Appellants Brief — City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc.
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ul = 1981
Che United States
Ocroser Term, 1980
Crry or Mesquite
Appeliant.
v.
Auapprn’s Castxz, Inc.
Appellee.
ON APPEAL FROM
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON THE MERITS
ELiLanp ARCHER
City Attorney
711 N. Galloway
Mesquite, Texas 75149
(214) 288-7711
Attorney for Appellant
1.
(i)
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Do children under the age of seventeen have an uncon-
ditional and unqualified constitutional right to play
coin-operated amusement machines located in a com-
mercial establishment?
Is the term “connection with criminal elements” uncon-
stitutionally vague when such language is merely an “in
house” directive to the Chief of Police to investigate an
applicant’s (applicant for a license to operate pinball
machines) character and the Chief of Police has no
power to issue or deny a license?
Are these issues justiciable at the instance of the owner
of a commercial amusement enterprise who itself has
received a license to operate coin-operated amusement
machines?
(ii)
LIST OF PARTIES
The parties are the same as in the caption.
(iii)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Pace
Gemtlems PROCOMIT 2 occ ccc ccvccvcccccccccccces i
EE Sac abacsesseebeccceccessecesccesese ii
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Table of Authorities ..........ccceeeeeescceeeeeees iv
Reference to Prior Decisions ..............eceeee005 1
Statement of Jurisdiction ............cceceeeeeeeee 2
Statutory Provisions Construed ................0065 2
Issues Argued .........seseeeeeceees or PereryretTy. 2
Statement of the Case .......... ccc cee eee eee eeeeees 3
Summary of the Argument ..............0 cece eeees 6
Argument and Authorities ...........0.ceceeeeeees 10
SEE, Lcuusscnsecusvsesecccoscoseecececes 12
Strict Scrutiny Test ..... Coecevece anenesces onccese 23
EE NEE Sobaseasencscsccccccccecccoecceses 25
i Circe eRebeheeeeeeseeenkeedseses sseees 32
WOOD cccccccccccccece PPPOE Tee TOL TET ooo OO
SE nacensecccccseacceessscscccccvcccccoes . 38
Certificate of Service .....cccccccccccccsccccccccece 39
(iv)
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Paar
A. F. of L.v. American Sash Co.,
Be Cs By Oe CEE) ca bcccvncvesdssdcocooses 7,16
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, (1979) ....... 8, 23, 24, 25
Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines,
ee Shae SY EEE hic biscecdecdpenescsveteseeens 13
Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States,
Se Shs Sy CHUNED Ao cvcccccecsescuccvesdaens 10, 36
Conolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Company,
ERE Fins CASE RRA ose sascedaseihectwcensisn 14
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) ....... 29, 30
Ex Parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 34, (1937) ...... 10, 34, 35
Fireman v. Chicago, RI. & P.R. Co.,
eC CEE Jos taescsenssrtebtevesiecube 30
Ginsberg v. New York,
390 U.S. 629, (1968) .......... 7, 8, 12, 16, 19, 21, 23, 27
Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, (1962) ...... 7,13
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408, U.S. 104, (1972).... 37
James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 600 .............. 9, 29
Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, (1974) ........... 00 eee 28
King v. Columbian Carbon Co.,
fe Fog ee) ee error 21
Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Commissioners,
ee Sees SE GUE) opccccccvcccccseuecacucess 14, 34
Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, (1972) ............0005- 10
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) .. 7, 12,19, 21
(v)
Pace
Munn v. State of Illinois, 94 U.S. 420 (1961) .......... 15
Murphy v. California, 225 U.S. 623, (1912) ...... 8, 20,21
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,
GHD Uae BOG, COTE) ci cicceccccnsessscnsaeeness 20, 36
Parham v. J.R. — U.S. —, 99 S.Ct. 2473 (1979) .... 24, 28
Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413. U.S. 49, (1973) 8, 22
Railway Express Agency v. New York,
BOO Us 1G, CIDE) ccccccccccccccnccscevaes 7, 15, 17
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, (1957) ......... 9, 29
Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545, (1954) .......... 13
San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, (1973) .........605. 8, 24, 28, 31
Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, (1971) ............ 7, 12
Semler v. Oregon State Board of Dental
Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, (1934) .........00 eee 16, 17
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. (1969) ........ 22, 28, 31
Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, (1974) ...........-008 36
The City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle,
570 S.W. 2d 377 (Tex. 1978) ........cccceeeeees 34, 35
Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, (1940) ........... 7, 12,14
United States v. Carolene Products Co.,
BG Os EGE, CROSS) cccccveccsscscescoeckocscunel 13
Vance v. Bradley, — U.S. — , 99 S.Ct. 939 (1979) . 7, 12, 30
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,
GAB UO. 3 CIGTEY 5 ive ccenivedncscsstecean 7, 18, 22, 27
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) ........ 9, 20, 29
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,
348 U.S. 483, (1955) 2.0... .. cece eee eee 7, 12, 15, 16, 17
In THE
Supreme Court of
Che United States
Ocroser TERM, 1980
No. 80-1577
City or Mesquite, Texas
Appellant,
v.
Avapptin’s Caste, Inc.
Appellee.
ON APPEAL FROM
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON THE MERITS
REFERENCE TO PRIOR DECISIONS
The opinion of the District Court of the United States
for the Northern District of Texas, William M. Taylor,
Judge Presiding in Cause No. CA-3-77-0194-C entitled
“Aladdin’s Castle, Inc. V. City of Mesquite is found at 434
F. Supp. 473 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit in Cause No. 77-2990 likewise entitled, is
reported at 630 F. 2d 1029 (1980).
2
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court of the United States has jurisdiction
of this issue as shown by the following:
1. The statutory provision believed to confer juris-
diction of this appeal in the Supreme Court of the
United States is 28 U.S.C. Section 1254(2).
2. The judgment of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit as to which review is sought
is dated and entered of record on November 17, 1980.
3. The Suggestion for Rehearing En Bane filed by
Appellant (City) on November 28, 1980, was denied by
Order entered December 15, 1981.
4. Appellant’s Jurisdictional Statement was filed
March 13, 1981.
5. The Supreme Court of the United States noted
probable jurisdiction on May 18, 1981.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS CONSTRUED
The case involves construction of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution and Ordinance No.
1353, Code of the City of Mesquite. Both provisions are re-
produced in Appendix to Jurisdictional Statement and are
not again reproduced.
ISSUES ARGUED
Issue: Whether there was a rational basis for the
regulation prohibiting a business establishment from
allowing minors under seventeen years of age to
operate a coin-operated amusement machine unless
accompanied by a parent or guardian.
Issue: Whether the City of Mesquite met the test of
strict scrutiny in proving’a state interest regulating
3
the age of persons allowed to play coin-operated
amusement machines.
Issue: The proper standard of Judicial Review to be
accorded a State (City) regulation of the business of
a coin-operated amusement center.
Issue: Whether Aladdin’s Castle, Ine. had standing
to complain of a provision in a City Ordinance instruet-
ing the Chief of Police as to how to make an investiga-
tion of an applicant’s character.
Issue: Whether the term, “connection with criminal
elements” in an ordinance of the City of Mesquite is
unconstitutionally vague in the context in which it is
used to instruct the Chief of Police as to how he should
make his investigation and report.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Procedural Background
This suit was brought by Aladdin’s Castle, Ine. in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of
Texas for injunctive relief seeking to prohibit enforcement
of a provision of City Ordinance 1353 limiting the opera-
tion of coin-operated amusement machines to persons
seventeen and older and those under seventeen accom-
panied by a parent or guardian.
On the day of trial, Aladdin’s filed a supplemental com-
plaint seeking declaratory relief to the effect that a portion
of Section 2 of said Ordinance requiring the Police Chief
to make an investigation of an applicant’s “character and
conduct as a law abiding person” and requiring that he
consider the applicant’s “connections with criminal ele-
ments” as one of the matters relating to the character of
the applicant be held unconstitutional for vagueness. (J.A.
111)
4
City questioned Aladdin’s standing to raise the question
of vagueness (J.A. 115) but was overruled by the trial
court.
Upon trial the United States District Court upheld the
age limit provision but held the “connections with criminal
elements” provision void for vagueness. Both parties per-
fected appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Cireuit which court reversed the trial court on
the age limitation and affirmed that portion of the trial
court judgment declaring the quoted language void for
vagueness, holding that Aladdin’s has standing in its own
right and standing to invoke the rights of third parties,
presumably its potential customers.’
B. Factual Background
In 1973 the City of Mesquite enacted Ordinance 1103
prohibiting persons under the age of seventeen from operat-
ing coin-operated amusement machines such as pinball
machines unless accompanied by a parent or guardian.
(J.A. 77) At that time Aladdin’s Castle, Inc. was unknown
to City (J.A. 67) and Bally Manufacturing Company had
not purchased Aladdin’s.
In 1975 representatives of Aladdin’s requested that the
City of Mesquite relax such ordinance in so far as Alad-
din’s, but not other operators, were concerned, represent-
ing to City that they, Aladdin’s would provide high quality
supervision of children in their establishment. (J.A. 29)
At Aladdin’s urging, and in reliance upon Aladdin’s re-
presentations that its customers would consist primarily
of children whose parents were present in the mall area,
although not physically within Aladdin’s establishment
‘Jt is not clear from the opinion how the alleged vagueness of the
statute affects the potential minor customers.
5
(J.A. 126), City granted Aladdin’s request to allow such
minors to play Aladdin’s machines.
On February 7, 1977, the City Couneil being of the
opinion that Aladdin’s representations were false and/or
misleading, City revoked the earlier relaxation of Ordin-
ance 1310 and enacted Ordinance 1353 which reinstated the
1973 age limitation. Throughout the entire period from
enactment of the Ordinance in 1973 to enactment of Ordin-
ance 1353 in February of 1977, the age limitation was in
effect AT ALL TIMES FOR ALL OPERATING ESTAB-
LISHMENTS except that on February 5th and 6th, 1977,
Aladdin’s operated under Ordinance No. 1310 AFTER City
had posted notice to enact ordinance 1353. (J.A. 44) All
other establishments in the City have operated pursuant
to the age limitation from 1973 to date as have establish-
ments in other cities including the City of Dallas (J.A. 135)
and the City of Garland (J.A. 25). No evidence was offered
in the trial court that any establishment in any of these
cities were operating unprofitably, including Aladdin’s
store at Valley Mills, (J.A. 129)?.
City’s police authorities had determined a need for the
age limitation due to problems of drugs, truancy and other
problems (J.A. 130-152) although not necessarily at Alad-
din’s. (At time of trial, Aladdin’s had only operated in
Mesquite for four months. Sgt. Drew had information
but not confirmation, of drug trade in Aladdin’s) (J.A. 152).
In the trial court, Aladdin’s had stipulated that the
proper review was upon the “Rational Basis Test” and
that Aladdin’s had the burden of proof. (Pi. Brief in
Support of Verified Complaint-R 43 at 67). The City
*The statement of the court below that City knew the change
would clearly make the Mesquite operation unprofitable and force
it to close is not supported by the record.
6
offered a minimum of evidence consisting of the testimony
of three police oflicers of the City and one City of Dallas
police officer, (J.A. 130-152) and testimony as to the City
of Dallas age limitation (J.A. 135). A copy of the City of
Garland Ordinance is in the record (J.A. 25). City did
not attempt to show the hundreds of police incidents in
other cities or bring in the multitude of witnesses that it
could have had the case been tried under the strict scrutiny
test.
The question of “association” was raised for the first
time in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Cireuit; that Court being of the opinion that such asso-
ciation gave rise to a constitutionally protected right. The
evidence of association is not in the record and it is not
clear from the opinion how the Court below determined
that any “association” other than mere concurrent pre-
sence existed. While it can be assumed that some of the
players may converse during or between plays, there is no
evidence that such conversation would be any different
from that occurring in any other commercial transaction
such as visiting a physician or dentist or purchasing a
handgun at a pawn shop.
The record is devoid of any evidence of “association” in
the constitutional sense.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The first three issues relate to the regulation of minors
playing coin-operated amusement machines in a commer-
cial establishment and the proper scope of judicial review
to be accorded such regulation and are subsidiary ques-
tions to the first question presented in the jurisdictional
statement.
7
The fourth issue relates to the third question presented
in the jurisdictional statement and the fifth issue relates to
the second question presented in the jurisdictional state-
ment.
Argument under the first three issues demonstrates that
the City met such burden of proof as is required for the
type of regulation involved; that under the “rational basis”
test City is entitled to a presumption of validity of its
enactment and the burden of proof was on Aladdin’s Castle,
Ine. to prove a lack of harm, evidence of which is totally
lacking. Vance v. Bradley, US. ,998.Ct. 939 (1979);
Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357 at 364, (1971); Ginsberg v.
New York, 390 U.S. 629, (1968) ; Williamson v. Lee Optical
Co., 348 U.S. 483, (1955) ; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 393, (1961); Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, (1940);
Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 569, (1962).
City demonstrates that this Court has traditionally in-
dulged a deference for the determinations of legislative
bodies and that it has not required legislation to cure all
ills at one time. Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336
USS. 106, (1949) ; A. F. of L. v. American Sash Co., 335 U.S.
538, (1948).
Further, testimony of harm based upon unarticulated
community values is not contrary to the rule in Ginsberg v.
New York, Supra and Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416
U.S. 1 at 9, (1974), quote:
“The police power is not confined to elimination of
filth, stench and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out
zones where family values, youth values and the bless.
ings of quiet seclusion and clean air make an area a
sanctuary for people.” (emphasis added)
8
Finally, City would show that Murphy v. California, 225
U.S. 623, (1912), relied upon by the trial court is, contrary
to the opinion of the Court below, good law today with
respect to determinations by a state that an activity in its
actual setting and not in the abstract is harmful and that
Murphy, Supra was cited with approval as recently as 1973
in Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, (1973) N. 15.
City submits that if the test of “strict scrutiny” is applied
its burden is far greater than under the “rational basis”
test. Nevertheless, the Court below failed to take into con-
sideration the distinction between the rights traditionally
accorded children and adults and misconstrued the holding
in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, (1979), as authority that
the standard for minors and adults is the same under all
circumstances.
Even in fundamental rights cases, the impact upon the
individual is given some consideration.
The impact upon a minor of being denied the right to
play a pinball machine or view “girlie magazines”, Gins-
berg, Supra, are but trivial compared to the right to decide
whether or not to bear a child with the lasting effect of such
decision extending far past majority, or even the right to
an education, San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, with all the association inherent in
the publie schools. Therefore, as in Ginsberg, Supra, where
First Amendment rights were involved, the same standard
is not in all cases applied to adults and children and the
proof offered by City is equal to that of the State of New
York in Ginsberg, Supra.
City submits, however, that the Court applied the incor-
rect standard of review because the right of association is
not involved in this case other than such as might be purely
incidental to any business transaction; that the broad scope
9
given the term “association” would encompass virtually
every business transaction known from a visit to the den-
tist to a call by a plumber to repair a leaking faucet.
Nor are the factors present to make it “suspect” legisla-
tion. A basic distinction exists between a group comprised
of children of a politically dominant group and groups
composed of minority race, color or religion; to wit: the
natural love and affection borne by parents for children
will afford protection for that group not available to tra-
ditional “suspect” groups. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972)
While it is clear that the Court below thought little of the
wisdom of the challenged regulation, where the suspect
criteria is absent the courts do not sit in judgment as to
the wisdom of legislation. James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 at
134, (1972)
“We do not inquire whether this statute is wise or
desirable or whether it is based on assumptions scien-
tifically sustantiated, Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476, 501, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1317, 1 L.Ed. 1498 (1957) (Sep-
arate opinion of Harlan, J.) misguided laws may none-
theless be constitutional.”
Nor is it practical for the Courts to judge the wisdom of
the multitude of State and local enactments.
Both the legal precedents of this Court and practicality
militates against extending the more stringent review of
strict scrutiny to cases of this nature.
The decision of the Court below as to Aladdin’s standing
to raise the question of vagueness is predicated upon an
incorrect construction of the ordinance; reasoning that the
instruction to the Chief of Police to consider an applicant’s
“connection with criminal elements” established a standard
10
by which the applicant would have to conduct itself. Such
is not the case at all.
Regardless of how the instruction is communicated to the
Chief, the applicant will be granted or denied a license upon
the basis of “good character as a law abiding citizen”.
The instruction to the Police Chief requires an intelli-
gence gathering task exactly as reviewed by the Court in
Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, (1972).
As required in Ex Parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 34, (1937),
Aladdin’s failed to show it “has sustained or is immediately
in danger of sustaining a direct injury... .”
Any evidence offered as a result of the investigation
would not be in the terms of the direction to the Chief of
Police but would be in its actual context.
Nor is the challenged language unconstitutionally vague
in the context in which it is used.
The Court below applied criminal case standards to
business regulation. Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United
States, 342 U.S. 337, (1952), and failed to give effect to the
legislative policy designed to prevent the control of amuse-
ment machines by organized crime.
Thus, the Court below erred in finding standing of Alad-
din’s Castle, Ine. to raise the question of vagueness and in
holding the challenged language unconstitutionally vague
in the context in which it was used.
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
The paramount question presented by this appeal is the
proper standard of judicial review to be accorded the pro-
vision of the challenged ordinance regulating the playing of
coin-operated amusement machines by minors. The Court
11
below held that minors possess an unconditional and
unqualified constitutional right to play coin-operated
amusement machines located in a commercial establishment
and applied the strict scrutiny test.
The case was tried and decided by the trial court upon
the traditional “rational basis” test.
No question of “strict scrutiny” or “compelling state in-
terest” was raised in the trial court and the evidence was
not offered to meet the more exacting “compelling state
interest” test.
Even the trial court, however, confused the burden of
proof requirement, characterizing the evidence offered by
City as “slender reeds” indicating his understanding that
the burden was on the City to go forward with the evidence
contrary to A.C.I.’s acknowledgment of such burden. Obvi-
ously, the Plaintiff and movant having accepted the burden
of proof and stipulated that the case was controlled by the
“rational basis” test’, City offered only a minimum amount
of evidence.
3See Plaintiffs Brief in Support of Verified Complaint for Tem-
porary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction and Permanent
Injunction, (R 43 at 67)
“The ‘compelling state interest’ test which places the burden
of strict scrutiny upon the state to justify legislative classifica-
tion based upon suspect criteria (race, national origin,
lineage and alienage) or fundamental interests (e.g., right
to travel, residency requirements, right to vote and right to
procreate) is not involved in this litigation. What is involved
is the ‘rational relationship’ test which requires A.C.I. to
prove that the classification created by Mesquite is without
any reasonable basis and hence, purely arbitrary.” (Empha-
sis Added)
12
RATIONAL BASIS
If the “rational basis” test was the proper form of re-
view it was not encumbent upon City to offer any testimony
and City could have relied upon the legal presumption tra-
ditionally accorded legislative acts. Vance v. Bradley,
U.S. , 99 S.Ct. 939 (1979); Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 US.
357 at 364, (1971); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,
(1968) ; Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, (1955) ;
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, ees Tigner v.
Texas, 310 U.S. 141, (1940).
In Schilb v. Kuebel, Supra, this court stated, 404 U.S.
at 370,
“The record is silent but the flow indeed may be the
other way.” (Emphasis Added).
In McGowan v. Maryland, Supra, the court said, 366 U.S.
at 426,
“The record is barren of any indication that this ap-
parently reasonable basis does not exist...”
and, 366 U.S. at 425,
“State Legislatures are presumed to have acted with-
in their constit) ional powers... ”
The court answered this question in Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629 at 642,
“While these studies all agree that a causal link has
not been demonstrated, they are equally agreed that
a causal link has not been disproved either.”
Therefore, under the decision of this court, if the record
be “barren” or “silent” or “no causal link has been demon-
strated”, nevertheless, the State is “presumed to have acted
13
within its constitutional power”. See Goldblatt v. Hemp-
stead, 369 U.S. 590, 596, (1962),
“Our past cases leave no doubt that appellants had
the burden on ‘reasonableness’. e.g., Bibb v. Navajo
Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 529, (1959) (exercise of
police power is presumed to be constitutionally valid) ;
Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545, 553, (1954) (the
presumption of reasonableness is with the State);
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144,
154, (1938) (exercise of police power will be upheld if
any state of facts either know or which could be reason-
ably assumed affords support for it).”
See also Vance v. Bradley, Supra, 99 S.Ct. 950,
“In an equal protection case of this type, however,
those challenging the legislative judgment must con-
vinee the court that the legislative facts on which the
classification is apparently based could not reasonably
be conceived to be true by the governmental decision-
maker.”
Notwithstanding the foregoing traditional rule of law
and a stipulation by A.C.I. that it had the burden of proof,
the City, nevertheless, offered testimony from four highly
qualified witnesses (J.A. 130-152) to the effect that these
amusement centers created numerous incidents of truancy,
illegal drugs and other problems. City submits that the
proffered testimony is more than adequate to support a
“rational basis” and is not “slender reeds”, but in fact is
ample to support the “compelling state interest” require-
ment if it should be determined that scope of review is
properly applied. City submits, however, that if it is deter-
mined that the “compelling state interest” test should be
applied, considering that the case was not tried on such
14
basis, the proper course would be to remand for a fuller
development of the evidence under that scope of review.
If, however, the proper standard is the rational basis as
it has been since this court decided Tigner v. Texas, Supra,
in 1940, overruling Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Com-
pany, 184 U.S. 540, then the presumption given legislative
enactments should be adequate absent evidence.
Obviously, the harm believed to result from the prohib-
ited activity is not something that can be proven in the
same manner as a broken bone in a personal injury case.
The proof, of a necessity, must depend upon certain inter-
pretations involving the experience of those in police work;
of community values interpreted by the elected represen-
tatives and more than anything, a working knowledge of
children.
This court has traditionally indulged a deference for the
determinations of legislative bodies. In Kotch v. Board of
River Port Pilot Commissioners, 330 U.S. at 563; this court
stated,
“We can only assume that the Louisiana legislature
weighed the obvious possibility of evil against what-
ever useful function a closely knit pilotage system may
serve. Thus the advantages of early experience .. .
might have prompted the legislature to permit Loui-
siana pilot officers to select those with whom they
would serve.”
Certainly, the Louisiana legislature could not prove to a
certainty that relatives of river pilots would be more quali-
fied than non-relatives any more than the State of Mary-
land could prove that the selling of certain articles on
Sunday would be harmful.
15
This court quotes Chief Justice Waite from Munn v.
State of Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, in Williamson v. Lee Optical,
Supra,
“For protection against abuses by legislatures, the
people must resort to the polls, not the courts.”
The Court further states in Williamson v. Lee Optical,
Supra, 34 U.S. at 488,
“The day is gone when this court uses the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike
down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial
conditions because they may be unwise, improvident,
or out of harmony with a particular school of thought.”
It is clear that the court below departed from the prin-
ciples applied by this court and placed the burden of proof
on City. See under heading “Rational Basis” 630 F. 2nd at
1039,
“The record is entirely devoid of evidence that a per-
son under seventeen years of age has been exposed to
a person who would promote gambling, the sale of nar-
coties and other unlawful activities. ...”
And
“Tnitially, therefore, we note that the City failed to
demonstrate the need which would give rise to an inter-
est in protecting its young citizens from corrupt in-
fluences in amusement centers.”
and, same page,
“Tf such people do go to the centers, there is no evi-
dence that they are drawn by the machines .. . the City
did not show that barring children from these centers
would in any way stop these people from associating
with children.” (emphasis added)
16
Even though the court below purported to consider the
questions separately under the “rational basis” test,
throughout the opinion the court applied the “strict
scrutiny” test and denied the City any presumption of
validity as well as misreading the evidence.
Under the rules of law laid down by this court, it is not
necessary that all ills be cured at the same time, William-
son v. Lee Optical, Supra; Railway Express Agency v.
New York, 336 U.S. 106, (1949); Semler v. Oregon State
Board of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, (1934) and the
legislative body may exempt or defer one phase while regu-
lating others. A. F. of L. v. American Sash Co., 335 U.S.
538, (1948). The court below required, however, that the
regulation cure all ills and cover all phases of the problem
or fall.
It is therefore clear that if the test is the “rational basis”
as held by the trial court, the regulation is within the
Constitutional limits set forth by this court because, as
stated in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. at 642,
“While these studies all agree that a casual link
has not been demonstrated, they are equally agreed
that a casual link has not been disproved either.”
If then, City failed to prove a causal link between the
operation of pinball machines and truancy and other ills
recited by witnesses, certainly the evidence offered by
A.C.1L. has not disproved such idea,
The concept that playing pinball games by minors is
harmful is exactly on par with the concept that looking at
“girlie magazines” by minors is harmful determined by
the New York legislature and upheld by this court in
Ginsberg, Supra.
Had this court placed the burden of proof on the State
of New York in Ginsberg, Supra, as did the court below
17
in the instant case the State of New York would have been
in the same position as is the City of Mesquite because
the ills associated with either are not so open and obvious
as other ills but must depend, to some extent upon unarticu-
lated community values. Both Mesquite and New York,
while not willing to go to the extent of Sparta, does desire
to develop ideal citizens. If a minor must forego playing a
few games or looking at cirlie magazines in order that he
develop into a good citizen, this is hardly a deprivation on
par with the treatment accorded the youth of ancient
Sparta.
Conceded, neither the prohibition of girlie magazine nor
pinball games will, standing alone, develop good citizens.
But as this court has held, Williamson v. Lee Optical,
Supra; Railway Express Company v. New York, Supra;
Semler v. Oregon Board of Dental Examiners, Supra; the
legislative body is not required to cure all ills at one time.
The City and State has other legislation, (compulsory
school attendance, aleohol consumption age limits and a
host of other laws), dealing with minors and it should
not be expected that one ordinance is to cure all ills
associated with minors. Nor will all of the laws on the
books of all the states cure all problems associated with
minors. But they may be one step in the right direction,
Railway Express Agency v. New York, Supra. At the very
worst, such laws can cause little harm to the minors (as
opposed to A.C.I.) for throughout recorded history chil-
dren were not able to play pinball machines except during
the last century because they were unavailable. No severe
trauma appears to have been inflicted by such lack prior
to the invention of such games.
The rationale that protection in one area is unconstitu-
tional because the regulation fails to afford protection in
another area is self-defeating and likened to an argument
that the prohibition of handguns on the person is uncon-
18
stitutional because a malefactor might harm a citizen with
a knife or club.
But what of the application of community values as a
basis for statutes? At least half of our regulations are
influenced, to some degree, by imprecise community values.
Commercial prositution and social extra-marital sex both
carry the potential for the same physical harm, It is only
in the community value area that commercial sex is deemed
more harmful than social union.
This court, in upholding the application of community
values as a basis for legislation in Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 at 9, (1974), said,
“The police power is not confined to elimination of
filth, stench and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay
out zones where family values, youth values and the
blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make an area
a sanctuary for people.” (emphasis added)
Although additional traffic was mentioned, it is doubtful
if it could be proven that six persons unrelated by blood
or marriage would create more traflie than the same num-
her of people having some blood or marital relationship.
Pure and simple, the case involved six male and female
students living in one house unrelated by blood or marriage
and such action did not comport with the community values
of the Village of Belle Terre. As stated by Justice Mar-
shall, 416 U.S. at 17, (dissenting opinion),
“The village has, in effect, acted to fence out those
individuals whose choice of lifestyle differs from that
of its current residents.”
What were the “youth values”, the protection of which
the individuals with different lifestyles had to be “fenced
out”? City submits that those values were not such that
19
they were capable of precise proof. No one contended that
having the multiple unit of unmarried individuals would
make the youth of the community physically ill or unsafe.
The ills that would adversely affect youth values were
those understood but unarticulated in Ginsberg v. New
York, Supra, and in the instant case more appropriately
called “moral values”, no different than the values sought
to be protected by laws prohibiting gambling, prostitution,
pornography, statutory rape and selling on Sunday.
Legislation prohibiting some of the above prohibited acts
is justified on the basis of other factors such as Sunday
sales in McGowan v. Maryland, Supra, but the desire to
protect moral values is present and everyone knows it.
Contrary to what the court below may believe, legislators
do not legislate in a “morally neutral” vacuum and never
will and this court has never required such. The concept of
right, decency and honor is too deeply rooted in our tradi-
tions to ignore.
City agrees with the court below that recreation or idle-
ness, per se, is not harmful. The City provides parks and
other means of recreation and encourages its vitizens to
partake of the benefits thereof. The playing of a pinball
machine or a game of billiards when viewed in the abstract,
is not harmful. Unfortunately, these games are not played
in the abstract.
Idleness, like food, is neither all good nor all bad. The
idea of having food is good because without it one would
starve. This does not mean, however, that no food is harm-
ful. More people in this country suffer from eating than
from starvation.
Idleness is likewise good in the abstract. Without some
idle time to refresh our minds and bodies, we would wear
out. But as with food, not all idleness is helpful. Children
20
that are taught to act in a responsible manner by being
assigned duties at home, required to attend school at the
designated times and use their money for useful purposes,
all other things being equal, grow into more responsible
citizens than those that are encouraged to forego respon-
sibility for idleness.
At the time Murphy v. California, 225 U.S. 623, (1912),
was decided the benefits of idleness, in the abstract, was
not unknown.
The members of the Murphy court knew that rest and
relaxation was needful equally as well as those deciding
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonviile, 405 U.S. 156, (1972).
They likewise knew that the participation in certain games
such as baseball, football and other sports provided needed
exercise, furthered a feeling of teamwork and sportsman-
ship and improved the quality of life. Men and women of
the Murphy era as well as of the present, attended the
theater, visited art galleries and performed many acts that
produced no income and provided no food or shelter.
Any suggestion that the Murphy court considered all
non-productive activity harmful is misleading and ineor-
rect.
Nor did Papachristou, Supra, hold that all idleness was
good,
At the same term in which Papachristou, Supra, was
decided this court decided Wisconsin v. Yoder, stating,
406 U.S. 205 at 228,
“.. but as alternative to the equally undesirable
consequence of unhealthful child labor displacing adult
workers, or on the other hand, forced idleness ... .”
(Emphasis Added)
The exact words relied upon by the court below are as
follows ; 630 F.2d at 1041, n. 16,
21
“All loitering, loafing, or idling ... is not necessarily
detrimental to the public welfare ... it may be and
often is entirely innocuous.” (Emphasis added)
Nothing in the foregoing is contrary to the decision in
Murphy v. California, Supra, nor the position of City
herein. The Murphy Court was speaking on the law of
nuisance which traditionally has allowed works of necessity
or productive work more leeway than non-productive or
frivolous activity, e.g. a citizen making noise repairing his
home after a storm versus making the same amount of
noise for purposes of amusement or the noise from a truck
delivering needed food versus a group of motorcyclists
riding for pleasure. See King v. Columbian Carbon Co.,
152 F. 2d 636, 641 (5th Cir. 1946)
“As a concession to industrial progress and social
utility the law will not abate a useful and lawful enter-
prise even though it be a nuisance. .. .” (emphasis
added)
With or without that comment with regard to idleness,
Murphy v. California, Supra, is the only expression by this
court addressed to the question at hand and involved a
review of the prohibition of a particular type of activity by
the State in the actual setting and context of pool halls as
they existed; not in the abstract, and a finding that pro-
hibition of that particular activity or idleness was within
the power of the State. The court judicially knows that at
least as much “association” occurs in a pool hall as in a
pinball establishment.
Rather than Murphy v. California being weakened by
more recent decisions of this court, City submits that the
holding is strengthened by the more recent cases of Gins-
berg v. New York, Supra, McGowan v. Maryland, Supra
22
and Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, Supra. City submits
that to the extent Murphy v. California holds that a state
may examine a particular activity and determine that in
the actual settiag and context in which it exists such activity
may be proscribed or regulated, that such holding has
never been overruled or weakened and that it is the law
today. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49,
(1973), n. 15.
The City fathers, with the advice of their police depart-
ment that must deal with errant youth and are charged
with protection of all youth, has viewed the situation in its
actual setting. They are better able to judge than the
judiciary the effect the activity in its real life setting will
have upon youth values; upon their efforts to protect youth
from the numerous factors within and without the indivi-
dual that detract from the youth values and community
values believed important in the proper development of our
citizenry. The fact that they are unable to articulate these
values in a precise manner in no wise detracts from their
existence. Most people could not give a precise definition
of “liberty” but believe it important.
The deference given by this court to determination of
elected representatives of the people is not outdated doe-
trine or a chance phrase picked up from an old ease and
carried forward after the reason for it has ceased to exist.
It is founded upon sound policy and is the cornerstone of
our doctrine of separation of powers.
See Shaprio v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 655, (1969), deny-
ing any role of a “Super-legislature” and Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas, Supra, as to a “zoning Board of Appeals”.
Thus, the courts should exercise restraint in extending
their supervisory role over lawmaking into those areas
not heretofore considered “suspect legislation”, i.e., race,
23
sex, national origin or truly fundamental areas such as
speech, religion and other rights vital to our way of life.
If this deference to the determination of facts and eir-
cumstances regarding community values by the elected
representatives of the City of Mesquite as was given to
the Village of Belle Berre and to the New York Legislature
in Ginsberg V. New York, Supra, is indulged and the
burden of proof is placed on the party challenging the
legislation; the presumption, standing alone or the evidence
standing alone and certainly both taken together, will
support a rational basis for the challenged regulation.
STRICT SCRUTINY TEST
If the proper scope of judicial review to be applied is
the “strict scrutiny test” then City concedes that it has a
much heavier burden, although not necessarily an insur-
mountable one, because of the different status of children
in our society. It is not so much that different legal stan-
dards apply to children but that children are in fact
different from adults. The regulation in Ginsberg, Supra,
involved a “fundamental right”, e.g. speech, not within the
ambit of obscenity as defined by this court, and was no
more narrowly drawn than the instant ordinance. (The
statute in Ginsberg absolutely prohibited sale to minors
whereas the instant ordinances permits playing when ac-
companied by a parent.)
The court below cites Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622,
(1979), as authority that the standard is not reduced
because minors are involved. City submits that the court
below has misconstrued this court’s pronouncement as to
regulation of minors.
While clearly children are not denied protection under
the constitution due to their minority, there are simply
some rights possessed by adults that have not been ex-
24
tended to children. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. at ;
99 S.Ct. at 3045 states,
“The guiding role of parents in the upbringing of
their children justifies limitations on the freedom of
minors. The State commonly protects its youth from
adverse governmental action and from their own im-
maturity by requiring parental consent to or involve-
ment in important decisions by minors.”
To hold that regulation of the activities of all children
at all ages is on par with the regulation of the activities
of adults is to ignore plain facts of life. Each and every
day children are denied rights routinely enjoyed by adults.
See Parham v. J.R., — U.S. —, 99 S.Ct. 2473 (1979) at 99
S.Ct. 2515,
“Under our law, parents make decisions for their
minor children that deprive the children of liberty and
even life itself.”
No one would give serious consideration to a law allowing
one adult to require another adult to “eat your spinach”,
“wash your hands”, “go to church”, or any of the one
thousand and one commands given to children as part of
their daily upbringing. The fact that in the instant case
parents act through their elected officials to control the
activities of their children imposes no greater restraint
upon the right of a minor to do as he pleases than if the
parent acted directly. In Bellotti v. Baird, Supra, the court
was considering restraint by parents through the state.
Recognizing that this court has held, San Antonio Inde-
pendent School District v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, that the
importance of an activity to the individual does not determ-
ine whether or not the right is “fundamental”, it is clear
that the importance of the right to the individual was at
least one factor in Bellotti v. Baird,
25
“... there are few situations in which denying a
minor the right to make an important decision will
have consequences so grave and indelible” (emphasis
added)
and, same page
“For these reasons ... the State may not impose a
blanket provision... ; (emphasis added)
If the “important decision” in Bellotti were not made
prior to majority the woman would be stuck with responsi-
bility that would not end with her majority but would last
far into adulthood.
In the case of marriage, voting or playing pinball, one
need only defer the activity to the age of majority, much
as one who happens not to like spinach.
Nor does the regulation discriminate against any person
because we all served our apprenticeship under the author-
ity of adults and everyone has an equal chance to reach
the age of majority without the lasting burden sought to
be imposed in Bellotti v. Baird, Supra. In this important
distinction, the court below erred and the evidence supports
the regulation whether the right to play pinball is “funda-
mental” or otherwise because of the distinction between
regulation of the activities of minors and that of adults and
the relatively minor impact upon the individual.
SCOPE OF REVIEW
The court below incorrectly applied the constitutionally
protected “right of association” in this case. Right of asso-
ciation is not involved to any extent.
There is no evidence or suggestion in the record that
minors visit the establishments for reasons other than
to play the machines. Any harmful association suggested
by the testimony consists of unwanted association by those
adult persons who would victimize the young. It is not
suggested that young people play the games as members
of a team or engage in tournaments as in the ease of out-
door sports (baseball, football, ete.) or bowling. Primarily,
the games are played solo. Although individual players
may ocassionally converse with each other between or
during plays, the overriding purpose for visiting the estab-
lishment is the rental of a machine for a cash consideration
variously estimated at between five and nine dollars per
hour. The playing requires a high degree of concentration
and at least in A.C.I.’s case, the customers are not allowed
to do mueh socializing between games and cannot even
drink a coke or “loiter”. (J.A. 126) More social contact
exists in numerous other commercial activities such as the
gas lines of recent, standing in line at a bank-teller cage
or a visit from the plumber to repair a faucet.
Constitutionally protected “association” means some-
thing more than mere concurrent physical presence purely
incidental to a commercial transaction for, except for her-
mits, almost every activity known involves some inter-
change between human beings. The fallacy in raising an
activity to constitutionally protected “fundamental” status
every time two or more people are present or engage in
casual interchange is that the government would be rela-
tively powerless to govern.
When two or more people engage in a dice game, in a
drag race or an act of prostitution; when a vendor sells
merchandise, when a con artist bilks a victim; all of these
activities would attain protected status if the term “asso-
ciation” is given its broadest scope.
City submits that the term “association” in the constitu-
tional sense, means, at the minimum, some desire or intent
to mingle or engage in interchange with others.
27
If two or more people rent a motel room, an automobile
or a boat the rental transaction itself should be governed
by the same law that governs the transaction when the
rental is by one person.
Once minors have rented the machine lawfully (accom-
panied by a parent or guardian) and once it is shown that
they desire to associate while engaging in lawful activity;
at that point the “association” becomes a fundamental
right. Likewise, when adults enter into a dice game their
“association” e.g., conversation and social activity, is pro-
tected but not their participation in the dice game where
such is illegal.
No one would seriously contend that the rental of a hotel
room for purposes of prostitution is constitutionally pro-
tected because prostitution requires participation of more
than one person.
Under the broad interpretation given the term “associa-
tion” by the court below the photographing of children in
sex scenes one at a time could be prohibited upon the show-
ing of a rational basis but if photographed in groups of
two or more a more stringent test must be applied. Such a
rule is itself irrational.
Had such a rule been applied in Ginsberg, Supra, the
court could have reasoned that minors purchasing the mag-
azines would share them with their friends and read “asso-
ciation” into the activity. The State having failed to prove
a causal link between the magazines and harm and the
right to share these books with their friends being funda-
mental, this court would have been compelied to void the
New York statute.
It cannot be doubted that the six college students in Vil-
lage of Belle Terre v. Boraas, Supra, “associated” in the
broad sense of the term and likely more than the players of
28
amusement machines. Nevertheless, this court considered
and rejected any “right of association” in upholding that
City’s ordinance.
This court judicially knows that there is much more asso-
ciational activity in the public schools than playing pinball
machines and yet found that the right to attend public
school is not a fundamental right. San Antonio Indepen-
dent School District v. Rodriguez, Supra.
To hold that viewing non-obscene magazines, (as applied
to adults) residing in a home or attending publie school,
with the associational activity inherent therein, is not fun-
damental but that playing amusement machines is funda-
mental is, to say the least, startling.
Nor is the classification based upon “suspect” criteria.
Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, (1974) ; Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618, (J. Harlan, dissent. op.). (See also n.1, Appel-
lant’s Brief citing Appellee’s Brief).
There is one great and distinct difference in the group
classified in the instant case and those consisting of groups
of a particular race, color, national origin or other suspect
groups.
The natural love borne by members of the politically
dominant group for their children, members of the politi-
cally impotent group, will provide more protection for that
group than all the courts and all the rules of law in the
land. The feeling of responsibility and protection for one’s
children is one of the more basic attributes of man and
makes unnecessary any suspicion that the dominant group
will sacrifice the interests of the politically impotent group
as in the case of those of different race, color or national
origin. See Parham v. J.R., 99 S.Ct. 2504,
29
“more important, historically it has recognized that
natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the
best interests of their children.”
Every person of voting age comprising the dominant group
was at one time a member of the politically impotent group
and can be expected to understand the needs of such group.
See Wisconsin v. Yoder, Supra.
This leaves then, only the question of the wisdom or
value of the ordinance.
This court states in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471
at 487,
“We do not decide today that the Maryland regula-
tion is wise, that it best fulfills the relevant objectives
that Maryland might ideally espouse, or that a more
just and humane system could not be devised. Con-
flicting claims of morality and intelligence are raised
by opponents and proponents of almost every measure,
certainly including the one before us. But the intract-
able economic, social, and even philosophical problems
presented by public welfare assistance programs are
not the business of this court**** but the Constitution
does not empower this court to second-guess state
officials**** ”
City recognizes that there is divided opinion as to
whether such regulation should be exercised. Many cities
do not so regulate this activity and likewise many do have
the same or similar regulations.
See also, James V. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 at 134, (1972),
“We do not inquire whether this statute is wise or
desirable or whether it is based on assumptions scien-
tifically substantiated, Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
30
476, 501, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1317, 1 L.Ed. 1498 (1957) (Sep-
arate opinion of Harlan, J.) misguided laws may none-
theless be constitutional.”
and, same p.
“Our task, however, is not to weigh this statute's
effectiveness but its constitutionality.”
This court expressed the concept in Dandridge v. Wil-
¢liams, Supra, 397 U.S. at 485, (1970), as follows:
“And it is a standard that is true to the principal
that the Fourteenth Amendment gives the federal
courts no power to impose upon the States their views
of what constitutes wise economic or social policy.”
See also, San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez, Supra, 411 U.S. at 33,
“It is not the province of this court to create sub-
stantive constitutional rights in the name of guarantee-
ing equal protection of the laws.”
Thus, whether the courts deem the instant ordinance wise
or unwise, so long as reasonable minds may differ upon the
question, and obviously they do, it is a basie tenet of
federalism that the courts do no substitute their opinion
for that of the legislative body except in those extreme
cases Where animosity and prejudice due to race or similar
factors call into question the objectivity of the lawmakers
or those cases involving truly fundamental rights such as
speech, religion, voting and the right to travel. This rule
is firmly established by this court and should control the
instant case. See Vance v. Bradley, 99 S.Ct. 939 at 946,
quoting Fireman v. Chicago, RI. & P. R. Co. 393 U.S. 129,
138, 89 S.Ct. 323, 28, 21 L.Ed. 2d 289 (1968),
31
“ .. and this kind of policy, under our constitutional
system, ordinarily is to be fixed only by the people
acting through their elected representatives”.
But aside from the legal and precedential basis for such
holding, City submits that it is mandated by a practical
basis.
As stated by Justice Harlan in his dissenting opinion in
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 655,
“Virtually every state statute affects important
rights.”
Those that do not affect “important” rights affect lesser
rights. If the courts take on the responsibility of determin-
ing, de novo, the wisdom of the multitude of State and local
statutes and ordinances the courts will need to become ex-
perts in every field of human life and endeavor. The time
required to accomplish this task would be without limit.
This, in turn, would detract from the courts’ primary role
of deciding questions of law. Nor, does City believe, that
the judiciary is in a position to acquire the expertise
necessary for such a monumental task.
This court stated in San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriquez, Supra, 411 U.S. at 42,
“In addition to matters of fiseal policy, this case
also involves the most persistent and difficult questions
of educational policy, another area in which this court's
lack of knowledge and experience counsels against
premature interference with the informed judgments
made at the local levels.”
No doubt, if review as to wisdom of legislation is extended
to all of the action of State and local bodies such as in the
32
instant case there will be many other areas wherein the
courts will express similar misgivings.
Therefore, the precedents of this court and practicality
militates against extending the more stringent review of
strict scrutiny to cases of this nature.
STANDING
The court below erred in its interpretation of the pro-
vision of the challenged ordinance relating to “connections
with criminal elements,” (J.A. 84) deeming such provision
to be proscriptive. Such is not the case at all.
The ordinance (.J.A. 82-3) reads, in part,
“Any person desiring to obtain a license for a coin-
operated establishment shall apply to the City Secre-
tary by original and five (5) copies; one of which shall
be routed to the City Manager, Chief of Police, Chief
Building Inspector and City Planney for review.
The Chief of Police shall make his recommendation
based upon his investigation of tne applicant’s char-
acter and conduct as a law abiding person and shall
consider past operations, if any, convictions of felonies
and crimes involving moral turpitude and connections
with criminal elements, taking into consideration the
attraction by such establishment of those of tender
years.” (emphasis added)
The definitions considered by the court below are repro-
duced at (J.A. 86-7) but are not a basis of the court below’s
decision.
The decision of the court below as to standing was pre-
dicated upon the mistaken belief that a finding of some
“connection with criminal elements” would automatically
33
bar an applicant from obtaining a license. There is no such
provision in the ordinance.
The import of the quoted provision is a directive to the
Chief of Police as to what matters he is to investigate.
There is no prohibition in the ordinance as to the grant-
ing of a license to a person having “connections with crim-
inal elements”.
Upon approval by all parties the City Secretary is re-
quired to issue the license. If, on the other hand, one or
more parties fail to approve the application, the matter is
referred to the City Manager for decision, (J.A. 84),
“.. he shall review such application, together with
such recommendation as may be furnished and shall
approve such appiication or disapprove same... .”
and, (J.A. 85),
“Upon appeal to the City Council of the City Man-
ager’s decision based upon an adverse recommendation
by the Chief of Police as to applicant’s character, the
applicant shall have the same burden as prescribed in
Article 305 V.A.C.S. to show to the council that he or
it is of good character as a law abiding citizen to such
extent that a license should be issued. Upon hearing,
the council may reverse the decision of the City Man-
ager in whole or in part or may affirm such decision.”
Nowhere will it be found in the ordinance that “connec-
tion with criminal elements” is a bar to a license or that the
Chief of Police may deny a license. His duty, under the
ordinance, is to make an investigation and a report of such
investigation to the City Manager. (Note that A.C.I. has
not alleged an invasion of privacy but only vagueness.)
34
Regardless of the content of the Chief’s report, the
standard for council review is “good character as a law
abiding citizen.”
Review is then provided to the State District Court, who,
of course, would be bound by the standa, | employed by the
City Council, not the standard employed by the Police
Chief. The district court can then review the evidence as to
“sood character as a law abiding citizen” without giving
consideration to any “connection with criminal elements”
as was actually done by the Texas Supreme Court in The
City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, 570 S.W. 2d 377 (Tex.
1978),
“The denial of the license was not reasonably sup-
ported by substantial evidence. We do not reach the
question of the constitutionality of the ordinance.”
Thus, Aladdin’s Castle, Inc. was not required to take
any action or refrain from taking any action by reason of
the challenged language. Only the Chief of Police was re-
quired to act and he does not contend that he does not
understand the language.
Further, at the time of trial A.C.I. had been issued a
license and had no application pending. There was no show-
ing that they would be adversely affected by the language,
particularly considering that the State Court had mandated
the issuance of a license.
Therefore, Respondent’s only complaint is about an in-
telligence gathering requirement of the Chief of Police
exactly as that complained of in Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1,
(1972).
This court quoted in the above case from Ex Parte Levitt,
302 U.S. 633, 634, (1937) at 408 U.S. 13,
35
“ .. established principle that to entitle a private
individual to invoke the judicial power to determine
the validity of executive or legislative action he must
show that he has sustained, or is immediately in danger
of sustaining, a direct injury as the result of that
action....”
and, same page,
“The respondents do not meet this test.”
Like the respondents in Laird v. Tatum, Supra, Appel-
lee herein disagrees with the requirement because they
do not want the substantive information revealed by the
investigation to be learned. Once the investigation is made
and the information is available it will then be considered
in its actual context; not in the terms of the ordinance
language.
This, then, would be the evidence the applicant would
have to refute and there is nothing vague about the actual
evidence. How the Police Chief was instructed to obtain it,
by vague language or otherwise is not a judicial question.
Laird v. Tatum, Supra.
Appellee therefore had no standing to question the man-
ner of the Council’s instruction to the Chief of Police as to
how to perform his duties as a license may be and actually
was issued without the consent or approval of the Chief of
Police. The City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Supra.
City concedes that if Appellee had alleged violation of
the right of privacy in the trial court, its standing would
have been enhanced though still foreclosed by Laird v.
Tatum, but where no such right is alleged and the only
complaint is vagueness, its claim of standing is frivolous.
36
VAGUENESS
The same misinterpretation of the ordinance pointed out
under the question of standing applies equally to this
question. If the term, “connections with criminal elements”
was set up as a standard for which the council and the
State courts must judge an applicant’s right to a license it
must at least be precise enough so that those charged
with the responsibility of review would know what stan-
dards to apply. But such is not the case. Review, as hereto-
fore demonstrated, is upon the standard of good character
as a law abiding citizen. In the context in which it is used
it adequately informs the Chief of Police as to what his
duties are.
But even were the term established as a standard for
determining the eligibility of an applicant for a license,
which it is not, it is not unconstitutionally vague as a
business regulation. Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United
States, 342 U.S. 337, (1952).
The court below erroneously relied upon cases construing
criminal statutes, some of which touched upon First Amend-
ment rights of speech. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566,
(1974) relied upon by the court below, states, 415 U.S. at
573,
“Where a statute’s literal scope, unaided by a nar-
rowing state court interpretation, is capable of reach-
ing expression sheltered by the First Amendment, the
doctrine demands a greater degree of specificity than
in other contexts.”
This court stated in Papachristou v. City of Jackson-
ville, Supra, 405 U.S. 156 at 162,
37
“In the field of regulatory statutes governing busi-
ness activities, where the acts are in a narrow category,
greater leeway is allowed.”
In Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, (1972)
this court upheld a criminal statute because of its require-
ment that the noise be actually incompatible with normal
school activity.
The instant ordinance requires that the relationship be
incompatible with the protection of those of tender years
(J.A. 86-7).
“... to the extent that the fencing of stolen mer-
chandise of illegally obtained funds, the procuring of
prostitutes, the transfer or sale of narcotics or illegal
substances is made more feasible or likely.”
The court below was of the opinion that an individual
would be unable to measure this “extent”. Again, this
court stated in Grayned v. City of Rockford, Supra, 408
US. at 112,
“Although the prohibited quantum of disturbance is
not specified in the ordinance, it is apparent from the
statute’s announced purpose that the measure is wheth-
er normal school activity has been or is about to be
disrupted.”
When one examines the Section of the ordinance desig-
nated “Legislative Policy” (J.A. 87-8) it will readily be
noted that the announced purpose of the ordinance limits
and clarifies the language as in Grayned, Supra.
Therefore, the cases relied upon by the court below are
inapplicable to the instant case and the provision should be
upheld as a legitimate direction to the Chief of Police and
as legitimate legislative policy.
38
CONCLUSION
For the reasons shown herein, the judgment of the court
below should be reversed. In the alternative, should it be
determined that the “strict scrutiny” test is applicable, the
case should in the interest of justice be remanded to the
trial court for a more complete development of the facts
under the more stringent test.
Respectfully Submitted,
ELLanp ArcHer
P. O. Box 137
Mesquite, Texas 75149
(214) 288-7711
Attorney for Appellant
City of Mesquite
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.