Appellants Reply Brief — Common Cause v. Schmitt

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Nos. 80-847 and 80-1067

Office-Supreme Court, U.S.

> RILED

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IN THE ALEXANDER IL. SicwAS,

Supreme Court of the United ree

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

COMMON CAUSE, et al.,

Appellants,

v.

HARRISON SCHMITT, et al.,

Appellees.

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION,

Appellant,

Vv.

AMERICANS FOR CHANGE, et al.,

Appellees.

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

OPPOSITION TO MOTIONS TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM

Of Counsel:

KENNETH J. Gumo, JR.

ELLEN G. BLOCK

DONALD J. SIMON

CoMMON CAUSE

2080 M Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20086

(202) 888-1200

February 6, 1981

MICHAEL L. BURACK

Counsel of Record

ROGER M. WITTEN

CLIFFORD B. HENDLER

WILMER, OuTLER &

PICKERING

1666 K Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 872-6000

Attorneys for Appellants

Common Cause, David Cohen

and Winifred Long

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. APPELLEES HAVE GIVEN NO COGENT

REASON WHY THIS COURT SHOULD DE-

PART FROM ITS LONG-STANDING PRAC-

TICE OF REQUIRING THE DEVELOPMENT

OF AN ADEQUATE FACTUAL RECORD AS

A PREDICATE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AD-

JUDICATION 2

II. THERE IS NO MERIT TO APPELLEES’ CON-

TENTION THAT THESE CASES DO NOT

WARRANT PLENARY REVIEW ..................... 6

Ill. THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT THE ER-

RONEOUS JURISDICTIONAL AND STAND-

ING ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY AFC, OR

IN THE ALTERNATIVE SHOULD ALLOW

THE DISTRICT COURT TO PASS UPON

THEM IN THE FIRST INSTANCE ON RE-

MAND 9

A. This Court Should Reject AFC’s Jurisdic-

tional Argument 9

B. This Court Should Reject AFC’s Standing

Argument 13

C. In the Alternative, This Court Should With-

hold Its Decision on the Jurisdictional and

Standing Issues Until After the District

Court Has First Passed Upon Them on

Remand 14

CONCLUSION 15

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES: Page

Animal Welfare Institute v. Kreps, 561 F.2d 1002

(D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1013

(1978) 18

Beal v. Doe, 482 U.S. 488 (1977) .......2...2..--2-..--0000--- 5

Board of Governors Vv. Agnew, 829 U.S. 441

(1947) me 8

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) .......... 4,5, 6, 7,9, 10

Civil Service Commission v. Letter Carriers, 418

U.S. 548 (1978) 8-9

First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 485 U.S.

765 (1978) 7-8

Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556

(1974) 8-4

Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1978)... 18

Mandel v. Bradley, 482 U.S. 178 (1977) (per

curiam) 8

Metropolitan Washington Coalition for Clean Air

v. District of Columbia, 511 F.2d 809 (D.C.

Cir. 1975) 13

Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 585 (1974) ................. 10

Posadas Vv. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497

(1936) ae. 10

Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S.

SE RED. ioasern cicn caveats wosissedicistiecthatainbsonucee 8-9

Republican National Committee v. Federal Elec-

tion Commission, 487 F. Supp. 280 (S.D.N.Y.)

(three-judge court), aff'd mem., 445 U.S. 955

(1980) ‘ 5-6

Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) .......... 18

Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) .....00........00--- 3

Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 409

U.S. 205 (1972) 18

United States v. Automobile Workers, 352 U.S.

567 (1957) a

United States v. Mississippi Tax Commission, 412

U.S. 868 (19738) 14

Youakim Vv. Miller, 425 U.S. 281 (1976) ................ 14

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

FEDERAL STATUTORY PROVISIONS: Page

2 U.S.C. § 481 et seq. 10

2 U.S.C. § 481(4) (A) 8

2 U.S.C. § 481(19) 11

2 U.S.C. § 487c(b) (1) 10, 11

2 U.S.C. § 487d (e) 11

2 U.S.C. § 487¢ 12

2 U.S.C. § 487g¢(a) (1) 12

2 U.S.C. § 487g¢(a) (2) 12

Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, 26

U.S.C. ch. 95 2

§ 9002 (9) 8

§ 9011 (b) 9, 10, 11, 12, 18

§9012(f) . passim

§ 9082 (8) 8

Pub. L. No. 94-288, Title III, 90 Stat. 497 ............ 11

CONGRESSIONAL MATERIALS:

H.R. Rep. No. 94-917, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3

(1976) 11

117 Cong. Rec. 42897 (1971) 8

117 Cong. Rec. 42626 (1971) 8

In THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

No. 80-847

COMMON CAUSE, et al.,

©: Appellants,

HARRISON SCHMITT, et al., ;

Appellees.

No. 80-1067

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION,

“< Appellant,

AMERICANS FOR CHANGE, e¢ al.,

Appellees.

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

OPPOSITION TO MOTIONS TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM '

According to appellees, it is perfectly appropriate—

indeed, desirable—for this Court to invalidate an Act

of Congress without a factual record to illuminate either

the actual working of the statute or the important gov-

1Common Cause, David Cohen and Winifred Long, appellants

in No. 80-847, are filing this Opposition in both of the above-

captioned cases because both cases involve the same constitu-

tional issue, arise out of the same proceeding, and have been

briefed together by appellees. ;

Citations to our Jurisdictional Statement are given by “J.S.

—.” Citations to the Appendices to our Jurisdictional State-

ernmental interests it serves, and without full briefing

and argument to explore the constitutional issues at

stake. Appellees are wrong.

The invalidation of 26 U.S.C. § 9012(f) would have

serious consequences, for—as the Federal Election Com-

mission (“the Commission”) has emphasized—it would

substantially undermine the public-financing scheme en-

acted by Congress in the Fund Act.? See FEC J.8. 13-15;

see also J.S. 16-19. These cases therefore require careful,

fully informed consideration. Consistently with its long-

standing practice, the Court should reverse (or vacate)

the decision below and remand the cases to the district

court so that an adequate record can be developed. In

any event, the Court should not decide the constitutional

issues in the absence of full briefing and argument. As

for AFC’s jurisdictional and standing arguments—on

which the court below did not rule—the Court should

either reject them now or let the district court consider

them first on remand.

I, APPELLEES HAVE GIVEN NO COGENT REASON

WHY THIS COURT SHOULD DEPART FROM ITS

LONG-STANDING PRACTICE OF REQUIRING THE

DEVELOPMENT OF AN ADEQUATE FACTUAL

RECORD AS A PREDICATE FOR CONSTITU-

TIONAL ADJUDICATION.

A fully developed factual record is a basic prerequi-

site for the delicate task of constitutional adjudication.

This Court has consistently reversed district court de-

cisions and remanded for factual development when the

record did not provide “the concrete factual setting . . .

ment are given by “App. ——.” Finally, citations to the Juris-

dictional Statement filed by the Federal Election Commission are

given by “FEC J.S. ——.”

2 Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, 26 U.S.C. ch. 95.

especially demanded for constitutional decision.” United

States v. Automobile Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 591 (1957).°

Appellees do not deny the importance of this principle;

they do not deny that the record in this case is extraor-

dinarily sparse; and they do not claim that the relatively

limited discovery needed to compile a factual record would

in any way prove burdensome. Instead, appellees con-

tend that a factual record is simply unnecessary in this

case: They pretend that this Court would need a factual

record only in order to determine whether they are cov-

ered by Section 9012(f), concede that the statute applies

to them, and then insist that the Court has all the in-

formation it needs to strike down the statute.

Appellees’ argument is fundamentally flawed. The

issue before this Court is not whether Section 9012(f)

applies to them—it clearly does—but whether, in light

of all of the circumstances surrounding its application to

committees such as appellees, Section 9012(f) is con-

stitutional. When the constitutionality of an Act of

Congress is challenged, the context in which the statute

operates, the effects it has and the interests it serves

must be explored and fully understood—even if it is

undisputed that the challengers come within the statute.

See note 3 supra. These matters must be explored in this

case; they are factual in nature, and they cannot (and

should not) be decided on the basis of blind hunches or

argumentative assertions.

8In addition to the cases cited at J.S. 18, 15 & n.18, see, ¢.g.,

Mandel v. Bradley, 482 U.S. 173, 177-79 (1977) (per curiam)

(decision vacated and remanded where a three-judge district court

had held a statute unconstitutional on the basis of a previous

Supreme Court decision instead of “sift{ing] through the con-

flicting evidence and making findings of fact” concerning the

operation of the statute); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 738-40

(1974) (this Court stated it was “quite sure” that the decision

of a three-judge district court should be vacated and remanded

because in order “to assess realistically whether the law imposes

excessively [and thus unconstitutionally] burdensome require-

ments ... it is necessary to know other critical facts which do not

appear from the evidentiary record”); Gilmore v. City of Mont-

4

There is another, equally fundamental reason why

appellees are wrong in requesting this Court to decide

the case on a virtually non-existent record. The dis-

trict court’s decision—which appellees say was correct

and urge this Court to affirm—depended upon crucial fac-

tual findings that the record does not support, that appel-

lants (including the Commission) contend are erroneous,

and that even appellees have not seriously attempted to

defend.

The district court correctly stated that “[a] ‘contribu-

tion’ case . . . is entitled to less-exacting judicial scrutiny

{than an ‘expenditure’ case] because the ‘transformation

of contributions into political debate involves speech by

someone other than the contributor.’” App. 15a (quoting

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976)) (footnote omit-

ted). The court found, however, that no such “transforma-

tion” occurs in the case of committees such as appellees,

because (in the court’s view) the contributors control the

committees’ expenditures. On that basis—and that basis

alone—the district court held that Section 9012(f) operates

as an “expenditure” limitation and struck it down. App.

15a-18a. Thus, the district court’s decision hinged on its

finding that the contributors control how the committees

spend their contributions.

To the extent the record sheds light on the relationship

between committees and their contributors, it indicates—

as we have already noted, and as the Commission agrees—

that the district court’s finding was incorrect. See J.S.

7n.9; FEC J.S. 24-25. But the point here is not whether

the district court’s finding was or was not correct on the

basis of the record before it. The point is, rather, that

the record is woefully inadequate to enable any court

(including this Court) to decide with any degree of

gomery, 417 U.S. 556, 570-74 (1974) (decision reversed in part

and remanded where the record before this Court did “not contain

sufficient facts upon which to predicate [the requisite] legal judg-

ments”).

assurance a central issue in this case—whether the con-

tributors in fact exercise control.*

Appellees do not contend that the record is adequate to

serve as the basis for deciding this issue. AFC and FCM

are simply mute on the subject, while AEP makes the

extraordinary suggestion that the district court’s findings

are gratuitous and should simply be ignored. See AEP

Br. 9-10 n.9. But findings as to control were essential to

the district court’s analysis, and such findings require a

factual record. Cf. Beal v. Doe, 482 U.S. 488, 448 (1977)

(case remanded to three judge court where the record

was inadequate to permit this Court to determine who

really controlled the medical decision at issue).

This Court should decline appellees’ invitation to decide

a delicate and important constitutional issue in the dark.

A fully developed record is essential here just as it was

in the previous cases in which this Court has ruled on

the constitutionality of election-law provisions. The Court

4 It is equally impossible to decide, on the present record, whether

another finding crucial to the district court’s constitutional anal-

ysis is in fact correct—its finding that a political committee's for-

mal independence eliminates any danger that the candidate, if

elected, will be (or appear to’ be) beholden to the committee. App.

19a; see J.S. 11, 27. This conclusion is essentially factual in nature.

Evidence can and should be developed bearing on the question

whether the activities of entities like appellees pose the kinds of

dangers of actual or apparent quid pro quo’s that this Court recog-

nized in Buckley. See 424 U.S. at 26-27.

Appellee FCM has erroneously suggested that this question was

answered in Buckley. See FCM Br. 8. But FCM has ignored

this Court’s express statement that its discussion of independ-

ent expenditures in Buckley was limited to election practices

as they “presently appear[ed].” 424 U.S. at 46. The kinds of

entities and activities at issue in this case were unknown and un-

foreseen when Buckley was decided, and they were not before this

Court for consideration in Buckley. See J.S. 20-21.

a Buckley v. Valeo, supra, 424 U.S. at 9-10; Republican National

Committee v. Federal Election Commission, 487 F. Supp. 280,

should, therefore, reverse (or vacate) the decision below

and remand these cases for the development of an ade-

quate factual record. ,

IL. THERE IS NO MERIT TO APPELLEES’ CONTEN-

TION THAT THESE CASES DO NOT WARRANT

PLENARY REVIEW.

Appellees’ contention that the district court’s invalida-

tion of 26 U.S.C. § 9012(f) does not present a substantial

federal question is—and we use this term advisedly—

frivolous. As the Commission has correctly stated, Sec-

tion 9012(f) was “rooted in Congress’ wise, indeed ex-

pert, assessment of the potential danger in allowing politi-

cal professionals to amass, control and spend vast sums to

secure the election of presidential candidates.” FEC J.S.

18. Accord, J.S. 16-19. In concluding that Section 9012 (f)

does not serve important governmental interests, the

district court simply disagreed with Congress’ consid-

ered determination. Under these circumstances, sum-

mary disposition of these cases would be inconsistent with

the respect owed to considered determinations of the Legis-

lative Branch in matters so peculiarly within its expertise.

Nothing in Buckley v. Valeo diminishes the need for

plenary consideration in these cases. Neither Section

9012(f) nor the kinds of activities in which appellees

have engaged were before this Court in Buckley, see

J.S. 20-21, and appellees do not contend otherwise. More-

over, the across-the-board prohibitions against independ-

ent expenditures that the Court overturned in Buckley

differed in every material respect from the carefully

tailored limitation contained in Section 9012(f). See

290-807 (S.D.N.Y.) (three-judge court), af’d mem., 445 U.S. 955

(1980).

There is no merit to AEP’s suggestion that this Court ignored

, the record in Buckley. See AEP Br. 10 n.9. This Court relied

extensively upon that record. See, e.g. 424 U.S. at 20 nn.20-21,

21-22 n.28, 26 n.27, 82 nn.84-87, 33 n.39, 34 0.40, 37 n.42.

7

J.S. 24-26.° Thus, in arguing that Buckley mandates

affirmance of the decision below, appellees are in reality

asking this Court significantly to extend Buckley. See

J.S. 25 & n.26. Such a step would require plenary

consideration."

Full briefing and argument will materially assist the

Court in resolving important questions of statutory con-

struction that bear directly on the constitutionality of

Section 9012(f). Section 9012(f) only applies to “politi-

cal committees” as that term is defined in the Fund Act.

Appellants contend that the term, properly construed,

excludes groups of individuals who pool and spend their

own money, without relinquishing control over it, and

that such groups therefore do not come within Section

9012(f). See J.S. 24 & n.28. See also FEC J.S. 19. In

response, AEP asserts that this construction is “not based

on statutory language, legislative history, ... or on any

other criterion utilized by lawyers.” AEP Br. 20. But

In particular: (1) As appellees concede, Section 9012(f) leaves

individuals free to make unlimited independent expenditures,

whereas the statute overturned in Buckley prohibited essentially

all such expenditures. (2) Section 9012(f) only applies to a narrow

and specific type of group (“political committees” within the

meaning of the Fund Act), whereas the statute overturned in

Buckley applied to all groups. (3) Section 9012(f) does not (and

was not intended to) place a limit on the total amount of money

that can be spent to support candidates, whereas the statute over-

turned in Buckley drastically restricted the overall quantity of

political speech. (4) Section 9012(f) protects the integrity of the

Fund Act’s public-financing scheme and therefore applies only

when a candidate has accepted public funding, whereas the statute

overturned in Buckley choked off all independent expenditures re-

gardiess of whether a candidate had received public financing.

T Appellees also err in contending that First National Bank

of Boston v. Bellotti, 486 U.S. 765 (1978), supports affirmance.

To be sure, Bellotti explained that the capacity of speech for

informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its

source. Jd, at 777. But that capacity is not at issue here. Rather,

these cases call into question Congress’ power to protect against

actual (or apparent) quid pro quo’s resulting from the creation

8

as AEP must be aware,* appellants’ construction finds

support in both the language of the Fund Act® and its

legislative history.” It is also supported by the well-

established principle—which runs directly counter to ap-

pellees’ approach—that this Court’s “task is not to destroy

the Act if we can, but to construe it, if consistent with the

of political debts in candidate elections. Bellotti did not deny

Congress that power; to the contrary, it acknowledged it. Jd. at

788 n.26.

8 Appellants provided detailed support for their position on this

point in their district court briefs filed on August 4 and 18, 1980.

®The statutory language shows that only a relatively narrow

class of entities are “political committees” within the meaning of

the Fund Act. The Fund Act defines a “political committee” to

include only a “committee, association, or organization (whether

or not incorporated)... .” 26 U.S.C. §9002(9). By contrast, the

Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”) defines a “political com-

mittee” as including “any committee, club, association, or other

group of persons... .” 2 U.S.C. §481(4)(A) (emphasis added).

Similarly, the Presidential Primary Matching Payment Account Act

defines a “political committee” as including “any individual, com-

mittee, association, or organization (whether or not incorpo-

rated). . . .” 26 U.S.C. §9082(8) (emphasis added). The Fund

Act thus defines “political committee” more narrowly than do

these other statutes. The differences are significant, and “(t]he

inference seems reasonable . . . that Congress by the words it chose

marked a distinction which we should not obliterate... .” Board

of Governors Vv. Agnew, 829 U.S. 441, 448 (1947).

These differences in statutory definitions undercut FCM’s reli-

ance on two Commission advisory opinions. See FCM Br. 19-20.

Since both involved the FECA, rather than the Fund Act, they

applied a broader definition of “political committee.” Those opin-

ions are therefore immaterial to a determination of what con-

stitutes a “political committee” within the meaning of the Fund

Act.

10 See, ¢.g., the remarks of Senator Pastore, the sponsor of the

Fund Act, at 117 Cong. Rec. 42897-98 (1971) (speaking against

amendment that, if adopted, would have extended Section 9012(f)

to all types of committees). See also id. at 42626 (Fund Act would

ee reo ee

a .

will of Congress, so as to comport with constitutional limi-

tations.” Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419

U.S. 102, 184 (1974), quoting Civil Service Commission

v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 571 (1973). This task

can be successfully performed here. Indeed, Section

9012(f), properly construed, comports exactly with the

constitutional distinction between contributions and ex-

penditures that this Court drew in Buckley. See JS.

24-25.

Appellees are therefore wrong in alleging that appellants

seek to relitigate Buckley. We seek, rather, to construe

Section 9012(f) “so as to comport with the constitutional

limitations” announced in Buckley. To be sure, that task

may involve difficult questions of constitutional and statu-

tory analysis. But that is precisely why these cases should

be decided only after plenary briefing and argument.

III. THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT THE ERRONEOUS

JURISDICTIONAL AND STANDING ARGUMENTS

ADVANCED BY AFC, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE

SHOULD ALLOW THE DISTRICT COURT TO PASS

UPON THEM IN THE FIRST INSTANCE ON

REMAND.

AEP and FCM apparently agree that appellants’ appeal

(No. 80-847) is within the jurisdiction conferred by the

judicial review provision of the Fund Act, 26 U.S.C.

§ 9011 (b), and is properly before this Court." AFC, how-

ever, has moved this Court to dismiss the appeal on juris-

dictional and standing grounds. AFC Br. 11-17. The

Court should deny AFC’s motion.

A. This Court Should Reject AFC’s Jurisdictional

Argument..

There is no merit to AFC’s argument that 26 U.S.C.

§ 9011(b) does not authorize Count I of appellants’ ac-

tion—the only part of that action involved in this appeal.

11 Neither AEP nor FCM contends that appellants’ may not prop-

erly prosecute this appeal. Nor has the Commission moved to dis-

miss the appeal.

10

See J.S. 10 n.15. Count I alleges that Section 9012(f)

of the Fund Act applies to appellees’ activities and re-

quests appropriate declaratory and injunctive relief. Thus,

Count I is authorized by the plain language of 26 U.S.C.

§ 9011(b), which states that “individuals eligible to vote

for President are authorized to institute such actions, in-

cluding actions for declaratory judgment or injunctive

relief, as may be appropriate to implement or construe

any prov sions of” the Fund Act.’* Congress has never ex-

pressly repealed this provision, and AFC does not contend

otherwise.

AFC’s argument is, at bottom, that Congress worked

an implied repeal of Section 9011(b)’s express authori-

zation to institute actions to “implement or construe” the

Fund Act when, in 1976, Congress amended the Federal

Election Campaign Act (“FECA”), 2 U.S.C. §§ 431

et seq., to give the Commission exclusive “enforcement”

jurisdiction. See 2 U.S.C. §487c(b) (1). But it is a

“cardinal rule” of statutory construction that such im-

plied repeals are disfavored. Morton v. Mancari, 417

U.S. 585, 549 (1974), quoting Posadas v. National City

Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936). An implied repeal may

be found only when there is an “affirmative showing of

an intention to repeal” or when “the earlier and later

statutes are irreconcilable’—that is, when they are not

“capable of co-existence.” Morton v. Mancari, 417 US.

at 550, 551. AFC’s argument fails under this test,

because (1) there is no “affirmative showing of an in-

tention” to repeal Section 9011(b) either in whole or in

12[t is undisputed that appellants David Cohen and Winitced

Long are “individuals eligible to vote for President” within the

meaning of 26 U.S.C. §9011(b). App. 78a-74a. It is also undis-

puted that appellant Common Cause has members who are “eligible

to vote for President” and whose interests it represents in election-

law matters, including litigation. App. 72a-73a. Cf. Buckley v.

Valeo, 424 U.S. at 9 n.5.

Il

part,” and (2) the private right of action expressly au-

thorized by Section 9011(b) of the Fund Act is entirely

“capable of co-existence” with Section 437c(b) (1) of the

FECA."*

AFC’s argument rests, moreover, on an erroneous

premise. According to AFC, Count I of appellants’ action

is an “enforcement” matter within the meaning of Section

487c(b) (1) of the FECA, rather than an action to “im-

plement or construe” the Fund Act within the meaning

of Section 9011(b) of that Act. See AFC Br. 12. But

18 The legislative history relating to 2 U.S.C. § 487c(b) (1) con-

tains no evidence whatsoever—let alone an “affirmative showing”—

of any intention by Congress to repeal the authorization expressly

granted by Section 9011(b). Indeed, the legislative history does

not even mention Section 9011(b). This fact is dispositive on the

question of an “intention to repeal,” because the 1976 legislation

did, expressly and specifically, amend other Fund Act provisions.

See Pub. L. No. 94-283, Tit. III, 90 Stat. 497-502. With Congress

explicitly specifying how it wished to change those provisions,

it makes no sense to assume that Congress would have decided to

repeal all or part of Section 9011(b) sub silentio.

14 Section 9011(b) is entirely compatible with the provision of

the FECA that deals with the exclusivity of remedies. 2 U.S.C.

§ 437d(e). That provision, which AFC has chosen to ignore, makes

actions by the Commission “the exclusive civil remedy for the en-

forcement of the provisions of this Act”—i.e., of the FECA. See

2 U.S.C. § 481(19). Because Section 9011(b) provides a remedy

for resolving issues that arise under the Fund Act only, and not

under the FECA, it is clearly “capable of co-existence” with Section

487d(e).

Section 487c(b)(1), in turn, is “capable of co-existence” with

both Section 9011(b) and Section 487d(e). Section 487c(b)(1)

does not deal with the exclusivity of any remedy; it deals, rather,

with the scope of the Commission’s enforcement jurisdiction. The

purpose of Section 487c(b) (1) was to “simplify and rationalize”

the civil enforcement powers that had previously been divided be-

tween the Commission and the Department of Justice. H.R. Rep.

No. 94-917, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1976). Thus, Section 4387c

(b) (1) and Section 9011(b) are fully reconcilable.

12

Count I of appellants’ action is virtually identical to the

Commission’s action. See J.S. 8-9. The Commission, how-

ever, does not regard its action as an “enforcement” mat-

ter; for instead of proceeding administratively, see 2

U.S.C. § 487g(a) (2),* the Commission brought an action

under Section 9011(b) to “implement or construe” the

Fund Act. See FEC J.S. 1. Since the Commission’s ac-

tion is an action to “implement or construe” authorized

by Section 9011 (b)—and no party contends otherwise—

appellants’ Count I, which involves the identical claim, is

also an action to “implement or construe” authorized by

that Section.

Equally unmeritorious is AFC’s suggestion that the

only actions which voters may bring under 26 U.S.C.

§9011(b) are actions against the Commission to chal-

lenge the constitutionality of provisions of the Fund Act.

See AFC Br. 15. To limit actions under Section 9011 (b)

to suits seeking to overturn Fund Act provisions as un-

constitutional would read the word “implement” out of

the statute. Indeed, such a limitation would be contrary

to the obvious intent of Congress, for it would allow

only suits whose purpose was to prevent the implementa-

tion of the statute as enacted. Such a limitation would

also be inconsistent with the Commission’s prosecution

of its own action under Section 9011(b)—an action, to

which AFC has raised no jurisdictional objection, that

seeks to give effect to, rather than to overturn, Section

9012(f) of the Fund Act.

16 As AFC acknowledges, “enforcement” matters are governed

by 2 U.S.C. § 487g, which prescribes administrative procedures

to be used in such cases. See AFC Br. at 12 n.17. Those proce-

dures apply not only to “enforcement” matters initiated by pri-

vate parties, 2 U.S.C. §487g(a)(1), but also to “enforcement”

matters initiated by the Commission, id. § 487g (a) (2).

13

B. This Court Should Reject AFC’s Standing Argument.

AFC’s argument that appellants lack standing also fails

to withstand scrutiny. That argument ignores the cru-

cial fact that Congress, in enacting 26 U.S.C. § 9011(b),

determined that “individuals eligible to vote for Presi-

dent” have a sufficient stake in the statutory scheme

for the public financing of Presidential elections to jus-

tify authorizing such persons to institute actions designed

to ensure the proper functioning of that scheme.”*

The cases that AFC cites do not advance its standing

argument. See AFC Br. 16-17. Those cases, without

exception, involved questions of standing that arose in

the absence of an express statutory grant of authoriza-

tion such as that contained in Section 9011(b). Here,

Congress has created a statutory scheme, has determined

that certain groups of persons have interests that are

affected by it, and has expressly authorized those persons

to institute actions to protect their interests. In such

situations, Congress’ determination is decisive on the

question of standing.” As this Court stated in Sierra

Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 782 n.38 (1972), “where

a dispute is otherwise justiciable, the question whether

the litigant is a ‘proper party to request an adjudication

of a particular issue’ . . . is one within the power of Con-

gress to determine” (citation omitted).

16 Congress’ determination was eminently reasonable; it is, after

all, the voters whose interests the Fund Act is ultimately designed

to safeguard.

17 See, e.g., Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n3

(1973) ; Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 409 U.S.

205, 212 (1972) (concurring opinion of Justices White, Blackmun

and Powell); Animal Welfare Institute v. Kreps, 661 F.2d 1002,

1005-06 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1013 (1978);

Metropolitan Washington Coalition. for Clean Air v. District of

Columbia, 511 F.2d 809, 814 n.26 (D.C. Cir. 1975).

14

C. In the Alternative, This Court Should Withhold Its

Decision on the Jurisdictional and Standing Issues

Until After the District Court Has First Passed

Upon Them on Remand.

The district court has not yet passed upon the jurisdic-

tional and standing issues raised by AFC."* Accordingly,

if this Court does not now deny AFC’s motion to dismiss,

it should withhold decision on the jurisdictional and stand-

ing issues until after the district court, on remand, has

ruled on them in the first instance.” This course is par-

ticularly appropriate, since these cases should in any

event be remanded to the district court for factual devel-

opment. See J.S. 13-16 and pp. 1-6 supra. This pro-

cedure would promote judicial economy, and would also

ensure that these issues, when they finally come before

this Court, will be framed in the manner best suited for

disposition by it.

18 The district court considered jurisdiction only with regard

to Count II of appellants’ action, and—as AFC correctly acknowl-

edges—only Count I is before this Court. AFC Br. 4 n.6. AFC

thus also concedes, as it must, that the district court did not re-

solve either the issue whether 26 U.S.C. §9011(b) authorizes ap-

pellants to prosecute the claim stated in Count I, see AFC Br.

11 n.15, or the issue whether appellants have standing to prosecute

that claim, see id. at 16 n.23.

19 See, e.g., Youakim v. Miller, 425 U.S. 281, 236 (1976) (“claim

should be aired first in the [three-judge] District Court”) ; United

States v. Mississippi Tax Commission, 412 U.S. 363, 379, 381

(1973) (same).

15

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth in appellants’ Jurisdictional

Statement and in this Opposition, the Court should deny

appellees’ motions to dismiss or affirm and should reverse

(or vacate) the decision below and remand these cases to

the district court. In the alternative, the Court should

note probable jurisdiction of these appeals and set them

down for a full hearing.

Respectfully submitted,

MICHAEL L. BURACK

Counsel of Record

ROGER M. WITTEN

CLIFFORD B. HENDLER

Of Counsel: WILMER, CUTLER &

PICKERING

KENNETH J. GUIDO, JR. 1666 K S NW.

ELLEN G. BLOCK treet,

Washington, D.C. 20006

DONALD J. SIMON (202) 872-6000

CoMMON CAUSE

2030 M Street, N.W. Attorneys for Appellants

Washington, D.C. 20036 Common Cause, David Cohen

(202) 833-1200 and Winifred Long

February 6, 1981

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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