Amicus Brief — David Orgell, Inc. v. Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Inc.

Supreme Court brief1981

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

Otte Suprerne Court. U.S.

FILLED

‘AUG 6 1981

ALEXAN DEI? L. STEVAS,

No. 80-1777 CLINFR

-

dn the Supreme Court of the Mnited States

OcTOBER TERM, 1980

DAVID ORGELL, INC., PETITIONER

A

JosiAh WepGwoop & Sons, INC., ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES

AS AMICUS CURIAE

LAWRENCE G. WALLACE

Acting Solicitor General

WILLIAM F. BAXTER

Assistant Attorney General |

RoBERT B. NICHOLSON

Altorney

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

(202) 633-2217

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether a plaintiff who has suffered repeated unlawful!

refusals to deal is barred by the four-year statute of limita-

tions from obtaining relief from any refusal because he has

not brought suit within four years of the initial refusal,

notwithstanding the fact that the subsequent refusals for

which relief is sought occurred less than four years prior to

suit.

(I)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

FARECMIOME. ccccccccccccccsecccccccesseeseesceness l

PRI o ccvcacacccccnpescetsscnues dunauauneee 2

COMGINSION. ccccccccvrecccccccevesdocnseconesseese 7

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Ansul Co. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 306 F. Supp. 541,

aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other

grounds, 448 F. 2d 872, cert. denied,

BOGUS. 1O1G oc vccccccesesdveccscovscetenan 4

Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S.

SPD coccecvvesdavevevsenessssesevenseeanan 6

Borger v. Yamaha Int'l Corp., 625 F. 2d 390 .... 4

Chapa v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.,

[1974-1] Trade Cas. para. 74,911 .......00e0e 4

Charlotte Telecasters, Inc. v. Jefferson- Pilot

Comp., FOF FO STO wecsrrvrcccccvcecceesce 3

Garelick v. Goerlich’s Inc., 323 F. 24 854 ....... 4

Imperial Point Colonnades Condominium, Inc. v.

Mangurian, 549 F. 2d 1029, cert. denied,

Ce WA OOD 0 vnccceseseciecesesneeeneunn 3, 6

Manok v. Southeast District Bowling Ass'n,

SUG F. Supp, 1215. .ccccccccccrsccccscesecss 4

Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, In re,

591 F. 2d 68, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 900 ..... 3,4

Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway

Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342 ...cce eens 6

IV

Page

Cases— Continued:

Pioneer Co. v. Talon, Inc., 462 F. 2d 1106 ...... 3

Poster Exchange, Inc. v. National Screen Service

DRED Me EET cxeswcvdssacccccscoce 3,4

Southeastern Hose, Inc. v. Imperial-Eastman

Corp., [1973-1] Trade Cas. para. 74,479 ....... 4

United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 ......... 6

Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,

MP MEMNI MEE avaceraccachccceccssceccccee ,

Statutes:

Clayton Act, Section 4B, 15 U.S.C. 15b ......... 2

Sherman Act, Section 1,15 U.S.C. 1 ........45. 2

Miscellaneous:

II P. Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law

SE SSeGhwde eS ved ecasabescavescececs 3,4, 5

H.R. Rep. No. 422, 84th Cong., Ist Sess.

| Sr re rrr rr Tree rrrrerTrTee 5

S. Rep. No. 619, 84th Cong., Ist Sess.

DE Sas tab WSs eeu Gddebesbebeceeccsccecess 5

13 J. von Kalinowski, Antitrust Laws and Trade

DCUEEEE Souddbcmestesedasccsececass 5

In the Supreme Court of the Hnited States

OcTOBER TERM, 1980

No. 80-1777

DAviD ORGELL, INC., PETITIONER

A

JosiAH WepGwoop & Sons, INC., ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES

AS AMICUS CURIAE

This brief is filed in response to the Court's invitation to

the Solicitor General to express the views of the United

States.

STATEMENT

Petitioner David Orgell, Inc. (“Orgell”), is a retailer of

silver, china and crystal in the Los Angeles area. Respond-

ent Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Inc. (“Wedgwood”), manu-

factures china and dinnerware and sells its products to

various retailers in the Los Angeles area, including Geary’s

Stores, Inc. (“Geary’s”), one of Orgell’s competitors (Pet.

App. Ia).

In 1965, Orgell sought and was refused the opportunity to

retail Wedgwood products. In 1968 and on two occasions

between 1976 and 1978, Orgell again sought and was

refused access to the Wedgwood line (Pet. App. 2a).

2

In 1978, Orgell sued Wedgwood, Geary’s, and other

china and dinnerware manufacturers, alleging that they had

conspired to refuse to deal with Orgell, in violation of

Section | of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. The district

court granted summary judgment to Wedgwood on the

ground that the suit was barred by the four-year statute of

limitations applicable to private antitrust suits under Sec-

tion 4B of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 15b, notwithstanding

the fact that Wedgwood had refused to deal with Orgell

within the four years preceding the suit (Pet. App. 5a-7a).

The court of appeals affirmed (Pet. App. la-3a), holding

that the cause of action accrued with the first refusal to deal

in 1965 and that each subsequent refusal was only “ ‘a

reaffirmation of the original decision not to deal with the

plaintiff’ ” (id. at 3a).

ARGUMENT

The court of appeals’ decision that repeated unlawful

refusals to deal do not give rise to new causes of action

exacerbates a conflict among the circuits. Moreover, the

decision poses needless risks for antitrust enforcement

without advancing the policies that underlie the statute of

limitations. Accordingly, we submit that review by this

Court is warranted.!

1. Section 4B of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 15b, pro-

vides that private antitrust claims “shall be forever barred

unless commenced within four years after the cause of

action accrued.” As this Court observed in Zenith Radio

Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 338

(1971), in the context of an ongoing conspiracy to violate

the antitrust laws, Section 4B has usually been construed to

mean that “each time a plaintiff is injured by an act of the

defendants a cause of action accrues to him to recover the

'Like the court of appeals and the district court, we express no view as

to the merits of Orgell’s substantive claim.

3.

damages caused by that act and * * *, as to those damages,

the statute of limitations runs from the commission of the

act.”

The courts of appeals have split on the issue of applying

the statute of limitations to suits for repeated refusals to

deal. The Fourth, Fifth and Eighth Circuits have held that

repeated refusals to deal give rise to new causes of action

and thereby allow plaintiffs to bring suit within four years

of the most recent refusal. Charlotte Telecasters, Inc. v.

Jefferson- Pilot Corp., 546 F. 2d 570, 572 (4th Cir. 1976);

Poster Exchange, Inc. v. National Screen Service Corp.,

517 F. 2d 117, 123-128 (Sth Cir. 1975); Imperial Point Col-

onnades Condominium, Inc. v. Mangurian, 549 F. 2d 1029

(Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 859 (1977) (elaborating on

Poster Exchange), Pioneer Co. v. Talon, Inc., 462 F. 2d

1106 (8th Cir. 1972).? These courts qualify the general rule

with two narrow caveats, both of which are implicit in this

Court’s decision in Zenith: (1) the initial refusal to deal

must not have been irrevocable; and (2) the plaintiff actu-

ally must have been denied an opportunity to deal within

the four-year period. See, e.g., Imperial Point Colonnades

Condominium, Inc. v. Mangurian, supra, 549 F. 2d at

1035. See also In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 59|

F. 2d 68, 72 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 900 (1979). The

2Although Wedgwood suggests (Br. in Opp. 6) that Poster Exchange

is confined to monopolization suits, the Fifth Circuit has not so limited

it. See Imperial Point Colonnades Condominium, Inc. v. Mangurian,

supra, 549 F. 2d at 1034-1035. See also Il P. Areeda & D. Turner,

Antitrust Law, para. 325b, at 122 n.19 (1978).

Wedgwood’s attempt (Br. in Opp. 7-8) to distinguish Pioneer on the

ground that no harm accrued to Pioneer from the initial notice of

termination, leaving the first refusal to accept an order (which occurred

within the limitations period) as the source of harm, neglects the case's

far broader holding: “{I]t is quite clear that [Talon’s] continued refusals

to deal caused new injury to Pioneer each time an order was refused.”

462 F. 2d at 1109 (emphasis added; footnote omitted).

4

courts have stressed that the irrevocable-refusal exception

is extremely limited in scope. If the circumstances surround-

ing the initial refusal to deai make the decision irrevocable

or the harm it causes irretrievable, subsequent refusals do

not cause new harm, since the initial choice compelled all

the harm that followed. See Jn re Multidistrict Vehicle Air

Pollution, supra, 591 F. 2d at 72; Poster Exchange, Inc. v.

National Screen Service Corp., supra, 517 F. 2d at 126.

Otherwise, a mere refusal to deal, however emphatic, is not

deemed to be final or irrevocable; as long as the decision is

capable of being reversed, each subsequent refusal to deal

inflicts new harm on the plaintiff.

There is, however, a conflicting line of authority. The

Sixth Circuit has held that subsequent refusals to deal do

not give rise to new causes of action, on the ground that

even if the refusals qualify as “overt acts,” they do not

themselves cause new harm. Garelick v. Goerlich’s, Inc.,

323 F. 2d 854, 856 (6th Cir. 1963) (“{T]he [subsequent]

incidents were simply acts that reflected that defendant-

appellee continued in refusing to sell its products to

plaintiffs-appellants”). Garelick has found support in sev-

eral district courts, including the Southern District of New

York. See Chapa v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.,[{1974-1]

Trade Cas. para. 74,911 (D.D.C. 1974); Southeastern Hose,

Inc. v. Imperial- Eastman Corp., [1973-1] Trade Cas. para.

74,479 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Manok v. Southeast District

Bowling Ass'n, 306 F. Supp. 1215, 1221 (C.D. Cal. 1969);

Ansul Co. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 306 F. Supp. 541, 569

(S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other

grounds, 448 F. 2d 872 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.

1018 (1972). Commentators also have treated Garelick as

stating the general rule. See II P. Areeda & D. Turner,

3But see Borger v. Yamaha Intl Corp., 625 F. 2d 390, 398 (2d Cir.

1980) (dictum).

»

Antitrust Law, para. 325b, at 121 (1978); cf. 13 J. von

Kalinowski, Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation

§ 103.02[ 1 [a] (1980).

The decision below aligns the Ninth Circuit with the

Sixth Circuit on the issue. Although the court below pur-

ported to rest its ruling on the irrevocable-refusal exception

employed by the Fourth, Fifth and Eighth Circuits, it has

expanded the exception so widely as to swallow the rule.

Rather than focusing on the irreversibility of the refusal to

deal, the court of appeals based its decision upon the

“unequivocal” nature of the initial refusal (Pet. App. 3a).

On this rationale, no suit for repeated refusals to deal could

ever be brought more than four years after the initial re-

fusal, since every subsequent refusal would qualify as a

“reaffirmation” of the original decision.

2. The statute of limitations for repeated refusals to deal

now varies from circuit to circuit; how quickly a plaintiff

must sue depends on the fortuity of where he ‘vings suit.

This division among the courts of appeals perpetuates the

very “confusion and discrimination” that Congress sought

to avoid by adopting a uniform federal statute of limitations

for the antitrust laws in 1955. S. Rep. No. 619, 84th Cong.,

Ist Sess. 5(1955); H.R. Rep. No. 422, 84th Cong., Ist Sess. 7

(1955). This Court should grant review to restore unifor-

mity among the circuits.

We think, moreover, that the Court should resolve the

conflict by reversing the decision below and approving the

rule followed by the Fourth, Fifth and Eighth Circuits.

Provided that the original refusal is not “irrevocable”

within the narrow meaning of that term (see page 4, supra),

where there are repeated unlawful refusals to deal each

subsequent unlawful refusal is the cause of whatever harm

follows it, because that harm would have been forgone but

for the new unlawful refusal. The contrary position of the

6

court below rests on the erroneous premise that subsequent

decisions whether or not to deal have no effect.

The decision below is not justified by any of the policies

underlying the statute of limitations. Statutes of limitations

safeguard judicial accuracy, preserve settled expectations,

insure timely notice of claims, and generally “promote jus-

tice by preventing surprise through the revival of claims that

have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost,

memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.”

Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 487 (1980);

United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979); Order

of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.,

321 U.S. 342, 348-349 (1944). Barring suits for repeated

refusals to deal advances none of these goals, since, in order

to maintain a cause of action under the statute, the plaintiff

must demonstrate that it has been refused an opportunity to

deal within the four-year period. See /mperial Point Colon-

nades Condominium, Inc. v. Mangurian, supra, 549 F. 2d

at 1041. Nor is the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the

statute of limitations needed as an incentive to bring suit

quickly, since it is always in a plaintiff's interest to seek relief

as quickly as possible. See id. at 1044.4

Moreover, the Ninth Circuit’s rule is particularly unde-

sirable in refusai to deal cases. A merchant who hopes

eventually to obtain a supplier’s products may well be less

likely to bring suit immediately and jeopardize a potentially

profitable future business relationship than to wait and

make another request to carry the goods. The Ninth Cir-

cuit’s rule will force buyers to choose between bringing what

‘Even if a rule barring refusal-to-deal suits brought more than four

years after an initial refusal to deal otherwise would serve a prophylactic

function, those plaintiffs most likely to bring suit more than four years

after an initial refusal to deal are the ones most likely to lack alert

antitrust counsel and, hence, least likely to become aware of a prophy-

lactic rule until the deadline has passed.

J

may turn out to be a needless ana undesired lawsuit and

forgoing the protection of the antitrust laws. Forcing sucha

choice is contrary to the public interest.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted.

LAWRENCE G. WALLACE

Acting Solicitor General

WILLIAM F. BAXTER

Assistant Attorney General

RosBerT B. NICHOLSON

Attorney

AuGust 1981

DOJ-1981-08

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.