Opposition — First National Bank of Tulsa v. Layon

No. 80-1947 SEP 30 1981

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Lb VAS

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

MOBILE COMPONENTS, INC., a corporation

Petitioner

v.

VERLEE C. LAYON, Executrix of the Estate of

THOMAS LAYON, SR., Deceased

Respondent

Consolidated With

FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF TULSA, et al.,

Petitioner

v.

VERLEE C. LAYON, Executrix of the Estate of

THOMAS LAYON, SR., Deceased

Respondent

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

STATE OF OKLAHOMA

WESLEY R. THOMPSON

THOMAS A. LAYON

15 South Park

Sapulpa, Oklahoma 74066

(918) 224-7330

Attorneys for Respondent

Verlee C. Layon

Cone-Lewis Printing Co. ¢ 323 E.3rd * Tulsa, Okla. 74120 ¢ Phone (919) 582-1234

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the United States Supreme Court has

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1257 and other established

jurisdictional procedures to review this case and the issues

involved herein.

The parent corporation of First National Bank of

Tulsa is First Tulsa Bank Corporation, Inc. The three

remaining Petitioners (The Outrigger, Inc., Planned Resi-

dential Communities Construction Company of Okla-

homa, Inc., Hamilton Investment Trust, a voluntary

business association of Massachusetts) have no parent

companies, subsidiaries, or affiliates. Supreme Court Rule

28(1).

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

SE vic ccndepidanwecesssbecvesncees i

PE ccc ddebikbidenskaddbanwntsunaesaane |

PE Wkheshacstektnasvsoceeeavétscsuneewuns 2

Proposition I: The decision of the Oklahoma

Supreme Court was not a final judgment as

required by 28 U.S.C. §1257.......cccceeeeees 2

Proposition II: The prior decisions of this Court

control the federal issues involved here and

therefore this case presents no new substantial

PS oc Ck.cubecudécccesencacouses 9

Proposition III: The decision of the Oklahoma

Supreme Court rests on adequate state grounds

and therefore precludes reexamination of the

issues involved by this Court... .......6.000045 13

hac... Lam esc had esl eek aneweuesenesKet 16

iii

AUTHORITIES CITED

CASES:

Page

Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority,

297 U.S. 288, 56 S.Ct. 466,

80 L.Ed. 688 (1936)...........

Brady v. Maryland,

373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194,

10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).........

Burton v. United States,

196 U.S. 283, 25 S.Ct. 243,

49 L.Ed. 482 (1905)...........

California v. Stewart,

384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602,

16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).........

Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,

420 U.S. 469, 95 S.Ct. 1029,

43 L.Ed.2d 328 (1975) .........

Construction Laborers v. Curry,

371 U.S. 542, 83 S.Ct. 531

9 L.Ed.2d 514(1963)..........

Davis v. Packard,

51 U.S. 41, 8 L.Ed.2d 312 (1832)

Fusari v. Steinberg,

419 U.S. 379, 95 S.Ct. 533,

42 L.Ed.2d 521 (1975).........

Hicks v. Miranda,

422 U.S. 332, 95 S.Ct. 2281,

45 L.Ed.2d 223 (1975) ........

Houston v. Moore,

16°U.S. 433, 4 L.Ed.2d 428 (1818)............05- 2

iv

Jankovich v. Indiana Toll Road Commission,

379 U.S. 487, 85 S.Ct. 493,

13 L.Ed.2d 439 (1965). ...... cece eeee eens

Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,

418 U.S. 241, 94S.Ct. 2831,

41 L.Ed.2d 730 (1974). ......c cece cece eeees

Mills v. Alabama,

384 U.S. 214, 86 S.Ct. 1434,

16 L.Ed.2d 484 (1966).......... ee eeeeeeeee

Minneapolis, S. P. v. & S.S.M.R. Co. v.

C. L. Merrick Co.,

254 U.S. 376, 41 S.Ct. 142,

65 L.Ed.2d 312 (1920)... ...cccccecvccccees

Minnesota v. National Tea Co.,

309 U.S. 551, 60 S.Ct. 676,

84 L.Ed. 920 (1940)... 0... cece cece cece eee

New York v. Cathedral Academy,

434 U.S. 125, 98 S.Ct. 340

54 L.Ed.2d 346 (1977)............ saewaous

North Dakota State Board of Pharmacy v.

Snyder’s Drug Stores, Inc.,

414 U.S. 156, 94 S.Ct. 407,

36 L.BG.26 S79 (UGTS) 0 cccccccccvccsccces

Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson,

326 U.S. 120, 47 S.Ct. 1475,

89 L.Ed.2d 2092 (1945) ....... cece ee ee eee

Republic Gas Co. v. Oklahoma,

334 U.S. 62, 68 S.Ct. 972,

yi me bier ti, | = Per eeerrreerrireee

Page

Roundhouse Construction Corp. v.

Telesco Masons Supplies Company, Inc.,

168 Conn. 371, 362 A.2d 778 (1975), vacated and

remanded for determination of whether case rests

on state or federal constitutional grounds, 423 U.S.

809, 96 S.Ct. 20, 46 L.Ed.2d 29 (1975), reaffirmed

on both state and federal grounds, 170 Conn. 155,

365 A.2d 393 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 889, 97

S.Ct. 246, 50 L.Ed.2d 172 (1976) ............ 14, 15

Spielman-Fond, Inc. v. Hanson’s inc.,

379 F.Supp. 997 (D. Ariz. 1973), aff'd 417 U.S.

901, 94 S.Ct. 2596,

41 L.Ed.2d 208 (1974) ............ 10, 11, 12, 13, 16

Utely v. St. Petersburg,

292 U.S. 106, 54 S.Ct. 593, 78 L.Ed.2d 1155,

reh. den. 292 U.S. 604,.54 S.Ct. 712,

78 L.Ed.2d 1466 (1934)... ....... cece eee eee 10

STATUTES

PRPs DEMS? cco sccccccpssscccccess 1,2, 8, 9, 16

No. 80-1947

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

MOBILE COMPONENTS, INC., a corporation

Petitioner

v.

VERLEE C. LAYON, Executrix of the Estate of

THOMAS LAYON, SR., Deceased

Respondent

Consolidated With

FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF TULSA, et al.,

Petitioner

v.

VERLEE C. LAYON, Executrix of the Estate of

THOMAS LAYON, SR., Deceased

Respondent

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

STATE OF OKLAHOMA

JURISDICTION

Petitioners seek to invoke the jurisdiction of this

Court under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §1257(3).

~~

ARGUMENTS

The decision of the Oklahoma Supreme Court

was not a final judgment as required by 28 U.S.C.

§1257.

This case came before the Oklahoma Supreme Court

on an appeal from the trial court’s order granting Peti-

tioner’s pretrial motion for summary judgment. The Okla-

homa Supreme Court reversed that order and remanded

the case for proceedings on the merits.'! There has been no

final judgment entered in this case.

Since 1789,2 Congress has granted this Court the

power to review decisions of a state court only in those in-

stances where the highest state court has entered a final

judgment or decree. Houston v. Moore, 16 U.S. 433, 4

L.Ed. 428 (1818); Davis v. Packard, 31 U.S. 41, 8 L.Ed.

312 (1832); Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326

U.S. 120, 47 S.Ct. 1475, 89 L.Ed.2d 2092 (1945).

The policies supporting this finality rule have been

cited in numerous decisions by this court and were perhaps

best articulated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his opinion

for this Court in Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson,

supra at 124, wherein he wrote:

This requirement has the support of considerations

generally applicable to good judicial administra-

tion. It avoids the mischief of economic waste and

of delayed justice. Only in very few situations

! Mobile Components v. Layon, 653 P.2d 591 (1980)

2 Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, §25 (1789)

an

where intermediate rulings may carry serious public

consequences, has there been a departure from this

requirement of finality for federal appellate

jurisdiction. This prerequisite to review derives

added force when the jurisdiction of this Court is

invoked to upset the decision of a State court. Here

we are in the realm of potential conflict between the

courts of two different governments. . . . This re-

quirement is not one of those technicalities to be

easily scorned. It is an important factor in the

smooth working of our federal system. (Emphasis

added).

Mr. Justice Frankfurter elaborated on these policy

arguments in Republic Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62,

67, 68 S.Ct. 972, 2 L.Ed.2d 1212 (1948), wherein he wrote

for that Court:

This prerequisite for the exercise of appellate

powers in this Court is‘especially pertinent when a

constitutional barrier is asserted against a State

Court’s decision on matters particularly of local

concern. Close observance of this limitation upon

the court is not regard for a strangling technicality.

History bears ample testimony that it is an impor-

tant factor in securing harmonious State-federal

relations.

In the present case, the Petitioners request that this

Court prematurally interfere with and reverse a decision of

the Oklahoma Supreme Court that this case should be

remanded to the trial court for further proceedings on the

merits. In addition, the Petitioners have repeatedly

pointed out in their arguments the local nature of the par-

ticular* controversy involved. They have gone to great

tiles

lengths to distinguish the characteristics of the Oklahoma

statutory scheme from those of other jurisdictions, thus

rendering any decision by this Court on this issue

predominently local in nature.

As important as the requirement for finality may be,

this Court has recognized the necessity of giving the rule a

pragmatic rather than a mechanical application. Radio

Station WOW, supra at 124. This has resulted in a number

of exceptions being carved from a strict adherence by this

Court to the finality rule in order to more effectively serve

the needs of justice and judicial economy.

In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 95

S.Ct. 1029, 43 L.Ed.2d 328 (1975), this Court summarized

the exceptions to the finality rule and divided them into

four specific categories:

1. Where, for one reason or another, the federal

issue decided by the state court is conclusive of the litiga-

tion, or where the outcome of further proceedings is

preordained. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 86 S.Ct.

1434, 16 L.Ed.2d 484 (1966); New York v. Cathedral

Academy, 434 U.S. 125, 98 S.Ct. 340, 54 L.Ed.2d 346

(1977).

2. Where the federal question will survive and re-

quire decision regardless of the outcome of further pro-

ceedings. Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, supra;

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10

L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).

3. Where later review of the federal question in

volved cannot be had by this Court regardless of the out-

~

come of any further proceedings. California v. Stewart,

384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). North

Dakota State Board of Pharmacy v. Snyder’s Drug Stores,

Inc., 414 U.S. 156, 94 S.Ct. 407, 38 L.Ed.2d 379 (1973).

4. Where the parties seeking review could win the

case on remand on non-federal grounds and thereby deny

this Court an opportunity to answer an important and

unsettled federal question, or where postponing review of

the case would seriously jeopardize an important national

policy or cast a shadow over an important and established

constitutional right. Construction Laborers v. Curry, 371

U.S. 542, 83 S.Ct. 531, 9 L.Ed.2d 514 (1963). Miami

Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 94 S.Ct.

2831, 41 L.Ed.2d 730 (1974).

The Petitioner herein acknowledges that the decision

of the Oklahoma Supreme court is not a final judgment as

required by §1257, but requésts that this court recognize it

as fitting into one of the exceptions recognized by the Cox

court.3 However, an examination of Petitioner’s claims

together with the facts of this case reveal that it will not fit

into any of the recognized exceptions to the finality rule.

1. The decision of the federal issue by the

Oklahoma Supreme Court is not conclusive of the litiga-

tion, nor is the outcome of any further proceedings pre-

ordained as a result of that decision. Petitioners reliance

on New York v. Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125, 98

S.Ct. 340, 54 L.Ed.2d 346 (1977), is misplaced. In that

case, the New York Court of Appeals had reversed a lower

“3 See, Petition For Writ of Certiorari, Note 2 at 2, Mobile v. Layon, 653 P.2d

591 (1980)

_

apellate court’s finding that a state law allowing the state

government to reimburse non-profit private schools for

certain expenditures was unconstitutional as being in

violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the

federal constitution. The Court of Appeals remanded the

case to the trial court for an audit to determine the amount

owed the private school. The State appealed that decision

to this Court. This Court granted the interim review on the

grounds that the decision by the Court of Appeals on the

federal issue was conclusive of the litigation and that “fur-

ther proceedings cannot remove or otherwise affect this

threshold federal issue. . . ” Id., Note 4 at 128.

By comparison, the decision of the Oklahoma Su-

preme Court on the federal issue herein is not conclusive

of the litigation. The Petitioners have detailed several non-

federal defenses available to them in their original Answer

to the Petition to Foreclose on the liens involved herein.

These defenses are still available to the Petitioner in a trial

on the merits on remand.‘ The decision of the Oklahoma

Supreme Court does not make the outcome of any further

litigation preordained but is “merely controlling the nature

and character of . . . the state proceedings still to come.”

Cox Broadcasting Corp., supra at 482.

2. The federal issue involved in this case will not

necessarily survive no matter the outcome of any further

4The Oklahoma Supreme Court indicated in their opinion that “[W]e do not

determine now if the trial court erred by allowing the description amend-

ment to the lien statement, or by allowing one lien statement to suffice for

two noncontiguous tracts of land.” Mobile Components v. Layon, 653 P.2d

at 592. Presumably, these defenses would still be available to Petitioners at

the proceedings on remand.

as pe

State proceedings. The Petitioner could win this case on

the merits on remand and preclude the necessity of any

decision by this Court on the federal question. This Court

has long adhered to the principle that constitutional issues

are 0 important to be decided unless absoutely necessary

to a decision of the case, and are to be avoided if there are

grounds for a decision of lesser dimension. Burton v.

United States, 196 U.S. 283, 25 S.Ct. 243, 49 L.Ed. 482

(1905), Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297

U.S. 288, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936).

3. The Petitioner here will not be precluded from

bringing a subsequent appeal of his federal claim if he

should lose at a trial on the merits. His federal claim that

he was denied his Fourteenth Amendment right to due

process will survive even if the trial court enters a judg-

ment against him on state law grounds.

4. The final category of exceptions to the finality

rule, as outlined by the Cox court, allows the court an op-

portunity to grant an interim review when postponement

of that review would endanger an important national

policy, or would cast a shadow upon an established and

vital constitutional right. The import of the cases which

have been granted an interim review within this category

has been that exigent circumstances peculiar to each of

those cases necessitated a waiver of the finality rule and

was consistent with the pragmatic approach adopted by

this Court.

The present case, however, does not contain any of

the requisite urgent circumstances which require the grant-

_

ing of an interim review. No national policy is endangered

by the Oklahoma decision, and the postponement of

review would not result in a shadow being cast over any

important or unsettled constitutional rights. If this Court

declines to hear this case, or if the Petitioners should

prevail on non-federal grounds at a trial on the merits,

thus precluding a subsequent review by this Court, the

Oklahoma construction industry will continue to operate

in the illuminating light of consistent state and federal

judicial interpretatioins that the mechanics’ and material-

men’s lien laws protecting the common laborer are consti-

tutionally valid and do not constitute a denial of due pro-

cess to the property owners.‘

Close examination reveals that not only does this case

not fit into one of the exceptions discussed by the Cox

court, but instead appears to fit more appropriately into

that category of cases which support the policy arguments

outlined by Justice Frankfurter in Radio Station WOW,

supra, and Republic Gas Co., supra, for the continued en-

forcement of the finality rule. The Petitioner is now re-

questing that this Court upset a decision of the Oklahoma

Supreme Court in a matter which will not bear any serious

public consequence if review was delayed, and which is

purely local in nature.

Mr. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting to the majority’s

granting of interim review in the Cox case, voiced his con-

cern over the growing trend of this court to “construe

§1257 so that [this Court] may virtually rush out and meet

5 See generally, 53 Am. Jur. 2d, Mechanic's Liens, §10 (1970)

=

the prospective constitutional litigant as he approaches

our doors.” Cox Broadcasting Corp., supra at 510. At

least in that case the majority presented a reasonable argu-

ment that a failure to decide the question before the court

there “would leave the press in Georgia operating in the

shadow of the civil and criminal sanctions of a rule of law

and a statute that the constitutionality of which was in

serious doubt. . . ” Id. at 486. For this Court to use the ra-

tionale supporting the Cox decision in order to grant in-

terim review of this case, would all but sound the death

knell for the finality rule of §1257.

Inasmuch as this case has been remanded by the Okla-

homa Supreme court for a trial on the merits; and in-

asmuch as such further proceedings will not hinder the Pe-

titioner’s opportunity to have his federal claim reviewed by

this Court at a later date; and since the circumstances of

this case do not represent any urgent circumstances war-

ranting a waiver of the finality rule of §1257, the

Respondents respectfully submit that the writ of certiorari

requested by the Petitioner should be denied.

The prior decisions of this Court control the

federal issues involved here and therefore this case

presents no new substantial federal question.

It is an established principle of this Court that when a

state court has correctly relied upon a previous decision of

this Court in answering a federal question, this Court

should not interfere with the state court’s decision. Min-

neapolis, S.P. & S.S.M.R. Co. v. C. L. Merrick Co., 254

~~

U.S. 376, 41 S.Ct. 142, 65 L.Ed.2d 312 (1920); Utely v. St.

Petersburg, 292 U.S. 106, 54 S.Ct. 593, 78 L.Ed.2d 1155,

reh den 292 U.S. 604, 54 S.Ct. 712, 78 L.Ed.2d 1466

(1934).

The Oklahoma Supreme Court’s holding in this case

that the filing of a mechanics’ or materialmen’s lien was a

de minimus interference with the use and enjoyment of the

debtor’s property followed the decision of the Arizona

District Court in Spielman-Fond Inc. v. Hanson’s, Inc.,

379 F.Supp. 997 (D. Ariz. 1973), aff'd 417 U.S. 901, 94

S.Ct. 2596, 41 L.Ed.2d 208 (1974).

Petitioners argue that the summary affirmance by this

Court of Spielman-Fond should not have controlling in-

fluence on this case. They rely on the concurring opinion

of Chief Justice Burger in Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S.

379, 391 95 S.Ct. 533, 42 L.Ed.2d 521 (1975), wherein he

indicated that a summary affirmance of a judgment by

this Court of a three-judge district court is an affirmance

of the judgment but not necessarily the reasoning by which

it was reached.

However, subsequent to the Fusari decision, this

Court addressed itself more directly to the question of the

precedential value of summary decisions. In Hicks v.

Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 95 S.Ct. 2281, 45 L.Ed.2d 223

(1975), this Court made it clear that the summary affirm-

ance by this Court of a lower federal court decision was a

decision on the merits, and lower federal courts were to be

bound by that summary affirmance until such time as this

Court indicated otherwise. Id. at 344.

Since the Oklahma Supreme Court was presented

on Stns

with a federal constitutional question in this case, it was

bound by precedents established by this Court. The

Oklahoma Supreme Court’s reliance on Spielman-Fond in

reaching their decision was required by the Hicks ruling.

The Hicks court did indicate that the precedential

weight afforded a summary decision could be mitigated by

the inability of lower courts to accurately ascertain what

issues were decided by this Court in a summary decision,

or by doctrinal developments occurring subsequent to the

summary decision which would necessitate a reevaluation

of that authority. Id. at 344.

A comparison of Spielman-Fond and the present case

reveals no ground for a claim of confusion in the issues

decided, and a search of the subsequent cases dealing with

the precise issue involved indicates that there has been no

substantial doctrinal developments since Spielman-Fond

that would warrant a reexamination of the issue involved

herein.®

6State and federal courts upholding the rationale of Spielman-Fond since it

was decided include: Silverman v. Gosset, 553 S.W.2d 581 (Tenn. 1977);

Banker’s Trust Co. v. El Paso Pre-Cast Co., 560 P.2d 457 (Colo. 1977);

Carl A. Morse v. Rentar Indus. Dev. Corp., 391 N.Y.S.2d 42 (N.Y. 1977);

S. Cent. Dist. Pentecostal Church of God of America, Inc. v. Bruce-Rogers

Co., 599 S.W.2d 702 (Ark. 1980); Williams & Works, Irc. v. Springfield

Corp., 265 N.W.2d 328 (Mich. App. 1978); Tucker Door & Trim Corp. v.

Fifteenth Street Co., 2 S.E.2d 433 (Ga. 1975); In re Thomas A. Cary, Inc.,

412 F.Supp. 667 (E.D. Va. 197“ B. & P. Development Co. v. Walker, 420

F.Supp. 704 (W.D. Pa. 1976).

Those cases which have either rejected the de minimus rationale of

Spielman-Fond, or have otherwise distinguished that case, include: Connol-

ly Development, Inc. v. Superior Court of Merced County, 553 P.2d 637

(Cal. 1976) (upholding the California lien laws as constitutional as providing

sufficient due process protections); Roundhouse Construction Corp. v.

(Continued)

=.

In Spielman-Fond, the district court addressed itself

to the singular issue of whether the filing of a mechanics’

or materialmen’s lien constituted a substantial taking of

property warranting the constitutional protections of due

process, or merely a de minimus interference with the

owner’s use and enjoyment of his property not requiring

the full panoply of due process protections. If the district

court had found the former to be the case, they would

have been required to examine the Arizona statutory

scheme to determine if it provided adequate due process

protections. However, by adopting the de minimus ra-

tionale, the court obviated any need for an examination of

the statutory scheme. Indeed, nowhere in the Spielman-

Fond opinion does the court address itself to the par-

ticulars of the Arizona statutes.

The only reasonable conclusion that can possibly be

reached by examining that decision is that this Court

upheld the de minimus determination of the Arizona

district court. For this Court to have summarily affirmed

the district court’s judgment on the grounds that the

Arizona laws provided adequate due process protection,

as the Petitioners hypothesized this Court could have

(Continued)

Telesco Masons Supplies Co., Inc., 362 A.2d 778 (Conn. 1974)

(distinguishing the Connecticut statutor scheme involved from that in

Spielman-Fond); Barry Properties, Inc. v. Fisk Bros. Roofing Co., 353

A.2d 222 (Md. 1976) (distinguishing the Maryiand statutory scheme frorn

that involved in Spielman-Fond).

Thus, since i976, all jurisdictions which have considered the constitutionali-

ty of their particular lien laws have held them to be constitutional, and of

those, at least seven have adopted the de minimus rationale of the Spielman-

Fond court.

=.

done, would have necessitated that this Court first reverse

the finding made by the Arizona district court of the de

minimus nature of the taking involved and then affirm the

result on grounds which that court never even considered

in its decision. Such a convoluted line of reasoning

stretches the doctrine of judicial interpretation beyond ac-

ceptable limits and would have the effect of leaving any

summary decision of this Court bankrupt of meaningful

precedential value, a result quite contrary to this Court’s

statements in Hicks.

Inasmuch as the Oklahoma Supreme Court based its

decision on the grounds that the filing of a mechanics’ or

materialmen’s lien constituted a de minimus interference

with the use and enjoyment of property; and since that

conclusion was based on this Court’s summary affirmance

of Spielman-Fond; and further, because there has been no

indication of new and contrary doctrinal developments

dealing with this issue since Spielman-Fond; and inasmuch

as there is no reasonable doubt concerning the issue de-

cided by Spielman-Fond; the Respondents respectfully

submit that this Court is bound by the summary affir-

mance of that case and that the writ of certiorari requested

by the Petitioners should be denied.

The decision of the Oklahoma Supreme Court

rests on adequate state grounds and therefore pre-

cludes a reexamination of the issues involved by

this Court.

When a decision by a state court could have been

a

decided on either state or federal grounds, this Court will

not interfere with that decision if it is supported by ade-

quate state grounds. Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309

U.S. 551, 60 S.Ct. 676, 84 L.Ed. 920 (1940); Jankovich v.

Indiana Toll Road Commission, 379 U.S. 487, 85 S.Ct.

493, 13 L.Ed.2d 439 (1965).

In the present case, the original Order entered by the

trial judge granting the Petitioner’s motion for a summary

judgment declared that the Oklahoma lien laws in ques-

tion were repugnant to both the Oklahoma constitution

and the federal constitution.” The subsequent reversal by

the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated that those laws were

not repugnant to either the state or federal constitutions.

In such circumstances, where the state court decision

rests on similar provisions of either the state or federal

constitutions, this Court has stated that the state constitu-

tional provision can provide an independent and adequate

ground for the decision, thus denying this Court jurisdic-

tion to review the state judgment. Jankovich, supra at 489.

This Court was faced with a similar situation in

Roundhouse Construction Corp. v. “elesco Masons Sup-

7 Layon v. First National Bank of Tulsa, No. C-75-1071 (D.C. Tulsa County,

State of Oklahoma, July 18, 1977). The trial judge in granting the Peti-

tioner’s pretrial Motion for a summary judgment, stated that “[The

Oklahoma] statutes are unconstitutional and void because they fail to pro-

vide due process of law as required by the Fourteenth Amendment of the

United States Constitution and Article 2, Section 7 of the Oklahoma Consti-

tution.” (Emphasis added). See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, App. F at 2,

Mobile v. Layon, 653 P.2d 591 (1980).

8 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, App. A at 16, Mobile v. Layon, 653

P.2d 591 (1980). See Note 6, supra at 18, for state and federal cases in ac-

cord.

~— =

plies Co., Inc., 168 Conn. 371, 362 A.2d 778 (1975).

There, a decision by the Connecticut Supreme Court in-

validating that state’s mechanics’ and materialmen’s lien

laws was appealed to this Court, and was subsequently

vacated and remanded to the Connecticut court for a

determination of whether it based its decision on provi-

sions of the state or federal constitution. 423 U.S. 809, 96

S.Ct. 20, 46 L.Ed.2d 29 (1975). At the rehearing, the Con-

necticut Supreme Court stated that its decision was based

on state and federal grounds. 170 Conn. 155, 365 A.2d 393

(1976). A subsequent petition for writ of certiorari was

denied by this Court on the grounds that the Connecticut

decision was based on adequate state grounds. 429 U.S.

889, 97 S.Ct. 246, 50 L.Ed.2d 172 (1976).

The general rule that has evolved from these decisions

is that absent an indication that the state court’s decision

was based specifically on federal provisions, or that the

state and federal grounds are so interwoven that the Court

cannot conclude that the judgment rests on independent

state grounds, then this Court should decline to review a

state court’s decision. Jankovich, supra at 491-492.

Inasmuch as a decision of the Oklahoma Supreme

Court in this case rests adequately on provisions of the

Oklahoma Constitution; and since the Oklahoma Su-

preme Court did not rely on provisions of the federal con-

stitution in reaching their decision; the Respondent

respectfully submits that the decision of the Oklahoma

Supreme Court rests on adequate state grounds, and there-

fore Petitioner’s request for a writ of certiorari should be

denied.

-—16—

CONCLUSION

This Respondent respectfully submits that this Court

lacks jurisdiction to review this case at this time.

There has been no final decision in this case as re-

quired by 28 U.S.C. §1257. The Oklahoma Supreme

Court has remanded this case to the trial court for pro-

ceedings on the merits, and the Petitioners could prevail

therein on non-federal grounds.

Also, the issue involved in this case does not present

any new or substantial federal question for this Court to

resolve. This Court has settled that issue in its summary

affirmance of Spielman-Fond, and in the absence of any

doctrinal developments subsequent to that decision, the

Oklahoma Supreme Court’s reliance on that decision when

considering a federal question is not misplaced.

Finally, the decision of the Oklahoma Supreme Court

rests on adequate state grounds precluding a review by this

Court. The Oklahoma Supreme Court’s opinion is based

on provisions of the Oklahoma Constitution as well as the

federal constitution, and that court did not rely on any

specific provisions of the federal constitution in reaching

its decision.

In light of all the foregoing, Respondent submits that

Petitioner’s request for a writ of certiorari should be

denied.

Wesley R. Thompson

Thomas A. Layon

15 South Park

Sapulpa, Oklahoma 74066

Attorneys for Respondent

Verlee C. Layon