Petition — Faircloth v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co.
Supreme Court brief1981
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APR 30
IN THE
Supreme Court of the Unite
Octoser Tzrm, 1980
CHARLES E. FAIRCLOTH,
Petitioner,
Vs.
NORFOLK AND WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS,
FIRST DISTRICT, FIRST DIVISION
JOHN J. NAUGHTON,
30 N. LaSalle Street,
Suite 2100,
Chicago, Illinois 60602,
(312) 782-5925,
Counsel of Record.
Rosert E. Harrineton,
Hargineton & Harrineron, Ltp.,
Henstez, Monex & Hensizz,
30 N. LaSalle Street,
Suite 2100,
(312) 782-5925,
Of Counsel.
April, 1981
‘Keenan Printing Company 312-648-0050<i> 365
ALEXANDE.S L. Sti?VAy,
Clie.
‘
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I
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Whether a Federal Employers’ Liability Act judgment:
for a railroad which presented no evidence, rejecting a
claim of an unsafe place of work and conflicting with this
Court’s safe place to work decisions should stand.
Whether the Appellate Court denied the plaintiff due
process of law when it decided non-existent questions
and failed to decide the questions raised on appeal.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Pace
I A ONO og, ic. U sap wd diwulea do be ose oes 2
SETI SS A Oe eaioar aCe aE Arce
Statutory Provision for Jurisdiction ............... 3
Statutes and Constitution Involved ................. 3
MRM ME co roe tk, eee ve iac Anec. 5
How The Federal And Constitutional Questions Were
IS itd wpa swage at seca niasy a phalodw'e «Ae 12
Se eS win as ba GR ON Whi’ i's Ba aie hae RCE 13
I. THIS COURT SHOULD RESOLVE THE CON-
FLICT BETWEEN ITS SAFE PLACE TO
WORK DECISIONS AND THE JUDGMENT
BELOW BY REVERSING THAT JUDGMENT 13
Il. THE PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE
PROCESS OF LAW WHEN THE APPELLATE
COURT AFFIRMED THE JUDGMENT WITH-
OUT DECIDING THE QUESTIONS RAISED
INS oa i a Sie gerald VG «SRE Roe kes eked es 16
REESE VOLES RA ERE Sen i Se 19
Appendices
Opinion of The Appellate Court .................. A-1
Order And Mandate Of The Illinois Supreme Court .A-11
PRECEDING PAGE WAS BLANK|
whi ata
*%
*S
IV
TABLE OF CITATIONS
CasEs PaGE
Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry., 319 U.S. 350, 352, 353
SS bn ds Laas 0 Wb:8 eRe hn es bea ee eke 13
Marsh v. Illinois Central R. Co., 5th Cir., 175 F. 2d 498,
Re CI ipa, Brad iu eI os wd c's ign Miaeaemiaia 18
Moore v. CO Railway, 340 U.S. 573, 578 (1951) ..... 16
Union Pac. R. Co. v. Hadley, 246 U.S. 330 (1918) ...... 16
STATUTES
MRE PCIE CURD 80.6 bs ah vase Wace nc Rew buwedoe cae
er EE ak cnet 5 GR Aaa Os cb pa pine aK oad om 3
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
i Rees SI MG Sis eins e kik os ocak he owe co's 4
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
Ocroser Term, 1980
CHARLES E. FAIRCLOTH,
Petitioner,
VS.
NORFOLK AND WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY,
Respondent.
a
———
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS,
FIRST DISTRICT, FIRST DIVISION
2
REFERENCE TO REPORTS
The Opinion of the Appellate Court of Illinois, First
District, First-Division is reported at 89 Ill. App. 3d
923, 414 N.E. 2d 634 (1980) and is appended hereto at
pages A-1 through A-10. The order and mandate of the
Supreme Court of Illinois denying Petitioner’s Petition
for Leave to Appeal appears at pages A-11 through A-12.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the Appellate Court of Illinois, First
District, First Division was entered on October 23, 1980.
Petitioner’s timely Petition for Leave to Appeal was
denied by the Supreme Court of Illinois on January 30,
1981 and this Petition for Certiorari was filed within 90
days of that date. This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked
under -28 U.S.C. § 1257(3).
3
STATUTORY PROVISION FOR JURISDICTION
62 Stat. 929 as amended 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3)
‘*Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest
court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be
reviewed by the Supreme Court as follows:
(3) By writ of certiorari, where the validity of a
treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in ques-
tion or where the validity of a State statute is drawn
in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the
Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, or
where any title, right, privilege or immunity is spe-
cially set up or claimed under the Constitution, treaties
or statutes of, or commission held or authority exer-
cised under, the United States. June 25, 1948, c. 646,
62 Stat. 929.”’
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTION INVOLVED
35 Stat. 66, as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 51.
‘‘Tiability of common carriers by railroad, in interstate
or foreign commerce, for injuries to employees from negli-
gence; definition of employees.
‘‘Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in
commerce between any of the several States or Territories,
or between any of the States and Territories, or between the
District of Columbia and any of the States or Territories,
or between the District of Columbia or any of the States or
Territories and any foreign nation or nations, shall be
liable in damages to any person suffering injury while
he is employed by such carrier in such commerce, or, in
case of the death of such employee, to his or her personal
representative, for the benefit of the surviving widow or
husband and children of such employee; and, if none, then
4
of such employee’s parents; and, if none, then of the next
of kin dependent upon such employee, for such injury or
death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of
any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier,
or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its
negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery,
track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves, or other equip-
ment.’’
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14, § 1, which reads as follows:
‘All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.’’
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is a FELA case against the Norfolk & Western
Railroad Company resulting from two accidents suffered
by the plaintiff while working for the railroad. As to
each accident, the only evidence presented was part of
the plaintiff’s case. The trial court refused to set aside
the verdicts in favor of the railroad. On appeal, the
Appellate Court, in a confusing Opinion, affirmed the
judgment.
In so doing, it decided several questions uever pre-
sented by the plaintiff-appellant. First, it decided that
‘*. . . Even under the manifest weight standard urged by
Faircloth, we do not believe the trial court abused its
discretion in denying his motion for a new trial.’’ (A. 7).
The manifest weight ‘‘standard’’ was urged by plaintiff
as an independent question which was exclusively for the
Appellate Court. Second, it decided that it was ‘‘. . . not
persuaded that the trial judge believed he had no authority
to exercise discretion or he refused to exercise his dis-
cretion.” (A. 9). Plaintiff never so claimed except as a
theoretical possibility existing solely because the trial
court’s statements were so meaningless.
The Accident of January 2, 1974
The first accident was suffered by the plaintiff as a
relief employee for a crew working in the Front Street
yards. The plaintiff was called to work with the crew as
a switchman after a member of the original crew became
ill and went home (R. 92, 93). On the second move made
after the plaintiff joined the crew, Conductor Fuller in-
structed the plaintiff to tie onto a string of cars and to
* .
pull those cars on to the lead track. Plaintiff was in-
structed that the first move would be a 3 car kick (R. 85
through 98).
Plaintiff was told to grab hold of the car and stay
on the ground and hold onto the cutting lever to make
sure that the pin stayed up. The pin will usually stay
up except when track conditions will cause it to fall
down. If this occurs, the movement has to be stopped
and restarted all over again (R. 99). The plaintiff was
unfamiliar with the yard and did not really know the
last time he had worked in that yard (R. 98). He fol-
lowed the directions of the Conductor and responcd to a
question that he was set. The Conductor gave a kick sign
and the engine started shoving, gathering up the slack
and causing the cars to roll. The plaintiff had his hand
on the grabiron and as he reached for the operating lever
he was not certain if he got his hand on it or not. The last
thing that he could remember was the cars coming at him.
(At the time of trial, he could remember that he went in
between the cars). The next thing he knew was that he was
lying on his back away from the cars (R. 100).
After he landed on his back, he could remember opening
his eyes and seeing several men around him. He felt hurt
all over. He was taken from the yard to the St. Charles
Hospital where they x-rayed his head and left leg. He was
at the hospital for 5 or 6 hours before he was told to go
home, stay in bed, and contact his family doctor (R. 101,
102). Surgery -was performed on his left knee before lie
returned to work (R. 105). That knee was operated on for
a second time in November of 1975 (R. 120).
Mr. Fuller testified that the condition of the track in
the immediate area in which the accident occurred was
very poor on high and low joints. The ties were in very
7
poor condition and a number of derailments had taken ~
place. Mr. Fuller had seen two high-low joints on that
track prior to the accident (R. 32). He knew that those
high-low joints existed at the time the cut had been made
and that they had been there 5 to 6 months prior to the
accident. In the area where the accident happened, there
had been 35 derailments on that track in 45 days (R. 33).
These would be reported on a form. The Conductor had
filled out those forms so many times that he was sick and
tired of filling them out.
He testified it was his responsibility to start and stop
the movements. Just before the movement, he informed
the crew what he intended to do. He made sure that Mr.
Faircloth was ready and then he gave the kick sign. He saw
Faircloth with his hand on the grabiron of the car to sup-
port himself while raising the operating lever. The Con-
ductor saw the plaintiff disappear between the cars. He
immediately gave a signal to try to stop the movement
when he saw plaintiff come shooting out. He thought
the plaintiff must be unconscious because he made no ef-
fort to protect himself and landed right on his head. He
ran up to him and held up 3 fingers and inquired how
many fingers. Faircloth said 6 with a big smile on his face.
The Conductor told the plaintiff to stay there and ran to a
telephone to get an ambulance (R. 35, 36).
When the plaintiff took hold of the grabiron and reached
in to cut off the car, the Conductor saw that they were
going over this low joint and the cars were violently swing-
ing back and forth. The Conductor saw that the plaintiff
was right at the low joint as he reached in to lift the oper-
ating lever. The cars were going 5 to 7 miles per hour and
would not become uncoupled (R. 36, 37). After the acci-
U
dent, he inspected the cars and found that there was noth-
ing the matter with them. He knew approximately how far
east the 3 or 4 cars stopped from the high-low joint. He
thought that all 3 cars never got by the high-low joint.
A high-low joint is caused when, through the years, the
ballast beneath the rails is washed away and then the tie
from working motions back and forth is caused to eat into
the ground. Eventually you can have as much as a 12
inch drop. Thus, when a car moves across the joint the
weight of the car causes it to make a violent sudden action
toward this hole. The track looks like it is okay until heavy
loaded railroad cars run over it. A high-low joint causes
a violent lateral action of the railroad cars as they run
over it (R. 24, 25).
The Conductor did not warn the plaintiff not to make
the cut at the low joint (R. 57). On redirect examination
the following question and answer were given (R. 59).
Q. It is necessary to run alongside of a car when
you are making a cut movement like this?
A. Not necessarily so. Without the low joint, no, sir
not necessary.
THE ACCIDENT OF MAY 6, 1976
On May 6, 1976, plaintiff was working with a crew in the
Homestead yard. He discussed the work to be done with
the Conductor in the railroad yard office and then went
out to work. He went to his engine which was located on
the No. 3 track about even with the No. 5 switch as he came
out of the yard office. He had to cross No. 5 and No. 4 track
to get to the engine. He was going to talk to the engineer,
but his window box was closed so he walked around the
front of the engine, banged on the fireman’s side and told
him they were going to go down through the yard. He
9
walked toward the main to check on some cars. He made
a turn to come back to meet his Conductor who was right
behind the plaintiff. His left leg then hit an object causing
him to twist his body and he slipped down into a hole that
was in the ground. The hole was between the No. 2 and
No. 3 track. He had a lantern with him and it was lit. At
times he observed where he was walking, but he also had
to watch in all directions. He did not see the object before
his foot hit it, but after his foot hit the object he saw that
it was a piece of railroad tie which appeared to be about
1 to 1% feet long and was stuck upwards at an angle. The
condition in that area was very uneven containing gravel,
air hoses, brakeshoes, knuckles and piles of grain as much
as 2 feet high where the grain has slipped out of cars. There
was all kinds of junk around there. It is the duty of the
Maintenance of Way people to clean up this area. His leg
was twisted because of the hitting of the object. He re-
ceived a sharp pain, a jabbing pain, down his leg and his
Conductor helped him back into the yard office to the
Supervisor’s office and he had to sit down there. The termi-
nal trainmaster was mad at him because he had hit his leg
again and he was taken to St. C! irles Hospital. There he
was instructed to see his orthopedic doctor (R. 123 through
128). }
Wayne G. Oestreich, the fireman on May 6, 1976, testified
for the plaintiff. He was sitting in the engine on the north
side. The engine was on No. 3 track waiting for the crew
which was to come out of the yard office. That office was
to the south of the engine (R. 62). He saw Mr. Faircloth
walking across in front of the unit. At that time, he said
something and yelled up to the fireman telling him he was
going to the north or west of the yard.
10
Faircloth proceeded north across No. 2 track and was
looking down the main towards some cars. He then turned
around and came back toward the engine. Between No. 2
and No. 3 track, Mr. Faircloth stepped on a piece of tie and
the fireman saw his leg give out and then he hobbled back
across in front of the engine. He then went into the yard
office.
Mr. Oestreich testified that the area had been rough and
the terrain had debris and stuff lying around for a couple
of months (R. 63). He testified that the plaintiff stepped
on a broken tie which is right about the middle between No.
2 and No. 3 track. He stated that a hunk of the tie was
buri» 1 in the debris. A lot of excavating work had been
done around there where it has been bad for a couple of
months. There were potholes, gravel and that. That is all
uneven gravel around there. He had observed the same
condition for the preceding couple of months.
Th ondition was reported to one of the members of the
Railroad Safety Committee. The fireman believed that he
said something to the Safety Committee. The Safety Com-
mittee is composed of different men from different depart-
ments who are picked every 6 months to determine unsafe
conditions around the railroad and to see what can be done
to correct them. The only thing that was done to correct
the condition was the placing of bulletins warning the men
to watch the conditions. These were put up by the Su-
perintendent (R. 65).
a
11
THE RAILROAD’S DEFENSE
The railroad presented no evidence, but, nonetheless,
contended in its opening statement that the evidence
would show that the two accidents ‘‘. . . were not the fault
of the Norfolk & Western Railway’’ (R. 19). At the con-
clusion of the evidence, the railroad conceded that the
plaintiff’s evidence was presented by all the people who
knew anything about the accident (R. 460). It claimed
that the plaintiff must prove that a specific low joint
was at the scene of the accident and that the low joint was
the ‘‘cause of the whole thing’’ (R. 463). As to the second
accident, the railroad argued that the sole cause of the
accident was the carelessness of the plaintiff ‘‘in not
watching where he was going’’ (R. 467).
THE HEARING ON THE POST TRIAL MOTION
The Post Trial Motion was extensively argued before the
trial court. The plaintiff stated the applicable law involv-
ing the weighing of evidence on such a Motion (R. 513
through 539). The railroad, on the other hand, contended
that a new trial could not be granted unless there was a
complete absence of probative facts to support the con-
clusion of the jury (R. 539 through 541). Following the
first hearing, the court asked for briefs which were filed.
On August 6, 1979, the Motion was reopened. The court
stated that it had studied most of the cases that both sides
submitted and that it was ‘‘very familiar with this proposi-
tion of law involved in these cases’’ (R. 560). After fur-
ther argument as to the standard in a FELA case as to the
weight of the evidence, the court ruled as follows (R. 570,
571):
“THE COURT: The Court was not disturbed
about the distinction as to standards of proof under
12
motions for a new trial and confusing that with a ver-
dict non obstante verdicto, or setting aside a verdict,
as some call it.
The Court is very familiar with the plethora of cases
in Illinois and merely discussed Federal cases to see if
there was any avenue at all that this Court could study
and see as to what he should determine on this motion
for new trial.
I have reached the conclusion that the motion for
new trial is hereby denied in that the record itself
speaks and the only one that can decide this maiter is
the Appellate Court.
MR. LANDESS: Thank you, your Honor.
MR. NAUGHTON: That is for all grounds?
THE COURT: On all grounds, yes.
If you will prepare your order, I will sign it.’’
HOW THE FEDERAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL
QUESTIONS WERE PRESENTED
Petitioner asserted its position on his federal claims at
every level of the court system.
Petitioner asserted its due process of law questions in
his Petition for Rehearing after the Appellate Court
handed down its Opinion.
Petitioner filed a timely Petition for Leave to Appeal
to the Supreme Court of Illinois which was denied on
January 30, 1981. Thus, the Appellate Court of Illinois,
First District, First Division is the ‘‘highest court in
[the] state in which decison could be had.’’ 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257(3).
SS
13
ARGUMENT
I.
THIS COURT SHOULD RESOLVE THE CONFLICT
BETWEEN ITS SAFE PLACE TO WORK DECISIONS
AND THE JUDGMENT BELOW BY REVERSING
THAT JUDGMENT.
This Court’s decisions have made clear beyond doubt
that the common law duty of the employer to use reasonable
care in furnishing its employees with a safe place to work
is plain and is deeply engrained in Federal Jurisprudence.
Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry., 319 U.S. 350, 352, 353
(1943). The court below, however, was completely obli-
vious of this rule even though plaintiff’s primary claim
of negligence was based upon that rule. In ignoring that
doctrine, the Appellate Court created an irreconcilable
conflict with this Court’s safe place decisions.
Plaintiff’s two FELA cases were tried to a jury with
all of the evidence part of the plaintiff’s case (R. 459-460).
Nevertheless, the jury aberrantly returned both verdicts in
favor of the defendant. Since the plaintiff’s case was un-
contradicted and unimpeached, the verdicts demonstrated
the jury did not understand the issues or the instructions.
Even so, the Appellate Court affirmed the refusal of a
new trial even though it admitted that the plaintiff’s case
was both uncontradicted and unimpeached (A. 1-10). The
Opinion ignores this Court’s teaching delineating the rail-
road’s duty to provide a safe place to work by summariz-
ing the evidence without mention of the rule and by re-
jecting all inferences favoring the plaintiff. Indeed, the
14
Appellate Court’s Opinion finds inferences favoring the
railroad by torturing the evidence and by creating con-
tradictions where none exist.
Contrary to the Opinion, the evidence was overwhelming-
ly contrary to the verdicts. As to the first accident, the
evidence clearly established the plaintiff was running
alongside the cars in the cut and was performing his
duties exactly as he was ordered to do by his Conductor.
Furthermore, the track involved was in deplorable con-
dition. It contained high-low joints, the cars were sway-
ing laterally as a result of these joints and the general
condition of the ballast supporting the track was poor.
The plaintiff’s testimony was that he reached for the oper-
ating lever while the cars were coming at him. The next
thing he knew, he was lying on his back away from the
cars (R. 100).
The Conductor observed the plaintiff throughout this
movement. He then saw the plaintiff disappear between the
cars and gave a stop signal. He saw the plaintiff come
shooting out between the cars as though he were uncon-
scious because no effort was made by the plaintiff to
protect himself and he landed right on his head. When the
Conductor ran up to the plaintiff, he held up 3 fingers and
inquired how many fingers. He stated that Faircloth said
6 with a big smile on his face. The Conductor ordered the
plaintiff to stay there and ran to a telephone to get an am-
bulance (R. 35, 36).
The basic charge of negligence presented to the jury
was a charge that the ‘railroad had failed to provide the
plaintiff with a reasonably safe place in which to do his
work. That charge was established without contradiction
by the testimony of the Conductor on redirect examina-
tion as follows (R. 59):
15
‘*Q. It is necessary to run alongside of a car when
you are making a cut movement like this?
A. Not necessarily so. Without the low joint, no,
sir not necessary.
No instruction was given to the jury as to a claim that
the accident was caused by a specific high-low joint.
Nevertheless, the railroad argued that the plaintiff was
required to prove that a high-low joint there was the cause
of the whole thing (R. 463). That argument negated all
of the claims of negligence submitted to the jury in the
instructions. It placed upon the plaintiff the burden of
proving a high-low joint contrary to the instructions. It
directly led to the irrational verdict on the first accident.
The verdict in favor of the defendant on the second
accident is even more incredible. As to that accident, the
plaintiff and the fireman, who observed the accident, testi-
fied that the area between tracks 2 and 3 was littered with
debris. Both testified that the plaintiff stepped over the
rail of No. 3 track and his foot hit a piece of railroad tie
which was buried in the debris causing the plaintiff to
twist his knee. The piece of railroad tie was about 1 to 114%4
feet long and it was stuck upwards at an angle. The
fireman testified that striking the tie caused the plaintiff’s
leg to give out (R. 63, 64). The plaintiff stated that hitting
the tie caused him to twist his body and slip down into a
hole in the ground (R. 123 through 128).
Faced with the overwhelming evidence that the railroad
had failed to provide the plaintiff with a reasonably safe
place in which to work, the defendant argued that the area
was so bad that the plaintiff was 100% to blame for his
accident because he hit the tie. Its argument, thus, was
contrary to the instructions of the court which place the
burden of proving contributory negligence on the railroad.
16
Here, as in the first accident, the railroad sought to rely
on speculation and conjecture and not upon evidence in
order to argue that it was not negligent. The jury should
have rejected such arguments, but did not. Even in a
FELA case, no jury is permitted to use speculation and
conjecture in order to supply a non-negligent explanation
of the plaintiff’s injury. Moore v. C£O Railway, 340 U.S.
573, 578 (1951).
The Appellate Court’s confusion as to negligence was
equaled by its confusion concerning the doctrine of partial
causation explicitly provided in the Federal Employers’
Liability Act. Its reasoning seemed to be based upon an
ancient theory of proximate causation. No other explana-
tion is possible for its holding that the railroad’s unsafe
place to work could be found to have no causal relation
to the plaintiff’s injuries. Thus, the reasoning of the Ap-
pellate Court must antedate the Opinion of this Court by
Mr. Justice Holmes in Union Pac. R. Co. v. Hadley, 246
U.S. 330 (1918) where Mr. Justice Holmes specifically held
that even if the plaintiff’s negligence was the last in time,
it cannot be deemed to be the only proximate cause be-
cause to do so would empty the statute of its meaning
and say that the death there did not ‘‘result in part from
the negligence of any of the employes.’’
II.
THE PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF
LAW WHEN THE APPELLATE COURT AFFIRMED
THE JUDGMENT WITHOUT DECIDING THE QUES.
TIONS RAISED ON APPEAL.
Petitioner appealed on two grounds:
1) The trial court abused its discretion in deciding
the verdicts were not contrary to the preponderance of
the evidence.
17
2) The Judgment should be reversed by the Ap-
pellate Court because the verdicts were contrary to
the manifest weight of the evidence.
The Appellate Court failed to decide either question.
Instead, it combined the two questions and held: ‘‘Even
under the manifest weight standard urged by Faircloth,
we do not believe the trial court abused its discretion in
denying his motion for a new trial’’ (A. 7). No such ques-
tion exists under either Federal or Illinois law. If such
a question were to exist, it would effectively eliminate new
trials because of the impossible burden such a test would
impose on the movant. By combining the questions, the
Court in effect agreed with the railroad that a new trial
cannot be granted in a FELA case unless there is a ‘‘com-
plete absence of probative facts” to support the verdict,
which is the identical test required for a judgment not-
withstanding the verdict.
The cavalier disregard of the questions raised on appeal
compounded the nonsensical ruling by the trial court.
That ruling was as follows (R. 570, 571):
‘THE COURT: The Court was not disturbed
about the distinction as to standards of proof under
motions for a new trial and confusing that with a ver-
dict non obstante verdicto, or setting aside a verdict,
as some call it.
The Court is very familiar with the plethora of cases
in Illinois and merely discussed Federal cases to see if
there was any avenue at all that this Court could study
and see as to what he should determine on this motion
for new trial.
I have reached the conclusion that the motion for
new trial is hereby denied in that the record itself
speaks and the only one that can decide this matter is
the Appellate Court.
*%
*y
18
MR. LANDESS: Thank you, your Honor.
MR. NAUGHTON: That is for all grounds?
THE COURT: On all grounds, yes.
If you will prepare your order, I will sign it.’’
The correct standard for both courts is plainly stated
in Marsh v. Illinois Central R. Co., 5th Cir., 175 F. 2d 498,
500 (1949). Both courts refer to that case, but neither
applied it. That failure deprived the petitioner of due
process of law in and of itself.
The Opinion also decides that the trial court did not
‘*fail to exercise discretion’’. This interpreta\ on was men-
tioned as a mere possibility. The Opinion, however, in-
creases that possibility because it relies on a colloquy
which occurred before the trial court’s ruling in order to
so hold.
In summary, the Appellate Court decided questions
never presented to it and did not decide the questions
presented to it, but confusingly at times stated the con-
tentions made by plaintiff-appellant correctly even though
it did not decide those questions. Therefore, the Appellate
Court Opinion does not satisfy the minimum standards
required as to clarity, exposition and intelligibility. Be-
cause of the Appellate Court’s failures, this Court should
exercise its supervisory auhority over the lower appellate
courts by granting the Petition for Certiorari in order
to reverse the Judgment of the Appellate Court.
19
CONCLUSION
For the reasons adverted to above, it is respectfully sub-
mitted that this Court should grant the Petition for a Writ
of Certiorart.
Respectfully submitted,
Joun J. NavuGuTon,
30 N. LaSalle Street,
Suite 2100,
Chicago, Illinois 60602,
(312) 782-5925,
Counsel of Record.
Rosert E. Harrineton,
Harrineton & Harrineton, Ltp.,
Hens.tezr, Monex & HENsLEEr,
30 N. LaSalle Street,
Suite 2100,
(312) 782-5925,
Of Counsel.
April, 1981
Al
APPENDIX
No. 79-2391 7
CHARLES E. FAIRCLOTH, Appeal from the
Plaintiff-Appellant, Cireuit Court of
va. Cook County
NORFOLK AND WESTERN ss a .
RAILWAY COMPANY ee ee
; ’ Presiding.
a corporation,
Defendant-Appellee. |
Mr. JUSTICE JIGANTI delivered the opinion of the
court:
The plaintiff, Charles E. Faircloth, filed a two count
complaint against the defendant, Norfolk & Western Rail-
way Company (Norfolk), under the Federal Employers’
Liability Act (45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq.). He sought to recover
for knee injuries allegedly resulting from two accidents
which occurred while he was working for Norfolk. The jury
found for the defendant on each accident. Faircloth appeals
from the judgment entered on the verdicts and seeks a
new trial on the ground that the verdicts were contrary to
the manifest weight of the evidence. He also appeals from
the denial of his post-trial motion for a new trial on the
grounds that the court abused its discretion or refused to
exercise its discretion.
Faircloth presented two occurrence witnessses on each
accident and submitted evidence as to damages. Norfolk
denied liability but presented no evidence. Due to our
disposition, we find it unnecessary to relate the evidence
concerning damages.
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A2
The first accident occurred on January 2, 1974 at Nor-
folk’s Front Street yard in Ohio. Faircloth and his super-
visor at che time of the accident testified concerning this
accident.
Conductor Charles Fuller testified that on January 2,
1974, he was supervising the crew to which Faircloth was
assigned. Faircloth reported to work on Fuller’s crew
about midway through the shift to replace a crew member
who had left the job early due to illness.
Fuller instructed Faircloth that the crew was going to
attempt a ‘‘three car kick”. That is, three cars were to be
separated from a fifteen car train and allowed to roll onto
another track. Cars are detached from the rest of the train
by lifting a cutting lever which is located between every
two cars.
Fuller started the movement after Faircloth stated he
was ready. Faircloth took two or three steps alongside the
train which was moving at five to seven miles per hour.
Fuller saw Faircloth put his hand on the grabhandle of the
ear. This is done so that the switchman can support him-
self while lifting the cutting lever. Faircloth reached be-
tween the cars as if to pull the cutting lever. He disap-
peared between the cars then came ‘‘shooting out,’’ land-
ing clear of the train.
Fuller testified that the condition of the track was ‘‘very
poor on high-low joints’’. When asked to describe or define
a high-low joint, Fuller related the following. A rail is
331% feet long. At the end of each rail is a joint. The joint
consist of a ballast, tieplate, and tie. The tieplate is two
pieces of metal with a bolt through them. Under the tie-
plate is a tie. Under the tie is a ballast. A high-low joint
occurs when, after years of wear, the ballast and ground
are washed away causing the tie to eat into the ground.
A3
This may cause a depression of up to 12 inches. The joint
appears to be in good condition, but when heavily loaded
cars roll over it they sink into the depression at the high-
low joint. This causes the cars to swing violently.
According to Fuller, there were two high-low joints
within 12°feet of one another in the area of the accident.
Prior to the accident there had been 35 derailments in an
unspecified 45 day period.
As Faircloth attempted the three car kick the cars were
swinging violently. The cars were empty. Faircloth was
right over a high-low joint as he reached between the cars
for the cutting lever. Fuller did not see the high-low joint
but he knew where it was located.
After the accident Fuller inspected the rail cars and
found nothing the matter with them. There was nothing
improper about the speed of the train or the actions of the
crew members. At the time of the accident there were six
inches of snow on the ground. No salt or other material
had been spread on the snow.
On cross-examination Fuller testified that he had not
been subpoenaed to testify but had appeared at Faircloth’s
request. He traveled from Toledo, Ohio to appear at trial.
He no longer worked for Norfolk because he had been
‘‘disqualified’’.
Faircloth testified that he began working for the railroad
in April of 1971. On the date of the accident he was em-
ployed as a switchman. He stated that he reported to work
at approximately 5 p.m. on the date of the accident. Fuller
told Faircloth that the crew was going to switch a string
of cars and that the first movement would be a three car
kick. Faircloth was instructed to lift the cutting lever and
to hold it in order to make certain it stayed up. He was told
7.
A4
there had been trouble in the past with the lever staying
up. He testified that the lever was supposed to stay up
without being held but that given certain track conditions
it must be held to keep it from falling down during a
movement.
Fuller asked Faircloth whether he was ready and Fair-
cloth answered that he was. The train started to move.
He had his hand on the grab-iron and was walking along-
side the train. He reached in to pull the cutting lever. He
was not sure whether he actually got his hand on the lever
or not. The cars were coming at him. The only thing he
could remember at the time of trial was that he went in
between the cars. The next thing he knew he was on his
back. There was snow on the ground.
On cross-examination Faircloth testified that there was
nothing improper about the speed at which the train was
moving, or about what any of his fellow crew members may
have done. He knew of nothing improper concerning the
rail cars.
The second accident occurred on May 6, 1976 at Norfolk’s
Homestead yard in Ohio. Faircloth and a member of the
crew testified concerning that accident.
Wayne Oestreich testified that on the date in question
he was working as a fireman on the crew with Faircloth.
Oestreich was sitting in the engine waiting for the crew to
come out. He saw Faircloth cross in front of the engine.
Faircloth turned around and started walking back towards
the engine between the tracks. Faircloth stepped on a piece
of broken tie which was partially buried. His leg gave out.
Faircloth did not, fall to the ground. Faircloth then hobbled
back across in front of the engine and went into the yard
office.
A5
Oestreich testified that the area in which the accident
occurred had previously been the scene of a derailment.
The area was undergoing repair and excavation work. The
ground was ‘‘rough” and there was debris strewn about.
There were potholes, gravel and uneven ground. A warning
had been posted stating that repair work was being con-
ducted and that the track in the area was closed to traffic.
The condition had existed for ‘‘a couple of months’’.
The witness had reported the condition to members of the
Safety Committee. To the witness’ knowledge the only
action that had been taken in response to the complaints
was the posting of the warning.
On cross-examination, the witness testified that he could
see the piece of broken tie on which Faircloth had stepped.
He was 10 or 15 feet away. There was a spotlight shining,
so the visibility was good from where he had been sitting.
Visibility from the ground would not have been as good
because of ‘‘shadows’’.
Faircloth testified that he was walking between the
tracks. He made a turn to come back to meet his conductor.
The conductor was right behind him before he turned.
Faircloth’s left leg hit an object causing him to twist his
body. He slipped into a hole.
Faircloth and the conductor were each carrying a lighted
lantern. He was looking where he was walking, but he
could not walk with his head all the way down because he
had to watch for trains.
After his foot hit the object he saw that it was a piece
of broken tie. It was a foot and a half long and protruded
from the ground between the tracks.
According to Faircloth’s testimony the condition of the
area where the accident occurred was very uneven. There
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ya
A6
was debris on the ground including gravel, air hoses,
brakeshoes, knuckles, and grain. At the time of the second
accident the yard was not really dark but neither was it
very well illuminated. He did not see the tie before he
stepped on it. There were shadows from engines and box
cars which would have prevented him from seeing the tie
even if he had looked at it.
Faircloth’s initial arguments concern the sufficiency of
the evidence. He contends first that the jury verdicts were
against the manifest weight of the evidence and secondly
that the trial court abused its discretion in not granting
his motion for a new trial which alleged that the verdicts
were against the manifest weight of the evidence. He argues
that the controlling standard was set forth in Marsh vy.
Illinois Central R.R. Co., (5th Cir. 1949), 175 F. 2d 498,
500 wherein the court stated: —
‘*A motion for a new trial is addressed to the trial
judge’s discretion. He may grant a new trial * * *
(and he alone can) because he thinks the verdict is
wrong, though supported by some evidence. The ex-
ercise of his discretion is not ordinarily reviewable
on appeal, though a failure to exercise discretion, or
an abuse of it, may be corrected’’.
Faircloth also relies upon the following statement in
Bazile v. Bisso Marine Co., (5th Cir. 1979), 606 F. 2d 101,
105:
‘‘As far as the motion for a new trial, the trial
judge can grant a new trial if he believes the verdict
is contrary to the weight of the evidence. [Citations.]
** * Tn a motion for a new trial the judge is free to
weigh the evidence. As an appellate court, our review
of the granting of the motion for a new trial is
severely limited — the lower court’s action is discre-
tionary and we may interfere only when the court
abuses its discretion or fails to exercise it’’,
A7
Norfolk argues that manifest weight is not the controlling
standard but rather that in Illinois a new trial! may be
granted only where there is a complete absence of proba-
tive facts to support the verdicts. Bowman v. Illinois
Central Railroad (1959), 11 Ill. 2d 186, 142 N.E. 2d 104.
Under either standard, our review of the denial of Fair-
cloth’s motion for a new trial is, as stated in Bazile
‘*severely limited’’. Even under the manifest weight stand-
ard urged by Faircloth, we do not believe the trial court
abused its discretion in denying his motion for a new trial.
Accordingly, we will not disturb on appeal the trial court’s
denial of the motion for a new trial or its determination
that the jury’s verdicts were supported by the evidence.
Concerning the first accident, the witnesses agree that
there was nothing improper concerning the speed of the
train, actions of the crew members, or condition of the rail
ears. Although there was testimony that there were six
inches of unsalted snow on the ground there is nothing in
the record to indicate that this condition bore any relation-
ship to the accident.
Fuller testified that there were high-low joints in the
track in question, that high-low joints cause the cars to
swing violently, and that the cars were at the time of the
accident swinging violently. Faircloth did not mention
high-low joints or whether the cars were swinging. There
was no testimony as to whether the presence of high-low
joints or the swinging of the cars related to the accident.
Neither witness testified that Faircloth was struck, pulled,
pushed or caught by the cars. Further, Fuller’s testimony
in this regard was somewhat contradictory. He stated that
rails are 3314 feet long and that joints occur where the
rails meet. His subsequent testimony was that there were
7.
*?
A8
two high-low joints within 12 feet of one another in the
area in question. He testified that when heavily loaded
ears roll over high-low joints a violent swinging action oc-
curs. Here, the rail cars were empty. Additionally, the jury
was entitled to consider that Fuller had been disqualified
for work by the defendant railroad after 22 years of em-
ployment. Faircloth, testifying on his own behalf, was no
longer employed by Norfolk.
Concerning the second accident, Oestreich testified that
Faircloth stepped on a piece of tie and that Faircloth’s
leg then gave out. The area was undergoing repair, was
the scene of excavation work, and was littered with debris.
Faircloth testified to similar facts except that instead of
testifying that his leg gave out, Faircloth stated that after
his leg hit the tie his body twisted and he slipped into a
hole. The evidence was somewhat contradictory. While
Oestreich testified that a bulletin had been posted warn-
ing of conditions and stating that the track was closed to
traffic, Faircloth testified that he could not look toward
the ground constantly while he was walking because he had
to be alert for the movement of trains. Additionally, Fair-
cloth stated that poor lighting would have kept him from
seeing the tie although he and the conductor he had been
walking with each carried a lighted lantern. The jury also
heard Oestreich testify that a light was shining on the tie
from where he was sitting but that from Faircloth’s posi-
tion the tie was in shadows.
Faircloth also contends that the trial court failed to ex-
ercise discretion when ruling on his motion for a new trial.
This contention is based on the following statement made
by the trial court:
A9
‘‘T have reached the conclusion that the motion for
new trial is hereby denied in that the record itself
speaks and the only one that can decide this matter is
the Appellate Court’’.
A similar contention was made in Asher v. Stromberg
(1966), 78 Ill. App. 2d 267, 223 N.E. 2d 300, in which the
jury held for the defendant and the trial judge denied the
plaintiff’s motion for a new trial, remarking ‘‘I have to
await the ruling of a higher court.” (Asher at 276, 223 N.E.
2d at 304). The appellate court, considering all of the trial
court’s comments in context, rejected the plaintiff’s con-
tention that the trial judge had erroneously concluded that
he had no authority or power to weigh the evidence.
Here, the trial court requested and received legal memo-
randa on the motion from counsel for each party. It heard
argument on the issues. The court stated that he had read
most of the cases submitted and was ‘‘very familiar’’ with
the proposition of the law involved. Additionally, the trial
court and plaintiff’s counsel agreed on the record that the
trial court was not refusing to exercise its discretion. This
is evidenced by the following colloquy which occurred at
the hearing on Faircloth’s motion:
“THE COURT: But the limitation [on the court’s
discretion in ruling on a motion for a new trial] only
is that he cannot abuse his power and discretion.
COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFF: That is the
only limitation on the Trial Court. <
THE COURT: Yes.
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF: And the Marsh case
goes further and says that when thewJudge refuses his
discretion it can be remanded to him and he must ex-
ercise the discretion.
THE COURT: We don’t have that element involved
here.
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF: No.’’
A10
Considering all of his remarks in context, we are not
persuaded that the trial judge believed he had no author-
ity to exercise discretion or that he refused to exercise
his discretion. Rather, we believe the trial court’s comment,
when viewed in context, was meant only to indicate that hav-
ing made its ruling on the motion for a new trial the unsuc-
cessful litigant was left with the option to appeal.
Accordingly the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
JOHNSON and ROMITI, JJ., concur.
7.
All
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
STATE OF ILLINOIS
SUPREME COURT =
AT A TERM OF THE SUPREME COURT, begun and
held in Springfield, on Monday, the twelfth day of January
in the year of our Lord, one thousand nine hundred and
eighty-one, within and for the State of Illinois.
Present: JosepH H. GoLpENHERSH, CHIEF JUSTICE
Justice Rospert C. UNDERWOOD
Justice Howarp C. Ryan
Justice THomas J. Moran
Justice Danie P. Wazp
Justice Witt1am G. CLARK
Justice Seymour Simon
Tyrone C. FaHNER, ATTORNEY GENERAL
Louvre F. Dean, MarsHan
Attest: CLett L. Woops, CLerk
- 4%
Al2
BE IT REMEMBERED, that, to-wit: on the 30th day of
January, 1981, the same being one of the days of the term
of Court aforesaid, the following proceedings were, by
said Court, had and entered of record, to-wit:
-CHARLES E. FAIRCLOTH, ) Petition for Leave
Petitioner,| to Appeal from
No. 54267 vs. Appellate Court,
First District.
NORFOLK AND WESTERN RAIL- a
WAY COMPANY, a corporation, 79-2391
Respondent. q 75 L 10099
And now on this day the Court having duly considered
the Petition for Leave to Appeal herein and being now
fully advised of and concerning the premises, doth overrule
the prayer of the petition and denies Leave to Appeal
herein.
And it is further considered by the Court that the said
Respondent recover of and from the said Petitioner costs
by it in this behalf expended, to be taxed, and that it have
execution therefor.
I, CLELL L. WOODS, Clerk of the Supreme Court of
the State of Illinois and keeper of the records, files and
Seal thereof, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true
copy of the final order of the said Supreme Court in the
above entitled cause of record in my office.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto
subscribed my name and affixed the Seal of
said Court this 9th day of April, 1981.
CLELL L. WOODS, Clerk,
Supreme Court of the State of Illinois.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.