Petition — Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn., Inc. v. McNary

Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

80-427

No SEP L¢ 1980

es IR., CLERK |

In THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Ocroser TERM, 1980

Fair ASSESSMENT IN REAL ESTATE

ASSOCIATION, INC., ef al.,

Petitioners,

Vv.

GENE MCNAankry, ef al.,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT

OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

DAvID J. NEWBURGER

SUSAN SPIEGEL

NEWBURGER & VOSSMEYER

393 N. Euclid, Suite 300

St. Louis, Missouri 63108

314/361-2555

Attorneys for Petitioners

St. Louis Law Printing Co., Inc., 411 No. Tenth Street 63101 314-231-4477

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the District Court erred in dismissing this action on

grounds that the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. $1341, bars a

suit at law for damages under the Fourteenth Amendment to the

United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. §1983 arising from

Respondents’ past discriminatory practices in assessing Peti-

tioners’ property and in taxing Petitioners.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

i Si chsciehibucchiseterseddserscones l

NGS CLC CEEES SERS Soec bode oscccceceeeeces 2

Statutory and Constitutional Provisions Involved...... 2

Statement Of the Case ......cccccccccccccccsccccces 2

Reasons for Granting the Writ .............000e0008 5

MED Wace sccvccccnevecccccccssooscoecoccece 8

Appendix A - Order of United States Court of Appeals

PPG ANOEES ccc ccvedspeccsescescocces A-l

Appendix B - Order and Memorandum of United States

District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri,

yh | PPO TTTETTTTITI LETT TT A-3

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Advertiser Co. v. Wallace, 446 F. Supp. 667 (M.D. Ala.

DCL AUER AGidlnht erase vee¥bedcvczcecsds ove 6

Bland v. McHann, 463 F.2d 21 (Sth Cir. 1972)......... 7

Bormann v. Tomlin, 461 F. Supp. 193 (S.D. Ill. 1978) .. 7

Central Steel Wire Co. v. City of Detroit, 99 F. Supp.

639, 101 F. Supp. 470 (E.D. Mich. 1951)......... 7

Evangelical Catholic Communion, Inc. v. Thomas, 373

F. Supp. 1342 (D. Vt. 1973), aff’d, 493 F.2d 1397

LES ss 6 hg iele bss ss dawwewanyss 6c 6,7

iv

Fulton Market Cold Storage Co. v. Cullerton, 582 F.2d

1071 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1121

CTE cocndncscereccdcnipedesesartssmavers

Gray v. Morgan, 371 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1966) .........

Hickmann v. Wujick, 488 F. 2d 875 (2d Cir. 1973) .....

Horn v. O’Cheskey, 387 F. Supp. 1280 (D.N.M. 1974) .

Kelley v. Springett, 527 F. 2d 1090 (9th Cir. 1975)......

LaSalle National Bank v. Rosewell, 604 F. 2d 530 (7th

Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S.Ct. 1310 (1980). ...

Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Atkins, 390 F. Supp.

576 (M.D. Tenn.), aff’d, 423 U.S. 802 (1975) .....

Ludwin v. City of Cambridge, 592 F. 2d 606 (ist Cir.

aX SEs ok Ks bebo Oo Meek A btdEebbekaveetsces

Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972)

Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America v. Sergeant, 337

Pr SO. Ms TRTEE 66 icccccoccecdetaces

Ott v. Mississippi Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169 (1949). .

Rico Argentine Mining Co. v. Board of County Com-

missioners, 215 F. Supp. 208 (D. Colo. 1963) .....

Southland Mall, Inc. v. Garner, 293 F. Supp. 1370 (W.

Es Ps RU a sd bas evs ecCRuk ah aen ewe bes ne 00%

United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Whitman, 595 F. 2d 323

Se UE voc 6's 0.0 CURE KeKEURAC AC RObaSADaes

United States v. State Tax Commission, 505 F. 2d 633

See SUSY hc ee s.6 40a cous oekeds kaos

Statutes:

Se EER shes hicbe Letbetcdebiewvacaeeis

PEN EE Kivh', 6 UG ie > 0 od edea bo ubes cay hece’s

UUs 6 din'n's 6 bab ac bcdakwed ObuKiovudes

Other Authorities:

United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, Section

No.

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Octoser Term, 1980

Fair ASSESSMENT IN REAL ESTATE

ASSOCIATION, INC., ef al.,

Petitioners,

Vv.

Gene McNaary, ef al.,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT

OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

Petitioners respectfully pray the Supreme Court to grant a

writ of certiorari to review the order of the United States Court

of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in the above-entitled case.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Eighth Circuit (App. A, infra, p. A-1) is reported at 622 F.2d

415. The opinion of the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Missouri is reported at 478 F.Supp. 1231

(App. B, infra, pp. A-2 to A-7).

a

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Eighth Circuit, en banc, was entered on June 19, 1980, (App. A,

infra, p. A-1), affirming the judgment of the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, entered on

November 7, 1979 (App. B, infra, p. A-2). The final mandate of

the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit was

entered on July 15, 1980. The jurisdiction of this Court is invok-

ed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1254(1).

STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, Section 1: No

state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the

privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;

nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or

property, without due process of law; nor deny to any per-

son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

42 U.S.C. §1983: Every person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or

Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen

of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction

thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or im-

munities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be

liable to the proper proceeding for redress.

28 U.S.C. §1341: The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend

or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax

under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy

may be had in the courts of such State.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The questions presented arise out of the District Court’s

dismissal of an action for actual and punitive damages to

aay in

remedy the deprivation of Petitioners’ rights under the Four-

teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 42

U.S.C. §1983. The individual Petitioners, J. David Cassilly and

Lynn F. Cassilly, are owners of real property with newly con-

structed improvements (hereinafter referred to as a ‘“‘new

home’’) located in St. Louis County, Missouri. Petitioner Fair

Assessment In Real Estate, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as

‘*FAIR’’) is a not-for-profit membership corporation formed

by real estate taxpayers in St. Louis County to promote

equitable enforcement of real property tax laws in the State of

Missouri. Respondents are various past and present officials of

St. Louis County and the Missouri State Tax Commission en-

trusted with responsibility for enforcement of real property tax

laws. (Respondent Gene McNary is the County Executive of St.

Louis County (formerly ‘‘County Supervisor’’); Respondents

William A. Skaggs and Edmund J. Pung are present and past

Directors of Revenue of St. Louis County; Respondents Charles

T. Schneider and Frank J. Antonio are present and past Tax

Assessors of St. Louis County; Respondents Donald G.

Williams, Stephen C. Snyder, and Tom R. Otto are present and

past members of the Missouri State Tax Commission.) Peti-

tioners alleged that Respondents have maliciously, willfully, in-

vidiously, systematically, knowingly, and intentionally enforced

property tax laws to the damage of Petitioners and other owners

of new homes. According to Petitioners’ allegations,

Respondents have done so by maliciously, willfully, invidiously,

systematically, knowingly, and intentionally assessing new

homes at a higher rate than old homes and by maliciously,

willfully, invidiously, systematically, knowingly, and inten-

tionally singling out such owners who have previously protested

such disparity for property tax reassessement.

Petitioners filed this action in the District Court for the

Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern Division, on July 2, 1979.

On August 13, 1979, Resrondents Gene McNary, William A.

Skaggs, Edmund J. Pung, Charles T. Schneider and Frank J.

Antonio, filed their joint Motion to Dismiss Petitioners’ Com-

peas

plaint for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted

and for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. On or about

August 16, 1979, Respondents Donald G. Williams, Thomas R.

Otto, and Stephen C. Snyder, filed an Answer generally denying

the allegations in Petitioners’ Complaint.

After considering the pleadings, suggestions and memoranda

filed by the various parties, and without the introduction of

evidence or oral argument, the District Court entered its order

on November 7, 197) dismissing this action in its ‘‘entirety,’’ on

the basis of the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. §1341 (App. B,

infra, pp. A-2 to A-7). Thereafter, on June 19, 1980, upon con-

sideration of the briefs and oral arguments of the parties, the

Eighth Circuit, en banc, entered its order affirming the District

Court judgment but issued no opinion (App. A, infra, p. A-1).

eg te

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

This Court should grant this petition for Writ of Certiorari

for two reasons. The case presents an important question of

federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by this

Court, and a conflict exists in various decisions of the Court of

Appeals of several Circuits in respect of the issue presented

here.

1. Petitioners’ lawsuit was a claim against certain state and

local officials as individuals for having maliciously, willfully, in-

vidiously, systematically, knowingly, and intentionally singled

out and discriminated against Petitioners by imposing upon

them a discriminatory tax. Petitioners were singled out for this

discriminatory treatment for two reasons—one, their real prop-

erty was newer than the countywide average, and two, they had

previously appealed their tax assessment.

The District Court dismissed the lawsuit on grounds that the

Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. §1341, barred the federal courts

from hearing Petitioners’ action at law for damages. The Eighth

Circuit, en banc, affirmed, upon a four-to-four vote, and issued

no opinion.

Petitioners’ action is founded upon a claim of discrimination

involving property rights. This Court has held that no distinc-

tion should be drawn between an invasion of ‘‘personal’’ rights

and ‘‘property”’ rights of persons claiming their right to be free

from unlawful discrimination. Lynch v. Household Finance

Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972).

Therefore, by ruling as they have, the District Court has

adopted, and the Eighth Circuit has affirmed, a rule that state

and local officials may impose any kind of discriminatory tax—

even, for example, a head tax on Blacks, Jews, or Lithuanians

—without fear that the federal courts will protect those so

discriminated against. The federal courts have not since 1954

been willing to so restrict their power to ensure citizens’ civil

rights. By their rvling, the courts below have taken that step by

x

at ben

extending the rather clear language of the Tax Injunction Act

beyond its limits. The Act refers to equitable sorts of remedies,

not to actions for damages in law proceedings.

This Court has recently indicated that it considers the scope

of the Tax Injunction Act a matter of significant importance. It

has agreed to review LaSalle National Bank v. Rosewell, 604

F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 1310 (1980),

in which the question is when a court should disregard the bar of

the Tax Injunction Act on grounds that a state lacks a plain,

speedy, and efficient review process in tax matters. The issue

presented here is whether the Tax Injunction Act bars actions at

law for damages as well as injunctive actions. The importance

of the question presented here is equal to that presented in

LaSalle National Bank, for both address the extent of the limit

that the Act imposes upon citizens’ efforts to protect their civil

rights.

The matter presented here is an important question of federal

law that has not been, but should be, settled by this Court.

2. In addition to the foregoing, this Court should grant the

petition for Writ of Certiorari because the Circuits are in con-

flict over whether the Tax Injunction Act bars the federal courts

from jurisdiction over actions at law for damages. The Seventh

Circuit has clearly decided the question contrary to the Eighth

Circuit in Fulton Market Storage Co. v. Cullerton, 582 F.2d

1071 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1121 (1979).

The Eighth Circuit is joined in its decision below by a lower

court in the Fifth Circuit in a clear holding that the Tax Injunc-

tion Act bars such action. Advertiser Co. v. Wallace, 446 F.

Supp. 667 (M.D. Ala. 1978). Moreover, Respondents herein

have argued that Ludwin v. City of Cambridge, 592 F.2d 606

(ist Cir." 1979); Evangelical Catholic Communion, Inc. v.

Thomas, 373 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Vt. 1973), aff’d, 493 F.2d 1397

(2d Cir. 1974) (mem.); Hickmann v. Wujick, 488 F.2d 875 (2d

Cir. 1973); Horn v. O‘Cheskey, 387 F. Supp. 1280 (D.N.M.

ee

1974), are to the same effect, although Petitioners dispute that

interpretation of those cases.

By implication, a line of cases that have held that the Tax In-

junction Act does not bar actions in federal court for tax

refunds supports the conclusion in Fulton Market. Bormann v.

Tomlin, 461 F. Supp. 193 (S.D. Ill. 1978); Louisville &

Nashville Railroad v. Atkins, 390 F. Supp. 576 (M.D. Tenn.),

aff'd, 423 U.S. 802 (1975); Southland Mall, Inc. v. Garner, 293

F. Supp. 1370 (W.D. Tenn. 1968); Rico Argentine Mining Co.

v. Board of County Commissioners, 215 F. Supp. 208, 209 (D.

Colo. 1963); Central Steel Wire Co. v. City of Detroit, 99 F.

Lupp. 639, 101 F. Supp. 470 (E.D. Mich. 1951), relying upon

Ott v. Mississippi Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169 (1949), as

reaching the same result. If those cases are correct, then an ac-

tion for damages against individual state officers, and not

against a public treasury, must not be barred by the Tax

Injunction Act.

Other courts among the Circuits, have ruled that the Tax In-

junction Act does bar actions for tax refunds. Thus, contrary

to the above cited cases stand United Gas Pipe Line Co. v.

Whitman, 595 F.2d 323 (Sth Cir. 1979); Kelley v. Springett, 527

F.2d 1090 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. State Tax Commis-

sion, 505 F.2d 633 (Sth Cir. 1974); Evangelical Catholic Com-

munion, Inc. v. Thomas, supra; Bland v. McHann, 463 F.2d 21

(Sth Cir. 1972). In addition, Respondents have argued that Gray

v. Morgan, 371 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1966), and Natural Gas

Pipeline Co. of America v. Sergeant, 337 F. Supp. 88 (D. Kan.

1972), likewise so hold, although Petitioners disagree with that

conclusion.

Thus, the Circuits are in conflict over whether a civil rights

action at law for damages is barred by the Tax Injunction Act.

The decision in Fulton Market directly supports the proposition

that the Act does not prohibit such an action. The decision

below and decisions in at least one other Circuit reach the op-

posite result. Still other decisions among the Circuits support

Fulton Market indirectly by holding that the Tax Injunction Act

is not a bar to actions at law for tax refunds. However, other

decisions within the Circuits hold that the Tax Injunction Act

bars such tax refund cases. The issue has become embroiled in a

series of conflicting and disorganized opinions among the Cir-

cuits that require determination by this Court.

CONCLUSION

The petition for Writ of Certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

DAVID J. NEWBURGER

SUSAN SPIEGEL

NEWBURGER & VOSSMEYER

393 N. Euclid, Suite 300

St. Louis, Missouri 63108

314/361-2555

Attorneys for Petitioners

September 17, 1980

LJ 4 *

if Ae fp

ey y (i AD) man

» ig iat bee

vl

Wk “ we ed i

TD ees,

-

Ae

4

m-

:

‘ 7

1,

eee Fe

+d

iy

ae ee

APPENDIX A

United States Court of Appeals

For The Eighth Circuit

No. 79-2031

Fair Assessment in Real Estate

Association, Inc.;

David J. Cassilly;

Lynn F. Cassilly,

Appellants,

V.

Gene McNary; William A. Skaggs;

Edmund J. Pung; Charles T.

Schneider; Frank J. Antonio;

Donald G. Williams; Tom R. Otto;

Stephen C. Snyder,

Appellees. |

Appeal from the

United States District

Court for the Eastern

District of Missouri

Submitted: June 11, 1980

Filed: June 19, 1980

Before LAY, Chief Judge, HEANEY, BRIGHT, ROSS,

STEPHENSON, HENLEY, McMILLIAN and ARNOLD,

Circuit Judges, En Banc.

ORDER

The judgment of the district court is affirmed by an equally

one Ras

divided court en banc. Chief Judge Lay and Judges Ross,

McMillian and Arnold would reverse the judgment of the

district court.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEAL, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.

a =

APPENDIX B

United States District Court

Eastern District of Missouri

Eastern Division

Fair Assessment in Real Estate ;

Association, Inc., et al.,

Plaintiffs,

vs. 4 No. 79-805 C (2)

Gene McNary, et al.,

Defendants. J

ORDER

Pursuant to the memorandum filed herein this day,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants’ motion to

dismiss be and is granted and that this case be and is dismissed

in its entirety.

/s/ JOHN F. NANGLE

United States District Judge

Dated: November 7, 1979.

is Hil tate

United States District Court

Eastern District of Missouri

Eastern Division

Fair Assessment in Real Estate 7

Association, Inc., et al.,

Plaintiffs,

vs. r No. 79-805 C (2)

Gene McNary, et al.,

Defendants. ;

MEMORANDUM

(Filed November 7, 1979)

This case is now before the Court on the motion to dismiss of

several defendants. Plaintiffs brought this suit pursuant to 42

U.S.C. §1983 alleging that defendants’ acts and practices in

connection with the taxing of real property in St. Louis County,

Missouri have deprived plaintiffs of equal protection and due

process of the law. Two specific practices of defendants are

alleged to violate these constitutional guarantees: 1) properties

with new improvements are assessed at approximately 33-1/3%

of their current market value, while properties without recent

improvements are assessed at approximately 22% of their cur-

rent market value, due to the fact that there has not been a

general reassessment in the County since 1960; and 2) property

owners who successfully appeal their assessment are specifically

targeted for reassessment the next year. By these actions, defen-

dants are alleged to have ‘‘maliciously, willfully, invidiously,

systematically, knowingly, and intentionally’’ violated plain-

tiffs’ constitutional rights.

Plaintiffs in this suit are Fair Assessment in Real Estate

Association, Inc. (“‘FAIR’’), and J. David and Lynn F. Cassilly.

Fair is a non-profit corporation whose purpose is to promote

and encourage equitable enforcement of the property tax laws

a ee

in Missouri. J. David and Lynn F. Cassilly, husband and wife,

are owners of real property with recent improvements in St.

Louis County. Plaintiffs J. David and Lynn F. Cassilly seek to

recover actual damages in the amount of the alleged over-

assessments, plus punitive damages. Plaintiff FAIR seeks to

recover the monies it has expanded in its attempts to obtain

equitable enforcement of the state real property tax law on

behalf of its members.

Three groups of defendants are involved. Defendants Charles

Schneider and Frank Antonio are the principal defendants.

They are the present Tax Assessor in St. Louis County and his

predecessor, respectively. It is their allegedly unlawful assess-

ment of real property in St. Louis County which is the gravamen

of this complaint.

Defendant Gene McNary is the Supervisor of St. Louis Coun-

ty. Defendants William Skaggs and Edmund Pung are the

Director of Revenue of St. Louis County and his predecessor,

respectively. These defendants allegedly have supervisory

responsibility over the assessor and have acquiesced in the

assessor’s illegal conduct.

Defendants Donald Williams, Stephen Snyder, and Tom Otto

are members of the Siate Tax Commission. As members of the

Commission, these defendants allegedly have supervisory

responsibility over the other defendants with respect to the state

property tax laws, and have allegedly refused to correct the il-

legal practices. These three defendants answered the complaint.

All the other defendants filed the motion to dismiss now under

consideration.

Defendants contend that this suit for damages is barred by

the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. §1341. That Act provides as

follows:

The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend, or restrain the

assessment, levy or collection of any tax under the state

a

law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had

in the courts of such state.

This Act, by its very terms, prohibits this Court from entering

an injunction which would enjoin, suspend, or restrain the

assessment, levy, or collection of the property tax now in ques-

tion. 28 East Jackson Enterprises, Inc. v. Cullerton, 551 F.2d

1093 (7th Cir. 1977). it has also been held that this Act prohibits

the granting of a declaratory judgment as to the collectability of

a state tax. Jilinois Central R. Co. v. Howlett, 525 F.2d 178 (7th

Cir. 1975). See, also, Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huff-

man, 319 U.S. 293 (1943). The issue now presented is whether

the Act prohibits a suit for damages in the circumstances

presently alleged.

The Seventh Circuit has recently answered this question in the

negative. Fulton Market Cold Storage Co. v. Cullerton, 582

F.2d 1071 (7th Cir. 1978). In that case, plaintiff alleged that

defendants had

systematically, knowingly, intentionally, fraudulently and

invidiously assessed its property at levels other than per-

mitted by law and greatly in excess of the levels at which

property was generally assessed in Cook County in those

years. Id. at 1073.

The court reviewed the cases construing the statute, as well as its

legislative history, and determined that permitting an action for

damages would not run counter to the underlying policy con-

siderations of the Act.

This Court must disagree with the conclusion reached by the

Seventh Circuit, at least to the extent that plaintiffs attempt to

apply it in this case. In Cullerton, the court summarized the pur-

poses of the Tax Injunction Act as follows:

The statute, its legislative history and significant cases in-

dicate that the primary evil to be avoided is federal

= «vn

equitable relief which would disrupt the state taxing pro-

cess. A federal court injunction or declaratory judgment

would not only undermine and jeopardize a state’s ability

to collect its revenue but would also seriously damage the

delicate balance inherent in our federalistic system of

government. Id. at 1078.

The court concluded that allowing a damage action under the

circumstances alleged would not interfere with those purposes.

In the present case, plaintiffs do not allege that they were

discriminated against due to their race, ethnic background or

political affiliation. Cf. Cullerton, id. at 1079. Rather, they are

complaining that the system adopted by defendants results in

overassessments of their property. The relief sought comports

with these allegations - actual damages to bring their tax

payments into line with those of other taxpayers. In effect, the

individual plaintiff seek a refund of the alleged overpayments.

It has been held that the Tax Injunction Act bars suits for

refunds as well as anticipatory relief. Kelly v. Springett, 527

F.2d 1090 (9th Cir. 1975); Bland v. McHann, 463 F.2d 21 (Sth

Cir. 1972), cert. denied 410 U.S. 966 (1973). Such a result is dic-

tated by the underlying purposes of the Tax Injunction Act. To

allow such suits would cause disruption of the states’ revenue

collection systems equal to that caused by anticipatory relief.

State tax collection officials could be summoned into federal

court to defend their assessments against claims for refunds as

well prayers for punitive damages, merely on the assertion that

the tax collected was willfully and maliciously discriminatory

against a certain type of property. Allowance of such claims

would result in this Court being a source of appellate review of

all state property tax classifications. This Court can not con-

done such a result.

Property taxation is a subject which is best left to the states to

perform in their own ways. The notion of ‘‘comity’’, so strongly

rewforced by ihe Supreme Court in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.

37 (1971), is equally applicable in the present situation

ay pe

. . . @ proper respect for state functions, a recognition of

the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of

separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief

that the National Government will fare best if the States

and their institutions are left free to perform their separate

functions in their separate ways. Id. at 44.

It can not be disputed that plaintiffs have means to rectify

what they consider an unjust situation through the state’s own

processes. In fact, they have been largely successful in doing just

that. Plaintiffs and similarly situated taxpayers have brought

numerous suits in state courts challenging the prevailing system

of property tax assessment.

In Breckenridge Hotels Corp. v. Leachman, 571 S.W.2d 251

(Mo.banc. 1978), it was held that the rights of taxpayers such as

plaintiffs were violated when their property was assessed at a

percentage of current market value much higher than other

property in St. Louis County. In State ex rel Cassilly v. Riney,

576 S.W.2d 325 (Mo.banc. 1979), the Missouri Supreme Court

directed the State Tax Commission to ensure that all property

was properly reassessed. This direction prompted the passage of

legislation to implement a general reassessment in the County.

Senate Bill 247, et al. Vernon’s Missouri Legislative Service

1979, No. 2, p. 367.

It is clear that plaintiffs’ proper course for relief is through

the state’s channels. This Court should not interfere in the

legitimate interests of the state in implementing its own property

tax system. Cf. Younger, supra. To allow a suit under the pre-

sent circumstances would be doing just that.

Plaintiff FAIR, as an alleged representative of property tax-

payers, is obviously in the same position as the individual plain-

tiffs. Similarly, the defendants who answered the complaint

rather than joining in the motion to dismiss now under con-

ae et ain

sideration are in the same position as the movir.; defendants.

Therefore, this suit will be dismissed in its entirety.

/s/ JOHN F. NANGLE

United States District Judge

Dated: November 7, 1979.