Petition — Lin v. American Airlines, Inc.

Supreme Court brief1981

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Text

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EXandyae > STENAS,

Supreme Court of the :

—

October Term, i980

SHUTAO H. LIN, as Administrator of the Goods, Chattels and

Credits which were of SHU REN LIN, M.D., Deceased;

JOSEPH P. MALACYNSKI, as Administrator of the Estate of

MICHELLE MALACYNSKI, and JOSEPH P.

MALACYNSKI, individually; DONALD R. LYON and

SOPHIE H. LYON; and JANE S. SHATKIN, as Executrix of

the Estate of LLOYD J. SHATKIN, Deceased,

Petitioners,

VS.

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC. and McDONNELL

DOUGLAS CORPORATION,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH

CIRCUIT

F. LEE BAILEY

AARON J. BRODER

Attorneys for Petitioners

350 Fifth Avenue

New York, New York 10001

(212) 244-2000

HARRY B. FRANK

LESTER J. KRAVITZ

IRVING ANOLIK

Of Counsel

4843 LUTZ APPELLATE PRINTERS, INC.

NY (212) 840-9494 © (516) 222-1606 © (914) 683-9363

NJ (201) 257-6850 © PA (215) 563-5587 © DC (202) 783-7288 @ MA (617) 227-1133

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the law permits recovery of punitive damages in

_death cases against American Airlines and/or McDonnell

Douglas?

2. Whether petitioners are denied equal protection of the

laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United

States Constitution by virtue of the fact that the court below has

held in essence that they may not seek punitive damages

although if the case had been brought in another jurisdiction

they would have been entitled to such damages?

-3. From a choice of law standpoint, when a defendant

corporation has moved its corporate headquarters after an

accident, which state has the predominant interest in the

awarding or denial of punitive damages, the state of the former

or present principal place of business of the defendant

corporation?

4. Since the pleadings below were inconsistent, with some

plaintiffs pleading that Texas was American’s principal place

of business and others pleading that it was New York, was it

proper for the court below to assume it was New York?

5. Assuming that New York law governs, does the denial by

such law of punitive damages only where the victim dies deny

the petitioners equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth

Amendment?

ii

PARTIES

The plaintiffs in the district court and the United States

Court of Appeals were as follows:

The actions below are currently known as “In Re Air Crash

Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois on May 25, 1979” and bear

Multi-District Litigation Master File Number MDL 391. The

names of all plaintiffs in MDL 391 are set forth infra (see Note

following petition).

The defendants were as follows:

American Airlines, Inc. and McDonnell Douglas

Corporation.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Cpeehees PUUGRINE | ic occ cs ccccccccccccsguascesscectcese i

PATTIES cc ccccccccccccsccccceccccccescceeecccseeoeneoes i

Table OF Comtemts nccccccccccccccccccccccccccccceveces iii

Table Of Citations .cccccccccccccccccccncccescccccccces iv

Opinions Belew occ cccccccsccsnpeccccsscccveccencvccoes 2

FOTMGIOUOR coc ccccccccccvcscvenevcccccccececeoscccces 2

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved ......... 3

Statement of the Case ....cccccccccccccccccccccccccccce 3

Summary Of APQUMORt oc cccccccccccccccccccccccccesccs 6

PRRTOGINOEY Sic cce csi cvdcdcvesecdeccocesscevescesecess 7

Reasons For Granting the Writ:

I. The United States Court of Appeals erred in

determining that no punitive damages could be

recovered, and applied a wrong determination of the

QOVETTING IAW. ccccccccccccccscccscodcccecccece 8

II. The court below erred in holding that a defendant

corporation's principal place of business at the time

of the accident had a predominant interest in the

issue of punitive damages, rather than its present

principal place of business. .........seeeeeeeees 14

iv

Contents

Page

III. Assuming New York law is applicable to the issue of

punitive damages against American, New York law

violates the equal protection clause of the United

DUD GORTIIIOR, . sc crcccessccsevcccccvececes 19

IV. The United States Court of Appeals opinion is

confusing and it does not give sufficient guidance in

complex and prolix cases of this kind. This Court

should grant certiorari to adequately resolve the

confusion created by the opinion below. ........ 21

DE <. cep cdbuee pack deauisbelbcledusadseees nneeae 22

ME. nod ne Veutnavaakole esd ddbibsed coeuebetoneeeuneeses ix

TABLE OF CITATIONS

Cases Cited:

Babcock v. Johnson, 12 N.Y. 2d 473, 240 N.Y.S. 743 (1964). 12

Belisario v. Manhattan Motor Rental, Inc., 370 N.Y.S. 2d

574, 48 A.D. 2d 477 (Ist Dept. 1975) ...........058. 13

Bernard v. Harrah’s Club, 546 P. 2d 719 (1976) ......... 12

Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F. 2d 1145, n. 2 (Ist Cir.

MG aut Rane meuresskics anak bac ines bwe0escadecesus 20

Forty-Eight Insulations v. Johns-Manville Products, 472

Fr, es See CN TR UBT) scvcdivncctevcacticoses 10

Vv

Contents

Page

Gore v. Northeast Airlines, 373 F. 2d 717 (2d Cir. 1967).. 13

Huff v. White Motor Corp., 609 F. 2d 286 (7th Cir. 1979) . 19, 20

Hurtado v. Superior Court, 114 Cal. Rptr. 106, 522 P. 2d 666

GRIER PD ccc ecscccccvencdamececctcdesccsceceone ll

Ingersoll v. Klein, 46 Ill. 2d 42 (1970) .........eeeees Pd

In Re Paris, 427 F. Supp. 701 (C.D. Cal. 1977) ..rccccee 19

Jackson v. Koninklijke Luchtyaart Maatschappij, N.V., 459

Fs ON Gas CREAN. Vs OPPS). cic cscccccsccmuses siise 10

Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y. 2d 34, 211

PE a Oe BSS CIDOE) cc ccomacccsstcvesevccecsnenece 13

Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487

GOED. “waddacne ccdiscececivetacantcletencteeseunsen 9

Long v. Pan Am World Airways, Inc., 16 N.Y. 2d 337, 266

Tee Bia Se OR HP OED oncccccccstccbasetepsaneanwwes 13

McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 81S. Ct. L101, 6 L. Ed.

Oe CEOEED * Sn vcviclecddusdceescegunevcespusenann 21

Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y. 2d 12, 290 N.Y.S. 2d 734, 237 N.E.

‘RB icmt. Mererrerreerit Tre r erry tree 15, 16, 18, 19

Mitseff v. Acme Steel Co., 208 F. Supp. 805 (N.D. Ill. 1962} 20

vi

Contents

Page

Pancotto v. Sociedade de Safaris de Mocambique, S.A.R.I.,

422 F. Supp. 405 (N.D. M11. 1976) ...ccccvcccccccces 10

Parham v. Hughes, 439 U.S. 815, 99 S. Ct. 75, 58 L. Ed. 2d

EP SEU SubeRsceweshebetahekSbedeevedicvabevecccces 20

Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 72 S. Ct. 251, 30 L. Ed. 225

Re EE reo, erry er eee eee ee Te ee 21

Reich v. Purcell, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31, 432 P. 2d 727 (Sup.

TEE ABREU RURGES ch GS OSV 6 cK csecbnadssecgesotercees 11

Sibley v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 454 F. Supp. 425

EE MED sc cackd Khob 00h ps evere ce cenceced coo.

Tarasoff v. Regents of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 131 Cal.

te A Gee Ws OO SO8 CITE) si idcicerascccccccsess 12

Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S. Ct. 939, 59 L. Ed. 2d 171

A PNG nee AbG UCR h0Ghddse ehh sae decsescccenes 20

Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964) .........46. 9, 10

Walkes v. Walkes, 465 F. Supp. 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) ..... 13

Statutes Cited:

es Spahoeedseces see’ 2

eM Eee i nvsdackesesecatveds 2

ee a ees ds cb essacescvdaess 3

’

vii

Contents

Page

28 U.S.C. $1332 ..cceccccrecccccccccccsccccsccvcsevecs 3

Missouri Statutes Annotated 509.200, 510.270 ............ 3

Missouri Revised Statutes 537.090 .......ceeeeeeeeeeeees 3

12 Oklahoma Statutes Annotated §1053 .........eeeeeee 3

22 Oklahoma Statutes Annotated, §134 ........eeeeeeeee 3

United States Constitution Cited:

Fifth AmenGment oc ccccccsccccccccccccececscccsccsoocs 3

Fourteenth Amendment .......secsecccsccccvcceceees i, 3, 19

Rules Cited:

Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 55.19, 70.01,

hn 5 466 ode thee eaeetones bu ebe’ varecne 3

Other Authorities Cited:

Broder, Aaron J., “The Death Penalty and Punitive Dam-

ages,” New York Law Journal, Feb. 8, 1980 ........ ee

Leflar, American Conflicts Law, 3d Ed. §99, pp. 197-198;

§108, pp. 219-222; §139, pp. 284-285 ........eeeeeees 18

Restatement of Conflict of Laws (Second Edition) ....... v)

SEAR CRNENS OD cca nce Naeeiecvenedesee setcrecse 10

viii

Contents

Page

APPENDIX

Appendix A — Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Seventh Circuit Decided January 5, 1981 .... la

Appendix B — Order Dated January 5, 1981 ............ 7la

Appendix C — Order Dated March 3, 1981 ..........+.. 73a

Appendix D — Memorandum Opinion of the United States

District Court Filed May 23, 1980 (Dated May 29, 1980). 77a

Appendix E — Order Dated May 23, 1980 ..........546- 95a

Appendix F — Order Dated May 27, 1980 ...........+.5. 96a

Appendix G — Relevant Constitutional and Statutory Pro-

WOME: odcckacrectdecccivecesccdsccntsceweuvesvens 97a

No.

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

-@>

October Term, 1980

SHUTAO H. LIN, as Administrator of the Goods, Chattels and

Credits which were of SHU REN LIN, M.D., Deceased;

JOSEPH P. MALACYNSKI, as Administrator of the Estate of

MICHELLE MALACYNSKI, and JOSEPH P.

MALACYNSKI, individually; DONALD R. LYON and

SOPHIE H. LYON; and JANE S. SHATKIN, as Executrix of

the Estate of LLOYD J. SHATKIN, Deceased,

Petitioners,

vs.

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC. and McDONNELL

DOUGLAS CORPORATION,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH

CIRCUIT

>

2

OPINIONS BELOW

A copy of the opinion of the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern District, is

reproduced in the appendix hereto.

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals of the

Seventh Circuit dated January 5, 1981 is likewise reproduced in

the appendix.

The orders sought to be reviewed were dated May 23, 1980

and May 27, 1980 respectively. These orders, made by the United

States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division, ruled in essence that the plaintiffs (petitioners

herein) can pursue punitive damages against McDonnell

Douglas Corporation (hereinafter referred to as “MDC”), but

not against American Airlines, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as

“American”). (See order of May 23, 1980 as amended by order

of May 27, 1980, both of which are set forth in the appendix

hereto.)

An opinion was made and rendered by the United States

District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern

Division, dated May 29, 1980. The United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in essence reversed so much of

the district court’s order as provided for a right to pursue

punitive damages as against MDC.

The orders of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Seventh Circuit are dated January 5, 1981 and March 3, i981,

and are set forth in the appendix hereto.

we JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction to review this order is predicated upon 28

U.S.C. §§1254 and 1257.

3

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

INVOLVED

The constitutional provisions are the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution. The statutory

provisions are: 28 U.S.C. §1292(b); 28 U.S.C. §1332; Missouri

Statutes Annotated 509.200, 510.270; Missouri Revised Statutes

537.090; 22 Oklahoma Statutes Annotated, §134; 12 Oklahoma

Statutes Annotated, §1053; Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure,

Rules 55.19, 70.01, 70.02, 71.06.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

These actions arise out of the crash of a DC-10 jet airliner

designed and built by respondent MDC and owned and

operated by respondent American. The plane was scheduled to

fly to Los Angeles as American Airlines flight 191, but crashed

in Illinois shortly after take-off from O’Hare International

Airport on May 25, 1979. Two hundred seventy three persons

were killed in this accident, the greatest number of persons to

perish in an air disaster within the United States.

The actions were started in California, Illinois, New York,

Puerto Rico, Hawaii and Michigan.

The accident and deaths occurred in Illinois.

There are numerous cases arising out of the accident, which

are now pending before the Hon. Edwin A. Robson and Hubert

L. Will, both of the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

Many of these actions were filed in or removed to other

federal district courts, but have been transferred to Illinois for

pre-trial purposes by order of the Judicial Panel on Multi

4

District Litigation. With exceptions not relevant to the merits of

this petition, plaintiffs’ claims against MDC arise under the

wrongful death statutes of various states and are pursued on

theories of negligence and strict tort liability. Many of the

complaints allege wrongful death actions against MDC. They

contain prayers for punitive damages, in addition to

compensatory damages.

MDC contends that the plaintiffs’ complaints failed to state

legally sufficient claims for this relief, insofar as they purport to

seek punitive damages for wrongful death.

MDC’s principal place of business is Missouri, but it is a

Maryland corporation.

American’s principal place of business is now Texas. There

is a dispute in the pleadings as to American’s principal place of

business on the day of the accident. Most of the plaintiffs were

aware of this, and advanced claims for punitive damages alleging

that American’s principal place of business on the accident date

was Texas. However, some of the plaintiffs allege that it was

New York.

American maintains that its corporate headquarters moved

from New York to Dallas, Texas in August of 1979, but the

decision to move was made in November of 1978. The move was

compicted by August of 1979. American was incorporated in

Delaware.

Thus, we point out that the district court’s statement that

the relevant facts are primarily “undisputed” and that at the time

of the crash American “had its prin.ipal place of business in

New York” is not correct with respect to American’s place of

business.

5

Plaintiffs are the decedents’ estates and personal

representatives, and were residents of numerous states and

countries including California, Illinois, New York,

Massachusetts, Vermont, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Holland and

Japan.

The plaintiffs contend that MDC’s conduct in the design

and imanufacture of the DC-10 was egregious. This alleged

misconduct occurred in California.

The plaintiffs maintain that American’s conduct regarding

the maintenance of the DC-10 was egregious. They contend that

this misconduct occurred in Oklahoma, the location of

American’s maintenance base. :

Both respondents moved in the district court to strike the

claims for punitive damages on the ground that such claims

failed to state legally sufficient claims for relief. The parties

disputed many issues: whether certain states allowed punitive

damages, the choice-of-law theories to be used regarding certain

states, and the results of the application of the choice-of-law

theories which were used.

Using the choice-of-law rules of each state where these

actions had originally been filed, the district court arrived at the

following results:

Under the Illinois “most significant relationship” test, the

district court found that the law of the state of the principal

place of business should prevail with regard to the ‘ssue of

punitive damages. Finding that New York was American's

principal place of business at the time of the crash and does not

allow punitive damages, and that Missouri, MDC’s principal

place of business, does allow the equivalent of punitive damages,

the court allowed the motions to strike punitive damage claims

against American but not against MDC.

6

Under the California “comparative impairment” test, the

district court held that the policies of the state of the principal

place of business would be impaired more than the policies of

the state of misconduct if those policies were not applied. Thus,

the court allowed the motion to strike punitive damage claims

with regard to American but not with regard to MDC. The

district court reached the same result with regard to the actions

filed in New York, Michigan, Puerto Rico, and Hawaii.

The court of appeals found that the motions to strike claims

for punitive damages should be granted with regard to both

MDC and American (4a).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The district court’s choice of law analysis was correct, with

one exception. Where a corporation changes its principal place

of business after an accident, the state with the greatest interest

in controlling its conduct and awarding or denying punitive

damages against it is the state of its current principal place of

business.

The district court assumed that American’s principal place

of business was New York oa the accident date and, based upon

this assumption, then appiied the law of New York, which does

not allow punitive damages in death cases. Even if this

assumption was undisputed, the court should have applied the

law of Texas, because even American concedes that Texas has

been its principal place of business from August 1979 to the

present. This was the court’s first error.

The court’s second error was in assuming that New York

was American’s principal place of business on the accident date.

The pleadings were in conflict on this issue.

7

Thirdly, the court below erred in holding that New York

law, which permits the recovery of punitive damages when the

victim of tort is injured but denies them when he dies, does not

violate the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution.

INTRODUCTORY

This case presents complex conflicts-of-law questions

regarding the allowance of punitive damages in wrongful death

actions arising out of an air crash disaster. The law of the place

of the disaster, the law of the place of manufacture of the

airplane, and the law of one place of business of the

airline do not allow punitive damages. However, the law of the

primary place of business of the manufacturer of the airplane

and the law of the place of maintenance of the aircraft do allow

punitive damages. The United State Court of Appeals for the

Seventh Circuit, in essence, held that under each of the

applicable state’s choice-of-law rules, punitive damages could

not be allowed against the manufacturer or the airline.

There are now one hundred eighteen wrongful death actions

arising out of the crash which were originally filed in many

jurisdictions, including, Illinois, California, New York,

Michigan, Hawaii and Puerto Rico. As already indicated, the

cases were transferred to the Northern District of Illinois by

order of the Judicial Panel on Miulti-District Litigation.

8

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The United States Court of Appeals erred in determining

that no punitive damages could be recovered, and applied a

wrong determination of the governing law.

It is ironic, but true, that if a person allegedly shoots and

kills another individual, the deceased’s estate cannot sue for

punitive damages in many states, but only can _ seek

compensatory damages.

In the case at bar a “Pickwickian” approach to the

governing law was applied by the United States Court of

Appeals, because in essence it ruled that none of the petitioners

herein or the plaintiffs in the actions can seek or recover punitive

damages from either of the respondents.

The main contention of MDC was that the court should

apply the law of Illinois, the place of injury, to all of the actions

and that since Illinois does not allow punitive damages, no

plaintiff should recover such damages. American basically

argued below that the law of Illinois should be applied to actions

originally filed in Illinois and that New York law should apply

to actions originally filed in New York and California. Since

neither Illinois nor New York permits punitive damages in a

wrongful death action, American contended that no punitive

damages should be allowed.

The plaintiffs take various positions. Some contend that the

conflicts of law rules of all the forum states require us to apply

the law of respondents’ principal place of business or the law of

the state where the alleged wrongful conduct occurred. Other

plaintiffs, notably those from Michigan and Hawaii, assert that

9

the conflict of law rules of those forums require the court to

apply the law of plaintiff's domicile. All plaintiffs contend that

under the applicable state law, punitive damages are recoverable

in a wrongful death action. Additionally, plaintiffs contend that

to deny punitive damages in wrongful death actions, while

permitting them in personal injury actions, violates the equal

protection clauses of the United States Constitution, and the

various State Constitutions.

Since the jurisdiction of this Court is predicated on diversity

of citizenship, we must apply the choice of law rules of the state

where the actions were originally filed. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor

Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); Van Dusen v. Barrack,

376 U.S. 612 (1964). See Broder, Aaron J., “The Death Penaity

and Punitive Damages,” New York Law Journal, Feb. 8, 1980.

With respect to actions filed in Illinois, Illinois courts use

the “most significant relationship” test of the Restatement of

Conflict of Laws (Second Edition) to determine the applicable

law in a tort claim. /ngersoll v. Klein, 46 Ill. 2d 42 (1970). Under

this test, four “contacts” generally are considered most

important in determining which law applied: (1) the place of the

injury; (2) the place where the conduct causing injury occurred;

(3) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation,

and place of business of the parties; and (4) the place where the

relationship, if any, of the parties is centered. /ngersoll, supra at

47-48. Illinois courts consider the purpose of the tort rule

involved when determining the relative importance of the

various contacts to the issue under consideration. The important

factor to be considered is the place where the conduct causing

the injury occurred, especially when that is a state other than

that in which the injury occurred.

The purpose of punitive damages is to punish and deter

wrongdoing. Sibley v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 454 F. Supp.

10

425 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Jackson v. Koninklijke Luchtyaart

Maatschappij N.V., 459 F. Supp. 953 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). The state

in which the wrongdoing actually occurred has a greater interest

than the state where the effect of the wrongdoing fortuitously

manifests itself. See Restatement, §146, comment e.

The principal place of business of the defendant is also

deemed important in determining the issue of which state’s law

governs the availability of punitive damages.

A state’s purpose in granting punitive damages is to insure

residents’ compliance with standards of conduct; a state’s

purpose in denying punitive damages isto limit the liability of its

domiciliaries in tort actions. Forty Eight Insulations v. Johns-

Manville Products, 472 F. Supp. 385 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Pancotto

v. Sociedade de Safaris de Mocambique, S.A.R.1., 422 F. Supp.

405 (N.D. Ill. 1976). Both purposes would be served by applying

the law of the state of the defendant’s domicile.

In Sibley, supra, and Jackson, supra, the court held that the

availability of punitive damages in cases arising from the

collision at Tenerife in the Canary Islands of a Pan American

747 and KLM 747 was governed either by the law of the place of

conduct and injury (Spain), or by the law of the principal place

of business of KLM (Netherlands), neither of which allowed

punitive damages. The court recognized that punitive damages

are primarily the concern of the jurisdiction where the conduct

occurred or the defendant’s business was located. Denial of

punitive damages reflects that jurisdiction’s concern with

protecting the financial interests of those doing »usiness there

and the state of residence’s concern with avoiding excessive

financial burdens on resident persons and corporations. See

Jackson, supra at 956.

Neither factor requires the determination of where the

relationship, if any, of where the parties is centered. We submit,

as the district court did, that the places where the conduct

causing the injury occurred and the states where the respondents’

principal place of business are located are crucial:

If New York was the principal place of business of

American at the time of the crash that would be one factor

militating against punitive damages so far as American is

concerned. We maintain, however, a perusal of the record

reveals that the conclusive decision of American to move to

Texas was consummated in 1978 and the move itself began prior

to the crash and was completed by August of 1979.

With respect to actions filed in California, we note that

unlike Illinois, California does not use the “most significant

relationship” test to determine the applicable law in tort cases.

California courts first determine whether a true conflict

exists by analyzing the interests of the states whose law might

apply to the issue. Reich v. Purcell, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31, 432 P. 2d

727, 730 (Sup. 1967); Hurtado v. Superior Court, 114 Cal. Rptr.

106, 522 P. 2d 666, 679-70 (Sup. 1974). California courts

recognize that there are three separate interests in wrongful

death actions: First, the plaintiff's domicile may have an interest

in the compensation of survivors. Second, the state of injury

may be concerned with deterring wrongful conduct and

protecting persons within its borders. Third, the defendant's

domicile may have an interest in limiting residents’ liability for

damages, thereby protecting residents from excessive financial

burdens. Hurtado, supra at 672-3.

Where. the laws of the interested states conflict as to a

particular issue, the court is to determine the proper law by

using the “comparative impairment” approach. Bernhard v.

12

Harrah's Club, 546 P. 2d 719 (1976). Under this test, the court

determines which state’s policy, as reflected by its law, would be

more severely affected if it were not applied. Bernhard, supra at

724.

As to respondent MDC, the two interested jurisdictions are

(1) the place where the conduct occurred, California; and (2) the

principal place of business of the respondent, Missouri.

The interests of California in this action are limited.

California courts have traditionally held punitive damages not

recoverable in wrongful death action. Tarasoff v. Regents of

California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 551 P. 2d 334

(1976); Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 113

Cal. Rptr. 416 (1976). Disallowance of punitive damages in

wrongful death actions expresses a state policy to avoid

excessive financial burdens on state residents. While MDC has

substantial operations in California, as well as in Missouri, it is

not a California resident.

The district court correctly held that California’s interest is

less than that of Missouri.

American had its maintenance facilities in the State of

Oklahoma, which allows punitive damages in wrongul death

actions. Oklahoma should have been deemed American's

effective place of business for conflict-of-laws purposes.

A perusal of the opinion of the district judges will

adequately outline the applicable law with respect to the several

other states herein involved.

New York courts apply the “governmental interest”

approach in determining the applicable law in tort cases.

Babcock v. Johnson, 12 N.Y. 2d 473, 240 N.Y.S. 2d 743 (1964);

Long v. Pan Am World Airways, Inc., 16 N.Y. 2d 337, 266

13

N.Y.S. 2d 513 (1965). This test requires the court to determine

which state has the greatest concern with the specific issue raised

because of its relationship or contact with the parties or the

occurrence. Babcock, supra at 481. Where there is nothing

fortuitous in the fact that the injury occurred in a given state,

New York courts will give great weight to the state where the

injury occurred. See Belisario v. Manhattan Motor Rental, Inc.,

370 N.Y.S. 2d 574, 48 A.D. 2d 477 (Ist Dept. 1975); Walkes v.

Walkes, 465 F. Supp. 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).

However, as New York courts have recognized, air crash

disasters often present situations where the place of injury is

largely fortuitous. Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y. 2d

34, 211 N.Y.S. 2d 133 (1961); Gore v. Northeast Airlines, 373 F.

2d 717 (2d Cir. 1967). That the injury in this case occurred in

Illinois can certainly be considered “fortuitous.” Under these

circumstances, and considering the purpose of punitive damages,

a New York court would hold that the law of the principal place

of business determines the availability of punitive damages.

The highlights of the district court’s opinion can be

capsulated as follows:

In sum, the district court’s approach was unimpeachable in

looking to a defendant’s principal place of business to determine

the applicability of punitive damages. The court erred, however,

when it looked to American's principal place of business at the

time of the accident rather than its current principal place of

business.

The court of appeals below (35a), correctly noted that there

are inconsistencies in the pleadings with regard to American's

principal place of business. However, that court’s determination

that despite these inconsistencies and lack of precision it could

not overturn the district court’s finding as to American's

14

principal place of business is untenable. We believe this Court

has a right to review the record and to make an independent

determination based upon the patently obvious aspects involved.

The court below erred in holding that a defendant

corporation’s principal place of business at the time of the

accident had a predominant interest in the issue of punitive

damages, rather than its present principal place of business.

Having properly concluded under the choice of law rules of

Illinois, California, New York and Michigan that a corporation,’s

principal place of business has the predominant interest in the

issue of punitive damages, the court below erred in applying the

law of New York, where American's corporate headquarters had

been located until its move to Texas.

Petitioners believe the court was wrong in assuming that

American’s principal place of business was New York on May

25, 1979, the day of the accident, since that issue had not been

resolved in the record below.

However, even if this assumption by the court below was

correct, the court committed a more basic error in applying the

law of New York, rather than Texas. Texas is American's

principal place of business now, and it has been, since, at the

latest, August 1979.

Under either the significant relationship test, the

governmental interest test, or the comparative impairment test,

the state with the greatest concern in controlling the conduct of

a defendant corporation, or in its financial protection, is its

current principal place of business.

15

The principal place of business on the date of the accident

has an academic interest only.

In Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y. 2d 12, 290 N.Y.S. 2d 734, 237

N.E. 2d 877 (1968), a similar situation was presented. The New

York Court of Appeals therein refused to apply Maine law to a

claim arising out of a Maine auto accident involving a

defendant-driver who was a Maine resident at the time of the

accident but moved to New York thereafter. The court held that

New York had the predominant interest in the protection and

regulation of the rights of the parties and that Maine, the

defendant’s residence at the time of the accident, had no interest

in applying its law. The court noted:

“Any claim that Maine has a paternalistic interest

in protecting its residents against liability for acts

committed while they were in Maine, should they

move to another jurisdiction, is highly

speculative . . .” 290 N.Y.S. 2d at 741.

In the instant case, American's former residence similarly

retains no interest in protecting its former resident. American’s

present residence, Texas, has the predominant interest in

applying its law on punitive damages.

The reasoning of the court below in rejecting Miller v.

Miller is fallacious.

The court first said, at p. 83a:

“In a similar case, Miller v. Miller, 22

N.Y.2d 12, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968), the New

York court found that defendant who moved

from Maine to New York shortly after an

automobile accident in Maine involving a New

16

York resident, should be considered a New York

resident for the purpose of determining the

applicable law. In that action, however, the

defendant had previously resided in New York

for a substantial period of time prior to a short

residence in Maine... .”

The fact that the defendant in Miller had previously resided

in New York for a substantial period of time prior to a short

residence in Maine provides no distinction at all from the instant

case. American has done substantial business in Texas for many

years. In fact its operations base has been-in Dallas even though

its corporate headquarters were in New York.

The court below next said that in Miller, “application of the

Maine law would have limited the compensatory damages

recoverable by the New York resident.” (83a).

But application of New York law in the instant case would

exclude the punitive damages recoverable by all plaintiffs,

whether they be resident of Texas, Illinois, California, New York

or Michigan, so this is no distinction.

Thus the only distinctions asserted by the district court

between Miller v. Miller and the instant case do not stand up.

The district court based its decision on “policy

considerations.” The court said, at p. 83a:

“We conclude that policy considerations

support finding New York, American's principal

place of business at the time of the crash,

determinative. A corporate move during lengthy

litigation is not uncommon, but the move should

not affect the substantive law to be applied in

17

that litigation. Although in this action, American

moved to a jurisdiction where the law arguably

would increase its potential liability, the opposite

situation might also occur. It would be clearly

inequitable to allow a defendant to diminish the

rights of the plaintiff through moving corporate

headquarters, however legitimately, at some

point after the injury occurred. We _ will,

therefore, consider New York the relevant

principal place of business for defendant

American.”

The court’s application of these particular “policy

considerations” was erroneous for several reasons.

First, they are outside the tests prescribed by the conflicts

rules (“significant relationship"; “governmental interest”;

“comparative impairment”) of the states whose conflicts law the

court was supposed to be applying.

Secondly, the court’s concern about corporate moves during

litigation being contrived to limit plaintiffs’ rights is not a factor

here. The move had been decided upon in November 1978. The

move, moreover, if it were related at all to punitive damages

would only have increased plaintiffs’ rights at the expense of the

respondent corporation.

Thirdly, if the court is concerned about contrived or

artificial attempts to avoid choice of law consequences by

moving, it would be a simple enough matter to hold that any

such contrived effort would not be effective in derogation of

plaintiffs’ rights.

For example, if the corporate move here was from Texas to

New York, and it was instigated after the accident, and by

reason of it, the court could simply hold that it would not

extinguish plaintiffs’ rights to punitive damages, since to do so

would be to frustrate the Texas interest in controlling the

conduct of its corporations.

The district court’s holding that it will deny effect to a

corporate move planned and largely executed before an accident

because in other circumstances such a move might be contrived

to deny plaintiffs’ rights is like throwing the baby out with the

bath water. :

Furthermore, application of New York law is anomalous

considering the fact that New York itself, under Miller v. Miller,

would look to the law of Texas.

It would not be unreasonable in this age of judicial

eclecticism in choice of law (see Leflar, American Conflicts Law,

3d Ed. §99, pp. 197-198; §108, pp. 219-222; §139, pp. 284-285)

for the court to fashion a rule that would consider the whole law

of a state, including its own conflicts rules.

Thus the court could hold that if it must look to New York

law it will consider all of New York law, including its conflicts

law as exemplified in Miller v. Miller.

Such a procedure would have the virtue in this case of

providing a consistent rule of punitive damages for both

defendants. “. . .[I]f uniformity of result is a major consideration

in any case or type of case, use of a renvoi technique is a means

of achieving it.” Leflar, American Conflicts Law, 3d Ed., p. 10.

This approach makes particular sense when one focuses on

the choice of law rationales we are dealing with. Under the

“governmental interest” tests of California, New York, and

Michigan, the court should apply the law of the state with the

greatest interest in having its law applied.

19

As between New York and Texas, New York can hardly

have the predominant interest in having its law applied when it

has already expressed, in Miller v. Miller, the view that the place

of present residence has the predominant interest.

Under California's comparative impairment refinement it

could hardly be said that New York interests would be impaired

by application of Texas law, when Miller v. Miller has

announced a predominant interest in Texas.

And even under the significant relatioriship test of Illinois,

as between the previous principal place of business and the

present one, clearly the present one has the closer relationship.

Finally, the particular “policy considerations” chosen by the

court below reflect an aspect of the vested rights theory, which

most courts now reject.

Ill.

Assuming New York law is applicable to the issue of

punitive damages against American, New York law violates the

equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.

In In Re Paris, 427 F. Supp. 701 (C.D. Cal. 1977) the court

held that a state’s denial of punitive damages in death cases

under circumstances where they are recoverable in injury cases is

a denial of equal protection under the United States

Constitution, Amendment 14.

This decision was reversed by a panel of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 622 F. 2d 1315 (1980).

Certiorari was thereafter denied. :

The district court’s decision in Jn Re Paris, supra, was also

rejected in Huff v. White Motor Corp., 609 F. 2d 286, 297-298

20

(7th Cir. 1979). However, we believe that the treatment of this

important question was perfunctory, and the court should

review it.

Parham v. Hughes, 439 U.S. 815, 99 S. Ct. 75, 58 L. Ed. 2d

106, and Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97, 99 S. Ct. 939, 943,

59 L. Ed. 2d 171 (1979) cited in Huff, are not on point. They are

simply situations where the court found that there was a rational

basis for the legislative classifications therein. There is no

rationality, howéver, to allowing punitive damages where the

victim lives and denying them where the victim dies.

The court in Huff also cited Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.

2d 1145, 1148-9 n. 2 (Ist Cir. 1974). Cyr, Mitseff v. Acme Steel

Co., 208 F. Supp. 805 (N.D. Ill. 1962), and other cases cited by

respondents below are distinguishable. They involved

contentions by plaintiffs that it was a denial of equal protection

to limit the amount of recovery in death cases but not in

personal injury cases. They merely hold that the Legislature

could treat death cases differently because their compensatory

damage elements were different from those in personal injury

cases. But punitive damages are the same in both types of cases.

It is, therefore, irrational to permit their recovery in one case but

not the other.

The question here is not whether a Legislature can place a

limit on compensatory damages in a death case. The question,

rather, is whether a Legislature can rationally distinguish

between permitting punitive damages in one class of cases and

not in the other, the purpose of punitiye damages being the

common purpose of deterring wrongdoing.

Petitioners believe that the court in Huff compressed many

applications of the “rational basis test” into one, and then

misapplied that one. Discriminations based on race are not the

21

only distinctions that violate the equal protection clause. See

Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 72 S. Ct. 251, 30 L. Ed. 225 (1971);

and McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-426, 81 S. Ct.

1101, 1105, 6 L. Ed. 2d 393, 399 (1961). We think this Court

should take another look at this question.

IV.

The United States Court of Appeals opinion is confusing

and it does not give sufficient guidance in complex and prolix

cases of this kind. This Court should grant certiorari to

adequately resolve the confusion created by the opinion below.

In essence, the court below determined that when all other

factors are equal, “the law of the place of the injury shall be

used” but in looking to claims against American Airlines, the

Seventh Circuit found that the law of the principal place of

business and the law of the allegedly egregious conduct were in

conflict.

The court further, rather anomously stated: “Again, we

emphasize that this result in no way signifies a return to the

mechanical, wooden law of /ex loci delicti. Rather it emphasizes

the fact that there must be some principled method of decision

when the standard ‘interest analysis’ of conflicts law cannot

settle the question.” In the final analysis therefore, it is difficult

to determine whether the court below actually has applied /ex

loci delicti without saying so, or whether it has created a

“Chinese jigsaw puzzle” to be applied on an ad hoc, case by case

basis.

It is manifest that the well-reasoned opinions of the district

judges were not sufficiently rationalized by the court of appeals.

It appears rather, that implicit in its opinion is the concern that

punitive damages would be so great as to be confiscatory, and

22

thus bankrupt the corporation against which they are exacted.

That further ought not to be a factor. We believe this Court

should make a determination that where a logical cause can be

made for the application of punitive damages, as is clear in the

case at bar, that punitive damages be imposed without regard to

“nice” questions of effect upon the defendant in the particular

case. Justice is equally due to the hapless plaintiffs (petitioners

herein).

To argue that a willful murder does not entitle the victim to

‘ punitive damages if he dies, but does if he is only grievously

wounded (e.g., New York) makes a mockery of the law

altogether (see article of Aaron J. Broder, N.Y.L.J. 2/8/80, The

Death Penalty. and Punitive Damages).

CONCLUSION

The petition for certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

F. LEE BAILEY

AARON J. BRODER

HARRY B. FRANK Attorneys for Petitioners

LESTER J. KRAVITZ

IRVING ANOLIK

Of Counsel

ix

NOTE

SHUTAO H. LIN, as Administrator

of the Goods, Chattels and Credits

which were of SHU REN LIN,

M.D., Deceased

JOSEPH P. MALACYNSKI, as

Administrator of the Estate

of MICHELLE MALACYNSKI, and ,

JOSEPH P. MALACYNSKI,

individually

DONALD R. LYON and SOPHIE

H. LYON

JANE S. SHATKIN as Executrix

of the Estate of LLOYD J.

SHATKIN

SWIFT, Rita P. surviving

spouse of William R. Swift;

Rita P. Swift as mother and

next friend of Lisa F. Swift

VAUGHAN, Sharon T.

individually and as mother

and next friend of Tena Ellen

Vaughan

LLOYD'S BANK CALIFORNIA as

Executor of the Estate of

WILLARD R. NARY., Deceased

LLOYD'S BANK CALIFORNIA

as Executor of the Estate

JULIA T. NARY

SUTTER, WILLIAM P. as

Administrator of the estate

of Ira S. Cohen, Deceased

x

BIELSKI, John

BIELSKI, Mary

BIELSKI, Michael

DITTMER, Carolyn Joan

individually and as mother

and next friend of Alicia

Dittmer and Brett Dittmer

and Keith Dittmer, individually

HAWKINS, Takako, individually

and as mother and next friend

of Clive Hawkins, an infant

ROTHFUSZ, Dries

and

VAN VIERSEN, Alida Rothfusz

GONZALEZ, Donna

GOLDSMITH, Catherine Gayle

GOLDSMITH, Kenneth, a minor

by Catherine Gayle Goldsmith

his guardian ad litem and

GOLDSMITH, Peter, a minor

by Catherine Gayle Goldsmith

his guardian ad litem

KRUPP, David Executor of

the estate of Judith Wax.

deceased

KRUPP, David Executor of

the estate of Sheldon S. Wax

deceased.

OHM, Gary R. as father and

next friend of Janella Ohm and

Jeffrey Ohm, minors

xi

STACKS, Frederick D.

Administrator of the estate of

Margaret (Peg) A. Stacks,

deceased, and Frederick W.

Stacks and Margaret A. Stacks

individually

MORUZI, Richard J. Administrator

of the Estate of Debra A. Moruzi,

deceased

MALEK, Martin A., Administrator

of the Estate of DOREEN L.

MALEK, Deceased

HIGGINBOTHAM, MARY A. an

individual, MARY A.

HIGGINBOTHAM, and Guardian

Ad Litem for TODD P.

HIGGINBOTHAM, BRIAN E.

HIGGINBOTHAM, PAUL L.

HIGGINBOTHAM,

MULLER, PAULA S.., individually

and as mother and next friend

of ANGELA LYNN MULLER and

MICHAEL TODD MULLER

GALLAGHER, GAYLE V. Administrator

of the Estate of KATHLEEN V.

GALLAGHER, Deceased

MAY, EDITH P. as mother of

JON D. MAY, Deceased

JAWOROWSKI, BERNARD

Administrator of the estate

of Ferdinand S. Jaworowski

ROGERS, Patricia L.

ROGERS, Thomas C.

xii

SIMMONS, Sandra Kay

FRASCO, Nioma R. @

TEMPE, Lucia A.

HILL, BETTY H., Widow and

as Administrator of the Estate

of EDWARD CHARLES HILL,

Deceased

GOLDENSOHN, Edith F., as

Executrix of the Last Will and

Testament of Kenneth Alan Green,

Deceased, and the Last Will and

Testament of Judith L. Green,

Deceased

PLATT Karen E., Special

Administratrix of the Estate of

Marcia E. Platt. Deceased

PLATT, Robert

PLATT, William E.

BEAN, Avon Personal

representative of the

estate of Jeannette E. Bean.

deceased,

BEAN, Avon, individually

BEAN, Michael A.

LAVANWAY, Ralph E.

CONNER, Donna, individually

and as mother and next friend

of Kathy Ann Conner, a minor

GLASS, Catherine H.

KEITH, Joanne Glass

BRAINE, Rosemary

BRAINE, Sharanne

BRAINE, Michelle

BRAINE, Lisa

xiii

BOHANAN, Clona

BOHANAN, Tanya, a minor

by Clona Bohanan, her

next friend

BRYSON, Dorothy Alma,

individually and as mother

and next friend of Laurel _

Jane Bryson and Lesley Joan

Bryson, minors

BRYSON, Judith Lynne

BRYSON, Janet Lee

SIMMONS, Michael David

SIMMONS, John Harold

minors, by their guardian .

ad litem Judy Lorenzen

VETOR, Andrew Administrator of

the estate of Narda Vetor

deceased, Andrew Vetor,

individually and Andrew Vetor

next friend of Derek S. Vetor,

Ryan A. Vetor and Rychee J. Vetor,

minor children

JIMENEZ, Pedro Rios

VELEZ, Luisa Gonzalez

GONZALEZ, Antonio Rios

GONZALEZ, Jose Rios

GONZALEZ, Hector Rios

GONZALEZ, William Rios

COUGHLIN, Christopher T.

a minor, by Dolores M. Coughlin

his guardian ad Litem

PILLIVANT, Marilyn Yvonne

personal representative of the

Estate of John E. Pillivant,

deceased

xiv

SCHRADER, Margaret, Special

Administrator of the Estate

of Charles M. Schrader,

Deceased

NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE

COMPANY, a corporation

MCcATEE, William C.

Administrator of the Estate

of Gordon C. McAtee, deceased

MITCHELL, Virginia

an individual

COUGHLIN, Beth A.

COUGHLIN, David P.

COUGHLIN, Mark A.

COUGHLIN, Laura S.

FILES, Lynne S. individually

FILES, Christopher Lynn

FILES, Michael Dale

FILES, Stephanie Nicole

minor persons, by and

Lynne S. Files, their

guardian ad litem

CANNON, Sandra Leigh,

Administratrix of the Estate of

CANNON, Robert Lamar, Deceased

CAMPBELL, Marleen, Personal

Representative of the Estate of

CAMPBELL, GERALD, Deceased

FRAXIER, Carol, individually

and as mother and next friend of

FRASIER, Pamela Ann

FRASIER, Stephen Lewis

FRASIER, Gail Hayes

xv

HART, Richard as Executor

of the estate of George Hart

deceased; Annette Hart, his

widow; Georgann Zar. his Daughter;

Richard Hart his Son; and

William Hart, his son.

PLESA, CORINNE and MICHAEL

PLESA, as Co-Administrators

of the Estate of EILEEN M. PLESA,

Deceased

EATON, Merlene M. as

Administrator of the Estate

of Frederick G. Eaton,

deceased

VICKERY

CLARK, Margaret

DAVIS, Richard

Co-Administrators of the Estate

of Patricia Clark Davis,

Deceased

MIYAGAWA, Michael

PAULEY. Harleen, Personal

Representatives of the Estate

of MYRON MIYAGAWA, Deceased

EGGLESTON, Edna M.

MIYAGAWA, Kurt

HOLLENBECK, Frances D.

DOOLEY, H. Ray, Jr.

BURNETT, Vera Bb.

McPHERSON, Maude Dooley

DOOLEY, B.J.

DOOLEY, B. Frank

JENNINGS, Bertha

DOOLEY, T.S.

BEASLEY, Lillie Mae

xvi

WASHBURN, Juanita

DOOLEY, James R.

DOOLEY, W. K.

LONG, Jake B.

Surviving kin of

REBECCA WASHBURN

GOETZ, Ryan

GOETZ, Robert

Minors by and through their

Guardian Ad Litem

GOETZ, Linda and

GOETZ, Linda, individually

O'ROURKE, John G.

O'ROURKE, Joan T.

TRAUTMAN, Mary, widow and

personal representative of

Paul R. Trautmann, Deceased

TRAUTMANN, Julie

TRAUTMANN, Amy

children of Paul R. Trautmann,

deceased

RAGUCCI, Vicent J., Jr.,

as Administrator of the Estate

of Elena Crucioli, deceased

DZWONKOWSKI, Frances O.

BLOUIN, Judith A.

CHURCH, Robert A.

HOOVER, Lois

HOOVER, Margaret

HOOVER, Michael

HOOVER, Michelle

HOOVER, Mary

xvii

CLARK, Suzanne E. individually

and Guardian Ad Litem of

CLARK, Julie Ann, Minor |

CLARK, Thomas W.

CLARK, Michael S.

CHARISSE, Nico, Widower and

Personal Representative of

Sheila Colleen Charisse,

Deceased

CRUCIOLI, Alexander, individually

and as Administrator D.B.N. of

the Estate of Mario A. Crucioli,

Deceased

GONZALEZ, Joseph L., Jr.

CHAVEZ, Margaret M.

WILLNER, Max

WILLNER, Irene, parents of

RONALD WILLNER

BOWER, Cathleen, individually

and as Administratrix of the

Estate of Edmund A. Bower,

Deceased

MOSK, Janet M.

MOSK, William Frank

KEENEY, Alberta

KEENEY, Mark Lawrence

KEENEY, Kathryn Elaine

KEENEY, ALBERTA as Guardian

ad litem of

KEENEY, Edward

FERNTHEIL, Albert T., Executor

of the Estate of CAROL ARNOLD

FERNTHEIL, Deceased

xviii

LUMBERMANS MUTUAL

INSURANCE COMPANY

A CORPORATION

CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY

a corporation

AMERICAN MOTORISTS INSURANCE COMPANY

a corporation

GEMME, LEILA B., Administrator

of the Estate of FRANCIS R.

GEMME, Deceased

KAMHI, Diane Irene

Individually, and as

Administratrix of the

Estate of MARC KAMHI,

Deceased, for herself and

on behalf of decedent's

infant daughter

LISA YVONNE KAMHI

KAHL, INGE MARIA, Widow and

Personal Representative of

HANS JURGEN KAHL, Deceased

KUSEK, Joan, Administrator

of the Estate of MICHAEL S.

SIROTA, Deceased

SPICUZZA, MERIKAY

Special Administrator of the

Estate of ROBERT SPICUZZA,

Deceased

LA SALLE NATIONAL BANK,

Special Administrator of

the Estate of Olin Hoskins,

Deceased

xix

KIRK, Rita Van

VALADARES

BELLAVIA, Andrew and °

BELLAVIA, Betty

MILNER, Marvin Sr., Father

and Special Administrator for

MARVIN MILNER, Jr., Deceased

LANG, Roy S. and

LOTZ, Robert F. Personal Representatives

of the Estates of E. STEPHEN LANG, Jr., and

SUSAN LANG, Deceased

CRAIG, Barbara

Individually, and as

Administrator of the Estate

of JOHN W. CRAIG

STATE NATIONAL BANK, Admini-

strators of the Estates of

CHRISTOPHER S. SUTTON and

COLIN P. SUTTON, Deceased

STATE NATIONAL BANK, Admini-

strator of the Estate of

CAROLYN M. SUTTON, Deceased

STATE NATIONAL BANK, Admini-

trator of the Estate of STEPHEN P.

SUTTON, Deceased

ZIEMBA, THOMAS S§., Personal

Representative of the Estates

of DIANE E. SIEMBA and JON

J. ZIEMBA, Deceased

SHERIDAN, THOMAS as Special

Administrator of the Estate of

MARY T. SHERIDAN, Deceased

xx

HAIDER, Syed

as Administrator of the

Estate of Victoria Chen

Haider, Deceased

HUTH, KENNETH, As Personal

Representative and Executor

of the Estate of Henry C.

Magner, Deceased

HUTH, KENNETH, as Personal

Representative and Executor

of the Estate of VIRGINIA K.

MAGNER, Deceased

DICASTRO, Angeline J.

Administrator of the Estate

of Gail Anne DiCastro,

Deceased

DI PIETRO, John J., as

Administrator of the Estate

of DARLENE DI PIETRO, Deceased

LUX, LORA, Widow and

personal representative of

WALTER H. LUX, Deceased

BLAKE, MARIE, Mother

HAYNES, VIRGINIA. Sister of

STEPHEN BLAKE, Deceased

SCHADE, DONALD, as Administrator

of the Estate of ZAIDITA

SCHADE, Deceased

SCHADE, DONALD, as Administrator

of the Estate of MARJORIE SCHADE,

Deceased

xxi

SCHADE, DONALD, as Administrator

of the Estate of ZAIDA LOUISA SCHADE,

Deceased

SCHADE, DONALD, as Administrator of the

Estate of PAUL WILLIAM SCHADE, Deceased

FIRST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY

OF SOUTH BEND, as Administrator

of the Estate of HENRY FRANCIS

REGNERY, Deceased

BENNETT, HENRY as Special

Administrator of the Estate of

JUDITH BENNETT, Deceased

GREEN, ANN MARIE

Widow & as Administrator of the

Estate of Andrew D. Green, Deceased

DAVIS, CHARLES A., JR. as Special

Administrator of the Estate of

Marily Davis, Deceased

DE YOUNG, KATHLEEN, Mother and

Personal Representative of

RHONDA DE YOUNG, Deceased

AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK

AND TRUST COMPANY OF CHICAGO,

as Special Administrator of the

Estate of JULIE LOUISE

OZMINKOWSKI, Deceased

FIRST WISCONSIN NATIONAL BANK,

as Personal Representative of <

the Estate of JOHN B. WEAR, JR.,

Deceased

FINK, SHARON Administrator of

The Estate of Larry M. Fink, Deceased

xxii

ADDUCI, PETER C. and

ADDUCI, LORRAINE V., co-

ADMINISTRATORS of the Estate

of KATHLEEN ADDUCI, Deceased

DI MICELLI, DIANE MARY,

Individually, and as Widow of

ROBERT JOSEPH DI MICELLI, Deceased

AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK & TRUST

COMPANY OF CHICAGO, as Special

Administrator of the Estate of

JONG BIN HAN, Deceased

THOMAS, ROBERT E.

HARLIN, JUDITH KAY, Widow,

Personal Representative and Special

Administrator of CHARLES THOMAS HARLIN

Deceased, and Mother and Next Friend of

ROBERT JOSEPH HARLIN and KRISTINE DAWN

HARLIN, Minors

GANSCHOW, Mary Loretta, as

Administrator and Personal

representative of the Estate

of MARGARET TYNE, Deceased

PECK, GREGORY, as Executor.

under the will of Donald

Optican, Deceased, resident

of New York

OPTICAN, BARBARA, Widow

OPTICAN, Scott L., Son

OPTICAN, Todd A., Son

OPTICAN, Marci E., Daughter,

a Minor, by B. Optican, her

mother and next friend

xxiii

OPTICAN, TONI E. Daughter, a

Minor, by B. Optican, her

mother and next friend

OPTICAN, LILA, Mother of

Donald Optican, Deceased

ANTONELLI, CAROL, Administrator

of the Estate of DENNIS T. CONNELL,

Deceased

WINGER, CAROL, As Executrix of

the Estate of CARROLL D. BEGLEY,

Deceased; CAROL WINGER, individually;

BENSON, GAIL;

LANGE, GWEN

UDOVICH, DORIS C.

Executor of the Estate of

Alfred F. Udovich, Deceased

STOGEL, Myrna as Mother and

next friend of Gregor L. Stoger

and Lauren N. Stogel

NORDHAUS, GEORGE W.

NORDHAUS, KATHERINE S. individually

and on behalf of the heirs and estate

of Jeffrey W. Nordhaus, Deceased

AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK AND

TRUST COMPANY OF CHICAGO,

as Special Administrator of the

Estate of DON J. NOVELLI, Deceased.

Suing for and on behalf of PATRICIA NOVELLI.

LAUREL S. NOVELLI, and KENDELL E. NOVELLI

FIND, JACOB J. individually and

dba J.J. Fink & Associates and

J. Fink, Inc. a corporation

xxiv

TRAMELL, JAMES RICHARD

a minor by and through his

guardian ad litem, Janice Marie

Wright

RIDDLE, Gregory A., a minor by

and through his Guardian ad litem

Janice Riddle

RIDDLE, Allen O. Jr.

RIDDLE, Eleanor

RIDDLE, Kenneth

RIDDLE, Thomas

RIDDLE, Michael

RIDDLE, Mary

SCHOTS, MARC LAURENS

a minor by his next friend Helwig

Rollema-Stater

WALKER, DAVID

WALKER, LONNA

WALKER, MICHELLE by their

Guardian ad litem, Carolyn Walker

ATKINSON, ROBERT M.

GARDNER, ALYCE ATKINSON

ABDUL AZIZ AL SWAILEM

NORA AL SWAILEM

NORA AL OMAIR

SHARPE, Margaret B.

as widow and

MGUBLIAN, Marjorie A.

SHARPE, James W.

SHARPE, Charles V.

SMITH, Mary C. children

BEGLEY, CHERYL L.

XXV

CORRIGAN, Shirley Joan

CORRIGAN, Pau! A.

CORRIGAN, Shirley Joan as

mother od next friend of

Linda J. Corrigan and

Carol R. Corrigan minors

MANNING, ROTHELL

PEREZ-BENABE, Santiago

and

PEREZ, AINO

FALCONE, VALENTINO JR.

EALY, Kimberly Su, a minor

by Valentino Falcone Jr. her

guardian ad litem

EALY, JOELL LYN a minor

by Valentino Falcone Jr. her

guardian ad litem and

EALY, ROBERT RONALD JR. a

minor by Valentino Falcone

Jr. his guardian ad litem

BENTOV, MIRTALA

DICK, NANCY S. individually

and as mother and next friend

Kathy S. Dick, Wendy G. Dick

and Brian S. Dick

STONE, June

STONE, Isadore

STONE, Jonathan

STTONE, June as mother and

next friend of Jeffrey Stone

SHEFFIELD, Elenore Ann

SHEFFIELD, Michael Frank

SHEFFIELD, Rebecca Ann

SHEFFIELD, Patricia Lynn

xxvi

SHEFFIELD, James Carl

minors by and through their

Guardian ad litem Elenore Ann

Sheffield

DI CREDICO, Connie G.

DI CREDICO, Seana J.

a minor by her mother and

next friend Connie G. Di Credico

DI CREDICO, Angelina M. a

minor by her mother and next

friend Connie G. Di Credico

DI CREDICO, NICHOLE A. a

minor by her mother and next

friend Connie G. Di Credico

APPENDIX A — OPINION OF THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

DECIDED JANUARY 5, 1981

IN THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 80-1812

IN RE AIR CRASH DISASTER NEAR CHICAGO,

ILLINOIS

ON MAY 25, 1979

APPEAL OF: McDONNELL DOUGLAS CORPORATION,

No. 80-1813

IN RE AIR CRASH DISASTER NEAR CHICAGO,

ILLINOIS

ON MAY 25, 1979

APPEAL OF: PLAINTIFFS IN ALL THE

CONSOLIDATED CASES IN MASTER FILE NO. MDL 391.

No. 80-1814

IN RE AIR CRASH DISASTER NEAR CHICAGO,

ILLINOIS

ON MAY 25, 1979

APPEAL OF: LLOYD'S BANK CALIFORNIA AS

EXECUTOR OF ESTATES OF WILLARD R. NARY AND

JULIA T. NARY, Deceased.

2a

Appendix A

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern

! District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. MDL 391—Edwin A. Robson & Hubert L. Will, Judges.

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 25, 1980—DECIDED JANUARY 5,

1981

Before SPRECHER, BAUER and CUDAHY, Circuit

Judges.

SPRECHER, Circuit Judge. This case presents complex

conflicts-of-law questions regarding the allowance of punitive

damages in wrongful death actions arising out of an air crash

disaster. The law of the place of the disaster, the law of the place

of manufacture of the airplane, and the law of the primary place

of business of the airline do not allow punitive damages; but, the

law of the primary place of business of the manufacturer of the

airplane and the law of the place of maintenance of the airline

do allow punitive damages. We find that, under each of the

applicable state choice-of-law rules, punitive damages cannot be

allowed against either the manufacturer or the airline.

The stark facts of the tragedy resulting in this litigation are

undisputed. On May 25, 1979, a DC-10 jet airplane, designed

and built by McDonnell Douglas Corporation (“MDC”),

operated by American Airlines (“American”) was scheduled to

fly from Chicago, Illinois to Los Angeles, California as

American's Flight 191. Shortly after takeoff from O'Hare

International Airport, however, the plane lost an engine and

crashed in the immediate vicinity of the airport. All two hundred

seventy-one persons aboard the plane, and two persons on the

ground, were killed.

3a

Appendix A

Now there are one hundred eighteen wrongful death actions

arising out of the crash. These cases were originally filed in

Illinois, California, New York, Michigan, Hawaii, and Puerto

Rico.' Many of the complaints allege wrongful death counts

which request awards of punitive as well as compensatory

damages. The plaintiffs and their decedents are and were

residents of California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana,

Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Vermont,

Puerto Rico, Japan, the Netherlands, and Saudi Arabia.

The: defendants in these cases are MDC and American.

MDC is a Maryland corporation having its principal place of

business, now and at the time of the accident, in Missouri. The

plaintiffs contend MDC’s conduct in the design and

manufacture of the DC-10 was egregious. That alleged

misconduct occurred in California. American is a Delaware

corporation. American's place of business prior to 1979 was New

York. During 1979, American moved its principal place of

business to Texas. Some plaintiffs contend that, on the date of

the crash, American’s principal place of business was in Texas,

but American contends that its principal place of business on

that date was New York. The plaintiffs contend that American's

conduct regarding the maintenance of the DC-.0 was egregious.

That alleged misconduct occurred in Oklahoma, site of

American's maintenance base.

Both defendants moved in district court to strike the claims

for punitive damages on the ground that such claims failed to

state legally sufficient claims for relief. The parties disputed

many issues; whether certain states allowed punitive damages,

1. The cases have been transferred to the Northern District of Illinois for

pretrial purposes by order of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.

4a

Appendix A

the choice-of-law theories to be used regarding certain states,

and the results of the application of the choice-of-law theories

which were used.

Using the choice-of-law rules of each state where these

actions had originally been filed, the district court arrived at the

following results. Under the Illinois “most significant

relationship” test, the district court found that the law of the

state of the principal place of business should prevail with regard

to the issue of punitive damages. Finding that New York was

American's principal place of business at the time of the crash

and does not allow punitive damages, and that Missouri, MDC’s

principal place of business, does allow the equivalent of punitive

damages, the court allowed the motions to strike punitive

damage claims against American but not against MDC.

Under the California “comparative impairment” test, the

district court held that the policies of the state of the principal

place of business would be impaired more than the policies of

the state of misconduct if those policies were not applied. Thus,

the court allowed the motion to strike punitive damage claims

with regard to American but not with regard to MDC. The

district court reached the same result with regard to the actions

filed in New York, Michigan, Puerto Rico, and Hawaii.

Although generally agreeing with the district court

regarding which states allow punitive damages and the choice-

of-law theories to be used, we reach a different result in applying

those theories. For the reasons discussed below, we find that the

motions to strike claims of punitive damages should be granted

with regard to both MDC and American.

Sa

Appendix A

II

At the outset, we must first determine whether we confront

“real” rather than “apparent” conflicts between the laws to be

applied.2 This requires a determination, first, of the law

regarding punitive damages in the relevant states: Illinois,

Missouri, California, Oklahoma, New York, Texas and Hawaii.

After this determination, it will then be necessary to determine

the conflict-of-law theories of the forum states and to apply

those theories.

Illinois is the place of the injury and, under various theories,

its law regarding punitive damages might be used. The Illinois

Supreme Court has clearly held that Illinois does not permit the

recovery of punitive damages in a wrongful death action.

Mattyasovszky v. West Towns Bus Co., 21 Ill. App. 3d 46, 313

N.E. 2d 496, 502 (1974), aff'd, 61 Ill. 2d 31, 330 N.E. 2d 509, 512

(1975).

Plaintiffs argue that the Illinois law on punitive damages is

in a state of flux, citing recent cases allowing punitive damages

in survival actions. National Bank of Bloomington v. Norfolk &

Western Ry. Co., 73 Ill. 2d 160, 383 N.E. 2d 919 (1978);

Churchill v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 73 Ill. 2d 127, 383 N.E.

2d 929 (1978). But in these Norfolk cases, damages were sought

2. See Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 L. & Contemp. Prob.

754, 757-58 (1963). Professor Currie’s use of the terms “true conflict.” “false

conflict” and “apparent true conflict” refers specifically to his theory of

government interest analysis. See generally Kay. The Use of Comparative

Impairment To Resolve True Conflicts: An Evaluation of the California

Experience, 68 Cal. L. Rev. 577 (1980) [hereinafter referred to as Kay,

Comparative Impairment. Our use of this terminology will not be so narrow.

All laws must be carefully examined to determine that a conflict actually exists

under any choice-of-law theory, before application of the theory.

6a

Appendix A

under the Public Utilities Act, which expressly provides for

punitive damages. In National Bank of Bloomington, the

Wrongful Death Act was not at issue; and in Churchill, the

surviving plaintiff sought recovery for her own loss, not on the

basis of the loss of life of her husband. The Illinois Supreme

Court held in the Norfolk cases that where a statute specifically

provides for punitive damages, nothing in the Survival Act, IIl.-

Rev. Stat. ch. 3, §339 (1964) now Ill. Rev. Stat. §110'4, par. 27-6

(1977), or in the Mattyasovszky decision operates to abate that

statutory liability for punitive damages.* Thus, the Norfolk cases

3. The Public Utilities Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 111 2/3, §77 provides:

[I}f the court shall find that the act or omission was willful.

the court may in addition to the actual damages, award

damages for the sake of example and by way of punishment.

4. The illinois Supreme Court stated:

In Mattyasovszky, where the decedent died instantly, his

estate sought to recover punitive damages which the

decedent, under the common law, might have recovered had

he survived. The court summarily denied recovery of

punitive damages because the Survival Act itself has “never

been thought to authorize the award of punitive

damages.” . . . The court. however, did not base its denial

of common law punitive damages on the broad proposition

that punitive damages are unrecoverable when injury results

in death... .

Here. in contrast to Mattvasovszky, punitive recovery

was sought, not under the common law, but directly under

the Public Utilities Act. ... The Survival Act itself neither

authorizes nor prohibits punitive damages. It is merely the

vehicle by which the cause of action. created by the Public

Utilities Act, survives the death of the injured person when

the action would otherwise have abated at common law.

383 N.E.2d at 924 (emphasis in original).

7a

Appendix A

do not vitiate the holding of the Mattyasovszky case. Moreover,

the argument that the Norfolk cases overturned the rule against

recovery of punitive damages in a wrongful death action was

impliedly rejected by an Illinois court in Rusher v. Smith, 70 Ill.

App. 3d 889, 388 N.E. 2d 906, 911-12 (1979).5 To be sure, the

Rusher case is not binding because it is an Appellate Court

decision. But it does nothing to detract from the voice of the

Illinois Supreme Court in Mattyasovszky. That declaration of

state law is, of course, binding on this Court. Erie RR Co. v.

Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). ;

Whether Missouri, MDC’s principal place of business,

allows the equivalent of punitive damages is hotly disputed by

the litigants. Although Missouri’s wrongful death act does not

by its express terms provide for punitive damages, Mo. Ann.

Stat §§537.080 er seq. (Vernon 1979), it does authorize the trier

of fact to consider the “mitigating or aggravating circumstances

attending the death.” Mo. Ann. Stat. §537.090 (Vernon 1979).

Damages for “aggravating circumstances” have been permitted

by Missouri wrongful death statutes since 1855, and have

consistently been considered punitive or exemplary by the

Missouri Supreme Court. Parsons v. Missouri Pacific Ry., 94

Mo. 286, 6 S.W. 464, 466-67 (1888); Haehl v. Wabash Ry. Co.,

119 Mo. 325, 24 S.W. 737, 741 (1893). Damages for

“aggravating circumstances” in death cases depend on proof of

5. The majority opinion stated that “{tJhe law is well settled that a party

cannot recover punitive damages in a wrongful death action in Illinois.” The

majority cited Martvasovszky but did not discuss the Norfolk cases. 388

N.E.2d at 911-12. But the dissent had cited both Mattyvasovszky and the

Norfolk cases for the proposition that it was nor “well-settled that a party

cannot recover punitive damages in a wrongful death action in Illinois.” /d. at

912. Thus, the majority opinion rejected the argument that the Vorfolk cases

changed the law barring punitive damages in wrongful death cases.

8a

Appendix A

“willful misconduct, wantonness, recklessness, or want of care

indicative of indifferences to consequences,” Wiseman v.

Missouri Pacific Railroad, 575 S.W. 2d 742 (Mo. App. 1978), a

standard commonly associated with the award of punitive

damages.°®

MDC argues that the case of Glick v. Ballentine Produce

Inc., 396 S.W. 2d 609 (1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 5

(1966), conclusively establishes that damages awarded because of

“aggravating circumstances” are not punitive. But MDC’'s

argument, based on selective quotation, is not persuasive. In

Glick, a wrongful death case, the plaintiffs attempted to recover

damages in excess of the then existing statutory monetary limit.

The Missouri Supreme Court disallowed the excess amount

requested. In so doing, the Missouri Court stated that there was

no recovery under Missouri law for punitive damages, “as such,”

but that “aggravating circumstances” could be considered by the

jury so long as the total verdict did not exceed the statutory

limit. 396 S.W. 2d at 616-17.’ Thus, we find, and the Glick

6. See also Williams v. Excavating and Foundation Co., 230 Mo. App.

973, 93 S.W. 2d 123. 127 (1936) (“to whatever extent the damages are increased

by reason of aggravating circumstances attending the death of the deceased.

such increase is punitive in its nature. . . .”) and Contestible v. Brookshire, 355

S.W. 2d 36. 42 (Mo. 1962). cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 68

(1962).

7. The court stated:

There is no recovery in a death case for punitive damages.

as such. Such a petition may plead, and appropriate

instructions may submit, the question of “mitigating or

aggravating circumstances,” if the evidence justifies it.

Williams v. Excavating & Foundation Co., 230 Mo. App.

973, 93 S.W.2d 123. 127; Hertz v. McDowell, 358 Mo. 383.

(Cont'd)

9a

Appendix A

decision is not inconsistent with our finding, that the damages

allowed under Missouri law with regard to “aggravating

circumstances” can be considered within the meaning of

“punitive” damages as sought by the plaintiffs.

California is the place of MDC’s conduct in the design and

manufacture of the DC-10. California courts have uniformly

held that the statute which allows punitive damages generally in

tort actions® applies with regard to survival actions only and not

with regard to wrongful death actions. See Tarasoff v. Regents

of the University of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 450, 131 Cal.

Rptr. 14, 33, 551, P. 2d 334, 353 (1976); Pease v. Beech Aircraft

Corp., 38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 113 Cal. Rptr. 416 (1974); and Note,

15 Santa Clara Law., 507 (1975). See also In Re Paris Air Crash,

622 F. 2d 1315 (9th Cir. 1980). Although the plaintiffs question

the strength of this policy, see discussion in Part VI, they do not

question the fact that the California courts do deny punitive

(Cont'd)

214 S.W.2d 546. While added damages because of

“aggravating circumstances” may, in a sense, be considered

as punitive in nature, they are not to be submitted as such

nor are they to be submitted separately, nor in any total

verdict and judgment to exceed the statutory limit. Within

that total limit the jury may exercise a broad discretion.

396 S.W.2d at 616-17 (emphasis added) (emphasized material was deleted in

MDC quotation).

8. Cal. Civil Code, $3294 (West, 1970), provides:

In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising

from contract, where the defendant has been guilty of

oppression, fraud, or malice, express or implied, the

plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover

damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing

the defendant.

10a

Appendix A

damages in death cases. Pl. Br. ®9-1812, at 35. Thus, we find

that California law does not allow punitive damages in wrongful

death cases.

Oklahoma is the site of American's maintenance

headquarters. The parties do not dispute the fact that Oklahoma

does allow punitive damages. 12 Okla. Stat. Ann. 1053(C) (1979-

80 Cum. Supp.)

New York was American’s principal place of business

during part of 1979. We find that New York does not allow an

award of punitive damages in wrongful death actions. See

Robert v. Ford Motor Co., 424 N.Y.S. 2d 747 (1980); Barrett v.

State, 85 Misc. 2d 456, 378 N.Y.S. 2d 946 (Ct. Claims 1976). See

also N.Y. Est., Powers & Trusts L. §5-4.3 (McKinney 1967).

Texas was American's principal place of business during

part of 1979 and has been its principal place of business

thereafter. It is undisputed that Texas does allow a punitive

damage recovery, by spouses or descendants, in wrongful death

actions. See Tex. Const. Art. 16 §26 (1976). See also Scoggins

v. Southwestern Elec. Service Co., 434 S.W. 2d 376 (Tex. Civ.

App. 1968); Pace v. McEwen, 574 S.W. 2d 792 (Tex. Civ. App.

1978).

Hawaii is the domicile of one of the plaintiffs; one action

was originally filed there. The parties have not been able to

identify the governing choice-of-law rule that would be applied

by Hawaii courts in personal injury actions. The defendants

argue that, absent an affirmative showing to the contrary, a

court should presume that the forum state would apply its own

law concerning punitive damages in a wrongful death action.

The Hawaii law regarding punitive damages will be discussed in

Part X of this opinion.

lla

Appendix A

In summary, we find that the “line-up” of the states

involved regarding the issue of punitive damages is as follows:

Illinois, place of the injury, does not allow punitive damages.

Missouri, MDC’s principal place of business, does allow

punitive damages, but California, place of MDC’s conduct, does

not. New York, one principal place of business of American,

does not allow punitive damages while Texas, another principal

place of business of American, does. Oklahoma, the place of

American’s conduct, does allow punitive damages.

* HI

It isnow,necessary to examine the constitutional objections

to the disallowance of punitive damages. For there would be no

conflict at all if it is unconstitutional to disallow punitive

damages in wrongful death actions.

In the district court below, plaintiffs raised two general

constitutional objections. First, they argued that the preclusion

of punitive damages in wrongful death actions, where they are

permitted in personal injury survival actions, is a violation of the

equal protection clause of the federal and of the [IIlinois,

Michigan, and California constitutions. In addition, certain

plaintiffs argued that the existence in Illinois of the difference in

damages between survival and wrongful death actions represents

“special legislation” of the type prohibited by Art. 4, §13 of the

Illinois Constitution. The district court rejected both arguments.

On this appeal, the only specific constitutional attack is the

argument that New York’s denial of punitive damages violates

the federal equal protection clause. Proceeding to the federal

equal protection analysis, we affirm, for the reasons below, the

district court’s holding that statutes which deny punitive

12a

Appendix A

damages in wrongful death cases but allow such damages in

other personal injury actions do not run afoul of the federal

Constitution.’

9. The district court first held that the equal protection clauses of the

Illinois and Michigan constitutions were coextensive with the equal protection

clause of the federal constitution, citing Friedman & Rochester, Ltd. v. Walsh,

67 Ill. 2d 413, 367 N.E. 2d 1325 (1977); Commissioners of Highways of Town

of Annawan v. United States, 466 F. Supp. 745, 769 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Moore v.

Spanglar, 401 Mich. 360, 258 N.W. 2d 34 (1977).

The district court then turned to California. It found that the California

equal protection clause was fundamentally equivalent to that of the federal

Constitution but that it required “some rationality” in the nature of the class

singled out. The court held that the denial of punitive damages was rational

and that, therefore, such denial did not offend the California constitution.

Finally, the district court examined the prohibition of “special legislation”

in the Illinois Constitution, Art. 4, §13. The court rejected the argument that

Illinois’ denial of punitive damages constituted “special legislation,” citing

Smith v. Hill, 12 Ul. 2d 588, 147 N.E. 2d 321 (1958); Siegall v. Soloman, 19 Ill.

2d 145, 166 N.E.*2d 5 (1960); Adams v. Continental Cas. Co., 21 Ill. App. 3d

111, 314 N.E. 2d 495 (1974), aff'd McRoberts v. Adams, 60 Ill. 2d 458, 328

N.E. 2d 321 (1975); Rincon v. License Appeal Commission of City of Chicago,

62 Ill. App. 3d 600, 378 N.E. 2d 1281 (1978); and Friedman & Rochester, Ltd.

v. Walsh, 67 Ill. 2d 413, 367 N.E. 2d 1325 (1977).

The plaintiffs do not directly challenge any of these findings by the district

court. Illinois plaintiffs Plesas do, however, raise some arguments which, inter

alia, imply a challenge based on Illinois constitutional grounds. The Plesas’

first argument is not a constitutional argument but a response to MDC's

argument that Illinois would refuse to enforce Missouri's law allowing punitive

damages. They argue that it is not the case that Illinois would refuse to enforce

Missouri's law. Since our analysis of the conflicts issue does not rely on this

MDC argument, we do not reach the Plesas’ first argument.

The Plesas’ second argument seems to be that the denial of punitive

damages is unconstitutional under Illinois law. But they do not press this

(Cont'd)

13a

Appendix A

The wrongful death statutes in question involve a legislative

classification which allows punitive damages in certain personal

injury actions but denies punitive damages in wrongful death

cases. This classification does not involve any suspect class. See

Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351 (1979) and Huff v. White

Motor Corp., 609 F. 2d 286, 298 (7th Cir. 1979). Nor does this

classification affect fundamental rights. See Huff, 609 F. 2d at

298. Thus, the classification is not ta be examined with “strict”

or even “intermediate” scrutiny'® but is to be examined by the

(Cont'd)

argument as such. Rather, they seem to argue that this Court should abstain

from deciding the Illinois constitutional challenge and allow Illinois courts to

decide it. Plaintiffs request abstention under Circuit Rule 13 of this Court

which provides the power to certify “questions arising under the laws of that

state which will control the outcome of a case pending in federal court.” This

second argument, then, presents two issues for resolution by this Court.

First, because we are not confronted with a specific challenge to the

district court’s finding that the Illinois equal protection guarantee is

coextensive with the federal equal protection guarantee, we decline to disturb

the district court’s finding.

Second, we find that abstention is not appropriate. As the United States

Supreme Court stated in Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 306 (1979), a

case cited by the Plesas, there is a fundamental prerequisite for abstention.

“(T]he abstention doctrine ‘contemplates that deference to state court

adjudication only be made where the issue of state law is uncertain.” Harman

v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534 (1965). But as we discussed in Part II, we do

not find the issue of whether Illinois denied punitive damages to be uncertain.

To the contrary, we find the Illinois Supreme Court's affirmation of

Mattyasovszky clear authority for the fact that Illinois does deny punitive

damages in wrongful death cases. Thus, we decline plaintiffs’ invitation to

abstain.

10. In In re Paris Air Crash, 622 F.2d 1315, 1319 n.4 (1980), the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals held that the “rational relationship” test—and not

(Cont'd)

l4a

Appendix A

“rational relationship” test. The classification must be rationally

related to a legitimate state purpose in order to pass

constitutional muster with regard to the equal protection clause.

Huff; Parham; Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental

Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1979); Mobil Oil Corp. v.

Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978); and Williamson v. Lee

Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).

_ Recently, this Court considered this same issue in Huff, 609

F. 2d 286, which involved an equal protection challenge to

Indiana’s wrongful death statute. That law, like the laws

challenged here, allowed punitive damages in other personal

injury cases but not in wrongful death cases. In Huff, we found

the legislation was rationally related to a legitimate state interest

and therefore passed equal protection scrutiny. The plaintiffs

here argue that the treatment of this question in Huff was

(Cont'd)

any higher level of scrutiny-—-should be used in examining the denial of

punitive damages in wrongful death actions. The court stated:

We do not apply a middle-tier analysis for three reasons.

First, both state and federal Supreme Courts have declined

frequent invitations to announce or articulate such an

analysis. Second, both courts have analyzed tort recovery

limits in terms of a rational bearing upon a legislative

objective. Third, the relatively nongrievous deprivation, if

indeed it can be called such, of a limit on who may act asa

private attorney general by seeking punitive damages makes

this case particularly inappropriate to inaugurate such an

analysis. Additional drawbacks of this proposed innovation

‘ are discussed in Hawkins v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 584,

607-10, 150 Cal. Rptr. 435, 450-51, 586 P.2d 916, 931-32

(1978) (Bird, C.J., concurring); Linde, Due Process of Law

Making, 55 Neb. L. Rev. 197 (1976).

622 F.2d 1315, 1319 n.4.

15a

Appendix A

perfunctory and request that we review the question again. We

agree the discussion of this issue in Huff was not elaborate. But

in reexamining the issue, we reach the same result.

Very recently, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

confronted a similar equal protection challenge to a state's

denial of punitive damages in wrongful death actions. In its

decision in /n Re Paris Air Crash, 622 F. 2d 1315 (9th Cir. 1980),

the Ninth Circuit found the classification denying punitive

damages to survive the rational relationship test. We find the

Ninth Circuit opinion persuasive and reach the same result here

for the following reasons.

First, the United States Supreme Court recently has

sustained tort liability limitations in Duke Power Co. v.

Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1979), and Mobil Oil

Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978). In those cases, the

damage limitations were more severe than the damage limitation

here. There, the challenged laws, limited the types or amounts of

compensatory relief. Here, the limitation is the denial of punitive

relief; compensatory damages are unaffected. Thus, the

limitations themselves are not irrational.

Second, the purpose of denying punitive damages is to

avoid excessive liability. Such denial represents a legislative

determination that a state’s interest in protecting defendants

from excessive damages outweighs its interest in punishing or

deterring misconduct. See In Re Paris Air Crash, 622 F. 2d at

1319, and Jackson v. K.L.M., 459 F. Supp. 953, 956 (S.D.N.Y.

1978). The state has legitimate interests in both the amount of

damages paid to survivors of persons wrongfully killed and in

16a

Appendix A

protection of defendants.'' The denial of punitive damages is

clearly a rational method of limiting damages in wrongful death

cases. See In Re Paris Air Crash, 622 F. 2d at 1319. For these

reasons, then, we find that a state's decision to limit punitive

damages does pass constitutional muster under the rational

relationship test. We note also that in every case of which we are

aware, every court which has confronted this question has

arrived at this same conclusion. See, e.g., In Re Paris Air Crash;

Huff; Johnson v. International Harvester Corp., 487 F. Supp.

1176 (D.N.D. 1980); and Robert v. Ford Motor Co., 73 App.

Div. 2d 1025, 424 N.Y.S. 2d 747 (1980). '?

IV

We now confront the actual conflicts issues among the

various states. It is not disputed that, since federal jurisdiction is

based on diversity of citizenship, the choice-of-law rules to be

11. A state may even determine, for example, that its interest in

maintaining accurate and efficient disposition of property at death is best

served by limiting damages to exclude punitive damages. See Parham v.

Hughes, 441 U.S. at 357.

12. Finally, plaintiffs argue that this Court must find the denial of

punitive damages in wrongful death cases unconstitutional because, so long as

this denial continues, there will continue to be some truth to the adage that “it

is cheaper to kill a victim than to injure him.” Unfortunately, this adage has

become an adage because there is some truth to it.

The decision of under what circumstances punitive damages should be

allowed ‘is for the state legislatures and not this Court. Neither with regard to

the constitutional argument, nor with regard to the conflicts analysis, do we

take into consideration the wisdom of specific decisions regarding punitive

damages.

17a

Appendix A

used are those choice-of-law rules of the states where the actions

were originally filed. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co.,

313 U.S. 487 (1941); Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964);

In Re Air Crash Disaster of Boston, Massachusetts, 399 F.

Supp. 1106 (D. Mass. 1975). We will consider the law of each

state in turn. We emphasize at the outset that the tests to be

used, although containing significant differences, mandate an

analytical inquiry which is basically the same. As Professor

Leflar has stated:

{I]t appears that the various scholarly views

concerning choice of law, developed during the

last couple of decades, are being accepted by the

courts as though they constituted one somewhat

multi-faceted approach to the subject.

Essentially, they are consistent with each other.

Any one of them is likely to produce about the

same result on a given set of facts as will

another....

The point to be emphasized is that the

modern decisions, regardless of exact language,

are substantially consistent with each other.

Leflar, American Conflicts Law, §10%, p. 218 (3d ed. 1977).

In general, we must attempt to determine which, if any, of

the states having some relationship to the parties or to the crash

has the most significant interest in the application of its own

substantive law to the merits of the punitive damage issue. The

application of choice-of-law rules is not a mechanical process of

cranking various factors through a formula. Critical to conflicts

analysis is the notion that we must examine the choice-of-law

rules not with regard to various states’ interests in general, but

18a

Appendix A

precisely, with regard to each state’s interest in the specific

question of punitive damages. Thus, we approve the concept of

“depecage”: the process of applying rules of different states on

the basis of the precise issue involved.'3

The depecage process has recently been approved and

utilized by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in an

aircraft products liability case involving a choice between

standards of liability. Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., No. 79-2747

(3d Cir. 1980), petit. for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3429 (Dec. 9,

13. In our case, there is only one relevant issue: the choice of law ©

regarding punitive damages. Thus, we use the term here to mean a precise

focus on the purpose of and policies behind the decision to either allow or

disallow punitive damages. See Reese, Depecage: A Common Phenomenon In

Choice of Law, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 58, 59-60 (1973). Professor Reese stated:

Amidst the chaos and tumult of choice of law there is

at least one point on which there seems to be general

agreement in the United States. This is that choice of the

applicable law should frequently depend upon the issue

involved. The search in these instances is not for the state

whose law will be applied to govern all issues in a case;

rather it is for the rule of law that can most approximately

be applied to govern the particular issue. .. .

It also seems probable that greater use of depecage will

be an inevitable by-product of the development of

satisfactory rules of choice of law. In contrast to the broad

rules that have been tried and found wanting, the new rules,

if we are indeed to develop such rules, are likely to be

narrow in scope and large in number... .

In short, a willingness to make a liberal use of depecage

would seem a prerequisite to the satisfactory development of

narrow rules of choice of law.

19a

Appendix A

1980) (No. 80-848).'* Depecage has also been endorsed by many

conflicts scholars.'5 The task of conflicts analysis using depecage

requires creativity and precision. With this admonition in mind,

we begin our analysis.

Vv

We begin with the actions filed in Illinois. The Illinois

courts apply the “most significant relationship” test of the

Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (“Restatement

(Second)”) to determine the applicable law in wrongful death

actions. This test incorporates a presumption that the local law

of the state where the injury occurred should govern, unless

another state has a “more significant relationship” to the

occurrence or to the parties.'* Jngersoll v. Klein, 46 Ill. 2d 42, 48,

262 N.E. 2d 593, 596 (1973).

14. Referring to depecage and the Reese article, id., the court said, with

regard to California choice-of-law:

Although the California Supreme Court has not

explicitly adopted this method, it is implicit in that court’s

analysis of cases and it is consistent with modern

governmental interest analysis to examine comparative

governmental interests as to each issue. to the extent the

issues are separable and the balance of comparative interests

may vary.

Reyno, slip op. at 29-30.

15. See Reese, Depecage, id.; Leflar, American Conflicts Law, $109, p.

221-22 (3d ed. 1977) citing Wilde, Depecage in the Choice of Tort Law, 41 S.

Cal. L. Rev. 329 (1968).

16. The Restatement (Second) §175, $178 (1971) provides as follows:

$175. Right of Action for Death. In an action for wrongful

‘ (Cont'd

20a

Appendix A

The Restatement (Second) provides two sets of criteria for

the measurement of the “most significant relationship.” The first

set of criteria includes general factors such as the needs of the

interstate system; relevant policies of the forum and other

interested states; protection of justified expectations; the basic

policies underlying the particular field of law; certainty,

predictability and uniformity of result; and ease in the

determination and application of the law to be applied.'’ The

(Cont'd) ne

death the local law of the state where the injury occurred

determines the rights and liabilities of the parties unless,

with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a

more significant relationship under the principles stated in

§6 to the occurrence and the parties, in which event the local

law of the other state will be applied.

$178. Damages. The law selected by application of the rule .

of §175 determines the measure of damages in an action for

wrongful death.

17. The Restatement (Second), §6, (1971), provides:

§6 Choice of Law Principles

(1) A court, subject to constitutional restriction, will

follow a statutory directive of its own state on choice of

law.

(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant

to the choice of the applicable rule of law include

(a) the needs of the interstate and

international systems,

(b) the relevant policies of the forum,

(c) the relevant policies of other interested

states and the relative interests of those states in

the determination of the particular issue,

(d) the protection of justified expectation,

(Cont'd)

2la

Appendix A

second set of criteria includes the contacts to be taken into

account in applying these principles. These contacts are: (1) the

place of the injury; (2) the place of misconduct: (3) the domicile,

residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of

business of the parties; and (4) the place where the relationship

between the parties is centered.'* These contacts are to be

“Cont'd)

(e) the basic policies underlying the particular

field of law,

(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of |

result, and

(g) ease in the determination and application

of the law to be applied.

18. The Restatement (Second). §145, provides:

$145 The General Principle

(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect

to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the

state which, with respect to that issue, has the most

significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties

under the principles stated in §6.

(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the

principles of §6 to determine the law applicable to an issue

include:

(a) the place where the injury occurred,

(b) the place where the conduct causing the

injury occurred,

(c) the domicil, residence, nationality. place

of incorporation and place of business of the

parties, and

(d) the place where the relationship, if any,

between the parties is centered.

These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with

respect to the particular issue.

22a

Appendix A

evaluated according to their relative importance to the issue

involved and according to the purposes sought to be achieved by

the relevant rules of the interested states.'9

A

Turning to defendant MDC, the precise issue, of course, is

which state’s law regarding the availability of punitive damages

should apply. The states having contacts to be taken into

account are: Illinois, place of injury; California, place of MDC’s

alleged misconduct; Missouri, MDC’s principal place of

business; and, if it can be determined, the states where the

relationship between the parties is centered.

It is unclear where the relationship of the parties is

“centered”. As the district court noted, most of the Illinois

actions involve Illinois decedents who purchased their tickets in

Illinois for a flight which began in Illinois. But the flight was to

California. Surely the importance of the place of destination of a

journey is just as great as the importance of the place of

departure. This issue need not detain us, however, because

neither California nor Illinois allows punitive damages.”

We next turn to the interests of the states of domi-

cile of the plaintiffs. The domiciliary states do not have an

19. See Id., $145, Comment c, at 416-17.

20. Moreover, the place where the relationship is centered would seem to

have a low interest in either punishment or protection merely because the

parties’ relationship was centered within its borders. The alleged egregious acts

would not have occurred there; thus, the state would have a low interest in

controlling nonresident corporate behavior. Also, because the corporations

were not located in that state, it would have a low interest in the protection of

nonresident defendants.

23a

Appendix A

interest in disallowing punitive damages because the decision to

disallow such damages is obviously designed to protect the

interest of resident defendants, not to effectuate the interest of

the domiciliary states in the welfare of plaintiffs. E.g., Hurtado

v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 574, 114 Cal. Rptr. 106, 522 P.2d

666, 670 (1974).

Nor do the domiciliary states have an interest in imposing

punitive damages on the defendants. The legitimate interests of

these states, after all, are limited to assuring that the plaintiffs

are adequately compensated for their injuries and that the

proceeds of any award are distributed to the appropriate

beneficiaries. E.g., Hurtado, 11 Cal. 3d at 584, 114 Cal. Rptr. at

112, 522 P.2d at 672. Those interests are fully served by applying

the law of the plaintiffs’ domiciles as to issues involving the

measure of compensatory damages (insofar as that law would

enhance the plaintiffs’ recovery) and the distribution of any

award. Once the plaintiffs are made whole by recovery of the full

measure of compensatory damages to which they are entitled

under the law of their domiciles, the interests of those states are

satisfied.

We thus return to the interests of the three relevant states,

Illinois, California, and Missouri. Illinois and California do not

allow punitive damages but Missouri does. If the interests of

these three states were to be weighed equally, the tally would be

two-to-one against allowing punitive damages. But the process

of weighing states’ interests requires more than merely tabulating

the states pro and con. We must examine the precise interest of

each state with regard to the purpose of punitive damages.*!

21. For this reason, we reject the defendants’ “grouping” theory.

Defendants argue that because the law of the place of injury and the law of the

place of misconduct are the same, the case must be analyzed for choice-of-law

(Cont'd)

24a

Appendix A

The purposes underlying the allowance of punitive

damages, as the district court noted, are punishment of the

defendant and deterrence of future wrongdoing. The purpose

underlying the disallowance of punitive damages is protection of

defendants from excessive financial liability. Two states which

very definitely have an interest in punishment or protection are

California and Missouri, the states in which, respectively, the

conduct occurred and the principal place of business is located.

Both states have an obvious interest in preventing future

misconduct; both states have an obvious interest in protecting

businesses located or acting within its borders. Illinois, the place

of injury, also has an interest in the punitive damages question;

its interest will be discussed after the discussion of Missouri's

and California’s interests.

MDC’s wrongful conduct here complained of involved the

design and manufacture of the DC-10. Because the corporate

headquarters of MDC is located in Missouri, Missouri has an

(Cont'd)

purposes as if conduct and injury occurred in the same state. Then, defendants

argue, punitive damages must be disallowed. But the very “grouping” process

that defendants advocate would vitiate the entire process of weighing states’

interests. The result of defendants’ approach would be the application of rules

as wooden and mechanical as the old /ex /oci delicti rule itself. which the

Restatement (Second) balancing process is designed to supplant. The

Restatement (Second) §6. at 14, states:

In determining a question of choice of law, the forum

should give consideration not only to its own relevant

policies... but also to the relevant policies of all other

interested states. The forum should seek to reach a result

that will achieve the best possible accommodation of these

policies. The forum should also appraise the relative

interests of the states involved in the determination of the

particular issue. In general. it is fitting that the state whose

interests are most deeply affected should have its local law

apply.

25a

Appendix A

obvious interest in deterring wrongful conduct in such design

and manufacture, even if the actual work was performed in

California. To find otherwise would be to gut the very concept

of corporate accountability. Moreover, to say that Missouri has

no interest in the imposition of punitive damages—as defendants

do—would encourage rampant subterfuge and confusion. For

example, many corporations have corporate headquarters in one

state and far-flung operations in many others.”* If courts held

that the place of “conduct” had the critical interest in punitive

damages and that the place of corporate headquarters had no

interest in punitive damages, then litigation would center around

exactly where activities and decisions occurred. The practical

effect of such a holding would be to require extensive

examinations of numerous employees and to require complex

investigations into the precise locations of many areas of

corporate decision. Corporations seeking to avoid potential

punitive damages would be encouraged to structure decisions so

that no specific locus for a major decision could ever be proved

to have occurred in a “punitive” state.

MDC argues that Jackson v. K.L.M., 459 F. Supp. 953

(S.D.N.Y. 1978) and Sibley v. KLM-Royal Dutch Airlines, 454

F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) establish the proposition that, as

between the state of misconduct and the primary place of

business, the state of misconduct is the only state with an

interest in awarding punitive damages. Citing these cases, it

argues that Missouri, as the state of its corporate headquarters

and principal place of business, has an interest oniy in the

decision to disallow punitive damages but not in the decision to

allow punitive damages. But the defendants misread the Jackson

22. In this case, for example, American maintained its corporate

headquarters in New York, its operations base in Texas, its maintenance

department in Oklahoma. and conducts business throughout the country.

26a

Appendix A

and Sibley opinions and their argument seems comparable to

“heads, I win; tails, you lose” logic.

Jackson and Sibley are companion cases which involved

suits by representatives of decedents who had been domiciled in

states allowing punitive damages. The suits were brought against

a Dutch airline for personal injuries arising from an air crash in

Spain. The holding for these cases was that the states of the

decedents had a proper interest only in adequate compensation,

but not in punitive damages. The only jurisdictions found to

have an interest in punitive damages were the Netherlands, place

of the airline’s incorporation and principal place of business, and

Spain, the country in which the accident and the tortious

conduct occurred. But because both the Netherlands and Spain

disallowed punitive damages, the court was not confronted with

the need to determine whether the place of conduct had a greater

or lesser interest than the principal place of business in the

punitive damages question.*? Thus, these cases do not provide

23. The Jackson court did state that the domiciliary states had a lower

interest in punitive damages than the placs of injury because “the California

Supreme Court had recognized that the interest in regulation of conduct in tort

cases is primarily local, in character and is the concern of the jurisdiction in

which the conduct occurred.” 459 F. Supp. at 955. But the Jackson court did

not use this reasoning to downplay the interest of the Netherlands, KLM’s

principal place of business. Nor did the court say that Spain and the

Netherland s had an interest on/y in protecting KLM from excessive financial

burdens. The court was not confronted with the question of the countries’

interests had they chosen to allow the financial burdens of punitive damages.

The court, which found for the defendants, characterized the defendants’

argument as follows:

KLM asserts that Netherlands, the place of KLM's

incorporation and its principal place of business, and Spain,

the country in which the accident occurred, are the only

(Cont'd)

27a

Appendix A

support for the argument that, in our case, Missouri has any less

interest than California.

California, place of MDC’s conduct in manufacture and

design of the DC-10, also has a strong interest in the issue of

punitive damages. California, as does every state, has a

substantial interest in the economic health of corporations which

do business within its borders. It derives substantial sales and

income taxes, as well as other revenues, directly and indirectly

from a corporation's activities within the state. Indeed,

California’s interest is strong with regard to a rule disallowing

punitive damages because such a rule protects the economic

well-being of the corporations and therefore enhances the

economic well-being of the state. Moreover, the rule may have

been a factor in various corporations’ decisions to move to

California.

The district court concluded that where, with regard to

punitive damages, the law of the principal place of business

conflicted with the law of the place of misconduct, the former

should prevail. The court reasoned that responsibility for

corporate conduct should be uniform, regardless of where

individual instances of that conduct took place. But the district

court’s analysis only looked at the purpose behind the decision

to allow punitive damages. As we have discussed, both the

decision to allow punitive damages and the decision to disallow

punitive damages must be accorded great respect. _

(Cont'd)

jurisdictions with a significant interest in the issue of

punitive damages.

459 F. Supp. at 955 (emphasis added). By the use of the phrase “issue of

punitive damages,” presumably the defendants’ argument, which the court had

accepted, would also have been accepted had the countries allowed punitive

damages.

28a

Appendix A

Thus, we find that the balance on the scales of significant

‘contacts is even: we cannot say that either California or

Missouri has a “greater” interest in the decision whether to allow

punitive damages against MDC. This situation involves a total

and genuine conflict: one jurisdiction allows punitive damages,

the other does not. There does not seem to be any way to arrive

at a “moderate and restrained” interpretation of either policy so

as to avoid a true conflict.”

With the scales evenly balanced, we now turn to the interest

of Illinois, the place of injury. The old rule in many jurisdictions,

developed from torts other than air crashes, was that where

there was nothing fortuitous about the fact that the injury

occurred in a given state, great weight would be given to the law

of the place of injury. But air crash disasters often present

situations where the place of injury is largely fortuitous. See

Cousins v. Instrument Flyers, Inc., 44 N.Y. 2d 698, 405 N.Y.S.

2d 441, 443, 376 N.E. 2d 914 (1978), and sources cited therein.

That the injury in our case occurred in Illinois can only be

described as foriuitous. Had the DC-10’s engine fallen off later,

the injury might have occurred in one of any number of states.

Because the place of injury is much more fortuitous than the

24. Kay. Comparative Impairment, supra, note 2, at 578, quoting W.

Reese & M. Rosenberg, Cases and Materials on Conflict of Laws 470 (7th ed.

1978). Also, we are unable to fathom a procedural compromise, such as a shift

in the burden of proof, which could accommodate both policies. See Twerski

& Mayer, Toward a Pragmatic Solution of Choice of Law Problems — At the

Interface of Substance and Procedure, 74 Nw, L. Rev. 781 (1979); Sedler, On

Choice of Law and the Great Quest: A Critique of Special Multistate Solutions

to Choice-of law Problems, 7 Hofstra L. Rev. 807 (1979). Nor are we able to

determine a consensus on shared values or policies which could lead to a

compromise. See Trautman, A Comment on Twerski and Mayer: A Pragmatic

Step Towards Consensus As a Basis For Choice-of-Law Solutions, 7 Hofstra

L. Rev. 833 (1979).

29a

Appendix A

place of misconduct or the principal place of business, its

interest in and ability to control behavior by deterrence or

punishment, or to protect defendants from liability, is lower

than that of the place of misconduct or principal place of

business. Also, merely as the place of injury, Illinois would not

have strong interests in protecting nonresident defendants from

excessive financial liability.

But the fact that the interest of the place of injury is less

than the interest of the principal place of business and the

interest of the place of alleged misconduct does not mean that

Illinois has no interest in the punitive damages question. Illinois

has very strong interests in not suffering air crash disasters and

also in promoting airplane safety. This Court takes judicial

notice that the DC-10 crash sent shock waves throughout the

metropolitan Chicago area. Illinois special emergency disaster

units responded to the crash. The state certainly incurred

significant expense in attempted rescue operations, clean-up

operations, and the necessary tasks of identifying the deceased

and notifying next-of-kin.

Also, in this case Illinois is more than merely the place of

injury. As noted before, many of the other contacts of

significance were in Illinois. With regard to the actions filed in

Illinois, all but two of the decedents resided in Illinois. As the

home of O'Hare International Airport, one of the world’s busiest

airports, Illinois certainly has strong interests in encouraging air

transportation corporations to do business in the state.

Because Illinois has such strong interests in promoting

airline safety, it would have a strong interest in allowing punitive

damages to deter corporate misconduct relating to air safety.

But because Illinois also has such strong interests in having

airlines fly into and out of the state, and having related air

30a

Appendix A

transportation companies do business within the state, it would

have a strong interest in protecting air transportation companies

by disallowing punitive damages. Thus, the decision made by the

Illinois legislature must be accorded special weight.

As noted earlier, Illinois’ choice-of-law law gives

presumptive importance to the place of injury. The law of the

place of injury is to be supplanted only when another state has a

more significant relationship than the place of injury.

Restatement (Second) §175. Although either California or

Missouri, taken separately, would have a greater interest than

Illinois, the fact that the laws of these states are in absolute

conflict indicates that neither state has an interest greater than

the other's. Thus, in terms of a principled basis upon which a

choice can be made, neither state has a “more significant

interest” than Illinois. Since neither California nor Missouri can

be chosen on a principled basis, the application of the “most

signficant relationship” test leads to the use of Illinois law.

Finally, application of Illinois law comports with the

general criteria of the Restatement (Second) which emphasize

certainty, predictability, uniformity of result, and ease in the

determination and application of the law to be applied.*5 In this

25. The Restatement (Second) also lists other policies including the needs

of the interstate system, the policies of the forum and other interested states,

the protection of justified expectations, and the basic policies underlying the

particular field of law. See note 17, supra. These other principles are not

helpful in the resolution of this issue because their application can cut either

way. Neither a decision for nor a decision against punitive damages will make

the interstate system work better or worse. The relevant policies of the forum,

as we have seen, are countered by the relevant policies of Missouri. “Justified

expectations” are not an issue because MDC’s corporate headquarters are in

Missouri. MDC does not argue, nor reasonably could it, that it somehow

(Cont'd)

3la

Appendix A

case, it is important to resolve the conflict between states by a

principled means. Determining that all other factors being equal,

the law of the place of injury shall be used, provides a principled

means of decision which also creates certainty.

Future defendants cannot predict, of course, where airplane

disasters will occur. But air transportation companies will now

be on notice that, under the “most significant relationship” test,

when there is a true conflict between laws of states having equal

interests in the issue of punitive damages, and when the place of

injury has a strong interest in air safety and in protection of air

transportation corporations, the law of the place of injury will

apply. Our result also comports with the Restatement (Second)’s

principle that choice-of-law rules should be relatively simple and

easy to apply. Restatement (Second) §6, at 10. We conclude

therefore, that under the “most significant relationship” test, the

law of Illinois should apply. For the above reasons, we grant

MDC’s motion to strike punitive damages claims.

We now apply the Illinois “most significant relationship”

test to American. The significant contacts to be examined are

the place of injury, the place of alleged misconduct, the principal

place of business, and the place where the relationship between

the parties is centered. As discussed with regard to MDC, the

place of injury is Illinois and the place where the relationship

(Cont'd)

justifiably expected it would not be held to Missouri law for its corporate

decisions. Finally, the basic policies underlying the field of punitive damages

are in conflict. Each state legislature weighs the balance of deterring wrongful

conduct or protecting defendants from excessive liability and then makes its

decision accordingly.

32a

Appendix A

between the parties is centered is either Illinois or California.

Neither of these states allows punitive damages. The place of

American's alleged misconduct is Oklahoma, site of its

maintenance base, which does allow punitive damages.

The place of American's principal place of business for

purposes of this analysis is disputed.. Prior to 1979 and during

part of 1979, American's principal place of business was New

York, which does not allow punitive damages. Subsequently,

American moved to Téxas, which does allow punitive damages.

Plaintiffs argue, first, that the law of American's present

principal place of business, Texas, should govern the punitive

damages issue. Second, plaintiffs argue that, if the principal

place of business on the date of the crash must be used,

American's principal place of business on that date was Texas.

First, plaintiffs argue that since the purpose of allowing

punitive damages is to control future conduct by deterrence, the

current principal place of business is the only state that can

control future conduct; the principal place of business on the

date of the accident can no longer do so. As support for their

argument, plaintiffs rely on Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y. 2d 12, 290

N.Y.S. 2d 734, 237 N.E. 2d 877 (1968), remittitur denied, 22

N.Y. 2d 722, 292 N.Y.S. 2d 107, 239 N.E. 2d 104 (1968), in

which the New York court found that a defendant who moved

from Maine to New York, shortly after an automobile accident

in Maine involving a New York resident, should be considered a

New York resident for the purpose of determining the applicable

law.

The Miller case is distinguishable from this case. In Miller,

the plaintiffs were seeking to avoid a Maine statutory limit on

compensatory damages in wrongful death actions. Because the

Miller situation involved: the policies of compensation of

33a

Appendix A

survivors, the court was concerned with determining which state

had the greatest interest in compensating the New York wife and

‘ children of a New York resident. 22 N.Y. 2d at 17, 290 N.Y.S.

2d at 738, 237 N.E. 2d at 879. The court was not confronted

with the question of punitive damages, which would have raised

the question of Maine’s interest in protecting its defendants from

liability. Moreover, by the time of trial, Maine had changed its

compensatory damage law so that the previous statutory limit

had been removed. Thus, the court was not confronted with a

situation where Maine had any actual interest in protection of its

former resident from financial liability. 22 N.Y. 2d at 21, 290

N.Y.S. 2d at 742, 237 N.E. 2d at 882.

In the case at bar, however, New York has nor changed its

law, as Maine had. New York does have a definite interest in

protecting its residents from excessive liability at the time that

the event giving rise to the liability occurred. To hold otherwise

would be a virtual absurdity betause the purpose of a decision to

impose or not impose punitive damages has to do with

regulation of conduct. If a state’s interest in punitive damages

“vested” not at the time of conduct but only at trial, a state

choosing to allow punitive damages could never deter conduct.

It is true, of course, that New York made the decision to give

more importance to protection of defendants than to

punishment and deterrence. But the issue confronted —

punishment or protection — only has meaning in terms of the

time of the conduct. Otherwise, both the decision to allow and

the decision to disallow punitive damages would have the effect

of providing protection from punitive damages for the

commission of any misconduct, so long as a corporation timely

moved thereafter. A corporation would not be deterred from

engaging in questionable conduct because it would know that it

34a

Appendix A

merely had to move corporate headquarters before trial in order

to escape liability. Thus the Miller case does not have decisive

persuasive value for our situation.

As the district court indicated, the probability of corporate

moves after misconduct is a major policy reason why the

principal place of business at the time of the crash — not at the

time of trial — must be used. If the “time of trial” rule were to

prevail, defendants in “punitive” states could always easily escape

such damages by moving their corporate headquarters to a

“non-punitive” state. Moreover, the “time of trial” rule should

be rejected because, under that rule, there would be no certainty

regarding when the “current” principal place of business should

be determined. Even “innocent” corporate moves could occur at

any number of times: between the accident and the beginning of

trial, during lengthy litigation, and also during lengthy appeals.

The use of the date of the principal place of business is to be

determined.

Plaintiffs’ final argument for the use of the current principal

place of business is that the decision on punitive damages deals

with future behavior and the only state that has an interest in

future behavior is the state where the defendant now lives, not

the state where the defendant used to live. This argument must

be rejected for two reasons. First, since the New York legislature

has decided not to allow punitive damages, it has determined

that protection of defendants is more important than deterrence

of future conduct. Second, the goal of deterrence is not limited

to the defendant in question. The entire theory of deterrence

assumes that the punishment of one person will cause other

persons not to engage in acts similarly punishable. Thus, in a

“punitive” state, even if the goal of deterrence can no longer be

achieved with regard to a defendant who has moved, it can still

be achieved with regard to other defendants within the state. For

35a

Appendix A

these reasons, we find the principal place of business to be used

in the “most significant relationship” test must be determined on

the date of the crash.

Plaintiffs next argue that American’s principal place of

business on the date of the crash was Texas, not New York, as

held by the district court. Plaintiffs advance two subarguments.

First, they argue that American’s corporate headquarters had

moved to Texas by the date of the accident. Second, they argue

that even if the corporate headquarters had not moved by that

date, the operations base was in Texas and some cases have held

that the operations base, not the corporate headquarters,

determines where the principal place of business of an airline is

located.

Plaintiffs allege, correctly, that there are inconsistencies in

the pleadings regarding American's principal place of business.

They allege, and American does not deny, that in the pleadings

in these consolidated cases, American gave inconsistent answers,

stating in some cases that its principal place of business was in

Texas and denying in other cases that its principal place of

business was in Texas. Part of the problem seems to be that

neither the complaints nor the answers specifically zeroed in on

the question of “when” American’s principal place of business

was “where”. Thus. American argues that in those answers

admitting that its principal place of business was Texas, the

answers referred to the principal place of business at the date of

the filing of the complaint, not at the time of the crash. Because

of the lack of precision by both defendants and plaintiffs

regarding the date of the allegations and denials of principal

place of business, we cannot overturn the district court’s finding

merely on grounds of inconsistent pleadings.

36a

Appendix.A

Plaintiffs next argue that the district court’s determination

that American’s principal place of business on the date of the

crash was New York was made on the basis of matters outside

the pleadings: American's unverified assertion in its reply brief

that its place of business on the date of the crash was New York.

Because the issue was American’s motion to dismiss punitive

damage claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted, the governing rule is Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure. Rule 12(b) requires that, if matters outside

the pleading are presented with regard to a motion to dismiss for

failure to state a claim, then the motion shall be treated as one

for summary judgment and all parties shall be given reasonable

opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a

motion by Rule 56.76

Plaintiffs correctly argue that, because the district court did

consider matters outside the pleadings within the meaning of

Rule 12(b), the motion should have been treated as one for

summary judgment and disposed of in accordance with Rule 56.

The district court did err in that it considered the motion as a

motion to strike under Rule 12(b) and not as a motion for

summary judgment under Rule 56. Plaintiffs argue that this

26. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) provides:

If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to

dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are

presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall

be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as

provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given

reasonable opportunity to present all material made

pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b).

37a

Appendix A

error was significant because, thus, neither affidavits nor

certified papers were filed and no reference to discovery was

made by any party.

But the error made by the district court on this matter must

be considered harmless for two reasons. First, plaintiffs

misunderstand the scope of the protection of Rule 56. Rule 56

provides that a defendant in a lawsuit may “at any time, move

with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in

his favor as to all or any part thereof.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b).

Thus, even if the district court had treated the motion as one for

summary judgment, it could have decided the question exactly

as it did and there could be no objection to the defendant's

failure to provide supporting affidavits.

Second, plaintiffs argue that American's principal place of

business was determined before discovery was taken on the

matter., But subsequent discovery on this issue has proven fatal

to the plaintiffs’ argument.

The unrefuted deposition testimony of Donald Lloyd-Jones,

Senior Vice President of Operations of American, the transcript

of which was made a part of the Record on Appeal at plaintiffs’

request, disproves plaintiffs’ assertion that Texas was American’s

principal place of business on May 25, 1979:

Q. Tell me about the move from New York

if you will. Was it done in steps, throughout

1979?

A. No, we did the entire move in

approximately six weeks time period. The first

38a

Appendix A

function moved to Dallas was the systems

Operations control center. That was about July

9th or 10th.

Q. When was the decision made to move to

Dallas?

A. November of ‘78.

Q. Was anything done to implement that

move until July of °79?

A. Could you be specific? There was -

planning obviously going on. I am not sure what

you mean.

Q. Were any departments moved down

there before July of 1979?

A. No sir.

Deposition of Donald Lloyd-Jones, Record MDL 391 #2, 2, at

42.27

27. The deposition of Mr. Lloyd-Jones continued:

Q. Was any space taken down here before July ‘79?

Mr. Long: Do you mean physically moved into or

contracts signed?

Mr. Morgan: Leased. bought, built?

Mr. Long: All of those?

Mr. Morgan: All of those.

Mr. Long: The question is compound, ambiguous and

vague.

(Cont'd)

39a

Appendix A

Plaintiffs also rely on the fact that American supplied a

Texas address as the “address of principal executive offices” on

the form 10-Q filed by American with the Securities and

Exchange Commission for the quarter ending June 30, 1979. But

the form 10-Q was dated August 10, 1979, and was filed on

August 14, 1979. The information supplied on the form contains

no reference to the crash on May 25, 1979. Thus, the inference is

stronger that the address refers to American’s address on the

date the form was signed than on the date of the crash.

Therefore, we find the district court’s conclusion that American

had not yet moved its corporate headquarters to Texas on the

date of the crash was correct.

Finally, the plaintiffs, citing Herschel v. Eastern Airlines,

Inc., 216 F. Supp. 347 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) and Clothier v. United

Airlines, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 435 (E.D.N.Y. 1961), argue that even

if American’s corporate headquarters was not in Texas on the

date of the crash, its operations base was located in Texas and

the operations base, not the corporate headquarters, should

determine where the principal place of business of an airline is

located. But the cases relied on by the plaintiffs are not

(Cont'd)

Mr. Morgan: Leased? How is that?

Mr. Long: That is fine.

A. Lease was entered into, it’s certainly a matter of

record when that was signed. I don't honestly remember

when that was signed. But it is a matter of record.

No one moved. however, until July. There was no work

done on preparation of the facility, until starting some time

in June, to the best of my recollection.

Q. I guess we can't move you down here into punitive

country, then.

Record, MDL 391 #2, 2, at 42-3.

40a

Appendix A

persuasive. First, these cases involved a determination of

principal place of business for purposes of establishing diversity,

not applicability of punitive damages.

Second, even if we look to diversity rules, this circuit

applies the “nerve center” test to determine diversity issues.** See

Celanese Corp. of America v. Vandalia Warehouse Corp., 424

F.2d 1176, 1178 (7th Cir. 1970); Sabo v. Standard Oil Co. of

Indiana, 295 F.2d 893, 895 (7th Cir. 1961). The mere fact that

American's operations base was located in Texas on the date of

the crash does not suggest that the operations center was the

true “nerve center” of American’s activities. Indeed, American’s

“system operations control center” was in New York on the date

of the crash and did not move to Texas until July, 1980.

Deposition of Donald Lloyd-Jones, Record, MDL 391 #2, at 42,

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs have a very weak

argument for placing American's principal place of business in

Texas on the date of the crash. Plaintiffs request a remand for

additional discovery. But such a remand would seem to be a

useless exercise whose only purpose would be to delay this

litigation. Moreover, denial of such a remand is appropriate

because plaintiffs did not seek to respond in the court below to

American’s assertion that its principal place of business was New

York; nor did they file a motion to vacate after the district

court’s ruling was announced. Rather, the plaintiffs waited to

announce their surprise in this Court.*?

28. In the Herschel case, the court did not even characterize the facts as

involving a direct conflict between the “nerve center” and the place of

operations since both were found to be in Miami. 216 F. Supp. at 349.

29. Plaintiffs Nary argue that they accepted American's answer that its

principal place of business was Texas and that they have never had the

(Cont'd)

4la

Appendix A

It is true the record certainly could have been developed

more to specify precise facts regarding where various activities of

American were carried out. But, given the unrefuted deposition

of Mr. Lloyd-Jones clearly establishing that American had not

yet moved its headquarters to Texas on the date of the crash, we

conclude that the need for finality on this matter outweighs the

faint possibility that further discovery would change the district

court’s conclusion. Therefore, we affirm the district court's

conclusion. American’s principal place of business on the date of

the crash was in New York.

We now turn to the specific conflict of laws regarding

American. Oklahoma, the place of American's alleged

misconduct does allow punitive damages, but New York,

American's principal place of business does not. Just as we

concluded with regard to MDC, we conclude that the place of

conduct and the principal place of business each have strong

interests in having its law applied to the punitive damages

question; we are unable to say that one state’s interest is greater

than the other. Thus, we follow the same analysis used above in

concluding that, under the “most significant relationship” test,

when the interests of the states of alleged misconduct and

primary place of business are equal and in a true and total

conflict, the law of the place of injury is to be used.

(Cont'd)

opportunity to reply to American's Reply Memorandum which contained the

assertion that American's principal place of business at the time of the crash

was New York. But, as noted above, the confusion regarding principal place of

business in the pleadings is due in part to the fact that plaintiffs’ original

complaint did not refer to any date regarding American's principal place of

business. American's answer, similarly, did not refer to any date. Thus, the

cause of much of the lack of precision must be placed at the plaintiffs’ own

doorstep. The plaintiffs’ argument that they never had the opportunity to

respond to American's later, more precise, assertion is also weakened by the

fact that they did not file a motion to vacate the district court's judgment

because of this issue.

42a

Appendix A

Again, we emphasize that this result in no way signifies a

return to the mechanical, wooden law of /ex /oci delicti. Rather,

it emphasizes the fact that there must be some principled method

of decision when the standard “interest analysis” of conflicts law

cannot settle the question. Moreover, as discussed above, the

choice of Illinois law is particularly appropriate here. Illinois has

strong interests in both protection of airline corporations and in

the deterrence of wrongful conduct by those corporations.

Therefore, we affirm the district court’s decision to strike the

claims for punitive damages against American with regard to the

actions filed in Illinois.

VI

We now turn to the actions filed in California. California

follows the “comparative impairment” approach to choice-of-

law questions. Offshore Rental Co., Inc. v. Continental Oil €o.,

22 Cal. 3d 157, 148 Cal. Rptr. 867, 583 P.2d 729 (1978);

Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215,

546 P.2d 719 (1976).*° The resolution of conflicts under this test

is as follows. First, the respective laws of interested states are

examined to ensure that there is an apparent conflict. Offshore

Rental, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 870. There is such a conflict with

regard to both MDC and American because, in both situations,

the law of the place of alleged misconduct differs from the law of

the principal place of business.

Second, when an apparent conflict is found to exist, the

court reexamines the applicable laws and circumstances to see if

30. See Kay, Comparative Impairment, supra, note 2: Kanowitz,

Comparative Impairment and Better Law; Grand Illusions in the Conflict of

Laws, 30 Hastings L.J. 255 (1978); and Note, After Hurtado and Bernhard;

Interest Analysis and the Search for a Consistent Theory for Choice-of-Law

Cases, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 127 (1976).

43a

Appendix A

a “moderate and restrained interpretation” of both the policy

and the circumstances reveals that only one state has a legitimate

interest in the application of its policy. Bernhard, 546 P.2d at

723.3! But as discussed with regard to the actions filed in Illinois,

both the principal place of business and the place of alleged

misconduct have strong interests in the protection of defendants

and the deterrence of wzongiul conduct. We see no restrained or

moderate interpretacion of either state’s policy which can resolve

this conflict.

When, as here, the reexamination of an apparent conflict

reveals no way in which the conflict can be resolved by a

restrained or moderate interpretation, the conflict is indeed a

“true” conflict. The comparative impairment analysis “proceeds

on the principle that true conflicts should be resolved by

applying the law of the state whose interest would be the more

impaired if its law were not applied.” Bernhard, 16 Cal. 3d at

320, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 219, 546 P.2d at 723; see also Offshore

Rental, 22 Cal. 3d at 165, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 872. This approach

does not involve the court in “weighing” the conflicting

governmental interests in the sense of determining which law

represents “better” social policies. Such an approach would

vitiate the policies of federalism which, within constitutional

31. Professor Kay argues that the step of moderate and restrained

interpretation was integral to Professor Currie’s governmental interest

approach and that its use in the new comparative impairment approach

announced by the California Supreme Court in Bernhard was improper. Kay,

Comparative Impairment, supra, note 2, at 583. Although some doctrinal

inconsistencies do exist between the two theories, id., at 583-86, we are not

convinced that this combination of theories is inappropriate. As we understand

it, the point is that the reviewing court must look behind an apparent conflict

to the precise issue and the precise interest of each state. This approach seems

to be the very essence of the depecage concept. See Leflar, American Conflicts

Law, §109, 221-22 (3d ed. 1977).

44a

Appendix A

limits, allow states to determine their own policies as they wish.

Offshore Rental, 22 Cal. 3d at 165, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 872. See

Horowitz, The Law of Choice of Law in California: A

Restatement, 21 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 719, 753 (1974). Rather, the

process used by the comparative impairment approach is

“essentially a process of allocating respective spheres of

lawmaking influence.” Offshore Rental, 22 Cal. 3d at 165, 148

Cal. Rptr. at 872, quoting Baxter, Choice of Law and the

Federal System, 16 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 11-12 (1963). This process of

allocation involves several steps. First, of course, the states with

relevant interests must be identified.

As discussed in relation to the Illinois “most significant

relationship” test, the principal place of business and the place of

alleged misconduct have strong and equal relevant interests.

These states have the interests of deterrence of misconduct or

protection of local corporations, as discussed above. Illinois, the

state in which the injury occurred, also has an important interest

in the application of its law because it is a state in which both

the policies of protection of airline corporations and deterrence

of misconduct are peculiarly important. Also as discussed with

regard to the Illinois test. the domiciliary states of the plaintiffs

and their representatives do not have significant interests in the

punitive damages question.

The comparative impairment theory requires that the court

attempt to determine the relative commitment by each interested

state to the law involved. Offshore Rental, 22 Cal. 3d at 165-66,

148 Cal. Rptr. at 873. This examination of relative commitment

examines two factors: (1) the current status of a statute and the

45a

Appendix A

intensity of interest with which it is held,*? and (2) the

“comparative pertinence” of the statute: the “fit” between the

purpose of the legislature and the situation in the case at hand;

32.. The Offshore Rental Court stated:

(W]hile “{i}t is not always possible to say fairly whether

(the] policy [underlying a state's law] is one that was much

more strongly held in the past than it is now,... this

ground of analysis should not be ignored.” (Emphasis

added.) (Von Mehren & Trautman, The Law of Multistate

Problems (1976) p. 337.)

Professor Freund has pointed out that “Statutes [in a

domestic case], by reason of their pattern or their

prevalence, may evidence a legal climate of opinion which

makes less oppressive the responsibility of the judge in

choosing between...two possible rules of law.... A

similar resort may be made in multistate cases. /f one of the

competing laws is archaic and isolated in the context of the

laws of the federal union, it may not unreasonably have to

yield to the more prevalent and progressive law, other

factors of choice being roughly equal... .” (Emphasis

added.) (Freund, Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of

Laws (1946) 56 Harv. L. Rev. 1210, 1216.)...

Moreover, a particular statute may be an antique not

only in comparison to the laws of the federal union, but also

as compared with the laws of the state of its enactment.

Such a statute may be infrequently enforced or interpreted

even within its own jurisdiction, and, as an anachronism in

that sense, should have a limited application in a conflicts

case.

22 Cal. 3d at 165-66, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 872 (emphases by the Offshore Rental

court).

46a

Appendix A

id., 22 Cal. 3d at 166, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 872, quoting Baxter, 16

Stan. L. Rev. 1, 12 (1963).

A

Applying California's “comparative impairment” analysis of

MDC, we begin with Missouri. We look first to the current

status of its interest in the application of its punitive damages

law. Despite defendants’ arguments to the contrary, discussed

and rejected in Part II, above, we find that Missouri permits

recovery in death cases for “aggravating circumstances” when

there has been a showing of “wilful misconduct, wantonness,

recklessness, or a want of care indicative of indifference to

consequences.” Williams v. Excavating and Foundation Co., 230

Mo. App. 973, 93 S.W. 2d 123, 127 (1936); Wiseman v. Missouri

Pacific Railroad, 575 S.W. 2d 742, 752 (Mo. App. 1978); Mo.

Rev. Stat. §537.090 (1978).

Recovery for “aggravating circumstances” has _ been

permitted, and the provision has been maintained in the statute

33. The Offshore Rental court stated:

The policy underlying a statute may be less “comparatively

pertinent” if the original object of the statute is no longer of

pressing importance: a statute which was once intended to

remedy a matter of grave public concern may have fallen in

significance to the periphery of the state's laws... .

Moreover, the policy underlying a statute may also be

less “comparatively pertinent” if the same policy may easily

be satisified by some means other than enforcement of the

statute itself.

Offshore Rental, 22 Cal. 3d at 166, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 872-73.

47a

Appendix A

through many amendments, the most recent ones being in 1978

and 1979. Mo. Stat. Ann. §537.090 (Vernon, 1980). When a

statutory provision that has received judicial construction is

reenacted, it is presumed that the intention of the legislature was

to adopt the construction given by the court. See 73 Am. Jur.

2d, Statutes §331 (1974); see also American National Ins. Co. v.

Keitel, 353 Mo. 1107, 186 S.W. 2d 447 (1945); and Gray v.

McDonald, 104 Mo. 303, 16 S.W. 398, 401 (1891). Thus, the

current status of Missouri's interest in the application of its

punitive damages statute seems strong.

Another factor of the “current status” test is whether a

statute is “archaic and isolated” in the context of the laws of

other states, see Offshore Rental, 22 Cal. 3d at 165. But, because

the states in the United States are about equaliy divided on the

punitive damages question,** it is not the case that either

allowance or disallowance of such damages is “archaic and

isolated” among other state laws.

We look, second, to the “comparative pertinence” of

Missouri's punitive damages rule to this case, involving a

corporation headquartered in Missouri. That is, we look to the

“fit” between the purpose of Missouri's legislation and the facts

here. The general purposes of allowing punitive damages are

punishment of defendants and deterrence of future wrongful

conduct. Those purposes are pertinent to the facts of this case. If

the claims for punitive damages are allowed and are proven at

trial, damage awards against MDC will be larger, perhaps

34. Plaintiffs assert. and defendants do not dispute, that no more than 22

states deny punitive damages in death cases: Alaska, California, Colorado,

Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska,

New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota,

Utah, Vermont, Virginia. Washington, and Wisconsin.

48a

Appendix A

significantly larger, than they would be if the claims are not

allowed. Such an increase will certainly be felt by MDC to be

“punishment”. Similarly, such awards could be expected to deter

future wrongful conduct, of the type alleged in this case, both by

MDC and by other corporations based in Missouri.

Another aspect of the “comparative pertinence” test is

whether Missouri's policy of deterrence can be satisified by some

means other than allowance of punitive damage claims.*5

Theoretically, it may be possible that Missouri could initiate a

criminal prosecution against MDC for MDC’s alleged wrongful

conduct. Presumably such a criminal prosecution, if successful,

could allow Missouri to achieve its goals of punishment and

deterrence. But we should not overemphasize this possibility,

because to do so would vitiate the “private attorney general”

concept inherent in the allowance of punitive damages in civil

suits.

Thus, the application of the “comparative impairment” test

to Missouri produces the following results. Missouri has a

strong current interest in its punitive damages law; there is a

solid “fit” between the purpose of that law and its application to

a Missouri-based corporation such as MDC; but, there is some

slippage in that “fit” in the sense that Missouri can theoretically

achieve at least some of the purposes of its law by other means.

We now examine California’s interest under the

comparative impairment test. First, we consider the current

status of its policy against allowing punitive damages in

wrongful death cases. Case law indicates that California seems

to have a strong commitment to its policy of denying punitive

damages in wrongful death cases. As the court stated in /n Re

35. See note 33 supra.

49a

Appendix A

Paris Air Crash, 622 F. 2d 1315, 1317 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1980),

“California courts have uniformly held that the statute allowing

punitive damage recoveries generally in tort actions is available

for death recovering only in survival actions and not in wrongful

death suits.” See Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of

California, 17 Cal 3d. 425, 450, 131 Cal Rptr.14, 33, 551 P. 2d

334, 353 (1976); Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 38 Cal. App. 3d

450, 113 Cal. Rptr. 416 (1974). .

In addition to case law, the refusal of the California

legislature to change the law also indicates that California has a

strong commitment to its no-punitive-damages rule for wrongful

death cases. Although plaintiffs set forth historical and policy

arguments designed to show that California has no commitment

to its policy against allowance of punitive damages,*° these

36. Plaintiffs argue that analysis of legislative changes made in 1962 to the

California wrongful death and survival statutes, combined with analysis of the

California Law Revision Commission recommendations on which those

changes were based, reveals that California policy does not truly oppose

punitive damages. Plaintiffs state that in its 1960 “Recommendation and Study

Relating to Survival of Actions,” the Commission concluded that there was no

valid reason for an exclusion of punitive damages in death cases. Plaintiffs

argue that the Commission recommended that there be a new survival statute

known as §573 of the Probate Code, which would specifically preserve a

decedent's right to sue for punitive damages and that the wrongful death

statute (Cal. Civil Proc. Code §377) be amended to exclude damages

recoverable under §573.

Both of those changes were enacted by the California legislature in 1962.

Plaintiffs assert that although nothing in the legislative record indicates that

the amendment to §377 was to overturn the earlier rule against punitive

damages, that is the only possible interpretation of the amendment because the

only damages recoverable under §573 that could otherwise have been

duplicated were punitive damages.

(Cont'd)

50a

Appendix A

arguments have not been persuasive with the California

legislature. That legislature failed to amend C2lifornia’s

wrongful death statute to include punitive damages after

attention had been drawn to that omission. See In Re Paris Air

Crash, 622 F.2d 1318 n.2.

Plaintiffs argue that the legislature did not need to amend

the wrongful death statute because the 1962 amendment to that

statute had in effect overturned the rule against punitive

damages.3’ These arguments might be persuasive if the question

before'us was whether California courts should have a policy of

disallowing punitive damages in wrongful death cases. But of

course that question is not, cannot be, and should not be, before

us. The question before us is whether California courts do have

a policy against awarding punitive damages in wrongful death

cases. The California Supreme Court answered that question,

“yes”, in Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 450, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 33, 551

P. 2d 334, 353. We are bound to follow that decision under the

rule of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Thus, we

conclude that California has a strong commitment to its policy

against allowing punitive damage claims in wrongful death

cases.

Second, we now examine the “comparative pertinence” of

California’s legislation to the facts of this case. First, if

California’s no-punitive-damages rule is used in this case, the

(Cont'd)

Plaintiffs argue that the Commission found that the object of awarding

punitive damages was to punish a wrongdoer, and that it would be particularly

inappropriate to deny such damages in a case in which the victim was killed,

rather than merely injured. In the face of these conclusions, plaintiffs argue,

the purpose of the 1962 amendment could only have been to end the

discrimination between wrongful death cases and survival cases regarding

punitive damages. Plaintiffs argue that the subsequent California cases which

have recited the rule against punitive damages in wrongful death cases have

failed to consider the true purpose of the 1962 amendment to §377.

37. See note 36, supra.

S5la

Appendix A

purpose of that rule, protection of defendants from excessive

financial liability, will certainly be achieved. If punitive damages

are disallowed, damages cannot be assessed beyond the award

for compensatory damages.

The second aspect of the “comparative pertinence” test is

whether the state can achieve its policy by means other than

enforcement of the statute in question. The allowance of

insurance is an alternative means of vindication of a state’s

protective policy. As the court stated in Offshore Rental, “[t}he

fact that parties may reasonably be expected to plan their

transactions with insurance in mind may therefore constitute a

relevant element in the resolution of a true conflict.” 22 Cal. 3d

at 166, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 873. California law permits defendants

to insure against punitive damages.8

Having applied the “comparative impairment” test to

California, we arrive at the following results. California has a

strung current interest in its policy disallowing punitive

damages; there is a solid “fit” between the purposes of that

policy and its application to a corporation engaging in conduct

in California; but, there is some slippage in that “fit” in the sense

that at least some of the purposes of California’s policy of

financial protection theoretically can be achieved by other

means, such as insurance.

Thus, the application of California’s “comparative

impairment” analysis to the states with the greatest interest in

38. Plaintiffs assert, and defendants apparently concede. App. Reply Br.

at 20, that California law does allow defendants to insure against punitive

damages. See 39 Cal. Jur. 3d §319, at 580-81 (Insurance for “liability imposed

by law .. . would appear to cover exemplary as well as compensatory damages

when so imposed by final judgment.”).

52a

Appendix A

application of their laws reveals that both states have strong

commitments to their respective policies. Both policies are

clearly pertinent to the issue in this case: Missouri would wish to

punish MDC, a Missouri-based corporation, for any

wrongdoing related to the DC-10 crash; California would want

to shield MDC, a corporation doing business in California, from

excessive liability regarding any wrongdoing committed in

California related to the DC-10 crash. We do not regard the fact

that, in each state, there is a theoretical possibility that the state

can vindicate its policy by, respectively, the criminal sanction or

the availability of insurance, as significant enough to outweigh

each state’s interest in application of its respective policy.

Moreover, to the extent that these theoretical possibilities do

exist, they cancel each other out. Thus, we are unable to say that

either state’s interest would be impaired less by the failure to

apply its policy.

We now turn to the place of injury, Illinois. As discussed

above, Illinois does have significant interests under the facts of

this case. Under the comparative impairment test, we first

consider the current status of the Illinois policy disallowing

punitive damages. This policy was examined in Part II of this

opinion and, as discussed there, it is strongly held. The rule

against punitive damages in wrongful death cases was recently

affirmed in Mattyasovszky v. West Towns Bus Co., 21 Ill. App.

3d 46, 313 N.E. 2d 496 (1974), aff'd, 61 Ill. 2d 31, 330 N.E. 2d

509 (1975).

The second aspect of a state's commitment to its policy

involves the “comparative pertinence” of the state's policy to the

facts of the case. Here, the “fit” between the purpose of the

Illinois rule and our facts is strong. The purpose of the no-

punitive-damages rule is to protect defendants from excessive

liability. If Illinois law is applied, MDC, a company which

53a

Appendix A

designs airplanes which fly from and over Illinois, will be

protected from excessive liability related to a crash that occurred

in Illinois. Perhaps merely as the fortuitous place of an injury

alone, Illinois might not have a special interest in protecting this

corporation, headquartered in Missouri, which performed its

alleged misconduct in California. But as noted in Part III, with

regard to the actions filed in Illinois, Illinois was severely

affected by this major disaster and Illinois also has strong

interests in the protection of airplane-related industries. Becéuse

Illinois does have unique interests in both the awarding and the

denial of punitive damages, the decision of its legislature to deny

punitive damages must be given special attention. For these

reasons, then, we find that, all other factors being equal, the

interests of Illinois tip the scales against the allowance of

punitive damages.

The use of Illinois’ interests as the deciding factor regarding

the substantive question of punitive damages also comports with

principles of certainty and uniformity. Our result under current

California choice-of-law law is consistent with our result under

Illinois choice-of-law law, which requires the adoption of the law

of the place of injury, unless another state has a greater interest

in the application of its law. Although California choice-of-law

law does not require this result, nothing in our approach is

inconsistent with California law.

Finally, although the California “comparative impairment”

test is relatively new, the result we reach is also consistent with

the result a California court probably would have reached prior

to the recent adoption of comparative impairment analysis.

Comparative impairment has only been used in two cases by the

California Supreme Court, Offshore Rental, 22 Cal. 3d 157, 148

Cal. Rptr. 867, 583 P.2d 721, and Bernhard, 61 Cal.3d 313, 128

Cal. Rptr. 215, 546 P.2d 719. Using the test in those cases, the

54a

Appendix A

court was able to identify a state whose interest would be “more

greatly” impaired by the failure to apply its laws. But the

California Supreme Court has not confronted a situation where,

under the comparative impairment test, the states with the most

relevant interests also were determined to have equal interests.

Perhaps in such a situation, the California Supreme Court

would apply the test used prior to comparative impairments

Whether it applied the rule of /ex loci delicti, see Bernhard, 546

P.2d at 720, or Professor Currie’s rule that in a true conflict, the

law of the forum should always be applied, see id., at 722-23; see

also Kay, Comparative Impairment, supra note 2, at 583, the

result would be a decision not to allow the punitive damage

claims. For all of the foregoing reasons, therefore, we reverse the

district court and grant MDC’s motion to strike the punitive

damage claims with regard to the actions filed in California.

We now consider the punitive damage claims sought against

American, with regard to the actions filed in California. As

discussed above, the first step in California’s analysis is to

determine that there is an apparent conflict of laws between the

states having relevant interests in the application of their laws.

The states which have the relevant interests are: the principal

place of business; the place of misconduct; and, under the

unique facts of this case, the place of injury.

American's principal place of business at the time of the

crash, as discussed above, was New York, which does not allow

punitive damages. The place of American's alleged misconduct is

Oklahoma, site of its maintenance base, which does allow

punitive damages. Thus, we have a clear clash of law regarding

interested states. As discussed above with regard to MDC's

principal place of business and place of alleged misconduct, we

55a

Appendix A

see no way to reach a compromise via a moderate and restrained

interpretation of either policy. Thus, we now examine each

state’s relative commitment to its policy in order to determine

whether either state's interest would be less impaired by the

failure to apply its law.

Under the “comparative impairment” test, the first aspect of

a state’s commitment to its policy is the current status of that

policy. The current status of the New York rule against punitive

damages seems strong. In Robert v. Ford Motor Co., 424

N.Y.S.2d 747 (1980), the court clearly held that punitive

damages were not allowed under the wrongful death statute. The

court stated that “[t]he remedy provided by the statute, the

recovery of compensatory damages, is exclusive and may not be

expanded by the courts.” 424 N.Y.S.2d at 749. See also Ratka v.

St. Francis Hosp., 44 N.Y.2d 604, 610, 612, 407 N.Y.S.2d 458,

460, 462, 378 N.E.2d 1027, 1030, 1032 (1978).

The second aspect of a state’s commitment to its policy is

whether that policy is “comparatively pertinent” to the facts of

the case. The purpose of a rule disallowing punitive damages is

to protect defendants from excessive financial liability. If New

York’s law is applied, American, a corporation headquartered in

New York, will be protected from any damages beyond

compensatory damages. Thus, there is a strong “fit” between the

purpose of the rule and the facts before us. The next question is

whether that state's interest can be achieved in other ways, such

as through the availability of insurance. As discussed with

regard to MDC, this factor is not of critical importance, but can

add another dimension to the analysis of a state's interest. It is

not clear whether a corporation can acquire insurance against

punitive damages in New York.’? For the foregoing reasons,

39. This issue was not addressed in the briefs of any of the parties.

56a

Appendix A

against punitive damages is strong and that there is a good “fit”

between New York’s policy and the facts of this case.

We now examine Oklahoma's interest in its policy allowing

punitive damages. The Oklahoma wrongful death statute

recently was amended to specify, inter alia, the availability of

punitive damages.*® Thus, the Oklahoma legislature seems to

40. Until 1979, Oklahoma's wrongful death act, in its entirety, provided as

follows:

§1053. Death—action for. When the death of one is caused

by the wrongful act or omission of another, the personal

representative of the former may maintain an action

therefor against the latter. or his personal representative, if

he is also deceased, if the former might have maintained an

action had he lived, against the latter, or his representative,

for an injury for the same act or omission. The action must

be commenced within two years. The damages must issue to

the exclusive benefit of the surviving spouse and children, if

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Petition — Lin v. American Airlines, Inc. · 454 U.S. 878 | Frix