Opposition — Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo

Supreme Court brief1982

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

Office-Supreme Court, U.S

| 2 Se

No. 80-1990 JUL 1. 1981

ALEXAT

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United Staten

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

CASPAR WEINBERGER ET AL.,

¥ Petitioners,

CARLOS ROMERO-BARCELO ET AL.,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION

HECTOR REICHARD DE CARDONA

Secretary of Justice

THOMAS R. LINCOLN

Department of Justice

GERAKDO A. CARLO

Special Counsel to the Governor

JOHN A. HODGES

(Counsel of Record)

TimoTHy L. HARKER

LAWRENCE WHITE

JEFFREY N. MARTIN

PEABODY, RIVLIN, LAMBERT &

MEYERS

A Professional Corporation

1150 Connecticut Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 457-1000

Counsel for Respondents

Of Counsel

Lewis A. RIVLIN

1150 Connecticut Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

July 1, 1981

WILSON - EPES PRINTING Co., INC. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

_——_—_—

ome oe eee

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ordering an

injunction, limited as to scope and duration, for a con-

tinuous violation of the permit requirements of the Fed-

eral Water Pollution Control Act, which violation was

in “utter disregard of the statutory mandate.”

(i)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED ..............scscsssssssscscssssssceseseess

TABLE OF AUTHORITIBS ...........scscscsssssscsssssssssssssessees

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ...........cccsssssssssssescsessneneees

I,

II.

Ill.

I cmv

I tr nc assulnateonuubroubea ‘

Decisions of the Courts Below ...............00000000...

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION ............

I,

Il.

Ill.

IV.

The Petition Raises a Question that in All Like-

lihood Will Be Mooted by the Completion of the

Administrative Process Concerning the Permit..

The Ruling of the Court Below Does Not Con-

flict with Fourth Circuit Decisions Cited by the

I a a cannes

The First Circuit Applied Settled Principles of

Federal Law in Enjoining the Navy’s Violations

OF Fe I PM MIO scttcccennsntcevsccsacsessecctscciecases

The Decision of the Court of Appeals is a Nar-

row, Fact-Specific Decision that Raises No

Significant Question of Federal Law ......... maceabiods

Denial of the Navy’s Petition Will Preserve the

Fair and Equitable Relief Secured by Puerto

Rico in the Court of Appeals ........0...0..00..00000000

ap IIIY -ichcucodstentenciencnentensvnsonineissaisebessasicaiesécsunadioninesn

(iii)

10

15

16

17

lv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES: Page

Aluli v. Rumsfeld, Civ. Action No, 76-0880 (D.

BAIT) concomseviecsiidanetnvctneusticvecsavuahiiemiocsaaaaeenenae 5

American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. V.

Donovan, —— U.S. ——, 49 U.S.L.W. 4720

CHWMO BF, ROBT) cercovericersncssercnsveascantanamiminaae 18

Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Train, 544 F.2d 657 (3d

Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 975 (1977)... 12

Buscaglia v. District Court of San Juan, 145 F.2d

274 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 8323 U.S. 798 (1944).. 12

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,

G02 GB. GOB CIDTE) sccscscerssriaitviensiiadaniaeseane 12

Consolidation Coal Co. v. Costle, 604 F.2d 239 (4th

Cir. 1979), rev’d sub nom., EPA v. National

Crushed Stone Ass'n, —— U.S. ——, 66 L.Ed.

BB BUD CRIB vereccccceestssssntsictecuae eee 8,9

Cooper Vv. Wisdom, 440 F. Supp. 1027 (S.D. Fla.

BOE D .: eveiccevecssnsveoesvesessuibinuainieaantaninataamannane 10, 12

Cousins Vv. Wigoda, 409 U.S, 1201 (Rehnquist, Cir-

GUNS TUTTO, DOE veccncssevescchesnsinthnnetnicaedieaee 7

FTC v. National Lead Co., 852 U.S, 419 (1957)... 9

Jones V. Lynn, 477 F.2d 885 (1st Cir. 1978) ......... 11

Lathan Vv. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir, 1971)... 18

Milwaukee v. Illinois, ——- U.S, ——, 49 U.S.L.W.

og OS OD ) ne 12

NLRB vy. Union Nacional de Trabajadores, 540

F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.

RODD COBTED serniccccdticccccrsicoseteitansienuadeceaee 9

National Wildlife Federation v. Coleman, 529 F.2d

859 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Boteler v.

National Wildlife Federation, 429 U.S. 979

CRIB) ccceccescvssesvssscnsendsttcshceleuusececcicecmananesnaninanae 18

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle,

668 F.2d 1869 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ...........cccsssrsssssnees 12

Save Our Sound Fisheries Ass'n v. Callaway, 887

aA. | Bt ls | | ew 10, 12

Standard Oil Co. of California v. FTC, 577 F.2d

GER COU Cie, REDD: nccessncsscclescedssisenesmnsentannianns 9

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

State Water Control Board v. Train, 559 F.2d 921

(Atha Cle. 1DTE) ccccccnsensincencstinsessncnseretaeamansiabaiaiana 8-9

Taggart Vv. Weinacker’s Inc., 397 U.S. 223 (1970)

CDEP CUFIRM) .ncccerceesveccscerscccssocssovsessscseseconessnonessceaens 7,8

Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153

CRITE) cecenecesececasenssnsenssensssisiniaasnnnsananenmniaeaianadais 11,12

United States v. City and County of San Francisco,

SIO UWB. 20 CRD eccrcsotcccscttsecmionionmamnan 12, 13

United States v. City of Painesville, Ohio, 644

if 8) 8 Ye 6} eee 13-14

United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d

DOB (10a Cle. TOFD) .ccecicncccssiscsscessenrssnenccvtsmnisanenss 1l

United States v. Gonzalez Vargas, 558 F.2d 631

(lat Cle, 2009) ccsccesicinicesstecsstcomttncemmencnnnaniien 9

United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665 (M.D.

Be. 2OGE) sececetincsesemscreiscscsinstiininina 11

United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 340

UB, FS (EBDOD ccnccccnsnscsncccssessessscasmenansanndanage 9

STATUTES:

Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.

§ 1251 et seq. (1976 & Supp. III 1980)

eee § UBL D .....cccsccesceacsesssnsssosecesesssscessnncsnvssnd 4,10, 11, 12

exe § 2812.01) (1) ...cccrccsccsecessoecsesnnsvensonensonsieins 9

came § IBRD (B) .2cccccscccccoroscoccscnsssoscnsens nlatiaete 2,7

cme § UDG qn. ccesececcseosceonsonssenssensescosensnanenssanenreniais 4

come BD BED onnccccccoccsssncsescccrseccncsvosssusensssvessesneranns 4

comme § 19GB (6) -....0c0cceecccsnscscscescsscessononcssssanasseenins 4,5

eee § 19687). 222220-00ecccersecsesscsscnsseosscsscssesssssosnens 4

—— § 1362(8) ...........-..-.---0000- scveccanssibennipieneesianes 4

exes § 19GB (18) .......02...cc0ccecresscoccccsscesessonoseseunesee 4

ee § 1963 (14) ..0c0ccesscsccssorscecessoncssssonessassnssseesnens 4,5

eee § 29GB (16) ...00000<0cscosscrnescsrenseresssssnscsnessinnsias 4

OTHER AUTHORITIES:

2 A Legislative History of the Water Pollution

Control Act Amendments of 1972, 92d Cong., 1st

Bad. (LOTB) nccccenccssecsesessssscstersinsninianiovenmisapmaaan 11,12

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

No. 80-1990

CASPAR WEINBERGER ET AL.,

¥ Petitioners,

CARLOS ROMERO-BARCELO ET AL.,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION

STATEMENT OF THE CASE?

I, Introduction

Carlos Romero-Barcelé, the Governor of Puerto Rico,

on behalf of Puerto Rico, the island municipality

of Vieques, and the other respondents (referred to col-

lectively as “Puerto Rico”), hereby opposes the petition

for a writ of certiorari filed on behalf of the Secretary

10n May 28, 1981, Puerto Rico filed its own petition for a

writ of certiorari to obtain review of other portions of the same

decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the First

Circuit. Romero-Barcel6 v. Weinberger, No. 80-2033. Puerto

Rico’s petition contained a brief statement describing the factual

and procedural background of the case, and the Court is respect-

fully referred to that statement for details not repeated herein.

2

of Defense and officials of the Department of the Navy

(referred to collectively as “the Navy”). Puerto Rico

respectfully submits that the Navy’s petition raises no

significant questions of federal law that merit this

Court’s attention.

This case concerns the propriety of an injunction of

limited scope and duration restraining the Navy from

further violation of the Federal Water Pollution Control

Act? in connection with intentional and accidental dis-

charges of ordnance into the coastal waters of the in-

habited island of Vieques. Both the trial court and the

First Circuit Court of Appeals found that the Navy, by

discharging bombs and shells into Puerto Rican coastal

waters without first obtaining a National Pollution Dis-

charge Elimination System (NPDES) permit from the

Environmental Protection Agency, engaged in a continu-

ing violation of the Clean Water Act.

The Navy does not dispute that conclusion. Instead,

characterizing its conduct as a “technical” violation of

the Clean Water Act*—a characterization specifically

rejected by the Court of Appeals—the Navy asks this

Court to review the remedy imposed by the Court of

Appeals: an injunction prohibiting further bombing and

shelling of coastal waters until the Navy either obtains

the required permit under the Clean Water Act or, pur-

suant to Section 313(a) of the Act,’ obtains a Presi-

dential exemption from the permit requirement.

233 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (1976 & Supp. III 1980) (referred to

hereinafter as the “Clean Water Act”).

8 Cf. Navy’s Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Appendix C, p. 162a.

As used herein, the abbreviation “Navy Pet.” refers to the Navy's

petition for a writ of certiorari; the abbreviation “App.” refers

to the Appendices filed with that petition; and the abbreviation

“C.A.J.A.” refers to the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in the

Court of Appeals.

*33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (Supp. ITI 1980).

3

II. Summary of Facts

This case arises out of the Navy’s air-to-ground bomb-

ing and ship-to-shore shelling of the inhabited island of

Vieques. Vieques is a small island approximately 20

miles long and an average of 4.5 miles wide. More than

8,000 people live on the island.

The Navy possesses title to approximately 76 percent

of the island’s land. Prior to 1970, the Navy conducted

air-to-ground bombing and ship-to-shore shelling on the

sparsely populated, nearby Puerto Rican island of

Culebra. Naval land on Vieques was used principally for

small-scale artillery training and amphibious exercises.

Between 1971 and 1975, the Navy methodically and

clandestinely transferred Culebra bombing and shelling

activities to Vieques.° As a result, the Navy tremen-

dously intensified the level of weapons firing on Vieques.

Between 1974 and 1977, the Navy increased by over 900

percent the number of 500 (MK82), 1,000 (MK83) and

2,000 (MK84) pound bombs dropped on and around

5 The clandestine nature of the Navy’s decision to transfer train-

ing operations from Culebra to Vieques is apparent from documents

produced by the Navy before trial. One confidential document re-

vealed the Navy’s awareness that the tempo of training operations

on Vieques was a sensitive issue:

It would seem advantageous to spread out the usage [on

Vieques] somewhat so as to give more ships a chance to fire

without increasing the apparent weekly tempo.

C.A.J.A. 1506 (emphasis added). The document also stated:

With regard to Vieques, [Rear Admiral] Ward indicated that

we should be very careful not to appear increase our tempo

of operations above that of previous yea,

C.A.J.A. 1504 (emphasis added). An internal Naval communication

in April, 1972, stressed that, due to the “extreme sensitivity” of any

plan for relocating Culebra operations to Vieques, all Navy message

traffic on the subject was to be “flagged limited distribution special

handiing.” C.A.J.A. 1413.

4

Vieques.* Bombing, shelling, and other military activities

have resulted in the discharge of millions of pounds of

munitions and other pollutants into the coastal waters of

Vieques, with damage to fragile coral reefs, seagrasses,

and other marine organisms and habitats. By the Navy’s

own admission, the beaches and waters surrounding

Vieques are now saturated with ordnance.’

The Navy was aware of the damage that would be in-

flicted on the marine environment of Vieques by the shift

of Culebra training activities to that island. A report pre-

pared for the Navy in 1972 warned that expanded range

use on Vieques “would cause a subtle and adverse impact

[on] the total marine environment of these waters.” The

report warned that coral reefs in Vieques coastal waters

would be irreparably damaged. “Although much of the

resulting ecological damage may be repaired by nature

in time, some damage to coastal zones, and reef systems

in particular, is irreparable.” *

The Clean Water Act expressly prohibits the “dis-

charge” of any “pollutant” from a “point source” into

the “navigable waters” of the United States without a

permit issued by the EPA or a state with an EPA-

approved permit program.’ The Act defines the term

®C.A.J.A. 1796-1824.

7C.A.J.A. 703-4, 757-60, 810-12, 1518-52, 1603-19. The extra-

ordinary intensification of bombing and shelling activities on

Vieques as Culebra sites were abandoned is graphically illustrated

in the record. See C.A.J.A. 1782-1952. Items discovered in the

waters of Vieques near the reefs include expioded and unexploded

bombs and shells, practice ordnance, parachutes, parachute cables,

flares, flaring casings, barges and other military vessels, machine

gun rounds, bazooka rockets and many unidentifiable ordnance

fragments.

8 C.A.J.A. 284-85. At trial, the Navy’s own witness testified that

“(t]he fringing reefs on both sides of the north central cove...

have been extensively bombed.” C.A.J.A. 311.

® $§ 301, 402, 403, 502(6), (7), (8), (12), (14), (16), 33 U.S.C.

§§ 1311, 1342, 1348, 1862(6), (7), (8), (12), (14), (16).

5

“pollutant” to include “munitions” and wrecked or dis-

carded equipment. The term “point source” is defined to

include vessels and other conveyances from which pol-

lutants may be discharged.’® Under the statutory scheme,

shells, bombs and other ordnance discharged into the

waters around Vieques are subject to the strictures of

the Act.

The Navy is chargeable with knowledge of these re-

quirements of the Act. In the words of the trial court,

the language of the Act is “unambiguous.” Further-

more, in 1976, a lawsuit was commenced challenging

Navy bombing and shelling activities on the island of

Kahoolawe in Hawaii.’ The complaint in that case as-

serted, among other things, that the Navy could not

conduct ship-to-shore shelling and air-to-ground bombing

without first obtaining an NPDES permit under the

Clean Water Act.’* Notwithstanding these facts and in

utter disregard of the explicit command of the statute,

the Navy neither sought nor obtained a permit from the

EPA for bombing and shelling of the coastal waters of

Vieques.

III. Decisions of the Courts Below

On March 1, 1978, Puerto Rico commenced this action

against the Navy in the United States District Court for

the District of Puerto Rico. Puerto Rico sought injunc-

10 § 502(6), (14), 33 U.S.C. § 1862(6), (14).

11 App. 80a.

12 Aluli v. Rumsfeld, Civ. Action No. 76-0380 (D.Haw.).

13 Tn its petition, the Navy untruthfully asserts that prior to the

filing of Puerto Rico’s complaint in 1978 nobody had ever con-

tended that the Clean Water Act applied to the incidental release

of ordnance into coastal waters. Navy Pet. 13. The Navy knows

full well that it was sued in 1976 over the failure to obtain an

NPDES permit for such activities. The Navy is being disingenuous,

therefore, when it asserts to this Court that “the first inkling” it

had “that anyone thought that a NPDES permit was required was

the complaint which was filed in this suit [concerning Vieques]... .”

Id.

6

tive relief until such time as the Navy complied fully

with the Clean Water Act.'*

On September 17, 1979, the trial court found that the

Navy had violated and was continuing to violate the

“unambiguous language” of the Act by discharging ord-

nance into the navigable waters of Vieques without an

NPDES permit. The trial court refused, however, to en-

join Naval bombing and shelling during the time period

required to obtain an NPDES permit."

The Navy did not even bother to appeal from the

ruling of the trial court that its conduct violated the

Act. Indeed, its petition to this Court admits what has

long been obvious: that “the literal language of the

Clean Water Act covers inadvertent release of shells and

bombs into the coastal waters of Vieques.” '*

On January 26, 1981, the Court of Appeals vacated the

judgment of the trial court on the Clean Water Act and

remanded with instructions to enter an order directing

the Navy “to take all steps necessary to insure that no

ordnance is discharged into the coastal waters of Vieques

until such time as it obtains a NPDES permit.” '’ The

Court of Appeals ruled that the Navy’s violation of the

Act was not “technical” and that the Navy had “utterly

disregarded the statutory mandate” by conducting bomb-

ing and shelling operations without first having obtained

14 Puerto Rico sought relief for violation of other laws as well.

See App. 55a-56a.

15 App. 78a-86a, 165a.

16 Navy Pet. 4, n.4. Nor did the Navy appeal with respect to

the matter it mentions in passing (Navy Pet. 13), that Puerto

Rico did not comply with a 60-day notice requirement. Nor could

the Navy have so appealed. Puerto Rico long ago filed a motion

in the district court to cure that alleged defect. The Navy did

not oppose the motion and the district court granted it. (C.A.J.A.

164-171.) The Navy’s mention of the 60-day notice matter in this

Court is a red herring.

17 App. 49a.

7

a permit.’* The Court of Appeals also stated that the

Navy could apply for a Presidential exemption from the

permit requirement pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1828(a) if

the injunction significantly interfered with Navy pre-

paredness.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION

I. The Petition Raises a Question that in All Likelihood

Will Be Mooted by the Completion of the Administra-

tive Process Concerning the Permit.

After the Navy filed its petition with this Court, the

EPA gave public notice of a draft NPDES permit and

announced its tentative decision to issue that permit.'

Were the Court to grant the Navy’s petition, adminis-

trative processing of the Navy’s application for an

NPDES permit in all likelihood would be completed be-

fore the Court could reach a decision on the merits, In

addition, the Navy can resort to another administrative

remedy—the application for Presidential exemption—in

the event that it is dissatisfied with the administrative

processing of its permit application at EPA. In either

case, this Court is being asked to consider a question

that is thus more academic than real at this juncture.

This Court on many occasions has expressed its dis-

inclination to consider petitions raising questions that are

likely to become moot.” Even if a case may not be com-

pletely mooted during the pendency of an appeal, this

Court has observed that certiorari should not be granted

18 Jd,

19 Public Notice No. NPDES 81-161, Application No, PROO23582,

EPA Region II, May 29, 1981.

20 F.g., Cousins v. Wigoda, 409 U.S. 1201, 1204 (Rehnquist, Cir-

cuit Justice, 1972) ; Taggart v. Weinacker’s, Inc., 397 U.S, 2238, 226

(1970) (per curiam).

to resolve the “small embers of controversy” that might

remain,”

Furthermore, since the Navy can apply for a Presi-

dential exemption from the permit requirement, it can

extinguish whatever controversy remains without resort

to this Court. If the Navy is sincere in asserting that

an injunction would affect its national security obliga-

tions,” then the Navy will presumably apply for Presi-

dential exemption in the event that the permit procedure

fails to produce a result satisfactory to it. In either case—

whether the Navy resolves the matter through EPA or

the Executive Office of the President—this Court’s inter-

vention is hardly merited.

II. The Ruling of the Court Below Does Not Conflict with

Fourth Circuit Decisions Cited by the Navy.

The Navy asserts that the decision of the court below

conflicts with the decisions of the Fourth Circuit in State

Water Control Board v. Train, 559 F.2d 921 (4th Cir.

1977), and Consolidation Coal Co. v. Costle, 604 F.2d 289

(4th Cir. 1979), rev’d sub nom. EPA v. National Crushed

Stone Ass’n, ——— U.S. ——, 66 L.Ed. 2d 268 (1980).”

Each of these cases is consistent analytically and philo-

sophically with the decision of the First Circuit in this

case.

State Water Control Board dealt with the narrow prob-

lem of whether the receipt of grant money under the

Clean Water Act by publicly owned treatment works for

construction of treatment plants was a condition prece-

dent to compliance with a requirement to achieve by July

21 Taggart v. Weinacker’s, Inc., 397 U.S. 223, 225 (1970) (per

curiam).

22 Navy Pet, 13-14,

23 Navy Pet. 5-6. The Navy’s petition does not cite the decision

of this Court in National Crushed Stone,

9

1, 1977, the degree of effluent reduction attainable

through secondary treatment under Section 801(b) (1) of

the Act, 33 U.S.C. §1811(b) (1). The court’s opinion

said merely that courts have equitable discretion to de-

termine whether and to what extent injunctive sanctions

should be imposed “for violations brought about by good

faith inability to comply with the deadline.” 559 F.2d at

927 (emphasis added). Similarly, the issue before the

Fourth Circuit in Consolidation Coal was whether and to

what extent sanctions could be imposed on coal compa-

nies that exercised “good faith efforts” to comply with

the best practicable control standards but were unable to

do so by the July 1, 1977, deadline. 604 F.2d at 245.

Neither decision involved a situation where, as here,

the polluter “utterly disregarded the statutory mandate”

to obtain an NPDES discharge permit. The First Circuit

could hardly have chosen stronger words than those to

characterize the Navy’s conduct." Violations of the per-

mit requirements of the Clean Water Act in utter dis-

regard of the statutory mandate are different from the

“good faith” efforts to comply with the July 1, 1977,

compliance deadlines involved in State Water Control

Board and Consolidation Coal. Nothing in the Fourth

Circuit decisions suggests, even by implication, that a

more stringent remedial policy should not be applied by

% Courts reserve the phrase “utter disregard” to express strong

disapproval of a party who willfully ignores a legal obligation. See,

e.g., FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 429 (1957):

Those in utter disregard of law, as here, “call for repression

by sterner measures than where the steps could reasonably

have been thought permissible.”

(Quoting from United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 340 U.S.

76, 89-90 (1950).) Accord, NLRB v. Union Nacional de Trabaja-

dores, 540 F.2d 1 (1st Cir, 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1089 (1977) ;

United States v. Gonzales Vargas, 558 F.2d 631 (1st Cir. 1977);

Standard Oil Co. of California v. FTC, 577 F.2d 653, 662 (9th Cir.

1978).

10

the federal courts in the circumstances presented by this

case.

III. The First Circuit Applied Settled Principles of Federal

Law in Enjoining the Navy’s Violations of the Clean

Water Act.

The decision of the court below is fully consistent with

other decisions under the Clean Water Act and related

environmental statutes. The court below, in fact, prop-

erly relied on two longstanding decisions involving the

propriety of injunctive relief for violations of the Act’s

permit requirements.

In Save Our Sound Fisheries Ass’n v. Callaway, 387

F. Supp. 292 (D.R.I. 1974), the court enjoined the Army

from disposing of dredged materials in violation of sev-

eral laws, including the Clean Water Act. The court

stated:

The statutory procedures for obtaining a permit...

before potentially harmful substances are introduced

into the water are designed to insure that such deci-

sions are based on specific and informed findings

regarding the effect of such dumping on the marine

environment.”*

And in Cooper v. Wisdom, 440 F. Supp. 1027 (S.D. Fla.

1977), the court restrained the Army from dredging ma-

rine areas under the authority of an invalid NPDES per-

mit. The court stated that because the operation was

being carried on without a valid permit, it “has therefore

not been evaluated according to established criteria.”

The court concluded that “the plaintiff’s right to protec-

tive relief from the effects of an invalid permit is clear.”

440 F. Supp. at 10380.

The permit requirement in Section 301(a) is the “en-

forcement hub” of the Act, at the center of a “web of

25 387 F.Supp. at 299-300.

11

complex interrelated regulatory programs.” ** The permit

is the mechanism by which individual point sources are

directly brought into compliance with the Act.*’ If the

courts in their discretion could allow certain point sources

to circumvent the prohibition of Section 301 (a), polluters

would be free to discharge their effluents without under-

going the detailed administrative review and compliance

procedures mandated by the Act. This result clearly con-

travenes Congress’ intent in designing the permit system

“to regulate to the fullest extent possible those sources

emitting pollution. .. .** The Court of Appeals recognized

this when it ordered the Navy to take all steps necessary

to insure that no ordnance is discharged into the coastal

waters of Vieques until it obtains an NPDES permit.

The courts have a responsibility to “protect the integ-

rity of the . . . process mandated by Congress, .. .” ”

Congress has decided the order of priorities in the area

of federal water pollution control efforts, and structured

the NPDES permit process accordingly. Now “it is for

the Executive to administer the laws and for the courts

to enforce them... .”™ If the Navy wishes to modify

the Congressional scheme for the issuance of discharge

permits, it should request such a change from Congress—

not by judicial fiat."

26 United States v. Holland, 373 F, Supp. 665, 668 (M.D, Fla.

1974). See also United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368

(10th Cir. 1979).

*7 See S. Rep. No, 92-414, 92d Cong., Ist Sess, 72 (1971), re-

printed in 2 A Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control

Act Amendments of 1972, 98d Cong., lst Sess, 1490 (1973).

28 United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc,, 599 F.2d 368, 873 (10th

Cir, 1979).

2% Jones v, Lynn, 477 F.2d 885, 892 (1st Cir, 1973).

*” Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S, 158, 194 (1978).

%t The Navy, by reference to the legislative history of the Clean

Water Act, attempts to show that Congress did not mean to “limit

12

The decision of the Court of Appeals is also consistent

with the general rule that where a court is called upon

to enjoin the continuing violation of a federal statute,

general considerations of “equity” are tempered by the

obligation to carry out the statutory mandate.” The rule

does not change when courts are called upon to enjoin

massive or nearly-completed government projects, even

when many millions of dollars of public funds have al-

ready been spent.” As this Court stated recently in

the traditional role of the courts in the enforcement process.” Navy

Pet. 8. On this point, however, the legislative history of the Clean

Water Act is no different from that of any other major environ-

mental statute. Congress intended to prohibit “the discharge of

any pollutant,” 83 U.S.C. §1311(a), unless the discharger first

secures an NPDES permit pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 1342. The leg-

islative history emphasizes the specificity and precision with which

Congress wrote these mandatory standards for environmental pro-

tection into the Act. See, ¢.g., Senate Debate on 8, 2770, Nov. 2,

1971, in 2 A Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control

Act Amendments of 1972, 98d Cong., lst Seas, 1272 (19738).

Congress intended the permit to be the only means by which a

discharger could escape the total prohibition of Section 1842,

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1869,

1874 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Train, 544 F.2d

657, 659 (8d Cir, 1976), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 975 (1977). This

Court specifically recognized that the Clean Water Act “established

a new system of regulation under which it is illegal for anyone to

discharge pollutants into the Nation’s waters except pursuant to a

permit.” Milwaukee v. Illinois, ——- U.S, ——, 49 U.S.L.W. 4445,

4447 (Apr. 28, 1981) (emphasis added), Two lower courts have

reached the same conclusion, Cooper v. Wisdom, 440 F.Supp, 1027,

1080 (S.D. Fla. 1977) ; Save our Sound Fisheries Ass'n v. Callaway,

887 F.Supp. 292 (D.R.I. 1974).

82 See, ¢.g., Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S, 153, 194

(1978) ; United States v. City and County of San Francisco, 310

U.S. 16, 30-81 (1940) (rejecting “balancing of equities” with

respect to an injunction where violation of Raker Act was shown) ;

Buscaglia v. District Court of San Juan, 145 F.2d 274 (1st Cir.),

cert, denied, 328 U.S. 798 (1944),

“ Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc, v. Volpe, 401 U.S, 402

(1971) (injunction upheld against a federal highway project which

13

American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. Dono-

van: *

For “(t]he judicial function does not extend to sub-

stantive revision of regulatory policy. That function

lies elsewhere—in Congressional and Executive over-

sight or amendatory legislation.” Industrial Union

Department v. American Petroleum Institute, supra,

slip op., at 2 (Burger, C.J., concurring); see T'en-

nessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 487 U.S. 158, 185,

187-188, 194-195 (1978).

Only two months before the Navy filed its petition

with this Court, the federal government successfully

defended the lower court’s issuance, without an eviden-

tiary hearing, of an injunction to enforce new source

performance standards under the Clean Air Act. United

States v. City of Painesville, Ohio, 644 F.2d 1186 (6th

Cir. 1981). In words that are relevant to this case as

well, the court said:

In Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 380 (1944),

the Supreme Court emphasized that when a court is

called upon to enforce a federal statutory injunction,

its reliance upon the traditional practices of equity

had been underway for more than ten years); National Wildlife

Federation v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub

nom. Boteler v. National Wildlife Federation, 429 U.S. 979 (1976)

(court enjoined ongoing construction of interstate highway upon

finding a violation of the Endangered Species Act). In the leading

case of Lathan v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1971), the govern-

ment violated NEPA and Federal Highway Administration regula-

tions by failing to prepare written environmental assessments of a

highway project in downtown Seattle. Citing United States v. City

and County of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16 (1940), the Court of

Appeals stated that “this case does not call for a balancing of

equities .. .,"” 465 F.2d at 1116 (quoting from 310 U.S. at 30), and

enjoined all construction and ordered the government to submit a

detailed timetable of compliance with NEPA and other environmen-

tal statutes and regulations, /d. at 1122.

= U8, ——-, 49 U.S.L.W. 4720, 4733-34 (June 17, 1981).

14

must be “conditioned by the necessities of the public

interest which Congress has sought to protect.” In

enacting the Clean Air Act, Congress made a deter-

mination that the public interest required that sub-

stantial measures he taken to combat the deleterious

effects of air pollution. See 42 U.S.C. § 7401. The

district court’s discretionary injunctive powers were

therefore tempered by its obligation to carry out the

Congressional mandate contained in the Clean Air

Act.

In a recent case, 7'VA v. Hill, 487 U.S. 153 (1978)

(the “snaildarter” case), the Court held that the

Endangered Species Act required the District Court

to enjoin the completion of the Tellico Dam in East

Tennessee, despite the lower court’s doubts about the

“wisdom ... of a particular course consciously se-

lected by the Congress.” Jd. at 194. The Court em-

phasized that it is the exclusive province of the

Congress to formulate legislative policies and estab-

lish their relative priority ....

By enacting the Clean Air Act, Congress estab-

lished a high priority for control of air pollution.

The legislature recognized that compliance would be

expensive in some cases, but the choice was made

to require compliance with the standards promul-

gated by EPA. Having made that choice, Congress

did not contemplate that its decision would be

thwarted by judicial reluctance to require compli-

ance when enforcement proceedings are brought and

liability is proven. Accordingly, this Court holds

that the district court was required to order injunc-

tive relief upon its finding of liability, once negotia-

tions for a compliance plan broke down. A hearing

to determine the presence of irreparable injury and

inadequacy of legal remedy was therefore unneces-

sary.”

35 644 F.2d at 1193-94.

15

IV. The Decision of the Court of Appeais is a Narrow,

Fact-Specific Decision that Raises No Significant Ques-

tion of Federal Law.

In its petition, the Navy hypothesizes that the ruling

below will have the far-reaching consequence of mandat-

ing the issuance of injunctions to redress technical viola-

tions of any federal environmental law. This argument,

however, is not consistent with the limiting language of

the First Circuit’s decision. The Court of Appeals was

careful to emphasize that it was not dealing with a

“technical” violation of the Clean Water Act. Instead,

the court reacted to the Navy’s “utter disregard” of the

statutory mandate. The injunction directed by the court

below is an appropriate response to the Navy’s egregious

disregard of the permit requirements of the Clean Water

Act.

The petition of the Navy raises only the narrow issue

of the type of relief to be awarded for the utter

disregard of the specific Clean Water Act require-

ment that an NPDES permit be obtained for the dis-

charge of pollutants from point sources. The decision of

the court below does not have broad implications. It

does not establish precedent for the type of remedies

that are appropriate for violations of lesser severity, vio-

lations of other provisions of the Clean Water Act, or

violations of other environmental statutes. The decision

of the court below is narrowly circumscribed by the

unique and unusual facts of this case. Lower courts and

other litigants would profit little from this Court’s re-

view of the Navy’s petition.

16

V. Denial of the Navy’s Petition Will Preserve the Fair

and Equitable Relief Secured by Puerto Rico in the

Court of Appeals.

The intensification of bombing and shelling activities

on Vieques has adversely affected the marine environ-

ment in the coastal waters of Vieques. These activities

continue to pose a significant hazard to the health and

well-being of the island’s inhabitants.** The injunction

ordered by the court below, limited as to scope and dura-

tion, may enhance the quality of the marine environment

and promote the safety of the people of Vieques.”

Puerto Rico has sought diligently to compel the Navy

to observe the requirements of the Act. The relief that

properly has been ordered under the Act should not be

overturned.

86 The Navy asserts that the permit process is unlikely to yield

new information about the “more extensive environmental harm”

(Navy Pet. 14) resulting from its discharge of ordnance into the

waters of Vieques on the ground that the environmental impact

statement (EIS) it has now prepared allegedly discloses no signifi-

cant adverse impacts on the coastal waters from the discharge of

ordnance, But the EIS is a Navy document, not an EPA document.

Furthermore, an important part of what the Court of Appeals was

saying is that the permit process could reveal information that would

help prevent or control environmental impact, not just whether

there is greater environmental impact than is revealed by the EIS.

The Navy’s assertion totally disregards the role of the EPA in its

review of NPDES permit applications and exhibits a disturbing

indifference to the thrust of the permit requirements under the

Clean Water Act. In any event, the Court of Appeals’ determination

that the permit process might reveal relevant information is not

clearly erroneous, particularly in light of the report prepared for

the Navy in 1972 warning about the environmental consequences of

a shift from Culebra to Vieques.

37 Ordnance can miss the target by at least six miles. During

trial a shell missed the target by about six miles and nearly hit

a fishing boat. C.A.J.A. 2738.

17

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Navy’s petition for a writ of

certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

HECTOR REICHARD DE CARDONA

Secretary of Justice

THOMAS R. }.INCOLN

Department of Justice

GERARDO A. CARLO

Special Counsel to the Governor

JOHN A. HODGES

(Counsel of Record)

TIMOTHY L. HARKER

LAWRENCE WHITE

JEFFREY N. MARTIN

PEABODY, RIVLIN, LAMBERT &

MEYERS

A Professional Corporation

1150 Connecticut Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 457-1000

Counsel for Respondents

Of Counsel

Lewis A. RIVLIN

1150 Connecticut Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

July 1, 1981

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.