

tence, at least (and we venture no cament as

to this limitation) so long as he has not yet

begun to serve his sentence, (Cites anitted) ."

DeFrancisco, supra at 344,

The New Jersey Supreme Court relying on this Court's prior holdings

woncluded the following: once a sentence is imposed and execution is

begun, absent statutory authority for appealing or increasing it, or the

voluntary action of the defendant, the defendant has a reasonable expec-

6 7

tation’ that it is a final sentence.” It is the doctrine of finality

upon which prior dictum as well as the New Jersey Supreme Court's ruling

5. In Benton v. land. 395 U.S. 784, 796 (1969) this Court held that

the double ey restrictions in the Fifth Amendment were applica-

ble to the states.

6. Reasonable expectation is a factual question which is resolved by first

he has voluntarily placed himself in a

the waiver of any double jeopardy argument

appeal of convicticn).

7. Finality can be described as that point in time when statutes and/or

to a jury's verdict of acquittal.’ Id. at

, 66 L. Ed, 2d at 343 (emphasis added) .

fhe instant case is with whether

a criminal sentence is entitled to finality

State v. Ryan, ___ N-J+ _ (at Pal0a). In analyzing Mr. Ryan's ex~

pectation of finality the New Jersey Supreme Court noted,

prisonment began. When he subsequently

moved for sentence modification under R.

3:21-10(b), the defendant was seeking

special, more lenient treatment subject to

the finality of his original sentence,

he would expect, at the very worse (that)

Ryan, supra at (Palla). |

In concluding its opinion the court directly addressed the ques~

‘tion of whether Mr. Ryan's action, the filing of the motion for transfer

to a drug treatment program, had in some way waived® his double jeopardy

rights or his reasonable expectation in the finality of his sentence.

“Finally, we address the State's contention,

by the Appellate Division, that when

a defendant by his own motion has his original

sentence set aside, the constitutional guaran-

tee against double jeopardy does not restrict

the imposition of whatever sentence may be

legally authorized, even though it may be

greater than the original sentence imposed.

On the strength of North Carolina v. Pearce,

a, the court below attempted to apply to

tant matter the principle derived from

that case that a more severe sentence upon recon=

viction is permitted when justified by defen-

dant's subsequent conduct, absent any motive

of retaliation for the taking of an appeal. See

Pearce, ,395 U.S. at 723-26, 23 L. Ed. 2d

at 668-70. by way of analogy the

Appellate Division concluded that “a sentence

imposed after probation has been violated can

reflect the added basis for evaluating defen-~

dant's amenability to reform, namely, his re-

sponse to probation.” 171 N.J. Super. at 436.

“There can be no doubt that defendant's subse-

conduct is an appropriate concern at the

time of sentencing after reconviction. But the

linchpin of Pearce's analysis is the premise

thet

‘the original conviction has, at the defendant's

behest, been wholly nullified and the slate

wiped clean, ***(S)o far as the conviction

itself goes, and that part of the sentence that

has not yet been served, it is no more than a

simple statement of fact to say that the slate

has been wiped clean. The conviction has been

set aside, and the unexpired portion of the

original sentence will never be served. ”

8. There can be no question that the record below is totally silent as

to the potential consequences of defendant's motion. Therefore, it

is irrelevant whether one applies a waiver test as set forth in

rill dad

Sain” on oe a

es nem Avt+t

=. Saba s ak

(395 U.S. at 721, 23 L. Ed. 2d at 667

(emphasis in original) .)

“Here, Ryan has not attacked his original

conviction. His R. 3:21-10(b) motion sought

only a modification of sentence, not a new

trial. The granting of that motion resulted

only in a suspension of the execution of his

original sentence pending successful can-

pletion of the drug rehabilitation program

and probationary term, not in a vacation or

annullment of that sentence. In effect

the sentence became temporarily and condition-

ally inoperative. Under the circumstances

The slate was not “wiped clean” within the

meaning of Pearce.”

It is clear from the above that the New Jersey Supreme Court in resin-

stating Mr. Ryan's original sentence was making several conclusions as

to both fact and law.

1. The Court found as a matter of state law

that no state statute gave authority to the

trial court to increase defendant's sentence.

2. Mr. Ryan's motion for transfer to a

treatment program was not an act which

in itself would subject him to a potentially

sentence. The Court decided that be-

cause of the lack of record below it would

not presume a voluntary waiver by defendant.

3. The Court having concluded that no waiver

existed and that the court's actions were not

based upon specific statutory authority held

that the double jeopardy provisicm of the

United States Constitution prevents an in-

crease in defendant's sentence once execution

has begun.

The fatal flaw in the New Jersey Attorney General's writ is that

it is asking this Court to disregard and overrule the New Jersey Supreme

Court conclusion as to the current status of New Jersey statutory law

and find that a specific New Jersey statutes exists which would justify

the action taken by the trial court. As stated earlier, there can be no

question than when the highest court of a state speaks on questions of

— SS ae a ee

existing state law and its meaning this Court must yield to their

opinions.

The New Jersey Supreme Court having concluded, based upon its

analysis of this Court's holding in DiFrancesco, supra, that the Double

Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution prohibits the State

fran increasing a defendant's sentence, once he has begun serving it,

unless the State can show specific statutory authority or the voluntary

action of defendant.

In deciding the case below the New Jersey Supreme Court found

1. No statutory authority existed for increasing defendant's

2. Defendant's filing of a motion for transfer to a drug treatment

program was not a waiver of his double jeopardy arguments.

As a result of their factual findings, based solely on New Jersey law, this

Court is without jurisdiction to review the finding of New Jersey's highest

court.

Respectfully submitted,

STANLEY C. VAN

Public Defender

Attorney for Defendant-Petitioner

| Neweree”

ORIGINAL | JUL 1.7 1981

FFICE OF THE CLERK

IN THE 0

SUPREME COURT, U.S.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES |_ SUPREME ¢ MRT be

October Term, 1981

No. 80-2151

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Petitioner

__

EDWARD RYAN, Respondent

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

The Respondent, Edward Ryan, asks leave to file the attached

Brief in Opposition to a Write of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of

New Jersey, without prepayment of costs and to proceed in forma pauperis

pursuant to Rule 46. :

Counsel for Respondent's affidavit in support of this motion is

attached hereto.

STANLEY C. VAN NESS

Public Defender of New Jersey

| (ls TN

GERALD P. BOSWELL

Ass t Deputy Public Defender

Counsel for Petitioner

RECEIVED

ORIGINAL ren Panes

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

SUPREME COURT, U.S. _

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1981

No. 80-2151

I, GERALD P. BOSWELL, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, counsel

for respondent Edward Ryan, being first duly sworn, according to law,

Gepose and says, in support of my motion for leave to proceed without

being required to prepay costs or fees:

1. I am counsel for respondent Edward Ryan in the above-entitled

2. Respondent Fdward Ryan has been found to be an indigent by

the New Jersey Office of the Public Defender.

3. Mr. Ryan has been represented by the Office of the Public Defender

at all stages of this matter.

4. Mr. Ryan appears before this Court as respondent to a Petition

for Writ of Certiorari filed by the New Jersey Office of the Attorney

General.

5. As counsel for Mr. Ryan I believe that he is entitled to proceed

In Forma Pauperis so as to oppose the New Jersey Attorney General Petition

for a Writ of Certiorari.

/ GERALD P. BOSWELL

for Edward Ryan, Respondent

Sworn to and subscribed to

before me on this 15th

day of July, 1981.

Fansck Ata

attorney-at-Law of the

otate of New Jersey

ORIGINAL ~ | RECEIVED |

JUL 17 1981,

ia SUPREME COURT, US. |

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1981

No. 80-2151

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Petitioner

-_~

EDWARD RYAN, Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 15th day of July, 1981,

one copy each of the Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis,

Affidavit in Support thereof, and Brief in Opposition to a Writ of

Certiorari were mailed, postage prepaid, to James R. Zazzali, Esq.,

Attorney General of New Jersey, Counsel for the Petitioner. I further

certify that all parties required to be served have been served.

P. BOSWELL

istant Deputy Public Defender

fice of the Public Defender

20 Evergreen Place

East Orange, New Jersey 07018

Counsel for Petitioner

July 15, 1981

#

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.