Petition — United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission v. Steven Sholly
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Office-Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
80-1656
APR 2 1961
No.
=.
Supreme Court of the United State
OcTOBER TERM, 1980
METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY, JERSEY CENTRAL
Power & LIGHT COMPANY AND PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRIC
COMPANY,
Petitioners,
V.
PEOPLE AGAINST NUCLEAR ENERGY, STEVEN SHOLLY AND
DONALD E. HOssLer,
Respondents.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
MARK AUGENBLICK
Attorney of Record
GEORGE F. TROWBRIDGE
Jay E. SILBERG
SHAW, PITTMAN, PoTTs & TROWBRIDGE
1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 822-1000
Counsel for Petititoners
PRESS OF BYRON S. ADAMS PRINTING, INC., WASHINGTON, D.C,
i
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the court of appeals erred in ruling that the
Nuclear Kegulatory Commission must hold a prior hear-
ing on a proposed amendment to a nuclear power plant
license whenever an interested party requests one, not-
withstanding a correct finding by the Commission that
the amendment presents ‘‘no significant hazards con-
sideration’’?
Supreme Court Rule 28.1 Statement:
General Public Utilities Corporation Parent
Metropolitan Edison Company Subsidiary
Jersey Central Power & Light Company Subsidiary
Pennsylvania Electric Company Subsidiary
GPU Service Corporation Subsidiary
eee
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
QUIET PRATINTUD 656s CS 6 écc cee cs dada he buNaue i
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DE TONED isis. oN SV ERA CADE R rte eed wchbuks 2
DORRIT OO TES CAMB os i Sk See hie eee hex bs 3
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ..............200005 6
Rs ou Wa smh nines oe oalieh eee Owe bs a eee wk wis 17
Appenpbix A: Order Of The Court Of Apes Denying
Suggestion For Rehearing En Banc...... la
APPENDIX B: Order Of The Court Of Appeals Denying
UNE Sin oh aie 4G 6 kw AMER Oe Ea Ces 19a
Appenpbix C: Opinion Of The Court Of Appeals And
FE iis v's PEST os eh ee Pe be abe 2la
APPENDIX D: NRC Order For Temporary Modification
Of License Dated June 12, 1980 ........ 45a
APPENDIX E: NRC Memorandum And Order Dated
FU Ads BOOO 0 8s CUO Re ee thes Sla
APPENDIX F: Exhibit A To Petition For Rehearing And
Suggestion For Rehearing En Banc...... 6la
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES: PAGE
Brooks v. Atomic Energy Commission, 476 F.2d 924
GA Os RUGS Win ah abbabtacheve coeands eo eons e 11
E.E.O.C. v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., ____. U.S.
SE Tees COE CEDURE aes aaa Eke vo seen ve 13
General Electric Company (Vallecitos Boiling Water
Reactor), 1 AEC 541 (1960) .............ceeeeeee 8
Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56 (1948) .......... eee eee 11
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Company,
BOP UB FeO IO hi 60k ASA ir sa ere heces teveds 12
North Alabama ress, Inc. v. United States, 585 F.2d
PUR Tals, COTM i a vine So cinGin 8K oee aaa: Wane we he 12
Northern Indiana Public Service Co. v. Porter County
Gen of the Izaak Walton League, 423 U.S. 12 -
Power Reactor Development Co. v. International Union
of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-
BER, SOT MP: SOO TIONED occd dv eeeevbeens sc because 13
Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962).... 12
Sholly v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, F.2d
A. CE, os chp ebe meee Ohi es oceans 2
Union of Concerned Scientists v. Atomic Energy Com-
mission, 499 F.2d 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1974)........... 11
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation v. National
Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978)... 7, 16
Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956) ..... 12
STATUTES AND RULES:
Ae Io 65.6 4d dae 0 5 cia ena s Veendeace de phen hh 12
Be REED o's «6 G4 1k p Sahn we Dp ERE Ves bane 2
es Sa NID 5 i iin Sin’ nas Mo AAO ROR ROCs Ceghage 15
Se Ware RE a 6 ab 65d 00'S Uh CR EGCEL EMO 00 00 deen 15
Vv
Table of Authorities Continued
STATUTES AND RULES: PAGE
RRM MCS | o's gue 02 oS Rede aA w OOH REEL Oe CaaS 4
Mes AMO ee Cede cee hN ee eNea code bakes cceen oils 12
A SD ses chu ewkkuws be cemeeee denne’ 2
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §551 et seq..... 6
Pub. L. 85-256, 71 Stat. $76 (1957)... ccc cree ccs ense 8
Pub. L. 87-615, 76 Stat. 409 (1962) ..........ceeeenee 7
Pub. L. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1233 (1974) ..........ceee eee 9
mi Menweateon 50.59 (ISG) ks i eee boo iiciae cba tats 9, 10
MISCELLANEOUS:
Staff of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 87th
Cong., Ist Sess., Improving the AEC Regulatory
Process, Joint Comm. Print (1961)............... 9, 10
AEC Regulatory Problems: Hearing Before the Subcom-
mittee on Legislation of the Joint Comm. on
Atomic Energy, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962)........ 8, 10
S. Rep. No. 1677, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
[1962] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2207........ 10, 13
27 Federal Register 5491 (1962) ................000005- 9
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1980
No.
METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY, JERSEY CENTRAL
Power & LIGHT COMPANY AND PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRIC
COMPANY,
Petitioners,
Vv.
PEOPLE AGAINST NUCLEAR ENERGY, STEVEN SHOLLY AND
DONALD E. HOssLer,
Respondents.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Metropolitan Edison Company, Jersey Central
Power & Light Company and Pennsylvania Electric
Company (‘‘petitioners’’) hereby petition for a writ of
certiorari to review the judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
entered in this case.'
' In the court below, party-respondents who are not named in the
above caption include the following: The United States of America,
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, John Ahearne, Vic-
tor Gilinsky, Richard T. Kennedy, Joseph M. Hendrie and Peter A.
Bradford.
2
OPINIONS BELOW
The orders of the court of appeals denying the peti-
tion for rehearing and the suggestion for rehearing en
banc, with a dissenting statement filed by four Judges,
(App. A and B, pp. la-19a, infra) have not been
reported. The panel decision of the court of appeals
(App. C, pp. 21a-44a) also has not been reported.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeais was entered
on November 19, 1980. The appellate court’s orders de-
nying rehearing and rehearing en banc (App. A, p. 2a;
App. B, p. 19a), were entered on March 4, 1981. The
jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.
§1254(1).
STATUTE INVOLVED
Section 189(a) of the Atomic Energy Act (the
“‘Act’’), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §2239(a), provides in
relevant part:
In any proceeding under this chapter, for the
granting, suspending, revoking, or amending of any
license or construction permit *** the Commission
shall grant a hearing upon the request of any person
whose interest may be affected by the proceeding,
and shall admit any such person as a party to such
proceeding. The Commission shall hold a hearing
after thirty days’ notice and publication once in the
Federal Register, on each application *** for a con-
struction permit for a facility *** [T]he Commission
may, in the absence of a request therefor by any
person whose interest may be affected, issue *** an
amendment to an operating license without a hear-
ing, but upon thirty days’ notice and publication
once in the Federal Register of its intent to do so.
The Commission may dispense with such thirty
days’ notice and publication with respect to any ap-
3
plication for *** an amendment to an operating
license upon a determination by the Commission
that the amendment involves no significant hazards
consideration.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On March 28, 1979, a serious nuclear accident oc-
curred at Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2
(‘*TMI-2’’), resulting in the accumulation of radioactive
krypton gas in the reactor containment building.
Removal of the gas was necessary before further decon-
tamination and cleanup of the facility could be
undertaken.
In the year following the accident, the Nuclear
Reguiatory Commission (‘‘the Commission’’) prepared
and issued first a Draft and then a Final Environmental
Assessment on decontamination of the TMI-2 reactor
containment building atmosphere. These documents
evaluated various alternatives to accomplish decon-
tamination in light of over eight hundred written com-
ments received from individuals and organizations,
statements made at public hearings, meetings held with
representatives of citizen groups in the area around
TMI-2, and the advice of Federal, State and local
government agencies and scientists having expertise with
regard to the subject of decontamination and related
matters. The Final Environmental Assessment concluded
that decontamination of the reactor building atmosphere
was essential, that all the alternative means for ac-
complishing decontamination would have a negligible im-
pact on the public health, and that a controlled release
of the containment atmosphere to the outside environ-
ment (‘‘purging’’) was the most desirable alternative and
therefore the recommended course of action.
4
The Commission reviewed the Final Environmental
Assessment at two public meetings and at one meeting
with the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
(“‘ACRS’’), a prestigious independent panel charged with
reviewing Commission licensing actions for their poten-
tial safety implications. See, 42 U.S.C. §2039. These
deliberations resulted in unanimous agreement that purg-
ing the reactor containment building atmosphere was the
best way to eliminate the krypton gas, and that the
physical health and environmental impacts from purging
would be negligible.
The Commission ther issued two Orders on June
12, 1980. One, entitled ‘‘Order For Temporary
Modification of License’’, made a temporary modifica-
tion to the TMI-2 license to permit purging to occur at a
faster rate than the plant’s Technical Specifications then
aliowed, but without increasing the radioactive dose to
any member of the public. Appendix D, pp. 45a-49a.
The other Order, entitled ‘‘Memorandum and Order’’,
authorized purging to be conducted starting 10 days
from the date of the Order. Appendix E, pp. 51la-60a.
The Order for Temporary Modification of License
was made effective immediately. That Order included a
finding that the license amendment it authorized
presented no significant hazards consideration within the
meaning of Section 189(a) of the Act. Appendix D at p.
47a. The Order also provided that a hearing could be
sought within 30 days by any party whcse interest might
be affected, but a request for a hearing would not stay
the effectiveness of the Order. Jd. at p. 48a.
Respondents filed a petition for review of the two
Orders with the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit. Their petition sought to
suspend the effectiveness of the Orders and further
5
sought a declaratory judgment that amendments to the
TMI-2 operating license required notice and a prior hear-
ing. The court of appeals denied respondents’ request for
temporary relief, which precipitated a flurry of motions
and petitions filed with the Courts of Appeals for both
the District of Columbia Circuit and the Third Circuit,
in which respondents sought to enjoin the scheduled
purging of the TMI-2 reactor containment building. All
motions for injunctive relief were denied, and the actions
in the two Circuits were consolidated in the District of
Columbia Circuit.
Purging at TMI-2 began on June 28 and was com-
pleted on July 11, 1980. It resulted in off-site radioactive
doses even lower than anticipated and well within all
permissible dose limits set forth in applicable Commis-
sion regulations, the restrictions set in the TMI-2
operating license, and the requirements of the June 12
Order.
The consolidated review petitions went forward on
respondents’ request for a declaratory judgment that the
Commission had deprived them of their statutory right
to notice and a prior hearing on the TMI-2 license
amendment and the Order authorizing purging. On
November 19, 1980, a panel of the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit held, in a per curiam
decision, that under Section 189(a) of the Act the Com-
mission ‘‘is required to hold a hearing on license amend-
ments whenever interested parties request one.’’ Appen-
dix C, p. 44a. The court was of the view that respond-
ents had requested a hearing.? Therefore, under the
court’s construction of the statute, the Commission
? The court of appeals held that ‘‘petitioners’ continued interest
in — and opposition to — the actions of the NRC at TMI-2 clearly
constituted a request for a hearing.’’ App. C at p. 39a, n.25.
6
was required to hold a hearing prior to making the
Orders effective.
Petitions for rehearing by petitioners and the Com-
mission, and petitioners’ suggestion for rehearing en
banc, were denied by the court of appeals on March 4,
1981. Appendix A and B at pp. la-19a. Four Judges
dissented from the denial of the suggestion for rehearing
en banc and filed a 15 page ‘‘Statement On Denial of
Rehearing En Banc.’’ Appendix A at pp. 3a-17a.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
The court of appeals below decided an important
question of federal law, namely whether the Commission
is required under Section 189(a) of the Act to hold a
prior hearing on a proposed amendment to a nuclear
power plant operating license upon request, notwithstan-
ding that the amendment has no health or safety
significance. The court of appeals’ decision requires the
attention of this Court, since it construes a federal
statute in a manner that is directly contrary to the intent
of Congress, that conflicts with a prior judicial construc-
tion of the same provision, that results in an anomalous
procedure which offends both the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act (“‘APA’’), 5 U.S.C. §551 ef seqg., and fun-
damental notions of due process, and that flies in the
face of the interpretation consistently given to the statute
by the agency charged with administering it.
If allowed to stand, the decision below will throw
the Commission’s regulatory process back to the paralyz-
ed state that prompted Congress to amend the Act in
1962 to add the very ‘‘no significant hazards considera-
tion’ language which the Commission invoked here. The
practical result of the decision will be to force the closing
of nuclear power plants throughout the nation, without
7
compensating benefits to the health and safety of the
public. Review by this Court is therefore imperative.
1. Section 189(a) of the Act does not require a man-
datory prior hearing on every amendment to a nuclear
power plant license simply because one is requested. Sec-
tion 189(a) provides that licensing actions for nuclear
power reactors fall into three categories:
(1) construction permits, which require a man-
datory hearing after thirty days notice and publica-
tion in the Federal Register (second sentence);
(2) operating licenses or amendments to construc-
tion permits or operating licenses involving signifi-
cant safety issues, which do not require a prior
hearing if none is requested after thirty days notice
and publication, but do require a hearing if one is
requested by an interested party (first and third
sentence); and
(3) amendments to construction permits or
operating licenses with respect to which the Com-
mission has made a determination that the amend-
ment ‘‘involves no significant hazards considera-
tion,’’ which require neither notice nor a prior hear-
ing (fourth sentence).’
This construction follows from a fair reading of Section
189(a) and is inescapable when the statute is read in light
of its legislative history, particularly the purpose sought
to be served by the amendments which added the ‘‘no
significant hazards consideration’’ language at issue here.
Section 189(a) reached its present form in the 1962
amendments to the Act, Pub. L. 87-615, 76 Stat. 409
> The complex process established by the Act and Commission
regulations for the licensing of commercial nuclear power reactors
is described in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519, 525-527 (1978).
(1962). As first enacted in 1954, Section 189(a) contained
only the first sentence of what is now the text of the
statute. In 1957, the Act was amend ed to add essentially
the second sentence, which established a mandatory
public hearing at the construction permit stage of licens-
ing a nuclear power reactor. Pub. L. 85-256, 71 Stat.
576 (1957).
The Commission initially interpreted the 1957
amendments to require it to give notice and to hold a
hearing every time an operating license or a construction
permit was granted or amended.‘ The Commission’s in-
terpretation resulted in an inordinate number of un-
necessary hearings,’ a situation which both Congress and
the Commission rapidly came to regard as unacceptable.
The Commission began to grapple with the problem
in the Vallecitos proceeding, General Electric Company
(Vallecitos Boiling Water Reactor), 1 AEC 541 (1960).
There, the Commission authorized a simplified pro-
cedure whereby a license amendment found by the Com-
mission staff to present ‘‘no significant new hazards con-
siderations’”” could be approved directly by the staff
without prior notice or opportunity for a hearing. Copies
of the “‘no significant new hazards consideration’’ fin-
ding and the amendment authorization were filed in the
public record of the proceeding so that interested parties
could file exceptions or seek judicial review.
* See, e.g., AEC Regulatory Problems: Hearing Before a Sub-
comm. on Legislation of the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1962) (‘AEC Regulatory Hearing’), at 6
(Testimony of Commissioner Olson).
* As Commissioner Olson illustrated ‘‘the technical specifications
often covered even the color of outbuildings, and in order to
vhange them we had to go through the same process [of hearings.]"’
AEC Regulatory Hearing at 7.
9
This change was favorably received by the Staff of
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in its 1961 study
on how to improve the Atomic Energy Commission
(‘‘AEC’’) regulatory process. The Joint Committee
Staff there criticized the Commission for holding hear-
ings on all licensing actions, endorsed the Vallecitos ap-
proach, and noted that ‘‘[t]he handling of changes
would be facilitated if the Commission’s recent order in
the Vallecitos case, could be broadened by statute or
regulation to a general rule.’’’
The Commission acted on this suggestion and pro-
mulgated AEC Regulation 50.59, which codified the pro-
cedure used in Vallecitos. 27 Fed. Reg. 5491, 5492-5493
(1962). Under AEC Regulation 50.59, if the Commission
staff found that a proposed amendment to a facility’s
license did not present ‘‘significant hazards considera-
tions,’’ the staff could authorize the amendment without
notice or a prior hearing. On the other hand, if the staff
found that the proposed change presented significant
hazards considerations, the change had to be referred to
the ACRS and the Commission had to order a public
hearing in accordance with applicable procedures.
It was against this backdrop of the problems caused
by the Commission’s post-1957 practice, and the subse-
quent administrative efforts to mitigate them in
Vallecitos and AEC Regulation 50.59, that the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy proposed the 1962 amend-
ments to Section 189(a) of the Act. In hearings on the
* The Atomic Energy Commission is the forerunner of what is
' now the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Pub. L. 93-438, 88 Stat.
1233 (1974).
’ Staff of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy 87th Cong., Ist
Sess., Improving the AEC Regulatory Process, Joint Comm. Print
(1961), Vol. I at 73, n.4.
10
proposed legislative changes, considerable attention was
focused on the Commission’s experience of the past
several years, as reflected in submitted studies and
reports and in testimony at the Committee hearings.’ In-
deed, the Joint Committee’s report on the bill that
enacted the 1962 amendments to the Act expressly
adopted the Vallecitos approach as embodied in AEC
Regulation 50.59.°
There is thus no question that the 1962 amendments
were intended by Congress to ratify the Commission
practice as embodied in AEC Regulation 50.59, thereby
providing explicit statutory authorization for the Com-
mission to continue dispensing with notice and oppor-
tunity for a prior hearing on proposed license amend-
ments which involved no significant safety implications.
Despite this unequivocal legislative intent, the court of
appeals below reverted to the pre-Vallecitos procedures
by ordering the Commission to hold a prior hearing
whenever one is requested, making it irrelevant whether
the Commission finds that the proposed amendment has
no safety significance. Thus, the court of appeals effec-
tively read the ‘‘no significant hazards consideration’’
language out of the Act while substituting its judgment
for the will of Congress.'°
* See, Improving the AEC Regulatory Process, Vol. I at 35-37,
49-50, 73; Id., Vol. Il at 464, 484-96, 579, 581 and 582. See also,
AEC Regulatory Hearings at 6-7.
* See, S. Rep. No. 1677, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. at 7-8, reprinted in
[1962] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2207, 2214-2215.
'° The court of appeals ignored the legislative history set forth
above and instead cited selectively from portions of the legislative
history which do not, in fact, support the proposition that Congress
intended a prior hearing to be held on amendments presenting no
significant hazards considerations. See, Statement on Denial of
Rehearing En Banc, App. A at p. 10a.
In so concluding. the court of appeals relied
primarily on its earlier decision in Brooks v. Atomic
Energy Commission, 476 F.2d 924 (1973), described
below as holding that a prior hearing on a license
amendment may not be denied if requested. Brooks,
however, dealt only with the Commission’s obligation to
give notice of a proposed amendment if it does not make
a “‘no significant hazards consideration’’ determination.
The court of appeals declined to follow a subsequent
decision from the same circuit, Union of Concerned
Scientists v. Atomic Energy Commissior., 499 F.2d 1069
(1974), in which a different panel, after reviewing the
legislative history of the 1962 amendments to the Act,
stated twice that a license amendment can be made
without opportunity for a hearing if the Commission
determines tha: it involves no significant hazards con-
sideration. 499 F.2d at 1078, text at n.22, and 1084,
n.36. The court of appeals’ reliance on Brooks and
disregard of Union of Concerned Scientists evidences a
clear conflict within the District of Columbia Circuit,
which is the circuit most likely to rule on cases arising
out of Section 189(a) of the Act. This conflict,
underscored by the sharply worded dissent from the
denial of rehearing en banc, is further reason for this
Court to review the decision. Cf. Maggio v. Zeitz, 333
U.S. 56, 59-60 (1948).
2. The court of appeals’ strained reading of Section
189(a) offered below is clearly in error and must be cor-
rected. The decision acknowledges that the fourth
sentence of Section 189(a) permits the Commission to
dispense with notice of a proposed license amendment
where the amendment presents ‘‘no significant hazards
consideration.’’ App. C at p. 34a. However, in precisely
the same circumstances, the court of appeals construes
12
the statute as requiring a prior hearing on request. The
obvious paradox was dismissed below as being no more
than a paradox ‘‘in theory.’’ App. C at p. 35a, n.20.
Yet, in the court’s own words, “‘it is difficult to imagine
how a hearing can be requested when the NRC issues a
license amendment without notice.’’/d.
When judicial construction of a federal statute pro-
duces such an anomalous result, it is inherently suspect.
The effect of the decision below is to read Section 189(a)
as affording an interested party the right to demand a
prior hearing, while simultaneously denying him the right
to receive notice of the proposed action on which he is
entitled to be heard. Neither the APA nor fundamental
notions of due process countenance such a result.'' It is
inconceivable that Congress, which incorporated the pro-
cedural safeguards afforded by the APA into the Act,'?
'' Under the APA, it is beyond dispute that, if a party is entitled
to a hearing on proposed agency action, he is also entitled to
receive adequate notice of that action. See, 5 U.S.C. §554(b); North
Alabama Express, Inc. v. United States, 585 F.2d 783, 786 (Sth Cir.
1978). Indeed, this notice requirement is fundamental to due pro-
cess. Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 211-12 (1962).
Notice or proposed action and opportunity for a hearing thereon
cannot be disassociated. As this Court stated in Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950), the right to a
hearing ‘‘ has little reality or worth unless one is informed that the
matter is pending and can choose for himself whether to appear or
default, acquiesce or contest.’’ See also, Walker v. City of Hutchin-
son, 352 U.S. 112, 115 (1956) (‘‘the right to a hearing is mean-
ingless without notice’). The statutory construction of Section
189%a) offered by the court below impermissibly uncouples these
two basic concepts. See App. C at p. 35a, n.20.
'2 Section 181 of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. §2231, states
that ‘‘[t}he provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act shall ap-
ply to all agency action taken under this chapter, and the terms
‘agency’ and ‘agency action’ shall have the meaning specified in the
Administrative Procedure Act.’’ The legislative history of the 1962
13
ever intended such an anomalous result. Rather, the
clear intent was to dispense with both notice and a prior
hearing where the proposed license amendment presents
no significant hazards to public health and safety.
3. This is the manner in which the Commission has
consistently read the statute for almost twenty years.'’
Its interpretation should not be lightly dismissed. See,
e.g., Northern Indiana Public Service Co. v. Porter
County of the Izaak Walton League, 423 U.S. 12, 14-15
(1975); Power Reactor Development Co. v. International
Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-
CIO, 367 U.S. 396, 408 (1961). This Court very recently
again emphasized that an agency’s contemporaneous
construction of its founding statute ‘‘deserves special
deference when it has remained consistent over a long
period of time [citaiion omitted].”” E.E.0.C. v.
Associated Dry Goods Corp., U.S. , 101 St.
Ct. 817, 823, n.17 (1981).
In giving short shrift to the Commission’s inter-
pretation of Section 189(a),'* the court of appeals never
amendments makes it clear that Congress intended the APA. pro-
cedures to remain applicable to the licensing process established by
the amendments. See Senate Report No. 1677, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess., at pp. 5-6, reprinted in [1962] U.S. Cong. & Admin. News,
at pp. 2212-13.
'' The Commission has consistently interpreted the 1962 amend-
ments to allow it to make license amendments which present ‘‘no
significant hazards considerations’ effective immediately without
notice or opportunity for a prior hearing. Some examples of this in-
terpretation by the Commision are listed in the court of appeals’
opinion. See, App. C at p. 40a, n.26.
'* The court of appeals felt that the Commission’s interpretation
was not worthy of deference because the statute and its legislative
history are ‘‘unambiguous’’. App. C at 40a, n.26. Only a few
sentences earlier, however, the court of appeals made the point that
14
inquired into the purposes and policies underlining that
interpretation. Had it done so, it would have realized the
grave practical consequences of abandoning the pro-
cedure that has heretofore been followed by the Com-
mission in reviewing license amendment applications.
It is noteworthy that the amendment process plays
an integral and pervasive role in the Commission’s
regulatory program for all seventy-one licensed nuclear
power reactors. Operating license amendments are ex-
tremely numerous. For example, at the present time,
there are about eight hundred license amendment actions
pending."
As part of its review of license amendment applica-
tions, the Commission staff determines whether the
amendment involves ‘‘no significant hazards considera-
tion.’’ Changes falling into that category involve changes
which are essentially neutral from a safety standpoint, as
well as changes which are believed to improve safety.
Boyd Aff. at para. 5. Of the hundreds of license amend-
ment applications pending at any one time, many would
be found to present no significant hazards consideration.
For example, in the last four calendar years, the Com-
mission has published in the Federal Register notice of
more than 1500 license amendments which fall into this
category. Id.
Obviously, any reinterpretation of statutory re-
quirements which might necessitate Commission hearings
on such a large scale, would have a dramatic impact on
the administrative machinery for regulation of nuclear
“*{t}he text and legislative history of the section are replete with am-
biguities and inconsistencies.’’ App. C at pp. 38a-39a, n.24.
'’ Affidavit of Roger S. Boyd, dated December 3, 1980 (‘‘Boyd
Affidavit’), App. F, infra at p. 62, para. 4.
15
plants. The expected delay in processing a ‘‘no hazards’’
amendment application would be at least nine months.
Boyd Aff. at para. 9. Moreover, this estimate assumes
that the Commission staff has at its disposal sufficient
resources to handle the increase in the number of hear-
ings, which is not the case. Jd. at para. 10. Nor does the
possible use of rulemaking in an effort to avoid delays
and resource allocation problems offer a viable alter-
native procedure for dealing with the expanded
workload. Id.
Such a monumental disruption of the Commission’s
current license amendment review process would serve
no discernable purpose. In fact, it would significantly
undermine the public interest. The operating license
amendments which are subject to the court of appeals’
ruling are those which present no significant danger to
public health and safety. At the present time, they or-
dinarily can be reviewed in a timely manner by the Com-
mission and, where appropriate, receive agency approval
without threatening a plant shutdown. This action is, in
most instances, not irreversible, and the availability of a
subsequent hearing assures further consideration by the
Commission of relevant issues raised by interested par-
ties. See, Boyd Aff. at para. 8.'°
The imposition of a prior hearing requirement raises
the very real specter of needless plant shutdowns while
the cumbersome hearing process runs its course. Jd. at
para. 7. In economic terms alone, the impact on the
public would be severe. Replacement power for a typical
'* Where a party alleges that he is threatened with irreparable in-
jury by a ‘‘no hazards’’ license amendment, he is not without a
remedy. The allegedly aggrieved party can seek pendente iite relief
from the court of appeals, as did petitioners here, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§2349(b) and 1651(a).
16
nuclear plant will cost the licensee and its customers bet-
ween $250,000 and $500,000 for each day the reactor is
down. Boyd Aff. at para. 11. In some areas of the coun-
try, particularly the Northeast, replacement power will
be generated in large part from more expensive imported
oil, used at a rate of about 30,000 barrels per day for a
1000 MWe nuclear plant. Jd. These consequences are
multiplied for every nuclear unit forced off-line as a
result of the procedures which the court of appeals’ deci-
sion would require.
4. The need for review by this Court is therefore
compelling. ‘‘[T]he panel’s interpretation of Section
189(a), taken as a whole, renders it virtually impossible
for the NRC faithfully to follow the explicit congres-
sional directives found in that section.’’ Statement On
Denial of Rehearing En Banc, App. A at p. 13a. In so
construing the statute, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit has once again
*‘unjustifiably intruded into the administrative process.”’
Vermont Yankee, supra, 435 U.S. at 556. It has dictated
a radical change in nuclear energy regulation, a change
that turns on its head the Congressional framework for
licensing nuclear power plants, and_ effectively,
‘“‘eviscerate[s] the congressional mandate found in both
the third and fourth sentences of section 189(a)... .’’
Statement on Denial of Rehearing En Banc, App. A at
p. 13a. The decision below severly impacts on the Com-
mission’s regulatory function to the decided detriment of
the utility industry and without discernible benefit to the
public. It should not be allowed to stand.
17
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, this petition for a
writ of certiorari should be granted.
Dated: April 2, 1981
Respectfully submitted,
MARK AUGENBLICK
Attorney of Record
GEORGE F. TROWBRIDGE
JAY E. SILBERG
SHAW, PITTMAN, Potts & TROWBRIDGE
1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 822-1000
Counsel for Petititoners
19
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 2nd day of April, three
copies of the foregoing Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit were served by deposit in the United
States mail, first class, postage prepaid, upon each of the
following:
Hon. Wade Hampton McCree, Jr.
Solicitor General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
Stephen F. Eilperin, Esq.
Solicitor
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
1717 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20555
Daniel P. Sheehan, Esq.
Robert Hager, Esq.
1324 North Capitol Street
Washington, D.C. 20530
/s/ MARK AUGENBLICK
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.