Petition — Vlcek v. United States

8Q = j ns nation

No. 6a6 APR 1? 196t.

ALE RAN Er L. STEVAS,

CLERK

Iu the

Supreme Cowt of the Rnited States

OctToser TERM, 1980

MICHAEL J. VLCEK,

Petitioner,

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

: Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

MICHAEL R. ABRAMOVIC

29 S. LaSalle Street

Chicago, Illinois 60603

(312) 782-7372

Attorney for Petitioner

MICHAEL A. PEDICONE

Of Counsel

UNITED STATES LAW PRINTING CO., CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60618 (312) 525-6581

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Did the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

commit error in refusing to address any of the issues

raised by the Petitioner, a ‘‘minor’’ figure in a criminal

conspiracy case?

2. Did the government’s continued intentional suppres-

sion of materials specifically requested and exculpatory

in nature, deprive the Petitioner of a fair trial?

3. Is it error for the trial court, when earlier in re-

sponse to the Petitioner’s Motion for Sanctions against

the government for its denial of the existence of an in-

formant, the Court ruled that no testimony from that in-

formant would be considered subsequent to the date that

the witness became an informant, for the Court at a later

time to deprive the jury of the factual determination by

directing the jury to find that the government’s witness

had become an informant effective February 11, 1978, de-

spite the witness’ own testimony on cross examination in

the presence of the jury that he became an informant in

1977?

4. Did the trial court commit error by refusing to admit

certain exhibits, one of which was originally hidden by

the government and on its face, tended to negate the guilt

of the Petitioner as a co-conspirator?

lil

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

Judgement And Opinion Below sdnosesitinoslonge decal 2

Jurisdictional Statement «....:...:<:ccssicsccsssesssssae ee 2

Constitutional Provisions Involved 0.00.00... cceeeeeeeeee eee 2

Statement OF The Came ..ccccccéssectecooceisneeeeee 2

Reasons For Granting The Writ ...0.00.0.0000cccceeeeeeeeeeeeee by)

PATON ...22c0nsseonenncsorsicccnsevenensstsueisaganequnanseanan dae 5)

CORCHUBION | .n.ccscenscosecsensscetessscesneevesecestsessessuvaiedsemnmeennaaan 8

Appendices:

Appendix A—Opinion of the Court of Appeals ..App. 1

Appendix B—Order Denying Rehearing ............ App. 24

Appendix C—Exhibit 44 at Petitioner’s

MRM onssscssescisnsnssunrvonnsnvincsncateaecemmameae Sen App. 25-26

PREVIOUS PAGE was BLANK

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

Cases

PAGE

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) .........000.00000... 8

Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) 200.0... ..... i

Moore v. Illinois, 403 U.S. 786 (1972) ...........00000000......... 8

Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) 000. 8

United States v. Meltzer, 100 F.2d 739 (7th Cir.

BE. ditt encima Schespkcunceidiaaaiabiduasuddotulasnesoaalinasatass

United States v. Perry, 512 F.2d 805 (6th Cir. 1975) ....

United States v. Stevenson, 445 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1971)

United States v. Young, 573 F.2d 1137 (9th Cir. 1978) .

Constitutional Provisions

Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United

ees Ge me ee 7

Iu the

Supreme Court of the United States

Qcroper Term, 1980

No.

MICHAEL J. VLCEK,

Petitioner,

VS.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

Petitioner, Michael J. Vicek, respectfully prays that a

writ of Certiorari be issued to the United States Court of

Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, to review its decision

affirming the District Court’s conviction for conspiracy to

possess marijuana or hashish with the intent to distribute!

' Other parties to the proceeding in the Fourth Circuit Court of

Appeals include: No. 79-5052, Donald David Haynie, No. 79-5068,

Lynn Edward Fletcher, No, 79-5069, Paul Max Jenkins and No.

79-5070, Jean A. Morrissette.

2

JUDGMENT AND OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-

cuit, No. 79-5053, is not yet reported. A copy is attached

as Appendix A, per Rule 21.1(k)(i) of this Court.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on

December 18, 1980 (Appendix A). A timely Petition for

Rehearing was denied on February 19, 1981 (Appendix B).

This Petition is timely filed within 60 days after entry of

judgment by a federal court of appeals, as provided in

Rule 20.1. Jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C.

$1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or

otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or

indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising

in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in

actual service in time of war or public danger; nor

shall any person be subject for the same offence to be

twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be

compelled in any criminal case be a witness against

himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law; nor shall private prop-

erty be taken for public use, without just compensation.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Petitioner, along with about eleven other individu-

als, was indicted on September 5, 1978. United States v.

Haynie et al., Cr. No. 78-161-A Eastern District of Vir-

ginia, Alexandria Division. The indictment charged the

Petitioner with participation in two conspiracies, Count I

3

charging a conspiracy from January 1, 1977-September 95,

1978, to import hashish and Count II charging a conspiracy

to possess with intent to distribute hashish and marijuana.

Petitioner filed several motions with the district court,

including, inter alia, change of venue, discovery, notice of

alibi and for supplemental peremptory challenges. Addi-

tionally, Petitioner asked for an expanded voir dire and

a pre-trial hearing under Federal Rule of Evidence 104 to

establish some preliminary showing of the conspiracy

charged through independent non-hearsay evidence. In the

first amended discovery motion, Petitioner requested, iter

alia, disclosure of relevant, material information provided

by an informant. The Petitioner also filed a motion to

adopt motions of co-defendants. The motions of co-defen-

dants also requested information relating to informants

and exculpatory information. The government responded

{o defendants’ motions by representing that no informants

were involved in the case.

As a result of the government’s representation that no

informers were involved in the case, the Petitioner’s attor-

ney, Michael Abramovie, concentrated the pre-trial inves-

tigation upon the possibility that certain customs agents

might possess exculpatory information relevant to the case.

Accordingly, Mr. Abramovie subpoenaed certain docu-

ments and witnesses seeking such information.

Although on paper the government repeatediy repre-

sented that defens counsel could examine all evidence

within the government’s possession, both inculpatory and

exculpatory, in reality such an opportunity was never af-

forded.

Upon discovery that ‘‘Robert Snow’’ identified as an

unindicted co-conspirator was actually John Robert Snow,

a/k/a, Jack Snow, a paid informant as disclosed the Jencks

+

materials, the Petitioner filed a motion im dimine to exclude

the testimony of and evidence presented by John Robert

Snow and additionally, a motion to dismiss for prosecu-

torial misconduct and an amended discovery motion re-

questing any and all personal history sheets relating to

Snow prepared by the DEA.

The government made no response to this specific re-

quest, neither disclosing such material to the defense nor

submitting it to the trial court for inspection. In response

to the Petitioner’s complaint that the government had

represented that no informers were involved in the case,

the government agreed, and the court ruled, that no testi-

mony from Snow would be admitted after he became a

government informant. The evidence concerning the date

when Snow became an informant was conflicting. The

Court, after having heard all the evidence in the presence

of the jury, ruled that the question was one of admissibil-

ity for the court to resolve and held that Snow became an

informant in February of 1978.

REASONS FOR GRANTING WRIT

Petitioner submits that the decision of the Court of

Appeals is totally wrong and incorrect and so far departed

from legal precedent as to call for this Court to exercise

its supervisory power as a matter of judicial discretion.

The decision is contrary to this Court’s decisions and with

many other Circuit Courts of Appeals. The decision fails

to address any of the Petitioner’s arguments by consider-

ing them to be without merit. The serious allegations of

prosecutorial misconduct and judicial unresponsiveness

should not be so cursorily disposed of particularly where

as in this case, the prosecutors involved are in positions

of supervisory authority.’

ARGUMENT

The Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals for

the Fourth Circuit committed error in refusing to address

any of the issues raised by the Petitioner, a ‘‘minor”’ figure

in the criminal conspiracy case. The Petitioner raised sig-

nificant issues relating to prosecutorial misconduct, and

errors committed by the trial court in his supplemental

brief. The published opinion dealt solely with issues relat-

ing to the reasonableness of searches and seizure which

were inapplicable to issues raised by the Petitioner.

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution

provides, in part:

‘‘No person ... shall be... deprived of life, liberty

or property without due process of law; .. .”’

* Since the entry of judgment in the case Mr. Williams has been

elevated to the position of United States Attorney for the Eastern

District Of Virginia while Mr. Hudson has been elected to the

office of Commonwealth Attorney for Arlington County, Virginia.

6

The Court of Appeals should be held to the same standard

as the Supreme Court has held other courts. The extent

of the Court of Appeals opinion contained in Appendix A,

page App. 23, was limited to the following flippant com-

ment: ‘‘We think all of these arguments are without

merit.’

The record of the trial court is replete with deliberate

misrepresentations on the part of the government. The

government repeatedly denied that any informants were

involved in the case, despite the fact Mr. Hudson* con-

ducted the Grand Jury proceedings in the case aad knew

of Mr. Snow’s informer status. Ey 2n when specifically con-

fronted with the issue, Mr. Hudson claimed that, as a

prospective witness, Mr. Snow was not considered an in-

formant. During trial, the government tried to hedge even

further, claiming only the first date of payment determined

the date of Mr. Snow’s informant status.

While maintaining a facade of revealing all documents,

reports and evidence to the defense the government sup-

pressed two key documents specifically requested by the

Petitioner, the 202 Form (Government Exhibit 44) see Ap-

pendix C and the summary of the December 12, 1977 re-

port. In regard to the controversy concerning when Snow

first became a DEA informant, the government suppressed

information contained in a DEA report of December 12,

1977, indicating that information was provided in April

1977 by an informant with Snow’s registered ‘‘(.I.”’

number.

The government masked the identity of Mr. Snow and

others by listing persons under names other than their

own and by failing to timely correct ‘‘typographical’’

errors. Thus, the defense was surprised to learn that the

unindicted co-conspirator listed in the Voluntary Bill of

Particulars as Robert Snow was really John Robert Snow.

’ Mr. Hudson also prosecuted the government's case.

(

a/k/a ‘‘Jack Snow’’; that the person listed as Loren EK.

Bogles was really Loren Boyles, and that ‘‘William M.

DeHeide’’ was really ‘‘ Utah.’’

These actions, considered cumulatively, misled Petition-

er and made a mockery both of realistic defense prepara-

tion and of the judicial process. See, e.g., United States

v. Perry, 512 F.2d 805 (6th Cir. 1975).

The trial court committed error when after having earli-

er in response to the Petitioner’s Motion for Sanctions

against the government for its denial] of the existence of

an informant, ruled that no testimony from Snow would be

considered subsequent to the date that he became an in-

formant, for the Court at a later time to deprive the jury

of the factual determination by directing the jury to find

that Snow became an informant effective February 11,

1978, despite Snow’s own testimony on cross examination

in the presence of the jury that he became an informant

in 1977.

The court’s ruling was tantamount to directing a ver-

dict against the Petitioner, United States v, Stevenson, 445

F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. Meltzer, 100 F.2d

739 (7th Cir. 1938). It is the province of the jury to weigh

the evidence and credibility of witnesses. United States vy.

Young, 573 F.2d 1137, 1139 (9th Cir. 1978).

The trial court committed error by refusing to admit

certain exhibits, one of which was originally hidden by the

government and on its face tended to negate the guilt of

the Petitioner as a co-conspirator. The Court refused to

admit exhibits numbered 41, 43 and 44. Exhibit number 44

(Appendix C) bolstered the Petitioner’s claim that mul-

tiple conspiracies existed rather than one conspiracy.

These documents fall directly under Giglio v. United

States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), because of their impeaching

nature and evidence of multiple conspiracies.

8

In determining whether the Petitioner has been denied

a fair trial on the grounds that the government suppressed

information unknown to him, important factors to be con-

sidered are whether prosecution suppressed the evidence

after defense counsel made a request for the evidence,

whether evidence was favorable to defense and whether it

was material. Moore v. United States, 408 U.S. 786 rehear-

ing denied 409 U.S. 897 (1972).

In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), this Court

held that, ‘‘the suppression of evidence favorable to an

accused upon request violates due process where the evi-

dence is material to guilt or to punishment, irrespective

of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.’’ 7d. at

87. The Court subsequently held that even impeaching

evidence falls within the Brady rule where ‘‘reliability of

a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or inno-

eence.’’ Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959) ; Giglio

v. United States, supra.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner respectfully re-

quests this Court to grant this Petition for Writ of Cer-

tiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

Micuaeut R. ABRAMovIc

29 South LaSalle Street

Chicago, Illinois 60603

(312) 782-7372

Attorney for Petitioner

Michael J. Vicek

One of his attorneys

Micuae. A. Pepicone

Of Counsel

APPENDIX

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 79-5052

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

v.

DONALD DAVID HAYNIE,

No. 79-5053

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

v.

MICHAEL VLCEK,

No. 79-5068

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

v.

LYNN EDWARD FLETCHER,

Appellee,

Appellant.

Appellee,

Appellant.

Appellee,

Appellant.

App. 2

No. 79-5069

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee,

v.

PAUL MAX JENKINS, Appellant.

No. 79-5070

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee,

v.

JEAN A. MORRISSETTE, Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.

Albert V. Bryan, Jr., District Judge.

Argued August 21, 1980 Decided December 18, 1980

Before RUSSELL, WIDENER, and PHILLIPS,

Cireuit Judges.

Michael Kennedy for Appellant David Haynie; Wilham

V. Moffitt (Lowe, Mark, Moffitt, Ford and Barton, on

App. 3

brief) for Appellant Lynn Edward Fletcher; (Michael R.

Abramovic on brief) for Appellant Michael Vicek ; (William

A. Powers on brief) for Appellant Michael Vicek; (Gerald

B. Lee, Wiggs, Lee & McClerklin on brief) for Appellant

Lynn Edward Fletcher; (Sheryl E. Reich on brief) for

Appellants; (J. Frederick Sinclair on brief’ for Appellant

Paul Max Jenkins; (Larry G. Turner, Turner & Morris,

on brief) for Appellant Jean A. Morrissette; (Sebastian

K. D. Graber, Norman A. Townsend, Graber, Stettler &

Townsend, on brief) for Appellants Donald David Haynie,

Michael Vleek and Jean A. Morrissette; Justine W. Wil-

liams, United States Attorney (Karen A. Rebrovich, Spe-

cial Assistant United States Attorney, Lori L. Levin, Third

Year Law Student, Jerel Yamamoto, Third Year Law

Spudent, on brief) for Appellee.

FS

WIDENER, Circuit Judge:

Appellants, Donald David Haynie, Lynn Edward Fletch-

er, Michael Vleek, Paul Max Jenkins and Jean Morrissette,

were convicted in the United States District Court for

the Eastern District of Virginia of conspiracy to possess

marijuana or hashish with the intent to distribute under

21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 963. In addition, Haynie was convicted

of conspiracy to import hashish, 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 963;

importation of hashish, 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 960 and 18

US.C. § 2; and two counts of engaging in interstate travel

for the purpose of carrying on an unlawful activity, 18

U.S.C. $$ 2, 1952(a)(13). From these convictions appel-

lants now seek relief. We affirm.

Appellants raise substantial questions with regard to

evidence obtained by searches and introduced in the trial.

They contend that the fruits of three searches introduced

at trial were obtained in violation of the Fourth Amend-

ment and were inadmissible. The trial court conducted

App. 4

an evidentiary hearing and denied appellants’ motion to

suppress. On appeal, the government contends that the

searches were valid, and, even if not, no appellant has

standing to challenge the propriety of the searches and

seizures in question. We find it unnecessary to address

the issue of standing because we hold that the searches

and seizures complained of were not invalid under the

Fourth Amendment.

The Airport Search

At approximately 1:30 a.m. on June 1, 1977, Norman

Handshaw (a co-indictee) and one John Bates approached

a security screening area in the Palm Beach International

Airport. Upon their attempting to enter the boarding

area to wait for an associate arriving at that gate, air-

port security guards requested that Handshaw open the

briefcase he was carrying. After expressing his unwilling-

ness and inability to open the case, Handshaw again ex-

pressed the desire to pass through the screening area. The

security officers again refused Handshaw admittance and

Handshaw suggested that he and Bates leave the screening

area and await the arrival of the flight elsewhere in the

airport. Michael O’Brien, a deputy of the Palm Beach

County Sheriff’s Office assigned to the airport, observed

this exchange and noted that Handshaw appeared to

be very nervous, had begun sweating noticeably and stam-

mered while discussing the briefcase. Based upon his

observations, O’Brien became concerned about the pos-

sibility that Handshaw’s briefcase might contain an ex-

plosive device and directed that the case be passed through

an X-ray scanning machine. The X-ray revealed a num-

ber of regular, rectangular packages inside the case. Upon

observing this, Deputy O’Brien escorted Handshaw and

Bates to a lounge in the airport sheriff’s office and secured

the assistance of Sergeant William Tremmer, head of

App. 5

the narcotics task force of the Palm Beach County Sheriff’s

Office. Sergeant Tremmer passed the briefcase through

the X-ray scanner a second time and then questioned Hand-

shaw concerning its contents. After Handshaw gave con-

flicting explanations of his knowledge of and interest in

the briefcase, Sergeant Tremmer asked whether Hand-

shaw owned the case and was told that he did not. Hand-

shaw subsequently surrendered the case ‘in return for a

property receipt. At the conclusion of this interview, Ser-

geant Tremmer applied for and received a warrant to

search the briefcase. In executing that warrant he found

$95,020 inside the case. It is the admission at trial of

evidence of this search and seizure to which appellants

now object.

Initially, it is clear that the officer’s examination of

Handshaw’s briefcase by means of an X-ray scanner was

a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

See United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 770 (4th Cir.

1972), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 947 (1972) (use of magneto-

meter constitutes search). It is also clear that a search

conducted without a warrant is unreasonable unless it falls

within one of the classes of permissible warrantless

searches. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 483, 439 (1973).

Here, the search of Handshaw’s briefease falls squarely

within one of such classes, and probably within another,

which we do not decide.

In United States v. DeAngelo, 584 F.2d 46 (4th Cir.

1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 935 (1979), we upheld the

validity of an airline boarding search on facts remark-

ably similar to those presented here on the ground that it

was conducted with the consent of the defendant as well as

the ground that the search was not unreasonable. There,

DeAngelo presented himself at an airport security screen-

ing station and submitted his briefease to X-ray examina-

App. 6

tion in the presence of signs warning that physical in

spection might be requested. When the X-ray examina.

tion proved suspicious and DeAngelo was advised that a

physical inspection was necessary, he protested that he

preferred not to take the flight rather than permit the

inspection. Security officers nonetheless opened his brief-

case and found quantities of marijuana and hashish. We

held that:

DeAngelo had a choice of traveling by air or by some

other means. The signs in the terminal gave him fair

notice that if in the course of the total screening process

a physical inspection of his hand luggage should be

considered necessary to assure the safety of the travel-

ing public, he could be required to submit to it for that

purpose. When he voluntarily entered upon the screen-

ing process DeAngelo acquiesced in its full potential

scope as represented to him if, as it developed, that

should be requested. Allowing him to withdraw his

luggage when the x-ray raised the suspicions of the

security officers would frustrate the regulations pyr-

pose of deterring hijacking.

584 F.2d at 47-48.

After DeAngelo, this case presents no novel aspect.

Handshaw voluntarily entered the screening process at the

Palm Beach International Airport by presenting himself

to security personnel manning an X-ray seanner. While

there is no evidence here that signs described the scope of

the prospective searches, Handshaw’s repeated expres-

sions of his desire to be admitted to the boarding area

through a security check point employing an X-ray scan-

ner cannot be construed as other than a knowing consent

to the full scope of the search conducted.

As in DeAngelo, we do not think that Handshaw’s at-

tempt to withdraw from the sereeining process should be

recognized as an act vitiating his consent. While there is

App.7

a division among the cireuits on this point,’ the rule

adopted in DeAngelo and reaffirmed here is both prudent

and necessary. The danger protected against, air piracy,

is as great today as it has ever been. It appears to us

that a rule under which consent to a screening search is

limited by the ability to withdraw at any time could only

encourage attempted hijackings by providing a_ secure

exit should detection be threatened.

We also believe the search and seizure was not unrea-

sonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

The Hanson, Massachusetts Searches

On or around July 14, 1977, the police department of the

town of Hanson, Massachusetts received an anonymous

telephone call advising that there was a large amount of

marijuana in the area of 437 MeQuan Street, which was

the residence of Mr. and Mrs. Bizier. At approximately

4:00 p.m. that day, Sergeant John Conroy and another

officer surveyed the houses in that area, and, although

Couroy was of the opinion that there may have been some

marijuana growing at the rear of the Biziers’ house, they

discovered no other concrete evidence of its presence in

the area. During their examination of the area, the of-

ficers were approached by Mr. and Mrs. Bizier who asked

the reason for their presence. Sergeant Conroy described

the Biziers’ demeanor as nervous, but nothing else of sub-

ne a ees +

1Cf. United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272 (Sth Cir. 1973).

with United States v. Homburg, 546 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1970),

cert. denied, 431 U.S. 940 (1977).

2 At this stage of his investigation, Sergeant Conroy's suspicion

was principally directed at the Smith residence next door to 437

McQuan Street, for he had previously investigated another marijuana

case at that house.

App. 8

stance transpired during the conversation, and the officers

departed.

Approximately two weeks later, on July 28, 1977, the

Hanson Police Department received a second anonymous

telephone call concerning 437 McQuan Street. The caller

asked whether the police had 437 MeQuan Street under

surveillance and stated that they would ‘‘[g]et down there

and note the positions of the cars in the driveway, because

there is going to be a drop there tonight, and I am not

kidding.’’

As a result of this call, Sergeants Conroy and Toomey

began surveillance of the Bizier residence at 9:15 p.m.,

from an unmarked car parked across the street.* At

that time, they noted two vehicles on the Biziers’ prop-

erty arranged with room in the driveway for two more.

During the course of the evening the officers observed

Bizier leave the house twice, once to look up and down

the street for a few seconds. They also observed the front

door open and close a third time when Bizier apparently

tended to the dog.

At approximately 11:35 p.m. the officers observed two

vehicles, a white Duster and a blue Chrysler, arrive to-

gether, back into the Biziers’ driveway and park side by

side. Two people emerged from each car and conferred

for a moment near the trunk of the Duster. One of the

party then restarted the Duster and backed it further

up the driveway to the corner of the garage. All four

individuals then disappeared behind the house. About

four minutes after that time, three returned to the Duster

and opened its trunk. Sergeant Conroy heard a rustling

* Upon hearing the second tip, it occurred to Sergeant Conroy

that 437 McQuan Street and not the Smith residence had been the

object of the first tip.

App. 9

sound, and, with Sergeant Toomey, crossed MeQuan Street

with weapon at his side to arrest the suspects. As they

approached the group, the Duster’s trunk was slammed

shut. While the suspects were being secured, one of their

number (Kenneth Larry Bates) began to walk away from

the officers and returned only after Sergeant Conroy’s

second order to halt. Sergeant Conroy noticed a pungent

smell which he identified as marijuana emanating from the

back of the Duster at this point. At about the same time,

Sergeant Toomey noticed vegetable material which he be-

lieved to be marijuana on the rear bumper of the Duster

and on the ground underneath. Upon securing the trunk

key from the pocket of one of the suspects, Sergeant Too-

mey opened the Duster’s trunk, and the officers observed

five burlap bales of a brownish-green herb-like substance.

The trunk was full of it. One of the bales had a tear at

the corner and Sergeant Conroy identified its contents as

marijuana.

Sergeant Conroy then realized that one of the four men

connected with the drop was still missing, and proceeded

to the front door of the Biziers’ house, while Sergeant

Miggs, one of two later arriving officers, watched the back

door. Mr. Bizier opened the front door and, after being

advised of Conroy’s identity, began to back into the house,

saying, ‘‘Oh, my God, it’s the police.’? Sergeant Conroy

followed him into a living area in which Mrs. Bizier and

Jean Morrissette were seated and requested that every-

one remain where they were. Morrissette arose and walked

into a darkened room adjoining the living room. Sergeant

Conroy stated that Morrissette stepped into the dark room

and, with three quarters of his body obscured, made a mo-

tion with his arm. The officer trained his weapon on Morris-

* Sergeant Toomey testified that Officer Taber had also com-

inented on its presence there.

App. 10

sette and said, ‘‘{djon’t do it.’’ Morrissette then slowly

returned to the living room and was placed under arrest.

Because Mr. Bizier had become hysterical and in order

not to awaken the Biziers’ sick child, Sergeant Conroy

moved Morrissette into the kitchen to administer the

Miranda warning. Once in the kitchen, Sergeant Conroy

saw some notebooks, one of which was open, in plain view

on the kitchen table, and $6,285.00 in cash in plain view on

the kitchen counter. He seized these items in evidence.

Meanwhile, Sergeant Toomey had entered the house.

Both he and Sergeant Conroy reported an odor of mari-

juana in the house which was particularly strong in the

area of the door leading to the cellar stairway. Sergeant

Toomey, aware that the basement had not been entered,

descended the stairs to look for other people, and dis-

covered a substantial number of bales of marijuana on

the basement floor and in an open coal bin. He then pro-

ceeded to look in the upstairs portion of the house for

people, and, finding no others present, reported what he

had observed in the basement to Sergeant Conroy.

Defendants assert that the initial arrest of the three

suspects at the rear of the Duster was made without prob-

able cause. The argument goes that the officers would

not have been in a position to see or smell the marijuana

in the car but for this allegedly illegal arrest and that all

subsequent discoveries were, thus, tainted and inadmissible.

It is further contended that even if the initial arrests were

proper, the opening of the trunk and search of the kitchen

and basement of the house were unreasonable in the ab-

sence of a warrant.

The Fourth Amendment, applicable to the States through

the Fourteenth Amendment, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 648

(1961), states: ‘*The right of the people to be secure in

App. 11

their persons .. . against unreasonable searches and sei-

zures, shall not be violated and no Warrants shall issue,

but upon probable cause... .’’ There is no question that

the three individuals aecosted by Sergeant Conroy and

his partner outside the Bizier residence were seized within

the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and were placed

under sufficient restraint to require a showing of probable

cause. Dunaway v. New York, 47 U.S.L.W. 4635 (June 5,

1979). The question is whether the information known

to the police at the time of the arrest was sufficient to

make such a showing.

The tip received by police on July 28, 1977 was, stand-

ing alone, insufficient to supply probable cause for the

arrests. Under the two pronged test of Aguilar v. Texas,

378 U.S. 108 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393

U.S. 410 (1969), a tip must contain information sufficient

to permit an independent determination that the infor-

mant is reliable and that his information is based on some-

thing more substantial than casual rumor. The anony-

mous tip received here, on its face and uncorroborated,

fails to disclose enough information to demonstrate either

fact.

Subsequent evidence gained during police investigation

may, however, serve to corroborate a tip, insufficient in

itself. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959). In

United States v. Branch, 565 F.2d 274 (4th Cir. 1977), we

observed that where the details of a tip were adequately

corroborated by police investigation,® both the reliability

of the informant and the substantiality in fact of his

information are established.

*Corroboration in Branch, supra, consisted of the observation

of a “variety of facts” consistent with the tip. The opinion sets

them out.

App. 12

In the present case, the officers had been told by the

informant to note the position of the cars in the driveway.

On arrival at the Bizier house, they found two Volks-

wagens in the driveway, obviously arranged so that other

ears could enter. They had been told that the narcotics

drop would take place that night. The two additional cars,

the Chrysler and the Duster, arrived at about 11:30 p.m.

that night, as predicted. The tip could only have been

understood to indicate that the narcotics drop involved the

automobiles in the driveway, and the officers observed a

gathering and discussion around the trunk of the Duster,

and the backing up of the Duster and opening of its trunk,

again consistent with the tip of the informer. The officers

heard a rustling sound during the examination of the con-

tents of the trunk of the Duster, again consistent with the

tip that the narcotics drop involved the automobiles.

Upon the approach of the officers toward the men gathered

around the cars in the driveway, the open trunk of the

Duster was slammed shut, again consistent with the tip

that a nareotics drop was taking place. Also consistent

with a narcotics drop was the lateness of the hour.

Although the identity of the informant was undisclosed

and thus his reliability had not been ascertained prior to

the time the arrest took place, each detail of the in-

formant’s tip had been verified by the time of the arrest.

The date was the same; the time was the same; the place

was the same, even to the driveway; the automobiles in

the driveway were involved, all as predicted; and, as in

Draper, by the time the arrest was made, the officers had

corroborated every facet of the information given except

whether the men present had accomplished their mission

and had the marijuana on hand. Draper, p. 13. As in

Draper, we think there was probable cause for the arrests

in the driveway. While the tip alone and its subsequent

App. 18

detailed independent corroboration furnished — sufficient

probable cause for the initial arrests, the officers also

knew of the earlier tip, the suspected marijuana plants at

the address, and the nervous behavior of the Biziers on

the earlier occasion, which would at the least fortify the

reasonableness of the officers’ actions.

We are thus of opinion there was probable cause to

arrest the three men in the driveway.

Contemporaneously with the first three arrests, Ser-

geant Conroy detected the odor of marijuana emanating

from the back of the Duster, and Sergeant Toomey ob-

served marijuana on the rear bumper and on the ground

underneath. This established probable cause for the

search of the trunk as well as placing the search within

the plain view doctrine, for this cireuit has held that

probable cause may be supported by the detection of dis-

tinctive odors, as well as by sight. United States v.

Sifuentes, 504 F.2d 845 (4th Cir. 1974) (marijuana) ;

United States vy. Gills, 357 F.2d 299 (4th Cir. 1966) (moon-

shine whiskey). See also United States v. Burrow, 396

F.Supp. 890, 895-96 (D. Md. 1975) (marijuana).

This leaves the question of the justification of the war-

rantless search of the trunk of the car which took place.

We think it justified under the plain view doctrine.

As we have expressed above, the officers had a right

to be where they were to effect the arresis. Their dis-

covery of the marijuana was inadvertent, Coolidge v. New

Hampshire, 408 U.S. 483, 469 (1971), because the officers

did not know the location of the marijuana in advance and

intend to seize it, they could not have obtained a warrant

to search the trunk of the Duster which they had never

seen and could not have described to a magistrate. Simi-

lar circumstances are specifically referred to in Coolidge

App. 14

at p. 482." Being where they had a right to be, they not

only smelled marijuana, they observed it on the rear bumper

of the car in plain view. This gave them the right to open

the trunk of the Duster to search for it. We think there

is no distinction between the marijuana in sight on the

bumper and that smelled in the trunk. Both were in

plain view within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment

if they were ‘‘obvious to the senses.’’ Sifuentes, p. S48.

In Sifuentes, the marijuana involved was in closed

cardboard boxes on the seat of a van which had been im-

pounded by the police. The police smelled the marijuana

when they opened the door of the van to drive it away,

and they examined the contents of the closed boxes. The

court held that ‘‘these facts combined to place the contra-

band in plain view, that is, obvious to the senses.’’ We

think the marijuana in the trunk of the Duster was no

less in plain view than the marijuana in the boxes on

the seat of the van in Sifuentes.

While we are aware that Coolidge stated that ‘'|t|he

word ‘automobile’ is not a talisman in whose presence

the Fourth Amendment fades away and disappears,”’

403 U.S. at 461, we note that several of the facts justifying

an automobile search under the doctrine established in

Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), and cases

following, are present. One of the men involved in the

nareotics drop was at large; there was contraband in-

volved, marijuana; a police guard would have been neces-

sary to immobolize the Duster during the period of more

than an hour necessary to get a warrant: and at least

*“We did not indicate there [a search incident to arrest in

Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. ...- (19...)] and do not suggest

here, that the police must obtain a warrant if they anticipate they

will obtain specific evidence in the course of a search.” 403 U.S

at 482.

App. 15

the seizure of the vehicle would have been necessary

without a warrant, if not its contents. Coolidge, p. 462;

Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 01-52 (1970). But, be-

cause we think the marijuana in the trunk of the Duster

was in plain view within the contemplation of Sifuentes,

we need not decide whether the automobile exception has

application here to render the evidence of the contents of

the trunk admissible. We also need not decide the validity

of other grounds which the government says should sus-

tain the search of the trunk.

Since Payton v. New York, 48 L.W. 4375 (April 15, 1980),

it is clear that the entry, without a warrant, into the pri-

vate home of the suspect to arrest him routinely for a

felony is invalid under the Fourth Amendment. In both

cases involved in Payton, probable cause existed to believe

that the suspect was guilty of a felony and that each sus-

pect was in the home where the police searched; indeed,

upon knocking at the door of suspect Riddick’s home, and

having the door opened by a child, the police saw Riddick.

In Payton’s case, a shell casing found as result of the

search for him was admitted in his murder trial, and in

Riddick’s nareoties and related paraphernalia were found

in a search for weapons, which were later introduced into

evidence in a trial on nareoties charges.

While the two homes involved in the Payton case were

those of the suspects, we need not decide what different

rules, if any, exist for arrest without a warrant in the

home of the person arrested and in the home of another,

Cf. Wallace v. King, No. 78-1399 (4th Cir. 1980), for the

rule of the Payton case does not apply where there are

exigent circumstances. ‘‘Absent exigent circumstances,

that threshold [of the home] may not reasonably be

crossed without a warrant.’”’ 48 L.W. 4375, 4380. With that

in mind, we think the entry of the officers into the Bizier

App. 16

home was authorized by the doctrine of hot pursuit, which

was recognized in Payton as the prevailing rule at the time

of the adoption of the Bill of Rights. 48 L.W. 4375, 4382.

In Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1976), the Court

recognized the doctrine of hot pursuit as an exception to

the Fourth Amendment requirement of a warrant, saying

‘The exigencies of the situation made that course impera-

tive.’’ 387 U.S. at 298. In Warden, a cab company in Balti-

more was robbed at about 8:00 a.m. on its business prem-

ises. Two cab drivers in the vicinity followed the robber

to a given street address and notified the company dis-

patcher that the robber had entered that house. The dis-

patcher relayed the information to the police, who arrived

at the house within minutes. The entry of the house to

search for the suspect followed. The exigencies of the

situation there were described as a danger to the lives of

the officers or others, and the court approved a thorough

search of the house for persons and weapons as the only

way of insuring that the suspect was the only man present

and that the police had control of all weapons which could

be used against them or to effect an escape. Speed was

described by the court as essential. In the case before us,

four men other than Bizier were initially seen taking part

in the narcotics drop, yet only three were initially arrested,

so the other one remained at large. The fourth man was

last seen going behind the Bizier house. It would have

taken an hour to procure a warrant for a man whose iden-

tity was unknown, for we remember that Conroy knew

Bizier and Bizier’s wife, having spoken to them previously

and having seen Bizier outside the house on three previous

occasions that very evening. At hand in the trunk of the

Duster were five bales of marijuana weighing 30 to 40

pounds each, so the narcotics drop in which the fourth

man was involved was of considerable magnitude; and it

App. 17

was apparent that a large scale narcotics operation was

involved, not merely a small scale street-corner transac-

tion, or an outdoor barbecue as suggested, possibly in jest,

by the defendants at trial. To have kept all the oceupants

of the Bizier residence in the home during the time a war-

rant could have been obtained would have amounted to no

less than a siege of the premises, no more authorized in

law than a warrantless entry absent exigent circumstances.

An officer was sent to watch the rear of the house but had

not apprehended the fourth man. The fourth man involved

in the narcotics drop not having been observed outside the

house, it was reasonable to assume that he was inside.

Conroy testified that he intended to go in the house to ar-

rest the fourth man and to see if there was any contraband

which was going to be destroyed. He knocked at the door

and identified himself as a police officer, at which time

Bizier, who had answered the door, became hysterical and

backed off. The entry was thus made without either

Bizier’s expressed consent or opposition. Conroy went on

in, and, seeing Morrissette, arrested him. The Biziers had

a small, sick daughter in a darkened room adjacent to the

room in which Morrissette was arrested, so, in order not

to disturb the child, Conroy took Morrissette into the

kitchen, where he sat Morrissette down at the table to give

him his Miranda rights, which was done. While Conroy

-was in the kitchen, he observed, on the table in plain view,

two notebooks containing records of marijuana transac-

tions, and on the kitchen counter in plain view was a sum

in excess of 6,000. These items were seized as evidence.

The house smelled of marijuana. Conroy could smell it

when he came in the front door. It was particularly strong

at a door leading to the basement. Both Conroy and Ser-

geant Toomey smelled it. Toomey, who meanwhile had

been let in the back door by Bizier, in looking around to

see if anvone else was present, found more hales of mari-

App. 18

Juana and other narcoties paraphernalia in the basement

which were also seized. No other search was made by the

officers.

As we have indicated, we think Conroy’s entry was justi-

fied as an entry in hot pursuit of Morrissette. The fourth

man had vanished just moments before; it was only rea-

sonable to believe he wus in the house; and speed was es-

sential. The notebooks and money were in plain view of

the officers in the kitchen, where Conroy had taken Mor-

rissette in order to avoid disturbing the sick child. The

marijuana in the basement was smelled by the officers and

thus was in plain view under Sifuen/es. Even were that

not true, the officers had a right to check the house to see

if anyone else were present, an elementary precaution for

their own safety, and the intrusion they made into the

house was no more than was necessary to effect the arrest

and take elementary precautions for their own safety. Mor-

rissette’s wallet was also seized by Conroy, it having been

discovered by Conroy on the child’s bed in the darkened

room after Morrissette tried to remove himself to that

room at the time he was arrested. If issue be made of this

seizure’, we think it was incident to the arrest. We think

the search made of the premises was quite limited and en-

tirely in keeping with the rule of Chimel vy. California, 395

U.S. 752 (19......), which has been construed in Coolidge at

p. 466, a part of note 24: ‘‘Where, however, the arresting

officer inadvertently comes within plain view of a piece of

evidence, not concealed, although outside the area under

the immediate control of the arrestee, the officer may seize

it, so long as the plain view was obtained in the course of

an appropriately limited search of the arrestee.’’

We are thus of opinion the evidence taken from the

Duster and from 427 MeQuan Street was admissible. We

7 The seizure of the wallet.

App. 19

note in passing that, for reasons best known to themselves,

neither the government nor the defendants have had tran-

scribed the argument on the motions to suppress which in-

cluded the court’s rulings on the same. We also do not

address the question of whether or not the officers were

entitled to enter the premises to prevent the destruction

of evidence. They had a right to enter to effect Morris-

sette’s arrest, and the articles seized in the house were

validly taken pursuant to that right. That another motive

may have been in mind also should not serve to downgrade

perfectly valid actions of the officers, even if the addition-

al motive were not valid, which we do not intimate.

The Banyon Road Search

During part of 1977, Haynie resided in a house at 235

Banyon Road in Palm Beach, Florida. This house was

rented from a Dr. Richard Wright pursuant to a lease,

the term of which expired in November of that year, Upon

returning from a trip on December 10, 1977, Dr. Wright

became aware that the house was vacant. He took posses-

sion of the house, got the key back from a real estate

agent, and removed the property remaining there to a

warehouse and contacted Haynie concerning certain dam-

ages to the house. Haynie and Dr. Wright met to discuss

these damages, and Haynie stated that he would make

good the cost of any repairs. Haynie was then given per-

mission to go to the warehouse in order to search for some

money he had apparently hidden in a television set.

Dr. Wright did not see Haynie at the house at any time

after November 1977 although he frequently visited the

property between December 10 of that year and January

24, 1978. During these visits, Dr. Wright found the house

unoceupied at all times with the exception of one instance

in December 1977. On that oceasion, Dr. Wright contacted

App. 20

the local police with regard to a Mr. Justice who was in

the house, unconscious. Upon responding to this eall, police

noted that the telephones were disconnected and that the

house was devoid of food and clothing.

On January 24, 1978, Officer David Kelley of the Palm

Beach Police Department conducted a warrantless search

of the house after receiving the written consent of Dr.

Wright. Dr. Wright stated that Haynie was no longer

living in the house and that it had not been occupied since

early December of the previous year. Several crates and

a tin can with a false bottom were seized during that

search.

Haynie contends that this warrantless search was not

justified by Dr. Wright’s consent. Referring to the Florida

law of property, he claims that the mere termination of a

lease is insufficient to terminate a landlord-tenant relation-

ship and vest a possessory interest in the landlord. Thus,

he argues, if Dr. Wright had no right to regain possession

of the premises, neither would he have the right to consent

to their search.

While we agree that, absent extraordinary cireum-

stances, a landlord may not give an effective consent for

the search of his tenant’s property, Chapman v. United

States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961), it is equally true that, ‘‘[t]here

can be nothing unlawful in the Government’s appropria-

tion of . .. abandoned property.’’ Abel vy. United States,

362 U.S, 217, 241 (1960). Further, appellant misconstrues

the nature of the inquiry under the Fourth Amendment if

he assumes that property rights conferred by State land-

lord and tenant law are exclusively determinative of con-

stitutional rights. In Chapman the Supreme Court de-

clined to ‘‘. . . import into the law surrounding the con-

stitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and

seizures subtle distinctions, developed and refined by the

App. 21

common law in evolving the body of private property law.

...’ 865 U.S. at 617. Thus, ‘‘[t!he proper test for aban-

donment is not whether all formal property rights have

been relinquished, but whether the complaining party re-

tains a reasonable expectation of privacy in the articles

alleged to be abandoned.’’ United States v. Wilson, 472

F2d 901, 903 (9th Cir. 1973). In Wilson, a tenant had de-

parted from his apartment and failed to make two weekly

payments of his rent at the time of a warrantless search.

In spite of the fact that the defendant had left some

clothing and a television set on the premises, the court

held that any reasonable expectation of privacy in the

apartment was terminated and that a warrantless search

conducted with the consent of the landlord was valid.

The present case presents a similar situation. Here, the

lease expired nearly two months before the search. Haynie

had not been seen at the premises for six weeks, and testi-

mony indicates that the house contained no clothing or

food and was without telephone service for a like period.

Furthermore, Haynie did not protest the removal of his

personalty from the property during his December meet-

ing with Dr. Wright as might reasonably be expected of

an individual who intended to remain in possession of his

residence. These facts indicate that Haynie intended to

permanently abandon the property and retained no expec-

tation of privacy therein. Therefore, where police gained

entry to 235 Banyon Road with the consent of the owner,

they were justified in conducting a warrantless search on

the basis that the residence and its contents had been aban-

doned by Haynie.

The claim of the defendant Fletcher deserves brief at-

tention. He asserts that his arrest at room 141 of the Holi-

day Inn near Dulles Airport was without probable cause

based upon his mere presence in the room. His argument

App. 22

then goes that his photograph taken as result of the claimed

illegal arrest was unlawfully used in grand jury proceed-

ings, and also that the witness Snow would have been un-

able to identify him had it not been for the photograph.

We do not agree with any of the claims.

We think his arrest was based upon probable cause. Only

a small part of the facts surrounding the arrest show that

room 141 was the communications center from which re-

ceipt of the importation of 800 pounds of illegal hashish

was arranged by Haynie and others. Fletcher had been

seen in and around the motel just prior to the arrest, and

it was known that he was staying in room 141 with Haynie,

a key suspect as the leader of the drug ring. The consignee

of the hashish, one Coury, also visited room 141 that day.

‘‘Consorting with criminals may in a particular factual

setting be a basis for believing that a criminal project is

under way.’’ Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 68 (1968)

(Mr. Justice Douglas concurring). Certainly in the set-

ting around room 141, the known communications center

for the importation of such a large amount of illegal drugs,

the officers had probable cause to arrest everyone who was

reasonably connected with the known participants. Fletcher

was so connected.

Even if Fletcher’s arrest were improper, use of the

photograph so obtained before the grand jury was not il-

legal. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974):

Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485 (1976). Additionally,

in Umted States v. Crews, 48 L.W. 4324, 4328-29 (May 25,

1980), five justices of the Supreme Court agreed that a

defendant’s face is not suppressible evidence as the fruit

of an illegal arrest.

In all events, the only evidence in the record is that

Fletcher was arrested in room 141, December 5, 1977. The

App. 23

witness Snow, a member of the drug ring, did not go over

to the government until February 1978. Shortly before

that time, in 1978, and following Fletcher’s previous arrest

at room 141 in December 1977, Fletcher was the keeper of

a house which Snow used in connection with the illicit drug

operation. At that time, and before Snow went over to

the government, [Fletcher told Snow about the arrest at

room 141. Thus, Fletcher had told Snow about the arrest

at room 141 before Snow went over to the government and

before Snow had access to the photographs taken by the

government at the time of the arrest in room 141. So far

as it relates to Snow’s testimony, Fletcher’s claim also has

no factual foundation. In passing, we note that the iden-

tification of Fletcher has been in no way related to his ar-

rest photograph, either by Snow, or before the grand jury,

or otherwise in the investigation.

We have also considered the remaining assignments of

error including the admissibility and sufficiency of evi-

dence; the suppression of evidence by the prosecution; the

denial of a motion for continuance; the jurisdiction of the

court; and the imposition of sentence upon Haynie. We

think all of these arguments are without merit.

Accordingly, the judgments of convictions are

AFFIRMED.

App. 24

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 79-5053

MICHAEL VLCEK

Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Appellee

ORDER

We have considered the petition for rehearing and are

of the opinion it is without merit.

It is accordingly ADJUDGED and ORDERED that the

petition for rehearing shall be, and the same hereby is,

denied.

With the concurrences of Judge Russell and Judge

Phillips.

/s/ Ilegible

For the Court

App. 25-26

APPENDIX C

PEHSONAL HISTORY REPORT

1. PILE NG. 2. G-OEP IDENTIFIER

3. USEO AS (Cheek applicable boxes)

CO) rersonar nistory

C) @-0€Pr susmission

CONF ORMANT SUBMISSION

C) G-oer surpLemeNnTar

C) Federsi

OQ State

0 FUGITIVE DECLARATION

4. FILE TITLE

$15780003

February 14, 1978

G. NAME (Last, Firat, Middle; Title, ie., Capt., Dr., ate.)

SNOW, John Robert _

7. NAOODIS NUMGER

AOORESS (No., Street, City, State, ZIP Code)

2616 West Burlington, Downers Grove, TL

9. ALIAS OR OTHER NAMES

10, PHONE NO, (Include Area Code) [11. CHINESE TELEGRAPHIC NAME CO

312-968-4353 DNA ee

12, DATE OF BIRTH (Mo., Day, Year) |13. PLACE OF BIATH (City and State) 14, CITIZENSHIP 16. ILLEGAL ALIEN

07-15-45 Oak Park, TL 0.2. Cres [Jno

16, NATIONAL ORIGIN 17, RACE 18, SEX 19, HEIGHY |[20.WEIGHYT |21.8YES 22. HAIA

American Caucasian mm Ce NM 215 brown brown _

23. IOENTIFYING CHARACTERISTICS (Sears, Marks, Physical Defects, ate.) 24, OCCUPATION

Scar on wrist :

rere Tauck Driver

25. ORUG USER

() No XMXK Yee (7 YES, what Drug) mang juana

26. SOCIAL SECURITY NO. |27. Fai NO. 28, OEA REGISTRATION NO, [29, OTHER NOS, (Federal, State, Local)

332-34-9487 :

30, PASSPORT NO. | 31. VISA APL. NO, [32, ISSUING COUNTRY 33. NAME ON PASSPORT

None |

34, CAIVER’S LICENSE 35, VEHICLE REGISTRATION

@. State or Country &. Number ++ - ce. Expiration Oate a. Make b. Year of Car

TLLinois $500-4764-520 7-15-78 Chrysler 1976

36. EOUCATION (Level and Name of School) ¢. License No, d. Year @. State

Liste H.S., Liske, IL - 40vhomore SM 4900 1977 | a

37. CLASS OF VIOLATOR (Check ona)

38. FILE REFERENCES (C-DEP ONLY)

QO: ©2 (Qs (a OruG coos: $i

39, CRITERIA

e. Check One b. Creek One

C) comesric C) InTeLLiaence

(1) FOREIGN

() ornecr evioence

40, CRITERIA IOENTIFICATION

Quantitative (Enter Numeral)

a) tf) sf) At) if

Qualitative (Enter Letter)

41, LOCATIONS OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY (City, State, Country)

Palm Beach, Florida

Downers Grove, IL

42a. CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES (Last, First, Name) 42b. NAODOIS NO,

42. SOURCE OF SUPPLY (Name) 424, NAOOIS NO,

40, PRIOR CRIMINAL RECORD Aggravated assault § battery-Napervilee,

TL-dismissed (This information provided by

sentence; Aggravated assault - Lisle,

no FRI vumber currontey aua

IL PO-2 year suspended

(Pah? e)

440. FAMILY (Laat, Firet, Middle Name) a)

spouse: SNOW, Paulette

44, ADORESS (No., Street, Cily, State, ZIP Code)

2616 W. Burlington, Downers Grove, IL

ratuer: SNOW, George

4401 Center, Lisle, IL

moTwen: SNOW, Madiline

4401 Center, Lisle, IL

BROTHERS/SISTERS/CHILOREN (Name and nies

(brothers & sisters: George, Joe, Jerry

Pat and Mike)

Unknown

PEHSONAL HISTORY REPORT

1. PILE NG. 2. G-OEP IDENTIFIER

3. USEO AS (Cheek applicable boxes)

CO) rersonar nistory

C) @-0€Pr susmission

CONF ORMANT SUBMISSION

C) G-oer surpLemeNnTar

C) Federsi

OQ State

0 FUGITIVE DECLARATION

4. FILE TITLE

$15780003

February 14, 1978

G. NAME (Last, Firat, Middle; Title, ie., Capt., Dr., ate.)

SNOW, John Robert _

7. NAOODIS NUMGER

AOORESS (No., Street, City, State, ZIP Code)

2616 West Burlington, Downers Grove, TL

9. ALIAS OR OTHER NAMES

10, PHONE NO, (Include Area Code) [11. CHINESE TELEGRAPHIC NAME CO

312-968-4353 DNA ee

12, DATE OF BIRTH (Mo., Day, Year) |13. PLACE OF BIATH (City and State) 14, CITIZENSHIP 16. ILLEGAL ALIEN

07-15-45 Oak Park, TL 0.2. Cres [Jno

16, NATIONAL ORIGIN 17, RACE 18, SEX 19, HEIGHY |[20.WEIGHYT |21.8YES 22. HAIA

American Caucasian mm Ce NM 215 brown brown _

23. IOENTIFYING CHARACTERISTICS (Sears, Marks, Physical Defects, ate.) 24, OCCUPATION

Scar on wrist :

rere Tauck Driver

25. ORUG USER

() No XMXK Yee (7 YES, what Drug) mang juana

26. SOCIAL SECURITY NO. |27. Fai NO. 28, OEA REGISTRATION NO, [29, OTHER NOS, (Federal, State, Local)

332-34-9487 :

30, PASSPORT NO. | 31. VISA APL. NO, [32, ISSUING COUNTRY 33. NAME ON PASSPORT

None |

34, CAIVER’S LICENSE 35, VEHICLE REGISTRATION

@. State or Country &. Number ++ - ce. Expiration Oate a. Make b. Year of Car

TLLinois $500-4764-520 7-15-78 Chrysler 1976

36. EOUCATION (Level and Name of School) ¢. License No, d. Year @. State

Liste H.S., Liske, IL - 40vhomore SM 4900 1977 | a

37. CLASS OF VIOLATOR (Check ona)

38. FILE REFERENCES (C-DEP ONLY)

QO: ©2 (Qs (a OruG coos: $i

39, CRITERIA

e. Check One b. Creek One

C) comesric C) InTeLLiaence

(1) FOREIGN

() ornecr evioence

40, CRITERIA IOENTIFICATION

Quantitative (Enter Numeral)

a) tf) sf) At) if

Qualitative (Enter Letter)

41, LOCATIONS OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY (City, State, Country)

Palm Beach, Florida

Downers Grove, IL

42a. CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES (Last, First, Name) 42b. NAODOIS NO,

42. SOURCE OF SUPPLY (Name) 424, NAOOIS NO,

40, PRIOR CRIMINAL RECORD Aggravated assault § battery-Napervilee,

TL-dismissed (This information provided by

sentence; Aggravated assault - Lisle,

no FRI vumber currontey aua

IL PO-2 year suspended

(Pah? e)

440. FAMILY (Laat, Firet, Middle Name) a)

spouse: SNOW, Paulette

44, ADORESS (No., Street, Cily, State, ZIP Code)

2616 W. Burlington, Downers Grove, IL

ratuer: SNOW, George

4401 Center, Lisle, IL

moTwen: SNOW, Madiline

4401 Center, Lisle, IL

BROTHERS/SISTERS/CHILOREN (Name and nies

(brothers & sisters: George, Joe, Jerry

Pat and Mike)

Unknown

of ARG - Time or AAREST 47. Mark “X" in appropi.a' «\;use | ins | ove | svu

Rap + SE __Arresting Agency

«8. PLACE OF ARES | and State) Participating in Arre

Discovering Agency

49. AAMED 50. AMOUNT OF FUNG 12JN PERSON AT Seizing Agency

TIME OF AAREST —

(1) ves [) No Participating in Seizure

wis 0 toned to other Yes] No] 52. DATE 83. AGENCY 54. TYPE OF VIOLATION (Pomession,

agency 4

55. rederal Prosecution 56. OATE 57. JUDICIAL DISTRICT S4a. HAJOR DRUG, Violator was Charged

authorized With (Heroin, cocgine, ete.)

6a. Magistrate Hearing: 59. OATE 60. BAIL AMOUNT 61. BAIL POSTEO 62. PENSONAL RECOGNIZANCE

Bound Over : $ Yes []No ()Y¥e []Noe

63. CASE CLASSIFICATION IS BASED ON THIS SUBJECT ? ves NO

64, REMARKS (Refer to Item No, when applicadie)

UTTLIZATTION

ST5780003 4s familiar with individuals involved in the James BARTH (11-77-0080, DAI-K1)

‘organization both in the Chicago area and in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. This informant

has also been approached to transport 1,000 pounds of marijuana from Fort Lauderdate,

Fiorida to Chicago by members of this organization.

BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION

Checks with Federal Probation and Illinois State Probation have revealed negative

results, This informant is negative in NADDIS and in Region 7's §ile.

APPROVALS

On February 13, 1978, SAIC Jerome S. Mooens verbally approved utilization of

this informant pending receipt of FBI rap sheet.

Negative in NCIC,

Qa 4 EPL

13 /r¥

65. AGENT'S NAME (Print or Type) 66. NTS SIGNATURE 67. DATE

Dale E. Anderson, S/A ) 2 /); N28

68. SUPERVISOR'S NAME (Print or Type) %

Jerome S. Mooers, SAIC

3 Bae

BEGIONAL APPROVAL 7

71. REVIEWED BY 72. CONCURRENCE 73. OATE

Jerome S. Mooers, SAIC Shu Gv (Ne

“a HEADQUARTERS APPROVAL

74. REVIEWEO BY 76. CONCURRENCE 76. OATE

OC) vee C) ne