Petition — Lin v. American Airlines, Inc.
Supreme Court brief1981
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EXandyae > STENAS,
Supreme Court of the :
—
October Term, i980
SHUTAO H. LIN, as Administrator of the Goods, Chattels and
Credits which were of SHU REN LIN, M.D., Deceased;
JOSEPH P. MALACYNSKI, as Administrator of the Estate of
MICHELLE MALACYNSKI, and JOSEPH P.
MALACYNSKI, individually; DONALD R. LYON and
SOPHIE H. LYON; and JANE S. SHATKIN, as Executrix of
the Estate of LLOYD J. SHATKIN, Deceased,
Petitioners,
VS.
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC. and McDONNELL
DOUGLAS CORPORATION,
Respondents.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH
CIRCUIT
F. LEE BAILEY
AARON J. BRODER
Attorneys for Petitioners
350 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10001
(212) 244-2000
HARRY B. FRANK
LESTER J. KRAVITZ
IRVING ANOLIK
Of Counsel
4843 LUTZ APPELLATE PRINTERS, INC.
NY (212) 840-9494 © (516) 222-1606 © (914) 683-9363
NJ (201) 257-6850 © PA (215) 563-5587 © DC (202) 783-7288 @ MA (617) 227-1133
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether the law permits recovery of punitive damages in
_death cases against American Airlines and/or McDonnell
Douglas?
2. Whether petitioners are denied equal protection of the
laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution by virtue of the fact that the court below has
held in essence that they may not seek punitive damages
although if the case had been brought in another jurisdiction
they would have been entitled to such damages?
-3. From a choice of law standpoint, when a defendant
corporation has moved its corporate headquarters after an
accident, which state has the predominant interest in the
awarding or denial of punitive damages, the state of the former
or present principal place of business of the defendant
corporation?
4. Since the pleadings below were inconsistent, with some
plaintiffs pleading that Texas was American’s principal place
of business and others pleading that it was New York, was it
proper for the court below to assume it was New York?
5. Assuming that New York law governs, does the denial by
such law of punitive damages only where the victim dies deny
the petitioners equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth
Amendment?
ii
PARTIES
The plaintiffs in the district court and the United States
Court of Appeals were as follows:
The actions below are currently known as “In Re Air Crash
Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois on May 25, 1979” and bear
Multi-District Litigation Master File Number MDL 391. The
names of all plaintiffs in MDL 391 are set forth infra (see Note
following petition).
The defendants were as follows:
American Airlines, Inc. and McDonnell Douglas
Corporation.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Cpeehees PUUGRINE | ic occ cs ccccccccccccsguascesscectcese i
PATTIES cc ccccccccccccsccccceccccccescceeecccseeoeneoes i
Table OF Comtemts nccccccccccccccccccccccccccccceveces iii
Table Of Citations .cccccccccccccccccccncccescccccccces iv
Opinions Belew occ cccccccsccsnpeccccsscccveccencvccoes 2
FOTMGIOUOR coc ccccccccccvcscvenevcccccccececeoscccces 2
Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved ......... 3
Statement of the Case ....cccccccccccccccccccccccccccce 3
Summary Of APQUMORt oc cccccccccccccccccccccccccesccs 6
PRRTOGINOEY Sic cce csi cvdcdcvesecdeccocesscevescesecess 7
Reasons For Granting the Writ:
I. The United States Court of Appeals erred in
determining that no punitive damages could be
recovered, and applied a wrong determination of the
QOVETTING IAW. ccccccccccccccscccscodcccecccece 8
II. The court below erred in holding that a defendant
corporation's principal place of business at the time
of the accident had a predominant interest in the
issue of punitive damages, rather than its present
principal place of business. .........seeeeeeeees 14
iv
Contents
Page
III. Assuming New York law is applicable to the issue of
punitive damages against American, New York law
violates the equal protection clause of the United
DUD GORTIIIOR, . sc crcccessccsevcccccvececes 19
IV. The United States Court of Appeals opinion is
confusing and it does not give sufficient guidance in
complex and prolix cases of this kind. This Court
should grant certiorari to adequately resolve the
confusion created by the opinion below. ........ 21
DE <. cep cdbuee pack deauisbelbcledusadseees nneeae 22
ME. nod ne Veutnavaakole esd ddbibsed coeuebetoneeeuneeses ix
TABLE OF CITATIONS
Cases Cited:
Babcock v. Johnson, 12 N.Y. 2d 473, 240 N.Y.S. 743 (1964). 12
Belisario v. Manhattan Motor Rental, Inc., 370 N.Y.S. 2d
574, 48 A.D. 2d 477 (Ist Dept. 1975) ...........058. 13
Bernard v. Harrah’s Club, 546 P. 2d 719 (1976) ......... 12
Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F. 2d 1145, n. 2 (Ist Cir.
MG aut Rane meuresskics anak bac ines bwe0escadecesus 20
Forty-Eight Insulations v. Johns-Manville Products, 472
Fr, es See CN TR UBT) scvcdivncctevcacticoses 10
Vv
Contents
Page
Gore v. Northeast Airlines, 373 F. 2d 717 (2d Cir. 1967).. 13
Huff v. White Motor Corp., 609 F. 2d 286 (7th Cir. 1979) . 19, 20
Hurtado v. Superior Court, 114 Cal. Rptr. 106, 522 P. 2d 666
GRIER PD ccc ecscccccvencdamececctcdesccsceceone ll
Ingersoll v. Klein, 46 Ill. 2d 42 (1970) .........eeeees Pd
In Re Paris, 427 F. Supp. 701 (C.D. Cal. 1977) ..rccccee 19
Jackson v. Koninklijke Luchtyaart Maatschappij, N.V., 459
Fs ON Gas CREAN. Vs OPPS). cic cscccccsccmuses siise 10
Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y. 2d 34, 211
PE a Oe BSS CIDOE) cc ccomacccsstcvesevccecsnenece 13
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487
GOED. “waddacne ccdiscececivetacantcletencteeseunsen 9
Long v. Pan Am World Airways, Inc., 16 N.Y. 2d 337, 266
Tee Bia Se OR HP OED oncccccccstccbasetepsaneanwwes 13
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 81S. Ct. L101, 6 L. Ed.
Oe CEOEED * Sn vcviclecddusdceescegunevcespusenann 21
Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y. 2d 12, 290 N.Y.S. 2d 734, 237 N.E.
‘RB icmt. Mererrerreerit Tre r erry tree 15, 16, 18, 19
Mitseff v. Acme Steel Co., 208 F. Supp. 805 (N.D. Ill. 1962} 20
vi
Contents
Page
Pancotto v. Sociedade de Safaris de Mocambique, S.A.R.I.,
422 F. Supp. 405 (N.D. M11. 1976) ...ccccvcccccccces 10
Parham v. Hughes, 439 U.S. 815, 99 S. Ct. 75, 58 L. Ed. 2d
EP SEU SubeRsceweshebetahekSbedeevedicvabevecccces 20
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 72 S. Ct. 251, 30 L. Ed. 225
Re EE reo, erry er eee eee ee Te ee 21
Reich v. Purcell, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31, 432 P. 2d 727 (Sup.
TEE ABREU RURGES ch GS OSV 6 cK csecbnadssecgesotercees 11
Sibley v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 454 F. Supp. 425
EE MED sc cackd Khob 00h ps evere ce cenceced coo.
Tarasoff v. Regents of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 131 Cal.
te A Gee Ws OO SO8 CITE) si idcicerascccccccsess 12
Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S. Ct. 939, 59 L. Ed. 2d 171
A PNG nee AbG UCR h0Ghddse ehh sae decsescccenes 20
Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964) .........46. 9, 10
Walkes v. Walkes, 465 F. Supp. 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) ..... 13
Statutes Cited:
es Spahoeedseces see’ 2
eM Eee i nvsdackesesecatveds 2
ee a ees ds cb essacescvdaess 3
’
vii
Contents
Page
28 U.S.C. $1332 ..cceccccrecccccccccccsccccsccvcsevecs 3
Missouri Statutes Annotated 509.200, 510.270 ............ 3
Missouri Revised Statutes 537.090 .......ceeeeeeeeeeeees 3
12 Oklahoma Statutes Annotated §1053 .........eeeeeee 3
22 Oklahoma Statutes Annotated, §134 ........eeeeeeeee 3
United States Constitution Cited:
Fifth AmenGment oc ccccccsccccccccccccececscccsccsoocs 3
Fourteenth Amendment .......secsecccsccccvcceceees i, 3, 19
Rules Cited:
Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 55.19, 70.01,
hn 5 466 ode thee eaeetones bu ebe’ varecne 3
Other Authorities Cited:
Broder, Aaron J., “The Death Penalty and Punitive Dam-
ages,” New York Law Journal, Feb. 8, 1980 ........ ee
Leflar, American Conflicts Law, 3d Ed. §99, pp. 197-198;
§108, pp. 219-222; §139, pp. 284-285 ........eeeeeees 18
Restatement of Conflict of Laws (Second Edition) ....... v)
SEAR CRNENS OD cca nce Naeeiecvenedesee setcrecse 10
viii
Contents
Page
APPENDIX
Appendix A — Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit Decided January 5, 1981 .... la
Appendix B — Order Dated January 5, 1981 ............ 7la
Appendix C — Order Dated March 3, 1981 ..........+.. 73a
Appendix D — Memorandum Opinion of the United States
District Court Filed May 23, 1980 (Dated May 29, 1980). 77a
Appendix E — Order Dated May 23, 1980 ..........546- 95a
Appendix F — Order Dated May 27, 1980 ...........+.5. 96a
Appendix G — Relevant Constitutional and Statutory Pro-
WOME: odcckacrectdecccivecesccdsccntsceweuvesvens 97a
No.
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
-@>
October Term, 1980
SHUTAO H. LIN, as Administrator of the Goods, Chattels and
Credits which were of SHU REN LIN, M.D., Deceased;
JOSEPH P. MALACYNSKI, as Administrator of the Estate of
MICHELLE MALACYNSKI, and JOSEPH P.
MALACYNSKI, individually; DONALD R. LYON and
SOPHIE H. LYON; and JANE S. SHATKIN, as Executrix of
the Estate of LLOYD J. SHATKIN, Deceased,
Petitioners,
vs.
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC. and McDONNELL
DOUGLAS CORPORATION,
Respondents.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH
CIRCUIT
>
2
OPINIONS BELOW
A copy of the opinion of the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern District, is
reproduced in the appendix hereto.
The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals of the
Seventh Circuit dated January 5, 1981 is likewise reproduced in
the appendix.
The orders sought to be reviewed were dated May 23, 1980
and May 27, 1980 respectively. These orders, made by the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division, ruled in essence that the plaintiffs (petitioners
herein) can pursue punitive damages against McDonnell
Douglas Corporation (hereinafter referred to as “MDC”), but
not against American Airlines, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as
“American”). (See order of May 23, 1980 as amended by order
of May 27, 1980, both of which are set forth in the appendix
hereto.)
An opinion was made and rendered by the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern
Division, dated May 29, 1980. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in essence reversed so much of
the district court’s order as provided for a right to pursue
punitive damages as against MDC.
The orders of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit are dated January 5, 1981 and March 3, i981,
and are set forth in the appendix hereto.
we JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction to review this order is predicated upon 28
U.S.C. §§1254 and 1257.
3
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
INVOLVED
The constitutional provisions are the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. The statutory
provisions are: 28 U.S.C. §1292(b); 28 U.S.C. §1332; Missouri
Statutes Annotated 509.200, 510.270; Missouri Revised Statutes
537.090; 22 Oklahoma Statutes Annotated, §134; 12 Oklahoma
Statutes Annotated, §1053; Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rules 55.19, 70.01, 70.02, 71.06.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
These actions arise out of the crash of a DC-10 jet airliner
designed and built by respondent MDC and owned and
operated by respondent American. The plane was scheduled to
fly to Los Angeles as American Airlines flight 191, but crashed
in Illinois shortly after take-off from O’Hare International
Airport on May 25, 1979. Two hundred seventy three persons
were killed in this accident, the greatest number of persons to
perish in an air disaster within the United States.
The actions were started in California, Illinois, New York,
Puerto Rico, Hawaii and Michigan.
The accident and deaths occurred in Illinois.
There are numerous cases arising out of the accident, which
are now pending before the Hon. Edwin A. Robson and Hubert
L. Will, both of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
Many of these actions were filed in or removed to other
federal district courts, but have been transferred to Illinois for
pre-trial purposes by order of the Judicial Panel on Multi
4
District Litigation. With exceptions not relevant to the merits of
this petition, plaintiffs’ claims against MDC arise under the
wrongful death statutes of various states and are pursued on
theories of negligence and strict tort liability. Many of the
complaints allege wrongful death actions against MDC. They
contain prayers for punitive damages, in addition to
compensatory damages.
MDC contends that the plaintiffs’ complaints failed to state
legally sufficient claims for this relief, insofar as they purport to
seek punitive damages for wrongful death.
MDC’s principal place of business is Missouri, but it is a
Maryland corporation.
American’s principal place of business is now Texas. There
is a dispute in the pleadings as to American’s principal place of
business on the day of the accident. Most of the plaintiffs were
aware of this, and advanced claims for punitive damages alleging
that American’s principal place of business on the accident date
was Texas. However, some of the plaintiffs allege that it was
New York.
American maintains that its corporate headquarters moved
from New York to Dallas, Texas in August of 1979, but the
decision to move was made in November of 1978. The move was
compicted by August of 1979. American was incorporated in
Delaware.
Thus, we point out that the district court’s statement that
the relevant facts are primarily “undisputed” and that at the time
of the crash American “had its prin.ipal place of business in
New York” is not correct with respect to American’s place of
business.
5
Plaintiffs are the decedents’ estates and personal
representatives, and were residents of numerous states and
countries including California, Illinois, New York,
Massachusetts, Vermont, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Holland and
Japan.
The plaintiffs contend that MDC’s conduct in the design
and imanufacture of the DC-10 was egregious. This alleged
misconduct occurred in California.
The plaintiffs maintain that American’s conduct regarding
the maintenance of the DC-10 was egregious. They contend that
this misconduct occurred in Oklahoma, the location of
American’s maintenance base. :
Both respondents moved in the district court to strike the
claims for punitive damages on the ground that such claims
failed to state legally sufficient claims for relief. The parties
disputed many issues: whether certain states allowed punitive
damages, the choice-of-law theories to be used regarding certain
states, and the results of the application of the choice-of-law
theories which were used.
Using the choice-of-law rules of each state where these
actions had originally been filed, the district court arrived at the
following results:
Under the Illinois “most significant relationship” test, the
district court found that the law of the state of the principal
place of business should prevail with regard to the ‘ssue of
punitive damages. Finding that New York was American's
principal place of business at the time of the crash and does not
allow punitive damages, and that Missouri, MDC’s principal
place of business, does allow the equivalent of punitive damages,
the court allowed the motions to strike punitive damage claims
against American but not against MDC.
6
Under the California “comparative impairment” test, the
district court held that the policies of the state of the principal
place of business would be impaired more than the policies of
the state of misconduct if those policies were not applied. Thus,
the court allowed the motion to strike punitive damage claims
with regard to American but not with regard to MDC. The
district court reached the same result with regard to the actions
filed in New York, Michigan, Puerto Rico, and Hawaii.
The court of appeals found that the motions to strike claims
for punitive damages should be granted with regard to both
MDC and American (4a).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district court’s choice of law analysis was correct, with
one exception. Where a corporation changes its principal place
of business after an accident, the state with the greatest interest
in controlling its conduct and awarding or denying punitive
damages against it is the state of its current principal place of
business.
The district court assumed that American’s principal place
of business was New York oa the accident date and, based upon
this assumption, then appiied the law of New York, which does
not allow punitive damages in death cases. Even if this
assumption was undisputed, the court should have applied the
law of Texas, because even American concedes that Texas has
been its principal place of business from August 1979 to the
present. This was the court’s first error.
The court’s second error was in assuming that New York
was American’s principal place of business on the accident date.
The pleadings were in conflict on this issue.
7
Thirdly, the court below erred in holding that New York
law, which permits the recovery of punitive damages when the
victim of tort is injured but denies them when he dies, does not
violate the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution.
INTRODUCTORY
This case presents complex conflicts-of-law questions
regarding the allowance of punitive damages in wrongful death
actions arising out of an air crash disaster. The law of the place
of the disaster, the law of the place of manufacture of the
airplane, and the law of one place of business of the
airline do not allow punitive damages. However, the law of the
primary place of business of the manufacturer of the airplane
and the law of the place of maintenance of the aircraft do allow
punitive damages. The United State Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, in essence, held that under each of the
applicable state’s choice-of-law rules, punitive damages could
not be allowed against the manufacturer or the airline.
There are now one hundred eighteen wrongful death actions
arising out of the crash which were originally filed in many
jurisdictions, including, Illinois, California, New York,
Michigan, Hawaii and Puerto Rico. As already indicated, the
cases were transferred to the Northern District of Illinois by
order of the Judicial Panel on Miulti-District Litigation.
8
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
The United States Court of Appeals erred in determining
that no punitive damages could be recovered, and applied a
wrong determination of the governing law.
It is ironic, but true, that if a person allegedly shoots and
kills another individual, the deceased’s estate cannot sue for
punitive damages in many states, but only can _ seek
compensatory damages.
In the case at bar a “Pickwickian” approach to the
governing law was applied by the United States Court of
Appeals, because in essence it ruled that none of the petitioners
herein or the plaintiffs in the actions can seek or recover punitive
damages from either of the respondents.
The main contention of MDC was that the court should
apply the law of Illinois, the place of injury, to all of the actions
and that since Illinois does not allow punitive damages, no
plaintiff should recover such damages. American basically
argued below that the law of Illinois should be applied to actions
originally filed in Illinois and that New York law should apply
to actions originally filed in New York and California. Since
neither Illinois nor New York permits punitive damages in a
wrongful death action, American contended that no punitive
damages should be allowed.
The plaintiffs take various positions. Some contend that the
conflicts of law rules of all the forum states require us to apply
the law of respondents’ principal place of business or the law of
the state where the alleged wrongful conduct occurred. Other
plaintiffs, notably those from Michigan and Hawaii, assert that
9
the conflict of law rules of those forums require the court to
apply the law of plaintiff's domicile. All plaintiffs contend that
under the applicable state law, punitive damages are recoverable
in a wrongful death action. Additionally, plaintiffs contend that
to deny punitive damages in wrongful death actions, while
permitting them in personal injury actions, violates the equal
protection clauses of the United States Constitution, and the
various State Constitutions.
Since the jurisdiction of this Court is predicated on diversity
of citizenship, we must apply the choice of law rules of the state
where the actions were originally filed. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); Van Dusen v. Barrack,
376 U.S. 612 (1964). See Broder, Aaron J., “The Death Penaity
and Punitive Damages,” New York Law Journal, Feb. 8, 1980.
With respect to actions filed in Illinois, Illinois courts use
the “most significant relationship” test of the Restatement of
Conflict of Laws (Second Edition) to determine the applicable
law in a tort claim. /ngersoll v. Klein, 46 Ill. 2d 42 (1970). Under
this test, four “contacts” generally are considered most
important in determining which law applied: (1) the place of the
injury; (2) the place where the conduct causing injury occurred;
(3) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation,
and place of business of the parties; and (4) the place where the
relationship, if any, of the parties is centered. /ngersoll, supra at
47-48. Illinois courts consider the purpose of the tort rule
involved when determining the relative importance of the
various contacts to the issue under consideration. The important
factor to be considered is the place where the conduct causing
the injury occurred, especially when that is a state other than
that in which the injury occurred.
The purpose of punitive damages is to punish and deter
wrongdoing. Sibley v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 454 F. Supp.
10
425 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Jackson v. Koninklijke Luchtyaart
Maatschappij N.V., 459 F. Supp. 953 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). The state
in which the wrongdoing actually occurred has a greater interest
than the state where the effect of the wrongdoing fortuitously
manifests itself. See Restatement, §146, comment e.
The principal place of business of the defendant is also
deemed important in determining the issue of which state’s law
governs the availability of punitive damages.
A state’s purpose in granting punitive damages is to insure
residents’ compliance with standards of conduct; a state’s
purpose in denying punitive damages isto limit the liability of its
domiciliaries in tort actions. Forty Eight Insulations v. Johns-
Manville Products, 472 F. Supp. 385 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Pancotto
v. Sociedade de Safaris de Mocambique, S.A.R.1., 422 F. Supp.
405 (N.D. Ill. 1976). Both purposes would be served by applying
the law of the state of the defendant’s domicile.
In Sibley, supra, and Jackson, supra, the court held that the
availability of punitive damages in cases arising from the
collision at Tenerife in the Canary Islands of a Pan American
747 and KLM 747 was governed either by the law of the place of
conduct and injury (Spain), or by the law of the principal place
of business of KLM (Netherlands), neither of which allowed
punitive damages. The court recognized that punitive damages
are primarily the concern of the jurisdiction where the conduct
occurred or the defendant’s business was located. Denial of
punitive damages reflects that jurisdiction’s concern with
protecting the financial interests of those doing »usiness there
and the state of residence’s concern with avoiding excessive
financial burdens on resident persons and corporations. See
Jackson, supra at 956.
Neither factor requires the determination of where the
relationship, if any, of where the parties is centered. We submit,
as the district court did, that the places where the conduct
causing the injury occurred and the states where the respondents’
principal place of business are located are crucial:
If New York was the principal place of business of
American at the time of the crash that would be one factor
militating against punitive damages so far as American is
concerned. We maintain, however, a perusal of the record
reveals that the conclusive decision of American to move to
Texas was consummated in 1978 and the move itself began prior
to the crash and was completed by August of 1979.
With respect to actions filed in California, we note that
unlike Illinois, California does not use the “most significant
relationship” test to determine the applicable law in tort cases.
California courts first determine whether a true conflict
exists by analyzing the interests of the states whose law might
apply to the issue. Reich v. Purcell, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31, 432 P. 2d
727, 730 (Sup. 1967); Hurtado v. Superior Court, 114 Cal. Rptr.
106, 522 P. 2d 666, 679-70 (Sup. 1974). California courts
recognize that there are three separate interests in wrongful
death actions: First, the plaintiff's domicile may have an interest
in the compensation of survivors. Second, the state of injury
may be concerned with deterring wrongful conduct and
protecting persons within its borders. Third, the defendant's
domicile may have an interest in limiting residents’ liability for
damages, thereby protecting residents from excessive financial
burdens. Hurtado, supra at 672-3.
Where. the laws of the interested states conflict as to a
particular issue, the court is to determine the proper law by
using the “comparative impairment” approach. Bernhard v.
12
Harrah's Club, 546 P. 2d 719 (1976). Under this test, the court
determines which state’s policy, as reflected by its law, would be
more severely affected if it were not applied. Bernhard, supra at
724.
As to respondent MDC, the two interested jurisdictions are
(1) the place where the conduct occurred, California; and (2) the
principal place of business of the respondent, Missouri.
The interests of California in this action are limited.
California courts have traditionally held punitive damages not
recoverable in wrongful death action. Tarasoff v. Regents of
California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 551 P. 2d 334
(1976); Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 113
Cal. Rptr. 416 (1976). Disallowance of punitive damages in
wrongful death actions expresses a state policy to avoid
excessive financial burdens on state residents. While MDC has
substantial operations in California, as well as in Missouri, it is
not a California resident.
The district court correctly held that California’s interest is
less than that of Missouri.
American had its maintenance facilities in the State of
Oklahoma, which allows punitive damages in wrongul death
actions. Oklahoma should have been deemed American's
effective place of business for conflict-of-laws purposes.
A perusal of the opinion of the district judges will
adequately outline the applicable law with respect to the several
other states herein involved.
New York courts apply the “governmental interest”
approach in determining the applicable law in tort cases.
Babcock v. Johnson, 12 N.Y. 2d 473, 240 N.Y.S. 2d 743 (1964);
Long v. Pan Am World Airways, Inc., 16 N.Y. 2d 337, 266
13
N.Y.S. 2d 513 (1965). This test requires the court to determine
which state has the greatest concern with the specific issue raised
because of its relationship or contact with the parties or the
occurrence. Babcock, supra at 481. Where there is nothing
fortuitous in the fact that the injury occurred in a given state,
New York courts will give great weight to the state where the
injury occurred. See Belisario v. Manhattan Motor Rental, Inc.,
370 N.Y.S. 2d 574, 48 A.D. 2d 477 (Ist Dept. 1975); Walkes v.
Walkes, 465 F. Supp. 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
However, as New York courts have recognized, air crash
disasters often present situations where the place of injury is
largely fortuitous. Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y. 2d
34, 211 N.Y.S. 2d 133 (1961); Gore v. Northeast Airlines, 373 F.
2d 717 (2d Cir. 1967). That the injury in this case occurred in
Illinois can certainly be considered “fortuitous.” Under these
circumstances, and considering the purpose of punitive damages,
a New York court would hold that the law of the principal place
of business determines the availability of punitive damages.
The highlights of the district court’s opinion can be
capsulated as follows:
In sum, the district court’s approach was unimpeachable in
looking to a defendant’s principal place of business to determine
the applicability of punitive damages. The court erred, however,
when it looked to American's principal place of business at the
time of the accident rather than its current principal place of
business.
The court of appeals below (35a), correctly noted that there
are inconsistencies in the pleadings with regard to American's
principal place of business. However, that court’s determination
that despite these inconsistencies and lack of precision it could
not overturn the district court’s finding as to American's
14
principal place of business is untenable. We believe this Court
has a right to review the record and to make an independent
determination based upon the patently obvious aspects involved.
The court below erred in holding that a defendant
corporation’s principal place of business at the time of the
accident had a predominant interest in the issue of punitive
damages, rather than its present principal place of business.
Having properly concluded under the choice of law rules of
Illinois, California, New York and Michigan that a corporation,’s
principal place of business has the predominant interest in the
issue of punitive damages, the court below erred in applying the
law of New York, where American's corporate headquarters had
been located until its move to Texas.
Petitioners believe the court was wrong in assuming that
American’s principal place of business was New York on May
25, 1979, the day of the accident, since that issue had not been
resolved in the record below.
However, even if this assumption by the court below was
correct, the court committed a more basic error in applying the
law of New York, rather than Texas. Texas is American's
principal place of business now, and it has been, since, at the
latest, August 1979.
Under either the significant relationship test, the
governmental interest test, or the comparative impairment test,
the state with the greatest concern in controlling the conduct of
a defendant corporation, or in its financial protection, is its
current principal place of business.
15
The principal place of business on the date of the accident
has an academic interest only.
In Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y. 2d 12, 290 N.Y.S. 2d 734, 237
N.E. 2d 877 (1968), a similar situation was presented. The New
York Court of Appeals therein refused to apply Maine law to a
claim arising out of a Maine auto accident involving a
defendant-driver who was a Maine resident at the time of the
accident but moved to New York thereafter. The court held that
New York had the predominant interest in the protection and
regulation of the rights of the parties and that Maine, the
defendant’s residence at the time of the accident, had no interest
in applying its law. The court noted:
“Any claim that Maine has a paternalistic interest
in protecting its residents against liability for acts
committed while they were in Maine, should they
move to another jurisdiction, is highly
speculative . . .” 290 N.Y.S. 2d at 741.
In the instant case, American's former residence similarly
retains no interest in protecting its former resident. American’s
present residence, Texas, has the predominant interest in
applying its law on punitive damages.
The reasoning of the court below in rejecting Miller v.
Miller is fallacious.
The court first said, at p. 83a:
“In a similar case, Miller v. Miller, 22
N.Y.2d 12, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968), the New
York court found that defendant who moved
from Maine to New York shortly after an
automobile accident in Maine involving a New
16
York resident, should be considered a New York
resident for the purpose of determining the
applicable law. In that action, however, the
defendant had previously resided in New York
for a substantial period of time prior to a short
residence in Maine... .”
The fact that the defendant in Miller had previously resided
in New York for a substantial period of time prior to a short
residence in Maine provides no distinction at all from the instant
case. American has done substantial business in Texas for many
years. In fact its operations base has been-in Dallas even though
its corporate headquarters were in New York.
The court below next said that in Miller, “application of the
Maine law would have limited the compensatory damages
recoverable by the New York resident.” (83a).
But application of New York law in the instant case would
exclude the punitive damages recoverable by all plaintiffs,
whether they be resident of Texas, Illinois, California, New York
or Michigan, so this is no distinction.
Thus the only distinctions asserted by the district court
between Miller v. Miller and the instant case do not stand up.
The district court based its decision on “policy
considerations.” The court said, at p. 83a:
“We conclude that policy considerations
support finding New York, American's principal
place of business at the time of the crash,
determinative. A corporate move during lengthy
litigation is not uncommon, but the move should
not affect the substantive law to be applied in
17
that litigation. Although in this action, American
moved to a jurisdiction where the law arguably
would increase its potential liability, the opposite
situation might also occur. It would be clearly
inequitable to allow a defendant to diminish the
rights of the plaintiff through moving corporate
headquarters, however legitimately, at some
point after the injury occurred. We _ will,
therefore, consider New York the relevant
principal place of business for defendant
American.”
The court’s application of these particular “policy
considerations” was erroneous for several reasons.
First, they are outside the tests prescribed by the conflicts
rules (“significant relationship"; “governmental interest”;
“comparative impairment”) of the states whose conflicts law the
court was supposed to be applying.
Secondly, the court’s concern about corporate moves during
litigation being contrived to limit plaintiffs’ rights is not a factor
here. The move had been decided upon in November 1978. The
move, moreover, if it were related at all to punitive damages
would only have increased plaintiffs’ rights at the expense of the
respondent corporation.
Thirdly, if the court is concerned about contrived or
artificial attempts to avoid choice of law consequences by
moving, it would be a simple enough matter to hold that any
such contrived effort would not be effective in derogation of
plaintiffs’ rights.
For example, if the corporate move here was from Texas to
New York, and it was instigated after the accident, and by
reason of it, the court could simply hold that it would not
extinguish plaintiffs’ rights to punitive damages, since to do so
would be to frustrate the Texas interest in controlling the
conduct of its corporations.
The district court’s holding that it will deny effect to a
corporate move planned and largely executed before an accident
because in other circumstances such a move might be contrived
to deny plaintiffs’ rights is like throwing the baby out with the
bath water. :
Furthermore, application of New York law is anomalous
considering the fact that New York itself, under Miller v. Miller,
would look to the law of Texas.
It would not be unreasonable in this age of judicial
eclecticism in choice of law (see Leflar, American Conflicts Law,
3d Ed. §99, pp. 197-198; §108, pp. 219-222; §139, pp. 284-285)
for the court to fashion a rule that would consider the whole law
of a state, including its own conflicts rules.
Thus the court could hold that if it must look to New York
law it will consider all of New York law, including its conflicts
law as exemplified in Miller v. Miller.
Such a procedure would have the virtue in this case of
providing a consistent rule of punitive damages for both
defendants. “. . .[I]f uniformity of result is a major consideration
in any case or type of case, use of a renvoi technique is a means
of achieving it.” Leflar, American Conflicts Law, 3d Ed., p. 10.
This approach makes particular sense when one focuses on
the choice of law rationales we are dealing with. Under the
“governmental interest” tests of California, New York, and
Michigan, the court should apply the law of the state with the
greatest interest in having its law applied.
19
As between New York and Texas, New York can hardly
have the predominant interest in having its law applied when it
has already expressed, in Miller v. Miller, the view that the place
of present residence has the predominant interest.
Under California's comparative impairment refinement it
could hardly be said that New York interests would be impaired
by application of Texas law, when Miller v. Miller has
announced a predominant interest in Texas.
And even under the significant relatioriship test of Illinois,
as between the previous principal place of business and the
present one, clearly the present one has the closer relationship.
Finally, the particular “policy considerations” chosen by the
court below reflect an aspect of the vested rights theory, which
most courts now reject.
Ill.
Assuming New York law is applicable to the issue of
punitive damages against American, New York law violates the
equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.
In In Re Paris, 427 F. Supp. 701 (C.D. Cal. 1977) the court
held that a state’s denial of punitive damages in death cases
under circumstances where they are recoverable in injury cases is
a denial of equal protection under the United States
Constitution, Amendment 14.
This decision was reversed by a panel of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 622 F. 2d 1315 (1980).
Certiorari was thereafter denied. :
The district court’s decision in Jn Re Paris, supra, was also
rejected in Huff v. White Motor Corp., 609 F. 2d 286, 297-298
20
(7th Cir. 1979). However, we believe that the treatment of this
important question was perfunctory, and the court should
review it.
Parham v. Hughes, 439 U.S. 815, 99 S. Ct. 75, 58 L. Ed. 2d
106, and Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97, 99 S. Ct. 939, 943,
59 L. Ed. 2d 171 (1979) cited in Huff, are not on point. They are
simply situations where the court found that there was a rational
basis for the legislative classifications therein. There is no
rationality, howéver, to allowing punitive damages where the
victim lives and denying them where the victim dies.
The court in Huff also cited Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.
2d 1145, 1148-9 n. 2 (Ist Cir. 1974). Cyr, Mitseff v. Acme Steel
Co., 208 F. Supp. 805 (N.D. Ill. 1962), and other cases cited by
respondents below are distinguishable. They involved
contentions by plaintiffs that it was a denial of equal protection
to limit the amount of recovery in death cases but not in
personal injury cases. They merely hold that the Legislature
could treat death cases differently because their compensatory
damage elements were different from those in personal injury
cases. But punitive damages are the same in both types of cases.
It is, therefore, irrational to permit their recovery in one case but
not the other.
The question here is not whether a Legislature can place a
limit on compensatory damages in a death case. The question,
rather, is whether a Legislature can rationally distinguish
between permitting punitive damages in one class of cases and
not in the other, the purpose of punitiye damages being the
common purpose of deterring wrongdoing.
Petitioners believe that the court in Huff compressed many
applications of the “rational basis test” into one, and then
misapplied that one. Discriminations based on race are not the
21
only distinctions that violate the equal protection clause. See
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 72 S. Ct. 251, 30 L. Ed. 225 (1971);
and McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-426, 81 S. Ct.
1101, 1105, 6 L. Ed. 2d 393, 399 (1961). We think this Court
should take another look at this question.
IV.
The United States Court of Appeals opinion is confusing
and it does not give sufficient guidance in complex and prolix
cases of this kind. This Court should grant certiorari to
adequately resolve the confusion created by the opinion below.
In essence, the court below determined that when all other
factors are equal, “the law of the place of the injury shall be
used” but in looking to claims against American Airlines, the
Seventh Circuit found that the law of the principal place of
business and the law of the allegedly egregious conduct were in
conflict.
The court further, rather anomously stated: “Again, we
emphasize that this result in no way signifies a return to the
mechanical, wooden law of /ex loci delicti. Rather it emphasizes
the fact that there must be some principled method of decision
when the standard ‘interest analysis’ of conflicts law cannot
settle the question.” In the final analysis therefore, it is difficult
to determine whether the court below actually has applied /ex
loci delicti without saying so, or whether it has created a
“Chinese jigsaw puzzle” to be applied on an ad hoc, case by case
basis.
It is manifest that the well-reasoned opinions of the district
judges were not sufficiently rationalized by the court of appeals.
It appears rather, that implicit in its opinion is the concern that
punitive damages would be so great as to be confiscatory, and
22
thus bankrupt the corporation against which they are exacted.
That further ought not to be a factor. We believe this Court
should make a determination that where a logical cause can be
made for the application of punitive damages, as is clear in the
case at bar, that punitive damages be imposed without regard to
“nice” questions of effect upon the defendant in the particular
case. Justice is equally due to the hapless plaintiffs (petitioners
herein).
To argue that a willful murder does not entitle the victim to
‘ punitive damages if he dies, but does if he is only grievously
wounded (e.g., New York) makes a mockery of the law
altogether (see article of Aaron J. Broder, N.Y.L.J. 2/8/80, The
Death Penalty. and Punitive Damages).
CONCLUSION
The petition for certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
F. LEE BAILEY
AARON J. BRODER
HARRY B. FRANK Attorneys for Petitioners
LESTER J. KRAVITZ
IRVING ANOLIK
Of Counsel
ix
NOTE
SHUTAO H. LIN, as Administrator
of the Goods, Chattels and Credits
which were of SHU REN LIN,
M.D., Deceased
JOSEPH P. MALACYNSKI, as
Administrator of the Estate
of MICHELLE MALACYNSKI, and ,
JOSEPH P. MALACYNSKI,
individually
DONALD R. LYON and SOPHIE
H. LYON
JANE S. SHATKIN as Executrix
of the Estate of LLOYD J.
SHATKIN
SWIFT, Rita P. surviving
spouse of William R. Swift;
Rita P. Swift as mother and
next friend of Lisa F. Swift
VAUGHAN, Sharon T.
individually and as mother
and next friend of Tena Ellen
Vaughan
LLOYD'S BANK CALIFORNIA as
Executor of the Estate of
WILLARD R. NARY., Deceased
LLOYD'S BANK CALIFORNIA
as Executor of the Estate
JULIA T. NARY
SUTTER, WILLIAM P. as
Administrator of the estate
of Ira S. Cohen, Deceased
x
BIELSKI, John
BIELSKI, Mary
BIELSKI, Michael
DITTMER, Carolyn Joan
individually and as mother
and next friend of Alicia
Dittmer and Brett Dittmer
and Keith Dittmer, individually
HAWKINS, Takako, individually
and as mother and next friend
of Clive Hawkins, an infant
ROTHFUSZ, Dries
and
VAN VIERSEN, Alida Rothfusz
GONZALEZ, Donna
GOLDSMITH, Catherine Gayle
GOLDSMITH, Kenneth, a minor
by Catherine Gayle Goldsmith
his guardian ad litem and
GOLDSMITH, Peter, a minor
by Catherine Gayle Goldsmith
his guardian ad litem
KRUPP, David Executor of
the estate of Judith Wax.
deceased
KRUPP, David Executor of
the estate of Sheldon S. Wax
deceased.
OHM, Gary R. as father and
next friend of Janella Ohm and
Jeffrey Ohm, minors
xi
STACKS, Frederick D.
Administrator of the estate of
Margaret (Peg) A. Stacks,
deceased, and Frederick W.
Stacks and Margaret A. Stacks
individually
MORUZI, Richard J. Administrator
of the Estate of Debra A. Moruzi,
deceased
MALEK, Martin A., Administrator
of the Estate of DOREEN L.
MALEK, Deceased
HIGGINBOTHAM, MARY A. an
individual, MARY A.
HIGGINBOTHAM, and Guardian
Ad Litem for TODD P.
HIGGINBOTHAM, BRIAN E.
HIGGINBOTHAM, PAUL L.
HIGGINBOTHAM,
MULLER, PAULA S.., individually
and as mother and next friend
of ANGELA LYNN MULLER and
MICHAEL TODD MULLER
GALLAGHER, GAYLE V. Administrator
of the Estate of KATHLEEN V.
GALLAGHER, Deceased
MAY, EDITH P. as mother of
JON D. MAY, Deceased
JAWOROWSKI, BERNARD
Administrator of the estate
of Ferdinand S. Jaworowski
ROGERS, Patricia L.
ROGERS, Thomas C.
xii
SIMMONS, Sandra Kay
FRASCO, Nioma R. @
TEMPE, Lucia A.
HILL, BETTY H., Widow and
as Administrator of the Estate
of EDWARD CHARLES HILL,
Deceased
GOLDENSOHN, Edith F., as
Executrix of the Last Will and
Testament of Kenneth Alan Green,
Deceased, and the Last Will and
Testament of Judith L. Green,
Deceased
PLATT Karen E., Special
Administratrix of the Estate of
Marcia E. Platt. Deceased
PLATT, Robert
PLATT, William E.
BEAN, Avon Personal
representative of the
estate of Jeannette E. Bean.
deceased,
BEAN, Avon, individually
BEAN, Michael A.
LAVANWAY, Ralph E.
CONNER, Donna, individually
and as mother and next friend
of Kathy Ann Conner, a minor
GLASS, Catherine H.
KEITH, Joanne Glass
BRAINE, Rosemary
BRAINE, Sharanne
BRAINE, Michelle
BRAINE, Lisa
xiii
BOHANAN, Clona
BOHANAN, Tanya, a minor
by Clona Bohanan, her
next friend
BRYSON, Dorothy Alma,
individually and as mother
and next friend of Laurel _
Jane Bryson and Lesley Joan
Bryson, minors
BRYSON, Judith Lynne
BRYSON, Janet Lee
SIMMONS, Michael David
SIMMONS, John Harold
minors, by their guardian .
ad litem Judy Lorenzen
VETOR, Andrew Administrator of
the estate of Narda Vetor
deceased, Andrew Vetor,
individually and Andrew Vetor
next friend of Derek S. Vetor,
Ryan A. Vetor and Rychee J. Vetor,
minor children
JIMENEZ, Pedro Rios
VELEZ, Luisa Gonzalez
GONZALEZ, Antonio Rios
GONZALEZ, Jose Rios
GONZALEZ, Hector Rios
GONZALEZ, William Rios
COUGHLIN, Christopher T.
a minor, by Dolores M. Coughlin
his guardian ad Litem
PILLIVANT, Marilyn Yvonne
personal representative of the
Estate of John E. Pillivant,
deceased
xiv
SCHRADER, Margaret, Special
Administrator of the Estate
of Charles M. Schrader,
Deceased
NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a corporation
MCcATEE, William C.
Administrator of the Estate
of Gordon C. McAtee, deceased
MITCHELL, Virginia
an individual
COUGHLIN, Beth A.
COUGHLIN, David P.
COUGHLIN, Mark A.
COUGHLIN, Laura S.
FILES, Lynne S. individually
FILES, Christopher Lynn
FILES, Michael Dale
FILES, Stephanie Nicole
minor persons, by and
Lynne S. Files, their
guardian ad litem
CANNON, Sandra Leigh,
Administratrix of the Estate of
CANNON, Robert Lamar, Deceased
CAMPBELL, Marleen, Personal
Representative of the Estate of
CAMPBELL, GERALD, Deceased
FRAXIER, Carol, individually
and as mother and next friend of
FRASIER, Pamela Ann
FRASIER, Stephen Lewis
FRASIER, Gail Hayes
xv
HART, Richard as Executor
of the estate of George Hart
deceased; Annette Hart, his
widow; Georgann Zar. his Daughter;
Richard Hart his Son; and
William Hart, his son.
PLESA, CORINNE and MICHAEL
PLESA, as Co-Administrators
of the Estate of EILEEN M. PLESA,
Deceased
EATON, Merlene M. as
Administrator of the Estate
of Frederick G. Eaton,
deceased
VICKERY
CLARK, Margaret
DAVIS, Richard
Co-Administrators of the Estate
of Patricia Clark Davis,
Deceased
MIYAGAWA, Michael
PAULEY. Harleen, Personal
Representatives of the Estate
of MYRON MIYAGAWA, Deceased
EGGLESTON, Edna M.
MIYAGAWA, Kurt
HOLLENBECK, Frances D.
DOOLEY, H. Ray, Jr.
BURNETT, Vera Bb.
McPHERSON, Maude Dooley
DOOLEY, B.J.
DOOLEY, B. Frank
JENNINGS, Bertha
DOOLEY, T.S.
BEASLEY, Lillie Mae
xvi
WASHBURN, Juanita
DOOLEY, James R.
DOOLEY, W. K.
LONG, Jake B.
Surviving kin of
REBECCA WASHBURN
GOETZ, Ryan
GOETZ, Robert
Minors by and through their
Guardian Ad Litem
GOETZ, Linda and
GOETZ, Linda, individually
O'ROURKE, John G.
O'ROURKE, Joan T.
TRAUTMAN, Mary, widow and
personal representative of
Paul R. Trautmann, Deceased
TRAUTMANN, Julie
TRAUTMANN, Amy
children of Paul R. Trautmann,
deceased
RAGUCCI, Vicent J., Jr.,
as Administrator of the Estate
of Elena Crucioli, deceased
DZWONKOWSKI, Frances O.
BLOUIN, Judith A.
CHURCH, Robert A.
HOOVER, Lois
HOOVER, Margaret
HOOVER, Michael
HOOVER, Michelle
HOOVER, Mary
xvii
CLARK, Suzanne E. individually
and Guardian Ad Litem of
CLARK, Julie Ann, Minor |
CLARK, Thomas W.
CLARK, Michael S.
CHARISSE, Nico, Widower and
Personal Representative of
Sheila Colleen Charisse,
Deceased
CRUCIOLI, Alexander, individually
and as Administrator D.B.N. of
the Estate of Mario A. Crucioli,
Deceased
GONZALEZ, Joseph L., Jr.
CHAVEZ, Margaret M.
WILLNER, Max
WILLNER, Irene, parents of
RONALD WILLNER
BOWER, Cathleen, individually
and as Administratrix of the
Estate of Edmund A. Bower,
Deceased
MOSK, Janet M.
MOSK, William Frank
KEENEY, Alberta
KEENEY, Mark Lawrence
KEENEY, Kathryn Elaine
KEENEY, ALBERTA as Guardian
ad litem of
KEENEY, Edward
FERNTHEIL, Albert T., Executor
of the Estate of CAROL ARNOLD
FERNTHEIL, Deceased
xviii
LUMBERMANS MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY
A CORPORATION
CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY
a corporation
AMERICAN MOTORISTS INSURANCE COMPANY
a corporation
GEMME, LEILA B., Administrator
of the Estate of FRANCIS R.
GEMME, Deceased
KAMHI, Diane Irene
Individually, and as
Administratrix of the
Estate of MARC KAMHI,
Deceased, for herself and
on behalf of decedent's
infant daughter
LISA YVONNE KAMHI
KAHL, INGE MARIA, Widow and
Personal Representative of
HANS JURGEN KAHL, Deceased
KUSEK, Joan, Administrator
of the Estate of MICHAEL S.
SIROTA, Deceased
SPICUZZA, MERIKAY
Special Administrator of the
Estate of ROBERT SPICUZZA,
Deceased
LA SALLE NATIONAL BANK,
Special Administrator of
the Estate of Olin Hoskins,
Deceased
xix
KIRK, Rita Van
VALADARES
BELLAVIA, Andrew and °
BELLAVIA, Betty
MILNER, Marvin Sr., Father
and Special Administrator for
MARVIN MILNER, Jr., Deceased
LANG, Roy S. and
LOTZ, Robert F. Personal Representatives
of the Estates of E. STEPHEN LANG, Jr., and
SUSAN LANG, Deceased
CRAIG, Barbara
Individually, and as
Administrator of the Estate
of JOHN W. CRAIG
STATE NATIONAL BANK, Admini-
strators of the Estates of
CHRISTOPHER S. SUTTON and
COLIN P. SUTTON, Deceased
STATE NATIONAL BANK, Admini-
strator of the Estate of
CAROLYN M. SUTTON, Deceased
STATE NATIONAL BANK, Admini-
trator of the Estate of STEPHEN P.
SUTTON, Deceased
ZIEMBA, THOMAS S§., Personal
Representative of the Estates
of DIANE E. SIEMBA and JON
J. ZIEMBA, Deceased
SHERIDAN, THOMAS as Special
Administrator of the Estate of
MARY T. SHERIDAN, Deceased
xx
HAIDER, Syed
as Administrator of the
Estate of Victoria Chen
Haider, Deceased
HUTH, KENNETH, As Personal
Representative and Executor
of the Estate of Henry C.
Magner, Deceased
HUTH, KENNETH, as Personal
Representative and Executor
of the Estate of VIRGINIA K.
MAGNER, Deceased
DICASTRO, Angeline J.
Administrator of the Estate
of Gail Anne DiCastro,
Deceased
DI PIETRO, John J., as
Administrator of the Estate
of DARLENE DI PIETRO, Deceased
LUX, LORA, Widow and
personal representative of
WALTER H. LUX, Deceased
BLAKE, MARIE, Mother
HAYNES, VIRGINIA. Sister of
STEPHEN BLAKE, Deceased
SCHADE, DONALD, as Administrator
of the Estate of ZAIDITA
SCHADE, Deceased
SCHADE, DONALD, as Administrator
of the Estate of MARJORIE SCHADE,
Deceased
xxi
SCHADE, DONALD, as Administrator
of the Estate of ZAIDA LOUISA SCHADE,
Deceased
SCHADE, DONALD, as Administrator of the
Estate of PAUL WILLIAM SCHADE, Deceased
FIRST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY
OF SOUTH BEND, as Administrator
of the Estate of HENRY FRANCIS
REGNERY, Deceased
BENNETT, HENRY as Special
Administrator of the Estate of
JUDITH BENNETT, Deceased
GREEN, ANN MARIE
Widow & as Administrator of the
Estate of Andrew D. Green, Deceased
DAVIS, CHARLES A., JR. as Special
Administrator of the Estate of
Marily Davis, Deceased
DE YOUNG, KATHLEEN, Mother and
Personal Representative of
RHONDA DE YOUNG, Deceased
AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK
AND TRUST COMPANY OF CHICAGO,
as Special Administrator of the
Estate of JULIE LOUISE
OZMINKOWSKI, Deceased
FIRST WISCONSIN NATIONAL BANK,
as Personal Representative of <
the Estate of JOHN B. WEAR, JR.,
Deceased
FINK, SHARON Administrator of
The Estate of Larry M. Fink, Deceased
xxii
ADDUCI, PETER C. and
ADDUCI, LORRAINE V., co-
ADMINISTRATORS of the Estate
of KATHLEEN ADDUCI, Deceased
DI MICELLI, DIANE MARY,
Individually, and as Widow of
ROBERT JOSEPH DI MICELLI, Deceased
AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK & TRUST
COMPANY OF CHICAGO, as Special
Administrator of the Estate of
JONG BIN HAN, Deceased
THOMAS, ROBERT E.
HARLIN, JUDITH KAY, Widow,
Personal Representative and Special
Administrator of CHARLES THOMAS HARLIN
Deceased, and Mother and Next Friend of
ROBERT JOSEPH HARLIN and KRISTINE DAWN
HARLIN, Minors
GANSCHOW, Mary Loretta, as
Administrator and Personal
representative of the Estate
of MARGARET TYNE, Deceased
PECK, GREGORY, as Executor.
under the will of Donald
Optican, Deceased, resident
of New York
OPTICAN, BARBARA, Widow
OPTICAN, Scott L., Son
OPTICAN, Todd A., Son
OPTICAN, Marci E., Daughter,
a Minor, by B. Optican, her
mother and next friend
xxiii
OPTICAN, TONI E. Daughter, a
Minor, by B. Optican, her
mother and next friend
OPTICAN, LILA, Mother of
Donald Optican, Deceased
ANTONELLI, CAROL, Administrator
of the Estate of DENNIS T. CONNELL,
Deceased
WINGER, CAROL, As Executrix of
the Estate of CARROLL D. BEGLEY,
Deceased; CAROL WINGER, individually;
BENSON, GAIL;
LANGE, GWEN
UDOVICH, DORIS C.
Executor of the Estate of
Alfred F. Udovich, Deceased
STOGEL, Myrna as Mother and
next friend of Gregor L. Stoger
and Lauren N. Stogel
NORDHAUS, GEORGE W.
NORDHAUS, KATHERINE S. individually
and on behalf of the heirs and estate
of Jeffrey W. Nordhaus, Deceased
AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK AND
TRUST COMPANY OF CHICAGO,
as Special Administrator of the
Estate of DON J. NOVELLI, Deceased.
Suing for and on behalf of PATRICIA NOVELLI.
LAUREL S. NOVELLI, and KENDELL E. NOVELLI
FIND, JACOB J. individually and
dba J.J. Fink & Associates and
J. Fink, Inc. a corporation
xxiv
TRAMELL, JAMES RICHARD
a minor by and through his
guardian ad litem, Janice Marie
Wright
RIDDLE, Gregory A., a minor by
and through his Guardian ad litem
Janice Riddle
RIDDLE, Allen O. Jr.
RIDDLE, Eleanor
RIDDLE, Kenneth
RIDDLE, Thomas
RIDDLE, Michael
RIDDLE, Mary
SCHOTS, MARC LAURENS
a minor by his next friend Helwig
Rollema-Stater
WALKER, DAVID
WALKER, LONNA
WALKER, MICHELLE by their
Guardian ad litem, Carolyn Walker
ATKINSON, ROBERT M.
GARDNER, ALYCE ATKINSON
ABDUL AZIZ AL SWAILEM
NORA AL SWAILEM
NORA AL OMAIR
SHARPE, Margaret B.
as widow and
MGUBLIAN, Marjorie A.
SHARPE, James W.
SHARPE, Charles V.
SMITH, Mary C. children
BEGLEY, CHERYL L.
XXV
CORRIGAN, Shirley Joan
CORRIGAN, Pau! A.
CORRIGAN, Shirley Joan as
mother od next friend of
Linda J. Corrigan and
Carol R. Corrigan minors
MANNING, ROTHELL
PEREZ-BENABE, Santiago
and
PEREZ, AINO
FALCONE, VALENTINO JR.
EALY, Kimberly Su, a minor
by Valentino Falcone Jr. her
guardian ad litem
EALY, JOELL LYN a minor
by Valentino Falcone Jr. her
guardian ad litem and
EALY, ROBERT RONALD JR. a
minor by Valentino Falcone
Jr. his guardian ad litem
BENTOV, MIRTALA
DICK, NANCY S. individually
and as mother and next friend
Kathy S. Dick, Wendy G. Dick
and Brian S. Dick
STONE, June
STONE, Isadore
STONE, Jonathan
STTONE, June as mother and
next friend of Jeffrey Stone
SHEFFIELD, Elenore Ann
SHEFFIELD, Michael Frank
SHEFFIELD, Rebecca Ann
SHEFFIELD, Patricia Lynn
xxvi
SHEFFIELD, James Carl
minors by and through their
Guardian ad litem Elenore Ann
Sheffield
DI CREDICO, Connie G.
DI CREDICO, Seana J.
a minor by her mother and
next friend Connie G. Di Credico
DI CREDICO, Angelina M. a
minor by her mother and next
friend Connie G. Di Credico
DI CREDICO, NICHOLE A. a
minor by her mother and next
friend Connie G. Di Credico
APPENDIX A — OPINION OF THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
DECIDED JANUARY 5, 1981
IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 80-1812
IN RE AIR CRASH DISASTER NEAR CHICAGO,
ILLINOIS
ON MAY 25, 1979
APPEAL OF: McDONNELL DOUGLAS CORPORATION,
No. 80-1813
IN RE AIR CRASH DISASTER NEAR CHICAGO,
ILLINOIS
ON MAY 25, 1979
APPEAL OF: PLAINTIFFS IN ALL THE
CONSOLIDATED CASES IN MASTER FILE NO. MDL 391.
No. 80-1814
IN RE AIR CRASH DISASTER NEAR CHICAGO,
ILLINOIS
ON MAY 25, 1979
APPEAL OF: LLOYD'S BANK CALIFORNIA AS
EXECUTOR OF ESTATES OF WILLARD R. NARY AND
JULIA T. NARY, Deceased.
2a
Appendix A
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern
! District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. MDL 391—Edwin A. Robson & Hubert L. Will, Judges.
ARGUED SEPTEMBER 25, 1980—DECIDED JANUARY 5,
1981
Before SPRECHER, BAUER and CUDAHY, Circuit
Judges.
SPRECHER, Circuit Judge. This case presents complex
conflicts-of-law questions regarding the allowance of punitive
damages in wrongful death actions arising out of an air crash
disaster. The law of the place of the disaster, the law of the place
of manufacture of the airplane, and the law of the primary place
of business of the airline do not allow punitive damages; but, the
law of the primary place of business of the manufacturer of the
airplane and the law of the place of maintenance of the airline
do allow punitive damages. We find that, under each of the
applicable state choice-of-law rules, punitive damages cannot be
allowed against either the manufacturer or the airline.
The stark facts of the tragedy resulting in this litigation are
undisputed. On May 25, 1979, a DC-10 jet airplane, designed
and built by McDonnell Douglas Corporation (“MDC”),
operated by American Airlines (“American”) was scheduled to
fly from Chicago, Illinois to Los Angeles, California as
American's Flight 191. Shortly after takeoff from O'Hare
International Airport, however, the plane lost an engine and
crashed in the immediate vicinity of the airport. All two hundred
seventy-one persons aboard the plane, and two persons on the
ground, were killed.
3a
Appendix A
Now there are one hundred eighteen wrongful death actions
arising out of the crash. These cases were originally filed in
Illinois, California, New York, Michigan, Hawaii, and Puerto
Rico.' Many of the complaints allege wrongful death counts
which request awards of punitive as well as compensatory
damages. The plaintiffs and their decedents are and were
residents of California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana,
Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Vermont,
Puerto Rico, Japan, the Netherlands, and Saudi Arabia.
The: defendants in these cases are MDC and American.
MDC is a Maryland corporation having its principal place of
business, now and at the time of the accident, in Missouri. The
plaintiffs contend MDC’s conduct in the design and
manufacture of the DC-10 was egregious. That alleged
misconduct occurred in California. American is a Delaware
corporation. American's place of business prior to 1979 was New
York. During 1979, American moved its principal place of
business to Texas. Some plaintiffs contend that, on the date of
the crash, American’s principal place of business was in Texas,
but American contends that its principal place of business on
that date was New York. The plaintiffs contend that American's
conduct regarding the maintenance of the DC-.0 was egregious.
That alleged misconduct occurred in Oklahoma, site of
American's maintenance base.
Both defendants moved in district court to strike the claims
for punitive damages on the ground that such claims failed to
state legally sufficient claims for relief. The parties disputed
many issues; whether certain states allowed punitive damages,
1. The cases have been transferred to the Northern District of Illinois for
pretrial purposes by order of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.
4a
Appendix A
the choice-of-law theories to be used regarding certain states,
and the results of the application of the choice-of-law theories
which were used.
Using the choice-of-law rules of each state where these
actions had originally been filed, the district court arrived at the
following results. Under the Illinois “most significant
relationship” test, the district court found that the law of the
state of the principal place of business should prevail with regard
to the issue of punitive damages. Finding that New York was
American's principal place of business at the time of the crash
and does not allow punitive damages, and that Missouri, MDC’s
principal place of business, does allow the equivalent of punitive
damages, the court allowed the motions to strike punitive
damage claims against American but not against MDC.
Under the California “comparative impairment” test, the
district court held that the policies of the state of the principal
place of business would be impaired more than the policies of
the state of misconduct if those policies were not applied. Thus,
the court allowed the motion to strike punitive damage claims
with regard to American but not with regard to MDC. The
district court reached the same result with regard to the actions
filed in New York, Michigan, Puerto Rico, and Hawaii.
Although generally agreeing with the district court
regarding which states allow punitive damages and the choice-
of-law theories to be used, we reach a different result in applying
those theories. For the reasons discussed below, we find that the
motions to strike claims of punitive damages should be granted
with regard to both MDC and American.
Sa
Appendix A
II
At the outset, we must first determine whether we confront
“real” rather than “apparent” conflicts between the laws to be
applied.2 This requires a determination, first, of the law
regarding punitive damages in the relevant states: Illinois,
Missouri, California, Oklahoma, New York, Texas and Hawaii.
After this determination, it will then be necessary to determine
the conflict-of-law theories of the forum states and to apply
those theories.
Illinois is the place of the injury and, under various theories,
its law regarding punitive damages might be used. The Illinois
Supreme Court has clearly held that Illinois does not permit the
recovery of punitive damages in a wrongful death action.
Mattyasovszky v. West Towns Bus Co., 21 Ill. App. 3d 46, 313
N.E. 2d 496, 502 (1974), aff'd, 61 Ill. 2d 31, 330 N.E. 2d 509, 512
(1975).
Plaintiffs argue that the Illinois law on punitive damages is
in a state of flux, citing recent cases allowing punitive damages
in survival actions. National Bank of Bloomington v. Norfolk &
Western Ry. Co., 73 Ill. 2d 160, 383 N.E. 2d 919 (1978);
Churchill v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 73 Ill. 2d 127, 383 N.E.
2d 929 (1978). But in these Norfolk cases, damages were sought
2. See Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 L. & Contemp. Prob.
754, 757-58 (1963). Professor Currie’s use of the terms “true conflict.” “false
conflict” and “apparent true conflict” refers specifically to his theory of
government interest analysis. See generally Kay. The Use of Comparative
Impairment To Resolve True Conflicts: An Evaluation of the California
Experience, 68 Cal. L. Rev. 577 (1980) [hereinafter referred to as Kay,
Comparative Impairment. Our use of this terminology will not be so narrow.
All laws must be carefully examined to determine that a conflict actually exists
under any choice-of-law theory, before application of the theory.
6a
Appendix A
under the Public Utilities Act, which expressly provides for
punitive damages. In National Bank of Bloomington, the
Wrongful Death Act was not at issue; and in Churchill, the
surviving plaintiff sought recovery for her own loss, not on the
basis of the loss of life of her husband. The Illinois Supreme
Court held in the Norfolk cases that where a statute specifically
provides for punitive damages, nothing in the Survival Act, IIl.-
Rev. Stat. ch. 3, §339 (1964) now Ill. Rev. Stat. §110'4, par. 27-6
(1977), or in the Mattyasovszky decision operates to abate that
statutory liability for punitive damages.* Thus, the Norfolk cases
3. The Public Utilities Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 111 2/3, §77 provides:
[I}f the court shall find that the act or omission was willful.
the court may in addition to the actual damages, award
damages for the sake of example and by way of punishment.
4. The illinois Supreme Court stated:
In Mattyasovszky, where the decedent died instantly, his
estate sought to recover punitive damages which the
decedent, under the common law, might have recovered had
he survived. The court summarily denied recovery of
punitive damages because the Survival Act itself has “never
been thought to authorize the award of punitive
damages.” . . . The court. however, did not base its denial
of common law punitive damages on the broad proposition
that punitive damages are unrecoverable when injury results
in death... .
Here. in contrast to Mattvasovszky, punitive recovery
was sought, not under the common law, but directly under
the Public Utilities Act. ... The Survival Act itself neither
authorizes nor prohibits punitive damages. It is merely the
vehicle by which the cause of action. created by the Public
Utilities Act, survives the death of the injured person when
the action would otherwise have abated at common law.
383 N.E.2d at 924 (emphasis in original).
7a
Appendix A
do not vitiate the holding of the Mattyasovszky case. Moreover,
the argument that the Norfolk cases overturned the rule against
recovery of punitive damages in a wrongful death action was
impliedly rejected by an Illinois court in Rusher v. Smith, 70 Ill.
App. 3d 889, 388 N.E. 2d 906, 911-12 (1979).5 To be sure, the
Rusher case is not binding because it is an Appellate Court
decision. But it does nothing to detract from the voice of the
Illinois Supreme Court in Mattyasovszky. That declaration of
state law is, of course, binding on this Court. Erie RR Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). ;
Whether Missouri, MDC’s principal place of business,
allows the equivalent of punitive damages is hotly disputed by
the litigants. Although Missouri’s wrongful death act does not
by its express terms provide for punitive damages, Mo. Ann.
Stat §§537.080 er seq. (Vernon 1979), it does authorize the trier
of fact to consider the “mitigating or aggravating circumstances
attending the death.” Mo. Ann. Stat. §537.090 (Vernon 1979).
Damages for “aggravating circumstances” have been permitted
by Missouri wrongful death statutes since 1855, and have
consistently been considered punitive or exemplary by the
Missouri Supreme Court. Parsons v. Missouri Pacific Ry., 94
Mo. 286, 6 S.W. 464, 466-67 (1888); Haehl v. Wabash Ry. Co.,
119 Mo. 325, 24 S.W. 737, 741 (1893). Damages for
“aggravating circumstances” in death cases depend on proof of
5. The majority opinion stated that “{tJhe law is well settled that a party
cannot recover punitive damages in a wrongful death action in Illinois.” The
majority cited Martvasovszky but did not discuss the Norfolk cases. 388
N.E.2d at 911-12. But the dissent had cited both Mattyvasovszky and the
Norfolk cases for the proposition that it was nor “well-settled that a party
cannot recover punitive damages in a wrongful death action in Illinois.” /d. at
912. Thus, the majority opinion rejected the argument that the Vorfolk cases
changed the law barring punitive damages in wrongful death cases.
8a
Appendix A
“willful misconduct, wantonness, recklessness, or want of care
indicative of indifferences to consequences,” Wiseman v.
Missouri Pacific Railroad, 575 S.W. 2d 742 (Mo. App. 1978), a
standard commonly associated with the award of punitive
damages.°®
MDC argues that the case of Glick v. Ballentine Produce
Inc., 396 S.W. 2d 609 (1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 5
(1966), conclusively establishes that damages awarded because of
“aggravating circumstances” are not punitive. But MDC’'s
argument, based on selective quotation, is not persuasive. In
Glick, a wrongful death case, the plaintiffs attempted to recover
damages in excess of the then existing statutory monetary limit.
The Missouri Supreme Court disallowed the excess amount
requested. In so doing, the Missouri Court stated that there was
no recovery under Missouri law for punitive damages, “as such,”
but that “aggravating circumstances” could be considered by the
jury so long as the total verdict did not exceed the statutory
limit. 396 S.W. 2d at 616-17.’ Thus, we find, and the Glick
6. See also Williams v. Excavating and Foundation Co., 230 Mo. App.
973, 93 S.W. 2d 123. 127 (1936) (“to whatever extent the damages are increased
by reason of aggravating circumstances attending the death of the deceased.
such increase is punitive in its nature. . . .”) and Contestible v. Brookshire, 355
S.W. 2d 36. 42 (Mo. 1962). cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 68
(1962).
7. The court stated:
There is no recovery in a death case for punitive damages.
as such. Such a petition may plead, and appropriate
instructions may submit, the question of “mitigating or
aggravating circumstances,” if the evidence justifies it.
Williams v. Excavating & Foundation Co., 230 Mo. App.
973, 93 S.W.2d 123. 127; Hertz v. McDowell, 358 Mo. 383.
(Cont'd)
9a
Appendix A
decision is not inconsistent with our finding, that the damages
allowed under Missouri law with regard to “aggravating
circumstances” can be considered within the meaning of
“punitive” damages as sought by the plaintiffs.
California is the place of MDC’s conduct in the design and
manufacture of the DC-10. California courts have uniformly
held that the statute which allows punitive damages generally in
tort actions® applies with regard to survival actions only and not
with regard to wrongful death actions. See Tarasoff v. Regents
of the University of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 450, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 14, 33, 551, P. 2d 334, 353 (1976); Pease v. Beech Aircraft
Corp., 38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 113 Cal. Rptr. 416 (1974); and Note,
15 Santa Clara Law., 507 (1975). See also In Re Paris Air Crash,
622 F. 2d 1315 (9th Cir. 1980). Although the plaintiffs question
the strength of this policy, see discussion in Part VI, they do not
question the fact that the California courts do deny punitive
(Cont'd)
214 S.W.2d 546. While added damages because of
“aggravating circumstances” may, in a sense, be considered
as punitive in nature, they are not to be submitted as such
nor are they to be submitted separately, nor in any total
verdict and judgment to exceed the statutory limit. Within
that total limit the jury may exercise a broad discretion.
396 S.W.2d at 616-17 (emphasis added) (emphasized material was deleted in
MDC quotation).
8. Cal. Civil Code, $3294 (West, 1970), provides:
In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising
from contract, where the defendant has been guilty of
oppression, fraud, or malice, express or implied, the
plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover
damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing
the defendant.
10a
Appendix A
damages in death cases. Pl. Br. ®9-1812, at 35. Thus, we find
that California law does not allow punitive damages in wrongful
death cases.
Oklahoma is the site of American's maintenance
headquarters. The parties do not dispute the fact that Oklahoma
does allow punitive damages. 12 Okla. Stat. Ann. 1053(C) (1979-
80 Cum. Supp.)
New York was American’s principal place of business
during part of 1979. We find that New York does not allow an
award of punitive damages in wrongful death actions. See
Robert v. Ford Motor Co., 424 N.Y.S. 2d 747 (1980); Barrett v.
State, 85 Misc. 2d 456, 378 N.Y.S. 2d 946 (Ct. Claims 1976). See
also N.Y. Est., Powers & Trusts L. §5-4.3 (McKinney 1967).
Texas was American's principal place of business during
part of 1979 and has been its principal place of business
thereafter. It is undisputed that Texas does allow a punitive
damage recovery, by spouses or descendants, in wrongful death
actions. See Tex. Const. Art. 16 §26 (1976). See also Scoggins
v. Southwestern Elec. Service Co., 434 S.W. 2d 376 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1968); Pace v. McEwen, 574 S.W. 2d 792 (Tex. Civ. App.
1978).
Hawaii is the domicile of one of the plaintiffs; one action
was originally filed there. The parties have not been able to
identify the governing choice-of-law rule that would be applied
by Hawaii courts in personal injury actions. The defendants
argue that, absent an affirmative showing to the contrary, a
court should presume that the forum state would apply its own
law concerning punitive damages in a wrongful death action.
The Hawaii law regarding punitive damages will be discussed in
Part X of this opinion.
lla
Appendix A
In summary, we find that the “line-up” of the states
involved regarding the issue of punitive damages is as follows:
Illinois, place of the injury, does not allow punitive damages.
Missouri, MDC’s principal place of business, does allow
punitive damages, but California, place of MDC’s conduct, does
not. New York, one principal place of business of American,
does not allow punitive damages while Texas, another principal
place of business of American, does. Oklahoma, the place of
American’s conduct, does allow punitive damages.
* HI
It isnow,necessary to examine the constitutional objections
to the disallowance of punitive damages. For there would be no
conflict at all if it is unconstitutional to disallow punitive
damages in wrongful death actions.
In the district court below, plaintiffs raised two general
constitutional objections. First, they argued that the preclusion
of punitive damages in wrongful death actions, where they are
permitted in personal injury survival actions, is a violation of the
equal protection clause of the federal and of the [IIlinois,
Michigan, and California constitutions. In addition, certain
plaintiffs argued that the existence in Illinois of the difference in
damages between survival and wrongful death actions represents
“special legislation” of the type prohibited by Art. 4, §13 of the
Illinois Constitution. The district court rejected both arguments.
On this appeal, the only specific constitutional attack is the
argument that New York’s denial of punitive damages violates
the federal equal protection clause. Proceeding to the federal
equal protection analysis, we affirm, for the reasons below, the
district court’s holding that statutes which deny punitive
12a
Appendix A
damages in wrongful death cases but allow such damages in
other personal injury actions do not run afoul of the federal
Constitution.’
9. The district court first held that the equal protection clauses of the
Illinois and Michigan constitutions were coextensive with the equal protection
clause of the federal constitution, citing Friedman & Rochester, Ltd. v. Walsh,
67 Ill. 2d 413, 367 N.E. 2d 1325 (1977); Commissioners of Highways of Town
of Annawan v. United States, 466 F. Supp. 745, 769 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Moore v.
Spanglar, 401 Mich. 360, 258 N.W. 2d 34 (1977).
The district court then turned to California. It found that the California
equal protection clause was fundamentally equivalent to that of the federal
Constitution but that it required “some rationality” in the nature of the class
singled out. The court held that the denial of punitive damages was rational
and that, therefore, such denial did not offend the California constitution.
Finally, the district court examined the prohibition of “special legislation”
in the Illinois Constitution, Art. 4, §13. The court rejected the argument that
Illinois’ denial of punitive damages constituted “special legislation,” citing
Smith v. Hill, 12 Ul. 2d 588, 147 N.E. 2d 321 (1958); Siegall v. Soloman, 19 Ill.
2d 145, 166 N.E.*2d 5 (1960); Adams v. Continental Cas. Co., 21 Ill. App. 3d
111, 314 N.E. 2d 495 (1974), aff'd McRoberts v. Adams, 60 Ill. 2d 458, 328
N.E. 2d 321 (1975); Rincon v. License Appeal Commission of City of Chicago,
62 Ill. App. 3d 600, 378 N.E. 2d 1281 (1978); and Friedman & Rochester, Ltd.
v. Walsh, 67 Ill. 2d 413, 367 N.E. 2d 1325 (1977).
The plaintiffs do not directly challenge any of these findings by the district
court. Illinois plaintiffs Plesas do, however, raise some arguments which, inter
alia, imply a challenge based on Illinois constitutional grounds. The Plesas’
first argument is not a constitutional argument but a response to MDC's
argument that Illinois would refuse to enforce Missouri's law allowing punitive
damages. They argue that it is not the case that Illinois would refuse to enforce
Missouri's law. Since our analysis of the conflicts issue does not rely on this
MDC argument, we do not reach the Plesas’ first argument.
The Plesas’ second argument seems to be that the denial of punitive
damages is unconstitutional under Illinois law. But they do not press this
(Cont'd)
13a
Appendix A
The wrongful death statutes in question involve a legislative
classification which allows punitive damages in certain personal
injury actions but denies punitive damages in wrongful death
cases. This classification does not involve any suspect class. See
Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351 (1979) and Huff v. White
Motor Corp., 609 F. 2d 286, 298 (7th Cir. 1979). Nor does this
classification affect fundamental rights. See Huff, 609 F. 2d at
298. Thus, the classification is not ta be examined with “strict”
or even “intermediate” scrutiny'® but is to be examined by the
(Cont'd)
argument as such. Rather, they seem to argue that this Court should abstain
from deciding the Illinois constitutional challenge and allow Illinois courts to
decide it. Plaintiffs request abstention under Circuit Rule 13 of this Court
which provides the power to certify “questions arising under the laws of that
state which will control the outcome of a case pending in federal court.” This
second argument, then, presents two issues for resolution by this Court.
First, because we are not confronted with a specific challenge to the
district court’s finding that the Illinois equal protection guarantee is
coextensive with the federal equal protection guarantee, we decline to disturb
the district court’s finding.
Second, we find that abstention is not appropriate. As the United States
Supreme Court stated in Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 306 (1979), a
case cited by the Plesas, there is a fundamental prerequisite for abstention.
“(T]he abstention doctrine ‘contemplates that deference to state court
adjudication only be made where the issue of state law is uncertain.” Harman
v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534 (1965). But as we discussed in Part II, we do
not find the issue of whether Illinois denied punitive damages to be uncertain.
To the contrary, we find the Illinois Supreme Court's affirmation of
Mattyasovszky clear authority for the fact that Illinois does deny punitive
damages in wrongful death cases. Thus, we decline plaintiffs’ invitation to
abstain.
10. In In re Paris Air Crash, 622 F.2d 1315, 1319 n.4 (1980), the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the “rational relationship” test—and not
(Cont'd)
l4a
Appendix A
“rational relationship” test. The classification must be rationally
related to a legitimate state purpose in order to pass
constitutional muster with regard to the equal protection clause.
Huff; Parham; Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental
Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1979); Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978); and Williamson v. Lee
Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
_ Recently, this Court considered this same issue in Huff, 609
F. 2d 286, which involved an equal protection challenge to
Indiana’s wrongful death statute. That law, like the laws
challenged here, allowed punitive damages in other personal
injury cases but not in wrongful death cases. In Huff, we found
the legislation was rationally related to a legitimate state interest
and therefore passed equal protection scrutiny. The plaintiffs
here argue that the treatment of this question in Huff was
(Cont'd)
any higher level of scrutiny-—-should be used in examining the denial of
punitive damages in wrongful death actions. The court stated:
We do not apply a middle-tier analysis for three reasons.
First, both state and federal Supreme Courts have declined
frequent invitations to announce or articulate such an
analysis. Second, both courts have analyzed tort recovery
limits in terms of a rational bearing upon a legislative
objective. Third, the relatively nongrievous deprivation, if
indeed it can be called such, of a limit on who may act asa
private attorney general by seeking punitive damages makes
this case particularly inappropriate to inaugurate such an
analysis. Additional drawbacks of this proposed innovation
‘ are discussed in Hawkins v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 584,
607-10, 150 Cal. Rptr. 435, 450-51, 586 P.2d 916, 931-32
(1978) (Bird, C.J., concurring); Linde, Due Process of Law
Making, 55 Neb. L. Rev. 197 (1976).
622 F.2d 1315, 1319 n.4.
15a
Appendix A
perfunctory and request that we review the question again. We
agree the discussion of this issue in Huff was not elaborate. But
in reexamining the issue, we reach the same result.
Very recently, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
confronted a similar equal protection challenge to a state's
denial of punitive damages in wrongful death actions. In its
decision in /n Re Paris Air Crash, 622 F. 2d 1315 (9th Cir. 1980),
the Ninth Circuit found the classification denying punitive
damages to survive the rational relationship test. We find the
Ninth Circuit opinion persuasive and reach the same result here
for the following reasons.
First, the United States Supreme Court recently has
sustained tort liability limitations in Duke Power Co. v.
Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1979), and Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978). In those cases, the
damage limitations were more severe than the damage limitation
here. There, the challenged laws, limited the types or amounts of
compensatory relief. Here, the limitation is the denial of punitive
relief; compensatory damages are unaffected. Thus, the
limitations themselves are not irrational.
Second, the purpose of denying punitive damages is to
avoid excessive liability. Such denial represents a legislative
determination that a state’s interest in protecting defendants
from excessive damages outweighs its interest in punishing or
deterring misconduct. See In Re Paris Air Crash, 622 F. 2d at
1319, and Jackson v. K.L.M., 459 F. Supp. 953, 956 (S.D.N.Y.
1978). The state has legitimate interests in both the amount of
damages paid to survivors of persons wrongfully killed and in
16a
Appendix A
protection of defendants.'' The denial of punitive damages is
clearly a rational method of limiting damages in wrongful death
cases. See In Re Paris Air Crash, 622 F. 2d at 1319. For these
reasons, then, we find that a state's decision to limit punitive
damages does pass constitutional muster under the rational
relationship test. We note also that in every case of which we are
aware, every court which has confronted this question has
arrived at this same conclusion. See, e.g., In Re Paris Air Crash;
Huff; Johnson v. International Harvester Corp., 487 F. Supp.
1176 (D.N.D. 1980); and Robert v. Ford Motor Co., 73 App.
Div. 2d 1025, 424 N.Y.S. 2d 747 (1980). '?
IV
We now confront the actual conflicts issues among the
various states. It is not disputed that, since federal jurisdiction is
based on diversity of citizenship, the choice-of-law rules to be
11. A state may even determine, for example, that its interest in
maintaining accurate and efficient disposition of property at death is best
served by limiting damages to exclude punitive damages. See Parham v.
Hughes, 441 U.S. at 357.
12. Finally, plaintiffs argue that this Court must find the denial of
punitive damages in wrongful death cases unconstitutional because, so long as
this denial continues, there will continue to be some truth to the adage that “it
is cheaper to kill a victim than to injure him.” Unfortunately, this adage has
become an adage because there is some truth to it.
The decision of under what circumstances punitive damages should be
allowed ‘is for the state legislatures and not this Court. Neither with regard to
the constitutional argument, nor with regard to the conflicts analysis, do we
take into consideration the wisdom of specific decisions regarding punitive
damages.
17a
Appendix A
used are those choice-of-law rules of the states where the actions
were originally filed. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co.,
313 U.S. 487 (1941); Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964);
In Re Air Crash Disaster of Boston, Massachusetts, 399 F.
Supp. 1106 (D. Mass. 1975). We will consider the law of each
state in turn. We emphasize at the outset that the tests to be
used, although containing significant differences, mandate an
analytical inquiry which is basically the same. As Professor
Leflar has stated:
{I]t appears that the various scholarly views
concerning choice of law, developed during the
last couple of decades, are being accepted by the
courts as though they constituted one somewhat
multi-faceted approach to the subject.
Essentially, they are consistent with each other.
Any one of them is likely to produce about the
same result on a given set of facts as will
another....
The point to be emphasized is that the
modern decisions, regardless of exact language,
are substantially consistent with each other.
Leflar, American Conflicts Law, §10%, p. 218 (3d ed. 1977).
In general, we must attempt to determine which, if any, of
the states having some relationship to the parties or to the crash
has the most significant interest in the application of its own
substantive law to the merits of the punitive damage issue. The
application of choice-of-law rules is not a mechanical process of
cranking various factors through a formula. Critical to conflicts
analysis is the notion that we must examine the choice-of-law
rules not with regard to various states’ interests in general, but
18a
Appendix A
precisely, with regard to each state’s interest in the specific
question of punitive damages. Thus, we approve the concept of
“depecage”: the process of applying rules of different states on
the basis of the precise issue involved.'3
The depecage process has recently been approved and
utilized by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in an
aircraft products liability case involving a choice between
standards of liability. Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., No. 79-2747
(3d Cir. 1980), petit. for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3429 (Dec. 9,
13. In our case, there is only one relevant issue: the choice of law ©
regarding punitive damages. Thus, we use the term here to mean a precise
focus on the purpose of and policies behind the decision to either allow or
disallow punitive damages. See Reese, Depecage: A Common Phenomenon In
Choice of Law, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 58, 59-60 (1973). Professor Reese stated:
Amidst the chaos and tumult of choice of law there is
at least one point on which there seems to be general
agreement in the United States. This is that choice of the
applicable law should frequently depend upon the issue
involved. The search in these instances is not for the state
whose law will be applied to govern all issues in a case;
rather it is for the rule of law that can most approximately
be applied to govern the particular issue. .. .
It also seems probable that greater use of depecage will
be an inevitable by-product of the development of
satisfactory rules of choice of law. In contrast to the broad
rules that have been tried and found wanting, the new rules,
if we are indeed to develop such rules, are likely to be
narrow in scope and large in number... .
In short, a willingness to make a liberal use of depecage
would seem a prerequisite to the satisfactory development of
narrow rules of choice of law.
19a
Appendix A
1980) (No. 80-848).'* Depecage has also been endorsed by many
conflicts scholars.'5 The task of conflicts analysis using depecage
requires creativity and precision. With this admonition in mind,
we begin our analysis.
Vv
We begin with the actions filed in Illinois. The Illinois
courts apply the “most significant relationship” test of the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (“Restatement
(Second)”) to determine the applicable law in wrongful death
actions. This test incorporates a presumption that the local law
of the state where the injury occurred should govern, unless
another state has a “more significant relationship” to the
occurrence or to the parties.'* Jngersoll v. Klein, 46 Ill. 2d 42, 48,
262 N.E. 2d 593, 596 (1973).
14. Referring to depecage and the Reese article, id., the court said, with
regard to California choice-of-law:
Although the California Supreme Court has not
explicitly adopted this method, it is implicit in that court’s
analysis of cases and it is consistent with modern
governmental interest analysis to examine comparative
governmental interests as to each issue. to the extent the
issues are separable and the balance of comparative interests
may vary.
Reyno, slip op. at 29-30.
15. See Reese, Depecage, id.; Leflar, American Conflicts Law, $109, p.
221-22 (3d ed. 1977) citing Wilde, Depecage in the Choice of Tort Law, 41 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 329 (1968).
16. The Restatement (Second) §175, $178 (1971) provides as follows:
$175. Right of Action for Death. In an action for wrongful
‘ (Cont'd
20a
Appendix A
The Restatement (Second) provides two sets of criteria for
the measurement of the “most significant relationship.” The first
set of criteria includes general factors such as the needs of the
interstate system; relevant policies of the forum and other
interested states; protection of justified expectations; the basic
policies underlying the particular field of law; certainty,
predictability and uniformity of result; and ease in the
determination and application of the law to be applied.'’ The
(Cont'd) ne
death the local law of the state where the injury occurred
determines the rights and liabilities of the parties unless,
with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a
more significant relationship under the principles stated in
§6 to the occurrence and the parties, in which event the local
law of the other state will be applied.
$178. Damages. The law selected by application of the rule .
of §175 determines the measure of damages in an action for
wrongful death.
17. The Restatement (Second), §6, (1971), provides:
§6 Choice of Law Principles
(1) A court, subject to constitutional restriction, will
follow a statutory directive of its own state on choice of
law.
(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant
to the choice of the applicable rule of law include
(a) the needs of the interstate and
international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested
states and the relative interests of those states in
the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectation,
(Cont'd)
2la
Appendix A
second set of criteria includes the contacts to be taken into
account in applying these principles. These contacts are: (1) the
place of the injury; (2) the place of misconduct: (3) the domicile,
residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties; and (4) the place where the relationship
between the parties is centered.'* These contacts are to be
“Cont'd)
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular
field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of |
result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application
of the law to be applied.
18. The Restatement (Second). §145, provides:
$145 The General Principle
(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect
to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the
state which, with respect to that issue, has the most
significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties
under the principles stated in §6.
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the
principles of §6 to determine the law applicable to an issue
include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the
injury occurred,
(c) the domicil, residence, nationality. place
of incorporation and place of business of the
parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any,
between the parties is centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with
respect to the particular issue.
22a
Appendix A
evaluated according to their relative importance to the issue
involved and according to the purposes sought to be achieved by
the relevant rules of the interested states.'9
A
Turning to defendant MDC, the precise issue, of course, is
which state’s law regarding the availability of punitive damages
should apply. The states having contacts to be taken into
account are: Illinois, place of injury; California, place of MDC’s
alleged misconduct; Missouri, MDC’s principal place of
business; and, if it can be determined, the states where the
relationship between the parties is centered.
It is unclear where the relationship of the parties is
“centered”. As the district court noted, most of the Illinois
actions involve Illinois decedents who purchased their tickets in
Illinois for a flight which began in Illinois. But the flight was to
California. Surely the importance of the place of destination of a
journey is just as great as the importance of the place of
departure. This issue need not detain us, however, because
neither California nor Illinois allows punitive damages.”
We next turn to the interests of the states of domi-
cile of the plaintiffs. The domiciliary states do not have an
19. See Id., $145, Comment c, at 416-17.
20. Moreover, the place where the relationship is centered would seem to
have a low interest in either punishment or protection merely because the
parties’ relationship was centered within its borders. The alleged egregious acts
would not have occurred there; thus, the state would have a low interest in
controlling nonresident corporate behavior. Also, because the corporations
were not located in that state, it would have a low interest in the protection of
nonresident defendants.
23a
Appendix A
interest in disallowing punitive damages because the decision to
disallow such damages is obviously designed to protect the
interest of resident defendants, not to effectuate the interest of
the domiciliary states in the welfare of plaintiffs. E.g., Hurtado
v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 574, 114 Cal. Rptr. 106, 522 P.2d
666, 670 (1974).
Nor do the domiciliary states have an interest in imposing
punitive damages on the defendants. The legitimate interests of
these states, after all, are limited to assuring that the plaintiffs
are adequately compensated for their injuries and that the
proceeds of any award are distributed to the appropriate
beneficiaries. E.g., Hurtado, 11 Cal. 3d at 584, 114 Cal. Rptr. at
112, 522 P.2d at 672. Those interests are fully served by applying
the law of the plaintiffs’ domiciles as to issues involving the
measure of compensatory damages (insofar as that law would
enhance the plaintiffs’ recovery) and the distribution of any
award. Once the plaintiffs are made whole by recovery of the full
measure of compensatory damages to which they are entitled
under the law of their domiciles, the interests of those states are
satisfied.
We thus return to the interests of the three relevant states,
Illinois, California, and Missouri. Illinois and California do not
allow punitive damages but Missouri does. If the interests of
these three states were to be weighed equally, the tally would be
two-to-one against allowing punitive damages. But the process
of weighing states’ interests requires more than merely tabulating
the states pro and con. We must examine the precise interest of
each state with regard to the purpose of punitive damages.*!
21. For this reason, we reject the defendants’ “grouping” theory.
Defendants argue that because the law of the place of injury and the law of the
place of misconduct are the same, the case must be analyzed for choice-of-law
(Cont'd)
24a
Appendix A
The purposes underlying the allowance of punitive
damages, as the district court noted, are punishment of the
defendant and deterrence of future wrongdoing. The purpose
underlying the disallowance of punitive damages is protection of
defendants from excessive financial liability. Two states which
very definitely have an interest in punishment or protection are
California and Missouri, the states in which, respectively, the
conduct occurred and the principal place of business is located.
Both states have an obvious interest in preventing future
misconduct; both states have an obvious interest in protecting
businesses located or acting within its borders. Illinois, the place
of injury, also has an interest in the punitive damages question;
its interest will be discussed after the discussion of Missouri's
and California’s interests.
MDC’s wrongful conduct here complained of involved the
design and manufacture of the DC-10. Because the corporate
headquarters of MDC is located in Missouri, Missouri has an
(Cont'd)
purposes as if conduct and injury occurred in the same state. Then, defendants
argue, punitive damages must be disallowed. But the very “grouping” process
that defendants advocate would vitiate the entire process of weighing states’
interests. The result of defendants’ approach would be the application of rules
as wooden and mechanical as the old /ex /oci delicti rule itself. which the
Restatement (Second) balancing process is designed to supplant. The
Restatement (Second) §6. at 14, states:
In determining a question of choice of law, the forum
should give consideration not only to its own relevant
policies... but also to the relevant policies of all other
interested states. The forum should seek to reach a result
that will achieve the best possible accommodation of these
policies. The forum should also appraise the relative
interests of the states involved in the determination of the
particular issue. In general. it is fitting that the state whose
interests are most deeply affected should have its local law
apply.
25a
Appendix A
obvious interest in deterring wrongful conduct in such design
and manufacture, even if the actual work was performed in
California. To find otherwise would be to gut the very concept
of corporate accountability. Moreover, to say that Missouri has
no interest in the imposition of punitive damages—as defendants
do—would encourage rampant subterfuge and confusion. For
example, many corporations have corporate headquarters in one
state and far-flung operations in many others.”* If courts held
that the place of “conduct” had the critical interest in punitive
damages and that the place of corporate headquarters had no
interest in punitive damages, then litigation would center around
exactly where activities and decisions occurred. The practical
effect of such a holding would be to require extensive
examinations of numerous employees and to require complex
investigations into the precise locations of many areas of
corporate decision. Corporations seeking to avoid potential
punitive damages would be encouraged to structure decisions so
that no specific locus for a major decision could ever be proved
to have occurred in a “punitive” state.
MDC argues that Jackson v. K.L.M., 459 F. Supp. 953
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) and Sibley v. KLM-Royal Dutch Airlines, 454
F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) establish the proposition that, as
between the state of misconduct and the primary place of
business, the state of misconduct is the only state with an
interest in awarding punitive damages. Citing these cases, it
argues that Missouri, as the state of its corporate headquarters
and principal place of business, has an interest oniy in the
decision to disallow punitive damages but not in the decision to
allow punitive damages. But the defendants misread the Jackson
22. In this case, for example, American maintained its corporate
headquarters in New York, its operations base in Texas, its maintenance
department in Oklahoma. and conducts business throughout the country.
26a
Appendix A
and Sibley opinions and their argument seems comparable to
“heads, I win; tails, you lose” logic.
Jackson and Sibley are companion cases which involved
suits by representatives of decedents who had been domiciled in
states allowing punitive damages. The suits were brought against
a Dutch airline for personal injuries arising from an air crash in
Spain. The holding for these cases was that the states of the
decedents had a proper interest only in adequate compensation,
but not in punitive damages. The only jurisdictions found to
have an interest in punitive damages were the Netherlands, place
of the airline’s incorporation and principal place of business, and
Spain, the country in which the accident and the tortious
conduct occurred. But because both the Netherlands and Spain
disallowed punitive damages, the court was not confronted with
the need to determine whether the place of conduct had a greater
or lesser interest than the principal place of business in the
punitive damages question.*? Thus, these cases do not provide
23. The Jackson court did state that the domiciliary states had a lower
interest in punitive damages than the placs of injury because “the California
Supreme Court had recognized that the interest in regulation of conduct in tort
cases is primarily local, in character and is the concern of the jurisdiction in
which the conduct occurred.” 459 F. Supp. at 955. But the Jackson court did
not use this reasoning to downplay the interest of the Netherlands, KLM’s
principal place of business. Nor did the court say that Spain and the
Netherland s had an interest on/y in protecting KLM from excessive financial
burdens. The court was not confronted with the question of the countries’
interests had they chosen to allow the financial burdens of punitive damages.
The court, which found for the defendants, characterized the defendants’
argument as follows:
KLM asserts that Netherlands, the place of KLM's
incorporation and its principal place of business, and Spain,
the country in which the accident occurred, are the only
(Cont'd)
27a
Appendix A
support for the argument that, in our case, Missouri has any less
interest than California.
California, place of MDC’s conduct in manufacture and
design of the DC-10, also has a strong interest in the issue of
punitive damages. California, as does every state, has a
substantial interest in the economic health of corporations which
do business within its borders. It derives substantial sales and
income taxes, as well as other revenues, directly and indirectly
from a corporation's activities within the state. Indeed,
California’s interest is strong with regard to a rule disallowing
punitive damages because such a rule protects the economic
well-being of the corporations and therefore enhances the
economic well-being of the state. Moreover, the rule may have
been a factor in various corporations’ decisions to move to
California.
The district court concluded that where, with regard to
punitive damages, the law of the principal place of business
conflicted with the law of the place of misconduct, the former
should prevail. The court reasoned that responsibility for
corporate conduct should be uniform, regardless of where
individual instances of that conduct took place. But the district
court’s analysis only looked at the purpose behind the decision
to allow punitive damages. As we have discussed, both the
decision to allow punitive damages and the decision to disallow
punitive damages must be accorded great respect. _
(Cont'd)
jurisdictions with a significant interest in the issue of
punitive damages.
459 F. Supp. at 955 (emphasis added). By the use of the phrase “issue of
punitive damages,” presumably the defendants’ argument, which the court had
accepted, would also have been accepted had the countries allowed punitive
damages.
28a
Appendix A
Thus, we find that the balance on the scales of significant
‘contacts is even: we cannot say that either California or
Missouri has a “greater” interest in the decision whether to allow
punitive damages against MDC. This situation involves a total
and genuine conflict: one jurisdiction allows punitive damages,
the other does not. There does not seem to be any way to arrive
at a “moderate and restrained” interpretation of either policy so
as to avoid a true conflict.”
With the scales evenly balanced, we now turn to the interest
of Illinois, the place of injury. The old rule in many jurisdictions,
developed from torts other than air crashes, was that where
there was nothing fortuitous about the fact that the injury
occurred in a given state, great weight would be given to the law
of the place of injury. But air crash disasters often present
situations where the place of injury is largely fortuitous. See
Cousins v. Instrument Flyers, Inc., 44 N.Y. 2d 698, 405 N.Y.S.
2d 441, 443, 376 N.E. 2d 914 (1978), and sources cited therein.
That the injury in our case occurred in Illinois can only be
described as foriuitous. Had the DC-10’s engine fallen off later,
the injury might have occurred in one of any number of states.
Because the place of injury is much more fortuitous than the
24. Kay. Comparative Impairment, supra, note 2, at 578, quoting W.
Reese & M. Rosenberg, Cases and Materials on Conflict of Laws 470 (7th ed.
1978). Also, we are unable to fathom a procedural compromise, such as a shift
in the burden of proof, which could accommodate both policies. See Twerski
& Mayer, Toward a Pragmatic Solution of Choice of Law Problems — At the
Interface of Substance and Procedure, 74 Nw, L. Rev. 781 (1979); Sedler, On
Choice of Law and the Great Quest: A Critique of Special Multistate Solutions
to Choice-of law Problems, 7 Hofstra L. Rev. 807 (1979). Nor are we able to
determine a consensus on shared values or policies which could lead to a
compromise. See Trautman, A Comment on Twerski and Mayer: A Pragmatic
Step Towards Consensus As a Basis For Choice-of-Law Solutions, 7 Hofstra
L. Rev. 833 (1979).
29a
Appendix A
place of misconduct or the principal place of business, its
interest in and ability to control behavior by deterrence or
punishment, or to protect defendants from liability, is lower
than that of the place of misconduct or principal place of
business. Also, merely as the place of injury, Illinois would not
have strong interests in protecting nonresident defendants from
excessive financial liability.
But the fact that the interest of the place of injury is less
than the interest of the principal place of business and the
interest of the place of alleged misconduct does not mean that
Illinois has no interest in the punitive damages question. Illinois
has very strong interests in not suffering air crash disasters and
also in promoting airplane safety. This Court takes judicial
notice that the DC-10 crash sent shock waves throughout the
metropolitan Chicago area. Illinois special emergency disaster
units responded to the crash. The state certainly incurred
significant expense in attempted rescue operations, clean-up
operations, and the necessary tasks of identifying the deceased
and notifying next-of-kin.
Also, in this case Illinois is more than merely the place of
injury. As noted before, many of the other contacts of
significance were in Illinois. With regard to the actions filed in
Illinois, all but two of the decedents resided in Illinois. As the
home of O'Hare International Airport, one of the world’s busiest
airports, Illinois certainly has strong interests in encouraging air
transportation corporations to do business in the state.
Because Illinois has such strong interests in promoting
airline safety, it would have a strong interest in allowing punitive
damages to deter corporate misconduct relating to air safety.
But because Illinois also has such strong interests in having
airlines fly into and out of the state, and having related air
30a
Appendix A
transportation companies do business within the state, it would
have a strong interest in protecting air transportation companies
by disallowing punitive damages. Thus, the decision made by the
Illinois legislature must be accorded special weight.
As noted earlier, Illinois’ choice-of-law law gives
presumptive importance to the place of injury. The law of the
place of injury is to be supplanted only when another state has a
more significant relationship than the place of injury.
Restatement (Second) §175. Although either California or
Missouri, taken separately, would have a greater interest than
Illinois, the fact that the laws of these states are in absolute
conflict indicates that neither state has an interest greater than
the other's. Thus, in terms of a principled basis upon which a
choice can be made, neither state has a “more significant
interest” than Illinois. Since neither California nor Missouri can
be chosen on a principled basis, the application of the “most
signficant relationship” test leads to the use of Illinois law.
Finally, application of Illinois law comports with the
general criteria of the Restatement (Second) which emphasize
certainty, predictability, uniformity of result, and ease in the
determination and application of the law to be applied.*5 In this
25. The Restatement (Second) also lists other policies including the needs
of the interstate system, the policies of the forum and other interested states,
the protection of justified expectations, and the basic policies underlying the
particular field of law. See note 17, supra. These other principles are not
helpful in the resolution of this issue because their application can cut either
way. Neither a decision for nor a decision against punitive damages will make
the interstate system work better or worse. The relevant policies of the forum,
as we have seen, are countered by the relevant policies of Missouri. “Justified
expectations” are not an issue because MDC’s corporate headquarters are in
Missouri. MDC does not argue, nor reasonably could it, that it somehow
(Cont'd)
3la
Appendix A
case, it is important to resolve the conflict between states by a
principled means. Determining that all other factors being equal,
the law of the place of injury shall be used, provides a principled
means of decision which also creates certainty.
Future defendants cannot predict, of course, where airplane
disasters will occur. But air transportation companies will now
be on notice that, under the “most significant relationship” test,
when there is a true conflict between laws of states having equal
interests in the issue of punitive damages, and when the place of
injury has a strong interest in air safety and in protection of air
transportation corporations, the law of the place of injury will
apply. Our result also comports with the Restatement (Second)’s
principle that choice-of-law rules should be relatively simple and
easy to apply. Restatement (Second) §6, at 10. We conclude
therefore, that under the “most significant relationship” test, the
law of Illinois should apply. For the above reasons, we grant
MDC’s motion to strike punitive damages claims.
We now apply the Illinois “most significant relationship”
test to American. The significant contacts to be examined are
the place of injury, the place of alleged misconduct, the principal
place of business, and the place where the relationship between
the parties is centered. As discussed with regard to MDC, the
place of injury is Illinois and the place where the relationship
(Cont'd)
justifiably expected it would not be held to Missouri law for its corporate
decisions. Finally, the basic policies underlying the field of punitive damages
are in conflict. Each state legislature weighs the balance of deterring wrongful
conduct or protecting defendants from excessive liability and then makes its
decision accordingly.
32a
Appendix A
between the parties is centered is either Illinois or California.
Neither of these states allows punitive damages. The place of
American's alleged misconduct is Oklahoma, site of its
maintenance base, which does allow punitive damages.
The place of American's principal place of business for
purposes of this analysis is disputed.. Prior to 1979 and during
part of 1979, American's principal place of business was New
York, which does not allow punitive damages. Subsequently,
American moved to Téxas, which does allow punitive damages.
Plaintiffs argue, first, that the law of American's present
principal place of business, Texas, should govern the punitive
damages issue. Second, plaintiffs argue that, if the principal
place of business on the date of the crash must be used,
American's principal place of business on that date was Texas.
First, plaintiffs argue that since the purpose of allowing
punitive damages is to control future conduct by deterrence, the
current principal place of business is the only state that can
control future conduct; the principal place of business on the
date of the accident can no longer do so. As support for their
argument, plaintiffs rely on Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y. 2d 12, 290
N.Y.S. 2d 734, 237 N.E. 2d 877 (1968), remittitur denied, 22
N.Y. 2d 722, 292 N.Y.S. 2d 107, 239 N.E. 2d 104 (1968), in
which the New York court found that a defendant who moved
from Maine to New York, shortly after an automobile accident
in Maine involving a New York resident, should be considered a
New York resident for the purpose of determining the applicable
law.
The Miller case is distinguishable from this case. In Miller,
the plaintiffs were seeking to avoid a Maine statutory limit on
compensatory damages in wrongful death actions. Because the
Miller situation involved: the policies of compensation of
33a
Appendix A
survivors, the court was concerned with determining which state
had the greatest interest in compensating the New York wife and
‘ children of a New York resident. 22 N.Y. 2d at 17, 290 N.Y.S.
2d at 738, 237 N.E. 2d at 879. The court was not confronted
with the question of punitive damages, which would have raised
the question of Maine’s interest in protecting its defendants from
liability. Moreover, by the time of trial, Maine had changed its
compensatory damage law so that the previous statutory limit
had been removed. Thus, the court was not confronted with a
situation where Maine had any actual interest in protection of its
former resident from financial liability. 22 N.Y. 2d at 21, 290
N.Y.S. 2d at 742, 237 N.E. 2d at 882.
In the case at bar, however, New York has nor changed its
law, as Maine had. New York does have a definite interest in
protecting its residents from excessive liability at the time that
the event giving rise to the liability occurred. To hold otherwise
would be a virtual absurdity betause the purpose of a decision to
impose or not impose punitive damages has to do with
regulation of conduct. If a state’s interest in punitive damages
“vested” not at the time of conduct but only at trial, a state
choosing to allow punitive damages could never deter conduct.
It is true, of course, that New York made the decision to give
more importance to protection of defendants than to
punishment and deterrence. But the issue confronted —
punishment or protection — only has meaning in terms of the
time of the conduct. Otherwise, both the decision to allow and
the decision to disallow punitive damages would have the effect
of providing protection from punitive damages for the
commission of any misconduct, so long as a corporation timely
moved thereafter. A corporation would not be deterred from
engaging in questionable conduct because it would know that it
34a
Appendix A
merely had to move corporate headquarters before trial in order
to escape liability. Thus the Miller case does not have decisive
persuasive value for our situation.
As the district court indicated, the probability of corporate
moves after misconduct is a major policy reason why the
principal place of business at the time of the crash — not at the
time of trial — must be used. If the “time of trial” rule were to
prevail, defendants in “punitive” states could always easily escape
such damages by moving their corporate headquarters to a
“non-punitive” state. Moreover, the “time of trial” rule should
be rejected because, under that rule, there would be no certainty
regarding when the “current” principal place of business should
be determined. Even “innocent” corporate moves could occur at
any number of times: between the accident and the beginning of
trial, during lengthy litigation, and also during lengthy appeals.
The use of the date of the principal place of business is to be
determined.
Plaintiffs’ final argument for the use of the current principal
place of business is that the decision on punitive damages deals
with future behavior and the only state that has an interest in
future behavior is the state where the defendant now lives, not
the state where the defendant used to live. This argument must
be rejected for two reasons. First, since the New York legislature
has decided not to allow punitive damages, it has determined
that protection of defendants is more important than deterrence
of future conduct. Second, the goal of deterrence is not limited
to the defendant in question. The entire theory of deterrence
assumes that the punishment of one person will cause other
persons not to engage in acts similarly punishable. Thus, in a
“punitive” state, even if the goal of deterrence can no longer be
achieved with regard to a defendant who has moved, it can still
be achieved with regard to other defendants within the state. For
35a
Appendix A
these reasons, we find the principal place of business to be used
in the “most significant relationship” test must be determined on
the date of the crash.
Plaintiffs next argue that American’s principal place of
business on the date of the crash was Texas, not New York, as
held by the district court. Plaintiffs advance two subarguments.
First, they argue that American’s corporate headquarters had
moved to Texas by the date of the accident. Second, they argue
that even if the corporate headquarters had not moved by that
date, the operations base was in Texas and some cases have held
that the operations base, not the corporate headquarters,
determines where the principal place of business of an airline is
located.
Plaintiffs allege, correctly, that there are inconsistencies in
the pleadings regarding American's principal place of business.
They allege, and American does not deny, that in the pleadings
in these consolidated cases, American gave inconsistent answers,
stating in some cases that its principal place of business was in
Texas and denying in other cases that its principal place of
business was in Texas. Part of the problem seems to be that
neither the complaints nor the answers specifically zeroed in on
the question of “when” American’s principal place of business
was “where”. Thus. American argues that in those answers
admitting that its principal place of business was Texas, the
answers referred to the principal place of business at the date of
the filing of the complaint, not at the time of the crash. Because
of the lack of precision by both defendants and plaintiffs
regarding the date of the allegations and denials of principal
place of business, we cannot overturn the district court’s finding
merely on grounds of inconsistent pleadings.
36a
Appendix.A
Plaintiffs next argue that the district court’s determination
that American’s principal place of business on the date of the
crash was New York was made on the basis of matters outside
the pleadings: American's unverified assertion in its reply brief
that its place of business on the date of the crash was New York.
Because the issue was American’s motion to dismiss punitive
damage claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted, the governing rule is Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Rule 12(b) requires that, if matters outside
the pleading are presented with regard to a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, then the motion shall be treated as one
for summary judgment and all parties shall be given reasonable
opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a
motion by Rule 56.76
Plaintiffs correctly argue that, because the district court did
consider matters outside the pleadings within the meaning of
Rule 12(b), the motion should have been treated as one for
summary judgment and disposed of in accordance with Rule 56.
The district court did err in that it considered the motion as a
motion to strike under Rule 12(b) and not as a motion for
summary judgment under Rule 56. Plaintiffs argue that this
26. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) provides:
If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to
dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are
presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall
be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given
reasonable opportunity to present all material made
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b).
37a
Appendix A
error was significant because, thus, neither affidavits nor
certified papers were filed and no reference to discovery was
made by any party.
But the error made by the district court on this matter must
be considered harmless for two reasons. First, plaintiffs
misunderstand the scope of the protection of Rule 56. Rule 56
provides that a defendant in a lawsuit may “at any time, move
with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in
his favor as to all or any part thereof.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b).
Thus, even if the district court had treated the motion as one for
summary judgment, it could have decided the question exactly
as it did and there could be no objection to the defendant's
failure to provide supporting affidavits.
Second, plaintiffs argue that American's principal place of
business was determined before discovery was taken on the
matter., But subsequent discovery on this issue has proven fatal
to the plaintiffs’ argument.
The unrefuted deposition testimony of Donald Lloyd-Jones,
Senior Vice President of Operations of American, the transcript
of which was made a part of the Record on Appeal at plaintiffs’
request, disproves plaintiffs’ assertion that Texas was American’s
principal place of business on May 25, 1979:
Q. Tell me about the move from New York
if you will. Was it done in steps, throughout
1979?
A. No, we did the entire move in
approximately six weeks time period. The first
38a
Appendix A
function moved to Dallas was the systems
Operations control center. That was about July
9th or 10th.
Q. When was the decision made to move to
Dallas?
A. November of ‘78.
Q. Was anything done to implement that
move until July of °79?
A. Could you be specific? There was -
planning obviously going on. I am not sure what
you mean.
Q. Were any departments moved down
there before July of 1979?
A. No sir.
Deposition of Donald Lloyd-Jones, Record MDL 391 #2, 2, at
42.27
27. The deposition of Mr. Lloyd-Jones continued:
Q. Was any space taken down here before July ‘79?
Mr. Long: Do you mean physically moved into or
contracts signed?
Mr. Morgan: Leased. bought, built?
Mr. Long: All of those?
Mr. Morgan: All of those.
Mr. Long: The question is compound, ambiguous and
vague.
(Cont'd)
39a
Appendix A
Plaintiffs also rely on the fact that American supplied a
Texas address as the “address of principal executive offices” on
the form 10-Q filed by American with the Securities and
Exchange Commission for the quarter ending June 30, 1979. But
the form 10-Q was dated August 10, 1979, and was filed on
August 14, 1979. The information supplied on the form contains
no reference to the crash on May 25, 1979. Thus, the inference is
stronger that the address refers to American’s address on the
date the form was signed than on the date of the crash.
Therefore, we find the district court’s conclusion that American
had not yet moved its corporate headquarters to Texas on the
date of the crash was correct.
Finally, the plaintiffs, citing Herschel v. Eastern Airlines,
Inc., 216 F. Supp. 347 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) and Clothier v. United
Airlines, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 435 (E.D.N.Y. 1961), argue that even
if American’s corporate headquarters was not in Texas on the
date of the crash, its operations base was located in Texas and
the operations base, not the corporate headquarters, should
determine where the principal place of business of an airline is
located. But the cases relied on by the plaintiffs are not
(Cont'd)
Mr. Morgan: Leased? How is that?
Mr. Long: That is fine.
A. Lease was entered into, it’s certainly a matter of
record when that was signed. I don't honestly remember
when that was signed. But it is a matter of record.
No one moved. however, until July. There was no work
done on preparation of the facility, until starting some time
in June, to the best of my recollection.
Q. I guess we can't move you down here into punitive
country, then.
Record, MDL 391 #2, 2, at 42-3.
40a
Appendix A
persuasive. First, these cases involved a determination of
principal place of business for purposes of establishing diversity,
not applicability of punitive damages.
Second, even if we look to diversity rules, this circuit
applies the “nerve center” test to determine diversity issues.** See
Celanese Corp. of America v. Vandalia Warehouse Corp., 424
F.2d 1176, 1178 (7th Cir. 1970); Sabo v. Standard Oil Co. of
Indiana, 295 F.2d 893, 895 (7th Cir. 1961). The mere fact that
American's operations base was located in Texas on the date of
the crash does not suggest that the operations center was the
true “nerve center” of American’s activities. Indeed, American’s
“system operations control center” was in New York on the date
of the crash and did not move to Texas until July, 1980.
Deposition of Donald Lloyd-Jones, Record, MDL 391 #2, at 42,
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs have a very weak
argument for placing American's principal place of business in
Texas on the date of the crash. Plaintiffs request a remand for
additional discovery. But such a remand would seem to be a
useless exercise whose only purpose would be to delay this
litigation. Moreover, denial of such a remand is appropriate
because plaintiffs did not seek to respond in the court below to
American’s assertion that its principal place of business was New
York; nor did they file a motion to vacate after the district
court’s ruling was announced. Rather, the plaintiffs waited to
announce their surprise in this Court.*?
28. In the Herschel case, the court did not even characterize the facts as
involving a direct conflict between the “nerve center” and the place of
operations since both were found to be in Miami. 216 F. Supp. at 349.
29. Plaintiffs Nary argue that they accepted American's answer that its
principal place of business was Texas and that they have never had the
(Cont'd)
4la
Appendix A
It is true the record certainly could have been developed
more to specify precise facts regarding where various activities of
American were carried out. But, given the unrefuted deposition
of Mr. Lloyd-Jones clearly establishing that American had not
yet moved its headquarters to Texas on the date of the crash, we
conclude that the need for finality on this matter outweighs the
faint possibility that further discovery would change the district
court’s conclusion. Therefore, we affirm the district court's
conclusion. American’s principal place of business on the date of
the crash was in New York.
We now turn to the specific conflict of laws regarding
American. Oklahoma, the place of American's alleged
misconduct does allow punitive damages, but New York,
American's principal place of business does not. Just as we
concluded with regard to MDC, we conclude that the place of
conduct and the principal place of business each have strong
interests in having its law applied to the punitive damages
question; we are unable to say that one state’s interest is greater
than the other. Thus, we follow the same analysis used above in
concluding that, under the “most significant relationship” test,
when the interests of the states of alleged misconduct and
primary place of business are equal and in a true and total
conflict, the law of the place of injury is to be used.
(Cont'd)
opportunity to reply to American's Reply Memorandum which contained the
assertion that American's principal place of business at the time of the crash
was New York. But, as noted above, the confusion regarding principal place of
business in the pleadings is due in part to the fact that plaintiffs’ original
complaint did not refer to any date regarding American's principal place of
business. American's answer, similarly, did not refer to any date. Thus, the
cause of much of the lack of precision must be placed at the plaintiffs’ own
doorstep. The plaintiffs’ argument that they never had the opportunity to
respond to American's later, more precise, assertion is also weakened by the
fact that they did not file a motion to vacate the district court's judgment
because of this issue.
42a
Appendix A
Again, we emphasize that this result in no way signifies a
return to the mechanical, wooden law of /ex /oci delicti. Rather,
it emphasizes the fact that there must be some principled method
of decision when the standard “interest analysis” of conflicts law
cannot settle the question. Moreover, as discussed above, the
choice of Illinois law is particularly appropriate here. Illinois has
strong interests in both protection of airline corporations and in
the deterrence of wrongful conduct by those corporations.
Therefore, we affirm the district court’s decision to strike the
claims for punitive damages against American with regard to the
actions filed in Illinois.
VI
We now turn to the actions filed in California. California
follows the “comparative impairment” approach to choice-of-
law questions. Offshore Rental Co., Inc. v. Continental Oil €o.,
22 Cal. 3d 157, 148 Cal. Rptr. 867, 583 P.2d 729 (1978);
Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215,
546 P.2d 719 (1976).*° The resolution of conflicts under this test
is as follows. First, the respective laws of interested states are
examined to ensure that there is an apparent conflict. Offshore
Rental, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 870. There is such a conflict with
regard to both MDC and American because, in both situations,
the law of the place of alleged misconduct differs from the law of
the principal place of business.
Second, when an apparent conflict is found to exist, the
court reexamines the applicable laws and circumstances to see if
30. See Kay, Comparative Impairment, supra, note 2: Kanowitz,
Comparative Impairment and Better Law; Grand Illusions in the Conflict of
Laws, 30 Hastings L.J. 255 (1978); and Note, After Hurtado and Bernhard;
Interest Analysis and the Search for a Consistent Theory for Choice-of-Law
Cases, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 127 (1976).
43a
Appendix A
a “moderate and restrained interpretation” of both the policy
and the circumstances reveals that only one state has a legitimate
interest in the application of its policy. Bernhard, 546 P.2d at
723.3! But as discussed with regard to the actions filed in Illinois,
both the principal place of business and the place of alleged
misconduct have strong interests in the protection of defendants
and the deterrence of wzongiul conduct. We see no restrained or
moderate interpretacion of either state’s policy which can resolve
this conflict.
When, as here, the reexamination of an apparent conflict
reveals no way in which the conflict can be resolved by a
restrained or moderate interpretation, the conflict is indeed a
“true” conflict. The comparative impairment analysis “proceeds
on the principle that true conflicts should be resolved by
applying the law of the state whose interest would be the more
impaired if its law were not applied.” Bernhard, 16 Cal. 3d at
320, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 219, 546 P.2d at 723; see also Offshore
Rental, 22 Cal. 3d at 165, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 872. This approach
does not involve the court in “weighing” the conflicting
governmental interests in the sense of determining which law
represents “better” social policies. Such an approach would
vitiate the policies of federalism which, within constitutional
31. Professor Kay argues that the step of moderate and restrained
interpretation was integral to Professor Currie’s governmental interest
approach and that its use in the new comparative impairment approach
announced by the California Supreme Court in Bernhard was improper. Kay,
Comparative Impairment, supra, note 2, at 583. Although some doctrinal
inconsistencies do exist between the two theories, id., at 583-86, we are not
convinced that this combination of theories is inappropriate. As we understand
it, the point is that the reviewing court must look behind an apparent conflict
to the precise issue and the precise interest of each state. This approach seems
to be the very essence of the depecage concept. See Leflar, American Conflicts
Law, §109, 221-22 (3d ed. 1977).
44a
Appendix A
limits, allow states to determine their own policies as they wish.
Offshore Rental, 22 Cal. 3d at 165, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 872. See
Horowitz, The Law of Choice of Law in California: A
Restatement, 21 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 719, 753 (1974). Rather, the
process used by the comparative impairment approach is
“essentially a process of allocating respective spheres of
lawmaking influence.” Offshore Rental, 22 Cal. 3d at 165, 148
Cal. Rptr. at 872, quoting Baxter, Choice of Law and the
Federal System, 16 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 11-12 (1963). This process of
allocation involves several steps. First, of course, the states with
relevant interests must be identified.
As discussed in relation to the Illinois “most significant
relationship” test, the principal place of business and the place of
alleged misconduct have strong and equal relevant interests.
These states have the interests of deterrence of misconduct or
protection of local corporations, as discussed above. Illinois, the
state in which the injury occurred, also has an important interest
in the application of its law because it is a state in which both
the policies of protection of airline corporations and deterrence
of misconduct are peculiarly important. Also as discussed with
regard to the Illinois test. the domiciliary states of the plaintiffs
and their representatives do not have significant interests in the
punitive damages question.
The comparative impairment theory requires that the court
attempt to determine the relative commitment by each interested
state to the law involved. Offshore Rental, 22 Cal. 3d at 165-66,
148 Cal. Rptr. at 873. This examination of relative commitment
examines two factors: (1) the current status of a statute and the
45a
Appendix A
intensity of interest with which it is held,*? and (2) the
“comparative pertinence” of the statute: the “fit” between the
purpose of the legislature and the situation in the case at hand;
32.. The Offshore Rental Court stated:
(W]hile “{i}t is not always possible to say fairly whether
(the] policy [underlying a state's law] is one that was much
more strongly held in the past than it is now,... this
ground of analysis should not be ignored.” (Emphasis
added.) (Von Mehren & Trautman, The Law of Multistate
Problems (1976) p. 337.)
Professor Freund has pointed out that “Statutes [in a
domestic case], by reason of their pattern or their
prevalence, may evidence a legal climate of opinion which
makes less oppressive the responsibility of the judge in
choosing between...two possible rules of law.... A
similar resort may be made in multistate cases. /f one of the
competing laws is archaic and isolated in the context of the
laws of the federal union, it may not unreasonably have to
yield to the more prevalent and progressive law, other
factors of choice being roughly equal... .” (Emphasis
added.) (Freund, Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of
Laws (1946) 56 Harv. L. Rev. 1210, 1216.)...
Moreover, a particular statute may be an antique not
only in comparison to the laws of the federal union, but also
as compared with the laws of the state of its enactment.
Such a statute may be infrequently enforced or interpreted
even within its own jurisdiction, and, as an anachronism in
that sense, should have a limited application in a conflicts
case.
22 Cal. 3d at 165-66, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 872 (emphases by the Offshore Rental
court).
46a
Appendix A
id., 22 Cal. 3d at 166, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 872, quoting Baxter, 16
Stan. L. Rev. 1, 12 (1963).
A
Applying California's “comparative impairment” analysis of
MDC, we begin with Missouri. We look first to the current
status of its interest in the application of its punitive damages
law. Despite defendants’ arguments to the contrary, discussed
and rejected in Part II, above, we find that Missouri permits
recovery in death cases for “aggravating circumstances” when
there has been a showing of “wilful misconduct, wantonness,
recklessness, or a want of care indicative of indifference to
consequences.” Williams v. Excavating and Foundation Co., 230
Mo. App. 973, 93 S.W. 2d 123, 127 (1936); Wiseman v. Missouri
Pacific Railroad, 575 S.W. 2d 742, 752 (Mo. App. 1978); Mo.
Rev. Stat. §537.090 (1978).
Recovery for “aggravating circumstances” has _ been
permitted, and the provision has been maintained in the statute
33. The Offshore Rental court stated:
The policy underlying a statute may be less “comparatively
pertinent” if the original object of the statute is no longer of
pressing importance: a statute which was once intended to
remedy a matter of grave public concern may have fallen in
significance to the periphery of the state's laws... .
Moreover, the policy underlying a statute may also be
less “comparatively pertinent” if the same policy may easily
be satisified by some means other than enforcement of the
statute itself.
Offshore Rental, 22 Cal. 3d at 166, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 872-73.
47a
Appendix A
through many amendments, the most recent ones being in 1978
and 1979. Mo. Stat. Ann. §537.090 (Vernon, 1980). When a
statutory provision that has received judicial construction is
reenacted, it is presumed that the intention of the legislature was
to adopt the construction given by the court. See 73 Am. Jur.
2d, Statutes §331 (1974); see also American National Ins. Co. v.
Keitel, 353 Mo. 1107, 186 S.W. 2d 447 (1945); and Gray v.
McDonald, 104 Mo. 303, 16 S.W. 398, 401 (1891). Thus, the
current status of Missouri's interest in the application of its
punitive damages statute seems strong.
Another factor of the “current status” test is whether a
statute is “archaic and isolated” in the context of the laws of
other states, see Offshore Rental, 22 Cal. 3d at 165. But, because
the states in the United States are about equaliy divided on the
punitive damages question,** it is not the case that either
allowance or disallowance of such damages is “archaic and
isolated” among other state laws.
We look, second, to the “comparative pertinence” of
Missouri's punitive damages rule to this case, involving a
corporation headquartered in Missouri. That is, we look to the
“fit” between the purpose of Missouri's legislation and the facts
here. The general purposes of allowing punitive damages are
punishment of defendants and deterrence of future wrongful
conduct. Those purposes are pertinent to the facts of this case. If
the claims for punitive damages are allowed and are proven at
trial, damage awards against MDC will be larger, perhaps
34. Plaintiffs assert. and defendants do not dispute, that no more than 22
states deny punitive damages in death cases: Alaska, California, Colorado,
Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota,
Utah, Vermont, Virginia. Washington, and Wisconsin.
48a
Appendix A
significantly larger, than they would be if the claims are not
allowed. Such an increase will certainly be felt by MDC to be
“punishment”. Similarly, such awards could be expected to deter
future wrongful conduct, of the type alleged in this case, both by
MDC and by other corporations based in Missouri.
Another aspect of the “comparative pertinence” test is
whether Missouri's policy of deterrence can be satisified by some
means other than allowance of punitive damage claims.*5
Theoretically, it may be possible that Missouri could initiate a
criminal prosecution against MDC for MDC’s alleged wrongful
conduct. Presumably such a criminal prosecution, if successful,
could allow Missouri to achieve its goals of punishment and
deterrence. But we should not overemphasize this possibility,
because to do so would vitiate the “private attorney general”
concept inherent in the allowance of punitive damages in civil
suits.
Thus, the application of the “comparative impairment” test
to Missouri produces the following results. Missouri has a
strong current interest in its punitive damages law; there is a
solid “fit” between the purpose of that law and its application to
a Missouri-based corporation such as MDC; but, there is some
slippage in that “fit” in the sense that Missouri can theoretically
achieve at least some of the purposes of its law by other means.
We now examine California’s interest under the
comparative impairment test. First, we consider the current
status of its policy against allowing punitive damages in
wrongful death cases. Case law indicates that California seems
to have a strong commitment to its policy of denying punitive
damages in wrongful death cases. As the court stated in /n Re
35. See note 33 supra.
49a
Appendix A
Paris Air Crash, 622 F. 2d 1315, 1317 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1980),
“California courts have uniformly held that the statute allowing
punitive damage recoveries generally in tort actions is available
for death recovering only in survival actions and not in wrongful
death suits.” See Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of
California, 17 Cal 3d. 425, 450, 131 Cal Rptr.14, 33, 551 P. 2d
334, 353 (1976); Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 38 Cal. App. 3d
450, 113 Cal. Rptr. 416 (1974). .
In addition to case law, the refusal of the California
legislature to change the law also indicates that California has a
strong commitment to its no-punitive-damages rule for wrongful
death cases. Although plaintiffs set forth historical and policy
arguments designed to show that California has no commitment
to its policy against allowance of punitive damages,*° these
36. Plaintiffs argue that analysis of legislative changes made in 1962 to the
California wrongful death and survival statutes, combined with analysis of the
California Law Revision Commission recommendations on which those
changes were based, reveals that California policy does not truly oppose
punitive damages. Plaintiffs state that in its 1960 “Recommendation and Study
Relating to Survival of Actions,” the Commission concluded that there was no
valid reason for an exclusion of punitive damages in death cases. Plaintiffs
argue that the Commission recommended that there be a new survival statute
known as §573 of the Probate Code, which would specifically preserve a
decedent's right to sue for punitive damages and that the wrongful death
statute (Cal. Civil Proc. Code §377) be amended to exclude damages
recoverable under §573.
Both of those changes were enacted by the California legislature in 1962.
Plaintiffs assert that although nothing in the legislative record indicates that
the amendment to §377 was to overturn the earlier rule against punitive
damages, that is the only possible interpretation of the amendment because the
only damages recoverable under §573 that could otherwise have been
duplicated were punitive damages.
(Cont'd)
50a
Appendix A
arguments have not been persuasive with the California
legislature. That legislature failed to amend C2lifornia’s
wrongful death statute to include punitive damages after
attention had been drawn to that omission. See In Re Paris Air
Crash, 622 F.2d 1318 n.2.
Plaintiffs argue that the legislature did not need to amend
the wrongful death statute because the 1962 amendment to that
statute had in effect overturned the rule against punitive
damages.3’ These arguments might be persuasive if the question
before'us was whether California courts should have a policy of
disallowing punitive damages in wrongful death cases. But of
course that question is not, cannot be, and should not be, before
us. The question before us is whether California courts do have
a policy against awarding punitive damages in wrongful death
cases. The California Supreme Court answered that question,
“yes”, in Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 450, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 33, 551
P. 2d 334, 353. We are bound to follow that decision under the
rule of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Thus, we
conclude that California has a strong commitment to its policy
against allowing punitive damage claims in wrongful death
cases.
Second, we now examine the “comparative pertinence” of
California’s legislation to the facts of this case. First, if
California’s no-punitive-damages rule is used in this case, the
(Cont'd)
Plaintiffs argue that the Commission found that the object of awarding
punitive damages was to punish a wrongdoer, and that it would be particularly
inappropriate to deny such damages in a case in which the victim was killed,
rather than merely injured. In the face of these conclusions, plaintiffs argue,
the purpose of the 1962 amendment could only have been to end the
discrimination between wrongful death cases and survival cases regarding
punitive damages. Plaintiffs argue that the subsequent California cases which
have recited the rule against punitive damages in wrongful death cases have
failed to consider the true purpose of the 1962 amendment to §377.
37. See note 36, supra.
S5la
Appendix A
purpose of that rule, protection of defendants from excessive
financial liability, will certainly be achieved. If punitive damages
are disallowed, damages cannot be assessed beyond the award
for compensatory damages.
The second aspect of the “comparative pertinence” test is
whether the state can achieve its policy by means other than
enforcement of the statute in question. The allowance of
insurance is an alternative means of vindication of a state’s
protective policy. As the court stated in Offshore Rental, “[t}he
fact that parties may reasonably be expected to plan their
transactions with insurance in mind may therefore constitute a
relevant element in the resolution of a true conflict.” 22 Cal. 3d
at 166, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 873. California law permits defendants
to insure against punitive damages.8
Having applied the “comparative impairment” test to
California, we arrive at the following results. California has a
strung current interest in its policy disallowing punitive
damages; there is a solid “fit” between the purposes of that
policy and its application to a corporation engaging in conduct
in California; but, there is some slippage in that “fit” in the sense
that at least some of the purposes of California’s policy of
financial protection theoretically can be achieved by other
means, such as insurance.
Thus, the application of California’s “comparative
impairment” analysis to the states with the greatest interest in
38. Plaintiffs assert, and defendants apparently concede. App. Reply Br.
at 20, that California law does allow defendants to insure against punitive
damages. See 39 Cal. Jur. 3d §319, at 580-81 (Insurance for “liability imposed
by law .. . would appear to cover exemplary as well as compensatory damages
when so imposed by final judgment.”).
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application of their laws reveals that both states have strong
commitments to their respective policies. Both policies are
clearly pertinent to the issue in this case: Missouri would wish to
punish MDC, a Missouri-based corporation, for any
wrongdoing related to the DC-10 crash; California would want
to shield MDC, a corporation doing business in California, from
excessive liability regarding any wrongdoing committed in
California related to the DC-10 crash. We do not regard the fact
that, in each state, there is a theoretical possibility that the state
can vindicate its policy by, respectively, the criminal sanction or
the availability of insurance, as significant enough to outweigh
each state’s interest in application of its respective policy.
Moreover, to the extent that these theoretical possibilities do
exist, they cancel each other out. Thus, we are unable to say that
either state’s interest would be impaired less by the failure to
apply its policy.
We now turn to the place of injury, Illinois. As discussed
above, Illinois does have significant interests under the facts of
this case. Under the comparative impairment test, we first
consider the current status of the Illinois policy disallowing
punitive damages. This policy was examined in Part II of this
opinion and, as discussed there, it is strongly held. The rule
against punitive damages in wrongful death cases was recently
affirmed in Mattyasovszky v. West Towns Bus Co., 21 Ill. App.
3d 46, 313 N.E. 2d 496 (1974), aff'd, 61 Ill. 2d 31, 330 N.E. 2d
509 (1975).
The second aspect of a state's commitment to its policy
involves the “comparative pertinence” of the state's policy to the
facts of the case. Here, the “fit” between the purpose of the
Illinois rule and our facts is strong. The purpose of the no-
punitive-damages rule is to protect defendants from excessive
liability. If Illinois law is applied, MDC, a company which
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Appendix A
designs airplanes which fly from and over Illinois, will be
protected from excessive liability related to a crash that occurred
in Illinois. Perhaps merely as the fortuitous place of an injury
alone, Illinois might not have a special interest in protecting this
corporation, headquartered in Missouri, which performed its
alleged misconduct in California. But as noted in Part III, with
regard to the actions filed in Illinois, Illinois was severely
affected by this major disaster and Illinois also has strong
interests in the protection of airplane-related industries. Becéuse
Illinois does have unique interests in both the awarding and the
denial of punitive damages, the decision of its legislature to deny
punitive damages must be given special attention. For these
reasons, then, we find that, all other factors being equal, the
interests of Illinois tip the scales against the allowance of
punitive damages.
The use of Illinois’ interests as the deciding factor regarding
the substantive question of punitive damages also comports with
principles of certainty and uniformity. Our result under current
California choice-of-law law is consistent with our result under
Illinois choice-of-law law, which requires the adoption of the law
of the place of injury, unless another state has a greater interest
in the application of its law. Although California choice-of-law
law does not require this result, nothing in our approach is
inconsistent with California law.
Finally, although the California “comparative impairment”
test is relatively new, the result we reach is also consistent with
the result a California court probably would have reached prior
to the recent adoption of comparative impairment analysis.
Comparative impairment has only been used in two cases by the
California Supreme Court, Offshore Rental, 22 Cal. 3d 157, 148
Cal. Rptr. 867, 583 P.2d 721, and Bernhard, 61 Cal.3d 313, 128
Cal. Rptr. 215, 546 P.2d 719. Using the test in those cases, the
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court was able to identify a state whose interest would be “more
greatly” impaired by the failure to apply its laws. But the
California Supreme Court has not confronted a situation where,
under the comparative impairment test, the states with the most
relevant interests also were determined to have equal interests.
Perhaps in such a situation, the California Supreme Court
would apply the test used prior to comparative impairments
Whether it applied the rule of /ex loci delicti, see Bernhard, 546
P.2d at 720, or Professor Currie’s rule that in a true conflict, the
law of the forum should always be applied, see id., at 722-23; see
also Kay, Comparative Impairment, supra note 2, at 583, the
result would be a decision not to allow the punitive damage
claims. For all of the foregoing reasons, therefore, we reverse the
district court and grant MDC’s motion to strike the punitive
damage claims with regard to the actions filed in California.
We now consider the punitive damage claims sought against
American, with regard to the actions filed in California. As
discussed above, the first step in California’s analysis is to
determine that there is an apparent conflict of laws between the
states having relevant interests in the application of their laws.
The states which have the relevant interests are: the principal
place of business; the place of misconduct; and, under the
unique facts of this case, the place of injury.
American's principal place of business at the time of the
crash, as discussed above, was New York, which does not allow
punitive damages. The place of American's alleged misconduct is
Oklahoma, site of its maintenance base, which does allow
punitive damages. Thus, we have a clear clash of law regarding
interested states. As discussed above with regard to MDC's
principal place of business and place of alleged misconduct, we
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Appendix A
see no way to reach a compromise via a moderate and restrained
interpretation of either policy. Thus, we now examine each
state’s relative commitment to its policy in order to determine
whether either state's interest would be less impaired by the
failure to apply its law.
Under the “comparative impairment” test, the first aspect of
a state’s commitment to its policy is the current status of that
policy. The current status of the New York rule against punitive
damages seems strong. In Robert v. Ford Motor Co., 424
N.Y.S.2d 747 (1980), the court clearly held that punitive
damages were not allowed under the wrongful death statute. The
court stated that “[t]he remedy provided by the statute, the
recovery of compensatory damages, is exclusive and may not be
expanded by the courts.” 424 N.Y.S.2d at 749. See also Ratka v.
St. Francis Hosp., 44 N.Y.2d 604, 610, 612, 407 N.Y.S.2d 458,
460, 462, 378 N.E.2d 1027, 1030, 1032 (1978).
The second aspect of a state’s commitment to its policy is
whether that policy is “comparatively pertinent” to the facts of
the case. The purpose of a rule disallowing punitive damages is
to protect defendants from excessive financial liability. If New
York’s law is applied, American, a corporation headquartered in
New York, will be protected from any damages beyond
compensatory damages. Thus, there is a strong “fit” between the
purpose of the rule and the facts before us. The next question is
whether that state's interest can be achieved in other ways, such
as through the availability of insurance. As discussed with
regard to MDC, this factor is not of critical importance, but can
add another dimension to the analysis of a state's interest. It is
not clear whether a corporation can acquire insurance against
punitive damages in New York.’? For the foregoing reasons,
39. This issue was not addressed in the briefs of any of the parties.
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against punitive damages is strong and that there is a good “fit”
between New York’s policy and the facts of this case.
We now examine Oklahoma's interest in its policy allowing
punitive damages. The Oklahoma wrongful death statute
recently was amended to specify, inter alia, the availability of
punitive damages.*® Thus, the Oklahoma legislature seems to
40. Until 1979, Oklahoma's wrongful death act, in its entirety, provided as
follows:
§1053. Death—action for. When the death of one is caused
by the wrongful act or omission of another, the personal
representative of the former may maintain an action
therefor against the latter. or his personal representative, if
he is also deceased, if the former might have maintained an
action had he lived, against the latter, or his representative,
for an injury for the same act or omission. The action must
be commenced within two years. The damages must issue to
the exclusive benefit of the surviving spouse and children, if
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