Opposition — Baltimore & Ohio Railroad v. R. J. Dickey Co.
Supreme Court brief1981
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80-1742 |
MAY 18 198,
No. 80 ALEXAND 2 L. STE
4472124
In THE
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1980
THE BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILROAD CO.,
Petitioner
vB.
R. J. DICKEY COMPANY, INC.,
Respondent
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION TO THE
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
JOSEPH B. BAGLEY, Esq.
JOSEPH M. DiGrorci0, Esq.
4156 Library Road
P. O. Box 10308
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15234
(412) 563-4877
Counsel for Respondent
SMITH BROS., LAW PRINTERS, 620 SECOND AVENUE, PITTSBURGH, PA. 15219
COUNTER QUESTION PRESENTED
Does federal common law based on nuisance allow
the owner of an onshore facility who cleans up an oil
spill to recover its expenses from a private party whose
negligent acts allegedly caused the spill when the iso-
lated incident of pollution did not constitute a nuisance;
Petitioner never requested the District Court to apply
federal common law or determine that the pollution con-
stituted a nuisance; the action involves private parties;
there is no basis to seek contribution under Pennsylvania
law or the FWPCA;; and the application of federal com-
mon law to a case between private parties as a result of
an isolated incident of pollution which originated on
shore will not effect private industry’s willingness to
shift the burden of clean-up to the government?
Table of Contents.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
Counter Question Presented .....................cccccccscessesseeees i
is. icntetbiebenbsmsndgancveate iii
Counter Statement of the Case .0.00............cccccecceeeeeeee 1
Mihi cis haieeiiccids edinteiteuisi ih itehadespchoccscek ca 3
There was no reason for the District Court to
apply federal common law at the first trial for the
following reasons:
1) This isolated incident of pollution did not
constitute a nuisance;
2) Petitioner never requested the District
Court to either apply federal common law
or determine that this pollution consti-
tuted a nuisance;
3) This action involves private parties;
4) There is no basis on which to seek contri-
bution either under Pennsylvania law in
effect at the time of the discharge or under
the provisions of the FWPCA;
5) The application of federal common law to a
case between private parties as a result of
an isolated incident of pollution which
originated on shore will not effect private
industry’s willingness to shift the burden
of clean-up to the government.
Lac stii a rclscdaesans ccadca cencasatdscesesséccsboncsdsouerce 7
dso lekbaahdnnadioe 8
TE icin cet er ew tetksssain 1b
Copy of Petitioner’s Original Complaint.
pS BU GED EE eee kOe Rene 6b
Transcript of Pre-Trial Conference taken
on August 21, 1978 at the United States
District Court, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania,
before the Honorable Barron P. McCune.
iii
Table of Contents.
TABLES OF AUTHORITIES
CASES PAGE
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230.......... 5
Glus v. G. D. Murphy Co., 629 F.2d 248 (3rd Cir.
P| Ret Oar Rp genes erent et arey RE UNA Hs pea 6
Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 92 S. Ct. 1385
6+ | SERRE SCRE Werner ke ae enema Cn evepen okt MY Ne 4,5
Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp., 619 F.2d 623
PE aS GIENIPE sii cerasia sb dvuvhiensscnevehvbcasstedbamsudtecdoease 4
STATUTES AND ACTS
Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, as
Amended, 33 U.S. C. § 1241 et seq..............0000.... 6
COUNTER STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Beginning sometime during the evening of April 9,
1976 and continuing into the morning of April 10, 1976,
a substantial amount of diesel fuel drained from Peti-
tioner’s 50,000 gallon storage tank, proceeded through
some open pipes and followed the natural course of
gravity through a sewer drainage system and ultimately
into the Monongahela River, which is an interstate navi-
gable waterway. The storage tank was located on Peti-
tioner’s land at a point approximately one mile from the
river bank or shore line. Around the time that the dis-
charge occurred, Respondent was engaged in the replace-
ment of pipes near the storage tank and to facilitate this
replacement it became necessary for Respondent’s em-
ployees to close certain valves. Because the replacement
was not complete by the end of the work day, these
valves remained closed. During the night, Petitioner’s
employees opened the valves without realizing that they
were allowing the diesel fuel to enter lines that lead to
open pipes and consequently caused the spill. The written
contract between Petitioner and Respondent pertaining
to the pipe work contained a general indemnification
clause in favor of Petitioner. Following the spill and the
subsequent clean-up efforts, Petitioner brought suit
against Respondent demanding indemnification for the
costs of the clean-up of the river; the loss of the diesel
fuel and the fine imposed upon Petitioner by the J. S.
Coast Guard. (See Appendix A). Indemnification pro-
vided for on the contract and negligence on the part of
Respondent were the only theories advanced by Peti-
tioner in its Complaint and at the Pre-trial Conference
before the first trial of the case. (See Page 30b, Appendix
B).
At the first trial the District Court applied the law
of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania generally and
after the close of the testimony and immediately prior
o%
i. |
Counter Statement of the Case.
to the closing arguments, decided to apply comparative
negligence in spite of the fact that the spill had occurred
prior to the enactment of the Pennsylvania Comparative
Negligence Statute, which had been determined to be
prospective in its application by the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court. The charge of the District Court on com-
parative negligence placed the entire burden of proof of
Petitioner’s contributory negligence on Respondent and
had the effect of prohibiting Respondent the use of Peti-
tioner’s evidence of its own culpability and contributory
negligence. Contributory negligence was a complete bar
to Petitioner’s recovery under the law of Pennsylvania
at the time of the spill. The jury returned its verdict at
the first trial in favor of Petitioner.
Respondent filed a Motion for a New Trial and
brought to the District Court’s attention that another
Judge of the same District Court had applied compara-
tive negligence in exactly the same manner in an almost
identical general indemnification case but not involving
an oil spili. In that case, Norfolk and Western Railway
Company v. Hardinger Transfer Company, Inc., 558
F.2d 1028 (3d Cir. 1976), the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals reversed and entered Judgment N.O.V. for De-
fendant based on the finding of negligence on the part
of the Plaintiff. The District Court therefore awarded
the Respondent in the case a new trial but refused to
issue a Judgment N.O.V. as there was no finding of
negligence on the part of the Plaintiff by the jury at
the first trial.
At the second trial the District Court correctly
charged the jury on contributory negligence and the
jury returned its verdict in favor of Respondent. Peti-
tioner appealed to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals,
Argument.
which Court having already ruled on the questions in-
volved, affirmed the second verdict and judgment. Hence,
Petitioner filed this Petition for Writ of Certiorari with
the U.S. Supreme Court.
ARGUMENT
There was no reason for the District Court to apply
federal common law at the first trial for the following
reasons:
1) This isolated incident of pollution did not con-
stitute a nuisance;
2) Petitioner never requested the District Court
to either apply federal common law or deter-
mine that this pollution constituted a nuisance;
3) This action involves private parties;
4) There is no basis on which to seek contribution
either under Pennsylvania law in effect at the
time of the discharge or under the provisions
of the FWPCA;
5) The application of federal common law to a case
between private parties as a result of an isolated
incident of pollution which originated on
shore will not effect private industry’s willing-
ness to shift the burden of clean-up to the gov-
ernment.
While it cannot be denied that there is a federal
common law of nuisance, there exists several obvious
and valid reasons why the District Court did not apply
federal common law at the initial trial of this matter.
The cases cited by Petitioner to support its contention
Argument.
of the existence of a right of recovery under the federal
law of nuisance are distinguishable from this case in
regard to the nature and kind of discharge involved. In
Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 92 S. Ct. 13885 (1972),
the cause of action was brought to abate a daily and
continual discharge of over 200 million gallons of raw
or inadequately treated sewage waste materials into
Lake Michigan by several Wisconsin cities. Also, in
Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp., 619 F.2d 623 (7th Cir.
1980) it was the alleged discharge by Outboard Marine
Corporation of toxic PCB’s over a nineteen year period
into Lake Michigan, bounded as it is by four states,
which convinced the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
that federal common law of nuisance should be applied.
Both of these cases are distinguishable from the present
cases in that the isolated discharge which occurred here
is not of the character or degree as the deliberate, con-
tinual and far reaching discharge which triggered the
application of federal common law of nuisance in JIli-
nois v. Milwaukee and Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp.,
supra.
Assuming even the possibility that federal common
law of nuisance might be applicable to this situation,
Petitioner should nonetheless be precluded from invok-
ing, for the first time, its application in this case. Peti-
tioner never requested the District Court, either in its
Complaint (Appendix A), at Pre-trial Conferences at the
first trial or in discussion of Points for Charge to apply
federal common law of nuisance. In fact, Petitioner
never asked the Court at any point to even make the
basie and necessary determination that the discharge
which occurred in this case constituted a “nuisance” so
as to invoke the application of federal common law. Pe-
titioner’s counsel specifically limited its theories of re-
Argument.
covery at the first Pre-trial Conference to indemnifica-
tion under the contract and/or negligence on the part
of Respondent based on the law of Pennsylvania. (Page
30b of Appendix B).
Respondent additionally advances the argument
that this case is unlike the others to which this Court
saw fit to apply federal common law of nuisance in that
both of the parties to this suit are private parties. In
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U. S. 230, this
Court stated:
“Tt is a fair and reasonable demand on the part
of a sovereign that the air over its territory should
not be polluted on a great scale by sulphurous acid
gas, that the forests on its mountains, be they better
or worse, and whatever domestic destruction they
have suffered, should not be further destroyed or
threatened by the act of persons beyond its control,
that the crops and orchards on its hills should not
be endangered from the same source. If any such
demand is to be enforced this must be, notwith-
standing the hesitation that we might feel if the
suit were between private parties, and the doubt
whether for the injuries which they might be suf-
fering to their property they should not be left
to an action at law.” Id., at 238. (Emphasis added).
The Court quoted this same passage approvingly in its
opinion in [linois v. City of Milwaukee, supra., which
concerned interstate waters. In both of those cases, it
was the character of one or both of the parties involved,
i.e., a governmental entity, which convinced the Court
that there was a need to fashion a federal common law
right. No such overriding need exists in this suit be-
tween two private entities and therefore, there is no
Argument.
need for this Court to fashion any such common law
right.
There is also no possible basis on which Petitioner
can seek contribution from Respondent for clean-up
costs when the applicable law then in effect in the Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania did not permit such a re-
covery. Petitioner’s contention that there exists a fed-
eral common law right to private parties to recover
reasonable removal costs from third parties analogous
to the right to contribution under Title VII recognized
by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Glus v.
G. C. Murphy Co., 629 F.2d 248 (3rd Cir. 1980) is incor-
rect. The Third Circuit’s holding in Glus that an employ-
er was entitled to contribution from co-defendant unions
was reached only after the Court reviewed Title VII to
determine the congressional intent. Id. at 255. This was
necessary since Title VII did not explicitly indicate whe-
ther or not Congress intended for a right of contribution
to exist. Whereas, the FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. $1251, et seq.,
expressly states the Congressional intention as follows;
“The liabilities established by this section shall
in no way affect any rights which (1) the owner or
operator of a vessel or of an onshore facility or an
offshore facility may have against any third party
whose acts may in any way have caused or con-
tributed to such discharge, or (2) the United. States
may have against any third party whose actions
may in any way have caused or contributed to the
discharge of oil or hazardous substance.” 33 U.S.C.
§1321(h).
Thus the congressional intent not to affect any right of
recovery which a party may have against a third party
expressed in the FWPCA distinguishes this case from
Conclusion.
the Glus case where no indication was evident in Title
VI itself.
Finally, Petitioner’s argument that failure to ap-
ply federal common law to a case between private par-
ties as a result of an alleged tort at an onshore facility
which caused an isolated incident of pollution will result
in an increase in private industry calling upon the gov-
ernment to bear the burden of clean-up is mistaken.
Clearly, the incentive for private industry to do the
clean-up itself is to control the cost factor and not whe-
ther or not there will be an eventual recovery against
other parties including the U. S. Government. To argue
that application of federal law would be an incentive
to private industry to conduct the clean-up is without
merit.
Therefore, for the reasons set forth herein, the Dis-
trict Court did not err in applying the law of Pennsylva-
nia. Petitioner does not argue that the District Court
misapplied the law of Pennsylvania.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, a Writ of Certiorori should not
issue to review the Judgment of the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit.
Respectfully Submitted,
PLIERS INE TE seathe PRON RIOT
Joseph B. Bagley
Attorney for Respondent
Certificate of Service.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Joseph B. Bagley, counsel for Respondent do here-
by certify that three copies of the within document have
been served on Petitioner by U. S. Mail, first class post-
age prepaid, sent on May 15, 1981 addressed to:
GARY F’. SHARLOCK
3090 U. S. Steel Building
Pittsburgh, PA 15219
/s8/ Joseph B. Bagley
APPENDIX
Appendix A
IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
THE BALTIMORE AND OHIO \
RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant
Plaintiff Civil Action
Vv. No. 77 16
R. J. DICKEY COMPANY, INC.,
COMPLAINT
The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, Plaintiff
herein, by its attorneys, Sharlock, Repcheck & Engel,
brings this action against R. J. Dickey Company, Inc.,
to recover damages of said Defendant upon a cause of
action whereof the following is a statement:
1. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company,
Plaintiff herein, is a corporation organized and existing
under the laws of the State of Maryland, and is a citizen
thereof.
2. R. J. Dickey Company, Inc., Defendant, is a citi-
en of Pennsylvania, with its principal place of business
located at 1110 Saw Mill Run Boulevard, Pittsburgh,
County of Allegheny and Commonwealth of Pennsylva-
nia.
3. That jurisdiction in this case is based upon the
diversity of citizenship of the parties and the amount in
controversy exceeds Ten Thousand ($10,000.00) Dollars
exclusive of interest and costs.
4. On June 9, 1975, the Baltimore and Ohio Rail-
road Company and R. J. Dickey Company, Inc. entered
2b
Appendix A.
into a written agreement, a copy of which is attached
hereto, and marked Exhibit “A’’, and made a part hereof.
5. Said written agreement provided for R. J.
Dickey Company, Inc. to install certain fuel lines for
unloading fuel from tank cars and trucks at the Glen-
wood Yards of The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Com-
pany, in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
6. Said written agreement provided that R. J.
Dickey Company, Inc. would indemnify, protect and save
harmless The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company
for damages sustained by the Plaintiff due to negligent
acts of omission or commission on the part of the De-
fendant.
7. On or before April 9, 1976, the Defendant,
through its agents, servants or employees, while in the
course of performing its duties, as outlined in the afore-
mentioned agreement, did negligently and carelessly
cause an oil spill at the Glenwood Yards of The Balti-
more and Ohio Railroad, in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
8. At the time of the aforesaid incident, that is on
or before April 19, 1976, the agreement represented as
Exhibit “A” was in full force and effect.
9. As a result of the incident hereinabove de-
scribed, the Plaintiff was caused to incur expenses in
the amount of $405,065.06 to remedy and correct the oil
spill and the damages caused by it.
10. Since June 11, 1976, the Plaintiff has demanded
that the Defendant make payments to it as indemnifica-
tion for the amounts spent in remedying and correcting
the oil spill and the damages caused by it.
3b
Appendix A.
11. ‘The Defendant has refused to pay the Plaintiff
the sum of $405,065.06 or any sum whatsoever.
WHEREFORE, The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Com-
pany, Plaintiff herein, demands judgment against R. J.
Dickey Company, Inc., Defendant herein, in the amount
of $405,065.06 plus interest and costs.
SHARLOCK, REPCHECK & ENGEL
By Gary F. SHARLOCK
Attorneys for The Baltimore
and Ohio Railroad Company
EXHIBIT “A”
THE BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILROAD
COMPANY
M: R. J. Dickey Company, Inc.
1110 Saw Mill Run Blvd.
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15226
Dated Jun 11.........
File: H-4694 ID/82
P-90
Dear Sir(s)
This will constitute a letter form of contract be-
tween us (hereinafter referred to as “Railroad” and
“Contractor,” respectively), when the enclosed duplicate
copy thereof duly signed or executed on Contractor’s
behalf is returned to Railroad, under which contract it
is agreed that Contractor, subject to the terms and con-
ditions hereinafter stated, will perform the work listed
below at either the rate or contract price (whichever is
filled in) shown.
4b
Appendix A.
Nature Estimated Contract
Location Facility of Work Rate Cost Price
Glenwood, Pa. Furnish all labor, equipment, ma-
AFE-55983 terials, etc. to install a 4” fuel line
for tank car unloading and a 3”
fuel line for truck fuel unloading
at Glenwood Yard. Railroad will
pay contractor the lump sum of
Five Thousand Eight Hundred
Sixty One Dollars ($5,861.00) up-
on completion of the work.
1. Contractor shall perform said work at a time
and in a manner satisfactory to Railroad’s Division En-
gineer, and Contractor’s bill or bills therefor shall be
submitted in triplicate to said Division Engineer.
2. In the performance of said work, Contractor
shall be deemed and held to be an independent contrac-
tor, and Railroad holds no control over Contractor or its
employees other than that the results to be accomplished
shall be satisfactory to Railroad.
3. Contractor hereby agrees to indemnify, protect
and save harmless Railroad from and against all loss
of or damage to any property whatsoever or injury to or
death of any persons (including the parties hereto and
their respective employees, agents or representatives) ,
and all claims or demands therefor resulting from any
acts or omissions of said Contractor, its agents or em-
ployees, in the execution of the work or in guarding the
same except that Contractor shall not be liable for any
damages to real property in the performance of the work
herein specified where such damages do not result from
accident or from the negligence or carelessness of con-
tractor, its agents or employees. !
*>>
5b
Appendix, A.
4. Contra or shall promptly notify said Division
Engineer of any loss, damage, injury or death arising
out of or in connection with said work.
5. No assignment of this contract shall be valid
for any purpose.
THE BALTIMORE AND OHIO
RAILROAD COMPANY
Vice President
Accepted this 9th day of June, 1975
R. J. DICKEY COMPANY, Inc. (Contractor)
By John Glue, President
If signed on behalf of a corporation or partnership,
the name and title of the person who signing should be
shown.
Note to Contractor: After execution on your behalf,
please forward Railroad’s copy direct to Mr. J. W. Brent,
Chief Engineer, The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Com-
pany, P. O. Box 1800, Huntington, W. Va. 25718.
EXHIBIT “A”
ry
Appendix B.
Appendix B
IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
a
THE BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILROAD
COMPANY,
Vv. No. 77-161
R. J. DICKEY COMPANY, INC.,
Defendant. |
Plaintiff, ; Civil Action
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS of the Pretrial
Conference taken in the above-entitled action on August
21, 1978, beginning at 4:00 p.m., at the United States
District Court, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, before the
Honorable Barron P. McCune, District Judge.
Court Reporter: Denise J. Khorey
APPEARANCES:
For the Plaintiff :
Sharlock, Repcheck, Engel & Mahler
3090 U. S. Steel Building
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219
by Gary F. Sharlock, Esquire
For the Defendant:
Bagley & Weaver
1224 Frick Building
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219
by Joseph P. Bagley, Esquire
Patrick Loughney, Esquire
Also Present:
John C. Benner
Albert Bobersky
7%
7b
Appendix B.
(The following Pretrial Conference, was held on
August 21, 1978, beginning at 4:00 p.m., at the United
States District Court, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, before
the Honorable Barron P. McCune.)
The Court: Let the record show that this is the
time set for a pretrial conference in the civil action at
77-161. It is the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company
versus R. J. Dickey Company. This is a case where the
B&O claims a written contract dated June 9, 1975, with
Dickey which provided that Dickey would install fuel
lines for unloading diesel fuel from tank cars and trucks
at the Glenwood yards of the B&O. According to the
complaint, the contract provided that Dickey would in-
demnify the B&O for damages sustained due to the neg-
ligent acts of Dickey.
The pretrial statement of the plaintiff alleges first
that on April 9, 1976, Dickey’s employees were negligent
in removing certain valves from three loading stations
without capping the openings, and secondly in opening
v?' ves located in the B&O pump house leading to the
tnree uncapped openings, and in closing valves in the
pump house which furnished fuel to a B&O fueling sta-
tion, and finally in failing to notify B&O that the valves
to the fueling station were closed and the valves to the
unloading facilities were open. As I understand it, this
caused the fuel oil leak during which about 155,000
gallons of fuel oil went in the river and had to be cleaned
up; but, the oil loss amounted to $47,000 and the cleanup
costs about $332,000, and the claim is for about $405,000
plus assessment that the Coast Guard made of $5,000.
Now, as I understand it, the defendant counters
that on April 8, 1976, defendant’s employees did close
certain valves, but left the bolts open for the purpose
-%
8b
Appendix B.
of demonstrating to anyone coming into the pump house
that work was to be done on the valves. This apparently
is recited as some kind of notice to anyone coming into
the pump house that the valves were being worked on,
but they were closed, and during the course of the even-
ing B&O employees opened the valves and the oil traveled
into an open sewer, apparently through the pipes which
were up at the bolt, and traveled into the river.
The defendant states that the issues are whether or
not comparative negligence applies—stated another way,
whether the maritime law applies; secondly, whether
contributory negligence applies because they allege there
was insufficient supervision or training in security and
that there was perhaps contributory negligence when
the plaintiff opened the valves, which were apparently
the ones upon which the bolts were loose.
Third, was the defendant negligent of course and
was the negligence the proximate cause of the oil spill?
And next whether B&O violated the rules of the Coast
Guard or the Environmental Protection Agency—but it
is not stated how this would be related to proximate
cause—and, then, whether or not B&O is a proper party.
It does not seem to me that that is of much consequence.
Finally, whether the damages are reasonable in
view of a second oil spill. It is not related in detail what
the second oil spill was, but it is alleged that it occurred
at Outfall 8. And I don’t know from the defendant’s
pretrial statement how that is related to the first oil
spill or whether it is related at all, or whether it was
part of the cleanup or whether it caused part of the
expense.
So it seems to me that the contract is not denied.
It seems to me that the issue raised by the defendant
9b
Appendix B.
of course primarily is whether the defendant was neg-
ligent, whether its negligence was a proximate cause
of the damage; and secondly, whether contributory neg-
ligence or comparative negligence applies. Obviously, the
railroad would have the burden of proving the contract
in the first instance and the negligence of the defendant.
I take it the defendant would have the burden of show-
ing that contributory negligence is there. Now, does
that state what the lawsuit is about, gentlemen?
Mr. Sharlock: From the plaintiff’s standpoint, your
Honor, I think you highlighted the essential issues of the
case and the facts of the case.
Mr. Bagley: With certain corrections, that basi-
cally states what the case is about, yes, your Honor.
The Court: Now, I have attempted to figure out
what valves the employees who have been deposed were
talking about and how it affected the flow of the oil, but
I cannot do it on the basis of what is in the file. At least,
I have not been able to thus far. There is a report of a
consulting engineer that the defendant hired which does
not help much, but it seems to me that somebody first
has to explain the effect of closing the one valve, the
one on which the bolts were opened, and allowing the
other one to remain open.
I gather from the file that the oil could have flowed
two ways, depending upon which pipes were open, and
when the one valve was closed and the other left open,
the oil might have flowed to a place where it was not
intended; but, as I understand it, the real problem is
or is alleged to be that when the Dickey employees
closed the one valve on which the bolts were open it
closed off the flow of oil to a location where diesels were
7%
”
10b
Appendix B.
serviced, and during the night it was necessary to serv-
ice a diesel engine. So the railroad employees opened
that valve and serviced the diesel engine.
As I understand defendant’s contention, when they
opened that valve the diesel flowed to the point where
the engine was serviced. Perhaps it was not closed then,
but it may be the plaintiff’s contention that it was closed
and the oil flowed out through the loosened valve. So
I am not sure what the mechanics were that are alleged
to be the negligence.
It is apparent from the depositions, the ones I have
been able to read, that when the Dickey employees left
the job with the bolts open they did not tell anybody
about that. Whether that is significant, I do not know.
So the point is: Does anybody here know exactly what
is alleged to have happened? Do you have an idea and
can you draw a picture for us? Mr. Sharlock?
Mr. Sharlock: Yes, Judge. We have a working
theory of what occurred—
The Court: Now, what was the—
Mr. Sharlock: —the way the demonstrative may
be, and we respectfully suggest that for trial purposes
we consider a couple of things. One would be a view of
the pump house itself. I think that would in itself cry-
stalize the issues, as to which are the important valves
in the routing of the diesel fuel from the storage tank
to the open stations and also the routing to the diesel
refueling station. If you see it on the site, as I think
all of us here have had an opportunity to do, that will
help a great deal.
The second thing that I recommend—and we have
both worked toward this—is either a model be prepared
11b
Appendia B.
—which it may not be necessary to use a model—or a
flow chart diagram where you can trace the valve num-
bers and correlate it to what the testimony has been.
Now, unfortunately, some of the railroad employees
refer to certain valves using a different numbering sys-
tem than the defendant’s expert has used. So there are
two numbering systems, and I am sure that I understand
the numbering system used by the defendant’s expert,
and I can correlate it with the numbers used by my
clients. So—
The Court: Let me just ask—
Mr. Sharlock: So we can say—
The Court: Let me just ask a couple, simple ques-
tions. Is it your theory that the oil came out through
the loosened valve?
Mr. Sharlock: No.
The Court: Allright. Is it your theory that—
Mr. Sharlock: It went through the valve, but not
through—not in the opening to go through the bolts.
The Court: Well, then, what did the loosened bolts
have to do with it?
Mr. Sharlock: All right. The situation to begin
with, as it affects this lawsuit, is this was an entirely
closed system that—except for the conduct of the de-
fendant—there is nothing our people could have done in
that room that would have caused an oil spill, because
their every outside location was either capped or had a
closed valve on it. There were three stations outdoors
away from the pump house and away from the diesel
refueling station which the defendant’s men cut the re-
|
12b
Appendix B.
moved valves that had been on there. They were to have
capped them, but they did not and all three were left
open. So that is hazard number one, but so far there is
no problem because of two valves inside the pump house
that were to be worked on.
Now, inside the pump house one of the valves was
to be removed. The second valve was to be a change, was
to be made for different routing to the outside. De-
fendant’s employee began the process of opening the
bolts on the valve that led to the three stanchions out-
side. In his deposition, I interpret it that he left the bolts
loose so that our people or anyone coming in would in-
stantly recognize that these valves were loose and be on
notice by virtue of the loose bolts that there was an
open-valve condition. It is our position he also had that
valve open that led to the outside, but still c .r theory is
this should have caused him no trouble.
The Court: Even though he left that valve open?
Mr. Sharlock: Even though that valve is open, it
should not have caused a loss due to the routing used in-
ternally. Now, when he opened the nuts, he had a leakage
of oil which he should not have had. He has got trouble.
He goes to the next valve and closes it. Which valve he
goes to, Iam not positive at this moment. I know which
one he closed, but I am not positive as to whether he
might have closed a second one upstream.
So he shut down our system. So the valves that he
closed, any combination of the valves, one or two valves
that he closed—not only did it protect his work site,
which was the proper thing for him to have done—un-
necessary because the original routing was not—he did
not have to close the valve off. But he chose to close the
ry
13b
Appendix B.
valve, thinking when he broke the bolts or loosened the
nuts to break the valve out of the line, thinking he is
getting oil from the tank, which I do not believe he was.
There was residual oil in the lines, but when he broke
that, he was worried that he was going to get a lot of oil
on top of him, so he shut off the valve. He did not need to
shut that valve off, but he shut it off anyway, but when
he did shut off the valve, that also closed down our diesel
refueling station located some considerable distance
away.
Now,. he did not know what he was doing when he
shut off that valve. Now, our people come in later that
night. They are not getting diesel fuel at the refueling
station. They come in and valves are opened inside the
refueling station. They are testified to by our people.
Now, this has changed the arrangement inside the pump
house, and when they opened the valve at first there was
some oil leakage where the bolts were loose, but just a
minor leakage at that location; and, when the valve at
the diesel engines—that is the control valve on the hose
right at the entrance—when that was opened and we
began to take fuel to the refueling station, the small leak
that was observed inside the pump house stopped. He
heard the meter running. He knew it was flowing. Now,
what he did not know and could not see was that the oil
flowing through the valve that had the bolts loosened,
was oil flowing throughout underground some distance
and then up to the stanchions out of the sight and a dis-
tance away from where our men were located. Oil was
then flowing through and flowed all night until it was
discovered the next day.
The Court: Now, this was not because the bolts
were loose?
7s
14b
Appendix B.
Mr. Sharlock: Wo.
The Court: It was because the valve was opened?
Mr. Sharlock: Yes, sir.
The Court: So actually the loosening of the bolts
has nothing to do with this.
Mr. Sharlock: Well, it has. Mr. Bagley’s argument
is that the loose bolts would have been notice to us, and
our man did notice oil leaking at that valve, but when
we began to deliver diesel fuel to the engines that leak
stopped. So the question may be whether our people,
seeing a leak at the area of those bolts, should have been
on notice that something more dangerous had gone on.
The Court: So is your allegation of negligence that
he opened that valve when he—
Mr. Sharlock: Itis a series of things.
The Court: —when he did not know the operation
of the system?
‘Mr. Sharlock: Oh, yes. That is one of the elements.
The first element is the three outside stanchions that had
valves on them which made the entire system closed, so
that nothing our men did inside should have made any
difference insofar as an oil spill is concerned. There is
no combination of valves they might have turned that
should have caused trouble, but when the defendant cut
off the valves that were outside and did nct cap them,
that set up a hazard. Now, there is a way out—
The Court: By cutting off the valves, he left an
open pipe?
Mr. Sharlock: Yes.
The Court: Isee, and he did not cap those?
7.
15b
Appendiz B.
Mr. Sharlock: He did not cap them.
The Court: Did he intend to cap them at a later
time?
Mr. Sharlock: He was to have capped them later
on, but then the arrangement would have been—they
had valves on them and the system as it is now installed
does not—there is a valve on one and the other two out
of service—
The Court: Did the contract call for his capping
those three pipes after he cut the valves off?
Mr. Sharlock: The contract does not speak to that,
but it is in the depositions. It was understood that they
were to have capped those three stanchions. The con-
tract does not go in any details as to how the work was
to be done.
The Court: Okay. Then your allegation of negli-
gence, as I understand it, is that he took off, three valves
on pipes that led to the outside and left open pipes?
Mr. Sharlock: Yes.
The Court: And then opened the valve on which
he was loosening the bolts?
Mr. Sharlock: And then thinking—
The Court: And then unnecessarily closed valves
leading to the diesel refueling station?
Mr. Sharlock: Yes, and—
The Court: So that when your employees opened
those valves to get fuel during the night and apparently
left them open, the fuel ran out through the uncapped
pipes and eventually into the river?
16b
Appendix B.
Mr. Sharlock: Failing to tell us what had hap-
pened.
The Court: Okay. Next question: Do you agree
that there is a defense of contributory negligence?
Mr. Sharlock: Yes.
The Court: Okay. Do you contend then that this
is a common law negligence and contributory negli-
gence?
Mr. Sharlock: Yes. Well, it is the application of
the indemnity agreement. We are not indemnified
against our own negligence under the indemnity agree-
ment; therefore, if we were negligent, we can only col-
lect half providing the defendant is also negligent.
The Court: Yes. Well, what I mean is this is not
maritime law.
Mr. Sharlock: No, sir. It is not maritime.
The Court: This is strictly common law.
Mr. Sharlock: Common law negligence.
The Court: Common law negligence under the in-
demnity clause of the contract.
Mr. Sharlock: Yes, sir.
The Court: Do you agree with that?
Mr. Bagley: No, not necessarily, your Honor. I
have a question or problem concerning that which I have
listed as the first issue.
The Court: Well, if he concedes that there is con-
tributory negligence, aren’t you better off than you are
under comparative negligence?
7%
17b
Appendix B.
Mr. Bagley: Yes, if he concedes there is contribu-
tory negligence because this has been—
Mr. Sharlock: No, no.
The Court: No, no. If he concedes that the legal
principles to be employed in a charge to the jury is neg-
ligence and contributory negligence, aren’t you better off
than you are under comparative negligence?
Mr. Bagley: Well, possibly that is right, but one
of the problems is that we have not demanded a jury
trial under the assumption—and possibly I should have
demanded one anyhow. I did not under the assumption
that the admiralty maritime law would apply to this
case, since it certainly involves the river.
The Court: Well, you could ask for a jury trial
anytime.
Mr. Bagley: Well, then, I would ask for leave of
the Court to demand a jury trial at this time. I realize
it is discretionary with the Court, if the Court is going
to rule that the law of Pennsylvania applies. Then, we
have the contributory negligence theory.
The Court: Oh, no.
Mr. Bagley: On the other hand, if the Court—
The Court: No, no. Iam not making any ruling on
what applies. On seeking guidance here, it seemed to me
when I picked up the file that it was the indemnification
clause in the contract that is at issue, and Mr. Sharlock
concedes that in order to collect on that clause he has
got to show that you were negligent, and he admits that
contributory negligence may be a defense. So—
Mr. Sharlock: Only to half the claim. Contributory
18b
Appendix B.
negligence in the defense of suit on the indemnity, if we
are both negligent, I collect half. If the defendant only
is negligent and we are free from negligence, then I col-
lect everything. But if we are—
Mr. Bagley: Let’s—
Mr. Sharlock: —both negligent, I collect half un-
der the indemnity position.
Mr. Bagley: Well, that is a new theory to me. I
would like to know what authority Mr. Sharlock has for
such a theory as that.
Mr. Sharlock: Pennsylvania contractual indemnity
proof law.
Mr. Bagley: This is the first time it has been
brought up, Judge, and I would have to look into that as
to whether or not that is a correct statement of the con-
tractual agreement.
The Court: Well, let me approach it the other way.
What authority do you have that this would be mari-
time?
Mr. Bagley: Well, we have done some research on
it. Mr. Loughney is associated with me, and we have
been doing some research on it, and we are willing to
concede that it is a close question as to whether or not
it would be; and, really, I suppose what it amounts to is,
from the research that we have done in the different
jurisdictions, that each case pretty well stands on its
own merits as to which law would be applied.
In this case, the actual spill and the actions of the
parties involved occurred on the land away from the
river some distance, but then the spill went into the
19b
Appendix B.
river, into an interstate waterway covered completely
by the Coast Guard and the EPA and also the DER, as
far as the land is concerned, so that I think it is a close
question. What I was going to suggest is just possibly
that. This contract question should be scheduled for an
argument whereby we could have the opportunity to
present briefs and argue to the Court either way. Pos-
sibly we would resolve it in the meantime among our-
selves, rather than have the Court try to make a cursory
decision under the pretrial conciliation. That way, we
could present our briefs including the contract question
that Mr. Sharlock has now raised.
The Court: Well, that might be a good suggestion
if they are really legal issues.
Mr. Bagley: Thatis right, your Honor.
The Court: I do not know that they are. I cannot
see any maritime Jaw in this since the parties were land-
based parties entering into an ordinary contract. The
only jurisdiction that the Coast Guard got was after the
oil got into the river. They had the jurisdiction under
statutes, I guess jointly with the EPA, of ordering a
cleanup and what penalty would be assessed, but I don’t
think that gives maritime jurisdiction to the underlying
factors. I may be wrong, and I imagine that it is true
that you have a defense of contributory negligence, but
I think the law is that under an indemnification agree-
ment it does not go the whole way. At common law, con-
tributory negligence would be a defense to everything.
Mr. Sharlock: That’s right.
The Court: But under indemnification I believe
that both parties are negligent and recovery is only 50
percent. Are there any other questions of law?
7%
20b
Appendix B.
Mr. Bagley: I have listed the issues in my pretrial
statement, which the Court already went over, and the
only other one would be No. 2 which is really not all that
important, and that is whether or not the B&O Railroad
is a proper party to be the plaintiff.
The Court: I do not care whether it is B&O or
Chessie, and I suppose if B&O is not really the proper
party, they could amend anyway.
Mr. Bagley: Possibly. I was thinking of the real
party in interest when I listed that as an issue, and if
you look at all the depositions, I have made that an issue
in all the depositions, trying to find out what the corpo-
rate structure was of this company and never did really
find out.
The Court: Well, we are going to assure you that
Chessie cannot recover twice. In other words, if B&O
either wins or loses, that will be the end of it. You can-
not come in and claim that B&O was not the right party
then; can you?
Mr. Sharlock: Well, I will state for the record what
the situation is as far as that is concerned. The Chessie
System, Inc., is a holding company. One of its subsidi-
aries is the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company. The
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company and the Chesa-
peake and Ohio Railroad Company and several other
companies do business under a logo known as Chessie
System. That is the corporate situation, but the Balti-
more and Ohio Railroad Company owns the property
and is a real party in interest in this matter.
The Court: ‘Well, did B&O pay the bill?
Mr. Sharlock: We did.
?%
21b
Appendix B.
The Court: Okay. They paid the contractors who
cleaned up the river?
Mr. Sharlock: Yes, sir.
The Court: Inotice that—
Mr. Bagley: Your Honor, please—
Mr. Sharlock: Do you have any questions about
that, Joe?
Mr. Bagley: Yes, because they are a wholly owned
subsidiary apparently of the Chessie System.
Mr. Sharlock: No, no, not Chessie System. Chessie
System, Inc.
Mr. Bagley: Of the Chessie System, Inc., and I
never have been able to find out in all the depositions I
took the answers to those questions. As I am saying,
nobody locally seems to be in a position to know the
corporate structure.
Mr. Sharlock: Well, don’t ask plumbers.
The Court: Well, is it really a subsidiary instead
of a division of Chessie? If it is a subsidiary, then it has
a corporate character of its own.
Mr. Bagley: Idon’t know, your Honor.
Mr. Sharlock: It is a subsidiary and I think, if
counsel cares to check on the second floor of the Frick
Building in the financial library, all that is spelled out in
the various encyclopedias that are there. I have looked
at it a number of times. It is correct as to the corporate
structure.
_The Court: Well, Standard & Poor’s would give
you the—
A |
Appendix B.
Mr. Sharlock: Standard & Poor’s, yes.
The Court: —the corporate structure.
Mr. Bagley: You asked, your Honor, if there were
any other legal questions and I think there is another
one, and that is the effect of the violation of the rules
and regulations of the EPA or the Coast Guard and
whether or not, if there were such violations, they were
proximate cause of the spill or were related to the spill,
whether or not they would constitute negligence per se,
and I think that is a very important legal determination.
I think that is a question for the Court. I think that
is very important because the research that we have
done and the material we have indicates that in oil spills
or fuel spills the violation of those rules and regulations
are to be considered as negligence per se, which would
establish in itself the contributory negligence of the
plaintiff.
The Court: Well, that may be, but your pretrial
has not set forth what the regulations were or how they
were violated.
Mr. Bagley: Well, one of the reasons for that,
Judge, was I just got today—and I have demanded on
numerous occasions—Mr. Sharlock in his defense has
demanded some things from me too, which he did not
get until just recently--was the SPCC regulations or
the plan that has to be approved by the EPA, and with-
out that I could not make a determination whether or
not there were violations of the rules.
I will state, as we both know from the Coast Guard
reports, that the plaintiff was fined $5,000 by the Coast
Guard for violations of various other regulations. Now,
23b
Appendix B.
we do have that one. There was a violation of that.
Without the SPCC, I was unable to determine how much
of this they violated. For example, they have to have a
dike, which they did have around this tank. They have
to remove any oil, or possibility of, into open sewers by |
so many feet. I could not determine that, and the SPCC
plan has to be approved by the EPA, which they did
have and apparently was approved.
Now, whether or not it was violated, I could not tell
and include in my pretrial statement because I just got
it from Mr. Sharlock today.
The Court: Well, in other words, there was a list-
ing of regulations governing the diesel pumping system. —
Mr. Sharlock: There are regulations that require
the plaintiff to submit a plan for this type of problem,
which was done. I don’t think that—what you received
is not the regulation, but the plan which the railroad
prepared in compliance with the regulation.
Mr. Bagley: That’s right.
The Court: Was it approved?
Mr. 8harlock: Yes.
Mr. Bagley: Yes. Now, whether that—
The Court: By the EPA?
Mr. Sharlock: Yes.
Mr. Bagley: Whether that plan was violated or
not, I could not determine because I just received it be-
fore we walked in the door—
Mr. Sharlock: Well, now, I think—
Mr. Bagley: Of course, I have not studied it yet,
7%
240
Appendix B.
which is involved in there. We do know, however, there
was a fining of $5,000 levied by the Coast Guard which
also leads me back to the first question of maritime law,
when they imposed a fine on the plaintiff for violation of
various federal regulations regarding the storage of oil
or fuel.
The Court: Well, you may have something if you
could show that the plan was violated and that was a
proximate cause of the damage.
Mr. Bagley: That’s right, your Honor.
The Court: But—
Mr. Bagley: Icould not do that until today because
I did not receive it until just now.
Mr. Sharlock: Well, I think on this particular sub-
ject I am sure the Court is aware that anyone who al-
lows certain categories of chemicals to enter the rivers
in this area is fined, irrespective of negligence, irrespec-
tive of care, irrespective of good faith actions taken by
property owners, and so those fines are not at all related
to any negligence.
The Court: It seemed to be a small fine.
Mr. Sharlock: If you are fined, no matter what
happens, even if it is the fault of a third party—
The Court: It seems to be a small fine in view of
the magnitude of the problem.
Mr. Bagley: That’s right.
The Court: I would have thought the Coast Guard
would be outraged.
Mr. Sharlock: Well, I would think what we should
do, then, is to bring representatives of the EPA in who
|
25b
Appendiz B.
did not sue us for polluting the rivers in this area and I
have been through situations where there was uninten-
tional oil spills and, despite the good will and the efforts
of the railroad to control matters like this, we have had
suits against us for a couple hundred thousand dollars
and where no negligence is involved. So I am sure counsel
will explore that issue very thoroughly.
Mr. Bagley: That is a shocking statement.
The Court: Well, let me—
Mr. Bagley: But I was only putting out to the
Court that I think that is another legal argument for
the Court.
The Court: Well, we will give you time necessary
to develop it, but let me raise another question here. You
dispute the reasonableness of the damages. Is that a
serious dispute? In other words, it seemed to me that
the bulk of the damages are composed of two items:
The oil that was lost and the contractor’s charge to clean
it up. Now, I would assume that the contractor charged
the going price, and B&O apparently had to get the work
done and paid the bill. Do you have any real dispute that
the bill was unreasonable?
Mr. Bagley: Yes, your Honor. I think that there
are numerous items—of course, there are very lengthy
invoices that are either not necessary or were not nec-
essary, such as purchasing new boats to go out-in the
river. Maybe they were. I am raising this as an issue, as
to whether or not these were necessary to the cleanup
operations.
One of the major questions again involves the Coast
Guard, and my understanding is that there are two ways
26b
Appendix B.
of doing this. One is for the plaintiff, being the railroad,
to have volunteered to go ahead and have this cleanup
done, which they so did; or, the other way to do it is to
turn it over to the Coast Guard and let them do it.
Mr. Sharlock: You do not have enough coverage
to let them do it. Excuse me, Mr. Bagley. That is a fact.
Mr. Bagley: Well, I think that the Coast Guard
would seriously dispute that, and the reason we have
listed them as witnesses—one of the reasons beside their
investigation—is exactly that reason as it relates to
damages because apparently Mr. Sharlock does not have
much faith in our Coast Guard and fines to begin with,
which shocks me—why they would levy a fine for no
reason—and even less respect for their ability to do this
type of work or to have it done at a much lesser price
than some private contractor who obviously, knowing he
has an emergency situation, will take advantage of the
situation.
So, yes, we seriously dispute the amount of the
damages.
The Court: Okay. Going back to legal questions
then, how much time do you want to determine whether
the plan was violated and whether it was the proximate
cause of the oil spill?
Mr. Bagley: Well, of course we always have pres-
sures this time of the year. We start getting into the
actual trials at Common Pleas Court and other jurisdic-
tions the first week in September, so I would request 30
days.
The Court: Okay. No problem. Put this on the pre-
trial transcript. We will give defendant 30 days to en-
27b
Appendiz B.
gage in any investigation he wishes concerning the EPA
plan, if they need to file a supplemental pretrial state-
ment—
Mr. Bagley: That is the SPCC plan, your Honor.
The Court: All right. —at the end of the 30 days.
Furthermore, if the defendant really wishes to brief the
issue whether maritime law governs, he may do so with-
in the same 30 days and file any motion to bring the
issue to a head. He may also brief the indemnification
issue; to wit, whether contributory negligence would
limit recovery to 50 percent as Mr. Sharlock contends or
not.
Mr. Sharlock is then extended 30 days at the end of
the first 30 days where he can reply to the motions.
The reason I am giving you the 60 days is, if this is
to be a jury trial, I will not be trying it anyhow in 60
days. Now, do you really want a jury trial? If you make
the motion, I will grant it.
Mr. Bagley: Yes, your Honor.
The Court: Because I cannot deny it even if I
wanted to.
Mr. Sharlock: I think it has been waived by not
demanding the jury trial with the complaint, and I made
that decision when we filed our complaint, not to demand
a jury trial. Due to the nature of the claim, the amount
of the claim and respective impressions that the parties
would have on a jury trial, I did not demand a jury trial.
I think it is waived.
The Court: I do not think I can deny him a jury
trial. I do not particularly want to, but I will say I don’t
think I can deny it anyhow.
28b
Appendix B.
Mr. Sharlock: I think it is waived, your Honor.
The Court: Well, you can present your brief on
that within 30 days, if you want to.
Mr. Sharlock: Sure.
The Court: But I do not think I can deny anyone
a jury trial that requests it at pretrial.
Mr. Bagley: Well, I will so make the demand at
this time, your Honor, for a jury trial in the event that
the Court determines that the law of Pennsylvania ap-
plies and not the maritime law. If the Court determines
that maritime law applies, my understanding of mari-
time law is that it is automatically non-jury anyhow, so
therefore it would be a moot question.
The Court: It seems to me you are arguing an in-
consistent position. You are arguing that maritime law
applies, but you do want a jury trial.
Mr. Bagley: Ican well realize why the Court would
feel that it is inconsistent, but I do not believe that it
necessarily is. What I am saying is: If that is the deter-
mination of the Court, of course I am satisfied with that
and that is why we did not demand a jury trial to begin
with. Now, if on the other hand the Court determines
that the Pennsylvania law should apply, then I would
request a jury trial.
The Court: Well, the Pennsylvania law I am talk-
ing about is not the new comparative negligence act;
you understand?
Mr. Bagley: That’s right, your Honor, because this
was before that statute.
The Court: Well, even if it was after the statute,
I don’t think it would have any effect on this case be-
cause this is not an ordinary negligence action.
i
29b
Appendix B.
Mr. Sharlock: This isa suit on a contract.
The Court: This is not double indemnity. This is
really a breach of contract action.
Mr. Sharlock: That’s right.
Mr. Bagley: Well, Ido not want to take the Court’s
time now to go into that contract because you have
given us 30 days to make our determination and file our
brief concerning the contract. I wonder if the relevancy
of the contract in this particular issue—when you are
talking about indemnification for negligence, well then
they still have to prove negligence, and the only rele-
vancy would be unnecessary indemnification, and one of
the matters—which does not come up legally, I suppose,
but I may as well tell the Court—that I will have to
determine is the carrier with contractual liability in that
event, which has come as somewhat of a surprise to me
here today; and, what I am talking about is that, if
there is liability for 50 percent, that is solely on the
basis of the indemnification contract, and this company
that I represent—being Northwestern National Insur-
ance Group and Crum & Forster—does not have con-
tractual coverage, then we are leaving the defendant
without any insurance.
The Court: Well, you may be.
Mr. Bagley: That is a matter I will have to get
into also.
. The Court: Well, you may be leaving them with-
out insurance depending upon how their policy reads, I
suppose. You raised that, didn’t you, in your pretrial
statement, that there may not be?
7%
7%
30b
Appendix B.
Mr. Bagley: That was for a different reason, your
Honor. 7 :
The Court: In the interrogatories rather than the
pretrial statement?
Mr. Bagley: Right, in the answers to interroga-
tories, because there is an exclusion under the policy
dealing with railroads. Any work done on railroads,
which I have quoted the language, and of course ob-
viously you have already read it—but that is an entirely
different issue than the contractual liability insurance
under a general liability policy.
The Court: You are thinking that maybe in answer
to the question: Does defendant’s insurers contest cov-
erage afforded by its policy of insurance and, if so, state
the reason for any reservation of rights? You answered
yes. I take it that means yes, they do contest enforce-
ment of the policy provided it is understood and agreed
that this policy excludes coverage to any repair or any
contractual agreements to any railroads.
Mr. Bagley: That’s right, your Honor.
The Court: Maybe you do not have any insurance
at all here.
Mr. Bagley: This is what I am saying to you. Now,
that was really put in there on the basis of an ordinary
negligence situation. As I understand this pretrial con-
ference, what I am getting out of it is the plaintiff is
limiting the theory to a right under the contract for
indemnification.
Mr. Sharlock: No, sir. There is a suit on the con-
tract and also a suit sounding in negligence.
31b
Appendiz B.
That is why, if you will notice, my pretrial state-
ment specifically spells out two separate theories.
Mr. Bagley: Well, now, if you have the one, can
you have the other?
Mr. Sharlock: Yes, sir.
Mr. Bagley: Where does that put us in?
Mr. Sharlock: It puts you in coverage. That’s what
it does.
Mr. Bagley: With respect to the insurance?
Mr. Sharlock: Ihave both—
Mr. Bagley: Now, I am looking at the verdict, Mr.
Sharlock. If the verdict is for the plaintiff against the
defendant solely on the basis of the contract—
Mr. Sharlock: It could find for both reasons.
Mr. Bagley: No. Then it would have to be for the
full amount. If the verdict should be for 50 percent be-
cause of the indemnification contract and the Court
should so rule, legally under your theory then you do
not have any insurance coverage.
The Court: Well, you have got 30 days to file any
motions you want to file and Mr. Sharlock has 30 days,
and let me go off—
Mr. Sharlock: Your Honor, we have requested cer-
tain reports and photographs referred to in Dr. Hocken-
berry’s report which Mr. Bagley has agreed to furnish
us. Upon receipt of those, I would like to take Dr. Hock-
enberry’s deposition. Now, depending on whether this
case is going to be tried before a jury or not, it would
give me some guidance as to whether I should use a
A |
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32b
Appendix B.
model of the piping system or schematic drawing of the
piping system. So I would like to reserve the right to go
either way, and I do not think that will delay the trial
any.
The Court: Wewill give you the right to—
Mr. Sharlock: But, to explain that, I may need one
of our persons who is already listed as a witness, who
would be explaining it and interpreting it. So that I feel
in proper compliance with the rules, I should have a
written report and will furnish you a copy of that report
as soon as it is prepared in that connection.
Finally, we have been attempting to locate a former
employee of the defendant, a Mr. Sunder—S-u-n-d-e-r—
and if he can be located, we would want leave to take his
deposition. But as of now Mr. Bagley has assured me
that his client cannot find him or does not know where
he is, and we have been unable to locate him, but we are
going to continue our efforts. If we do snag him, I
would like to take his deposition.
Mr. Bagley: Well, I have listed in the answers to
interrogatories in front of the Court the last known
address of Mr. Sunder that we have, and that is all we
know about him. He does not work for the company any
more. He is gone.
The Court: Well—
Mr. Bagley: If he is located, I have no objection
to his deposition as a witness.
Mr. Sharlock: Okay.
Mr. Bagley: Now, but to Dr. Hockenberry’s depo-
sition, he is our expert. The plaintiff has not chosen to
>.
33b
Appendix B.
have any expert, and his deposition would have to be
limited to only factual observations. He would not be
permitted to ask Dr. Hockenberry any opinion questions
or otherwise. And Mr. Sharlock already has all of that
in his report which is quite detailed and very thick, to
attest to the defendant’s pretrial statement.
It is the same category as taking a doctor’s deposi-
tion, the doctor of the plaintiff so to speak or a doctor
of the defendant, and he does not have an absolute right
to ask him any questions, but just probe questions and
not getting into any opinions and just asking him for
factual observations only, all of which he already has.
So, therefore, I would object to the deposition of Dr.
Hockenberry and I do not object to Mr. Sunder’s, if they
can find him.
Mr. Sharlock: With reference to Dr. Hockenberry’s
deposition, it was received not too long ago and just
before we all were going on vacations, quite a compre-
hensive report which I have pored through a number of
_ times and have forwarded to my people for analysis. Un-
fortunately, I do not have a report back from them, and
there is some questions in my mind about what Dr.
Hockenberry is referring to. I would like leave to take
his deposition, and I believe under federal discovery
rules, unlike our Common Pleas rules, I am permitted to
ask discovery questions. I would like the Court to rule
on it, if the Court allows me to take his deposition.
The Court: Well, why don’t you get the photo-
graphs that you are going to get from Mr. Bagley? If
you want to take his deposition then—you may not want
to after you get all the factual information.
Mr. Sharlock: That may well be.
7%
34b
Appendix B.
The Court: And if you are in disagreement about
the deposition, I will settle the issue if you want to come
in.
Mr. Sharlock: Thank you.
The Court: I have an idea you can agree on it.
You can certainly take the deposition of the other em-
ployee if you can find him. We will give you that leave,
and as far as that is concerned, during this 60 days that
you gentlemen are going to file supplemental pretrial
statements, if there is any discovery that is important to
either of you, I take it you could engage in it.
Mr. Sharlock: Thank you, Judge.
The Court: As long as it is not burdensome. Any-
thing else?
Mr. Sharlock: No.
Mr. Bagley: Nothing, your Honor.
(Whereupon, at 5:05 p.m. the pretrial conference
was concluded. )
35b
Appendia B.
REPORTER’S CERTIFICATE
I, Denise J. Khorey, Court Reporter, do hereby cer-
tify that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript
made from my stenotype notes of the proceedings held
on August 21, 1978, at 4:00 p.m., United States District
Court, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, before the Honorable
Barron P. McCune.
DENISE J. KHOREY
Court Reporter
September 15, 1978
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.