Petition — Faircloth v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co.

Supreme Court brief1981

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

8 0 : | we Mgr U.S.

APR 30

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Unite

Octoser Tzrm, 1980

CHARLES E. FAIRCLOTH,

Petitioner,

Vs.

NORFOLK AND WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS,

FIRST DISTRICT, FIRST DIVISION

JOHN J. NAUGHTON,

30 N. LaSalle Street,

Suite 2100,

Chicago, Illinois 60602,

(312) 782-5925,

Counsel of Record.

Rosert E. Harrineton,

Hargineton & Harrineron, Ltp.,

Henstez, Monex & Hensizz,

30 N. LaSalle Street,

Suite 2100,

(312) 782-5925,

Of Counsel.

April, 1981

‘Keenan Printing Company 312-648-0050<i> 365

ALEXANDE.S L. Sti?VAy,

Clie.

‘

+

? ,

I

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Whether a Federal Employers’ Liability Act judgment:

for a railroad which presented no evidence, rejecting a

claim of an unsafe place of work and conflicting with this

Court’s safe place to work decisions should stand.

Whether the Appellate Court denied the plaintiff due

process of law when it decided non-existent questions

and failed to decide the questions raised on appeal.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Pace

I A ONO og, ic. U sap wd diwulea do be ose oes 2

SETI SS A Oe eaioar aCe aE Arce

Statutory Provision for Jurisdiction ............... 3

Statutes and Constitution Involved ................. 3

MRM ME co roe tk, eee ve iac Anec. 5

How The Federal And Constitutional Questions Were

IS itd wpa swage at seca niasy a phalodw'e «Ae 12

Se eS win as ba GR ON Whi’ i's Ba aie hae RCE 13

I. THIS COURT SHOULD RESOLVE THE CON-

FLICT BETWEEN ITS SAFE PLACE TO

WORK DECISIONS AND THE JUDGMENT

BELOW BY REVERSING THAT JUDGMENT 13

Il. THE PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE

PROCESS OF LAW WHEN THE APPELLATE

COURT AFFIRMED THE JUDGMENT WITH-

OUT DECIDING THE QUESTIONS RAISED

INS oa i a Sie gerald VG «SRE Roe kes eked es 16

REESE VOLES RA ERE Sen i Se 19

Appendices

Opinion of The Appellate Court .................. A-1

Order And Mandate Of The Illinois Supreme Court .A-11

PRECEDING PAGE WAS BLANK|

whi ata

*%

*S

IV

TABLE OF CITATIONS

CasEs PaGE

Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry., 319 U.S. 350, 352, 353

SS bn ds Laas 0 Wb:8 eRe hn es bea ee eke 13

Marsh v. Illinois Central R. Co., 5th Cir., 175 F. 2d 498,

Re CI ipa, Brad iu eI os wd c's ign Miaeaemiaia 18

Moore v. CO Railway, 340 U.S. 573, 578 (1951) ..... 16

Union Pac. R. Co. v. Hadley, 246 U.S. 330 (1918) ...... 16

STATUTES

MRE PCIE CURD 80.6 bs ah vase Wace nc Rew buwedoe cae

er EE ak cnet 5 GR Aaa Os cb pa pine aK oad om 3

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION

i Rees SI MG Sis eins e kik os ocak he owe co's 4

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Ocroser Term, 1980

CHARLES E. FAIRCLOTH,

Petitioner,

VS.

NORFOLK AND WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY,

Respondent.

a

———

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS,

FIRST DISTRICT, FIRST DIVISION

2

REFERENCE TO REPORTS

The Opinion of the Appellate Court of Illinois, First

District, First-Division is reported at 89 Ill. App. 3d

923, 414 N.E. 2d 634 (1980) and is appended hereto at

pages A-1 through A-10. The order and mandate of the

Supreme Court of Illinois denying Petitioner’s Petition

for Leave to Appeal appears at pages A-11 through A-12.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Appellate Court of Illinois, First

District, First Division was entered on October 23, 1980.

Petitioner’s timely Petition for Leave to Appeal was

denied by the Supreme Court of Illinois on January 30,

1981 and this Petition for Certiorari was filed within 90

days of that date. This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked

under -28 U.S.C. § 1257(3).

3

STATUTORY PROVISION FOR JURISDICTION

62 Stat. 929 as amended 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3)

‘*Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest

court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be

reviewed by the Supreme Court as follows:

(3) By writ of certiorari, where the validity of a

treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in ques-

tion or where the validity of a State statute is drawn

in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the

Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, or

where any title, right, privilege or immunity is spe-

cially set up or claimed under the Constitution, treaties

or statutes of, or commission held or authority exer-

cised under, the United States. June 25, 1948, c. 646,

62 Stat. 929.”’

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTION INVOLVED

35 Stat. 66, as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 51.

‘‘Tiability of common carriers by railroad, in interstate

or foreign commerce, for injuries to employees from negli-

gence; definition of employees.

‘‘Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in

commerce between any of the several States or Territories,

or between any of the States and Territories, or between the

District of Columbia and any of the States or Territories,

or between the District of Columbia or any of the States or

Territories and any foreign nation or nations, shall be

liable in damages to any person suffering injury while

he is employed by such carrier in such commerce, or, in

case of the death of such employee, to his or her personal

representative, for the benefit of the surviving widow or

husband and children of such employee; and, if none, then

4

of such employee’s parents; and, if none, then of the next

of kin dependent upon such employee, for such injury or

death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of

any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier,

or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its

negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery,

track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves, or other equip-

ment.’’

U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14, § 1, which reads as follows:

‘All persons born or naturalized in the United

States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are

citizens of the United States and of the State wherein

they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law

which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of

citizens of the United States; nor shall any State de-

prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without

due process of law; nor deny to any person within

its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.’’

STATEMENT OF FACTS

This is a FELA case against the Norfolk & Western

Railroad Company resulting from two accidents suffered

by the plaintiff while working for the railroad. As to

each accident, the only evidence presented was part of

the plaintiff’s case. The trial court refused to set aside

the verdicts in favor of the railroad. On appeal, the

Appellate Court, in a confusing Opinion, affirmed the

judgment.

In so doing, it decided several questions uever pre-

sented by the plaintiff-appellant. First, it decided that

‘*. . . Even under the manifest weight standard urged by

Faircloth, we do not believe the trial court abused its

discretion in denying his motion for a new trial.’’ (A. 7).

The manifest weight ‘‘standard’’ was urged by plaintiff

as an independent question which was exclusively for the

Appellate Court. Second, it decided that it was ‘‘. . . not

persuaded that the trial judge believed he had no authority

to exercise discretion or he refused to exercise his dis-

cretion.” (A. 9). Plaintiff never so claimed except as a

theoretical possibility existing solely because the trial

court’s statements were so meaningless.

The Accident of January 2, 1974

The first accident was suffered by the plaintiff as a

relief employee for a crew working in the Front Street

yards. The plaintiff was called to work with the crew as

a switchman after a member of the original crew became

ill and went home (R. 92, 93). On the second move made

after the plaintiff joined the crew, Conductor Fuller in-

structed the plaintiff to tie onto a string of cars and to

* .

pull those cars on to the lead track. Plaintiff was in-

structed that the first move would be a 3 car kick (R. 85

through 98).

Plaintiff was told to grab hold of the car and stay

on the ground and hold onto the cutting lever to make

sure that the pin stayed up. The pin will usually stay

up except when track conditions will cause it to fall

down. If this occurs, the movement has to be stopped

and restarted all over again (R. 99). The plaintiff was

unfamiliar with the yard and did not really know the

last time he had worked in that yard (R. 98). He fol-

lowed the directions of the Conductor and responcd to a

question that he was set. The Conductor gave a kick sign

and the engine started shoving, gathering up the slack

and causing the cars to roll. The plaintiff had his hand

on the grabiron and as he reached for the operating lever

he was not certain if he got his hand on it or not. The last

thing that he could remember was the cars coming at him.

(At the time of trial, he could remember that he went in

between the cars). The next thing he knew was that he was

lying on his back away from the cars (R. 100).

After he landed on his back, he could remember opening

his eyes and seeing several men around him. He felt hurt

all over. He was taken from the yard to the St. Charles

Hospital where they x-rayed his head and left leg. He was

at the hospital for 5 or 6 hours before he was told to go

home, stay in bed, and contact his family doctor (R. 101,

102). Surgery -was performed on his left knee before lie

returned to work (R. 105). That knee was operated on for

a second time in November of 1975 (R. 120).

Mr. Fuller testified that the condition of the track in

the immediate area in which the accident occurred was

very poor on high and low joints. The ties were in very

7

poor condition and a number of derailments had taken ~

place. Mr. Fuller had seen two high-low joints on that

track prior to the accident (R. 32). He knew that those

high-low joints existed at the time the cut had been made

and that they had been there 5 to 6 months prior to the

accident. In the area where the accident happened, there

had been 35 derailments on that track in 45 days (R. 33).

These would be reported on a form. The Conductor had

filled out those forms so many times that he was sick and

tired of filling them out.

He testified it was his responsibility to start and stop

the movements. Just before the movement, he informed

the crew what he intended to do. He made sure that Mr.

Faircloth was ready and then he gave the kick sign. He saw

Faircloth with his hand on the grabiron of the car to sup-

port himself while raising the operating lever. The Con-

ductor saw the plaintiff disappear between the cars. He

immediately gave a signal to try to stop the movement

when he saw plaintiff come shooting out. He thought

the plaintiff must be unconscious because he made no ef-

fort to protect himself and landed right on his head. He

ran up to him and held up 3 fingers and inquired how

many fingers. Faircloth said 6 with a big smile on his face.

The Conductor told the plaintiff to stay there and ran to a

telephone to get an ambulance (R. 35, 36).

When the plaintiff took hold of the grabiron and reached

in to cut off the car, the Conductor saw that they were

going over this low joint and the cars were violently swing-

ing back and forth. The Conductor saw that the plaintiff

was right at the low joint as he reached in to lift the oper-

ating lever. The cars were going 5 to 7 miles per hour and

would not become uncoupled (R. 36, 37). After the acci-

U

dent, he inspected the cars and found that there was noth-

ing the matter with them. He knew approximately how far

east the 3 or 4 cars stopped from the high-low joint. He

thought that all 3 cars never got by the high-low joint.

A high-low joint is caused when, through the years, the

ballast beneath the rails is washed away and then the tie

from working motions back and forth is caused to eat into

the ground. Eventually you can have as much as a 12

inch drop. Thus, when a car moves across the joint the

weight of the car causes it to make a violent sudden action

toward this hole. The track looks like it is okay until heavy

loaded railroad cars run over it. A high-low joint causes

a violent lateral action of the railroad cars as they run

over it (R. 24, 25).

The Conductor did not warn the plaintiff not to make

the cut at the low joint (R. 57). On redirect examination

the following question and answer were given (R. 59).

Q. It is necessary to run alongside of a car when

you are making a cut movement like this?

A. Not necessarily so. Without the low joint, no, sir

not necessary.

THE ACCIDENT OF MAY 6, 1976

On May 6, 1976, plaintiff was working with a crew in the

Homestead yard. He discussed the work to be done with

the Conductor in the railroad yard office and then went

out to work. He went to his engine which was located on

the No. 3 track about even with the No. 5 switch as he came

out of the yard office. He had to cross No. 5 and No. 4 track

to get to the engine. He was going to talk to the engineer,

but his window box was closed so he walked around the

front of the engine, banged on the fireman’s side and told

him they were going to go down through the yard. He

9

walked toward the main to check on some cars. He made

a turn to come back to meet his Conductor who was right

behind the plaintiff. His left leg then hit an object causing

him to twist his body and he slipped down into a hole that

was in the ground. The hole was between the No. 2 and

No. 3 track. He had a lantern with him and it was lit. At

times he observed where he was walking, but he also had

to watch in all directions. He did not see the object before

his foot hit it, but after his foot hit the object he saw that

it was a piece of railroad tie which appeared to be about

1 to 1% feet long and was stuck upwards at an angle. The

condition in that area was very uneven containing gravel,

air hoses, brakeshoes, knuckles and piles of grain as much

as 2 feet high where the grain has slipped out of cars. There

was all kinds of junk around there. It is the duty of the

Maintenance of Way people to clean up this area. His leg

was twisted because of the hitting of the object. He re-

ceived a sharp pain, a jabbing pain, down his leg and his

Conductor helped him back into the yard office to the

Supervisor’s office and he had to sit down there. The termi-

nal trainmaster was mad at him because he had hit his leg

again and he was taken to St. C! irles Hospital. There he

was instructed to see his orthopedic doctor (R. 123 through

128). }

Wayne G. Oestreich, the fireman on May 6, 1976, testified

for the plaintiff. He was sitting in the engine on the north

side. The engine was on No. 3 track waiting for the crew

which was to come out of the yard office. That office was

to the south of the engine (R. 62). He saw Mr. Faircloth

walking across in front of the unit. At that time, he said

something and yelled up to the fireman telling him he was

going to the north or west of the yard.

10

Faircloth proceeded north across No. 2 track and was

looking down the main towards some cars. He then turned

around and came back toward the engine. Between No. 2

and No. 3 track, Mr. Faircloth stepped on a piece of tie and

the fireman saw his leg give out and then he hobbled back

across in front of the engine. He then went into the yard

office.

Mr. Oestreich testified that the area had been rough and

the terrain had debris and stuff lying around for a couple

of months (R. 63). He testified that the plaintiff stepped

on a broken tie which is right about the middle between No.

2 and No. 3 track. He stated that a hunk of the tie was

buri» 1 in the debris. A lot of excavating work had been

done around there where it has been bad for a couple of

months. There were potholes, gravel and that. That is all

uneven gravel around there. He had observed the same

condition for the preceding couple of months.

Th ondition was reported to one of the members of the

Railroad Safety Committee. The fireman believed that he

said something to the Safety Committee. The Safety Com-

mittee is composed of different men from different depart-

ments who are picked every 6 months to determine unsafe

conditions around the railroad and to see what can be done

to correct them. The only thing that was done to correct

the condition was the placing of bulletins warning the men

to watch the conditions. These were put up by the Su-

perintendent (R. 65).

a

11

THE RAILROAD’S DEFENSE

The railroad presented no evidence, but, nonetheless,

contended in its opening statement that the evidence

would show that the two accidents ‘‘. . . were not the fault

of the Norfolk & Western Railway’’ (R. 19). At the con-

clusion of the evidence, the railroad conceded that the

plaintiff’s evidence was presented by all the people who

knew anything about the accident (R. 460). It claimed

that the plaintiff must prove that a specific low joint

was at the scene of the accident and that the low joint was

the ‘‘cause of the whole thing’’ (R. 463). As to the second

accident, the railroad argued that the sole cause of the

accident was the carelessness of the plaintiff ‘‘in not

watching where he was going’’ (R. 467).

THE HEARING ON THE POST TRIAL MOTION

The Post Trial Motion was extensively argued before the

trial court. The plaintiff stated the applicable law involv-

ing the weighing of evidence on such a Motion (R. 513

through 539). The railroad, on the other hand, contended

that a new trial could not be granted unless there was a

complete absence of probative facts to support the con-

clusion of the jury (R. 539 through 541). Following the

first hearing, the court asked for briefs which were filed.

On August 6, 1979, the Motion was reopened. The court

stated that it had studied most of the cases that both sides

submitted and that it was ‘‘very familiar with this proposi-

tion of law involved in these cases’’ (R. 560). After fur-

ther argument as to the standard in a FELA case as to the

weight of the evidence, the court ruled as follows (R. 570,

571):

“THE COURT: The Court was not disturbed

about the distinction as to standards of proof under

12

motions for a new trial and confusing that with a ver-

dict non obstante verdicto, or setting aside a verdict,

as some call it.

The Court is very familiar with the plethora of cases

in Illinois and merely discussed Federal cases to see if

there was any avenue at all that this Court could study

and see as to what he should determine on this motion

for new trial.

I have reached the conclusion that the motion for

new trial is hereby denied in that the record itself

speaks and the only one that can decide this maiter is

the Appellate Court.

MR. LANDESS: Thank you, your Honor.

MR. NAUGHTON: That is for all grounds?

THE COURT: On all grounds, yes.

If you will prepare your order, I will sign it.’’

HOW THE FEDERAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL

QUESTIONS WERE PRESENTED

Petitioner asserted its position on his federal claims at

every level of the court system.

Petitioner asserted its due process of law questions in

his Petition for Rehearing after the Appellate Court

handed down its Opinion.

Petitioner filed a timely Petition for Leave to Appeal

to the Supreme Court of Illinois which was denied on

January 30, 1981. Thus, the Appellate Court of Illinois,

First District, First Division is the ‘‘highest court in

[the] state in which decison could be had.’’ 28 U.S.C.

§ 1257(3).

SS

13

ARGUMENT

I.

THIS COURT SHOULD RESOLVE THE CONFLICT

BETWEEN ITS SAFE PLACE TO WORK DECISIONS

AND THE JUDGMENT BELOW BY REVERSING

THAT JUDGMENT.

This Court’s decisions have made clear beyond doubt

that the common law duty of the employer to use reasonable

care in furnishing its employees with a safe place to work

is plain and is deeply engrained in Federal Jurisprudence.

Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry., 319 U.S. 350, 352, 353

(1943). The court below, however, was completely obli-

vious of this rule even though plaintiff’s primary claim

of negligence was based upon that rule. In ignoring that

doctrine, the Appellate Court created an irreconcilable

conflict with this Court’s safe place decisions.

Plaintiff’s two FELA cases were tried to a jury with

all of the evidence part of the plaintiff’s case (R. 459-460).

Nevertheless, the jury aberrantly returned both verdicts in

favor of the defendant. Since the plaintiff’s case was un-

contradicted and unimpeached, the verdicts demonstrated

the jury did not understand the issues or the instructions.

Even so, the Appellate Court affirmed the refusal of a

new trial even though it admitted that the plaintiff’s case

was both uncontradicted and unimpeached (A. 1-10). The

Opinion ignores this Court’s teaching delineating the rail-

road’s duty to provide a safe place to work by summariz-

ing the evidence without mention of the rule and by re-

jecting all inferences favoring the plaintiff. Indeed, the

14

Appellate Court’s Opinion finds inferences favoring the

railroad by torturing the evidence and by creating con-

tradictions where none exist.

Contrary to the Opinion, the evidence was overwhelming-

ly contrary to the verdicts. As to the first accident, the

evidence clearly established the plaintiff was running

alongside the cars in the cut and was performing his

duties exactly as he was ordered to do by his Conductor.

Furthermore, the track involved was in deplorable con-

dition. It contained high-low joints, the cars were sway-

ing laterally as a result of these joints and the general

condition of the ballast supporting the track was poor.

The plaintiff’s testimony was that he reached for the oper-

ating lever while the cars were coming at him. The next

thing he knew, he was lying on his back away from the

cars (R. 100).

The Conductor observed the plaintiff throughout this

movement. He then saw the plaintiff disappear between the

cars and gave a stop signal. He saw the plaintiff come

shooting out between the cars as though he were uncon-

scious because no effort was made by the plaintiff to

protect himself and he landed right on his head. When the

Conductor ran up to the plaintiff, he held up 3 fingers and

inquired how many fingers. He stated that Faircloth said

6 with a big smile on his face. The Conductor ordered the

plaintiff to stay there and ran to a telephone to get an am-

bulance (R. 35, 36).

The basic charge of negligence presented to the jury

was a charge that the ‘railroad had failed to provide the

plaintiff with a reasonably safe place in which to do his

work. That charge was established without contradiction

by the testimony of the Conductor on redirect examina-

tion as follows (R. 59):

15

‘*Q. It is necessary to run alongside of a car when

you are making a cut movement like this?

A. Not necessarily so. Without the low joint, no,

sir not necessary.

No instruction was given to the jury as to a claim that

the accident was caused by a specific high-low joint.

Nevertheless, the railroad argued that the plaintiff was

required to prove that a high-low joint there was the cause

of the whole thing (R. 463). That argument negated all

of the claims of negligence submitted to the jury in the

instructions. It placed upon the plaintiff the burden of

proving a high-low joint contrary to the instructions. It

directly led to the irrational verdict on the first accident.

The verdict in favor of the defendant on the second

accident is even more incredible. As to that accident, the

plaintiff and the fireman, who observed the accident, testi-

fied that the area between tracks 2 and 3 was littered with

debris. Both testified that the plaintiff stepped over the

rail of No. 3 track and his foot hit a piece of railroad tie

which was buried in the debris causing the plaintiff to

twist his knee. The piece of railroad tie was about 1 to 114%4

feet long and it was stuck upwards at an angle. The

fireman testified that striking the tie caused the plaintiff’s

leg to give out (R. 63, 64). The plaintiff stated that hitting

the tie caused him to twist his body and slip down into a

hole in the ground (R. 123 through 128).

Faced with the overwhelming evidence that the railroad

had failed to provide the plaintiff with a reasonably safe

place in which to work, the defendant argued that the area

was so bad that the plaintiff was 100% to blame for his

accident because he hit the tie. Its argument, thus, was

contrary to the instructions of the court which place the

burden of proving contributory negligence on the railroad.

16

Here, as in the first accident, the railroad sought to rely

on speculation and conjecture and not upon evidence in

order to argue that it was not negligent. The jury should

have rejected such arguments, but did not. Even in a

FELA case, no jury is permitted to use speculation and

conjecture in order to supply a non-negligent explanation

of the plaintiff’s injury. Moore v. C£O Railway, 340 U.S.

573, 578 (1951).

The Appellate Court’s confusion as to negligence was

equaled by its confusion concerning the doctrine of partial

causation explicitly provided in the Federal Employers’

Liability Act. Its reasoning seemed to be based upon an

ancient theory of proximate causation. No other explana-

tion is possible for its holding that the railroad’s unsafe

place to work could be found to have no causal relation

to the plaintiff’s injuries. Thus, the reasoning of the Ap-

pellate Court must antedate the Opinion of this Court by

Mr. Justice Holmes in Union Pac. R. Co. v. Hadley, 246

U.S. 330 (1918) where Mr. Justice Holmes specifically held

that even if the plaintiff’s negligence was the last in time,

it cannot be deemed to be the only proximate cause be-

cause to do so would empty the statute of its meaning

and say that the death there did not ‘‘result in part from

the negligence of any of the employes.’’

II.

THE PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF

LAW WHEN THE APPELLATE COURT AFFIRMED

THE JUDGMENT WITHOUT DECIDING THE QUES.

TIONS RAISED ON APPEAL.

Petitioner appealed on two grounds:

1) The trial court abused its discretion in deciding

the verdicts were not contrary to the preponderance of

the evidence.

17

2) The Judgment should be reversed by the Ap-

pellate Court because the verdicts were contrary to

the manifest weight of the evidence.

The Appellate Court failed to decide either question.

Instead, it combined the two questions and held: ‘‘Even

under the manifest weight standard urged by Faircloth,

we do not believe the trial court abused its discretion in

denying his motion for a new trial’’ (A. 7). No such ques-

tion exists under either Federal or Illinois law. If such

a question were to exist, it would effectively eliminate new

trials because of the impossible burden such a test would

impose on the movant. By combining the questions, the

Court in effect agreed with the railroad that a new trial

cannot be granted in a FELA case unless there is a ‘‘com-

plete absence of probative facts” to support the verdict,

which is the identical test required for a judgment not-

withstanding the verdict.

The cavalier disregard of the questions raised on appeal

compounded the nonsensical ruling by the trial court.

That ruling was as follows (R. 570, 571):

‘THE COURT: The Court was not disturbed

about the distinction as to standards of proof under

motions for a new trial and confusing that with a ver-

dict non obstante verdicto, or setting aside a verdict,

as some call it.

The Court is very familiar with the plethora of cases

in Illinois and merely discussed Federal cases to see if

there was any avenue at all that this Court could study

and see as to what he should determine on this motion

for new trial.

I have reached the conclusion that the motion for

new trial is hereby denied in that the record itself

speaks and the only one that can decide this matter is

the Appellate Court.

*%

*y

18

MR. LANDESS: Thank you, your Honor.

MR. NAUGHTON: That is for all grounds?

THE COURT: On all grounds, yes.

If you will prepare your order, I will sign it.’’

The correct standard for both courts is plainly stated

in Marsh v. Illinois Central R. Co., 5th Cir., 175 F. 2d 498,

500 (1949). Both courts refer to that case, but neither

applied it. That failure deprived the petitioner of due

process of law in and of itself.

The Opinion also decides that the trial court did not

‘*fail to exercise discretion’’. This interpreta\ on was men-

tioned as a mere possibility. The Opinion, however, in-

creases that possibility because it relies on a colloquy

which occurred before the trial court’s ruling in order to

so hold.

In summary, the Appellate Court decided questions

never presented to it and did not decide the questions

presented to it, but confusingly at times stated the con-

tentions made by plaintiff-appellant correctly even though

it did not decide those questions. Therefore, the Appellate

Court Opinion does not satisfy the minimum standards

required as to clarity, exposition and intelligibility. Be-

cause of the Appellate Court’s failures, this Court should

exercise its supervisory auhority over the lower appellate

courts by granting the Petition for Certiorari in order

to reverse the Judgment of the Appellate Court.

19

CONCLUSION

For the reasons adverted to above, it is respectfully sub-

mitted that this Court should grant the Petition for a Writ

of Certiorart.

Respectfully submitted,

Joun J. NavuGuTon,

30 N. LaSalle Street,

Suite 2100,

Chicago, Illinois 60602,

(312) 782-5925,

Counsel of Record.

Rosert E. Harrineton,

Harrineton & Harrineton, Ltp.,

Hens.tezr, Monex & HENsLEEr,

30 N. LaSalle Street,

Suite 2100,

(312) 782-5925,

Of Counsel.

April, 1981

Al

APPENDIX

No. 79-2391 7

CHARLES E. FAIRCLOTH, Appeal from the

Plaintiff-Appellant, Cireuit Court of

va. Cook County

NORFOLK AND WESTERN ss a .

RAILWAY COMPANY ee ee

; ’ Presiding.

a corporation,

Defendant-Appellee. |

Mr. JUSTICE JIGANTI delivered the opinion of the

court:

The plaintiff, Charles E. Faircloth, filed a two count

complaint against the defendant, Norfolk & Western Rail-

way Company (Norfolk), under the Federal Employers’

Liability Act (45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq.). He sought to recover

for knee injuries allegedly resulting from two accidents

which occurred while he was working for Norfolk. The jury

found for the defendant on each accident. Faircloth appeals

from the judgment entered on the verdicts and seeks a

new trial on the ground that the verdicts were contrary to

the manifest weight of the evidence. He also appeals from

the denial of his post-trial motion for a new trial on the

grounds that the court abused its discretion or refused to

exercise its discretion.

Faircloth presented two occurrence witnessses on each

accident and submitted evidence as to damages. Norfolk

denied liability but presented no evidence. Due to our

disposition, we find it unnecessary to relate the evidence

concerning damages.

-%

A2

The first accident occurred on January 2, 1974 at Nor-

folk’s Front Street yard in Ohio. Faircloth and his super-

visor at che time of the accident testified concerning this

accident.

Conductor Charles Fuller testified that on January 2,

1974, he was supervising the crew to which Faircloth was

assigned. Faircloth reported to work on Fuller’s crew

about midway through the shift to replace a crew member

who had left the job early due to illness.

Fuller instructed Faircloth that the crew was going to

attempt a ‘‘three car kick”. That is, three cars were to be

separated from a fifteen car train and allowed to roll onto

another track. Cars are detached from the rest of the train

by lifting a cutting lever which is located between every

two cars.

Fuller started the movement after Faircloth stated he

was ready. Faircloth took two or three steps alongside the

train which was moving at five to seven miles per hour.

Fuller saw Faircloth put his hand on the grabhandle of the

ear. This is done so that the switchman can support him-

self while lifting the cutting lever. Faircloth reached be-

tween the cars as if to pull the cutting lever. He disap-

peared between the cars then came ‘‘shooting out,’’ land-

ing clear of the train.

Fuller testified that the condition of the track was ‘‘very

poor on high-low joints’’. When asked to describe or define

a high-low joint, Fuller related the following. A rail is

331% feet long. At the end of each rail is a joint. The joint

consist of a ballast, tieplate, and tie. The tieplate is two

pieces of metal with a bolt through them. Under the tie-

plate is a tie. Under the tie is a ballast. A high-low joint

occurs when, after years of wear, the ballast and ground

are washed away causing the tie to eat into the ground.

A3

This may cause a depression of up to 12 inches. The joint

appears to be in good condition, but when heavily loaded

cars roll over it they sink into the depression at the high-

low joint. This causes the cars to swing violently.

According to Fuller, there were two high-low joints

within 12°feet of one another in the area of the accident.

Prior to the accident there had been 35 derailments in an

unspecified 45 day period.

As Faircloth attempted the three car kick the cars were

swinging violently. The cars were empty. Faircloth was

right over a high-low joint as he reached between the cars

for the cutting lever. Fuller did not see the high-low joint

but he knew where it was located.

After the accident Fuller inspected the rail cars and

found nothing the matter with them. There was nothing

improper about the speed of the train or the actions of the

crew members. At the time of the accident there were six

inches of snow on the ground. No salt or other material

had been spread on the snow.

On cross-examination Fuller testified that he had not

been subpoenaed to testify but had appeared at Faircloth’s

request. He traveled from Toledo, Ohio to appear at trial.

He no longer worked for Norfolk because he had been

‘‘disqualified’’.

Faircloth testified that he began working for the railroad

in April of 1971. On the date of the accident he was em-

ployed as a switchman. He stated that he reported to work

at approximately 5 p.m. on the date of the accident. Fuller

told Faircloth that the crew was going to switch a string

of cars and that the first movement would be a three car

kick. Faircloth was instructed to lift the cutting lever and

to hold it in order to make certain it stayed up. He was told

7.

A4

there had been trouble in the past with the lever staying

up. He testified that the lever was supposed to stay up

without being held but that given certain track conditions

it must be held to keep it from falling down during a

movement.

Fuller asked Faircloth whether he was ready and Fair-

cloth answered that he was. The train started to move.

He had his hand on the grab-iron and was walking along-

side the train. He reached in to pull the cutting lever. He

was not sure whether he actually got his hand on the lever

or not. The cars were coming at him. The only thing he

could remember at the time of trial was that he went in

between the cars. The next thing he knew he was on his

back. There was snow on the ground.

On cross-examination Faircloth testified that there was

nothing improper about the speed at which the train was

moving, or about what any of his fellow crew members may

have done. He knew of nothing improper concerning the

rail cars.

The second accident occurred on May 6, 1976 at Norfolk’s

Homestead yard in Ohio. Faircloth and a member of the

crew testified concerning that accident.

Wayne Oestreich testified that on the date in question

he was working as a fireman on the crew with Faircloth.

Oestreich was sitting in the engine waiting for the crew to

come out. He saw Faircloth cross in front of the engine.

Faircloth turned around and started walking back towards

the engine between the tracks. Faircloth stepped on a piece

of broken tie which was partially buried. His leg gave out.

Faircloth did not, fall to the ground. Faircloth then hobbled

back across in front of the engine and went into the yard

office.

A5

Oestreich testified that the area in which the accident

occurred had previously been the scene of a derailment.

The area was undergoing repair and excavation work. The

ground was ‘‘rough” and there was debris strewn about.

There were potholes, gravel and uneven ground. A warning

had been posted stating that repair work was being con-

ducted and that the track in the area was closed to traffic.

The condition had existed for ‘‘a couple of months’’.

The witness had reported the condition to members of the

Safety Committee. To the witness’ knowledge the only

action that had been taken in response to the complaints

was the posting of the warning.

On cross-examination, the witness testified that he could

see the piece of broken tie on which Faircloth had stepped.

He was 10 or 15 feet away. There was a spotlight shining,

so the visibility was good from where he had been sitting.

Visibility from the ground would not have been as good

because of ‘‘shadows’’.

Faircloth testified that he was walking between the

tracks. He made a turn to come back to meet his conductor.

The conductor was right behind him before he turned.

Faircloth’s left leg hit an object causing him to twist his

body. He slipped into a hole.

Faircloth and the conductor were each carrying a lighted

lantern. He was looking where he was walking, but he

could not walk with his head all the way down because he

had to watch for trains.

After his foot hit the object he saw that it was a piece

of broken tie. It was a foot and a half long and protruded

from the ground between the tracks.

According to Faircloth’s testimony the condition of the

area where the accident occurred was very uneven. There

*%

ya

A6

was debris on the ground including gravel, air hoses,

brakeshoes, knuckles, and grain. At the time of the second

accident the yard was not really dark but neither was it

very well illuminated. He did not see the tie before he

stepped on it. There were shadows from engines and box

cars which would have prevented him from seeing the tie

even if he had looked at it.

Faircloth’s initial arguments concern the sufficiency of

the evidence. He contends first that the jury verdicts were

against the manifest weight of the evidence and secondly

that the trial court abused its discretion in not granting

his motion for a new trial which alleged that the verdicts

were against the manifest weight of the evidence. He argues

that the controlling standard was set forth in Marsh vy.

Illinois Central R.R. Co., (5th Cir. 1949), 175 F. 2d 498,

500 wherein the court stated: —

‘*A motion for a new trial is addressed to the trial

judge’s discretion. He may grant a new trial * * *

(and he alone can) because he thinks the verdict is

wrong, though supported by some evidence. The ex-

ercise of his discretion is not ordinarily reviewable

on appeal, though a failure to exercise discretion, or

an abuse of it, may be corrected’’.

Faircloth also relies upon the following statement in

Bazile v. Bisso Marine Co., (5th Cir. 1979), 606 F. 2d 101,

105:

‘‘As far as the motion for a new trial, the trial

judge can grant a new trial if he believes the verdict

is contrary to the weight of the evidence. [Citations.]

** * Tn a motion for a new trial the judge is free to

weigh the evidence. As an appellate court, our review

of the granting of the motion for a new trial is

severely limited — the lower court’s action is discre-

tionary and we may interfere only when the court

abuses its discretion or fails to exercise it’’,

A7

Norfolk argues that manifest weight is not the controlling

standard but rather that in Illinois a new trial! may be

granted only where there is a complete absence of proba-

tive facts to support the verdicts. Bowman v. Illinois

Central Railroad (1959), 11 Ill. 2d 186, 142 N.E. 2d 104.

Under either standard, our review of the denial of Fair-

cloth’s motion for a new trial is, as stated in Bazile

‘*severely limited’’. Even under the manifest weight stand-

ard urged by Faircloth, we do not believe the trial court

abused its discretion in denying his motion for a new trial.

Accordingly, we will not disturb on appeal the trial court’s

denial of the motion for a new trial or its determination

that the jury’s verdicts were supported by the evidence.

Concerning the first accident, the witnesses agree that

there was nothing improper concerning the speed of the

train, actions of the crew members, or condition of the rail

ears. Although there was testimony that there were six

inches of unsalted snow on the ground there is nothing in

the record to indicate that this condition bore any relation-

ship to the accident.

Fuller testified that there were high-low joints in the

track in question, that high-low joints cause the cars to

swing violently, and that the cars were at the time of the

accident swinging violently. Faircloth did not mention

high-low joints or whether the cars were swinging. There

was no testimony as to whether the presence of high-low

joints or the swinging of the cars related to the accident.

Neither witness testified that Faircloth was struck, pulled,

pushed or caught by the cars. Further, Fuller’s testimony

in this regard was somewhat contradictory. He stated that

rails are 3314 feet long and that joints occur where the

rails meet. His subsequent testimony was that there were

7.

*?

A8

two high-low joints within 12 feet of one another in the

area in question. He testified that when heavily loaded

ears roll over high-low joints a violent swinging action oc-

curs. Here, the rail cars were empty. Additionally, the jury

was entitled to consider that Fuller had been disqualified

for work by the defendant railroad after 22 years of em-

ployment. Faircloth, testifying on his own behalf, was no

longer employed by Norfolk.

Concerning the second accident, Oestreich testified that

Faircloth stepped on a piece of tie and that Faircloth’s

leg then gave out. The area was undergoing repair, was

the scene of excavation work, and was littered with debris.

Faircloth testified to similar facts except that instead of

testifying that his leg gave out, Faircloth stated that after

his leg hit the tie his body twisted and he slipped into a

hole. The evidence was somewhat contradictory. While

Oestreich testified that a bulletin had been posted warn-

ing of conditions and stating that the track was closed to

traffic, Faircloth testified that he could not look toward

the ground constantly while he was walking because he had

to be alert for the movement of trains. Additionally, Fair-

cloth stated that poor lighting would have kept him from

seeing the tie although he and the conductor he had been

walking with each carried a lighted lantern. The jury also

heard Oestreich testify that a light was shining on the tie

from where he was sitting but that from Faircloth’s posi-

tion the tie was in shadows.

Faircloth also contends that the trial court failed to ex-

ercise discretion when ruling on his motion for a new trial.

This contention is based on the following statement made

by the trial court:

A9

‘‘T have reached the conclusion that the motion for

new trial is hereby denied in that the record itself

speaks and the only one that can decide this matter is

the Appellate Court’’.

A similar contention was made in Asher v. Stromberg

(1966), 78 Ill. App. 2d 267, 223 N.E. 2d 300, in which the

jury held for the defendant and the trial judge denied the

plaintiff’s motion for a new trial, remarking ‘‘I have to

await the ruling of a higher court.” (Asher at 276, 223 N.E.

2d at 304). The appellate court, considering all of the trial

court’s comments in context, rejected the plaintiff’s con-

tention that the trial judge had erroneously concluded that

he had no authority or power to weigh the evidence.

Here, the trial court requested and received legal memo-

randa on the motion from counsel for each party. It heard

argument on the issues. The court stated that he had read

most of the cases submitted and was ‘‘very familiar’’ with

the proposition of the law involved. Additionally, the trial

court and plaintiff’s counsel agreed on the record that the

trial court was not refusing to exercise its discretion. This

is evidenced by the following colloquy which occurred at

the hearing on Faircloth’s motion:

“THE COURT: But the limitation [on the court’s

discretion in ruling on a motion for a new trial] only

is that he cannot abuse his power and discretion.

COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFF: That is the

only limitation on the Trial Court. <

THE COURT: Yes.

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF: And the Marsh case

goes further and says that when thewJudge refuses his

discretion it can be remanded to him and he must ex-

ercise the discretion.

THE COURT: We don’t have that element involved

here.

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF: No.’’

A10

Considering all of his remarks in context, we are not

persuaded that the trial judge believed he had no author-

ity to exercise discretion or that he refused to exercise

his discretion. Rather, we believe the trial court’s comment,

when viewed in context, was meant only to indicate that hav-

ing made its ruling on the motion for a new trial the unsuc-

cessful litigant was left with the option to appeal.

Accordingly the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

JOHNSON and ROMITI, JJ., concur.

7.

All

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

STATE OF ILLINOIS

SUPREME COURT =

AT A TERM OF THE SUPREME COURT, begun and

held in Springfield, on Monday, the twelfth day of January

in the year of our Lord, one thousand nine hundred and

eighty-one, within and for the State of Illinois.

Present: JosepH H. GoLpENHERSH, CHIEF JUSTICE

Justice Rospert C. UNDERWOOD

Justice Howarp C. Ryan

Justice THomas J. Moran

Justice Danie P. Wazp

Justice Witt1am G. CLARK

Justice Seymour Simon

Tyrone C. FaHNER, ATTORNEY GENERAL

Louvre F. Dean, MarsHan

Attest: CLett L. Woops, CLerk

- 4%

Al2

BE IT REMEMBERED, that, to-wit: on the 30th day of

January, 1981, the same being one of the days of the term

of Court aforesaid, the following proceedings were, by

said Court, had and entered of record, to-wit:

-CHARLES E. FAIRCLOTH, ) Petition for Leave

Petitioner,| to Appeal from

No. 54267 vs. Appellate Court,

First District.

NORFOLK AND WESTERN RAIL- a

WAY COMPANY, a corporation, 79-2391

Respondent. q 75 L 10099

And now on this day the Court having duly considered

the Petition for Leave to Appeal herein and being now

fully advised of and concerning the premises, doth overrule

the prayer of the petition and denies Leave to Appeal

herein.

And it is further considered by the Court that the said

Respondent recover of and from the said Petitioner costs

by it in this behalf expended, to be taxed, and that it have

execution therefor.

I, CLELL L. WOODS, Clerk of the Supreme Court of

the State of Illinois and keeper of the records, files and

Seal thereof, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true

copy of the final order of the said Supreme Court in the

above entitled cause of record in my office.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto

subscribed my name and affixed the Seal of

said Court this 9th day of April, 1981.

CLELL L. WOODS, Clerk,

Supreme Court of the State of Illinois.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.