Amicus Brief — David Orgell, Inc. v. Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Inc.
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Otte Suprerne Court. U.S.
FILLED
‘AUG 6 1981
ALEXAN DEI? L. STEVAS,
No. 80-1777 CLINFR
-
dn the Supreme Court of the Mnited States
OcTOBER TERM, 1980
DAVID ORGELL, INC., PETITIONER
A
JosiAh WepGwoop & Sons, INC., ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES
AS AMICUS CURIAE
LAWRENCE G. WALLACE
Acting Solicitor General
WILLIAM F. BAXTER
Assistant Attorney General |
RoBERT B. NICHOLSON
Altorney
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 633-2217
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether a plaintiff who has suffered repeated unlawful!
refusals to deal is barred by the four-year statute of limita-
tions from obtaining relief from any refusal because he has
not brought suit within four years of the initial refusal,
notwithstanding the fact that the subsequent refusals for
which relief is sought occurred less than four years prior to
suit.
(I)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
FARECMIOME. ccccccccccccccsecccccccesseeseesceness l
PRI o ccvcacacccccnpescetsscnues dunauauneee 2
COMGINSION. ccccccccvrecccccccevesdocnseconesseese 7
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Ansul Co. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 306 F. Supp. 541,
aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other
grounds, 448 F. 2d 872, cert. denied,
BOGUS. 1O1G oc vccccccesesdveccscovscetenan 4
Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S.
SPD coccecvvesdavevevsenessssesevenseeanan 6
Borger v. Yamaha Int'l Corp., 625 F. 2d 390 .... 4
Chapa v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.,
[1974-1] Trade Cas. para. 74,911 .......00e0e 4
Charlotte Telecasters, Inc. v. Jefferson- Pilot
Comp., FOF FO STO wecsrrvrcccccvcecceesce 3
Garelick v. Goerlich’s Inc., 323 F. 24 854 ....... 4
Imperial Point Colonnades Condominium, Inc. v.
Mangurian, 549 F. 2d 1029, cert. denied,
Ce WA OOD 0 vnccceseseciecesesneeeneunn 3, 6
Manok v. Southeast District Bowling Ass'n,
SUG F. Supp, 1215. .ccccccccccrsccccscesecss 4
Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, In re,
591 F. 2d 68, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 900 ..... 3,4
Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway
Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342 ...cce eens 6
IV
Page
Cases— Continued:
Pioneer Co. v. Talon, Inc., 462 F. 2d 1106 ...... 3
Poster Exchange, Inc. v. National Screen Service
DRED Me EET cxeswcvdssacccccscoce 3,4
Southeastern Hose, Inc. v. Imperial-Eastman
Corp., [1973-1] Trade Cas. para. 74,479 ....... 4
United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 ......... 6
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,
MP MEMNI MEE avaceraccachccceccssceccccee ,
Statutes:
Clayton Act, Section 4B, 15 U.S.C. 15b ......... 2
Sherman Act, Section 1,15 U.S.C. 1 ........45. 2
Miscellaneous:
II P. Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law
SE SSeGhwde eS ved ecasabescavescececs 3,4, 5
H.R. Rep. No. 422, 84th Cong., Ist Sess.
| Sr re rrr rr Tree rrrrerTrTee 5
S. Rep. No. 619, 84th Cong., Ist Sess.
DE Sas tab WSs eeu Gddebesbebeceeccsccecess 5
13 J. von Kalinowski, Antitrust Laws and Trade
DCUEEEE Souddbcmestesedasccsececass 5
In the Supreme Court of the Hnited States
OcTOBER TERM, 1980
No. 80-1777
DAviD ORGELL, INC., PETITIONER
A
JosiAH WepGwoop & Sons, INC., ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES
AS AMICUS CURIAE
This brief is filed in response to the Court's invitation to
the Solicitor General to express the views of the United
States.
STATEMENT
Petitioner David Orgell, Inc. (“Orgell”), is a retailer of
silver, china and crystal in the Los Angeles area. Respond-
ent Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Inc. (“Wedgwood”), manu-
factures china and dinnerware and sells its products to
various retailers in the Los Angeles area, including Geary’s
Stores, Inc. (“Geary’s”), one of Orgell’s competitors (Pet.
App. Ia).
In 1965, Orgell sought and was refused the opportunity to
retail Wedgwood products. In 1968 and on two occasions
between 1976 and 1978, Orgell again sought and was
refused access to the Wedgwood line (Pet. App. 2a).
2
In 1978, Orgell sued Wedgwood, Geary’s, and other
china and dinnerware manufacturers, alleging that they had
conspired to refuse to deal with Orgell, in violation of
Section | of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. The district
court granted summary judgment to Wedgwood on the
ground that the suit was barred by the four-year statute of
limitations applicable to private antitrust suits under Sec-
tion 4B of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 15b, notwithstanding
the fact that Wedgwood had refused to deal with Orgell
within the four years preceding the suit (Pet. App. 5a-7a).
The court of appeals affirmed (Pet. App. la-3a), holding
that the cause of action accrued with the first refusal to deal
in 1965 and that each subsequent refusal was only “ ‘a
reaffirmation of the original decision not to deal with the
plaintiff’ ” (id. at 3a).
ARGUMENT
The court of appeals’ decision that repeated unlawful
refusals to deal do not give rise to new causes of action
exacerbates a conflict among the circuits. Moreover, the
decision poses needless risks for antitrust enforcement
without advancing the policies that underlie the statute of
limitations. Accordingly, we submit that review by this
Court is warranted.!
1. Section 4B of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 15b, pro-
vides that private antitrust claims “shall be forever barred
unless commenced within four years after the cause of
action accrued.” As this Court observed in Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 338
(1971), in the context of an ongoing conspiracy to violate
the antitrust laws, Section 4B has usually been construed to
mean that “each time a plaintiff is injured by an act of the
defendants a cause of action accrues to him to recover the
'Like the court of appeals and the district court, we express no view as
to the merits of Orgell’s substantive claim.
3.
damages caused by that act and * * *, as to those damages,
the statute of limitations runs from the commission of the
act.”
The courts of appeals have split on the issue of applying
the statute of limitations to suits for repeated refusals to
deal. The Fourth, Fifth and Eighth Circuits have held that
repeated refusals to deal give rise to new causes of action
and thereby allow plaintiffs to bring suit within four years
of the most recent refusal. Charlotte Telecasters, Inc. v.
Jefferson- Pilot Corp., 546 F. 2d 570, 572 (4th Cir. 1976);
Poster Exchange, Inc. v. National Screen Service Corp.,
517 F. 2d 117, 123-128 (Sth Cir. 1975); Imperial Point Col-
onnades Condominium, Inc. v. Mangurian, 549 F. 2d 1029
(Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 859 (1977) (elaborating on
Poster Exchange), Pioneer Co. v. Talon, Inc., 462 F. 2d
1106 (8th Cir. 1972).? These courts qualify the general rule
with two narrow caveats, both of which are implicit in this
Court’s decision in Zenith: (1) the initial refusal to deal
must not have been irrevocable; and (2) the plaintiff actu-
ally must have been denied an opportunity to deal within
the four-year period. See, e.g., Imperial Point Colonnades
Condominium, Inc. v. Mangurian, supra, 549 F. 2d at
1035. See also In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 59|
F. 2d 68, 72 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 900 (1979). The
2Although Wedgwood suggests (Br. in Opp. 6) that Poster Exchange
is confined to monopolization suits, the Fifth Circuit has not so limited
it. See Imperial Point Colonnades Condominium, Inc. v. Mangurian,
supra, 549 F. 2d at 1034-1035. See also Il P. Areeda & D. Turner,
Antitrust Law, para. 325b, at 122 n.19 (1978).
Wedgwood’s attempt (Br. in Opp. 7-8) to distinguish Pioneer on the
ground that no harm accrued to Pioneer from the initial notice of
termination, leaving the first refusal to accept an order (which occurred
within the limitations period) as the source of harm, neglects the case's
far broader holding: “{I]t is quite clear that [Talon’s] continued refusals
to deal caused new injury to Pioneer each time an order was refused.”
462 F. 2d at 1109 (emphasis added; footnote omitted).
4
courts have stressed that the irrevocable-refusal exception
is extremely limited in scope. If the circumstances surround-
ing the initial refusal to deai make the decision irrevocable
or the harm it causes irretrievable, subsequent refusals do
not cause new harm, since the initial choice compelled all
the harm that followed. See Jn re Multidistrict Vehicle Air
Pollution, supra, 591 F. 2d at 72; Poster Exchange, Inc. v.
National Screen Service Corp., supra, 517 F. 2d at 126.
Otherwise, a mere refusal to deal, however emphatic, is not
deemed to be final or irrevocable; as long as the decision is
capable of being reversed, each subsequent refusal to deal
inflicts new harm on the plaintiff.
There is, however, a conflicting line of authority. The
Sixth Circuit has held that subsequent refusals to deal do
not give rise to new causes of action, on the ground that
even if the refusals qualify as “overt acts,” they do not
themselves cause new harm. Garelick v. Goerlich’s, Inc.,
323 F. 2d 854, 856 (6th Cir. 1963) (“{T]he [subsequent]
incidents were simply acts that reflected that defendant-
appellee continued in refusing to sell its products to
plaintiffs-appellants”). Garelick has found support in sev-
eral district courts, including the Southern District of New
York. See Chapa v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.,[{1974-1]
Trade Cas. para. 74,911 (D.D.C. 1974); Southeastern Hose,
Inc. v. Imperial- Eastman Corp., [1973-1] Trade Cas. para.
74,479 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Manok v. Southeast District
Bowling Ass'n, 306 F. Supp. 1215, 1221 (C.D. Cal. 1969);
Ansul Co. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 306 F. Supp. 541, 569
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other
grounds, 448 F. 2d 872 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1018 (1972). Commentators also have treated Garelick as
stating the general rule. See II P. Areeda & D. Turner,
3But see Borger v. Yamaha Intl Corp., 625 F. 2d 390, 398 (2d Cir.
1980) (dictum).
»
Antitrust Law, para. 325b, at 121 (1978); cf. 13 J. von
Kalinowski, Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation
§ 103.02[ 1 [a] (1980).
The decision below aligns the Ninth Circuit with the
Sixth Circuit on the issue. Although the court below pur-
ported to rest its ruling on the irrevocable-refusal exception
employed by the Fourth, Fifth and Eighth Circuits, it has
expanded the exception so widely as to swallow the rule.
Rather than focusing on the irreversibility of the refusal to
deal, the court of appeals based its decision upon the
“unequivocal” nature of the initial refusal (Pet. App. 3a).
On this rationale, no suit for repeated refusals to deal could
ever be brought more than four years after the initial re-
fusal, since every subsequent refusal would qualify as a
“reaffirmation” of the original decision.
2. The statute of limitations for repeated refusals to deal
now varies from circuit to circuit; how quickly a plaintiff
must sue depends on the fortuity of where he ‘vings suit.
This division among the courts of appeals perpetuates the
very “confusion and discrimination” that Congress sought
to avoid by adopting a uniform federal statute of limitations
for the antitrust laws in 1955. S. Rep. No. 619, 84th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 5(1955); H.R. Rep. No. 422, 84th Cong., Ist Sess. 7
(1955). This Court should grant review to restore unifor-
mity among the circuits.
We think, moreover, that the Court should resolve the
conflict by reversing the decision below and approving the
rule followed by the Fourth, Fifth and Eighth Circuits.
Provided that the original refusal is not “irrevocable”
within the narrow meaning of that term (see page 4, supra),
where there are repeated unlawful refusals to deal each
subsequent unlawful refusal is the cause of whatever harm
follows it, because that harm would have been forgone but
for the new unlawful refusal. The contrary position of the
6
court below rests on the erroneous premise that subsequent
decisions whether or not to deal have no effect.
The decision below is not justified by any of the policies
underlying the statute of limitations. Statutes of limitations
safeguard judicial accuracy, preserve settled expectations,
insure timely notice of claims, and generally “promote jus-
tice by preventing surprise through the revival of claims that
have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost,
memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.”
Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 487 (1980);
United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979); Order
of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.,
321 U.S. 342, 348-349 (1944). Barring suits for repeated
refusals to deal advances none of these goals, since, in order
to maintain a cause of action under the statute, the plaintiff
must demonstrate that it has been refused an opportunity to
deal within the four-year period. See /mperial Point Colon-
nades Condominium, Inc. v. Mangurian, supra, 549 F. 2d
at 1041. Nor is the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the
statute of limitations needed as an incentive to bring suit
quickly, since it is always in a plaintiff's interest to seek relief
as quickly as possible. See id. at 1044.4
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit’s rule is particularly unde-
sirable in refusai to deal cases. A merchant who hopes
eventually to obtain a supplier’s products may well be less
likely to bring suit immediately and jeopardize a potentially
profitable future business relationship than to wait and
make another request to carry the goods. The Ninth Cir-
cuit’s rule will force buyers to choose between bringing what
‘Even if a rule barring refusal-to-deal suits brought more than four
years after an initial refusal to deal otherwise would serve a prophylactic
function, those plaintiffs most likely to bring suit more than four years
after an initial refusal to deal are the ones most likely to lack alert
antitrust counsel and, hence, least likely to become aware of a prophy-
lactic rule until the deadline has passed.
J
may turn out to be a needless ana undesired lawsuit and
forgoing the protection of the antitrust laws. Forcing sucha
choice is contrary to the public interest.
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted.
LAWRENCE G. WALLACE
Acting Solicitor General
WILLIAM F. BAXTER
Assistant Attorney General
RosBerT B. NICHOLSON
Attorney
AuGust 1981
DOJ-1981-08
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