Jurisdictional Statement — Williams v. Ohio

Office-Supreme Court, U.S.

riLz2 wy

80-1867 . MAY 5. 198!

No. reaver STEYAS,

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

EDWARD JOHN WILLIAMS,

Appellant,

V.

STATE OF OHIO

Appellee.

On Appeal From the Supreme Court of Ohio

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

PATRICK H. YOUNG

Attorney of Record

of PATRICK H. YOUNG CO., L.P.A.

Attorney for the Appellant

106 East Jackson Street

Paulding, Ohio 45879

Telephone: 419/399/5991

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Cetee PUG ov aoc kets ckees eee ee i

Footie cf AMOUUIS 6 6 6dc ions tees veencsndhieesoeees iv

The Copltiows Belew «6 occ enc edvcauneesaes cee eee l

Statement of the Grounds on Which the

Jurisdiction of This Court is Invoked.............. 2

Statement of the Facts of the Case ......cceccescsces 3

The Federal Question Presented is Substantial ........ 4

i. The Court’s earlier decision in Delaware v. Prouse,

440 U.S. 625, 99 S. Ct. 1391 (1979), clearly indicates

that any evidence of an alleged criminal offense

obtained by an illegal search and seizure must be

SUTCNE a6 ccadeensecvensens shee geeueapneean 5

ii. The issue in this case is of public and great general

WORE ik cn edansciveuund cress ene een 9

COMCMINION ov ccd vcdvnvicndvisanvenbureene een 19

Appendix A Copy of Notice of Appeal to the Supreme

Coed OF GINO. «ssa ce scanda cocne cases eee 1A

Appendix B Copy of the State of Ohio’s Assignment of

Error filed in Court of Appeals ... 2.2.50 csces0 2A

Appendix C Copy of Memorandum Opinion of the Court

ff, .. PPeEVere rT ere Te eer eee 3A

QUESTION PRESENTED BY THE APPEAL

The following question is presented by this appeal:

Under the holding of Delaware vs. Prouse, 440 U.S. 625,

99 S. Ct. 1391 (1979), must evidence of an alleged criminal

offense be suppressed as a constitutionally impermissable

search and seizure where such evidence was seized during a

random motor vehicle stop made by an Ohio State Highway

Patrolman when there was no articulable or reasonable

suspicion that a violation of law had been committed or that

the vehicle or the appellant was otherwise subject to seizure?

Appendix D Copy of Journal Entry (Judgment) of the

RUE Oe PRED 6 ov cae ewteceesy coker deecennes 12A

Appendix E Copy of Journal Entry of the Court of

Common Pleas, Paulding County, Ohio ......... 13A

Appendix F Statutes ....cccccscceccccsesccesccces 14A

7.3.0, Tie GI, BO CEI ee o cescesccvedensars 14A

DR, BO Fee Ce cece vectinecccuvnnnes ISA

ph Rot rt PP eTrererrerrr cri re ISA

O.R.C. Section $503.02(B), para. 3.....cccccceces 16A

Appendix G Constitutional Provisions.............. 16A

POU FO oc cass cesvcseeeessceccesoes 16A

POULT ATORIIIOE cc cccecccvccccseccsacess 17A

Ohio Constitution

AOE PIE Dic cc necoctccccekoevsevecaucen 17A

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 226, 93 S. Ct.

SE bb dc eae ye cks hha ene hebuwneeneaes 15

Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S. Ct. 223 (1964) ...... 13

Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 93 S. Ct.

EE 6 can We de Un Hin ee a hacd a awe ONS ROE o 15

Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S. Ct.

og Ge errr ee ere 14, 15

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 625, 99 S. Ct.

1931 (1979) .. 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19

Delaware v. Prouse, 383 A. 2d 1359 (Del. 1978)....... 5

Dunway v. New York, 99 S. Ct. 2248 (1979).......... 17

Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 25 L. Ed.

PEE Shc ivateerensaeve Ube deeronayasasnees 12

Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 79 S. Ct. 804 (1959) .11

Kretchmar v. Nebraska, 99 S. Ct. 1783 (1979) .. 2, 18, 19

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684 (1961) 12, 14

Marbury v. Madison, | Granch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803)i1

Marshall v. Barlow’s Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 98 S. Ct.

SUED hia k cad dobesuenSavenciensceeen ne 13, 15

Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 4 L. Ed.

PP. s46ukbaeb eer CeSACSEKSD CERES Ee ORO wes 11

Payton v. New York, 100 S. Ct. 1371 (1980).......... 17

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES, Continued

State v. Kretchmar, 201 Neb. 308, 267 N.W. 2d

SR 18

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct.

UG ag be 13, 14, 15

Tinetti v. Wittke, 479 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. Wis 1979),

aff'd 620 F. 2d 160 (7th Cir. 1980) ............... 17

United States v. Beck, 602 F. 2d 726

ccc acewiceecosscorccescecoone 18

United States v. Brignoni- Ponce, 422 U.S. 873,

APE EMIOD cicccvecccccccccccccccscene 13

United States v. Buenaventura-Ariza, 615 F. 2d 29

SE EN cp wcccacevcesesesccovecccecccess 17

United States v. Dunbar, 470 F. Supp. 704 (D. Conn.

1979) aff'd. 610 F. 2d 807 (2d Cir. 1979) .......... 18

United States v. Martinez- Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543,

96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976) 2... cc ee ees 13

United States v. Palmer, 603 F. 2d 1286

we weed warasdecrncnccacsesecvess 17

United States v. Price, 599 F. 2d 494 (2d Cir. 1979) ..17

United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 97 S. Ct.

Se 13

United States v. Soto-Soto, 598 F. 2d 545

EN i wincdcecncesccccsvecseccccceses 18

United States v. Taylor, 488 F. Supp. 475

Es ona eee scccsartsersasncceesecs 17

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES, Continued

United States v. United States District Court,

ee a re ee es GR, BERS CEDIA) ss ccc vccccrvcces 14

Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)......... 11

Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 100 S. Ct.

i eevee eps eessesesce ce veees 17

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS:

United States Constitution

Fourth Amendment ........... 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13,

15, 16, 17, 18, 19

Fourteenth Amendment .......... 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 19

Ohio Constitution

ov eeceevccscseccecocce 12

STATUTES:

United States Code

ee ee, OUUNOD BEST CZ) oc cc ccccsccccccs 2

Ohio Revised Code

Cicer ete sccccccerecessere 6, 7

Ne Ll nab orks varetescee 13

ee i wisec ee ks sess eseecee 7

vi

l

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

NO.

EDWARD JOHN WILILIAMS,

Appellant,

Vv.

STATE OF OHIO

Appellee.

On Appeal From the Supreme Court of Ohio.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

THE OPINIONS BELOW

The Memorandum Opinion of the Court of Appeals for

Paulding County, Ohio is unreported and appears herein as

Appendix C.

2

STATEMENT OF THE GROUNDS ON WHICH THE

JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT IS INVOKED

(i) This is a criminal prosecution against the appellant,

Edward John Williams. The indictment against appellant

charged that the appellant received stolen property in

violation of Ohio Revised Code, Section 2913.51. Receiving

stolen property is defined as receiving, retaining, or

disposing of property of another, knowing or having

reasonable cause to believe that the property has been

obtained through commission of a theft offense. The

appellant moved the trial court for an order suppressing all

evidence obtained from appellant as the result of an

unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth

and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the

United States. The trial court sustained appellant’s motion.

(ii) The judgment or decree sought to be reviewed is the

ruling of the Supreme Court of Ohio which dismissed

appellant’s appeal for lack of a substantial question.

Appellant had appealed the decision of the Ohio Court of

Appeals for Paulding County, Ohio which had reversed the

judgment of the trial court and remanded the case with

instructions to overrule appellant’s motion to suppress

evidence. The Ohio Court of Appeals ruling was issued on

October 24, 1980 and entered on that day. A Notice of

Appeal was filed in the Court of Appeals of the Third

Appellate Judicial District of Ohio, Paulding County, Ohio

on November 28, 1980. The Supreme Court of Ohio

dismissed the appeal on February 10, 1981. The Notice of

Appeal was filed in the Supreme Court of Ohio on April 28,

1981.

(iii) Jurisdiction of the appeal is conferred on this Court by

Title 28 of the United States Code, Section 1257 (2).

(iv) Cases sustaining the jurisdiction of this Court are:

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 625, 99 S. Ct. 1391 (1979).

Kretchmar v. Nebraska, 99 S. Ct. 1783 (1979).

3

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS OF THE CASE

Edward John Williams, appellant herein, is a citizen of the,

United States and a resident of the State of Ohio. On March

8, 1979, appellant was charged with receiving stolen property

in a complaint filed by Trooper Jerry P. Brown of the Ohio

State Highway Patrol.

On March 13, 1979, a hearing was held in the County

Court of Paulding County, Ohio, for the purpose of setting

bond. At that time, bond was set at $ 25,000.00 and the

appellant was ordered released upon execution of an

appearance bond in the amount of $2,500.00. The appellant

had a preliminary hearing on April 23, 1979, at which time he

was bound over to the Court of Common Pleas of Paulding

County, Ohio. Subsequently, on June 7, 1979, a Paulding

County, Ohio grand jury returned an indictment against the

appellant for receiving stolen property, a violation of Ohio

Revised Code Section 2913.51. At his arraignment on June

21, 1979, the appellant entered a plea of not guilty. A jury

trial was scheduled to begin in the Court of Common Pleas of

Paulding County, Ohio on September 17, 1979, but was

continued until October 23, 1979. Thereafter, on September

19, 1979, appellant, through his counsel, filed a motion to

suppress all evidence obtained from the appellant as a result

of the stopping and detention of appellant’s vehicle.

The charge against appellant was based on an incident

which occurred on March 7, 1979. On that date the appellant

was operating a motor vehicle on U.S. Route 127 in Paulding

County, Ohio. As the appellant proceeded northbound on

Route 127, he and two other motorists were motioned to pull

over by Trooper Jerry P. Brown of the Ohio State Highway

Patrol. The appellant duly pulled off the highway and was

informed by the officer that a motor vehicle inspection would

be conducted on appellant’s vehicle. The officer then asked

appellant for his driver’s license and automobile registration,

which appellant produced. A lengthy delay ensued during

%

4

which Officer Brown made several trips to his cruiser.

Finally, Troo»er Brown informed appellant that he

suspected the vehicle was a stolen one, read him the Miranda

rights, and asked him for a statement. At this time appellant

declined to make any further comments and Trooper Brown

then transported him to the Paulding County Jail in

Paulding, Ohio.

At a hearing held in regard to appellant’s motion to

suppress, testimony was elicited which showed that Trooper

Brown had stopped appellant’s vehicle entirely at random

(transcript at pages 9 and 13) and that he observed nothing

suspicious about appellant or his automobile at the time he

motioned him to stop. (Transcript at page 10 and 11). On

October 9, 1979, the Court of Common Pleas of Paulding

County, Ohio made a finding sustaining appellant’s motion

to suppress. The Paulding County Prosecuting Attorney

appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals for the Third

Judicial District of Ohio. On October 24, 1980, the Court of

Appeals rendered a decision reversing the trial court and

instructing that the motion to suppress be overruled. The

appellant then appealed this decision to the Ohio Supreme

Court on the basis of Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 625, 99S.

Ct. 1391 (1979), but on February 10, 1981 that court dis-

missed applellant’s appeal on the grounds that no substantial

constitutional question existed. Appellant therefore appeals

to the Supreme Court of the United States.

THE FEDERAL QUESTION PRESENTED

IS SUBSTANTIAL

This appeal squarely raises the issue as to whether a

random motor vehicle stop, where there is no articulable or

reasonable suspicion that a violation of law has been

committed or that the vehicle or an occupant thereof is

subject to seizure, is a constitutionally impermissable search

5

and seizure under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments

to the Constitution of the United States.

(i) THE COURT’S EARLIER DECISION IN DELA-

WARE v. PROUSE, 440 U.S. 625, 99 S. CT. 1391 (1979),

CLEARLY INDICATES THAT ANY EVIDENCE OF

AN ALLEGED CRIMINAL OFFENSE OBTAINED

BY AN ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE MUST BE

SUPPRESSED.

The case presently before the Court is directly on point

with the Court’s recent decision in Delaware v. Prouse,

supra, and several past cases which logically lead to the

Prouse finding that persons in automobiles on public

highways may not for that reason alone have their travel and

privacy interfered with at the unbridled discretion of police

officers and therefore evidence obtained from such stops and

detentions must be suppressed in conformity with the

constitutional rights of privacy and freedom from

unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed by the

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States

Constitution. In Delaware v. Prouse, supra, this Court

affirmed the finding of the Delaware Supreme Court that a

motion to suppress must be granted where evidence was

obtained from a random stop of a motorist in the absence of

specific articulable facts which justify the stop by indicating a

reasonable suspicion that a violation of the law has occurred.

Delaware v. Prouse, 383 A. 2d 1359, 1364 (Del. 1978). The

facts of the instant case fall squarely within this Court’s

prohibition. Trooper Brown on direct examination in the

trial court testified that he chose the vehicles he wished to

inspect at random. “They don’t expect us to inspect vehicles

today at a certain location. Normally we do it at random

where we choose.” Transcript at page 13, lines 11 through 13.

“We just do it at more or less our own choice, you might say.”

Transcrsipt at page 13, lines 16 and 17 “We just select them at

random. When I get out of my car, I stop the next couple of

cars coming at me...” Transcript at page 13, lines 24 and 25.

Thus it is clear that the Defendant was stopped at random by

the officer. The only remaining question to be answered is

6

whether the officer had probable cause to stop the

Defendant. The majority opinion in Prouse concluded with

the holding that “except in those situations in which there is

at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist

is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, or that

either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to

seizure for violation of law, stopping an automobile and

detaining the driver...are unreasonable under the Fourth

Amendment.” Delaware v. Prouse, supra, at 99 S. Ct. 1401.

Trooper Brown testified that there was nothing suspicious

about the Defendant or his vehicle at the time he was ordered

to stop.

Q. Now was there anything suspicious about his

(Defendant’s) car at that time?

A. I just held up my hand and motioned for him to go over.

Q. There was nothing suspicious about the manner in

which he drove the car or its appearance or anything like

that? You just saw a car coming down and you motioned for

that car to go over because he was more or less the next one in

line to be pulled off to be inspected?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. At the time that you pulled him over, there was no

suspicion of anything; is that correct?

A. Not at the time that I held my hand up and motioned for

him to go over.

Transcript at page 10 and II.

The case before the court is clearly one in which the

articulable and reasonable suspicion which an officer must

have in order to lawfully stop and detain a motorist was

lacking. Indeed, th. se was no suspicion at all and therefore

the stop was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment

and any evidence obtained thereby must be suppressed under

the exclusionary rule.

The first paragraph of Ohio Revised Code Section 4513.02

(B) provides:

7

When directed by any state highway patrolman, the

operator of any motor vehicle shall stop and submit

such motor vehicle to an inspection and such tests

as are necessary to determine by law, or that its

equipment is not in proper adjustment or repair, or

in violation of the equipment provisions of

Chapter 4513. of the Revised Code.

This statute is certainly not unconstitutional per se,

although state highway patrolmen, like any other law

enforcement officers, are required to meet minimum

constitutional standards in the exercise of their duties. Thus,

whenever a state highway patrolman stops a motor vehicle

for an inspection under O.R.C. Section 4513.02 (B) under

circumstances in which the officer has probable cause to

believe the vehicle is unsafe or that some other violation of

the law has been committed, the subsequent search and

seizure would undoubtedly be constitutional. However,

where the officer uses “unbridled discretion” to stop a vehicle

under O.R.C. Section 4513.02 (B) without “at least

articulable and reasonable suspicion” that a violation of law

has occurred, then such a stop is unconstitutional under the

Delaware v. Prouse decision.

The Court of Appeals of Paulding County, Ohio erred in

stating that: “We conclude that in spite of the officer’s

statement that he stopped vehicles ‘at random’...the

intrusion, if any, of defendant’s privacy was warranted in the

interests of vehicular safety, and the stop was not violative of

defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.” Court of Appeals

Memorandum Opinion, page 7. The Ohio Supreme Court

also erred in failing to modify this decision. Their holdings

fly in the face of the finding of this Court in Delaware v.

Prouse and are therefore directly at odds with the law of the

land. Mr. Justice White stated, in the Prouse majority

opinion: “The State’s interest in discretionary spot checks as

a means of ensuring the safety of its roadways does not

8

outweigh the resulting intrusion on the privacy and security

of the persons detained. Given the physical and

psychological intrusion visited upon the occupants of a

vehicle by a random stop..., the marginal contribution to

roadway safety possibly resulting from a system of spot

checks cannot justify subjecting every occupant of every

vehicle on the roads to a seizure at the unbridled discretion of

law enforcement officials.” Delaware v. Prouse, supra at 99

S. Ct. 1393. The search and seizure of Appellant’s vehicle was

void ab initio and all evidence of alleged criminal offenses

was properly suppressed by the trial court judge in the

Common Pleas Court of Paulding County, Ohio. The Court

of Appeals of Paulding County erred in reversing the

decision and instructing the trial court to overrule appellant's

motion to suppress.

The Delaware v. Prouse holding extends to all individuals

operating or traveling in automobiles: “An individual

operating or traveling in an automobile does not lose all

reasonable expectation of privacy simply because the

automobile and its use are subject to government

regulation.” Prouse at 99 S. Ct. 1400-1401. “The marginal

contribution to roadway safety possibly resulting from a

system of spot checks cannot justify subjecting every

occupant of every vehicle on the roads to a seizure.”...,

Prouse at 99 S. Ct. 1400.

It is helpful, in this case, to examine footnote 18 of the

Delaware v. Prouse opinion:

It has been urged that additional state interests are

the apprehension of stolen motor vehicles and of

drivers under the influence of alcohol or narcotics.

The latter interest is subsumed by the interest in

roadway safety, as may be the former interest to

some extent. The remaining governmental interest

in controlling automobile thefts is not

distinguishable from the general interest in crime

control. Prouse at 99 S. Ct. 1399.

9

After considering these important state interests, this

court nevertheless found that random spot checks were not

constitutionally permissible methods of enforcing them.

Given the alternative mechanisms available, both

those in use and those that might be adopted, we

are unconvinced that the incremental contribution

to highway safety of the random spot check justifies

the practice under the Fourth Amendment. Prouse

at 99 S. Ct. 1399.

This court ended by holding that “except in \ ose

situations in which there is at least articulable and reasonable

suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed, or that an automobile

is not registered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant is

otherwise subject to seizure for violation of the law, stopping

an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his

driver’s license and the registration of the automobile are

unreasonable under the Fourth Amendments.” Prouse,

supra at 99 S. Ct. 1401. The record below shows clearly that

the stop was a totally random one made without any

suspicion that a violation of law had occurred and was

therefore an unreasonable seizure. Because the stop was

constitutionally impermissible under the Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendments, any evidence of alleged criminal

offenses must be suppressed under the Delaware v. Prouse

decision. The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision dismissing

Appellant’s appeal of the Ohio Court of Appeals’ decision

overruling the trial court must be reversed. The trial court

correctly sustained appellant’s motion to suppress.

(ii) THE ISSUE IN THIS CASE IS OF PUBLIC AND

GREAT GENERAL INTEREST.

The resolution of the issue in this case will obviously affect

all users of public highways. In this appeal, the court is

confronted with a case directly on point to the Delaware v.

Prouse decision. The trial court judge in the Paulding

10

County Common Pleas Court found that the facts of the case

at bar fit the Delaware v. Prouse situation. On appeal by the

State of Ohio, the Court of Appeals for the Third Appellate

Judicial District of Ohio reversed the trial court’s judgment

sustaining a motion to suppress, finding first, that the

random motor vehicle stop was warranted in the interests of

vehicular safety and second, that Appellant had no standing

to enforce his Fourth Amendment rights due to a lack of

possessory interest in the subject motor vehicle.

Appellant submits that the findings of the Ohio Court of

Appeals and the Ohio Supreme Court directly conflict with

the finding of this court in Delaware v. Prouse, supra, and

that it will be necessary for this court to address the issues

herein in order to resolve the resulting conflict.

The search and seizure issue involved herein is clearly a

substantial constitutional question. The starting point in

search and scizure cases is, of course, the Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendments. “The right of the people to be

secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against

unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,

and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,

supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly

describing the piace to be searched, and the persons or things

to be seized.” Fourth Amendment, United States

Constitution. “No State shall make or enforce any law which

shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the

United States; nor shall deprive any person of life, liberty or

property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person

within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1, United States

Constitution. In interpreting the unreasonableness of

searches and seizures, this court has found that “two

protections emerge from the broad constitutional

proscription of official invasion. The first of these is the right

to be secure from intrusion into personal privacy. The

second, and intimately related protection, is self-protection:

the right to resist unauthorized entry which has as its design

the securing of information to fortify the coercive power of

the state against the individual, information which may be

used to effect a further deprivation of life or liberty or

property. Thus, evidence of criminal action may not, save in

very limited and closely confined situations, be seized

without a judicially issued search warrant.” Frank vs.

Maryland, 359 U.S. 300, 79 S. Ct. 804 (1959).

This court made a finding at an early stage of American

history that it was vested with sufficient power to “without

question, revise the proceedings of the executive and

legislative authorities of the states, and if they are found to be

contrary to the constitution, may declare them to be of no

legal validity.” Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, | Wheat. 304, 4 L.

Ed 97 (1816). This holding conformed to the basic principal

already established “that a law repugnant to the constitution

is void.” Marbury v. Madison, | Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60

(1803). This court specifically applied the Fourth

Amendment protections to evidence secured by illegal

searches and seizures in federal prosecutions. “If letters and

private documents can thus be seized and held and used in

evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the

protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to

be secure against such searches and seizures is of no value,

and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well

be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts

and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praise-

worthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of

those great principles established by years of endeavor and

suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the

fundamental law of the land.” Weeks v. United States, 232

U.S. 383 (1914).

This court next made the logical extension that the Fourth

and Fourteenth Amendments were to be applied with equal

force to unreasonable searches and seizures by state officials.

“Having once recognized that the right to privacy embodied

in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States,

12

and that the right to be secure against rude invasions of

privacy by state officers is, therefore, constitutional in origin,

we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty

promise. Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to

like effect as other basic rights secured by the Due Process

Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the

whim of any police officer who, in the name of law

enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our

decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual

no more than that which the Constitution guarantees him, to

the police officer no less than that to which honest law

enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial

integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice.”

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684 (1961).

On appeal below, the State of Ohio cited various Ohio

statutes at length in support of the authority of the Ohio

State Highway Patrol. It must be recognized, however, that

pronouncements of this court override any non-conforming

use of state law. It is axiomatic that no agency of the state,

legislative, executive, or judicial; nor instrumentality of the

state, and no person, officer, or agent exerting the power of

the state shall violate individual rights guaranteed by the

United States Constitution. Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339,

25 L. Ed. 676 (1880). Moreover, the Ohio Constitution

prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by verbatim

incorporation of Section One of the Fourth Amendment of

the United States Constitution:

The right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and possessions,

against unreasonable searches and seizures

shall not be violated; and no warrant shall

issue, but upon probable cause, supported by

oath or affirmation, particularly describing the

place to be searched and the person and things

to be seized. Ohio Constitution, Article 1,

Section 14.

13

In addition, the Ohio statute which sets forth the duties and

powers of Ohio State Highway Patrolmen contains the fol-

lowing:

Patrolmen shall have no other right or power of

search and seizure except to take from any person,

under arrest or about to be arrested, deadly or

dangerous weapons in the possession of such

person. O.R.C. Section 5503.02 (B).

Thus it is clear that Ohio law contains provisions very similar

to the principles stated by this Court in Delaware v. Prouse,

supra.

It is well established that stopping an automobile and

detaining its occupants constitutes a “seizure” within the

meaning of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, even

though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting

detention brief. United States v. Martinez- Fuerte, 428 U.S.

543, 556-558, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 3082-3083 (1976); United States

v. Brignoni- Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878, 95 S. Ct. 2578 (1975):

cf. Terry vs. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 88S. Ct. 1868, 1877 (1968).

The basic reason for imposing Fourth Amendment

limitations on law enforcement officials is to maintain a

standard of reasonableness upon their exercise of discretion

in order to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals

against arbitrary invasions. Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436

U.S. 307, 312, 98 S. Ct. 1816, 1820 (1978): see also Beck v.

Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97, 85 S. Ct. 223, 228 (1964). The

permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is

judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth

Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate

governmental interest. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S.

606, 616-619, 97 S. Ct. 1972, 1979-1980 (1977). This court is

the ultimate interpreter of the United States Constitution

and its decisions form the basis of the exclusionary rule

whereby any evidence obtained in an illegal search and

14

seizure is inadmissible in either federal or state courts. Mapp

v. Ohio, supra. The facts in the instant case must now be

applied to this court’s finding that “the State’s interest in

discretionary spot checks as a means of ensuring the safety of

its roadways does not outweigh the resulting intrusion on the

privacy and security of the persons detained. Given the

physical and psychological intrusion visited upon the

occupants of a vehicle by a random stop..., the marginal

contribution to roadway safety possibly resulting from a

system of spot checks cannot justify subjecting every

occupant of every vehicle on the roads to a seizure at the

unbridled discretion of law enforcement officials.” Delaware

v. Prouse, supra at 99 S. Ct. 1393.

This court has been especially concerned with

guaranteeing that the individual's reasonable expectations of

privacy are not subject to the discretion of the official in the

field. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532, 87 S.

Ct. 1727, 1733, (1967); United States v. United States District

Court, 407 U.S. 297, 322-323, 92S. Ct. 2125, 2139 (1972). In

theProuse decision, this Court found that the marginal

contribution to roadway safety possibly resulting from spot

checks cannot justify subjecting every occupant of every

vehicle on the roads to a seizure - limited in magnitude

compared to other intrusions but nonetheless

constitutionally cognizable - at the unbridled discretion of

law enforcement officials. Delaware v. Prouse, supra at 99 S.

Ct. 1400. The court further pointed out that to insist upon

neither an appropriate factual basis for suspicion directed at a

particular automobile nor upon some other substantial and

objective standard or rule to govern the exercise of discretion

“would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed

rights based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate

hunches...” Terry v. Ohio, supra 392 U.S. at 22, 88S. Ct. at

1880. This kind of standardless and unconstrained discretion

is the evil which this court has discerned in previous cases and

the court has insisted that the discretion of the official in the

15

field be circumscribed, at least to some extent. Camara vs.

Municipal Court, supra, 387, U.S. at 532-533, 87 S. Ct. at

1733; Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 270,

93 S. Ct. 2535, 2538 (1973).

The court has further found that the grave danger of abuse

of discretion does not disappear simply because the

automobile is subject to state regulation resulting in

numerous instances of police - citizen contact. Cady v.

Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93 S. Ct. 2523, 2538 (1973).

Whenever the government intrudes upon individual rights,

the privacy interest suffers regardless of whether the

government’s motivation is to investigate violations of

criminal laws or breaches of other statutory or regulatory

standards. Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., supra. Justice White's

majority opinion is eloquent in expressing the concern that

must be given to the individual's rights in search and seizure

cases involving motorists:

An individual operating or traveling in an

automobile does not lose all reasonable

expectation of privacy simply because the

automobile and its use are subject to government

regulation. Automobile travel is a basic, pervasive,

and often necessary mode of transportation to and

from one’s home, workplace, and lesiure activities.

Many people spend more hours each day traveling

in cars than walking on the streets. Undoubtedly,

many find a greater sense of security and privacy in

traveling in an automobile than they do in

exposing themselves by pedestrian or other modes

of travel. Were the individual subject to unfettered

governmental intrusion every time he entered an

automobile, the security guaranteed by the Fourth

Amendment would be seriously circumscribed. As

Terry v. Ohio, supra, recognized, people are not

shorn of all Fourth Amendment protection when

they step from their homes onto the public

i6

sidewalks. Nor are they shorn of those interests

when they step from the sidewalks into their

automobiles. Delaware v. Prouse, supra, at 1400-

1401.

The rationale for extending probable cause protections to

those traveling in automobiles is therefore indisputably

clear.

The case at bar cannot be distinguished from Delaware v.

Prouse. Both cases deal with the power of state police under

state statutes to stop and detain motorists without probable

cause for the purpose of maintaining highway safety. The

State of Delaware urged that “these stops are reasonable

under the Fourth Amendment because the State’s interest in

the practice as a means of promoting highway safety upon its

roads more than outweighs the intrusion entailed.” De/aware

v. Prouse, supra at 99 S. Ct. 1398. The State of Ohio argues

the identical point herein. This court has already considered

this argument and agreed with the State of Delaware (and

now the State of Ohio) “that the States have a vital interest in

ensuring that only those qualified to do so are permitted to

operate motor vehicles, that these vehicles are fit for safe

operation, and hence that licensing, registration, and vehicle

inspection requirements are being observed...Unquestion-

ably, those provisions, properly administered, are essential

elements in a highway safety program...The question

remains, however, whether in the service of these important

ends the discretionary spot check is a sufficiently productive

mechanism to justify the intrusion upon Fourth Amendment

interests which such stops entail...Given the alternative

mechanisms available, both in use and those that might be

adopted, we are unconvinced that the incremental

contribution to highway safety of the random spot check

justifies the practice under the Fourth Amendment.”

Delaware v. Prouse, supra at 99 S. Ct. 1398 and 1399.

Among the alternatives available to states, Mr. Justice White

17

noted that some states require all vehicles to pass an annual

safety inspection before they can be registered for the next

year. Delaware v. Prouse, supra at 99 S, Ct. 1401. It is

important to note in this respect that the State of Ohio does

not rely solely on its highway patrolment to make safety

inspections. Motor vehicle safety inspections are conducted

extensively throughout Ohio by civilian employees of the

Ohio State Highway Patrol who set up less threatening

checkpoint stops similar to the suggestion in Mr. Justice

White’s majority opinion of Delaware v. Prouse. “We hold

only that persons in automobiles on public roadways may not

for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered

with at the unbridled discretion of police officers.” Delaware

v. Prouse, supra at 99 S. Ct. 1401.

Although the Delaware v. Prouse decision is only a few

years old, anumber of reported cases have cited and followed

the case in subsequent search and seizure decisions. Payton

v. New York, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1379 (1980); Ybarra v. Illinois,

100 S. Ct. 338, 345 (1979); Dunway v. New York, 99 S. Ct.

2248, 2255 (1979); United States v. Buenaventura-Ariza, 615

F. 2d 29, 32 (2nd Cir. 1980); United States v. Palmer, 603 F.

2d 1286, 1291 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Price, 599 F.

2d 494, 499, (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Taylor, 488 F.

Supp. 475, 478 (D. Ore. 1980); Tinetti v. Wittke, 479 F. Supp.

486, 490 (E.D. Wis. 1979), aff'd 620 F. 2d 160(7th Cir. 1980).

In addition several courts have been confronted with fact

situations similar to the one in the present case and have

found themselves bound to follow Delaware v. Prouse.

Where an FBI agent, claiming to be conducting vehicle

inspections in conjunction with the California State

Highway Patrol under a California state statute and, at the

same time, looking for stolen motor vehicles, stopped a

motorist for the sole reason that the motorist was driving a

late model pick-up truck, the stop and search was illegal

under the Fourth Amendment as an overly discretionary

spot check and all evidence obtained therefrom was properly

18

suppressed. United States v. Soto-Soto, 598 F, 2d 545 (9th

Cir. 1979). In another case, the state police officer's stop of a

motorist based on a good faith belief that the motorist was

lost was not a sufficient basis for Fourth Amendment

purposes to outweigh the Defendant-motorist’s right to

personal security free from arbitrary interference by law

officers. The exclusionary rule was used to exclude all

evidence obtained as a direct result of the Fourth

Amendment violation. United States v. Dunbar, 470 F.

Supp. 704 (D. Conn. 1979), affd. 610 F. 2d 807 (2d Cir.

1979). The initial stop of a vehicle by police officers based

only on the facts that the neighborhood was a high crime area

and that neither occupant of the vehicle was known to the

officers was illegal under Prouse and evidence discarded by

the occupants as the result of the illegal stop was tainted fruit

of the initial illegal stop, could not be used to validate the

unlawful search and seizure, and was suppressed on appeal.

United States v. Beck, 602 F. 2d 726 (Sth Cir. 1979),

Finally, in the only reported state case thus far which deals

with a Prouse fact situation, this court granted a petition for

a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Nebraska and

vacated that court’s judgment, remanding the case back to

the Supreme Court of Nebraska for further consideration in

light of Delaware v. Prouse. Kretchmar v. Nebraska, 99 S.

Ct. 1783 (1979). The Supreme Court of Nebraska had erred

in upholding the conviction of a motorist based on evidence

seized from the motorist by an officer who made a random

spot check of the motorist based only on the fact that the

motorist was driving a late model car. The Supreme Court of

Nebraska held that the officer’s poorly founded suspicion

was not sufficient to vitiate the lawfulness of the arrest and,

moreover, that the officer had probable cause to arrest the

motorist anyway when he discovered the evidence on the

basis of which the motorist was convicted. State v.

Kretchmar, 201 Neb. 308, 267 N.W. 2d 740 (1978).

Nevertheless, this court found the Kretchmar case fell

19

squarely within its holding in Delaware v. Prouse, supra.

Appellant submits that the instant case must also be required

to fall into line with the Delaware v. Prouse decision.

CONCLUSION

This appeal raises an issue of fundamental importance in

regard to the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the

Constitution of the United States. In light of this court's

recent decisions in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 625, 99 S.

Ct. 1391 (1979) and Kretchmar v. Nebraska, --U.S.--, 99 S.

Ct. 1783 (1979) it seems clear that the search of the

appellant's vehicle was illegal, and that the evidence

discovered in that search should be suppressed.

Respectfully submitted,

PATRICK H. YOUNG

of PATRICK H. YOUNG CO., L.P.A.

Attorney for the Appellant

106 East Jackson Street

Paudling, Ohio 45879

Telephone: 419/ 399/599]

1A

APPENDIX A

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OHIO

EDWARD JOHN WILLIAMS,

Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF OHIO,

Appellee.

NOTICE OF APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE UNITED STATES

Notice is hereby given that Edward John Williams, the

appellant above named, hereby appeals to the Supreme

Court of the United States from the final order of the

Supreme Court of Ohio dismissing the appellant's appeal, for

the reason that no substantial constitutional question existed,

in a case in which the court of Appeals for Paulding County,

Ohio revised the trial court’s judgment in regard to the appel-

lant’s motion to supress evidence entered in this action on

February 10, 1981.

This appeal is taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1257 (2).

/s/ Patrick H. Young

PATRICK H. YOUNG

of PATRICK H. YOUNG CO., L.P.A.

Attorney for the Appellant

106 East Jackson Street

Paulding, Ohio 45879

Telephone: 419/399/5991

2A

PROOF OF SERVICE

I, Patrick H. Young, Attorney for Edward John Williams,

appellant herein, and a member of the Bar of the Supreme

Court of the United States, hereby certify that, on the 28th

day of April, 1981, I served copies of the foregoing Notice of

Appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States on the

several parties thereto, as follows: on the State of Ohio, by

mailing a copy in a duly addressed envelope by certified mail

and to J. David Webb, Prosecuting Attorney, 705 West

Wayne Street, Paulding, Ohio 45879.

It is further certified that all parties required to be served have

been served.

/s/ Patrick H. Young

PATRICK H. YOUNG

of PATRICK H. YOUNG CO., L.P.A.

Attorney for the Appellant

106 East Jackson Street

Paulding, Ohio 45879

Telephone: 419/399/5991

APPENDIX B

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

The Court of Common Pleas of Paulding County erred in

finding that a motor vehicle safety inspection made pursuant

to Section 4513.02 of the Ohio Revised Code which revealed

that the inspected vehicle was stolen violated the Fourth

Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and suppressing all

evidence arising from that inspection.

3A

APPENDIX C

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE THIRD APPELLATE

JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF OHIO

STATE OF OHIO,

Plaintiff-Appellant

V.

EDWARD JOHN WILLIAMS,

Defendant-Appellee.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

(CASE #11-79-12 - Decided October 24, 1980)

APPEAL: Court of Appeals for Paulding County.

MR. J. DAVID WEBB, Prosecuting Attorney, counsel for

Plaintiff-Appellant.

MR. PATRICK H. YOUNG, counsel for Defendant-

Appellee.

MILLER, J. This is an appeal by the prosecuting attor-

ney of Paulding county from a judgment of the Court of

Common Pleas of that county granting a motion to suppress

evidence.

Defendant’s vehicle was stopped by a state highway

trooper in a traffic safety check. The officer observed that the

vehicle identification number located inside the windshield of

the car, and which was readily visible to him from outside the

4A

car, was not in accord with those generally appearing on Ford

Motor Company products. Upon further check it was disco-

vered that the vehicle was in fact stolen.

The indictment against defendant provided that he “did,

receive, retain or dispose of certain property, being a 1978

Lincoln Continental Mark V automobile, the property of

another * * * knowingly or having reasonable cause to

believe said property had been obtained through the commis-

sion of a theft offense * * * in violation of the Ohio

Revised Code, Title 29,, Section 2913.51 * * * .”

Defendant moved the trial court for an order suppressing

all evidence obtained from defendant as a result of an illegal

stop and detention. The trial court sustained defendant's

motion.

The prosecutor sets forth one assignment of error in this

appeal:

“The Court of Common Pleas of Paulding

County erred in finding that a motor vehicle

safety inspection made pursuant to Section

4513.02 of the Ohio Revised Code which

revealed that the inspected vehicle was stolen

violated the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.

Constitution and suppressing all evidence aris-

ing from that inspection.”

The Supreme Court in Delaware v. Prouse, U.S. .

99 S. Ct. 1391, the case principally relied upon by defendant,

concluded that stopping an automobile and detaining its

occupants constitutes a “seizure” within the meaning of the

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court held that

(page 1401):

SA

“ * * * except in those situations in which

there is at least articulable and reasonable sus-

picion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an

automobile is not registered, or that either the

vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to

seizure for violation of law, stopping an auto-

mobile and detaining the driver in order to

check his driver's license and the registration of

the automobile are unreasonable under the

Fourth Amendment.”

The Court stated, however (p1401):

“This holding does not preclude the State of

Delaware or other states from developing

methods for spot checks that involve less intru-

sion or that do not involve the unconstrained

exercise of discretion. Questioning all oncom-

ing traffic at roadblock-type stops is one pos-

sible alternative. We hold only that persons in

automobiles on public roadways may not for

that reason alone have their travel and privacy

interfered with at the unbridled discretion of

police officers * * * .”

In U.S. v. Martinez- Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 96 S. Ct. 3074,

the Supreme Court held a permanent checkpoint inspection

of automobiles for illegal aliens constitutional where the

automobiles were slowed at the checkpoint and certain

automobiles selectively referred to an area for secondary

inspection for a more thorough inquiry, although having

previously held roving patrol stops without warrant or prob-

able cause for the same purpose to be unconstitutional in

Almeida-Sanchez v. U.S., 413 U.S. 263, 93 S. Ct. 2535.

6A

In Delaware v. Prouse, supra, the court stated that (p1398)

“[w]e cannot assume that the physical and psychological

intrusion visited upon the occupants of a vehicle by arandom

stop to check documents is of any less moment than that

occasioned by a stop by border agents on roving patrol.”

R.C. 5503.02(A) entitled “Duties and powers of state

highway patrol” provides as pertinent:

“(A) The state highway patrol shall enforce the

laws of the state relating to the titling, registra-

tion, and licensing of motor vehicles; enforce,

on all roads and highways, notwithstanding

section 4513.39 of the Revised Code, the laws

relating to the operation and use of vehicles on

the highways; enforce and prevent the viola-

tion of the laws relating to the size, weight, and

speed of commercial motor vehicles and all

laws designed for the protection of the high-

way pavements and structures on such high-

ways; investigate and report to the public utili-

ties commission violations of its rules and the

laws governing the transportation of persons

and property by motor transportation com-

panies and all other motor carriers for hire;

investigate and report violations of all laws

relating to the collection of excise taxes on

motor vehicle fuels; and regulate the move-

ment of traffic on the roads and highways of

the state, notwithstanding section 4513.39 of

the Revised Code.”

R.C. 4513.02(B) states in part:

“(B) When directed by any state highway

patrolman, the operator of any motor vehicle

7A

shall stop and submit such motor vehicle to an

inspection and such tests as are necessary to

determine whether it is unsafe or not equipped

as required by law, or that its equipment is not

in proper adjustment or repair, or in violation

of the equipment provisions of Chapter 4513.

of the Revised Code.”

The state trooper testified in part as follows: (p8ff. of

transcript of hearing on motion to Suppress):

“Q. Would you please tell the Court what you were

doing at the particular time immediately before

Mr. Williams [defendant] was stopped?

“A. I was holding a motor vehicle inspection.

* kee.”

“Q. From time to time I have observed inspection

stations where they have a station or a van set

up, and the patrolman - they stop vehicles

going in both directions and sometimes just

one direction.

Was this such a vehicle inspection?

“A. It was similar, except that people that you are

referring to - we just do it at random.

“Q. You do it at random?

“A. Yes, sir.

ms x*ee .”

8A

“Q. Would you explain to the Court how you went

about selecting the cars that you stopped?

“A. Well, when I originally stopped there, I just

stopped two or three vehicles that would come

down the road. It makes no difference which

ones, I just stop the next two or three vehicles

down the road.

“Q. Allright. Now, is there any particular method

of selection outside of just the fact that you just

happened to stop the first two or three that

came along?

“A. No, there is not. Obviously, if you see a defect,

such as no muffler or something like this, then

I would, you know, stop that because I can see

that that is a violation. And then I continue to

inspect the whole vehicle.

ma xe.”

We conclude that in spite of the officer’s statement that he

stopped vehicles “at random”, that he in fact only stopped at

one time the number of vehicles he could reasonably check

without interfering with the flow of traffic, that the officer

was exercising a reasonable discretion, that the intrusions, if

any, of defendant’s privacy was warranted in the interests of

vehicular safety, and that the stop was not violative of

defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.

Having determined the stopping of the vehicle not to be

violative of defendant’s Fourth Amendment Rights, we then

consider defendant’s standing to seek suppression of the evi-

dence under the particular circumstances of the case.

9A

Here the unrefuted evidence was that the automobile was

in fact a stolen vehicle and was being driven by defendant,

defendant claiming that he was driving the car after having

borrowed it from one Young whose name appeared on the

vehicle registration. Such a registration, however, indicates

only that the vehicle is licensed and is not sufficient to prove

ownership, a certificate of title being required therefor. See

R.C. 4505.04.

Thus defendant had no title to the vehicle nor did the

person from whom he allegedly had borrowed the car have

title.

Although it is the current view that a person driving a car

with the owner’s consent has standing to object to a search of

the vehicle, most courts agree that an occupant of a vehicle

cannot be said to have standing by virtue of his presence if he

is in possession of a stolen or otherwise illegally possessed or

controlled vehicle. See La Fave, Search & Seizure, Section

11.3(e). In U.S. v. Pitts. 588 F 2d 102(CAS, 1979) cert. denied

U.S. , 99S. Ct. 2171, the court held that a mere

possessor-driver of a stolen automobile in operation on a

highway has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the VIN

number observable through the windshield.

The following appears from the testimony of the trooper at

p. 18 of the transcript of the hearing on defendant’s motion to

suppress:

“Q. How did you come to get the information from

the people in the vehicle?

“A. Well, I asked whose vehicle it was. He stated

that it was registered to a Mr. Young. And I

asked him how to get a hold of Mr. Young. His

wife just spoke up and said that he had an

10A

unlisted phone number, and they had just bor-

rowed the car from him.

“They were from Florida. I said, ‘Well, | would

like to hold you and verify that you have per-

mission to have the vehicle. We don’t know his

number, and it’s unlisted. We will check him

and verify that you have permission to have the

car.”

“And I got this information about an address

on Beach Street.

“Q. William B. Young, 1147 Front Street, is that

it?

“MR. WEBB: I think it is Front Street in Lebanon.

“THE WITNESS: That was on the warranty card.

“BY THE COURT: Was that on the owner’s

card?

“A. That was the driver’s registration, 125 Beach

Street, Barberton, Ohio. That’s what he gave

me originally.

“Q. That’s when you got his license?

“A. Yes, right. Later he produced that little war-

ranty card and said something about it was his

brother’s or something like that. I don’t recol-

lect exactly what he said on that.”

Thus any possessory interest that defendant could claim in

the vehicle was that acquired through Mr. Young who

11A

obviously did not and could not own the vehicle, the same

having been stolen, and thus could not invest defendant with

any legal possessory interest.

Since defendant had nor claimed no ownership in the

vehicle and his only possessory interest as claimed was that

claimed through Mr. Young who could not confer on

defendant a valid possessory interest in a sto)2n vehicle,

defendant could have no legitimate expectation’ privacy in

the vehicle and thus no standing to seek suppr ssion of evi-

dence obtained as a result of the stopping of the vehicle.

We conclude that it was erroneous for the trial court to

sustain defendant’s motion and its judgment must be reversed.

We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand with

instructions to overruled defendant’s motion to suppress

evidence.

Judgment accordingly.

GUERNSEY, P.G. and COLE, J, concur.

12A

APPENDIX D

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE THIRD APPELLATE JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF OHIO PAULDING COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

V.

EDWARD JOHN WILLIAMS,

Defendant-Appellee.

CASE NO 11-79-12

JOURNAL ENTRY

This matter came on to be heard on appeal on the record,

briefs and oral arguments of counsel.

Upon consideration the court finds error of the Court of

Common Pleas of Paulding County in sustaining defendant-

appellee’s motion to suppress evidence.

It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED

that the judgment of the trial court be reversed at defendant-

appellee’s costs and that this cause be, and the same hereby is,

remanded to the Court of Common Pleas of Paulding

County with instructions to overrule defendant-appellee’s

motion and for further proceedings according to law.

It is further ORDERED that the Clerk of this Court certify

a copy of this journal entry of judgment as the mandate

required by Appellate Rule 27 or as required by any other

provision of law.

13A

It is further ORDERED that the Clerk of this Court fur-

nish a copy of any opinion filed concurrently with this journal

entry directly to the trial judge.

Exceptions saved.

/s/ JUDGES

APPENDIX E

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

* _, OF PAULDING COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO,

Plaintiff,

vs.

EDWARD JOHN WILLIAMS,

Defendant.

CASE NO. CR-79-523

JOURNAL ENTRY

THIS CAUSE came on to be heard upon the Defendant's

Motion to suppress all evidence obtained from the Defendant

as a result of a safety check stop and detention of the Defend-

ant’s automobile on March 7, 1979 in Paulding County, Ohio

as an unreasonable search and seizure under Amendment IV,

U.S. Constitution in producing evidence indicating a viola-

tion of the law but unrelated to automobile safety, viz, the

following: Defendant's operators license, the Ohio Registra-

tion for the 1978 Lincoln Continental Mark V automobile, a

14A

Warranty identification card for said automobile and any

other evidence obiained from the confiscation and inspection

of the aforesaid motor vehicle on the date mentioned. The

court finds the motion well taken. Consequently;

Defendant's motion to suppress is sustained.

DATED: October 12, 1979

/s/ J. Gareth Hitchcock

J. GARETH HITCHCOCK

JUDGE

APPROVED:

/s/ John David Webb

JOHN DAVID WEBB, Prosecuting Attorney

/s/ Patrick H. Young

PATRICK H. YOUNG, Attorney for Defendant

APPENDIX F

§ 1257. STATE COURTS; APPEAL; CERTIORARI

Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of

a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by

the Supreme Court as follows:

(2) By appeal, where is drawn in question the

validity of a statute of any state on the ground

of its being repugnant to the Constitution,

treaties or laws of the United States, and the

decision is in favor of its validity.

ISA

§ 2913.51 RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY.

(A) No person shall receive, retain, or dis-

pose of property of another, knowing or hav-

ing reasonable cause to believe that the prop-

erty has been obtained through commission of

a theft offense.

§ 4513.02(B)

(B) When directed by any state highway patrol-

man, the operator of any motor vehicle shall

stop and submit such motor vehicle to an

inspection and such tests as are necessary to

determine whether it is unsafe or not equipped

as required by law, or that its equipment is not

in proper adjustment or repair, or in violation

of the equipment provisions of Chapter 4513.

of the Revised Code.

Such inspection shall be made with respect

to the brakes, lights, turn signals, steering,

horns and warning devices, glass, mirrors,

exhaust system, windshield wipers, tires, and

such other items of equipment as designated by

the superintendent of the state highway patrol

by rule or regulation adopted pursuant to sec-

tions 119.01 to 119.13 of the Revised Code.

Upon determining that a motor vehicle is in

safe operating condition and its equipment in

conformity with Chapter 4513. of the Revised

Code, the inspecting officer shall issue to the

operator an official inspection sticker, which

shall be in such form as the superintendent

prescribes except that its color shall vary from

year to year.

16A

§ 5503.02(B), PARA. 3

...Patrolmen shall have no other right or

power of search or of seizure except to take

from any person, under arrest or about to be

arrested, deadly or dangerous weapons in the

possession of such person...

APPENDIX G

CONSTITUTION OF

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AMENDMENT IV

Security from Unwarrantable Search and Seizure

The right of the people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches

and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall

issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-

mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,

and the persons or things to be seized.

17A

CONSTITUTION OF

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AMENDMENT XIV

SECTION I

Citizenship Rights Not to Be Abridged by States

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and

subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United

States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall

make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or

immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any

State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without

due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-

tion the equal protection of the laws.

§14 SEARCH WARRANTS AND

GENERAL WARRANTS.

The right of the people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers, and possessions, against unreasonable

searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant

shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or

affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched

and the person and things to be seized. (See Const 1802, Art

VIII, § 5.)