Amicus Brief — Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co.

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ss ee No.80-1925

bs , oo IN THE

. Supreme Court of the Anited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION

ro .

v.

LONG ISLAND RAILROAD COMPANY and

METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

t —_——— +

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE, AND BRIEF AMICUS

CURIAE OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF

_ MUNICIPAL LAW OFFICERS IN SUPPORT OF

RESPONDENTS, LONG ISLAND RAILROAD AND

METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY

Petitioner,

101 City & County Building

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

STANLEY J. GARBER

Corporation Counsel

511 City Hall

Chicago, Illinois 60602

LEE E. HOLT

City Attorney

501 Municipal Building

Dallas, Texas 75201

GEORGE F. KNOX, JR.

City Attorney

174 E. Flagier Street

Miami, Florida 33131

WALTERM. “OWELL

ALLEN G. SCHWARTZ

Corporation Counsel

100 Church Street

Room 6A-11

New York, New York 10007

J. LAMAR SHELLEY

City Attorney

48 North Macdonald Street

Mesa, Arizona 95201

City Administration Building

Washington, D.C. 20036

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

No. 80-1925

UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION,

Petitioner,

v.

LONG ISLAND RAILROAD COMPANY and

METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF

AS AMICUS CURIAE

The National Institute of Municipal Law Officers

(NIMLO) moves the Court for leave to file the attached brief

as amicus curiae in support of the Respondents, Long Island

Railroad Company and Metropolitan Transportation Au-

thority. The respondents have consented to the filing of the

brief, but the petitioner has withheld consent. The letter

granting consent has been lodged with the Clerk.

l

2

NIMLO submits that its brief can assist the Court in

determining whether publicly owned and operated transit

systems are integral and traditional governmental functions

within the meaning of the principles of Federalism as

expressed in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.

833 (1976). NIMLO’s interest in the issue is set out in the

Interest of the Amicus Curiae section of the attached brief.

That brief analyzes the historical development of transit

operations in the United States from the days of private

ownership and operation to the present situation of forced

takeover and operation by state and local governments. It

also considers the nature of the interest involved in the

uninterrupted delivery of public transportation services.

Because of the widespread ownership and operation of

transit systems by state and local governments, this case is of

nationwide importance, and, we submit, the attached amicus

brief will assist the Court in evaluating the nationwide

importance of the decision in this case.

Therefore, we urge the Court to grant NIMLO leave to file

the attached brief as amicus curiae.

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN DEKKER HENRY W. UNDERHILL,

Director of Law JR.

City Hall, 13th Floor City Attorney

455 North Main Street 600 East Trade Street

Wichita, Kansas 67202 Charlotte, North Carolina

JAMES B. BRENNAN 28202

City Attorney BENJAMIN L. BROWN

800 City Hall City Solicitor

Milwaukee, Wisconsin 101 City Hall

53202 Baltimore, Maryland

21202

ROY D. BATES

City Attorney

City Hall

P.O. Box 147

Columbia, South Carolina

29217

GEORGE AGNOST

City Attorney

206 City Hall

San Francisco, California

94102

ROGER F. CUTLER

City Attorney

101 City & County

Building

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

STANLEY J. GARBER

Corporation Counsel

511 City Hall

Chicago, Illinois 60602

LEE E. HOLT

City Attorney

501 Municipal Building

Dallas, Texas 75201

GEORGE F. KNOX, JR.

City Attorney

174 E. Flagler Street

Miami, Florida 33131

100 Church Street

Room 6A-11

New York, New York

10007

J. LAMAR SHELLEY

City Attorney

48 North Macdonald

Street

Mesa, Arizona 95201

AARON A. WILSON

City Attorney

28th Floor - City Hall

Kansas City, Missouri

64106

JOHN W. WITT

City Attorney

202 C Street

City Administration

Building

San Diego, California

92101

MAX P. ZALL

City Attorney

City & County Building

Denver, Colorado 80202

CONARD B. MATTOX,

JR., Esq.

309 Marston Avenue

Richmond, Virginia 23221

CHARLES S. RHYNE,

Counsel of Record

MARTHA B, PEDRICK

1000 Connecticut Ave.,

N.W.

Suite 800

Washington, DC. 20036

(202) 466-5420

Attorneys for National Insti-

tute of Municipal Law

Officers as Amicus Curiae

October 1981

(i)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Interest of the amicus Curiae ..........ccccccccccccesvcvnce 1

DE CUE he codec conccevicualn bdebiedapaens te 3

EL Sc lasuddays sdccccakepebeneeuniocbieas 4

PRE ait b'3's WEd RS eneRe che descent Adedre ciceWeveeer 6

I. The question in this case is whether a state-

owned railroad, primarily engaged in the

provision of commuter service to the working

public, and only incidentally engaged in inter-

state freight operations, is an integral and

traditional government function of state and

II. The self-help provisions of the Railway Labor

Act may not constitutionally be applied to the

operation of a state-owned commuter railroad

under our Nation’s system of Federalism ............ 9

A. The facts of public transit operations, as

exemplified by the operation of the ra

Island railroad, demonstrate that

rin iti Suerte os tae patito

an integral and traditional governmental

function of state and local governments.......... 10

B. This court’s decision in Hodel v. Virginia

Surface Mining and Reclamation Associ-

ation is not determinative of the issue in this

(ii)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page

American Public Transit Association v. Lewis,

Oe Ee Mes COMED 0 cc cv ascvvccvectoceuevegec 12

Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclama-

tion Association,

POD; POA CE BS, LSD) 6c ccccdeccecccceceeve 17,18

Munn v. Illinois,

seeds can FL 0s s eWelnwes spissshesecgade 1}

National League of Cities v. Usery,

MEd CUES Ces cds cb cBisn cis ceopovegss passim

United States v. California,

EE Di cO bata bso cle cosdcheecdcabapsedgeteaces 4

Constitution, statutes and regulations:

United States Constitution, Tenth Amendment ....... passim

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §7401 ef seg...........++45- 16,17

Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §201 et seg. .... 10,18

National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §152(2)........ 18

Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §151 ef seg. .......... 5,9,10

Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977,

RED ORME, vo'e'e cclecedecccvscheseccess 17,18

. Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, 49 U.S.C.

EMT 2hc PEUS nS UMD ce ccccccdccucdecvected 8,12,13

N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law §200 et seg. (McKinney 1973

and Supp. 1980) (“Taylor Law”) ................. 2,4,5,8

eT EME TEEU cc oi ccccscccuccospedetescess 12

Miscellaneous:

A. Altschuler, Changing Patterns of Policy: The

Decision-Making Environment of Urban Transpor-

tation, Public Policy, Spring 1977 ................000- 13

(iii)

American Public Transit Association, Transit Fact

CE FEP TE MED cevcccccicscccageceoneds 5,10,11,15

109 Congressional Record 5671-73 (1963).........-+006: 8

46 Federal Register 37488 (July 20, 1981)............... 12

The Impact of Transportation on the Central Business

District, Traffic Quarterly, October 1980 .............. 16

Institute of Public Administration, Financing Transit:

Alternatives for Local Government, July 1979 .11,12,13,14

Public Transit and Downtown Development, Metro-

SUE nc cae va ceecncvaesedian canes 16

University of Illinois at Chicago Circle, School of

Urban Sciences, Moving People: An Introduction to

Public Transportation, January 1981 ...... 7,8,11,12,13,15

Weekly Bond Buyer, July 13, 1981 ..............eeeeeee 15

Womack and Altschuler, An Examination of the

Transit Funding Process at the Local Level,

DE <atGetWKGUAGAUNs vey ee esenceaedaeaeses 10,15

IN THE .

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

No. 80-1925

UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION,

Petitioner,

v.

LONG ISLAND RAILROAD COMPANY and

METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

BRIEF OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF

MUNICIPAL LAW OFFICERS AS AMICUS CURIAE

INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE

This brief amicus curiae is filed on behalf of the more

than 1600 local governments, or political subdivisions of

states, who are members of the National Institute of

Municipal Law Officers (NIMLO). These member local

governments operate NIMLO through their chief legal

officer, variously called city or county attorney, corporation

l

2

counsel, city solicitor or law director and other titles, with

each member local government having one vote on all

actions which are casi by the organization. This brief

amicus curiae is signed by the chief legal officers of

NIMLO members on behalf of their own local government

and the chief legal officers of the members of NIMLO in

their officiai capacity.

The local government attorneys who participate in the

work of NIMLO are responsible for advising local govern-

ment officials, in cities and counties which own and

operate a public transit system, on the subject of employ-

ment relations involving transit system employees. They

assist in negotiating contracts between municipal transit

systems and their employees, both through collective

bargaining and through arbitration processes where they

exist. They must also advise the local governing body when

transit employees threaten and engage in strike actions.

Since National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.

833 (1976), local governments have structured their em-

ployment relations free of federal interference in those

areas of integral and traditional government operations

expressly identified by this Court. However, lack of

guidance from this Court as to what constitutes integral

and traditional governmental operations, produces un-

certainty among local governments in providing public

services.

The essential nature of public transit service and the

very real threat of strikes by these public employees is of

great concern to local government transit system owners.

Laws such as New York’s Taylor Law were enacted to

prevent the interruption in the provision of essential

government services such as public transportation. If the

opinion of the Court of Appeals is left standing, it will

3

allow local government transit system owners to structure

employment relations based on local needs and circum-

stances. Because the Court of Appeals properly analyzed

the facts of the Long Island Railroad operations in

determining whether those operations were integral and

traditional governmental operations within the meaning

of National League, NIMLO urges affirmance of the

Judgment of the Court of Appeals.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Long Island Railroad (LIRR) is a state-owned and

operated railroad, primarily engaged in the transportation

of passengers from counties in Long Island to their jobs and

businesses in New York City, and incidentally in the

hauling of freight in interstate commerce. Pet. App. 4a.'

The Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), an

agency of the State of New York, purchased the LIRR from

the Pennsylvania Railroad in 1966, based upon a deter-

mination that private enterprise could no longer continue

to provide the service. Pet. App. 21a. In 1968, the LIRR

became part of the largest public transit operation in the

country as subway and bus transit operations transporting

some 5.5 million daily passengers were added to the

jurisdiction of the MTA. Brief in Opposition, at 4.

Prior to its conversion to public benefit corporation

status in February, 1980, the LIRR’s 6,900 employees

"In 1980, other railroads providing local passenger service in addition

to freight services still maintained a high ratio of interstate freight

revenue to aggregate revenue (96.9%) compared to the LIRR (4%).

Brief in Opposition, at 6.

4

were the only employees of the MTA’s work force of 50,000

public employees not covered by the Taylor Law. Brief in

Opposition, at 6. Interestingly, one of the factors leading to

enactment of the Taylor Law was the transit strike in

1966. Pet. App. 14a. The principal objective of the

conversion to public benefit corporation status was to

subject the LIRR employees to the Taylor Law. Brief in

Opposition, at 3.

In light of the facts of the LIRR’s operations, and the

operation of public transit systems nationwide, the Court

of Appeals held that the state’s operation of a passenger

rail service constituted an integral governmental function

within the meaning of National League of Cities v.

Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), based on the finding that

public transportation is a service that state and local

governments are particularly suited to provide and have

been forced to provide by a process of economic elimina-

tion of private suppliers. Pet. App. 18a. In addition, the

Court found the importance of the LIRR’s passenger

service to the public greater than the state-operated freight

line in United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936).

Pet. App. 18a.

. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

State and local governments have long been involved in

the provision of transit service to the public, historically as

grantors of franchises to private transit companies to

occupy the public streets and, more recently, as owners and

operators of transit systems. The determination of whether

and when transit operations are an “integral and tradi-

tional governmental function” under National League of

Cities v. Usery, 429 U.S. 833 (1976), requires an

5

examination of the facts of public transit as it exists

today.

The State of New York faced the termination of com-

muter rail service provided by a privately-owned railroad

to the public when operating and capital costs could no

longer be financed from the revenue produced by the private

system. Rather than lose this essential public service, the

State had no choice but to purchase and operate the

system. Forced public takeover as occurred in the case of

the Long Island Railroad is typical of the forced public

takeover, occurring over the last two decades, of privately

owned transit sy.tems nationwide. Although publicly

owned systems represent only 48% of the transit industry,

they carry 91% of all transit passengers and produce 90%

of all operating revenues.’

One of the primary services performed by public transit

systems is the transportation of persons from their homes to

downtown jobs and businesses. Interruptions caused by

employee strikes in this essential public service produce

disastrous results for commuters, the city and state, and

local businesses. The pressure on the public transit owner

to avoid a strike is great. Laws like New York’s Taylor

Law were enacted to avoid the interruption in the delivery

of public services caused by a strike. Application of the

Railway Labor Act which would allow employees of a

state-owned and operated commuter railroad to strike in

contravention of the state law prohibiting strikes by public

employees, displaces the state’s ability to structure employ-

ment relationships in furnishing an essential public service

in violation of state constitutional powers as described by

2American Public Transit Association, Transit Fact Book, 1978-

1979 ed., at 38-39.

6

this Court’s decision in National League of Cities v.

Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).

With the advent of public takeover, a substantial

program of government subsidization of capital and

operating expenses has developed to maintain this essen-

tial public service. In conjunction with government subsi-

dization of operating and capital costs, transit has

become an important means of achieving governmental

social, economic and environmental goals which benefit

not only the transit passenger, but also the community in

which the system operates.

The Court of Appeals properly analyzed the facts of the

operation of the Long Island Railroad. Those operations

were properly found to be an integral and traditional

governmental function within the meaning of the principles

set forth in Federalism as defined in National League.

ARGUMENT

I. THE QUESTION IN THIS CASE IS

WHETHER A STATE-OWNED RAIL-

ROAD, PRIMARILY ENGAGED IN

THE PROVISION OF COMMUTER

SERVICE TO THE WORKING PUBLIC,

AND ONLY INCIDENTALLY EN-

GAGED IN INTERSTATE FREIGHT

OPERATIONS, IS AN INTEGRAL AND

TRADITIONAL GOVERNMENTAL

FUNCTION OF STATE AND LOCAL

GOVERNMENTS

7

Public mass transportation systems, of which the Long

Island Railroad (LIRR) is a part,’ account for nearly 90%

of the trips entering the central business district in cities

like New York.* One of the primary services performed by

these systems, as in the case of the LIRR, Brief for the

Petitioner, at 13, is the transportation of persons from their

homes to work and downtown businesses, and home again.

Thus, the interest of the public transit system owner and

operator in the uninterrupted functioning of the system is

great. Disruption caused by labor strife is one of the

greatest threats to the system’s smooth operation and the

economic stability of the community it serves.

At the very least, this case presents a very narrow

question for decision by this Court. Both the Petitioners

United Transportation Union (UTU), Brief, at 13, and the

LIRR, Brief in Opposition at 3-4, agree that the LIRR is

unique among operators of commuter railroads.* The high

percentage of revenue derived from the LIRR’s passenger

service compared to that attributable to the hauling of

freight in interstate commerce, which the Court of Appeals

characterized as “but a fraction of the revenues of the

LIRR,” Pet. App. 10a, is not found elsewhere. The primary

public interest, then, is in the smooth operation of the

Under the jurisdiction of the Respondent Metropolitan Transporta-

tion Authority, the LIRR is part of the largest transit operation in the

Nation, carrying some 5.5 million daily rail, subway and bus riders. Brief

in Opposition, at 5.

“University of Illinois at Chicago Circle, School of Urban Sciences,

Moving People: An Introduction to Public Transportation, January

1981, at 5, hereafter referred to as Moving People.

*The United States is in agreement noting that the majority of the

business of other carriers is derived from freight operations. Amicus

Curiae Brief of the United States, at 29-30, n.24.

8

system so that commuters get to their jobs and downtown

businesses via public transportation. This is especially

true in cities like New York where such a high percentage

of trips into the central business district are via public

transportation. °

The Taylor Law was enacted for the protection of the

public to assure the orderly and uninterrupted operations

and functions of government by prohibiting strikes by

public employees. Pet. App. 14a. Continuous public

transportation is among the most important of government

operations, the uninterrupted functioning of which the

Taylor Law was designed to assure.’ A transit strike

leaves many commuters stranded, unable to get to work,

and results in severe financial losses to downdown busi-

nesses and thus to the city and state and to their employees.*

A strike produces adverse environmental effects as com-

muters turn to automobiles, thereby adding to traffic

congestion and increasing air pollution. The government

interests involved in this case, then, are those of the public

interest of New York rather than any overriding public

need of the federal government. And, in light of the nature of

public transit operations today, this Court must conclude

" ‘Moving People, supra, n.4.

7As the Court of Appeals noted, the Taylor Law was in large part a

response to the transit strike in 1966. Pet. App. 14a. Interestingly, the

legislative history of Section 13(c) of the Urban Mass Transportation

Act, 49 U.S.C. §1609(c) which requires as a condition of federal

funding under that Act, that fair and equitable arrangements be made to

protect the employees affected by the assistance, reveals that that section

was not intended to supercede state laws forbidding public employee

strikes. 109 Cong. Rec. 5671-73 (1963) (remarks of Senator Morse).

*A loss by New York City of $1.1 billion and $100 million daily by

businesses during the 11 day transit strike in April 1980 was

documented in the Court of Appeals. Pet. App. 15a.

9

that such operations are integral and traditional within

the meaning of the principles of Federalism set forth in

National League and other decisions of this Court.

Il. THE SELF-HELP PROVISIONS OF

THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT MAY NOT

CONSTITUTIONALLY BE APPLIED

TO THE OPERATION OF A STATE-

OWNED COMMUTER RAILROAD

UNDER OUR NATION’S SYSTEM OF

FEDERALISM

In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833

(1976), this Court held that the federal government could

not, consistent with Federalism and the principles set forth

in the Tenth Amendment, “exercise [its power to regulate

commerce] so as to force directly upon the States its

choices as to how essential decisions regarding the

conduct of integral governmental functions are to be

made.”? Application of the Railway Labor Act, which

would allow employees of a state-owned and operated

commuter railroad to strike in contravention of a state law

which prohibits strikes by public employees is contrary to

the public interests of states and local governments and

displaces their ability to structure employer-employee

relationships in discharging the dual functions of adminis-

tering the public law and furnishing public services.'®

There is no question that public transportation is a vital

public service and that the state performs a vital public

interest in providing it when private interests withdraw

from this field of service. As the Court of Appeals noted,

Pet. App. 15a, the freedom to strike has a negative

influence on the collective bargaining process. The threat

*National League of Cities, supra, 426 U.S., at 855.

'°Td., at 851.

10

of a transit strike causes the public transit employer to

agree to the payment of higher wages in order to avoid a

strike.'' The freedom to strike, embodied in the Railway

Labor Act, displaces the state’s decisions in structuring its

employment relationships in the same manner as those

decisions were displaced by the minimum wage and

overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29

U.S.C. §201 et seg., when it was amended to include

nearly all employees of state and local governments. '?

A. THE FACTS OF PUBLIC TRANSIT

OPERATIONS, AS EXEMPLIFIED

BY THE OPERATION OF THE

LONG ISLAND RAILROAD, DE-

MONSTRATE THAT TRANSIT IS

AN INTEGRAL AND TRADITION-

AL GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION

OF STATES AND LOCAL GOV-

ERNMENTS

Transit operations in the United States have evolved

from that of a public service provided primarily by the

private sector to one which is today, of necessity, virtually

exclusively provided by government.'? Governmental in-

"Womack and Altschuler, An Examination of the Transit Fund-

ing Process at the Local Level, May 1979, at 18 “(While [public

officials] may also feel pressure from voters and taxpayer groups if

additional revenues must be found to pay wage settlements, these only

come much later and permit more flexibility in diffusing the blame.)

Hereafter referred to as Transit Funding Process.

"Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, amending 29 U.S.C.

§201 et seq.

“Publicly owned transit systems carry 91% of all transit passengers.

90% of the operating revenues of transit systems nationwide are derived

from public transit systems. Transit Fact Book, supra, at 38-39.

volvement in transit operations, though, is certainly not

new.'* This dramatic and relatively recent forced rise in

public ownership and operation of transit systems grew out

of an overall decline in the use and revenues of the private

transit industry following World War II.'* During the

same period, increased operating costs added to the

private transit system owner’s financial difficulties.'* In

the mid-1960s, operating costs were approximately equal

to operating revenues. In 1974, operating expenses were

more than one and one half times greater than operating

revenues.'’ Small wonder that private operators quit this

field of service!

Several factors have been identified as contributing to

the decline in the local transit industry. The general move

out of the central city and into the suburbs with the

accompanying rise in the use of the automobile was a

Munn vy. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125 (1876) “[In the exercise of the

police power] it has been customary in England from time im-

memorial, and in this country from its first colonization, to regulate

ferries, common carriers, hackmen. . .and in so doing to fix a maximum

charge to be made for services rendered. . . .”

In 1950, transit carried 13.8 billion passengers. By 1977, ridership

had decreased to 5.7 billion. Moving People, supra, at 5.

‘Between 1950 and 1970, operating costs per transit mile increased

an average of approximately 4.2% per year while the consumer price

index for the same years increased an average of only approximately

2.4% per year. Institute of Public Administration, Financing Transit:

Alternatives for Local Government, July 1979, at 8-9, hereafter

referred to as Financing Transit.

"Transit Fact Book, supra, at 20-21.

12

major factor.'* Increased labor costs were another factor. '®

A third factor was the cost of accomplishing certain

governmental social and environmental goals, among

them the provision of special services for school children,

the elderly” and the handicapped.”' The cost of complying

"Moving People, supra, at 15-16, 18. Given the lower density in

suburban areas, the cost of transit service per passenger greatly

increased. Another phenomenon known as “peaking,”’ or the concen-

tration of riders during the rush hours, in combination with labor

contracts requiring overtime for hours worked in excess of eight,

actually makes rush hour service more costly than non-rush hour

services.

'°A substantial proportion (75%) of operating expenses are attribu-

table to wages and related benefits. In 1950, the average annual transit

wage was higher than the wages of manufacturing and city employees.

Between 1950 and 1975 the rate of increase in transit wages was more

than 50% greater than that for manufacturing employees. Financing

Transit, supra, at 8, 11.

*Rates for the elderly and handicapped during non-peak hours may

not exceed one-half of the rates generally applicable during peak

hours. 49 U.S.C. § 1604(m).

""Based on the requirements of §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of

1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C §794, and §16 of the Urban Mass

Transportation Act, as amended, 49 U.S.C. §1612, requiring that

mass transit be accessible to the handicapped and elderly, the

Department of Transportation adopted implementing regulations, in

conformance with the HEW guidelines, which became effective May

31, 1979. 49 C.F.R. § §27.81-27.119 (1979). The’ regulations were

found to exceed the Department of Transportation’s authority under

§504. American Public Transit Association v. Lewis, 655 F.2d

1272 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The Department of Transportation has

promulgated an interim rule requiring recipients of federal funds to

certify that special efforts to provide transportation that handicapped

persons can use are being made pending reconsideration of the regula-

tory requirements under § §504 and 16. 46 Fed. Reg. 37488 (July 20,

1981).

13

with conditions attached to federal and state subsidies

has contributed to an overall decline in system productivity

as measured by revenue passengers per employee during

the period between 1950-1976.”?

Faced with the prospect of losing essential transit

service, state and local governments have been forced to

purchase and operate the private systems. With enactment

of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 (UMTA),

49 U.S.C. §1601 ef seq., the federal government made

federal funds for acquisition of private systems avail-

able.”> Since enactment of the UMTA, the federal

government has been heavily involved in the subsidization

of public transit systems.”

The history of the operation of the Long Island Railroad

fits the pattern of forced takeover by state and local

governments of financially troubled private systems as the

only alternative to loss of this essential public service. The

financial difficulties of the LIRR were typical of other

privately owned commuter railroads. Brief in Opposition,

at 12.

"Financing Transit, supra, at 2. Among the conditions adding to

labor costs identified by one commentator are the prevailing wage

requirements, 49 U.S.C. §1609(a), and the requirement that the

Secretary of Labor determine that “fair and equitable arrangements

are made, . . to protect the interests of employees affected by [federal]

assistance,” 49 U.S.C. § 1609(c). Generally, the Secretary will grant

certification only if all affected unions concur. Competitors threatened

by publicly aided service improvements are generally entitled to

compensation or are bought out. 49 U.S.C. §1602(e). A. Altschuler,

Changing Patterns of Policy: The Decision-Making Environment of

Urban Transportation, Public Policy, Spring 1977, at 171, 194.

“Funds for acquisition are authorized under 49 U.S.C. § 1602.

“The federal government contributes 80% of the total financial

assistance for capital expenditures and 10.9% of all operating

assistance. Moving People, supra, at 70.

14

‘As the Court of Appeals noted, the state’s purchase of the

railroad in 1966 “was premised on its finding that private

enterprise would be unable to continue to own and operate

the facility.” Pet. App. 21a, n.27.

The LIRR is the only common carrier railroad serving

Long Island. Brief for Petitioner, at 10. It carries a daily

ridership of 260,000 which is primarily commuter in

nature, Brief in Opposition, at 9, generally of the home to

work type. Brief for Petitioner, at 13. The railroad receives

the benefit of substantial federal subsidization since its

takeover by the state, having received an estimated

$450,000,000 between 1967 and 1980. Brief for Petitioner,

at 10, n.7.

The mere fact of forced public takeover and operation of

such a substantial portion of the private transit industry

over the last two decades should be sufficient to satisfy

National League’s test of integralness. But, there are other

distinguishing features of public transit operations which

lend support to the argument.

Although transit is not a free public service due to the

tradition of charging fares, it is not a self-supporting

public utility like telephone or electric utilities. Transit

competes with individual motorists while utility com-

panies enjoy the status of government-protected monopolies.

After forced public takeover, the transit system has

ceased to operate as it did when privately owned. Increased

costs are not always passed on to the consumer as is the

case with other utilities. Nor are fares necessarily tied to

transit costs per passenger.** On the contrary, increasingly

*Between 1950 and 1970, fares rose slightly less than transit costs

per passenger. However, between 1970 and 1975, transit costs per

passenger rose 14.3% per year while fares rose only 3.6% per year.

Financing Transit, supra, at 8, 10.

15

less and less of the operating expenses are recovered from

fares.** Rather, publicly owned transit systems are sup-

ported by tax revenues from transit and non-transit riders

who also benefit indirectly from transit service.”’

Public takeover has not cured the financial problems of

transit systems. Despite heavy subsidization, transit

continues to operate at a deficit.”* In 1978, transit operating

expenses exceeded operating revenues by $30.6 million.”

As public takeover has occurred, public attitudes toward the

financing of transit have changed.*® There is a great

reluctance to raise fares in cities experiencing public

takeovers, accompanied by pressures to provide special

services and higher wages to avoid transit strikes.*'

**Prior to World War II, nearly all operating and capital expenses

were recovered from revenue attributable to fares. By the 1960s, only

operating costs were recovered from fares, and by the late 1970s, fares

accounted for only half of all operating expenses and none of the

capital costs. Moving People, supra, at 15.

"In 1979, over $129 million in taxpayers’ funds were invested by the

state in the LIRR for operating expenses alone. Between 1966 and

1980, hundreds of millions of dollars in state subsidies have been

invested for capital expenses. Brief in Opposition, at 6.

**The threatened loss of federal operating and capital subsidies will,

for many systems heavily dependent on federal aid, make a bad

situation worse. The Weekly Bond Buyer, p. 5, July 13, 1981.

*Transit Fact Book, supra, at 20-21.

*Transit Funding Process, supra, at 4.

“In our case study cities we found a widespread expectation that

public ownership and subsidization would stabilize transit

finances by reducing operating costs (through new capital) and

by helping to attract new riders. However, more nearly the

opposite has occurred: unit costs (per vehicle mile and per

passenger) have increased rapidly in constant dollars during the

period of public, subsidized operation. Consequently, the amount

of public support needed to continue systems operations at a

given level has continued to grow rapidly... .”

*Yd., at 18.

16

Finally, aided by heavy government subsidization,

transit has become an integral component of the local

government planning process. That process is designed to

achieve governmental social, economic and environmental

goals for the benefit of society as a whole and not just the

transit passenger.

Transportation planning has become an integral com-

ponent of the overall comprehensive land use planning

process occurring at the local level. The availability of

public transportation allows land in the central business

district to be used at its highest potential, for commercial

office space, thus reducing its use for traffic and parking

needs. *? This is dramatically illustrated by the facts in this

case. State officials have estimated that 52 additional

lanes of expressway going into and out of New York City

would be required to accommodate traffic if the LIRR went

out of service and 10 city blocks would be needed solely for

parking. Pet. App. 17a. Access to public transportation

attracts economic development, thus aiding urban revitali-

zation efforts.*’

Public transportation figures prominently in the govern-

mental goal of achieving cleaner air as found in the Clean

Air Act.** The consistency requirements of the UMTA

illustrate the importance of public transportation to the

governmental planning process designed to achieve this

Traffic Quarterly, October 1980, p. 523.

“Cities have experienced considerable growth in construction of

commercial office space in the vicinity of public transit stations. Public

Transit and Downtown Development, Metropolitan, May-June 1980,

at 48.

442 U.S.C. §7401 et seq.

17

goal. Activities approved, supported or funded by the

Department of Transportation must conform to the State

Implementation Plan required under the Clean Air Act.*

As government involvement in transit service has grown,

the benefits accompanying transit have spread beyond

transit users to all segments of society. It is doubtful that

such governmental goals as urban revitalization, clean air

and energy conservation would be attainable if public

takeover had not occurred. The only conclusion to draw is

that public transit operations are and have been integral

operations of traditional governmental functions.

B. THIS COURT’S DECISION IN

HODEL V. VIRGINIA SURFACE

MINING AND RECLAMATION AS-

SOCIATION IS NOT DETERMI-

NATIVE OF THE ISSUE IN THIS

CASE.

Appellant’s reliance on this Court’s recent decision in

Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation

Association, 452 U.S. ___. (June 15, 1981) is misplaced.

Brief for Petitioner, at 19. Hodel involved a challenge,

based on the Tenth Amendment and the principles of

Federalism as expressed in National League, to the

Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30

U.S.C. §1201 et seg. (Mining Act).

We submit that Hodel is not determinative of the issue

in this case. As found by this Court, the regulatory scheme

employed in the Mining Act was one of “cooperative

federalism.” It did not require the state to participate in

the Federal program. Slip op., 22. Rather, the challenged

42 U.S.C. $7506(c).

18

provisions of the Mining Act governed only the activities

of the private coal operators and thus the requirement of

National League that the challenged federal statute must

regulate “States as States” was not met. Slip op., 21

Unlike the challenge in Hodel, the challenge here, as in

National League, is to the direct application of a federal

statute, the Railway Labor Act, to the state of New York as

employer to limit its decisions as to the structuring of its

employment relations. There is no program of cooperative

federalism involved here. The governmental transit system

owner has no choice whether or not to be governed by the

Railway Labor Act, just as it had no choice whether to

comply with the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Moreover, this Court in Hodel noted the national

interest in the environment and the economy as affected by

the surface mining industry. Slip op., 12. No such national

interests exist here. Rather, the interest in this case is in

avoiding interruptions in the provision of public services,

and this interest is purely local. Congress recognized the

local nature of this interest when it exempted all municipal

labor relations from the provisions of the National Labor

Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §152(2).

CONCLUSION

Faced with the certain prospect of losing public transit

services provided by privately owned and operated transit

companies, state and local governments have been forced

in locality after locality to purchase the financially

troubled private systems all over our Nation in order to

continue to provide this essential public service. Typically,

employees of the private transit company have become

public employees.

19

With the aid of substantial federal, state and local

subsidies, transit has become an integral part of the

governmental planning process and is the vehicle for the

accomplishment of governmental social, economic and

environmental goals which aid not only the transit rider,

but society as a whole.

Public employee labor relations have traditionally been

matters of local interest, as distinguished from matters of

national interest. Strikes by public employees are the

greatest threat to the delivery of public services by state

and local governments. Local laws such as New York’s

Taylor Law are designed to assure the uninterrupted

delivery of essential governmental services to the public.

Public transportation is one such service the interruption

of which produces drastic results. The operations of the

LIRR are an integral component of the largest public local

transit operation in this Nation. This Court should not

allow this case to turn on the incidental 4% freight

operations of that railroad.

The concept of what is an integral governmental function

should not be static because governing is not static.

Whether it takes a year or several years of public

operation to denominate a public function as a traditional

governmental function, there can be no doubt that public

transit operations are an integral and essential govern-

mental service under the facts of our day. The decision of

the Court of Appeals should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN DEKKER JAMES B. BRENNAN

Director of Law City Attorney

City Hall, 13th Floor 800 City Hall

455 North Main Street Milwaukee, Wisconsin

Wichita, Kansas 67202 53202

HENRY W. UNDERHILL, LEE E. HOLT

JR.

City Attorney

600 East Trade Street

Charlotte, North Carolina

28202

BENJAMIN L. BROWN

City Solicitor

101 City Hall

Baltimore, Maryland

21202

ROY D. BATES

City Attorney

City Hall

P.O. Box 147

Columbia, South Carolina

29217

GEORGE AGNOST

City Attorney

206 City Hall

San Francisco, California

94102

ROGER F. CUTLER

City Attorney

101 City & County

Buildi

Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

STANLEY J. GARBER

Corporation Counsel

511 City Hall

Chicago Illinois 60602

City Attorney

501 Municipal Building

Dallas, Texas 75201

GEORGE F. KNOX, JR.

City Attorney

174 E. Flagler Street

Miami, Florida 33131

WALTER M. POWELL

Corporation Counsel

100 Church Street

Room 6A-11

New York, New York

10007

J. LAMAR SHELLEY

City Attorney

48 North Macdonald

Street

Mesa, Arizona 95201

AARON A. WILSON

City Attorney

28th Floor - City Hall

Kansas City, Missouri

64106

21

JOHN W.WITT

City Attorney

202 C Street

City Administration

Building

San Diego, California

92101

MAX P. ZALL

City Attorney

City and County Building

Denver, Colorado 80202

CONARD B. MATTOX,

JR., Esq.

309 Marston Avenue

Richmond, Virginia 23221

CHARLES S. RHYNE,

Counsel of Record

MARTHA B. PEDERICK

1000 Connecticut Ave.,

N.W.

Suite 800

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 466-5420

Attorneys for National In-

stitute of Municipal Law

Officers as Amicus Curiae

October, 1981

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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