Opposition — Puerto Rico v. Regan

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FILED

No. 80-1647 APR 17 99)

IN THE ALEX ‘8977 1. STHVAS,

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

DONALD T. REGAN, SECRETARY

DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, Petitioner,

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COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO Rico, Respondent.

DONALD T. REGAN, SECRETARY

DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, Petitioner,

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VIRGIN ISLANDS, Respondent.

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN

RESPONSE TO CROSS-PETITION

MICHAEL J. HENKE - Counsel of Record

CHARLES D. TETRAULT

VINSON & ELKINS

1101 Connecticut Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 862-6500

Attorneys for the

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico

ARTHUR LAZARUS, JR.

MILTON EISENBERG

Henry A. HUBSCHMAN

FRIED, FRANK, HARRIS,

SHRIVER & KAMPELMAN

600 New Hampshire Ave., N.W.

Suite 1000

Washington, D.C. 20037

(202) 342-3624

Attorneys for the Virgin Islands

April 17, 1981

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PRESS OF BYRON S. ADAMS PRINTING, INC., WASHINGTON, D.C.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

TORT ou ccc vcccvccssevuvep hese ee een l

CONCLUSION ....cccscscvectovenceus ue ee anne nn = aEEnE 5

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES: PAGE

City of Santa Clara vy. Andrus, 572 F.2d 660 (9th Cir.

1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 859 (1979) .........-. 3

Clackamas County v. McKay, 219 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir.

1954), vacated as moot, 349 U.S. 909 (1955) ....... 4

Driver v. Helms, 456 F. Supp. 496 (D.R.I. 1978) ....... 2

Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963) ........eeeeeeenee 2

Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization vy. Simon,

506 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974), vacated on other

grounds, 426 U.S. 26 (1976) ........sceeeeeeeeeeee 23

Houston v. Ormes, 252 U.S. 469 (1920) ........-.-0ee-

Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp., 337

U.S. 662 (194D) . oo ccc ccccsccctsunes se enenere :

Legal Aid Society of Alameda County v. Brennan, 608

F.2d 1319 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921

CIGGD) onc cnccvecctvcsecceshes teh e bene e mane 2

McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972) 4-5

Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373 (1902)........... 3

National Council of Community Mental Health Centers

v. Weinberger, 361 F. Supp. 897 (D.D.C. 1973) .... 3

Pennsylvania v. Lynn, 362 F. Supp. 1363 (D.D.C. 1973),

rev’d on other grounds, 501 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir.

1GTD) oc ccnvdvcusaaceceeuness¥eeae eee eeeee eee

Table of Authorities Continued

CASES: PAGE

Sheehan v. Army and Air Force Exchange Service, 619

F.2d 1132 (Sth Cir, 1900) .0 ici eueus see eee 2

Train v. Campaign Clean Water, Inc., 420 U.S. 136

(i+) ee 3

1978). os ee cecnve one vucsis eeyaiemnnnannn 4

STATUTES:

Revised Organic Act of the Virgin Islands, 68 Stat. 497..

$ U.S.C. SPOR oo 0csde v0 ekn oe ee

26 U.S.C. S742 1(R). . .. 0500000 0es eee

28 U.S.C. $2201 ow. ccccunshs5eease ee

4B U.S.C. §736 noc cas 000s nun sence es ee

uf FN UY

CONGRESSIONAL MATERIAL:

H.R. Rep. No. 94-1656, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) .... 2

\y, .

No. 80-1647

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

DONALD T. REGAN, SECRETARY

DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, Petitioner,

Ve

COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO, Respondent.

DONALD T. REGAN, SECRETARY

DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, Petitioner,

Vv.

VIRGIN ISLANDS, Respondent.

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN

RESPONSE TO CROSS-PETITION

Petitioner recognizes that the petition in the caption-

ed case is, in effect, a cross-petition for certiorari in

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Regan, No. 80-1252

and Virgin Islands v. Regan, No. 80-1253. Petn. at 1,

14-15. Although respondents are prepared to show that

there is no merit in the Secretary’s position on the ques-

tions set forth in his cross-petition, the Commonwealth

of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands do not oppose

Supreme Court review of those questions. The fact that

the Secretary felt compelled to file a cross-petition on

issues not considered by the Court of Appeals only

serves to highlight the overall importance of these cases

and to provide additional reason for granting the

Original petitions for certiorari filed by Puerto Rico and

the Virgin Islands. Certainly, nothing in the Secretary’s

cross-petition is in any way inconsistent with the reasons

for granting the writ advanced by Puerto Rico and the

Virgin Islands.

2

Though respondents are content to await the briefs

on the merits to respond to most of petitioner’s

arguments, we do wish to demonstrate now the frailty of

the threshold arguments lest this Court be lulled into

believing that is lacks jurisdiction over these cases.

a. Contrary to the Secretary’s argument, the doc-

trine of sovereign immunity does not bar these actions.

The October 21, 1976 amendments to the Administrative

Procedure Act explicitly waive that defense in actions for

declaratory and injunctive relief and mandamus. 5

U.S.C. §702, as amended. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1656, 94th

Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code Cong.

& Ad. News 6121. (Section 702 was amended ‘“‘so as to

remove the defense of sovereign immunity as a bar to

judicial review of Federal administrative action otherwise

subject to judicial review.’’) See Sheehan v. Army and

Air Force Exchange Service, 619 F.2d 1132, 1139 (Sth

Cir. 1980). And the waiver occasioned by the 1976

amendments is applicable to litigation pending at the

time of their enactment. Legal Aid Society of Alameda

County v. Brennan, 608 F.2d 1319, 1332 (9th Cir. 1979),

cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921 (1980); Driver v. Helms, 456

F. Supp. 496, 497, n. 1 (D.R.I. 1978). In addition, these

cases fall within the well-established exception that an

action against an officer of the federal government is not

barred by sovereign immunity if the officer’s challenged

acts are ultra vires. Larson v. Domestic and Foreign

Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949); Dugan v. Rank,

372 U.S. 609 (1963); Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights

Organization v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974),

vacated on other grounds, 426 U.S. 26 (1976). Contrary

to the Secretary’s assertion, the relief sought by

respondents will not require an affirmative act of the

sovereign or the disposition of unquestionably sovereign

property, but only that the Secretary cease the

unauthorized withholding of funds which Congress has

appropriated and ordered to be covered into the

treasuries of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. See Ci-

ty of Santa Clara vy. Andrus, 572 F.2d 660, 679 (9th Cir.

1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 859 (1979); Schafly v.

Volpe, 495 F.2d 273, 280 (7th Cir. 1974); National

Council of Community Mental Health Centers v.

Weinberger, 361 F. Supp. 897, 900 (D.D.C. 1973); Penn-

sylvania v. Lynn, 362 F. Supp. 1363, 1368 (D.D.C.

1973), rev’d on other grounds, 501 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir.

1974).

Furthermore, as the district court correctly conclud-

ed, the claims in these cases fall squarely within the

traditional principles governing actions for mandamus.

Indeed, this Court has itself, in a long line of cases,

specifically affirmed the appropriateness of mandamus

relief to compel federal officers to pay monies out of the

public treasury, where the duty was clear and ministerial.

E.g., Houston v. Ormes, 252 U.S. 469, 472 (1920); Min-

nesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373, 386 (1902). The

Secretary’s cross-petition suggests that this line of cases

was Overruled by the dictum found in a footnote in Lar-

son v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp., supra,

337 U.S. at 692, n. 11, thereby implying that sovereign

immunity is applicable whenever a court order could af-

fect the disposition of sovereign property even if the

government Official is acting in violation of a mandatory

statutory duty. While this Court has not squarely ad-

dressed this issue, see Train v. Campaign Clean Water,

Inc., 420.U.S. 136, 138 (1975), at least one court of ap-

peals has expressed the view that it is ‘‘inconceivable

that the Court would take such a step without mention-

ing the rule of those cases or the cases themselves, and

4

particularly that it would take such sweeping action in a

footnote to an opinion which did not involve the point.”’

Clackamas County v..McKay, 219 F.2d 479, 493 (D.C.

Cir. 1954), vacated as moot, 349 U.S. 909 (1955). See

also Vishnevsky v. United States, 581 F.2d 1249, 1255

(7th Cir. 1978).

The claims in these cases are based on explicit

statutory provisions mandating the payment into the

treasuries of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the

Virgin Islands of ‘‘all taxes collected under the internal

revenue laws of the United States’’ on articles produced

in the respective islands and transported to the United

States, and, in the case of the Virgin Islands, of ‘‘[t]he

proceeds of customs duties ... less the costs of collec-

ting all of said duties.’”’ The language of the statutes

relied upon is peremptory. No issues of fact or matters

of policy are involved. If the statutes embrace the

disputed taxes and duties, the Secretary is under a clear

duty to deposit the sums collected in the treasuries of

Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, and he never has

suggested otherwise. Only if sovereign immunity bars all

suits for mandamus affecting the disposition of federal

funds can the claims in this case be deemed jurisdic-

tionally deficient.

b. Nor is there any merit to the Secretary’s argu-

ment that the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C.

§2201, bars these actions. It is well settled that the

Declaratory Judgment Act is coterminous with the Anti-

Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. §7421(a), which proscribes

suits for the purpose of restraining the assessment or col-

lection of any tax. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights

Organization v. Simon, supra, 506 F.2d at 1284-1285;

McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 453 (D.D.C.

5

1972) (three-judge court). The instant actions clearly are

not barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, and hence not by

the Declaratory Judgment Act, because they have

nothing to do with restraining the assessment or collec-

tion of taxes. The Secretary already has assessed and col-

lected the taxes which are at issue. The only questions

presented are whether 48 U.S.C. §734 and section 28 of

the Revised Organic Act of the Virgin Islands, 68 Stat.

497, require that the taxes which have been assessed and

collected be covered into the treasuries of Puerto Rico

and the Virgin Islands.

CONCLUSION

The petitions for certiorari in Nos. 80-1252 and

80-1253 and the cross-petition in No. 80-1647 should be

granted, and writs of certiorari should issue to review

the judgments and opinions of the United States Court

of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,

MICHAEL J. HENKE - Counsel of Record

CHARLES D. TETRAULT

VINSON & ELKINS

1101 Connecticut Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 862-6500

Attorneys for the

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico

ARTHUR LAZARUS, JR.

MILTON EISENBERG

HENRY A. HUBSCHMAN

FRIED, FRANK, HARRIS,

SHRIVER & KAMPELMAN

600 New Hampshire Ave., N.W.

Suite 1000

Washington, D.C. 20037

(202) 342-3624

Attorneys for the Virgin Islands

April 17, 1981

6

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Michael J. Henke, attorney for respondent and a

member of the Bar of this Court, certify that on this

17th day of April, 1981, the foregoing Brief in Response

to Cross-Petition has been served upon petitioner by

hand-delivering three copies thereof to David English

Carmack, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., at-

torney for petitioner, and by mailing three copies,

postage prepaid, to the Solicitor General, Department of

Justice, Washington, D.C. 20530. I further certify that

all parties required to be served have been served.

MICHAEL J. HENKE

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