Opposition — Baltimore & Ohio Railroad v. R. J. Dickey Co.

Supreme Court brief1981

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80-1742 |

MAY 18 198,

No. 80 ALEXAND 2 L. STE

4472124

In THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1980

THE BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILROAD CO.,

Petitioner

vB.

R. J. DICKEY COMPANY, INC.,

Respondent

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION TO THE

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

JOSEPH B. BAGLEY, Esq.

JOSEPH M. DiGrorci0, Esq.

4156 Library Road

P. O. Box 10308

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15234

(412) 563-4877

Counsel for Respondent

SMITH BROS., LAW PRINTERS, 620 SECOND AVENUE, PITTSBURGH, PA. 15219

COUNTER QUESTION PRESENTED

Does federal common law based on nuisance allow

the owner of an onshore facility who cleans up an oil

spill to recover its expenses from a private party whose

negligent acts allegedly caused the spill when the iso-

lated incident of pollution did not constitute a nuisance;

Petitioner never requested the District Court to apply

federal common law or determine that the pollution con-

stituted a nuisance; the action involves private parties;

there is no basis to seek contribution under Pennsylvania

law or the FWPCA;; and the application of federal com-

mon law to a case between private parties as a result of

an isolated incident of pollution which originated on

shore will not effect private industry’s willingness to

shift the burden of clean-up to the government?

Table of Contents.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

Counter Question Presented .....................cccccccscessesseeees i

is. icntetbiebenbsmsndgancveate iii

Counter Statement of the Case .0.00............cccccecceeeeeeee 1

Mihi cis haieeiiccids edinteiteuisi ih itehadespchoccscek ca 3

There was no reason for the District Court to

apply federal common law at the first trial for the

following reasons:

1) This isolated incident of pollution did not

constitute a nuisance;

2) Petitioner never requested the District

Court to either apply federal common law

or determine that this pollution consti-

tuted a nuisance;

3) This action involves private parties;

4) There is no basis on which to seek contri-

bution either under Pennsylvania law in

effect at the time of the discharge or under

the provisions of the FWPCA;

5) The application of federal common law to a

case between private parties as a result of

an isolated incident of pollution which

originated on shore will not effect private

industry’s willingness to shift the burden

of clean-up to the government.

Lac stii a rclscdaesans ccadca cencasatdscesesséccsboncsdsouerce 7

dso lekbaahdnnadioe 8

TE icin cet er ew tetksssain 1b

Copy of Petitioner’s Original Complaint.

pS BU GED EE eee kOe Rene 6b

Transcript of Pre-Trial Conference taken

on August 21, 1978 at the United States

District Court, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania,

before the Honorable Barron P. McCune.

iii

Table of Contents.

TABLES OF AUTHORITIES

CASES PAGE

Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230.......... 5

Glus v. G. D. Murphy Co., 629 F.2d 248 (3rd Cir.

P| Ret Oar Rp genes erent et arey RE UNA Hs pea 6

Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 92 S. Ct. 1385

6+ | SERRE SCRE Werner ke ae enema Cn evepen okt MY Ne 4,5

Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp., 619 F.2d 623

PE aS GIENIPE sii cerasia sb dvuvhiensscnevehvbcasstedbamsudtecdoease 4

STATUTES AND ACTS

Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, as

Amended, 33 U.S. C. § 1241 et seq..............0000.... 6

COUNTER STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Beginning sometime during the evening of April 9,

1976 and continuing into the morning of April 10, 1976,

a substantial amount of diesel fuel drained from Peti-

tioner’s 50,000 gallon storage tank, proceeded through

some open pipes and followed the natural course of

gravity through a sewer drainage system and ultimately

into the Monongahela River, which is an interstate navi-

gable waterway. The storage tank was located on Peti-

tioner’s land at a point approximately one mile from the

river bank or shore line. Around the time that the dis-

charge occurred, Respondent was engaged in the replace-

ment of pipes near the storage tank and to facilitate this

replacement it became necessary for Respondent’s em-

ployees to close certain valves. Because the replacement

was not complete by the end of the work day, these

valves remained closed. During the night, Petitioner’s

employees opened the valves without realizing that they

were allowing the diesel fuel to enter lines that lead to

open pipes and consequently caused the spill. The written

contract between Petitioner and Respondent pertaining

to the pipe work contained a general indemnification

clause in favor of Petitioner. Following the spill and the

subsequent clean-up efforts, Petitioner brought suit

against Respondent demanding indemnification for the

costs of the clean-up of the river; the loss of the diesel

fuel and the fine imposed upon Petitioner by the J. S.

Coast Guard. (See Appendix A). Indemnification pro-

vided for on the contract and negligence on the part of

Respondent were the only theories advanced by Peti-

tioner in its Complaint and at the Pre-trial Conference

before the first trial of the case. (See Page 30b, Appendix

B).

At the first trial the District Court applied the law

of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania generally and

after the close of the testimony and immediately prior

o%

i. |

Counter Statement of the Case.

to the closing arguments, decided to apply comparative

negligence in spite of the fact that the spill had occurred

prior to the enactment of the Pennsylvania Comparative

Negligence Statute, which had been determined to be

prospective in its application by the Pennsylvania Su-

preme Court. The charge of the District Court on com-

parative negligence placed the entire burden of proof of

Petitioner’s contributory negligence on Respondent and

had the effect of prohibiting Respondent the use of Peti-

tioner’s evidence of its own culpability and contributory

negligence. Contributory negligence was a complete bar

to Petitioner’s recovery under the law of Pennsylvania

at the time of the spill. The jury returned its verdict at

the first trial in favor of Petitioner.

Respondent filed a Motion for a New Trial and

brought to the District Court’s attention that another

Judge of the same District Court had applied compara-

tive negligence in exactly the same manner in an almost

identical general indemnification case but not involving

an oil spili. In that case, Norfolk and Western Railway

Company v. Hardinger Transfer Company, Inc., 558

F.2d 1028 (3d Cir. 1976), the Third Circuit Court of Ap-

peals reversed and entered Judgment N.O.V. for De-

fendant based on the finding of negligence on the part

of the Plaintiff. The District Court therefore awarded

the Respondent in the case a new trial but refused to

issue a Judgment N.O.V. as there was no finding of

negligence on the part of the Plaintiff by the jury at

the first trial.

At the second trial the District Court correctly

charged the jury on contributory negligence and the

jury returned its verdict in favor of Respondent. Peti-

tioner appealed to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals,

Argument.

which Court having already ruled on the questions in-

volved, affirmed the second verdict and judgment. Hence,

Petitioner filed this Petition for Writ of Certiorari with

the U.S. Supreme Court.

ARGUMENT

There was no reason for the District Court to apply

federal common law at the first trial for the following

reasons:

1) This isolated incident of pollution did not con-

stitute a nuisance;

2) Petitioner never requested the District Court

to either apply federal common law or deter-

mine that this pollution constituted a nuisance;

3) This action involves private parties;

4) There is no basis on which to seek contribution

either under Pennsylvania law in effect at the

time of the discharge or under the provisions

of the FWPCA;

5) The application of federal common law to a case

between private parties as a result of an isolated

incident of pollution which originated on

shore will not effect private industry’s willing-

ness to shift the burden of clean-up to the gov-

ernment.

While it cannot be denied that there is a federal

common law of nuisance, there exists several obvious

and valid reasons why the District Court did not apply

federal common law at the initial trial of this matter.

The cases cited by Petitioner to support its contention

Argument.

of the existence of a right of recovery under the federal

law of nuisance are distinguishable from this case in

regard to the nature and kind of discharge involved. In

Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 92 S. Ct. 13885 (1972),

the cause of action was brought to abate a daily and

continual discharge of over 200 million gallons of raw

or inadequately treated sewage waste materials into

Lake Michigan by several Wisconsin cities. Also, in

Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp., 619 F.2d 623 (7th Cir.

1980) it was the alleged discharge by Outboard Marine

Corporation of toxic PCB’s over a nineteen year period

into Lake Michigan, bounded as it is by four states,

which convinced the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals

that federal common law of nuisance should be applied.

Both of these cases are distinguishable from the present

cases in that the isolated discharge which occurred here

is not of the character or degree as the deliberate, con-

tinual and far reaching discharge which triggered the

application of federal common law of nuisance in JIli-

nois v. Milwaukee and Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp.,

supra.

Assuming even the possibility that federal common

law of nuisance might be applicable to this situation,

Petitioner should nonetheless be precluded from invok-

ing, for the first time, its application in this case. Peti-

tioner never requested the District Court, either in its

Complaint (Appendix A), at Pre-trial Conferences at the

first trial or in discussion of Points for Charge to apply

federal common law of nuisance. In fact, Petitioner

never asked the Court at any point to even make the

basie and necessary determination that the discharge

which occurred in this case constituted a “nuisance” so

as to invoke the application of federal common law. Pe-

titioner’s counsel specifically limited its theories of re-

Argument.

covery at the first Pre-trial Conference to indemnifica-

tion under the contract and/or negligence on the part

of Respondent based on the law of Pennsylvania. (Page

30b of Appendix B).

Respondent additionally advances the argument

that this case is unlike the others to which this Court

saw fit to apply federal common law of nuisance in that

both of the parties to this suit are private parties. In

Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U. S. 230, this

Court stated:

“Tt is a fair and reasonable demand on the part

of a sovereign that the air over its territory should

not be polluted on a great scale by sulphurous acid

gas, that the forests on its mountains, be they better

or worse, and whatever domestic destruction they

have suffered, should not be further destroyed or

threatened by the act of persons beyond its control,

that the crops and orchards on its hills should not

be endangered from the same source. If any such

demand is to be enforced this must be, notwith-

standing the hesitation that we might feel if the

suit were between private parties, and the doubt

whether for the injuries which they might be suf-

fering to their property they should not be left

to an action at law.” Id., at 238. (Emphasis added).

The Court quoted this same passage approvingly in its

opinion in [linois v. City of Milwaukee, supra., which

concerned interstate waters. In both of those cases, it

was the character of one or both of the parties involved,

i.e., a governmental entity, which convinced the Court

that there was a need to fashion a federal common law

right. No such overriding need exists in this suit be-

tween two private entities and therefore, there is no

Argument.

need for this Court to fashion any such common law

right.

There is also no possible basis on which Petitioner

can seek contribution from Respondent for clean-up

costs when the applicable law then in effect in the Com-

monwealth of Pennsylvania did not permit such a re-

covery. Petitioner’s contention that there exists a fed-

eral common law right to private parties to recover

reasonable removal costs from third parties analogous

to the right to contribution under Title VII recognized

by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Glus v.

G. C. Murphy Co., 629 F.2d 248 (3rd Cir. 1980) is incor-

rect. The Third Circuit’s holding in Glus that an employ-

er was entitled to contribution from co-defendant unions

was reached only after the Court reviewed Title VII to

determine the congressional intent. Id. at 255. This was

necessary since Title VII did not explicitly indicate whe-

ther or not Congress intended for a right of contribution

to exist. Whereas, the FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. $1251, et seq.,

expressly states the Congressional intention as follows;

“The liabilities established by this section shall

in no way affect any rights which (1) the owner or

operator of a vessel or of an onshore facility or an

offshore facility may have against any third party

whose acts may in any way have caused or con-

tributed to such discharge, or (2) the United. States

may have against any third party whose actions

may in any way have caused or contributed to the

discharge of oil or hazardous substance.” 33 U.S.C.

§1321(h).

Thus the congressional intent not to affect any right of

recovery which a party may have against a third party

expressed in the FWPCA distinguishes this case from

Conclusion.

the Glus case where no indication was evident in Title

VI itself.

Finally, Petitioner’s argument that failure to ap-

ply federal common law to a case between private par-

ties as a result of an alleged tort at an onshore facility

which caused an isolated incident of pollution will result

in an increase in private industry calling upon the gov-

ernment to bear the burden of clean-up is mistaken.

Clearly, the incentive for private industry to do the

clean-up itself is to control the cost factor and not whe-

ther or not there will be an eventual recovery against

other parties including the U. S. Government. To argue

that application of federal law would be an incentive

to private industry to conduct the clean-up is without

merit.

Therefore, for the reasons set forth herein, the Dis-

trict Court did not err in applying the law of Pennsylva-

nia. Petitioner does not argue that the District Court

misapplied the law of Pennsylvania.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, a Writ of Certiorori should not

issue to review the Judgment of the Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit.

Respectfully Submitted,

PLIERS INE TE seathe PRON RIOT

Joseph B. Bagley

Attorney for Respondent

Certificate of Service.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Joseph B. Bagley, counsel for Respondent do here-

by certify that three copies of the within document have

been served on Petitioner by U. S. Mail, first class post-

age prepaid, sent on May 15, 1981 addressed to:

GARY F’. SHARLOCK

3090 U. S. Steel Building

Pittsburgh, PA 15219

/s8/ Joseph B. Bagley

APPENDIX

Appendix A

IN THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

THE BALTIMORE AND OHIO \

RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant

Plaintiff Civil Action

Vv. No. 77 16

R. J. DICKEY COMPANY, INC.,

COMPLAINT

The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, Plaintiff

herein, by its attorneys, Sharlock, Repcheck & Engel,

brings this action against R. J. Dickey Company, Inc.,

to recover damages of said Defendant upon a cause of

action whereof the following is a statement:

1. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company,

Plaintiff herein, is a corporation organized and existing

under the laws of the State of Maryland, and is a citizen

thereof.

2. R. J. Dickey Company, Inc., Defendant, is a citi-

en of Pennsylvania, with its principal place of business

located at 1110 Saw Mill Run Boulevard, Pittsburgh,

County of Allegheny and Commonwealth of Pennsylva-

nia.

3. That jurisdiction in this case is based upon the

diversity of citizenship of the parties and the amount in

controversy exceeds Ten Thousand ($10,000.00) Dollars

exclusive of interest and costs.

4. On June 9, 1975, the Baltimore and Ohio Rail-

road Company and R. J. Dickey Company, Inc. entered

2b

Appendix A.

into a written agreement, a copy of which is attached

hereto, and marked Exhibit “A’’, and made a part hereof.

5. Said written agreement provided for R. J.

Dickey Company, Inc. to install certain fuel lines for

unloading fuel from tank cars and trucks at the Glen-

wood Yards of The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Com-

pany, in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

6. Said written agreement provided that R. J.

Dickey Company, Inc. would indemnify, protect and save

harmless The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company

for damages sustained by the Plaintiff due to negligent

acts of omission or commission on the part of the De-

fendant.

7. On or before April 9, 1976, the Defendant,

through its agents, servants or employees, while in the

course of performing its duties, as outlined in the afore-

mentioned agreement, did negligently and carelessly

cause an oil spill at the Glenwood Yards of The Balti-

more and Ohio Railroad, in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

8. At the time of the aforesaid incident, that is on

or before April 19, 1976, the agreement represented as

Exhibit “A” was in full force and effect.

9. As a result of the incident hereinabove de-

scribed, the Plaintiff was caused to incur expenses in

the amount of $405,065.06 to remedy and correct the oil

spill and the damages caused by it.

10. Since June 11, 1976, the Plaintiff has demanded

that the Defendant make payments to it as indemnifica-

tion for the amounts spent in remedying and correcting

the oil spill and the damages caused by it.

3b

Appendix A.

11. ‘The Defendant has refused to pay the Plaintiff

the sum of $405,065.06 or any sum whatsoever.

WHEREFORE, The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Com-

pany, Plaintiff herein, demands judgment against R. J.

Dickey Company, Inc., Defendant herein, in the amount

of $405,065.06 plus interest and costs.

SHARLOCK, REPCHECK & ENGEL

By Gary F. SHARLOCK

Attorneys for The Baltimore

and Ohio Railroad Company

EXHIBIT “A”

THE BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILROAD

COMPANY

M: R. J. Dickey Company, Inc.

1110 Saw Mill Run Blvd.

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15226

Dated Jun 11.........

File: H-4694 ID/82

P-90

Dear Sir(s)

This will constitute a letter form of contract be-

tween us (hereinafter referred to as “Railroad” and

“Contractor,” respectively), when the enclosed duplicate

copy thereof duly signed or executed on Contractor’s

behalf is returned to Railroad, under which contract it

is agreed that Contractor, subject to the terms and con-

ditions hereinafter stated, will perform the work listed

below at either the rate or contract price (whichever is

filled in) shown.

4b

Appendix A.

Nature Estimated Contract

Location Facility of Work Rate Cost Price

Glenwood, Pa. Furnish all labor, equipment, ma-

AFE-55983 terials, etc. to install a 4” fuel line

for tank car unloading and a 3”

fuel line for truck fuel unloading

at Glenwood Yard. Railroad will

pay contractor the lump sum of

Five Thousand Eight Hundred

Sixty One Dollars ($5,861.00) up-

on completion of the work.

1. Contractor shall perform said work at a time

and in a manner satisfactory to Railroad’s Division En-

gineer, and Contractor’s bill or bills therefor shall be

submitted in triplicate to said Division Engineer.

2. In the performance of said work, Contractor

shall be deemed and held to be an independent contrac-

tor, and Railroad holds no control over Contractor or its

employees other than that the results to be accomplished

shall be satisfactory to Railroad.

3. Contractor hereby agrees to indemnify, protect

and save harmless Railroad from and against all loss

of or damage to any property whatsoever or injury to or

death of any persons (including the parties hereto and

their respective employees, agents or representatives) ,

and all claims or demands therefor resulting from any

acts or omissions of said Contractor, its agents or em-

ployees, in the execution of the work or in guarding the

same except that Contractor shall not be liable for any

damages to real property in the performance of the work

herein specified where such damages do not result from

accident or from the negligence or carelessness of con-

tractor, its agents or employees. !

*>>

5b

Appendix, A.

4. Contra or shall promptly notify said Division

Engineer of any loss, damage, injury or death arising

out of or in connection with said work.

5. No assignment of this contract shall be valid

for any purpose.

THE BALTIMORE AND OHIO

RAILROAD COMPANY

Vice President

Accepted this 9th day of June, 1975

R. J. DICKEY COMPANY, Inc. (Contractor)

By John Glue, President

If signed on behalf of a corporation or partnership,

the name and title of the person who signing should be

shown.

Note to Contractor: After execution on your behalf,

please forward Railroad’s copy direct to Mr. J. W. Brent,

Chief Engineer, The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Com-

pany, P. O. Box 1800, Huntington, W. Va. 25718.

EXHIBIT “A”

ry

Appendix B.

Appendix B

IN THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

a

THE BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILROAD

COMPANY,

Vv. No. 77-161

R. J. DICKEY COMPANY, INC.,

Defendant. |

Plaintiff, ; Civil Action

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS of the Pretrial

Conference taken in the above-entitled action on August

21, 1978, beginning at 4:00 p.m., at the United States

District Court, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, before the

Honorable Barron P. McCune, District Judge.

Court Reporter: Denise J. Khorey

APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiff :

Sharlock, Repcheck, Engel & Mahler

3090 U. S. Steel Building

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219

by Gary F. Sharlock, Esquire

For the Defendant:

Bagley & Weaver

1224 Frick Building

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219

by Joseph P. Bagley, Esquire

Patrick Loughney, Esquire

Also Present:

John C. Benner

Albert Bobersky

7%

7b

Appendix B.

(The following Pretrial Conference, was held on

August 21, 1978, beginning at 4:00 p.m., at the United

States District Court, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, before

the Honorable Barron P. McCune.)

The Court: Let the record show that this is the

time set for a pretrial conference in the civil action at

77-161. It is the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company

versus R. J. Dickey Company. This is a case where the

B&O claims a written contract dated June 9, 1975, with

Dickey which provided that Dickey would install fuel

lines for unloading diesel fuel from tank cars and trucks

at the Glenwood yards of the B&O. According to the

complaint, the contract provided that Dickey would in-

demnify the B&O for damages sustained due to the neg-

ligent acts of Dickey.

The pretrial statement of the plaintiff alleges first

that on April 9, 1976, Dickey’s employees were negligent

in removing certain valves from three loading stations

without capping the openings, and secondly in opening

v?' ves located in the B&O pump house leading to the

tnree uncapped openings, and in closing valves in the

pump house which furnished fuel to a B&O fueling sta-

tion, and finally in failing to notify B&O that the valves

to the fueling station were closed and the valves to the

unloading facilities were open. As I understand it, this

caused the fuel oil leak during which about 155,000

gallons of fuel oil went in the river and had to be cleaned

up; but, the oil loss amounted to $47,000 and the cleanup

costs about $332,000, and the claim is for about $405,000

plus assessment that the Coast Guard made of $5,000.

Now, as I understand it, the defendant counters

that on April 8, 1976, defendant’s employees did close

certain valves, but left the bolts open for the purpose

-%

8b

Appendix B.

of demonstrating to anyone coming into the pump house

that work was to be done on the valves. This apparently

is recited as some kind of notice to anyone coming into

the pump house that the valves were being worked on,

but they were closed, and during the course of the even-

ing B&O employees opened the valves and the oil traveled

into an open sewer, apparently through the pipes which

were up at the bolt, and traveled into the river.

The defendant states that the issues are whether or

not comparative negligence applies—stated another way,

whether the maritime law applies; secondly, whether

contributory negligence applies because they allege there

was insufficient supervision or training in security and

that there was perhaps contributory negligence when

the plaintiff opened the valves, which were apparently

the ones upon which the bolts were loose.

Third, was the defendant negligent of course and

was the negligence the proximate cause of the oil spill?

And next whether B&O violated the rules of the Coast

Guard or the Environmental Protection Agency—but it

is not stated how this would be related to proximate

cause—and, then, whether or not B&O is a proper party.

It does not seem to me that that is of much consequence.

Finally, whether the damages are reasonable in

view of a second oil spill. It is not related in detail what

the second oil spill was, but it is alleged that it occurred

at Outfall 8. And I don’t know from the defendant’s

pretrial statement how that is related to the first oil

spill or whether it is related at all, or whether it was

part of the cleanup or whether it caused part of the

expense.

So it seems to me that the contract is not denied.

It seems to me that the issue raised by the defendant

9b

Appendix B.

of course primarily is whether the defendant was neg-

ligent, whether its negligence was a proximate cause

of the damage; and secondly, whether contributory neg-

ligence or comparative negligence applies. Obviously, the

railroad would have the burden of proving the contract

in the first instance and the negligence of the defendant.

I take it the defendant would have the burden of show-

ing that contributory negligence is there. Now, does

that state what the lawsuit is about, gentlemen?

Mr. Sharlock: From the plaintiff’s standpoint, your

Honor, I think you highlighted the essential issues of the

case and the facts of the case.

Mr. Bagley: With certain corrections, that basi-

cally states what the case is about, yes, your Honor.

The Court: Now, I have attempted to figure out

what valves the employees who have been deposed were

talking about and how it affected the flow of the oil, but

I cannot do it on the basis of what is in the file. At least,

I have not been able to thus far. There is a report of a

consulting engineer that the defendant hired which does

not help much, but it seems to me that somebody first

has to explain the effect of closing the one valve, the

one on which the bolts were opened, and allowing the

other one to remain open.

I gather from the file that the oil could have flowed

two ways, depending upon which pipes were open, and

when the one valve was closed and the other left open,

the oil might have flowed to a place where it was not

intended; but, as I understand it, the real problem is

or is alleged to be that when the Dickey employees

closed the one valve on which the bolts were open it

closed off the flow of oil to a location where diesels were

7%

”

10b

Appendix B.

serviced, and during the night it was necessary to serv-

ice a diesel engine. So the railroad employees opened

that valve and serviced the diesel engine.

As I understand defendant’s contention, when they

opened that valve the diesel flowed to the point where

the engine was serviced. Perhaps it was not closed then,

but it may be the plaintiff’s contention that it was closed

and the oil flowed out through the loosened valve. So

I am not sure what the mechanics were that are alleged

to be the negligence.

It is apparent from the depositions, the ones I have

been able to read, that when the Dickey employees left

the job with the bolts open they did not tell anybody

about that. Whether that is significant, I do not know.

So the point is: Does anybody here know exactly what

is alleged to have happened? Do you have an idea and

can you draw a picture for us? Mr. Sharlock?

Mr. Sharlock: Yes, Judge. We have a working

theory of what occurred—

The Court: Now, what was the—

Mr. Sharlock: —the way the demonstrative may

be, and we respectfully suggest that for trial purposes

we consider a couple of things. One would be a view of

the pump house itself. I think that would in itself cry-

stalize the issues, as to which are the important valves

in the routing of the diesel fuel from the storage tank

to the open stations and also the routing to the diesel

refueling station. If you see it on the site, as I think

all of us here have had an opportunity to do, that will

help a great deal.

The second thing that I recommend—and we have

both worked toward this—is either a model be prepared

11b

Appendia B.

—which it may not be necessary to use a model—or a

flow chart diagram where you can trace the valve num-

bers and correlate it to what the testimony has been.

Now, unfortunately, some of the railroad employees

refer to certain valves using a different numbering sys-

tem than the defendant’s expert has used. So there are

two numbering systems, and I am sure that I understand

the numbering system used by the defendant’s expert,

and I can correlate it with the numbers used by my

clients. So—

The Court: Let me just ask—

Mr. Sharlock: So we can say—

The Court: Let me just ask a couple, simple ques-

tions. Is it your theory that the oil came out through

the loosened valve?

Mr. Sharlock: No.

The Court: Allright. Is it your theory that—

Mr. Sharlock: It went through the valve, but not

through—not in the opening to go through the bolts.

The Court: Well, then, what did the loosened bolts

have to do with it?

Mr. Sharlock: All right. The situation to begin

with, as it affects this lawsuit, is this was an entirely

closed system that—except for the conduct of the de-

fendant—there is nothing our people could have done in

that room that would have caused an oil spill, because

their every outside location was either capped or had a

closed valve on it. There were three stations outdoors

away from the pump house and away from the diesel

refueling station which the defendant’s men cut the re-

|

12b

Appendix B.

moved valves that had been on there. They were to have

capped them, but they did not and all three were left

open. So that is hazard number one, but so far there is

no problem because of two valves inside the pump house

that were to be worked on.

Now, inside the pump house one of the valves was

to be removed. The second valve was to be a change, was

to be made for different routing to the outside. De-

fendant’s employee began the process of opening the

bolts on the valve that led to the three stanchions out-

side. In his deposition, I interpret it that he left the bolts

loose so that our people or anyone coming in would in-

stantly recognize that these valves were loose and be on

notice by virtue of the loose bolts that there was an

open-valve condition. It is our position he also had that

valve open that led to the outside, but still c .r theory is

this should have caused him no trouble.

The Court: Even though he left that valve open?

Mr. Sharlock: Even though that valve is open, it

should not have caused a loss due to the routing used in-

ternally. Now, when he opened the nuts, he had a leakage

of oil which he should not have had. He has got trouble.

He goes to the next valve and closes it. Which valve he

goes to, Iam not positive at this moment. I know which

one he closed, but I am not positive as to whether he

might have closed a second one upstream.

So he shut down our system. So the valves that he

closed, any combination of the valves, one or two valves

that he closed—not only did it protect his work site,

which was the proper thing for him to have done—un-

necessary because the original routing was not—he did

not have to close the valve off. But he chose to close the

ry

13b

Appendix B.

valve, thinking when he broke the bolts or loosened the

nuts to break the valve out of the line, thinking he is

getting oil from the tank, which I do not believe he was.

There was residual oil in the lines, but when he broke

that, he was worried that he was going to get a lot of oil

on top of him, so he shut off the valve. He did not need to

shut that valve off, but he shut it off anyway, but when

he did shut off the valve, that also closed down our diesel

refueling station located some considerable distance

away.

Now,. he did not know what he was doing when he

shut off that valve. Now, our people come in later that

night. They are not getting diesel fuel at the refueling

station. They come in and valves are opened inside the

refueling station. They are testified to by our people.

Now, this has changed the arrangement inside the pump

house, and when they opened the valve at first there was

some oil leakage where the bolts were loose, but just a

minor leakage at that location; and, when the valve at

the diesel engines—that is the control valve on the hose

right at the entrance—when that was opened and we

began to take fuel to the refueling station, the small leak

that was observed inside the pump house stopped. He

heard the meter running. He knew it was flowing. Now,

what he did not know and could not see was that the oil

flowing through the valve that had the bolts loosened,

was oil flowing throughout underground some distance

and then up to the stanchions out of the sight and a dis-

tance away from where our men were located. Oil was

then flowing through and flowed all night until it was

discovered the next day.

The Court: Now, this was not because the bolts

were loose?

7s

14b

Appendix B.

Mr. Sharlock: Wo.

The Court: It was because the valve was opened?

Mr. Sharlock: Yes, sir.

The Court: So actually the loosening of the bolts

has nothing to do with this.

Mr. Sharlock: Well, it has. Mr. Bagley’s argument

is that the loose bolts would have been notice to us, and

our man did notice oil leaking at that valve, but when

we began to deliver diesel fuel to the engines that leak

stopped. So the question may be whether our people,

seeing a leak at the area of those bolts, should have been

on notice that something more dangerous had gone on.

The Court: So is your allegation of negligence that

he opened that valve when he—

Mr. Sharlock: Itis a series of things.

The Court: —when he did not know the operation

of the system?

‘Mr. Sharlock: Oh, yes. That is one of the elements.

The first element is the three outside stanchions that had

valves on them which made the entire system closed, so

that nothing our men did inside should have made any

difference insofar as an oil spill is concerned. There is

no combination of valves they might have turned that

should have caused trouble, but when the defendant cut

off the valves that were outside and did nct cap them,

that set up a hazard. Now, there is a way out—

The Court: By cutting off the valves, he left an

open pipe?

Mr. Sharlock: Yes.

The Court: Isee, and he did not cap those?

7.

15b

Appendiz B.

Mr. Sharlock: He did not cap them.

The Court: Did he intend to cap them at a later

time?

Mr. Sharlock: He was to have capped them later

on, but then the arrangement would have been—they

had valves on them and the system as it is now installed

does not—there is a valve on one and the other two out

of service—

The Court: Did the contract call for his capping

those three pipes after he cut the valves off?

Mr. Sharlock: The contract does not speak to that,

but it is in the depositions. It was understood that they

were to have capped those three stanchions. The con-

tract does not go in any details as to how the work was

to be done.

The Court: Okay. Then your allegation of negli-

gence, as I understand it, is that he took off, three valves

on pipes that led to the outside and left open pipes?

Mr. Sharlock: Yes.

The Court: And then opened the valve on which

he was loosening the bolts?

Mr. Sharlock: And then thinking—

The Court: And then unnecessarily closed valves

leading to the diesel refueling station?

Mr. Sharlock: Yes, and—

The Court: So that when your employees opened

those valves to get fuel during the night and apparently

left them open, the fuel ran out through the uncapped

pipes and eventually into the river?

16b

Appendix B.

Mr. Sharlock: Failing to tell us what had hap-

pened.

The Court: Okay. Next question: Do you agree

that there is a defense of contributory negligence?

Mr. Sharlock: Yes.

The Court: Okay. Do you contend then that this

is a common law negligence and contributory negli-

gence?

Mr. Sharlock: Yes. Well, it is the application of

the indemnity agreement. We are not indemnified

against our own negligence under the indemnity agree-

ment; therefore, if we were negligent, we can only col-

lect half providing the defendant is also negligent.

The Court: Yes. Well, what I mean is this is not

maritime law.

Mr. Sharlock: No, sir. It is not maritime.

The Court: This is strictly common law.

Mr. Sharlock: Common law negligence.

The Court: Common law negligence under the in-

demnity clause of the contract.

Mr. Sharlock: Yes, sir.

The Court: Do you agree with that?

Mr. Bagley: No, not necessarily, your Honor. I

have a question or problem concerning that which I have

listed as the first issue.

The Court: Well, if he concedes that there is con-

tributory negligence, aren’t you better off than you are

under comparative negligence?

7%

17b

Appendix B.

Mr. Bagley: Yes, if he concedes there is contribu-

tory negligence because this has been—

Mr. Sharlock: No, no.

The Court: No, no. If he concedes that the legal

principles to be employed in a charge to the jury is neg-

ligence and contributory negligence, aren’t you better off

than you are under comparative negligence?

Mr. Bagley: Well, possibly that is right, but one

of the problems is that we have not demanded a jury

trial under the assumption—and possibly I should have

demanded one anyhow. I did not under the assumption

that the admiralty maritime law would apply to this

case, since it certainly involves the river.

The Court: Well, you could ask for a jury trial

anytime.

Mr. Bagley: Well, then, I would ask for leave of

the Court to demand a jury trial at this time. I realize

it is discretionary with the Court, if the Court is going

to rule that the law of Pennsylvania applies. Then, we

have the contributory negligence theory.

The Court: Oh, no.

Mr. Bagley: On the other hand, if the Court—

The Court: No, no. Iam not making any ruling on

what applies. On seeking guidance here, it seemed to me

when I picked up the file that it was the indemnification

clause in the contract that is at issue, and Mr. Sharlock

concedes that in order to collect on that clause he has

got to show that you were negligent, and he admits that

contributory negligence may be a defense. So—

Mr. Sharlock: Only to half the claim. Contributory

18b

Appendix B.

negligence in the defense of suit on the indemnity, if we

are both negligent, I collect half. If the defendant only

is negligent and we are free from negligence, then I col-

lect everything. But if we are—

Mr. Bagley: Let’s—

Mr. Sharlock: —both negligent, I collect half un-

der the indemnity position.

Mr. Bagley: Well, that is a new theory to me. I

would like to know what authority Mr. Sharlock has for

such a theory as that.

Mr. Sharlock: Pennsylvania contractual indemnity

proof law.

Mr. Bagley: This is the first time it has been

brought up, Judge, and I would have to look into that as

to whether or not that is a correct statement of the con-

tractual agreement.

The Court: Well, let me approach it the other way.

What authority do you have that this would be mari-

time?

Mr. Bagley: Well, we have done some research on

it. Mr. Loughney is associated with me, and we have

been doing some research on it, and we are willing to

concede that it is a close question as to whether or not

it would be; and, really, I suppose what it amounts to is,

from the research that we have done in the different

jurisdictions, that each case pretty well stands on its

own merits as to which law would be applied.

In this case, the actual spill and the actions of the

parties involved occurred on the land away from the

river some distance, but then the spill went into the

19b

Appendix B.

river, into an interstate waterway covered completely

by the Coast Guard and the EPA and also the DER, as

far as the land is concerned, so that I think it is a close

question. What I was going to suggest is just possibly

that. This contract question should be scheduled for an

argument whereby we could have the opportunity to

present briefs and argue to the Court either way. Pos-

sibly we would resolve it in the meantime among our-

selves, rather than have the Court try to make a cursory

decision under the pretrial conciliation. That way, we

could present our briefs including the contract question

that Mr. Sharlock has now raised.

The Court: Well, that might be a good suggestion

if they are really legal issues.

Mr. Bagley: Thatis right, your Honor.

The Court: I do not know that they are. I cannot

see any maritime Jaw in this since the parties were land-

based parties entering into an ordinary contract. The

only jurisdiction that the Coast Guard got was after the

oil got into the river. They had the jurisdiction under

statutes, I guess jointly with the EPA, of ordering a

cleanup and what penalty would be assessed, but I don’t

think that gives maritime jurisdiction to the underlying

factors. I may be wrong, and I imagine that it is true

that you have a defense of contributory negligence, but

I think the law is that under an indemnification agree-

ment it does not go the whole way. At common law, con-

tributory negligence would be a defense to everything.

Mr. Sharlock: That’s right.

The Court: But under indemnification I believe

that both parties are negligent and recovery is only 50

percent. Are there any other questions of law?

7%

20b

Appendix B.

Mr. Bagley: I have listed the issues in my pretrial

statement, which the Court already went over, and the

only other one would be No. 2 which is really not all that

important, and that is whether or not the B&O Railroad

is a proper party to be the plaintiff.

The Court: I do not care whether it is B&O or

Chessie, and I suppose if B&O is not really the proper

party, they could amend anyway.

Mr. Bagley: Possibly. I was thinking of the real

party in interest when I listed that as an issue, and if

you look at all the depositions, I have made that an issue

in all the depositions, trying to find out what the corpo-

rate structure was of this company and never did really

find out.

The Court: Well, we are going to assure you that

Chessie cannot recover twice. In other words, if B&O

either wins or loses, that will be the end of it. You can-

not come in and claim that B&O was not the right party

then; can you?

Mr. Sharlock: Well, I will state for the record what

the situation is as far as that is concerned. The Chessie

System, Inc., is a holding company. One of its subsidi-

aries is the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company. The

Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company and the Chesa-

peake and Ohio Railroad Company and several other

companies do business under a logo known as Chessie

System. That is the corporate situation, but the Balti-

more and Ohio Railroad Company owns the property

and is a real party in interest in this matter.

The Court: ‘Well, did B&O pay the bill?

Mr. Sharlock: We did.

?%

21b

Appendix B.

The Court: Okay. They paid the contractors who

cleaned up the river?

Mr. Sharlock: Yes, sir.

The Court: Inotice that—

Mr. Bagley: Your Honor, please—

Mr. Sharlock: Do you have any questions about

that, Joe?

Mr. Bagley: Yes, because they are a wholly owned

subsidiary apparently of the Chessie System.

Mr. Sharlock: No, no, not Chessie System. Chessie

System, Inc.

Mr. Bagley: Of the Chessie System, Inc., and I

never have been able to find out in all the depositions I

took the answers to those questions. As I am saying,

nobody locally seems to be in a position to know the

corporate structure.

Mr. Sharlock: Well, don’t ask plumbers.

The Court: Well, is it really a subsidiary instead

of a division of Chessie? If it is a subsidiary, then it has

a corporate character of its own.

Mr. Bagley: Idon’t know, your Honor.

Mr. Sharlock: It is a subsidiary and I think, if

counsel cares to check on the second floor of the Frick

Building in the financial library, all that is spelled out in

the various encyclopedias that are there. I have looked

at it a number of times. It is correct as to the corporate

structure.

_The Court: Well, Standard & Poor’s would give

you the—

A |

Appendix B.

Mr. Sharlock: Standard & Poor’s, yes.

The Court: —the corporate structure.

Mr. Bagley: You asked, your Honor, if there were

any other legal questions and I think there is another

one, and that is the effect of the violation of the rules

and regulations of the EPA or the Coast Guard and

whether or not, if there were such violations, they were

proximate cause of the spill or were related to the spill,

whether or not they would constitute negligence per se,

and I think that is a very important legal determination.

I think that is a question for the Court. I think that

is very important because the research that we have

done and the material we have indicates that in oil spills

or fuel spills the violation of those rules and regulations

are to be considered as negligence per se, which would

establish in itself the contributory negligence of the

plaintiff.

The Court: Well, that may be, but your pretrial

has not set forth what the regulations were or how they

were violated.

Mr. Bagley: Well, one of the reasons for that,

Judge, was I just got today—and I have demanded on

numerous occasions—Mr. Sharlock in his defense has

demanded some things from me too, which he did not

get until just recently--was the SPCC regulations or

the plan that has to be approved by the EPA, and with-

out that I could not make a determination whether or

not there were violations of the rules.

I will state, as we both know from the Coast Guard

reports, that the plaintiff was fined $5,000 by the Coast

Guard for violations of various other regulations. Now,

23b

Appendix B.

we do have that one. There was a violation of that.

Without the SPCC, I was unable to determine how much

of this they violated. For example, they have to have a

dike, which they did have around this tank. They have

to remove any oil, or possibility of, into open sewers by |

so many feet. I could not determine that, and the SPCC

plan has to be approved by the EPA, which they did

have and apparently was approved.

Now, whether or not it was violated, I could not tell

and include in my pretrial statement because I just got

it from Mr. Sharlock today.

The Court: Well, in other words, there was a list-

ing of regulations governing the diesel pumping system. —

Mr. Sharlock: There are regulations that require

the plaintiff to submit a plan for this type of problem,

which was done. I don’t think that—what you received

is not the regulation, but the plan which the railroad

prepared in compliance with the regulation.

Mr. Bagley: That’s right.

The Court: Was it approved?

Mr. 8harlock: Yes.

Mr. Bagley: Yes. Now, whether that—

The Court: By the EPA?

Mr. Sharlock: Yes.

Mr. Bagley: Whether that plan was violated or

not, I could not determine because I just received it be-

fore we walked in the door—

Mr. Sharlock: Well, now, I think—

Mr. Bagley: Of course, I have not studied it yet,

7%

240

Appendix B.

which is involved in there. We do know, however, there

was a fining of $5,000 levied by the Coast Guard which

also leads me back to the first question of maritime law,

when they imposed a fine on the plaintiff for violation of

various federal regulations regarding the storage of oil

or fuel.

The Court: Well, you may have something if you

could show that the plan was violated and that was a

proximate cause of the damage.

Mr. Bagley: That’s right, your Honor.

The Court: But—

Mr. Bagley: Icould not do that until today because

I did not receive it until just now.

Mr. Sharlock: Well, I think on this particular sub-

ject I am sure the Court is aware that anyone who al-

lows certain categories of chemicals to enter the rivers

in this area is fined, irrespective of negligence, irrespec-

tive of care, irrespective of good faith actions taken by

property owners, and so those fines are not at all related

to any negligence.

The Court: It seemed to be a small fine.

Mr. Sharlock: If you are fined, no matter what

happens, even if it is the fault of a third party—

The Court: It seems to be a small fine in view of

the magnitude of the problem.

Mr. Bagley: That’s right.

The Court: I would have thought the Coast Guard

would be outraged.

Mr. Sharlock: Well, I would think what we should

do, then, is to bring representatives of the EPA in who

|

25b

Appendiz B.

did not sue us for polluting the rivers in this area and I

have been through situations where there was uninten-

tional oil spills and, despite the good will and the efforts

of the railroad to control matters like this, we have had

suits against us for a couple hundred thousand dollars

and where no negligence is involved. So I am sure counsel

will explore that issue very thoroughly.

Mr. Bagley: That is a shocking statement.

The Court: Well, let me—

Mr. Bagley: But I was only putting out to the

Court that I think that is another legal argument for

the Court.

The Court: Well, we will give you time necessary

to develop it, but let me raise another question here. You

dispute the reasonableness of the damages. Is that a

serious dispute? In other words, it seemed to me that

the bulk of the damages are composed of two items:

The oil that was lost and the contractor’s charge to clean

it up. Now, I would assume that the contractor charged

the going price, and B&O apparently had to get the work

done and paid the bill. Do you have any real dispute that

the bill was unreasonable?

Mr. Bagley: Yes, your Honor. I think that there

are numerous items—of course, there are very lengthy

invoices that are either not necessary or were not nec-

essary, such as purchasing new boats to go out-in the

river. Maybe they were. I am raising this as an issue, as

to whether or not these were necessary to the cleanup

operations.

One of the major questions again involves the Coast

Guard, and my understanding is that there are two ways

26b

Appendix B.

of doing this. One is for the plaintiff, being the railroad,

to have volunteered to go ahead and have this cleanup

done, which they so did; or, the other way to do it is to

turn it over to the Coast Guard and let them do it.

Mr. Sharlock: You do not have enough coverage

to let them do it. Excuse me, Mr. Bagley. That is a fact.

Mr. Bagley: Well, I think that the Coast Guard

would seriously dispute that, and the reason we have

listed them as witnesses—one of the reasons beside their

investigation—is exactly that reason as it relates to

damages because apparently Mr. Sharlock does not have

much faith in our Coast Guard and fines to begin with,

which shocks me—why they would levy a fine for no

reason—and even less respect for their ability to do this

type of work or to have it done at a much lesser price

than some private contractor who obviously, knowing he

has an emergency situation, will take advantage of the

situation.

So, yes, we seriously dispute the amount of the

damages.

The Court: Okay. Going back to legal questions

then, how much time do you want to determine whether

the plan was violated and whether it was the proximate

cause of the oil spill?

Mr. Bagley: Well, of course we always have pres-

sures this time of the year. We start getting into the

actual trials at Common Pleas Court and other jurisdic-

tions the first week in September, so I would request 30

days.

The Court: Okay. No problem. Put this on the pre-

trial transcript. We will give defendant 30 days to en-

27b

Appendiz B.

gage in any investigation he wishes concerning the EPA

plan, if they need to file a supplemental pretrial state-

ment—

Mr. Bagley: That is the SPCC plan, your Honor.

The Court: All right. —at the end of the 30 days.

Furthermore, if the defendant really wishes to brief the

issue whether maritime law governs, he may do so with-

in the same 30 days and file any motion to bring the

issue to a head. He may also brief the indemnification

issue; to wit, whether contributory negligence would

limit recovery to 50 percent as Mr. Sharlock contends or

not.

Mr. Sharlock is then extended 30 days at the end of

the first 30 days where he can reply to the motions.

The reason I am giving you the 60 days is, if this is

to be a jury trial, I will not be trying it anyhow in 60

days. Now, do you really want a jury trial? If you make

the motion, I will grant it.

Mr. Bagley: Yes, your Honor.

The Court: Because I cannot deny it even if I

wanted to.

Mr. Sharlock: I think it has been waived by not

demanding the jury trial with the complaint, and I made

that decision when we filed our complaint, not to demand

a jury trial. Due to the nature of the claim, the amount

of the claim and respective impressions that the parties

would have on a jury trial, I did not demand a jury trial.

I think it is waived.

The Court: I do not think I can deny him a jury

trial. I do not particularly want to, but I will say I don’t

think I can deny it anyhow.

28b

Appendix B.

Mr. Sharlock: I think it is waived, your Honor.

The Court: Well, you can present your brief on

that within 30 days, if you want to.

Mr. Sharlock: Sure.

The Court: But I do not think I can deny anyone

a jury trial that requests it at pretrial.

Mr. Bagley: Well, I will so make the demand at

this time, your Honor, for a jury trial in the event that

the Court determines that the law of Pennsylvania ap-

plies and not the maritime law. If the Court determines

that maritime law applies, my understanding of mari-

time law is that it is automatically non-jury anyhow, so

therefore it would be a moot question.

The Court: It seems to me you are arguing an in-

consistent position. You are arguing that maritime law

applies, but you do want a jury trial.

Mr. Bagley: Ican well realize why the Court would

feel that it is inconsistent, but I do not believe that it

necessarily is. What I am saying is: If that is the deter-

mination of the Court, of course I am satisfied with that

and that is why we did not demand a jury trial to begin

with. Now, if on the other hand the Court determines

that the Pennsylvania law should apply, then I would

request a jury trial.

The Court: Well, the Pennsylvania law I am talk-

ing about is not the new comparative negligence act;

you understand?

Mr. Bagley: That’s right, your Honor, because this

was before that statute.

The Court: Well, even if it was after the statute,

I don’t think it would have any effect on this case be-

cause this is not an ordinary negligence action.

i

29b

Appendix B.

Mr. Sharlock: This isa suit on a contract.

The Court: This is not double indemnity. This is

really a breach of contract action.

Mr. Sharlock: That’s right.

Mr. Bagley: Well, Ido not want to take the Court’s

time now to go into that contract because you have

given us 30 days to make our determination and file our

brief concerning the contract. I wonder if the relevancy

of the contract in this particular issue—when you are

talking about indemnification for negligence, well then

they still have to prove negligence, and the only rele-

vancy would be unnecessary indemnification, and one of

the matters—which does not come up legally, I suppose,

but I may as well tell the Court—that I will have to

determine is the carrier with contractual liability in that

event, which has come as somewhat of a surprise to me

here today; and, what I am talking about is that, if

there is liability for 50 percent, that is solely on the

basis of the indemnification contract, and this company

that I represent—being Northwestern National Insur-

ance Group and Crum & Forster—does not have con-

tractual coverage, then we are leaving the defendant

without any insurance.

The Court: Well, you may be.

Mr. Bagley: That is a matter I will have to get

into also.

. The Court: Well, you may be leaving them with-

out insurance depending upon how their policy reads, I

suppose. You raised that, didn’t you, in your pretrial

statement, that there may not be?

7%

7%

30b

Appendix B.

Mr. Bagley: That was for a different reason, your

Honor. 7 :

The Court: In the interrogatories rather than the

pretrial statement?

Mr. Bagley: Right, in the answers to interroga-

tories, because there is an exclusion under the policy

dealing with railroads. Any work done on railroads,

which I have quoted the language, and of course ob-

viously you have already read it—but that is an entirely

different issue than the contractual liability insurance

under a general liability policy.

The Court: You are thinking that maybe in answer

to the question: Does defendant’s insurers contest cov-

erage afforded by its policy of insurance and, if so, state

the reason for any reservation of rights? You answered

yes. I take it that means yes, they do contest enforce-

ment of the policy provided it is understood and agreed

that this policy excludes coverage to any repair or any

contractual agreements to any railroads.

Mr. Bagley: That’s right, your Honor.

The Court: Maybe you do not have any insurance

at all here.

Mr. Bagley: This is what I am saying to you. Now,

that was really put in there on the basis of an ordinary

negligence situation. As I understand this pretrial con-

ference, what I am getting out of it is the plaintiff is

limiting the theory to a right under the contract for

indemnification.

Mr. Sharlock: No, sir. There is a suit on the con-

tract and also a suit sounding in negligence.

31b

Appendiz B.

That is why, if you will notice, my pretrial state-

ment specifically spells out two separate theories.

Mr. Bagley: Well, now, if you have the one, can

you have the other?

Mr. Sharlock: Yes, sir.

Mr. Bagley: Where does that put us in?

Mr. Sharlock: It puts you in coverage. That’s what

it does.

Mr. Bagley: With respect to the insurance?

Mr. Sharlock: Ihave both—

Mr. Bagley: Now, I am looking at the verdict, Mr.

Sharlock. If the verdict is for the plaintiff against the

defendant solely on the basis of the contract—

Mr. Sharlock: It could find for both reasons.

Mr. Bagley: No. Then it would have to be for the

full amount. If the verdict should be for 50 percent be-

cause of the indemnification contract and the Court

should so rule, legally under your theory then you do

not have any insurance coverage.

The Court: Well, you have got 30 days to file any

motions you want to file and Mr. Sharlock has 30 days,

and let me go off—

Mr. Sharlock: Your Honor, we have requested cer-

tain reports and photographs referred to in Dr. Hocken-

berry’s report which Mr. Bagley has agreed to furnish

us. Upon receipt of those, I would like to take Dr. Hock-

enberry’s deposition. Now, depending on whether this

case is going to be tried before a jury or not, it would

give me some guidance as to whether I should use a

A |

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32b

Appendix B.

model of the piping system or schematic drawing of the

piping system. So I would like to reserve the right to go

either way, and I do not think that will delay the trial

any.

The Court: Wewill give you the right to—

Mr. Sharlock: But, to explain that, I may need one

of our persons who is already listed as a witness, who

would be explaining it and interpreting it. So that I feel

in proper compliance with the rules, I should have a

written report and will furnish you a copy of that report

as soon as it is prepared in that connection.

Finally, we have been attempting to locate a former

employee of the defendant, a Mr. Sunder—S-u-n-d-e-r—

and if he can be located, we would want leave to take his

deposition. But as of now Mr. Bagley has assured me

that his client cannot find him or does not know where

he is, and we have been unable to locate him, but we are

going to continue our efforts. If we do snag him, I

would like to take his deposition.

Mr. Bagley: Well, I have listed in the answers to

interrogatories in front of the Court the last known

address of Mr. Sunder that we have, and that is all we

know about him. He does not work for the company any

more. He is gone.

The Court: Well—

Mr. Bagley: If he is located, I have no objection

to his deposition as a witness.

Mr. Sharlock: Okay.

Mr. Bagley: Now, but to Dr. Hockenberry’s depo-

sition, he is our expert. The plaintiff has not chosen to

>.

33b

Appendix B.

have any expert, and his deposition would have to be

limited to only factual observations. He would not be

permitted to ask Dr. Hockenberry any opinion questions

or otherwise. And Mr. Sharlock already has all of that

in his report which is quite detailed and very thick, to

attest to the defendant’s pretrial statement.

It is the same category as taking a doctor’s deposi-

tion, the doctor of the plaintiff so to speak or a doctor

of the defendant, and he does not have an absolute right

to ask him any questions, but just probe questions and

not getting into any opinions and just asking him for

factual observations only, all of which he already has.

So, therefore, I would object to the deposition of Dr.

Hockenberry and I do not object to Mr. Sunder’s, if they

can find him.

Mr. Sharlock: With reference to Dr. Hockenberry’s

deposition, it was received not too long ago and just

before we all were going on vacations, quite a compre-

hensive report which I have pored through a number of

_ times and have forwarded to my people for analysis. Un-

fortunately, I do not have a report back from them, and

there is some questions in my mind about what Dr.

Hockenberry is referring to. I would like leave to take

his deposition, and I believe under federal discovery

rules, unlike our Common Pleas rules, I am permitted to

ask discovery questions. I would like the Court to rule

on it, if the Court allows me to take his deposition.

The Court: Well, why don’t you get the photo-

graphs that you are going to get from Mr. Bagley? If

you want to take his deposition then—you may not want

to after you get all the factual information.

Mr. Sharlock: That may well be.

7%

34b

Appendix B.

The Court: And if you are in disagreement about

the deposition, I will settle the issue if you want to come

in.

Mr. Sharlock: Thank you.

The Court: I have an idea you can agree on it.

You can certainly take the deposition of the other em-

ployee if you can find him. We will give you that leave,

and as far as that is concerned, during this 60 days that

you gentlemen are going to file supplemental pretrial

statements, if there is any discovery that is important to

either of you, I take it you could engage in it.

Mr. Sharlock: Thank you, Judge.

The Court: As long as it is not burdensome. Any-

thing else?

Mr. Sharlock: No.

Mr. Bagley: Nothing, your Honor.

(Whereupon, at 5:05 p.m. the pretrial conference

was concluded. )

35b

Appendia B.

REPORTER’S CERTIFICATE

I, Denise J. Khorey, Court Reporter, do hereby cer-

tify that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript

made from my stenotype notes of the proceedings held

on August 21, 1978, at 4:00 p.m., United States District

Court, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, before the Honorable

Barron P. McCune.

DENISE J. KHOREY

Court Reporter

September 15, 1978

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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