Appendix — Beltran v. Myers

Supreme Court brief1981

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“Supreme Court, US|

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No. 80-5303

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October ‘Term, 1980

ANTONIA BELTRAN,. individually and on behalf of

all others similarly situated,

Petitioner,

BEVERLEE A. MYERS, individually and in her

official capacity as Director of the California

State Department of Health; and ELISABETH LYMAN,

individually and in her official capacity as

Deputy Director of the State Department of

Health,

Respondents.

RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION TO MOTION OF PETITIONER

FOR SUMMARY REVERSAL AND REMAND IN PART, AND

FOR VACATION AND REMAND IN PART DUE TO

INTERVENING LEGISLATION

GEORGE DEUKMEJIAN, Attorney General

THOMAS E. WARRINER, ;

Assistant Attorney General

ANNE S. PRESSMAN,

DONALD A. ROBINSON,

RICHARD J. MAGASIN,

Deputy Attorneys General

3580 Wilshire ‘Boulevard, Suite 8060

Los Angeles, California 90010

Telephone: (213) 736-2606 and

(213) 736-2214

Attorneys for Respondents

“

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION TO MOTION OF PETITIONER 1

a ®F & ND

I. THE ENACTMENT OF THE BOREN/LONG

: AMENDMENT CANNOT BE INTERPRETED

i! AS A STATEMENT OF CONGRESS'

6 (

OPINION THAT, UNDER THE LAW -

7 is PRIOR TO THE AMENDMENT, STATES

q COULD NOT APPLY TRANSFER OF

8 ji ASSETS RULES IN THE

MEDICAID PROGRAM 3

9 |i

A. The Amendment Is An Explicit

10 Expression Of Legislative

Intent That States Should Be

ll Permitted to Apply Transfer of

Assets Rules In The

12 Medicaid Program. 3

13 B. Courts Have Recognized That

The Use of Subsequent Ys

14 Legislative Pronouncements Ler

Form a Hazardous Basis For 7

15 Inferring The Intent Of An

Earlier Congress. 6

ae. C. Certain Reports Of The Senate

17 | Finance Committee Explicitly

State That Legislation ree

18 Allowing States To Apply

Transfer Rules Should Not

19 Be Construed As Agreement

With Those Decisions Which

20 Have Struck Down Such Rules. 7

21 | CONCLUSION 9

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASE

Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr

(2d Cir., 1967) 383 F.2d 166

cert. den. (1968) 390 U.S. 956

Caldwell v. Blum

(CCH Medicare and Medicaid Guide)

para. 30,093 (N.D.N.Y. 1979)

Caldwell v. Blum

(2d Cir., 1980) 621 F.2d 491,

petn. for cert. pending

No. 79-2034 (filed June 24, 1980)

Dawson v. Beach

No. 78-2350 (C.D. Cal. 1979)

Dawson v. Myers

9th Cir., 1980)

22 F.2d 1304

Fabula v. Buck

(4th Cir., 1979)

598 F.2d 869

. Fabula v. Solomon

(D.Md. 1978)

463 F.Supp. 830

Lerner ve Division of Family Services

(Wis. 1975) 70 Wis.2d 670,

235 N.W.2d 478

Mathews v. Weber

(1976) 423 U.S. 261

Oklahoma Tax Commission, et al. v.

Shanoline Pipeline Co. .

(10th Cir.,. 1940)

113 F.2d 853

Rinefierd v. Blum

(4th Dept. 1979)

412 N.Y.S.2d 526

Robinson v. Pratt

(CCH Medicare and Medicaid Guide)

para. 30,605 (D.Mass. 1980)

Scarpuzza v. Blum

(2d Dept. 1980)

426 N.Y.S.2d 505

United States v. Price

(1960) 361 U.S. 304

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STATUTE

California Welf. & Inst. Code § 14015

42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C)

1396a(f£)

"REGULATION

22 Cal. Admin. Code § 50408

50409

MISCELLANEOUS

at Amendment No. 1936 to House Report

1979-1980 CCH Congressional Index,

p- 34,547 (Dec. 19, 1980)

126 Congressional Record, $8248 5

(daily ed., June 26, 1980)

126 Congressional Record, $8250 8, 9

(daily ed., June 26, 1980)

126 Congressional Record, S16505 a, 3, .6,.2

(daily ed., Dec. 13, 1980)

Public Law 96-611 1, 10

Public Law 96-611, § 2 10

puntte tos GN Ae | 1, 10

Rules of the Supreme Court, Rule 23.1 1

Senate Bill 2885, § 511 | 8

Senate Report No. 95-1111, 95th Cong., 6

2d Sess. (1978) 24-25 reprinted

in CCH Medicare and Medicaid Guide,

para. 29,592

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RESPONDENTS' OPPOSITION TO MOTION OF PETITION

FOR SUMMARY REVERSAL AND REMAND IN PART, AND

FOR VACATION AND REMAND IN PART DUE TO

INTERVENING LEGISLATION

The Boren/Long Amendment No. 1936 (hereinafter referred

to as "“Amendment") passed both the Senate and House of

Representatives on December 13, 1980, as part of HR 8406 (see

1979-1980 CCH Congressional Index, p. 34,547 (December 19,

1980)) and was signed into law by the President on December 28,

1980. The slip law will be designated Public Law 96-61l, § 5.

Petitioner contends that the nature of this legislation |e

and its purpose, as explained in its legislative history,

resolves the issue of this case for certain class members, and

requests that this Court reverse summarily pursuant to Rule 23.l,

Rules of the Supreme Court. In addition, petitioner contends

that the case should be remanded for other members of the class

who will apply after July 1, 1981. Petitioner's position,

however, is untenable.

Bat

Respondents have argued at all levels of this

litigation that California's transfer of assets rule, under the

law prior to the Amendment, does not violate the Supremacy Clause

as it does not conflict with any federal statute or regulation.

The recent enactment of the Boren/Long Amendment and accompanying

legislative intent is in fact supportive of respondents'

position. The Boren/Long Amendment is an explicit expression of

legislative intent that states should be permitted to apply

transfer of assets rules in the Medicaid program, in addition to

the Title XVI SSI/SSP cash assistance program. This legislation,

especially in light of recent court decisions, was found

necessary to correct the practice whereby persons with

substantial assets intentionally divest themselves of such assets

so that the costs of long-term institutional care will be borne

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by the state through its medical assistance program.

enactment of the Boren/Long Amendment cannot be interpreted as a

statement of Congress' opinion that, prior thereto, states could

not apply transfer of assets rules to the Title XIX Medicaid

program.

legislative pronouncements form a hazardous basis for inferring

the intent of an earlier Congress. Furthermore, certain reports

Courts have acknowledged that the use of subsequent

of the Senate Finance Committee explicitly state that legislation fe ok

allowing states to apply transfer rules should not be construed

as agreement with those decisions which have struck down such

rules.

te, en ee i. at Ai aii ee ae. A ae

THE ENACTMENT OF THE BOREN/LONG AMENDMENT

CANNOT BE INTERPRETED AS A STATEMENT OF :

CONGRESS' OPINION THAT, UNDER THE LAW R-

PRIOR TO THE AMENDMENT, STATES COULD

NOT APPLY TRANSFER OF ASSETS RULES

IN THE MEDICAID PROGRAM

a fF A ND

6! A. The Amendment Is An Explicit Expression

f Of Legislative Intent That States Should

7: Be Permitted to Apply Transfer of Assets

ae Rules In The Medicaid Program. aS

8 | af

9 Respondents submit that California's transfer of assets

10 rule, under the law prior to the Amendment, does not violate the

1l Supremacy Clause as it does not conflict with any federal statute

12} °F — Although other courts have reached a contrary 3

13 conclusion, respondents have argued in their Brief on file with

14 this Court that the Court below, as well as several concurring an

15 courts, have reached the correct decision based on the language

16 of those sections and applicable case law. (Dawson v. Beach No.

17 78-2350 (C.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd. sub nom. Dawson v. Myers, 622

18 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1980); J.A. 52; J.A. 56; Fabula v. Solomon

19 463 F.Supp. 830 (D. Md. 1978), rev'd. sub nom. Fabula v. Buck,

20 | 598 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1979); Lerner v. Division of Family

21 Services 235 N.W.2d 478 (Wis. 1975); Rinefierd v. Blum 412

N.Y¥.S.2d 526 (4th Dept. 1979).)

1. Fabula v. Buck (4th Cir. 1979) 598 F.2d 869, oy

241 scarpuzza v. Blum (2d Dept. 1980) 426 N.Y.S.2d 505. Both the

lower court in Caldwell v. Blum (CCH Medicare and Medicaid Guide, |

25 para. 30,093 (N.D.N.Y. 1979)) and the Second Circuit, Caldwell v.

Blum (2d Cir. 1980) 621 F.2d 491, pet. for cert. pending No.

26 | 79-3034 (filed June 24, 1980), as well as Robinson v. Pratt (CCH

Medicare and Medicaid Guide, para. 30,605 (D. Mass. 1980)) also

found the transfer of assets rule violative of the Supremacy

Clause in those states which did not elect the option available

in 42 U.S.C. sec. 1396a(f£). These latter three decisions were

not final rulings on the merits, but were in the context of

29] motions for a preliminary injunction.

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_of respondent's position. The Amendment explicitly permits

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The enactment of the Boren/Long Amendment is supportive

states to do that which states had the authority to do under the

prior law, namely, to apply transfer of assets rules in the Title ne

XIX Medicaid Program. The transfer rule under the Amendment is

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very similar to California's transfer of assets rule. (Welf. ;oR)

& Inst. Code, § 14015; 22 Cal. Admin. Code, §§ 50408, 50409.)

individual within the preceding two years if the individual gave 4

away or sold assets for less than valuable consideration for enol

purpose of establishing eligibility for Medicaid. States may

presume that the transfer was made for the purpose of becoming

eligible for benefits, unless the applicant rebuts the

presumption by furnishing convincing contrary evidence. The bill

also establishes periods of time during which the states may deny fs

the applicant's eligibility. ass

This legislation was found necessary to correct the

frequently utilized practice whereby persons with substantial

assets intentionally divest themselves of such assets so that the

costs of long-term institutional are will be borne by the state

through its medical assistance program. In arguing for the

passage of his cosponsored amendment, Senator Russell Long

charaterized a transfer of assets for the purpose of establishing

eligibility for public assistance as: :

". . »« am abusive practice in which certain individuals

transfer substantial assets to their families

or to others in order to bring themselves down

2. The Boren/Long Amendment No. 1936 to HR 8406, as it

appears in the Congressional Record at 126 Cong.Rec. S16505

(daily ed. December 13, 1980) is set forth in the Brief of the

Respondents at p. 40, fn. 22.

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135

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eligibility level which will qualify them for

payments under the supplemental security income

(SSI) program and for fully paid medical care

under the medicaid program." (126 Cong.Rec. S16505

(daily ed. December 13, 1980).)

Senator Long recognized this “abusive practice" as a "substantial

fiscal concern for many states." (Ibid.)

Further support for congressional recognition of the

need to allow states to impose restrictions on the transfer of

assets for the purpose of establishing eligibility for public

assistance can be found in the legislative history of that

reconciliation bill referred to by Senator Long (Senate Bill |

2885). In the General Discussion of (the Senate) Finance

Committee Amdendments to Senate Bill 2885 (126 Cong.Rec. S8248

(daily ed. June 26, 1980)), the following comments on the

practice of transferring assets to establish SSI eligibility

were made:

"The committee believes that it is inappropriate

for the public assistance programs to be burdened

with the assumption of the support and medical care

of individ»als who have ample personal resources. ...

The Committee recognizes that there may be cases

in which such a transaction takes place in good faith

and unforeseen circumstances subsequently require an

individual to apply for assistance. The committee

believes that such a situation would be quite rare;

. ss" (Emphasis added.) (126 Cong.Rec. S8250 (daily

ed. June 26, 1980).)

Thus, with the enactment of the Boren/Long Amendment, Congress

has explicitly recognized that states should be permitted to

apply transfer of assets rules in the Medicaid program, in

addition to the Title XVI, SSI/SSP cash assistance program.

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B. Courts Have Recognized That The

Use of Subsequent Legislative

Pronouncements Form A Hazardous

Basis For inferring The Intent

Of An Earlier Congress

Petitioner contends that the legislative history of the

Boren/Long Amendment also supports her argument that, under

existing law, California and other states are not permitted to

apply transfer of assets rules. Petitioner made a similar

argument before the Court below based on certain Senate Finance

Committee reports. In 1978, as part of the Medicare-Medicaid

Administrative and Reimbursement Reform Act, the Senate Finance

+“

Committee proposed an amendment to the Medicaid statute requiring | ~

states to adopt transfer rules similar to California's. (S. Rep.

No. 95-llll, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 24-25 (1978).) The Senate

Committee stated at that time that states were unable to adopt

transfer rules under the present law. (Dawson v. Myers (9th Cir.

1980) 622 F.2d 1304, 1308-1309; J.A. 66-67.) The Ninth Circuit,

concluding that the Senate Committee was apparently relying on

the federal agency's erroneous interpretation of section

1396a(a)(10)(C) of Title 42 of the United States Code, flatly

rejected petitioner's argument. (Ibid.)

Petitioner, relying on recent statements of Senator

Long, suggests that this Court should also defer to subsequent

legislative history. (126 Cong.Rec. S16505 (daily ofs,

December 13, 1980).) The particular passage which petitioner

quotes on page 2 of her motion does not demonstrate clear

legislative intent that Congress intended that states could not,

under existing law, impose a transfer of assets restriction.

This use of subsequent legislative history to interpret a statute

is of dubious value. The Court below correctly recognized that

pronouncements by a subsequent Congress are not entitled to the

same weight as those of the Congress which enacted a measure.

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(Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr (2d Cir. 1967) 383 F.2d 166, 175.)

cert.den. (1968) 390 U.S. 956.) In United States v. Price (1960) |S

361 U.S. 304, 313, this Court stated that: ". . . views of a alas

subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the

intent of an earlier one." Furthermore, courts are not bound by er oe.

such pronouncements and it has been contended that subsequently [J

expressed congressional views should not be relied upon at all. “f

the United States Code (Dawson v. Myers, 622 F.2d at 1312; JA. op

66-67), this Court should not accord deference to the subsequent ’

legislative history of the Medicaid program.

C. Certain Reports Of The Senate Finance

Committee Explicitly State That

Legislation Allowing States To

Apply Transfer Rules Should

Not Be Construed As Agreement

With Those Decisions Which Have

Struck Down Such Rules

Not every amendment of a statute demonstrates

legislative intent to make a major change in the substance or

effect of a pre-existing law. (Oklahoma Tax Commission, et. al.

v. Stanoline Pipeline Co. (10th Cir. 1940) 113 F.2d 853, 856.)

Consideration of the surrounding circumstances may indicate that

the amendment was merely the result of a legislative intent to

clarify the true meaning of the pre-existing statute. In

addition, an amendment may reflect the Legislature's desire to

meet a new and unanticipated condition brought about by judicial

interpretation of the pre-existing law. (Ibid)

Certain reports of the Senate Finance Committee

explicitly state that legislation allowing states to apply

transfer of assets rules should not be construed as agreement

with court decision which have struck down such rules. In 1980,

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the Senate Finance Committee, as part of the budget reconcilia-

tion bill, supported an amendment (Senate Bill 2885, § 511)

restricting transfer of assets in the Title XVI SSI/SSP cash

assistance program and the Title XIX Medicaid program. (126

Cong.Rec. S8250 (daily ed. June 26, 1980).) Although this

agreement could not be reached in the context of the

reconciliation conference. (Ibid.) Senator Long, in ceaensil

on the Boren/Long Amendment, referred to this section of the

budget reconciliation bill. (126 Cong.Rec. $16505 (daily ed. jis

December 13, 1980).) The Senate Finance Committee, in its ai

explanation of the S2885 reconciliation provisions, specificall eh

pointed out that its attempt to limit the disposal of annatis for

the purpose of establishing SSI eligibility should not be

interpreted as agreement with the reasoning of the cases which

had struck down transfer of assets rules. ae

7 "The Committee has been told that transfers

of this type frequently occur, particularly in cases

where an aged individual may face substantial medical

expenses. For example, in connection with protracted

nursing home care, by transferring assets to a relative,

the individual qualifies not only for SSI but also

for medicaid. Moreover, under certain court decisions,

the absence of an SSI provision in this area has been

found to lead to similar problems in connection with

the medically needy segment of the medicaid program.

(The committee does not intend that its recognition

of the existence of these court decisions should be

construed as agreement that they are correct.)"

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"The committee is aware as indicated above,

that certain courts have held that the absence

of a provision of this type in the SSI statute

precludes States from applying such a rule in

‘medically needy' cases. The adoption of this

provision will remedy the problems this has created

for the States.” _ (Emphasis added.) (126 Cong.Rec.

$8250 (daily ed. June 26, 1980).)

F.2d 491, pet. for cert. pending. (No. 79-2034); Scarpuzza v. ;

Blum (2d Dept. 1980) 426 N.¥.S.2d 505) and in Maryland (Fabula on ;

Buck (4th Cir. 1979) 598 F.2d 869), invalidating transfer of “Te

assets rules. The Senate Finance Committee was concerned about

remedying the problems created by these ccurt decisions which

found that state transfer of assets rules conflicted with the es

section 1396a(a)(10)(C) of Title 42 of the United States Code and ta

thus violated the Supremacy Clause.

Therefore, the enactment of the Boren/Long Amendment

and accompanying legislative intent should not be interpreted as

a statement of congressional opinion that states could not, under

the law prior to that Amendment, apply transfer of assets rules

in their Title XIX Medicaid programs.

CONCLUSION

reversal and remand in part should be denied. Petitioner also

moves for vacation of the decision of the Court of Appeals and

for remand for those class members who will apply on or after

July 1, 1981. This relief is requested so that the district

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court may determine whether California's transfer of” assets rule |

on July l, 1981. Respondents would simply submit that this

will comply with federal law that will allegedly be implemented [B

relief is beyond the scope of these proceedings. Whether

California's transfer of assets rule complies with federal law 4

and regulations, yet to be written or implemented, is not a

question that should be decided in the context of this

litigation. This issue is not ripe for judicial review.

Therefore, respondents respectfully submit that petitioner's

motion should be denied in toto.

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3. Petitioner contends that because there is no

specific effective date section in section 5 cf Pub. L. 96-611

Which adds subsection (j) to the Medicaid statute, that this

provision is a gg to the law's general effective date of Jul

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Richard J. Magasin, a member of the Bar of the

Supreme Court, do hereby certify that I have served on the 19th

day of January, 1981, one copy of RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION TO

MOTION OF PETITIONER FOR SUMMARY REVERSAL AND REMAND IN PART,

AND FOR VACATION AND REMAND IN PART DUE TO INTERVENING

LEGISLATION, with postage thereon fully prepared, in the United

States mail at Los Angeles, California, addressed to:

GILL DEFORD

NEAL S. DUDOVITZ

National Senior Citizens Law center

1636 West 8th Street, Suite 201

Los Angeles, CA 90017

I further certify that all parties required to be

served have been served.

Belt mae.

ICHARD J d/ MAGASIN

Attorney for Respondents

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