Appellants Brief — City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc.

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ul = 1981

Che United States

Ocroser Term, 1980

Crry or Mesquite

Appeliant.

v.

Auapprn’s Castxz, Inc.

Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROM

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON THE MERITS

ELiLanp ARCHER

City Attorney

711 N. Galloway

Mesquite, Texas 75149

(214) 288-7711

Attorney for Appellant

1.

(i)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Do children under the age of seventeen have an uncon-

ditional and unqualified constitutional right to play

coin-operated amusement machines located in a com-

mercial establishment?

Is the term “connection with criminal elements” uncon-

stitutionally vague when such language is merely an “in

house” directive to the Chief of Police to investigate an

applicant’s (applicant for a license to operate pinball

machines) character and the Chief of Police has no

power to issue or deny a license?

Are these issues justiciable at the instance of the owner

of a commercial amusement enterprise who itself has

received a license to operate coin-operated amusement

machines?

(ii)

LIST OF PARTIES

The parties are the same as in the caption.

(iii)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Pace

Gemtlems PROCOMIT 2 occ ccc ccvccvcccccccccccces i

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Table of Authorities ..........ccceeeeeescceeeeeees iv

Reference to Prior Decisions ..............eceeee005 1

Statement of Jurisdiction ............cceceeeeeeeee 2

Statutory Provisions Construed ................0065 2

Issues Argued .........seseeeeeceees or PereryretTy. 2

Statement of the Case .......... ccc cee eee eee eeeeees 3

Summary of the Argument ..............0 cece eeees 6

Argument and Authorities ...........0.ceceeeeeees 10

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Strict Scrutiny Test ..... Coecevece anenesces onccese 23

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i Circe eRebeheeeeeeseeenkeedseses sseees 32

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SE nacensecccccseacceessscscccccvcccccoes . 38

Certificate of Service .....cccccccccccccsccccccccece 39

(iv)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Paar

A. F. of L.v. American Sash Co.,

Be Cs By Oe CEE) ca bcccvncvesdssdcocooses 7,16

Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, (1979) ....... 8, 23, 24, 25

Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines,

ee Shae SY EEE hic biscecdecdpenescsveteseeens 13

Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States,

Se Shs Sy CHUNED Ao cvcccccecsescuccvesdaens 10, 36

Conolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Company,

ERE Fins CASE RRA ose sascedaseihectwcensisn 14

Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) ....... 29, 30

Ex Parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 34, (1937) ...... 10, 34, 35

Fireman v. Chicago, RI. & P.R. Co.,

eC CEE Jos taescsenssrtebtevesiecube 30

Ginsberg v. New York,

390 U.S. 629, (1968) .......... 7, 8, 12, 16, 19, 21, 23, 27

Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, (1962) ...... 7,13

Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408, U.S. 104, (1972).... 37

James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 600 .............. 9, 29

Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, (1974) ........... 00 eee 28

King v. Columbian Carbon Co.,

fe Fog ee) ee error 21

Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Commissioners,

ee Sees SE GUE) opccccccvcccccseuecacucess 14, 34

Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, (1972) ............0005- 10

McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) .. 7, 12,19, 21

(v)

Pace

Munn v. State of Illinois, 94 U.S. 420 (1961) .......... 15

Murphy v. California, 225 U.S. 623, (1912) ...... 8, 20,21

Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,

GHD Uae BOG, COTE) ci cicceccccnsessscnsaeeness 20, 36

Parham v. J.R. — U.S. —, 99 S.Ct. 2473 (1979) .... 24, 28

Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413. U.S. 49, (1973) 8, 22

Railway Express Agency v. New York,

BOO Us 1G, CIDE) ccccccccccccccnccscevaes 7, 15, 17

Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, (1957) ......... 9, 29

Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545, (1954) .......... 13

San Antonio Independent School District v.

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, (1973) .........605. 8, 24, 28, 31

Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, (1971) ............ 7, 12

Semler v. Oregon State Board of Dental

Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, (1934) .........00 eee 16, 17

Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. (1969) ........ 22, 28, 31

Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, (1974) ...........-008 36

The City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle,

570 S.W. 2d 377 (Tex. 1978) ........cccceeeeees 34, 35

Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, (1940) ........... 7, 12,14

United States v. Carolene Products Co.,

BG Os EGE, CROSS) cccccveccsscscescoeckocscunel 13

Vance v. Bradley, — U.S. — , 99 S.Ct. 939 (1979) . 7, 12, 30

Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,

GAB UO. 3 CIGTEY 5 ive ccenivedncscsstecean 7, 18, 22, 27

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) ........ 9, 20, 29

Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,

348 U.S. 483, (1955) 2.0... .. cece eee eee 7, 12, 15, 16, 17

In THE

Supreme Court of

Che United States

Ocroser TERM, 1980

No. 80-1577

City or Mesquite, Texas

Appellant,

v.

Avapptin’s Caste, Inc.

Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROM

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON THE MERITS

REFERENCE TO PRIOR DECISIONS

The opinion of the District Court of the United States

for the Northern District of Texas, William M. Taylor,

Judge Presiding in Cause No. CA-3-77-0194-C entitled

“Aladdin’s Castle, Inc. V. City of Mesquite is found at 434

F. Supp. 473 (N.D. Tex. 1977).

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Fifth Circuit in Cause No. 77-2990 likewise entitled, is

reported at 630 F. 2d 1029 (1980).

2

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Supreme Court of the United States has jurisdiction

of this issue as shown by the following:

1. The statutory provision believed to confer juris-

diction of this appeal in the Supreme Court of the

United States is 28 U.S.C. Section 1254(2).

2. The judgment of the United States Court of Ap-

peals for the Fifth Circuit as to which review is sought

is dated and entered of record on November 17, 1980.

3. The Suggestion for Rehearing En Bane filed by

Appellant (City) on November 28, 1980, was denied by

Order entered December 15, 1981.

4. Appellant’s Jurisdictional Statement was filed

March 13, 1981.

5. The Supreme Court of the United States noted

probable jurisdiction on May 18, 1981.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS CONSTRUED

The case involves construction of the Fourteenth Amend-

ment to the United States Constitution and Ordinance No.

1353, Code of the City of Mesquite. Both provisions are re-

produced in Appendix to Jurisdictional Statement and are

not again reproduced.

ISSUES ARGUED

Issue: Whether there was a rational basis for the

regulation prohibiting a business establishment from

allowing minors under seventeen years of age to

operate a coin-operated amusement machine unless

accompanied by a parent or guardian.

Issue: Whether the City of Mesquite met the test of

strict scrutiny in proving’a state interest regulating

3

the age of persons allowed to play coin-operated

amusement machines.

Issue: The proper standard of Judicial Review to be

accorded a State (City) regulation of the business of

a coin-operated amusement center.

Issue: Whether Aladdin’s Castle, Ine. had standing

to complain of a provision in a City Ordinance instruet-

ing the Chief of Police as to how to make an investiga-

tion of an applicant’s character.

Issue: Whether the term, “connection with criminal

elements” in an ordinance of the City of Mesquite is

unconstitutionally vague in the context in which it is

used to instruct the Chief of Police as to how he should

make his investigation and report.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Procedural Background

This suit was brought by Aladdin’s Castle, Ine. in the

United States District Court for the Northern District of

Texas for injunctive relief seeking to prohibit enforcement

of a provision of City Ordinance 1353 limiting the opera-

tion of coin-operated amusement machines to persons

seventeen and older and those under seventeen accom-

panied by a parent or guardian.

On the day of trial, Aladdin’s filed a supplemental com-

plaint seeking declaratory relief to the effect that a portion

of Section 2 of said Ordinance requiring the Police Chief

to make an investigation of an applicant’s “character and

conduct as a law abiding person” and requiring that he

consider the applicant’s “connections with criminal ele-

ments” as one of the matters relating to the character of

the applicant be held unconstitutional for vagueness. (J.A.

111)

4

City questioned Aladdin’s standing to raise the question

of vagueness (J.A. 115) but was overruled by the trial

court.

Upon trial the United States District Court upheld the

age limit provision but held the “connections with criminal

elements” provision void for vagueness. Both parties per-

fected appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for

the Fifth Cireuit which court reversed the trial court on

the age limitation and affirmed that portion of the trial

court judgment declaring the quoted language void for

vagueness, holding that Aladdin’s has standing in its own

right and standing to invoke the rights of third parties,

presumably its potential customers.’

B. Factual Background

In 1973 the City of Mesquite enacted Ordinance 1103

prohibiting persons under the age of seventeen from operat-

ing coin-operated amusement machines such as pinball

machines unless accompanied by a parent or guardian.

(J.A. 77) At that time Aladdin’s Castle, Inc. was unknown

to City (J.A. 67) and Bally Manufacturing Company had

not purchased Aladdin’s.

In 1975 representatives of Aladdin’s requested that the

City of Mesquite relax such ordinance in so far as Alad-

din’s, but not other operators, were concerned, represent-

ing to City that they, Aladdin’s would provide high quality

supervision of children in their establishment. (J.A. 29)

At Aladdin’s urging, and in reliance upon Aladdin’s re-

presentations that its customers would consist primarily

of children whose parents were present in the mall area,

although not physically within Aladdin’s establishment

‘Jt is not clear from the opinion how the alleged vagueness of the

statute affects the potential minor customers.

5

(J.A. 126), City granted Aladdin’s request to allow such

minors to play Aladdin’s machines.

On February 7, 1977, the City Couneil being of the

opinion that Aladdin’s representations were false and/or

misleading, City revoked the earlier relaxation of Ordin-

ance 1310 and enacted Ordinance 1353 which reinstated the

1973 age limitation. Throughout the entire period from

enactment of the Ordinance in 1973 to enactment of Ordin-

ance 1353 in February of 1977, the age limitation was in

effect AT ALL TIMES FOR ALL OPERATING ESTAB-

LISHMENTS except that on February 5th and 6th, 1977,

Aladdin’s operated under Ordinance No. 1310 AFTER City

had posted notice to enact ordinance 1353. (J.A. 44) All

other establishments in the City have operated pursuant

to the age limitation from 1973 to date as have establish-

ments in other cities including the City of Dallas (J.A. 135)

and the City of Garland (J.A. 25). No evidence was offered

in the trial court that any establishment in any of these

cities were operating unprofitably, including Aladdin’s

store at Valley Mills, (J.A. 129)?.

City’s police authorities had determined a need for the

age limitation due to problems of drugs, truancy and other

problems (J.A. 130-152) although not necessarily at Alad-

din’s. (At time of trial, Aladdin’s had only operated in

Mesquite for four months. Sgt. Drew had information

but not confirmation, of drug trade in Aladdin’s) (J.A. 152).

In the trial court, Aladdin’s had stipulated that the

proper review was upon the “Rational Basis Test” and

that Aladdin’s had the burden of proof. (Pi. Brief in

Support of Verified Complaint-R 43 at 67). The City

*The statement of the court below that City knew the change

would clearly make the Mesquite operation unprofitable and force

it to close is not supported by the record.

6

offered a minimum of evidence consisting of the testimony

of three police oflicers of the City and one City of Dallas

police officer, (J.A. 130-152) and testimony as to the City

of Dallas age limitation (J.A. 135). A copy of the City of

Garland Ordinance is in the record (J.A. 25). City did

not attempt to show the hundreds of police incidents in

other cities or bring in the multitude of witnesses that it

could have had the case been tried under the strict scrutiny

test.

The question of “association” was raised for the first

time in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth

Cireuit; that Court being of the opinion that such asso-

ciation gave rise to a constitutionally protected right. The

evidence of association is not in the record and it is not

clear from the opinion how the Court below determined

that any “association” other than mere concurrent pre-

sence existed. While it can be assumed that some of the

players may converse during or between plays, there is no

evidence that such conversation would be any different

from that occurring in any other commercial transaction

such as visiting a physician or dentist or purchasing a

handgun at a pawn shop.

The record is devoid of any evidence of “association” in

the constitutional sense.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The first three issues relate to the regulation of minors

playing coin-operated amusement machines in a commer-

cial establishment and the proper scope of judicial review

to be accorded such regulation and are subsidiary ques-

tions to the first question presented in the jurisdictional

statement.

7

The fourth issue relates to the third question presented

in the jurisdictional statement and the fifth issue relates to

the second question presented in the jurisdictional state-

ment.

Argument under the first three issues demonstrates that

the City met such burden of proof as is required for the

type of regulation involved; that under the “rational basis”

test City is entitled to a presumption of validity of its

enactment and the burden of proof was on Aladdin’s Castle,

Ine. to prove a lack of harm, evidence of which is totally

lacking. Vance v. Bradley, US. ,998.Ct. 939 (1979);

Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357 at 364, (1971); Ginsberg v.

New York, 390 U.S. 629, (1968) ; Williamson v. Lee Optical

Co., 348 U.S. 483, (1955) ; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.

420, 393, (1961); Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, (1940);

Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 569, (1962).

City demonstrates that this Court has traditionally in-

dulged a deference for the determinations of legislative

bodies and that it has not required legislation to cure all

ills at one time. Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336

USS. 106, (1949) ; A. F. of L. v. American Sash Co., 335 U.S.

538, (1948).

Further, testimony of harm based upon unarticulated

community values is not contrary to the rule in Ginsberg v.

New York, Supra and Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416

U.S. 1 at 9, (1974), quote:

“The police power is not confined to elimination of

filth, stench and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out

zones where family values, youth values and the bless.

ings of quiet seclusion and clean air make an area a

sanctuary for people.” (emphasis added)

8

Finally, City would show that Murphy v. California, 225

U.S. 623, (1912), relied upon by the trial court is, contrary

to the opinion of the Court below, good law today with

respect to determinations by a state that an activity in its

actual setting and not in the abstract is harmful and that

Murphy, Supra was cited with approval as recently as 1973

in Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, (1973) N. 15.

City submits that if the test of “strict scrutiny” is applied

its burden is far greater than under the “rational basis”

test. Nevertheless, the Court below failed to take into con-

sideration the distinction between the rights traditionally

accorded children and adults and misconstrued the holding

in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, (1979), as authority that

the standard for minors and adults is the same under all

circumstances.

Even in fundamental rights cases, the impact upon the

individual is given some consideration.

The impact upon a minor of being denied the right to

play a pinball machine or view “girlie magazines”, Gins-

berg, Supra, are but trivial compared to the right to decide

whether or not to bear a child with the lasting effect of such

decision extending far past majority, or even the right to

an education, San Antonio Independent School District v.

Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, with all the association inherent in

the publie schools. Therefore, as in Ginsberg, Supra, where

First Amendment rights were involved, the same standard

is not in all cases applied to adults and children and the

proof offered by City is equal to that of the State of New

York in Ginsberg, Supra.

City submits, however, that the Court applied the incor-

rect standard of review because the right of association is

not involved in this case other than such as might be purely

incidental to any business transaction; that the broad scope

9

given the term “association” would encompass virtually

every business transaction known from a visit to the den-

tist to a call by a plumber to repair a leaking faucet.

Nor are the factors present to make it “suspect” legisla-

tion. A basic distinction exists between a group comprised

of children of a politically dominant group and groups

composed of minority race, color or religion; to wit: the

natural love and affection borne by parents for children

will afford protection for that group not available to tra-

ditional “suspect” groups. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.

205 (1972)

While it is clear that the Court below thought little of the

wisdom of the challenged regulation, where the suspect

criteria is absent the courts do not sit in judgment as to

the wisdom of legislation. James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 at

134, (1972)

“We do not inquire whether this statute is wise or

desirable or whether it is based on assumptions scien-

tifically sustantiated, Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.

476, 501, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1317, 1 L.Ed. 1498 (1957) (Sep-

arate opinion of Harlan, J.) misguided laws may none-

theless be constitutional.”

Nor is it practical for the Courts to judge the wisdom of

the multitude of State and local enactments.

Both the legal precedents of this Court and practicality

militates against extending the more stringent review of

strict scrutiny to cases of this nature.

The decision of the Court below as to Aladdin’s standing

to raise the question of vagueness is predicated upon an

incorrect construction of the ordinance; reasoning that the

instruction to the Chief of Police to consider an applicant’s

“connection with criminal elements” established a standard

10

by which the applicant would have to conduct itself. Such

is not the case at all.

Regardless of how the instruction is communicated to the

Chief, the applicant will be granted or denied a license upon

the basis of “good character as a law abiding citizen”.

The instruction to the Police Chief requires an intelli-

gence gathering task exactly as reviewed by the Court in

Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, (1972).

As required in Ex Parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 34, (1937),

Aladdin’s failed to show it “has sustained or is immediately

in danger of sustaining a direct injury... .”

Any evidence offered as a result of the investigation

would not be in the terms of the direction to the Chief of

Police but would be in its actual context.

Nor is the challenged language unconstitutionally vague

in the context in which it is used.

The Court below applied criminal case standards to

business regulation. Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United

States, 342 U.S. 337, (1952), and failed to give effect to the

legislative policy designed to prevent the control of amuse-

ment machines by organized crime.

Thus, the Court below erred in finding standing of Alad-

din’s Castle, Ine. to raise the question of vagueness and in

holding the challenged language unconstitutionally vague

in the context in which it was used.

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

The paramount question presented by this appeal is the

proper standard of judicial review to be accorded the pro-

vision of the challenged ordinance regulating the playing of

coin-operated amusement machines by minors. The Court

11

below held that minors possess an unconditional and

unqualified constitutional right to play coin-operated

amusement machines located in a commercial establishment

and applied the strict scrutiny test.

The case was tried and decided by the trial court upon

the traditional “rational basis” test.

No question of “strict scrutiny” or “compelling state in-

terest” was raised in the trial court and the evidence was

not offered to meet the more exacting “compelling state

interest” test.

Even the trial court, however, confused the burden of

proof requirement, characterizing the evidence offered by

City as “slender reeds” indicating his understanding that

the burden was on the City to go forward with the evidence

contrary to A.C.I.’s acknowledgment of such burden. Obvi-

ously, the Plaintiff and movant having accepted the burden

of proof and stipulated that the case was controlled by the

“rational basis” test’, City offered only a minimum amount

of evidence.

3See Plaintiffs Brief in Support of Verified Complaint for Tem-

porary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction and Permanent

Injunction, (R 43 at 67)

“The ‘compelling state interest’ test which places the burden

of strict scrutiny upon the state to justify legislative classifica-

tion based upon suspect criteria (race, national origin,

lineage and alienage) or fundamental interests (e.g., right

to travel, residency requirements, right to vote and right to

procreate) is not involved in this litigation. What is involved

is the ‘rational relationship’ test which requires A.C.I. to

prove that the classification created by Mesquite is without

any reasonable basis and hence, purely arbitrary.” (Empha-

sis Added)

12

RATIONAL BASIS

If the “rational basis” test was the proper form of re-

view it was not encumbent upon City to offer any testimony

and City could have relied upon the legal presumption tra-

ditionally accorded legislative acts. Vance v. Bradley,

U.S. , 99 S.Ct. 939 (1979); Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 US.

357 at 364, (1971); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,

(1968) ; Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, (1955) ;

McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, ees Tigner v.

Texas, 310 U.S. 141, (1940).

In Schilb v. Kuebel, Supra, this court stated, 404 U.S.

at 370,

“The record is silent but the flow indeed may be the

other way.” (Emphasis Added).

In McGowan v. Maryland, Supra, the court said, 366 U.S.

at 426,

“The record is barren of any indication that this ap-

parently reasonable basis does not exist...”

and, 366 U.S. at 425,

“State Legislatures are presumed to have acted with-

in their constit) ional powers... ”

The court answered this question in Ginsberg v. New

York, 390 U.S. 629 at 642,

“While these studies all agree that a causal link has

not been demonstrated, they are equally agreed that

a causal link has not been disproved either.”

Therefore, under the decision of this court, if the record

be “barren” or “silent” or “no causal link has been demon-

strated”, nevertheless, the State is “presumed to have acted

13

within its constitutional power”. See Goldblatt v. Hemp-

stead, 369 U.S. 590, 596, (1962),

“Our past cases leave no doubt that appellants had

the burden on ‘reasonableness’. e.g., Bibb v. Navajo

Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 529, (1959) (exercise of

police power is presumed to be constitutionally valid) ;

Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545, 553, (1954) (the

presumption of reasonableness is with the State);

United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144,

154, (1938) (exercise of police power will be upheld if

any state of facts either know or which could be reason-

ably assumed affords support for it).”

See also Vance v. Bradley, Supra, 99 S.Ct. 950,

“In an equal protection case of this type, however,

those challenging the legislative judgment must con-

vinee the court that the legislative facts on which the

classification is apparently based could not reasonably

be conceived to be true by the governmental decision-

maker.”

Notwithstanding the foregoing traditional rule of law

and a stipulation by A.C.I. that it had the burden of proof,

the City, nevertheless, offered testimony from four highly

qualified witnesses (J.A. 130-152) to the effect that these

amusement centers created numerous incidents of truancy,

illegal drugs and other problems. City submits that the

proffered testimony is more than adequate to support a

“rational basis” and is not “slender reeds”, but in fact is

ample to support the “compelling state interest” require-

ment if it should be determined that scope of review is

properly applied. City submits, however, that if it is deter-

mined that the “compelling state interest” test should be

applied, considering that the case was not tried on such

14

basis, the proper course would be to remand for a fuller

development of the evidence under that scope of review.

If, however, the proper standard is the rational basis as

it has been since this court decided Tigner v. Texas, Supra,

in 1940, overruling Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Com-

pany, 184 U.S. 540, then the presumption given legislative

enactments should be adequate absent evidence.

Obviously, the harm believed to result from the prohib-

ited activity is not something that can be proven in the

same manner as a broken bone in a personal injury case.

The proof, of a necessity, must depend upon certain inter-

pretations involving the experience of those in police work;

of community values interpreted by the elected represen-

tatives and more than anything, a working knowledge of

children.

This court has traditionally indulged a deference for the

determinations of legislative bodies. In Kotch v. Board of

River Port Pilot Commissioners, 330 U.S. at 563; this court

stated,

“We can only assume that the Louisiana legislature

weighed the obvious possibility of evil against what-

ever useful function a closely knit pilotage system may

serve. Thus the advantages of early experience .. .

might have prompted the legislature to permit Loui-

siana pilot officers to select those with whom they

would serve.”

Certainly, the Louisiana legislature could not prove to a

certainty that relatives of river pilots would be more quali-

fied than non-relatives any more than the State of Mary-

land could prove that the selling of certain articles on

Sunday would be harmful.

15

This court quotes Chief Justice Waite from Munn v.

State of Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, in Williamson v. Lee Optical,

Supra,

“For protection against abuses by legislatures, the

people must resort to the polls, not the courts.”

The Court further states in Williamson v. Lee Optical,

Supra, 34 U.S. at 488,

“The day is gone when this court uses the Due Pro-

cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike

down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial

conditions because they may be unwise, improvident,

or out of harmony with a particular school of thought.”

It is clear that the court below departed from the prin-

ciples applied by this court and placed the burden of proof

on City. See under heading “Rational Basis” 630 F. 2nd at

1039,

“The record is entirely devoid of evidence that a per-

son under seventeen years of age has been exposed to

a person who would promote gambling, the sale of nar-

coties and other unlawful activities. ...”

And

“Tnitially, therefore, we note that the City failed to

demonstrate the need which would give rise to an inter-

est in protecting its young citizens from corrupt in-

fluences in amusement centers.”

and, same page,

“Tf such people do go to the centers, there is no evi-

dence that they are drawn by the machines .. . the City

did not show that barring children from these centers

would in any way stop these people from associating

with children.” (emphasis added)

16

Even though the court below purported to consider the

questions separately under the “rational basis” test,

throughout the opinion the court applied the “strict

scrutiny” test and denied the City any presumption of

validity as well as misreading the evidence.

Under the rules of law laid down by this court, it is not

necessary that all ills be cured at the same time, William-

son v. Lee Optical, Supra; Railway Express Agency v.

New York, 336 U.S. 106, (1949); Semler v. Oregon State

Board of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, (1934) and the

legislative body may exempt or defer one phase while regu-

lating others. A. F. of L. v. American Sash Co., 335 U.S.

538, (1948). The court below required, however, that the

regulation cure all ills and cover all phases of the problem

or fall.

It is therefore clear that if the test is the “rational basis”

as held by the trial court, the regulation is within the

Constitutional limits set forth by this court because, as

stated in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. at 642,

“While these studies all agree that a casual link

has not been demonstrated, they are equally agreed

that a casual link has not been disproved either.”

If then, City failed to prove a causal link between the

operation of pinball machines and truancy and other ills

recited by witnesses, certainly the evidence offered by

A.C.1L. has not disproved such idea,

The concept that playing pinball games by minors is

harmful is exactly on par with the concept that looking at

“girlie magazines” by minors is harmful determined by

the New York legislature and upheld by this court in

Ginsberg, Supra.

Had this court placed the burden of proof on the State

of New York in Ginsberg, Supra, as did the court below

17

in the instant case the State of New York would have been

in the same position as is the City of Mesquite because

the ills associated with either are not so open and obvious

as other ills but must depend, to some extent upon unarticu-

lated community values. Both Mesquite and New York,

while not willing to go to the extent of Sparta, does desire

to develop ideal citizens. If a minor must forego playing a

few games or looking at cirlie magazines in order that he

develop into a good citizen, this is hardly a deprivation on

par with the treatment accorded the youth of ancient

Sparta.

Conceded, neither the prohibition of girlie magazine nor

pinball games will, standing alone, develop good citizens.

But as this court has held, Williamson v. Lee Optical,

Supra; Railway Express Company v. New York, Supra;

Semler v. Oregon Board of Dental Examiners, Supra; the

legislative body is not required to cure all ills at one time.

The City and State has other legislation, (compulsory

school attendance, aleohol consumption age limits and a

host of other laws), dealing with minors and it should

not be expected that one ordinance is to cure all ills

associated with minors. Nor will all of the laws on the

books of all the states cure all problems associated with

minors. But they may be one step in the right direction,

Railway Express Agency v. New York, Supra. At the very

worst, such laws can cause little harm to the minors (as

opposed to A.C.I.) for throughout recorded history chil-

dren were not able to play pinball machines except during

the last century because they were unavailable. No severe

trauma appears to have been inflicted by such lack prior

to the invention of such games.

The rationale that protection in one area is unconstitu-

tional because the regulation fails to afford protection in

another area is self-defeating and likened to an argument

that the prohibition of handguns on the person is uncon-

18

stitutional because a malefactor might harm a citizen with

a knife or club.

But what of the application of community values as a

basis for statutes? At least half of our regulations are

influenced, to some degree, by imprecise community values.

Commercial prositution and social extra-marital sex both

carry the potential for the same physical harm, It is only

in the community value area that commercial sex is deemed

more harmful than social union.

This court, in upholding the application of community

values as a basis for legislation in Village of Belle Terre v.

Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 at 9, (1974), said,

“The police power is not confined to elimination of

filth, stench and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay

out zones where family values, youth values and the

blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make an area

a sanctuary for people.” (emphasis added)

Although additional traffic was mentioned, it is doubtful

if it could be proven that six persons unrelated by blood

or marriage would create more traflie than the same num-

her of people having some blood or marital relationship.

Pure and simple, the case involved six male and female

students living in one house unrelated by blood or marriage

and such action did not comport with the community values

of the Village of Belle Terre. As stated by Justice Mar-

shall, 416 U.S. at 17, (dissenting opinion),

“The village has, in effect, acted to fence out those

individuals whose choice of lifestyle differs from that

of its current residents.”

What were the “youth values”, the protection of which

the individuals with different lifestyles had to be “fenced

out”? City submits that those values were not such that

19

they were capable of precise proof. No one contended that

having the multiple unit of unmarried individuals would

make the youth of the community physically ill or unsafe.

The ills that would adversely affect youth values were

those understood but unarticulated in Ginsberg v. New

York, Supra, and in the instant case more appropriately

called “moral values”, no different than the values sought

to be protected by laws prohibiting gambling, prostitution,

pornography, statutory rape and selling on Sunday.

Legislation prohibiting some of the above prohibited acts

is justified on the basis of other factors such as Sunday

sales in McGowan v. Maryland, Supra, but the desire to

protect moral values is present and everyone knows it.

Contrary to what the court below may believe, legislators

do not legislate in a “morally neutral” vacuum and never

will and this court has never required such. The concept of

right, decency and honor is too deeply rooted in our tradi-

tions to ignore.

City agrees with the court below that recreation or idle-

ness, per se, is not harmful. The City provides parks and

other means of recreation and encourages its vitizens to

partake of the benefits thereof. The playing of a pinball

machine or a game of billiards when viewed in the abstract,

is not harmful. Unfortunately, these games are not played

in the abstract.

Idleness, like food, is neither all good nor all bad. The

idea of having food is good because without it one would

starve. This does not mean, however, that no food is harm-

ful. More people in this country suffer from eating than

from starvation.

Idleness is likewise good in the abstract. Without some

idle time to refresh our minds and bodies, we would wear

out. But as with food, not all idleness is helpful. Children

20

that are taught to act in a responsible manner by being

assigned duties at home, required to attend school at the

designated times and use their money for useful purposes,

all other things being equal, grow into more responsible

citizens than those that are encouraged to forego respon-

sibility for idleness.

At the time Murphy v. California, 225 U.S. 623, (1912),

was decided the benefits of idleness, in the abstract, was

not unknown.

The members of the Murphy court knew that rest and

relaxation was needful equally as well as those deciding

Papachristou v. City of Jacksonviile, 405 U.S. 156, (1972).

They likewise knew that the participation in certain games

such as baseball, football and other sports provided needed

exercise, furthered a feeling of teamwork and sportsman-

ship and improved the quality of life. Men and women of

the Murphy era as well as of the present, attended the

theater, visited art galleries and performed many acts that

produced no income and provided no food or shelter.

Any suggestion that the Murphy court considered all

non-productive activity harmful is misleading and ineor-

rect.

Nor did Papachristou, Supra, hold that all idleness was

good,

At the same term in which Papachristou, Supra, was

decided this court decided Wisconsin v. Yoder, stating,

406 U.S. 205 at 228,

“.. but as alternative to the equally undesirable

consequence of unhealthful child labor displacing adult

workers, or on the other hand, forced idleness ... .”

(Emphasis Added)

The exact words relied upon by the court below are as

follows ; 630 F.2d at 1041, n. 16,

21

“All loitering, loafing, or idling ... is not necessarily

detrimental to the public welfare ... it may be and

often is entirely innocuous.” (Emphasis added)

Nothing in the foregoing is contrary to the decision in

Murphy v. California, Supra, nor the position of City

herein. The Murphy Court was speaking on the law of

nuisance which traditionally has allowed works of necessity

or productive work more leeway than non-productive or

frivolous activity, e.g. a citizen making noise repairing his

home after a storm versus making the same amount of

noise for purposes of amusement or the noise from a truck

delivering needed food versus a group of motorcyclists

riding for pleasure. See King v. Columbian Carbon Co.,

152 F. 2d 636, 641 (5th Cir. 1946)

“As a concession to industrial progress and social

utility the law will not abate a useful and lawful enter-

prise even though it be a nuisance. .. .” (emphasis

added)

With or without that comment with regard to idleness,

Murphy v. California, Supra, is the only expression by this

court addressed to the question at hand and involved a

review of the prohibition of a particular type of activity by

the State in the actual setting and context of pool halls as

they existed; not in the abstract, and a finding that pro-

hibition of that particular activity or idleness was within

the power of the State. The court judicially knows that at

least as much “association” occurs in a pool hall as in a

pinball establishment.

Rather than Murphy v. California being weakened by

more recent decisions of this court, City submits that the

holding is strengthened by the more recent cases of Gins-

berg v. New York, Supra, McGowan v. Maryland, Supra

22

and Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, Supra. City submits

that to the extent Murphy v. California holds that a state

may examine a particular activity and determine that in

the actual settiag and context in which it exists such activity

may be proscribed or regulated, that such holding has

never been overruled or weakened and that it is the law

today. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49,

(1973), n. 15.

The City fathers, with the advice of their police depart-

ment that must deal with errant youth and are charged

with protection of all youth, has viewed the situation in its

actual setting. They are better able to judge than the

judiciary the effect the activity in its real life setting will

have upon youth values; upon their efforts to protect youth

from the numerous factors within and without the indivi-

dual that detract from the youth values and community

values believed important in the proper development of our

citizenry. The fact that they are unable to articulate these

values in a precise manner in no wise detracts from their

existence. Most people could not give a precise definition

of “liberty” but believe it important.

The deference given by this court to determination of

elected representatives of the people is not outdated doe-

trine or a chance phrase picked up from an old ease and

carried forward after the reason for it has ceased to exist.

It is founded upon sound policy and is the cornerstone of

our doctrine of separation of powers.

See Shaprio v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 655, (1969), deny-

ing any role of a “Super-legislature” and Village of Belle

Terre v. Boraas, Supra, as to a “zoning Board of Appeals”.

Thus, the courts should exercise restraint in extending

their supervisory role over lawmaking into those areas

not heretofore considered “suspect legislation”, i.e., race,

23

sex, national origin or truly fundamental areas such as

speech, religion and other rights vital to our way of life.

If this deference to the determination of facts and eir-

cumstances regarding community values by the elected

representatives of the City of Mesquite as was given to

the Village of Belle Berre and to the New York Legislature

in Ginsberg V. New York, Supra, is indulged and the

burden of proof is placed on the party challenging the

legislation; the presumption, standing alone or the evidence

standing alone and certainly both taken together, will

support a rational basis for the challenged regulation.

STRICT SCRUTINY TEST

If the proper scope of judicial review to be applied is

the “strict scrutiny test” then City concedes that it has a

much heavier burden, although not necessarily an insur-

mountable one, because of the different status of children

in our society. It is not so much that different legal stan-

dards apply to children but that children are in fact

different from adults. The regulation in Ginsberg, Supra,

involved a “fundamental right”, e.g. speech, not within the

ambit of obscenity as defined by this court, and was no

more narrowly drawn than the instant ordinance. (The

statute in Ginsberg absolutely prohibited sale to minors

whereas the instant ordinances permits playing when ac-

companied by a parent.)

The court below cites Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622,

(1979), as authority that the standard is not reduced

because minors are involved. City submits that the court

below has misconstrued this court’s pronouncement as to

regulation of minors.

While clearly children are not denied protection under

the constitution due to their minority, there are simply

some rights possessed by adults that have not been ex-

24

tended to children. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. at ;

99 S.Ct. at 3045 states,

“The guiding role of parents in the upbringing of

their children justifies limitations on the freedom of

minors. The State commonly protects its youth from

adverse governmental action and from their own im-

maturity by requiring parental consent to or involve-

ment in important decisions by minors.”

To hold that regulation of the activities of all children

at all ages is on par with the regulation of the activities

of adults is to ignore plain facts of life. Each and every

day children are denied rights routinely enjoyed by adults.

See Parham v. J.R., — U.S. —, 99 S.Ct. 2473 (1979) at 99

S.Ct. 2515,

“Under our law, parents make decisions for their

minor children that deprive the children of liberty and

even life itself.”

No one would give serious consideration to a law allowing

one adult to require another adult to “eat your spinach”,

“wash your hands”, “go to church”, or any of the one

thousand and one commands given to children as part of

their daily upbringing. The fact that in the instant case

parents act through their elected officials to control the

activities of their children imposes no greater restraint

upon the right of a minor to do as he pleases than if the

parent acted directly. In Bellotti v. Baird, Supra, the court

was considering restraint by parents through the state.

Recognizing that this court has held, San Antonio Inde-

pendent School District v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, that the

importance of an activity to the individual does not determ-

ine whether or not the right is “fundamental”, it is clear

that the importance of the right to the individual was at

least one factor in Bellotti v. Baird,

25

“... there are few situations in which denying a

minor the right to make an important decision will

have consequences so grave and indelible” (emphasis

added)

and, same page

“For these reasons ... the State may not impose a

blanket provision... ; (emphasis added)

If the “important decision” in Bellotti were not made

prior to majority the woman would be stuck with responsi-

bility that would not end with her majority but would last

far into adulthood.

In the case of marriage, voting or playing pinball, one

need only defer the activity to the age of majority, much

as one who happens not to like spinach.

Nor does the regulation discriminate against any person

because we all served our apprenticeship under the author-

ity of adults and everyone has an equal chance to reach

the age of majority without the lasting burden sought to

be imposed in Bellotti v. Baird, Supra. In this important

distinction, the court below erred and the evidence supports

the regulation whether the right to play pinball is “funda-

mental” or otherwise because of the distinction between

regulation of the activities of minors and that of adults and

the relatively minor impact upon the individual.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

The court below incorrectly applied the constitutionally

protected “right of association” in this case. Right of asso-

ciation is not involved to any extent.

There is no evidence or suggestion in the record that

minors visit the establishments for reasons other than

to play the machines. Any harmful association suggested

by the testimony consists of unwanted association by those

adult persons who would victimize the young. It is not

suggested that young people play the games as members

of a team or engage in tournaments as in the ease of out-

door sports (baseball, football, ete.) or bowling. Primarily,

the games are played solo. Although individual players

may ocassionally converse with each other between or

during plays, the overriding purpose for visiting the estab-

lishment is the rental of a machine for a cash consideration

variously estimated at between five and nine dollars per

hour. The playing requires a high degree of concentration

and at least in A.C.I.’s case, the customers are not allowed

to do mueh socializing between games and cannot even

drink a coke or “loiter”. (J.A. 126) More social contact

exists in numerous other commercial activities such as the

gas lines of recent, standing in line at a bank-teller cage

or a visit from the plumber to repair a faucet.

Constitutionally protected “association” means some-

thing more than mere concurrent physical presence purely

incidental to a commercial transaction for, except for her-

mits, almost every activity known involves some inter-

change between human beings. The fallacy in raising an

activity to constitutionally protected “fundamental” status

every time two or more people are present or engage in

casual interchange is that the government would be rela-

tively powerless to govern.

When two or more people engage in a dice game, in a

drag race or an act of prostitution; when a vendor sells

merchandise, when a con artist bilks a victim; all of these

activities would attain protected status if the term “asso-

ciation” is given its broadest scope.

City submits that the term “association” in the constitu-

tional sense, means, at the minimum, some desire or intent

to mingle or engage in interchange with others.

27

If two or more people rent a motel room, an automobile

or a boat the rental transaction itself should be governed

by the same law that governs the transaction when the

rental is by one person.

Once minors have rented the machine lawfully (accom-

panied by a parent or guardian) and once it is shown that

they desire to associate while engaging in lawful activity;

at that point the “association” becomes a fundamental

right. Likewise, when adults enter into a dice game their

“association” e.g., conversation and social activity, is pro-

tected but not their participation in the dice game where

such is illegal.

No one would seriously contend that the rental of a hotel

room for purposes of prostitution is constitutionally pro-

tected because prostitution requires participation of more

than one person.

Under the broad interpretation given the term “associa-

tion” by the court below the photographing of children in

sex scenes one at a time could be prohibited upon the show-

ing of a rational basis but if photographed in groups of

two or more a more stringent test must be applied. Such a

rule is itself irrational.

Had such a rule been applied in Ginsberg, Supra, the

court could have reasoned that minors purchasing the mag-

azines would share them with their friends and read “asso-

ciation” into the activity. The State having failed to prove

a causal link between the magazines and harm and the

right to share these books with their friends being funda-

mental, this court would have been compelied to void the

New York statute.

It cannot be doubted that the six college students in Vil-

lage of Belle Terre v. Boraas, Supra, “associated” in the

broad sense of the term and likely more than the players of

28

amusement machines. Nevertheless, this court considered

and rejected any “right of association” in upholding that

City’s ordinance.

This court judicially knows that there is much more asso-

ciational activity in the public schools than playing pinball

machines and yet found that the right to attend public

school is not a fundamental right. San Antonio Indepen-

dent School District v. Rodriguez, Supra.

To hold that viewing non-obscene magazines, (as applied

to adults) residing in a home or attending publie school,

with the associational activity inherent therein, is not fun-

damental but that playing amusement machines is funda-

mental is, to say the least, startling.

Nor is the classification based upon “suspect” criteria.

Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, (1974) ; Shapiro v. Thompson,

394 U.S. 618, (J. Harlan, dissent. op.). (See also n.1, Appel-

lant’s Brief citing Appellee’s Brief).

There is one great and distinct difference in the group

classified in the instant case and those consisting of groups

of a particular race, color, national origin or other suspect

groups.

The natural love borne by members of the politically

dominant group for their children, members of the politi-

cally impotent group, will provide more protection for that

group than all the courts and all the rules of law in the

land. The feeling of responsibility and protection for one’s

children is one of the more basic attributes of man and

makes unnecessary any suspicion that the dominant group

will sacrifice the interests of the politically impotent group

as in the case of those of different race, color or national

origin. See Parham v. J.R., 99 S.Ct. 2504,

29

“more important, historically it has recognized that

natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the

best interests of their children.”

Every person of voting age comprising the dominant group

was at one time a member of the politically impotent group

and can be expected to understand the needs of such group.

See Wisconsin v. Yoder, Supra.

This leaves then, only the question of the wisdom or

value of the ordinance.

This court states in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471

at 487,

“We do not decide today that the Maryland regula-

tion is wise, that it best fulfills the relevant objectives

that Maryland might ideally espouse, or that a more

just and humane system could not be devised. Con-

flicting claims of morality and intelligence are raised

by opponents and proponents of almost every measure,

certainly including the one before us. But the intract-

able economic, social, and even philosophical problems

presented by public welfare assistance programs are

not the business of this court**** but the Constitution

does not empower this court to second-guess state

officials**** ”

City recognizes that there is divided opinion as to

whether such regulation should be exercised. Many cities

do not so regulate this activity and likewise many do have

the same or similar regulations.

See also, James V. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 at 134, (1972),

“We do not inquire whether this statute is wise or

desirable or whether it is based on assumptions scien-

tifically substantiated, Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.

30

476, 501, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1317, 1 L.Ed. 1498 (1957) (Sep-

arate opinion of Harlan, J.) misguided laws may none-

theless be constitutional.”

and, same p.

“Our task, however, is not to weigh this statute's

effectiveness but its constitutionality.”

This court expressed the concept in Dandridge v. Wil-

¢liams, Supra, 397 U.S. at 485, (1970), as follows:

“And it is a standard that is true to the principal

that the Fourteenth Amendment gives the federal

courts no power to impose upon the States their views

of what constitutes wise economic or social policy.”

See also, San Antonio Independent School District v.

Rodriguez, Supra, 411 U.S. at 33,

“It is not the province of this court to create sub-

stantive constitutional rights in the name of guarantee-

ing equal protection of the laws.”

Thus, whether the courts deem the instant ordinance wise

or unwise, so long as reasonable minds may differ upon the

question, and obviously they do, it is a basie tenet of

federalism that the courts do no substitute their opinion

for that of the legislative body except in those extreme

cases Where animosity and prejudice due to race or similar

factors call into question the objectivity of the lawmakers

or those cases involving truly fundamental rights such as

speech, religion, voting and the right to travel. This rule

is firmly established by this court and should control the

instant case. See Vance v. Bradley, 99 S.Ct. 939 at 946,

quoting Fireman v. Chicago, RI. & P. R. Co. 393 U.S. 129,

138, 89 S.Ct. 323, 28, 21 L.Ed. 2d 289 (1968),

31

“ .. and this kind of policy, under our constitutional

system, ordinarily is to be fixed only by the people

acting through their elected representatives”.

But aside from the legal and precedential basis for such

holding, City submits that it is mandated by a practical

basis.

As stated by Justice Harlan in his dissenting opinion in

Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 655,

“Virtually every state statute affects important

rights.”

Those that do not affect “important” rights affect lesser

rights. If the courts take on the responsibility of determin-

ing, de novo, the wisdom of the multitude of State and local

statutes and ordinances the courts will need to become ex-

perts in every field of human life and endeavor. The time

required to accomplish this task would be without limit.

This, in turn, would detract from the courts’ primary role

of deciding questions of law. Nor, does City believe, that

the judiciary is in a position to acquire the expertise

necessary for such a monumental task.

This court stated in San Antonio Independent School

District v. Rodriquez, Supra, 411 U.S. at 42,

“In addition to matters of fiseal policy, this case

also involves the most persistent and difficult questions

of educational policy, another area in which this court's

lack of knowledge and experience counsels against

premature interference with the informed judgments

made at the local levels.”

No doubt, if review as to wisdom of legislation is extended

to all of the action of State and local bodies such as in the

32

instant case there will be many other areas wherein the

courts will express similar misgivings.

Therefore, the precedents of this court and practicality

militates against extending the more stringent review of

strict scrutiny to cases of this nature.

STANDING

The court below erred in its interpretation of the pro-

vision of the challenged ordinance relating to “connections

with criminal elements,” (J.A. 84) deeming such provision

to be proscriptive. Such is not the case at all.

The ordinance (.J.A. 82-3) reads, in part,

“Any person desiring to obtain a license for a coin-

operated establishment shall apply to the City Secre-

tary by original and five (5) copies; one of which shall

be routed to the City Manager, Chief of Police, Chief

Building Inspector and City Planney for review.

The Chief of Police shall make his recommendation

based upon his investigation of tne applicant’s char-

acter and conduct as a law abiding person and shall

consider past operations, if any, convictions of felonies

and crimes involving moral turpitude and connections

with criminal elements, taking into consideration the

attraction by such establishment of those of tender

years.” (emphasis added)

The definitions considered by the court below are repro-

duced at (J.A. 86-7) but are not a basis of the court below’s

decision.

The decision of the court below as to standing was pre-

dicated upon the mistaken belief that a finding of some

“connection with criminal elements” would automatically

33

bar an applicant from obtaining a license. There is no such

provision in the ordinance.

The import of the quoted provision is a directive to the

Chief of Police as to what matters he is to investigate.

There is no prohibition in the ordinance as to the grant-

ing of a license to a person having “connections with crim-

inal elements”.

Upon approval by all parties the City Secretary is re-

quired to issue the license. If, on the other hand, one or

more parties fail to approve the application, the matter is

referred to the City Manager for decision, (J.A. 84),

“.. he shall review such application, together with

such recommendation as may be furnished and shall

approve such appiication or disapprove same... .”

and, (J.A. 85),

“Upon appeal to the City Council of the City Man-

ager’s decision based upon an adverse recommendation

by the Chief of Police as to applicant’s character, the

applicant shall have the same burden as prescribed in

Article 305 V.A.C.S. to show to the council that he or

it is of good character as a law abiding citizen to such

extent that a license should be issued. Upon hearing,

the council may reverse the decision of the City Man-

ager in whole or in part or may affirm such decision.”

Nowhere will it be found in the ordinance that “connec-

tion with criminal elements” is a bar to a license or that the

Chief of Police may deny a license. His duty, under the

ordinance, is to make an investigation and a report of such

investigation to the City Manager. (Note that A.C.I. has

not alleged an invasion of privacy but only vagueness.)

34

Regardless of the content of the Chief’s report, the

standard for council review is “good character as a law

abiding citizen.”

Review is then provided to the State District Court, who,

of course, would be bound by the standa, | employed by the

City Council, not the standard employed by the Police

Chief. The district court can then review the evidence as to

“sood character as a law abiding citizen” without giving

consideration to any “connection with criminal elements”

as was actually done by the Texas Supreme Court in The

City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, 570 S.W. 2d 377 (Tex.

1978),

“The denial of the license was not reasonably sup-

ported by substantial evidence. We do not reach the

question of the constitutionality of the ordinance.”

Thus, Aladdin’s Castle, Inc. was not required to take

any action or refrain from taking any action by reason of

the challenged language. Only the Chief of Police was re-

quired to act and he does not contend that he does not

understand the language.

Further, at the time of trial A.C.I. had been issued a

license and had no application pending. There was no show-

ing that they would be adversely affected by the language,

particularly considering that the State Court had mandated

the issuance of a license.

Therefore, Respondent’s only complaint is about an in-

telligence gathering requirement of the Chief of Police

exactly as that complained of in Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1,

(1972).

This court quoted in the above case from Ex Parte Levitt,

302 U.S. 633, 634, (1937) at 408 U.S. 13,

35

“ .. established principle that to entitle a private

individual to invoke the judicial power to determine

the validity of executive or legislative action he must

show that he has sustained, or is immediately in danger

of sustaining, a direct injury as the result of that

action....”

and, same page,

“The respondents do not meet this test.”

Like the respondents in Laird v. Tatum, Supra, Appel-

lee herein disagrees with the requirement because they

do not want the substantive information revealed by the

investigation to be learned. Once the investigation is made

and the information is available it will then be considered

in its actual context; not in the terms of the ordinance

language.

This, then, would be the evidence the applicant would

have to refute and there is nothing vague about the actual

evidence. How the Police Chief was instructed to obtain it,

by vague language or otherwise is not a judicial question.

Laird v. Tatum, Supra.

Appellee therefore had no standing to question the man-

ner of the Council’s instruction to the Chief of Police as to

how to perform his duties as a license may be and actually

was issued without the consent or approval of the Chief of

Police. The City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Supra.

City concedes that if Appellee had alleged violation of

the right of privacy in the trial court, its standing would

have been enhanced though still foreclosed by Laird v.

Tatum, but where no such right is alleged and the only

complaint is vagueness, its claim of standing is frivolous.

36

VAGUENESS

The same misinterpretation of the ordinance pointed out

under the question of standing applies equally to this

question. If the term, “connections with criminal elements”

was set up as a standard for which the council and the

State courts must judge an applicant’s right to a license it

must at least be precise enough so that those charged

with the responsibility of review would know what stan-

dards to apply. But such is not the case. Review, as hereto-

fore demonstrated, is upon the standard of good character

as a law abiding citizen. In the context in which it is used

it adequately informs the Chief of Police as to what his

duties are.

But even were the term established as a standard for

determining the eligibility of an applicant for a license,

which it is not, it is not unconstitutionally vague as a

business regulation. Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United

States, 342 U.S. 337, (1952).

The court below erroneously relied upon cases construing

criminal statutes, some of which touched upon First Amend-

ment rights of speech. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566,

(1974) relied upon by the court below, states, 415 U.S. at

573,

“Where a statute’s literal scope, unaided by a nar-

rowing state court interpretation, is capable of reach-

ing expression sheltered by the First Amendment, the

doctrine demands a greater degree of specificity than

in other contexts.”

This court stated in Papachristou v. City of Jackson-

ville, Supra, 405 U.S. 156 at 162,

37

“In the field of regulatory statutes governing busi-

ness activities, where the acts are in a narrow category,

greater leeway is allowed.”

In Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, (1972)

this court upheld a criminal statute because of its require-

ment that the noise be actually incompatible with normal

school activity.

The instant ordinance requires that the relationship be

incompatible with the protection of those of tender years

(J.A. 86-7).

“... to the extent that the fencing of stolen mer-

chandise of illegally obtained funds, the procuring of

prostitutes, the transfer or sale of narcotics or illegal

substances is made more feasible or likely.”

The court below was of the opinion that an individual

would be unable to measure this “extent”. Again, this

court stated in Grayned v. City of Rockford, Supra, 408

US. at 112,

“Although the prohibited quantum of disturbance is

not specified in the ordinance, it is apparent from the

statute’s announced purpose that the measure is wheth-

er normal school activity has been or is about to be

disrupted.”

When one examines the Section of the ordinance desig-

nated “Legislative Policy” (J.A. 87-8) it will readily be

noted that the announced purpose of the ordinance limits

and clarifies the language as in Grayned, Supra.

Therefore, the cases relied upon by the court below are

inapplicable to the instant case and the provision should be

upheld as a legitimate direction to the Chief of Police and

as legitimate legislative policy.

38

CONCLUSION

For the reasons shown herein, the judgment of the court

below should be reversed. In the alternative, should it be

determined that the “strict scrutiny” test is applicable, the

case should in the interest of justice be remanded to the

trial court for a more complete development of the facts

under the more stringent test.

Respectfully Submitted,

ELLanp ArcHer

P. O. Box 137

Mesquite, Texas 75149

(214) 288-7711

Attorney for Appellant

City of Mesquite

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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