Respondents Brief — United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission v. Sholly

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Nos. 80-1640, 80-1656 ER L. STEVAS,

Aa Maras ret

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COM-

MISSION,

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY,

JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

AND

PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRIC COMPANY,

Petitioners

V.

PEOPLE AGAINST NUCLEAR ENERGY,

STEVEN SHOLLY AND DONALD E. HOSSLER,

Respondents.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS

ROBERT HAGER

Counsel of Record

DANIEL P. SHEEHAN

JOHN CLEWETT

Christic Institute

1324 N. Capitol St.

Washington, D.C. 20002

(202) 797-8106

Counsel for People Against

September 2, 1981 Nuclear Energy, et al.

THE CASILLAS PRESS, INC.-1717 K Street. N W.-Weshington, 0. C.-223-1220

(i)

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether § 189 of the Atomic Energy Act authorizes the

NRC to deny to affected persons a duly requested hear-

ing before giving effect to a license amendment which ir-

reversibly impacts health and the environment but is sum-

marily found by the NRC to involve “no significant

hazards consideration.”

(iii)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED .. 0.00.50. cescccccccccsvcccccvcccss i

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I Nos ed lek cine aka wear bal we Oi Hae e Hed 2

ee URN EEED. oiled hd Use eo kpinlain s Peeves vetoes ieee 2

Ee A TU CPU ois ons beeen riedcdvpeedncee eewaa 3

SEAR Y Gr INI 6 obs Mea k ceeds teen ceaenaew ns 15

PUI cw eN Wo eC UN Nn et aS 0 abe DK RBME ES Cones Co aane 17

1. The Plain Meaning of § 189 Forbids Any Interpreta-

tion That a Duly Requested Hearing May Be Denied

Upon a Summary Finding by the NRC That a

License Amendment Invoives “No Significant

Hazards Consideration.” . . «61... . cece cere ec emme eens 19

2. The Legislative History of § 189 Lends No Support

to the Notion That Congress Intended to Authorize

the NRC to Deny a Duly Requested Hearing............ 24

3. The NRC’s Own Administrative Practice Does Not

Support Its Denial of a Requested Hearing Prior to

Taking an Irreversible Act Pursuant to a License

Amendment Found by the NRC to Involve “No

Significant Hazards Consideration.” .................. 28

4. This Court’s Upholding of the Plain Meaning of

§ 189 So As To Accord Requested Hearings on “No

Significant Hazards Consideration” Amendments In-

volving Irreversible Action Will Not Introduce The

Overwhelming Administrative Burdens Imagined by

POMONE oie cod iaedcsinteteeaheRaee Were e¥es vane 33

(iv)

5. The Important Interests of Due Process and Fun-

damental Fairness Require That § 189 Be Strictly and

Faithfully Construed to Preserve the Public’s Right

to a Hearing Before Suffering the Irreversible Effects

of Radiation, In the Absence of Clear and Un-

mistakable Evidence of Congressional Intent to Deny

IMENT Via died oh ata bh Os FeO CS AK A440 08 o reese 36

TEN iicicin Wu rebel db a Race MERE c VERKESs ¥ emn,e ROUN 46

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: Page

Armstrong v. Manzo,

Rs ENE oo Raids a0 058 cas aawedvawenedctaknekeee 39

Brooks v. AEC,

Sr Es Cees STEP SaSka dr heOa sed eOkehoeesavnune 21

Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc.

REI PERE ETORC cass PEMA OPR CRE CSS hs heen canes aed 38, 42

Fuentes v. Shevin,

EE CUED b Grkid ba GAs Seed Kee se wade ced 'ee-oud he ee 33

Greene v. McElroy,

SE CP SRE G0 0s Vik CES a Cae e disc hdeuneoesseeee 39

Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Inst.

Oe WS NT CE soc ed Cea iis esate oth caecaneeskennhs 44

Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath,

AR CE Uae CEMORD Pha Sls dine a By Wa Males 'a in BBG om kenwacloue 39

Mahoney v. United States,

220 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. Tenn.), aff'd 339 F.2d

te FOE ck 6 kee eae bo EPAPER Lei pleetcn> Canne nes 43

Mathews v. Eldridge,

PRR CERIO (snk ewe A PeUN ee dean os eceeccane bebe ts 39

NeNabb v. United States,

BEG Ue SO CEES 6 aceon eo

Mullane v. Central Hanover Tru:

539 U.S. 306(1950) ..........

Nader v. NRC,

513 F.2d 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1975)

Northern States Power Co. v. M

447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971),

405 U.S. 1035 (1972) ........

Oklahoma v. Bernstein,

5 Media L. Rep. 2313 (1980) ..

Office of Communication of the

v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir

Pacific Legal Foundation v. Stat

& Dev. Com., 472 F. Supp. 191

Siegel v. AEC,

400 F.2d 778, 783 (D.C. Cir. 19

Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,

585 F. Supp. 566 (W.D. Okla. |

Susquehanna Valley Alliance v.

619 F.2d 231 (3rd Cir. 1980) ..

Train v. Colorado PIRG,

Pl 8 Et |

Statutes and Regulation:

PEPER ED: oo Oh0C8 che cece

MBUD.G. ZERO ove vc cvcecc:

42 U.S.C. 2021(k) ............

(vi)

42 U.S.C. 2239 (Atomic Energy Act, § 189)........... 2 and passim

MRIS. SHOT) i icici sinrice cou debebe ceiced onus canes esis 42

SEMCCOPENERT): ov Gees cheba vee Gh edelascudecvee dice spinpey 42

MEMOS MEE, 45 5 5 s vA C aud a CARERS TS ots ay Cobo aay 42

NS BLO Eis v.kow vee be'sb (CRAPO MS GAIWKGS © be airy ane bagels Vey 29

DTI UNO is wskk Conde UV USER MORON Reap eccecee'e'y Mpg waN’s 19

SMO Secu eo REE O ERK GG OME w ah we Reaver dscns Sane. 34

AIF OE: coins hh kr dirs amnriien DV aN RE! vhke' vestige cesenat 34

BOR BA TOe as Piece ko RIN oho yb eaeWGEW olen be cviss Heh eue pues 34

bk. | SE ee Dee ee One PT ewe pe ye ete wenn SS 34

Ee | | Ree Per CORE TERT. (COLT RRET ERLE le ee 34

SOG PRL csdads vate ane cvrendbbee aero cskestivba dippers 29

6 ig SVG ia cae bee dee eR b ba en bah sn een valves 9, 12

TR SAR ice shire ver cues her eceeeisoebrebudhracceeent® 10

SOT FOF i ia i caste Fin 0 Gis’ oct ncaens ncbee csv oeewsion eye 19

IOCER Amp. LSE TRIV: cc iciiicciecedescceeteediee 10, 11, 13

QO GTR BGG 1O 8s hue Sabin ccceenwescipe aged ileees opiniecceeen chine 42

Miscellaneous: :

K. DAVIS, I ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (1978) ..... 44

Green, “Safety Determination in Nuclear Power Licensing:

A Critical View,” 43 Notre Dame Lawyer 633, (1968) .......... 37

(vii)

Monaghan, “Of ‘Liberty’ and ‘Property’”

62 Cornell L. R. 405 (1977)... ces ccecccceseees SAcdaweeah yes 38

L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978) ..... 42

Wright, “Beyond Discretionary Justice,”

BE J. SISTA 6c eictdvdevccocudenesevesses demons 40

100 Cong. Rec. 10730 (July 16, 1954) ...... 6. cece cece eee eenees 36

25 Fed. Reg. 11015 (November 18, 1960) ..........:eeeeeeeeeee 26

26 Fed. Reg. 8469 (September 1, 1961) ........- eee eeeeeeeeee 27

27 Fed. Reg. 5491 (June 9, 1962) ........-sccccccecrervecceees 26

44 Fed. Reg. 45271 (August 1, 1979) ...... 2.0 cee eee e eee ee eens 5

44 Fed. Reg. 67738 (November 27, 1979) ........cceeeeeeeeeeeee 6

45 Fed. Reg. 20265 (March 27, 1980) .........seeee eee eeeeenees 8

45 Fed. Reg. 30760 (May 9, 1980) .......-- cece cece eee eneeeees 8

Senate Report, “Nuclear Accident and Recovery

at Three Mile Island,” June, 1980, Ser. No. 96-14.

Dts Come BOG B88 isis oo cals eelewg eed e iced s cocesecosaee 7

Consumers Power Co., 7AEC 297 (1974) 2.0... ccc cece rece cena 34

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

No. 80-1640

No. 80-1656

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION, Et AlL.,

Petitioners

Vv.

PEOPLE AGAINST NUCLEAR ENERGY, Ei. Al,

Respondents.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS PEOPLE AGAINST

NUCLEAR ENERGY, ET AL.

People Against Nuclear Energy, Steven Sholly and Donald

E. Hossler, respondents in 80-1640 and 80-1656 submit

this brief on the merits in these consolidated cases.

2

OPINION BELOW

The decision of the Court of Appeals is reported at 651

F.2d 780. The denial of rehearing en banc and dissent

therefrom appear at id. 792.'

STATUTE INVOLVED

THE Atomic ENERGY AcT, SECTION 189(a) (“§ 189”), pro-

vides in pertinent part as follows:

Sentence One; In any proceeding under this Act, for

the... amending of any license... the Commission

shall grant a hearing upon the request of any person whose

interest may be affected by the proceeding, and shall ad-

mit any person as a party to such proceeding. . .

Sentence Two; The commission shall hold a hearing

after thirty days’ notice and publication once in the

Federal Register, on each application . . . for a construc-

tion permit... .

Sentence Three; ...{[T]he Commission may, in the

absence of a request therefor by any person whose interest

may be affected, issue . . . an amendment to an operating

license without a hearing, but upon thirty days’ notice and

publication once in the Federal Register of its intent to

do so.

Sentence Four; The commission may dispense with such

thirty days’ notice and publication with respect to any ap-

'The officially reported opinion differs in several material respects

from that printed in the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari of the

government (“Pet.”) and in that of Metropolitan Edison ef al.

(“Met Ed”).

3

plication for... an amendment to an operating license

upon a determination by the Commission that the amend-

ment involves no significant hazards consideration.

(Sentence enumeration added)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On March 28, 1979 the now-famous Three Mile Island

nuclear power reactor accident began. Due to a partial

meltdown of the reactor core of Three Mile Island Unit 2

(“TMI-2”), radioactive gas and radioactive particulate mat-

ter was released into the atmosphere. This release of radia-

tion caused, among other things the evacuation of some of

the local residents.

In addition to this release of radiation to the at-

mosphere, radioactive gases such as Krypton gas (Kr-85)

accumulated in the crippled reactor’s containment

building, along with radioactive particulate matter such as

Strontium-90, Plutonium-239 and Carbon-14. See NRC

Staff Report, “Final Environmental Assessment for

Decontamination of the Three Mile Island Unit 2 Reactor

Building Atmosphere”, May, 1980, Record, Vol. V, Tab

69, p.3-1, line 6, (“NRC Final Assessment”); Institute for

Energy and Environmental Research, Heidelberg, FRG,

“Radiation Exposure Due to Venting TMI-2 Reactor

Building Atmosphere”, June 12, 1980, (Attachment B,

Petition for Review of Final NRC Orders, No. 80-1691)

p.4, (“Heideloerg Report”); cf J.A. 61.

These radionuclides were eventually ordered by the

NRC to be released into the atmosphere, in two Orders

from which these consolidated lawsuits arose.

Respondents Sholly and Hossler petitioned for review of

the NRC orders stating that law and regulation required 30

4

days prior notice before these NRC orders could be made

effective, since they both effected amendments to

Metropolitan Edison’s operating license, and since they

both involved “significant hazards consideration”. And in

a second petition, People Against Nuclear Energy (PANE)

stated that hearings on both NRC Orders were required

under § 189 since both Orders effected license amend-

ments and since a hearing had been requested by persons

“whose interest may be affected by” the amendments.

The NRC opposed any notice or hearing on either of the

two Orders. The NRC contended that the Order entitled

“Memorandum and Order” was not subject to the § 189

notice and hearing requirements because it was not a

license amendment. The NRC then claimed that both

notice and a duly requested prior hearing could be waived

on the “Order for Temporary Modification of License”

(“Modification of License”) because a summary finding of

“no significant hazards consideration” had been made by

the NRC. Pet. 49a, 62a.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia rejected this reasoning. It found that a hearing

had been duly requested and was required by law to be

granted on both orders. Therefore, the Court of Appeals

found it unnecessary to reach the question of whether 30

days’ notice was required prior to effectuating the NRC

orders. 651 F.2d 786, note 16. Therefore the Court of Ap-

peals did not need io resolve the question of whether the

NRC orders did involve “significant hazards considera-

tion.” The Court of Appeals held that the “Memorandum

and Order” did effect a license amendment and according-

ly a hearing should have been held on the matter of releas-

ing radiation into the environment. The Court of Appeals

also held that the hearing should have included the matter

contained in the “Modification of License” since the Court

5

found nothing in the legislative history of § 189 to suggest

that the plain language of the provision should be

modified as to permit a waiver of hearing upon an NRC

finding of “no significant hazards consideration.”

Moreover the Court found that the “administrative prac-

tice” offered by the NRC to support its interpretation of

the statute was not unambiguous and in any event could

not “avail to overcome a statute so plain in its commands

as to leave nothing for construction.” 651 F.2d 789, note

26, quoting Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. U.S.,

288 U.S. 294, 315 & 1933). The Court of Appeals entered a

declaratory judgment on both of these two holdings.

The Petitioners sought certiorari in this Court only on

the second, and lesser, of the holdings, i.e. that § 189 does

not authorize the NRC to deny a requested hearing on the

basis of a “no significant hazards consideration” finding.

The NRC Orders from which these consolidated cases

arose followed a series of NRC actions. The first of these

appeared about four months after the beginning of the

Three Mile Island crises, when the NRC issued on July 20,

1979 an “Order for Modification of License”, 44 Fed. Reg.

45271, which said the NRC was reviewing the TMI-2

operating license to see what license modifications were

needed to “assure the continued maintenance of the cur-

rent safe, stable, long-term cooling condition of the facili-

ty.” It stated that “[t]his evaluation will be set out in a for-

thcoming Safety Evaluation which will address the imposi-

tion of new and/or revised Technical Specifications. It is

expected that this effort will be completed in about 30 days

at which time a further Order will be issued.”

Pending a second Order the NRC suspended the

“authority granted by the TMI-2 Operating License No.

DPR-73 to operate Three Mile Island Nuclear Station,

6

Unit 2”, but provided that the “licensee shall maintain the

facility in a shutdown condition.” Further, the NRC found

that the “public health, safety and interest require that this

suspension be effective immediately” and promised that

the subsequent Order would state the time for requesting a

public hearing “on this matter.” Id.

A second Order imposing new or revised Technical

Specifications and other license modifications was not

forthcoming within the promised 30 days. Instead, on

November 21, 1979, the NRC issued a “Statement of

Policy and Notice of Intent to Prepare a Programmatic

Environmental Impact Statement,” 44 Fed. Reg. 67738.

This Statement announced the decision of the NRC to

prepare a “programmatic environmental impact statement

on the decontamination and disposal of radioactive wastes

resulting from the March 28, 1979 accident” at TMI-2.

J.A. 36 The Statement goes on to say that if the NRC

decides it to be in the public interest to purge the contain-

ment building of radioactive gases before the “program-

matic” EIS [Environmental Impact Statement] is complete

“the Commission will consider CEQ [The Council on En-

vironmental Quality]’s advice as to the Commission’s

NEPA [National Environmental Policy Act] respon-

sibi .ies.” CEQ’s advice was that venting the radioactive

gas prior to preparation of an Environmental Impact

Statement would be inconsistant with NEPA. J.A. 83. The

Statement concludes that with “the help of the public’s

comments on our proposals we intend to assure, pursuant

to NEPA and the Atomic Energy Act, that the cleanup of

TMI-2 is done consistently with the public health and safe-

ty, and with awareness of the choices ahead.”

On February 11, 1980 the NRC issued its second

“Order,” 45 Fed. Reg. 11282, February 20, 1980. J.A.°

39-45. This Order recognizes that

7

in the present post accident status of the facility,

the license itself does not include explicit provi-

sions or technical specifications for assuring the

continued maintenance of the plant in a safe,

stable condition . . . [P]rovisions [concerning oper-

ation] are now simply inapplicable to the facility

in its present post-accident condition. J.A. 40

Therefore, the Order modified the operating license to,

among other things, “prohibit venting or purging or other

treatment of the reactor building atmosphere” or other

waste disposal until “approved by the NRC” in accordance

with the November 21, 1979 Statement (44 Fed. Reg.

67738).

The second Order also proposed new “Appendix A”

Technical Specifications as a forma! amendment of the

license which was not to take effect until after holding any

requested hearing. (This Order did not change the license’s

Appendix B “Environmental Technical Specifications”

which set maximum limits on effluent releases and

discharges.) But paradoxically, the Appendix A changes

were also made immediately effective by amendment of

the July 20, 1979 Order for Modification of License, and

the NRC stated that the operation of this amendment

would not be stayed by a request for a hearing. The sub-

ject matter of any requested hearing was limited to: (a) the

new Appendix A technical specifications; and (b) “whether

the provisions of this Order would significantly affect the

quality of the environment.”

In response to this February 11, 1980 Order, hearings

were requested by the Environmental Coalition on

Nuclear Power, and by two individuals. See “Nuclear Ac-

cident and Recovery at Three Mile Island,” S. Report,

Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation, June, 1980, Ser.

No. 96-14, 98th Cong. 2nd Sess. p. 208. One of these in-

dividuals was Respondent Steven Sholly. Hearings on this

Order had still not been held by the time the venting occur-

red, on June 28, 1980.

On March 27, 1980, the NRC published a notice in the

Federal Register on the “Availability of Environmental

Assessment for Decontamination of Three Mile Island

Unit 2 Reactor Building Atmosphere,” 45 Fed. Reg.

20265. This notice announced that a draft of an NRC staff

report “recommends that the building atmosphere be

decontaminated by purging to the environment” and that

it concludes, based “on its estimate of doses to the public,”

that “this action does not constitute a significant en-

vironmental impact.” This notice did not provide for any

public hearings, although it did allow written comments if

they were submitted by April 11, 1980 (i.e. within two

weeks of the publication date of the notice). A later “Ad-

dendum 2” to this draft report was made available on

April 2, 1980, 45 Fed. Reg. 21760, and again, written com-

ments were allowed if they were submitted within two

weeks, by April 17, 1980. Numerous people, including the

Governor of Pennsylvania, Richard Thornburgh, criticis-

ed these short periods for public comment, since the NRC

had taken an entire year in preparing its report, and since

there had not been any general publicity about the staff

report. As a consequence, the NRC published a notice en-

titled “Extension of Comment Periods,” 45 Fed. Reg.

30760, May 9, 1980, which extended the comment period

by one week from the publication of that notice, until May

16, 1980. See S.Rep., “Nuclear Accident,” supra at 206.

After this, the NRC staff issued its report, “Final En-

vironmental Assessment for Decontamination of the

Three Mile Island Unit 2 Reactor Building Atmosphere,”

NUREG-0662, May 1980 (Record, Vol. V, Tab 69). This

9

Final Assessment discussed several alternative methods for

decontaminating the TMI-2 reactor building atmosphere.

These methods included cryogenic processing (i.e. freez-

ing) of the gas, gas compression, a fluorocarbon absorp-

tion process developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory,

and other processes which would remove the radioactive

contaminants from the reactor containment building at-

mosphere for ultimate storage aid isolation from the en-

vironment. Each of these methods presented alternatives

which would meet in varying degrees the objective of

maintaining “radiation exposures, and releases of radioac-

tive materials in effluents to unrestricted areas, as low as is

reasonably achievable”, 10 CFR Section 20.1(c). The NRC

staff also presented another alternative: to turn %n the

TMI-2 ventilation system so as to simply release the Kryp-

ton gas into the ambient air, along with all of the radioac-

tive particulates that would pass through the system’s

filters with the gas. These radioactive materials would then

be disseminated throughout the air and deposited on the

land, including valuable farm property, near the plant,

where they would remain as sources of radiation for

periods determined by the half-lives of each radionuclide.

The half-life of Kr-85 is over 10 years, that of Pu-239, for

example, over 24,000 years. The venting, or “purge”, alter-

native was clearly the cheapest of all the alternatives. It

was this alternative that the NRC staff recommended for

adoption by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on the

grounds that it was the one which could be executed most

quickly.

No public hearings were ever held on the NRC staff

recommendation, though written coments from the public

and some interested parties were received. Some of these

were included in Volume 2 of the NRC staff report.

NUREG- 0662. The Comments from the public over-

10

whelmingly opposed the purge alternative, as did an

enraged public at a “meeting” held by the NRC on March

19, 1980. Record, Vol. IV, Tab 46, p. 16 and passim; J.A.

85.

On June 5, 1980, the five NRC Commissioners met to

consider the staff report. Although the public could attend

this meeting, there was no opportunity for any of the peo-

ple who would be affected by the NRC staff recommend-

dation, or any other members of the public, to be heard.

At this meeting a summary of a report prepared by the In-

stitute for Energy and Environmental Research, of

Heidelberg, FRG, was presented to Commissioner John F.

Ahearne, Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-

sion. This summary stated the conclusions of the

Institute’s final report, published on June 12, 1980, that

the proposed venting could cause four additional cancer

cases and an equivalent level of genetic damage.

Heidelberg Report, pp. 6 and 13.

On June 12, 1980, the NRC issued the two final orders

which gave rise to these consolidated lawsuits, authorizing

the venting of radioactive materials into the environment

as recommended by the NRC staff. The “Modification of

License” provided that the “Environmental Technical

Specifications,” (Appendix B of the TMI-2 Operating

License DPR-73, dated February 8, 1978) would be

amended to suspend the detailed limitations on releases of

radioactive materials contained in Section 2.1.2. Appendix

B of the license titled “Gaseous Effluents”. This affected

portion of the license is intended to implement the “design

objectives” set out in 10 CFR Part 50, App. I, § II (B& C)

and 10 CFR Section 50.36a for operating reactors, which

permit flexibility by allowing quarterly averaging of high

releases into the environment so as to assure that “unusual

operating conditions that temporarily result in releases

higher” than those normally allowed do not interfere with

“a dependable source of power.” 10 CFR Part 50, App I,

§ IV. The releases thus authorized by the NRC for the

TMI-2 cleanup therefore exceeded even the amounis

allowed for an operating reactor, even after allowing for

unusual operating conditions. See Pet 64a note.

The “Modification of License” was made “effective im-

mediately” (Pet 65a), and the venting of radioactive

materials was authorized starting 10 days after June 12 (Pet.

58a). The “Modification of License” specifically stated

that a request for a hearing would not stay its effectiveness

(Pet. 66a) and officially stated its summary conclusion that

the change in Appendix B of the Operating License “involves

no significant hazards consideration” (Pet. 64a, 65a).

The reason given for the finding of “no significant

hazards consideration” was not, however, a scientific or

technical one, but rather a legal argument. The NRC did

not contend that the releases would not exceed the approx-

imately 1300 curies of Kr-85 monthly that the reactor

would normally release while in operation, nor did the

NRC contend that the releases would not exceed the ap-

proximately 100 curies of Kr-85 monthly that the reactor

was releasing to the environment at that time. J.A.31. Nor

did the NRC argue that the offsite doses of radiation to

people in the Three Mile Island area would not increase

with the purging — as indeed they did increase.

Instead, the NRC simply contended that these increased

doses of radiation to the public would still fall “within the

limits that would apply if the reactor were operating nor-

mally” (Pet. 64a, emphasis added). The NRC then con-

cluded that since the doses resulting from venting would

not exceed the standards for radiation doses applicable to

an operating reactor and therefore would implement “the

same concept of limiti:

amount in mind, th

hazards consideration”

sider whether the ventir

damental standard for

of radioactive material

achievable” (ALARA)

very face the alternati\

the highest possible rel

than the lowest possibl

tended that a release c

reactor which yields d

(Pet. 65a) no greater t

dards for an operati,

hazards consideration”

a specified low amount

an absolute regulato

although it is not in fa

amount either for ope

this specific cleanup of

The NRC bifurcatec

that the “Modification

the release of radia

authorization was give

“Memorandum and Or

avoid a hearing by tl

release of radiation fro

quire licensing action |

authorizes releases of 1

of the reactor to pro

license does provide rel

any releases normally «

the license also provid

environment are to be

License No. DPR-73, I

13

The “Modification of License” was intended to provide

the NRC maximum flexibility in administering the venting

operation so as to allow releases of even greater amounts

of radiation to the environment than those already

substantial amounts nominally allowed by the operating

license. Since this required an explicit license amendment

it was isolated in a separate order. Petitioners have

mischaracterized the “Modification of License” as “replac-

ing” limits on releases of radiation with “new limits ex-

pressed in terms of actual radiation dosages.” U.S. Brief,

pp. 3 & 6. However the limits on dosages were neither

“new” nor did they relate to “actual” doses received by the

people around Three Mile Island. The dosage limits pro-

vided by the Modification of License, Pet. 65a, — 15

mrem skin dose and 5 mrem total body dose — are the

same as the limits provided by 10 CFR Part 50, App. I,

§ I1.B(2)(b) for annual offsite doses that will be

“deemed” to comply with the ALARA requirement for

operating light water reactors. The additional provision

that 20% of these limits should not be exceeded in any one

hour period compares with the reporting requirement con-

tained in id., § IV. A that attaches if half of these limits is

exceeded in any one quarter. It is readily apparent that the

dosage limits provided in the Modification of License are

very little different than those already applicable to TMI-2

under Appendix I of Part 50. Accordingly the NRC did

not “replace” the suspended release limits with “new”

dosage limits, but rather left the old dose standards

roughly the same, thereby leaving only half of the former

protection against radiation in place. Similarly, the dose

standards were not based on actual measurements of doses

to real individuals but rather were based on hypothetical

doses calculated from a limited number of sampling sta-

tions.

14

An independent team of scientists performed their own

radiation sampling and measurements during the full

course of the venting operation. These scientists tracked

the “plume” of materials released from TMI-2 and placed

their instruments at the point where the radioactive ef-

fluent reached ground level. J.A. 98-99. On the basis of

their independent measurements these scientists calculated

that 7 millicuries of Strontium-90 had been released —

four million times the amount expected by the NRC. J.A.

102,104. These independent scientists calculated that this

amount of Strontium-90 was sufficient to cause long term

health effects of 50 to 300 additional fatal cancers as well

as other genetic effects. J.A. 104. The people who will die

from these cancers and who will suffer from genetic

defects will have no recourse against petitioners for the

damages done them solely for purposes of cutting the ex-

pense of the cleanup. The trail of causation from these in-

juries back to petitioners’ action in June and July 1980

becomes lost in the myriad alternative causes of cancer

and genetic defects. The hearing which the Court of Ap-

peals below held to have been illegally denied was the only

recourse available to the people exposed to these dangers.

The question of whether the hearing on the release of

radiation from TMI-2 to the environment was illegally

denied by the NRC is not before this Court. That question

has not been appealed and therefore must be taken as

settled. It was unlawful for the NRC to deny a public hear-

ing on the decision to release radioactive materials from

TMI-2. The narrow question before this Court is whether

it was also unlawful for the NRC to refuse to include as

part of such a hearing the matters addressed in the

Modification of License, i.e. the suspension of the limits

on release of radiation contained in the operating license.

15

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Sentence One of § 189, which has been in effect since

1954, provides as follows:

In any proceeding under this Act, for the...

amending of any license... the Commission

shall grant a hearing upon the request of any per-

son whose interest may be affected by the pro-

ceeding...

A 1962 amendment to § 189 made the following changes

with respect to hearings on licensing actions under the

Atomic Energy Act:

Sentence Two — retained a mandatory hearing

requirement for construction permits while

eliminating mandatory (i.e. unrequested) hear-

ings on other licensing actions such as license

amendments;

Sentence Three — provided that in the case

where a hearing had not been requested such

other licensing actions could be taken only after

30 days’ prior notice and publication in the

Federal Register;

Sentence Four — excepted from this 30 days’

prior notice and publication requirement those

license amendments which the NRC finds to in-

volve no significant hazards consideration.

Petitioners in this case attempt to read into Sentence

Four language that Congress did not choose to write and

even petitioners admit “189(a) does not expressly

mention.” U.S. Brief 14. Petitioners argue that Sentence

Four might somehow be read to authorize the denial of a

requested hearing. But the arguments offered for this im-

16

aginative reading of § 189 lack cogency, boiling down

essentially to the non-sequitur assertion that to authorize

waiver of notice and publication when a hearing has not

been requested necessarily implies authority to deny a

hearing when one has been requested. This ignores the fact

that economy of prose if nothing else would lead a

legislative draftsman intent on authorizing the denial of a

requested hearing to simply say as much and thereby make

any reference to notice and publication unnecessary. The

ambiguity petitioners seek in § 189 as the essential founda-

tion for their case is simply not to be found there.

Petitioners also fail to present a single exampie of

legislative history or relevant administrative practice that

is in any way inconsistent with the principle that a mean-

ingful hearing must be held on request made at some time

after the initial decision is issued on a “no significant

hazards consideration” license amendment. Nor do peti-

tioners cite any legislative history or administrative prac-

tice whatsoever even bearing on the principle embodied in

the Court of Appeals’ holding in this case that to be mean-

ingful a hearing on an amendment involving irreversible

action such as release of radiation into the environment

must be held prior to final issuance and effectuation of the

license amendment.

Petitioners seek to supplement a statutory construction

argument riddled with empty reasoning, confusion and ir-

relevance by offering wholy disingenuous predictions

about the dire consequences that the relatively infrequent-

ly invoked due process rights involved in this proceeding

might speculatively have upon NRC administrative effi-

ciency. The speculation that props up this policy argument

is readily revealed to be as unreliable as petitioners’

idiosyncratic approach to statutory construction.

17

The due process rights at stake — infrequently invoked

as they may be — are nevertheless too important in the

context of protection of the public against hazards of

radiation to be so lightly revoked as by the judicial legisla-

tion sought by petitioners in this case. The unique and vast

discretion already reposed in the NRC over matters that

hazard grievous loss of life, liberty and property precludes

the judicial erosion of the minimal due process rights ac-

corded by a strict and faithful construction of the plain

language of the statute by which Congress sought to struc-

ture otherwise unbounded agency discretion’ with pro-

cedural safeguards.

ARGUMENT

The resolution of this case will turn on the interpreta-

tion given by the Court to the fourth sentence of § 189 of

the Atomic Energy Act. The fourth sentence of § 189

refers back to and can only be understood in reference to

the third sentence of § 189 which provides that in the

absense of a request for a hearing on certain licensing ac-

tions, a hearing may be omitted prior to issuance of the

amendment, but only after a 30 days’ notice and pv’slica-

tion of the NRC’s intent to so proceed without such an

(unrequested) hearing. The fourth sentence goes on to pro-

vide that “such 30 days’ notice and publication” may be

dispensed with, in the case of amendments, “upon a deter-

mination by the Commission that the amendment involves

no significant hazards consideration.” It is this language

which petitioners seek to turn into authority for denying

requested hearings upon a finding of “no significant

hazards consideration.” Such authority would provide a

powerful weapon in the hands of an agency seeking to con-

duct its affairs outside of public view. Strategic use of this

weapon can effectively paralyze representatives of the pub-

lic who would seek to contest controversial issues involving

18

nuclear safety by requiring them to litigate first in the

Court of Appeals an ultimate question of fact on a barren

record. Because of problems of timing, because a “court

more often than not will decline to grant emergency relief,”

651 F.2d 784 note 14, and because of the sheer expense of

litigation for public interest plaintiffs who stand to make

no financial gain from the litigation, even a victory in

Court will typically be Pyrrhic — as it was in this case.

In order to craft such a weapon from the otherwise in-

nocuous language of § 189 petitioners must of necessity

prevail in persuading this Court, as it failed to persuade

the Court of Appeals, of the following:

1. That the fourth sentence of § 189 contains

some ambiguity which might allow an inter-

pretation that the NRC has authority to deny a

requested hearing on the basis of a “no signifi-

cant hazards consideration” finding, and

2. Legislative history exists that indicates that

Congress intended § 189 to authorize the NRC to

deny a requested hearing on the basis of a “no

significant hazards consideration” finding, or

3. Consistent administrative practice inter-

preted § 189 to permit the NRC to deny a re-

quested hearing on the basis of a “no significant

hazards consideration” finding.

In addition petitioners attempt to fashion a “public policy”

argument in support of granting the NRC the authority it

seeks to deny duly requested hearings.

The arguments offered by the petitioners in their briefs

on these issues constitute an unbroken tissue of dis-

ingenuous assertion, speculation and non-sequitur. Each of

these arguments is answered in turn below.

19

1. The Plain Meaning of § 189 Forbids Any In-

terpretation That a Duly Requested Hearing May

Be Denied Upon a Summary Finding by the NRC

That a License Amendment Involves No Signifi-

cant Hazards Consideration.

in its brief presented to the Court of Appeals the United

States gave a cogent exegesis of the plain meaning of § 189

(Justice Department Brief pp. 4-8, 12-4. In its brief before

this Court the United States attempts to turn the tables to

assert that the “plain language” of the statute supports the

NRC’s position. (U.S. Brief 38). The petitioners’ “plain

language” arguments are as weak here as the United States’

arguments were strong below.

a) The principal argument relied upon by Met Ed and the

NRC below was that since a right to hearing is not mean-

ingful without an attendant right to notice, Congress’

authority to waive notice must have carried with it an im-

plicit waiver of the right to hearing. However, as the Court

of Appeals found, this seeming “paradox” is theoretical

only, it did not occur in this case, and it is unclear whether

it would ever occur. First the notice required under 10

CFR 2.106 probably must be given before an issued

amendment is effectuated so as to provide an opportunity

for appeal. Second, and more important the Government

in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. 552b (1976) provides that

every meeting at which the Commissioners dispose of

agency business must be open to public observation. Ac-

cordingly the interested public and the press have ample

means to learn of decisions that might affect their in-

terests. Even the repealed 10 CFR 50.59 so heavily relied

upon by petitioners, in subsection(g) (J.A. 25-26) required

that both the request for a license change and the

authorization issued by the Commission must be made

20

part of the public record of the licensing proceeding.

Again any persons following the proceedings would have

actual notice of the licensing action.

Both briefs of petitioners cite the case of Mullane v.

Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314

(1950) for the proposition that a right of hearing without

notice is meaningless. U.S. Brief 38; Met Ed Brief 24 note

18. But both briefs ignore the type of notice that is being

waived under § 189, i.e. publication in the Federal

Register. The significance of such notice was tellingly

described, on the very next page of text in Mullane from

that cited by petitioners, as follows.

It would be idle to pretend that publication

alone, as prescribed here, is a reliable means of

acquainting interested parties of the fact that

their rights are before the courts . . . [Compared

to] actual notice we are unable to regard this as

more than a feint . . . . Chance alone brings to

the attention... an advertisement in... a

newspaper. Id. 315 (sentence order modified).

Persons having the economic and scientific resources re-

quired for participation in a hearing on a license amend-

ment would not likely find out about the amendment by

casual perusal of the Federal Register. It is far more likely

that they would be monitoring the proceedings by which

they are affected and learn about the amendment directly

or indirectly from the public record. The purpose and ef-

fect of sentence four is to save 30 days of administrative

time on each of the overwhelming number of amendments

where it can be reasonably expected that no hearing will be

requested, i.e. whereof the NRC fairly determines there to

be “no significant hazards consideration.” Given peti-

tioners’ estimate of about 400 “no significant hazards con-

2!

sideration” amendments a year, this technique saves about

12,000 days of administrative time annually. The due pro-

cess cost of so expediting the overall administrative

licensing process is that any affected party seeking a hear-

ing On an irreversible action has the burden of requesting a

hearing promptly before the issued amendment is given ef-

fect.

The compromise struck by the fourth sentence of § 189

between administrative efficiency and administrative due

process has apparently been an eminently workable one.

In the 19 years since this provision was enacted only one

other dispute involving the provision has reached the

courts, Brooks v. AEC, 476 F.2d 924 (1973). Both in

Brooks and in the instant case the cause of the dispute over

the fourth sentence of § 189 was generated less by any am-

biguity in the provision itself than by the NRC’s attempt to

cover more serious violations of other provisions of § 189

that were coupled with the NRC’s violation of this provi-

sion.

b) The other argument offered by petitioners in hopes of

reading some ambiguity into § 189 is based on a non-

sequitur. The government’s brief at 36, the last two

sentences, states correctly that the words “such thirty days’

notice and publication” in the fourth sentence refers back

to the notice and publication required when the NRC in-

tends to issue a license amendment without a hearing. This

action is of course by the very terms of sentence three only

permitted “in the absence of a request” for a hearing.

However, petitioners conclude, in what must be a minor

classic of ilbgic, that if the NRC is allowed, upon making a

no significant hazards consideration finding, to dispense

with the notice required when a hearing has been omitted

because one has not been requested, “it necessarily follows

that the Commission is in fact entitled to dispense with a

22

hearing”. Ibid. The simple answer to this notion is that

sentence three provides that a hearing may indeed be

dispensed with when one has not been requested. Sentence

four says nothing about and does not remotely suggest the

possibility of dispensing with a hearing that has been re-

quested. Its use of the words “such notice” makes it

clear that sentence four is only a qualification of, and is

therefore limited to the subject matter of, sentence three,

Petitioners attempt to explain away this obvious rela-

tionship between sentences three and four of § 189 in a str-

ing of non-sequiturs. U.S. Brief 36 note 30. First peti-

tioners state that respondents’ recognition of this relation-

ship somehow conflicts with the interpretation of the

Court of Appeals. But petitioners do not explain how they

came to believe the Court of Appeals’ view differed from

that of the respondents. Several references are provided

(id. 37 & note 31) suggesting that the Court of Appeals

assumed the “sentence three” notice of NRC intent to issue

a license amendment without a hearing would also be the

first notice that a license amendment would issue at all.

This identity between the two possible kinds of notice not

only exists in fact, since the law nowhere requires any

other published notice of the action prior to the notice re-

quired by sentence three, but it is also the very premise

upon which petitioners argument discussed in 1(a) above is

based. If some notice other than that required in sentence

three were to be given by the NRC of the issusance of a

license amendment, then there would be no basis what-

soever for the argument that waiver of “sentence three”

notice implies waiver of hearing. However, in the argu-

ment of petitioners now under discussion a wholly dis-

ingenuous attempt is made to discover some error of in-

determinate consequence in the Court of Appeals’ decision

by suggesting that the notice of action without a hearing is

23:

somehow distinct from the notice of the action, without

anywhere stating that there is any practical difference bet-

ween the two. This attempt can only be understood as an

effort to import the confusion and ambiguities of peti-

tioners’ own arguments into the statute.

Next (id. 37 note 30) petitioners seek to base a similarly

confused argument on the use of the word “any” in the

sentence four phrase that the “Commission may dispense

with such thirty day notice and publication with respect to

any application for an amendment...” It requires no

elaborate argument to show that the word “any”, just as

the whole sentence, is qualified by the words “such notice”

which in turn refer back to the waiver of hearing when one

is not requested per sentence three. So again an attempt to

find ambiguity through analysis of the words of the statute

leads nowhere.

Next petitioners state that “respondents’ suggestion fails

to account for” the omission of the issuance of an

operating license from the coverage of sentence four. (Id

note 30.) The simple answer to this argument is that the

omission accounts for itself. It is only too obvious that an

operating license could never under any circumstances “in-

volve no significant hazards consideration” and therefore

there is no need to include operating licenses within the

scope of sentence four.

Finally petitioners close out this pointless string of

arguments on the plain meaning by repeating the ever-

ready assertion that the legislative history of § 189 “adopts

the Commission’s practice under 10 CFR 50.59.” Id. This

assertion is irrelevant to a discussion of the plain meaning

of § 189 and is dealt with below. Legislative history —

even if it did support petitioners’ interpretation, as 10 CFR

50.59 fails to do — could not create ambiguity in the text

24

of the statute. This exhausts the arguments proffered by

petitioners to undermine the clear and plain meaning of

sentence four. In their lack of persuasiveness, and even

logic, these frivolous arguments only serve to reinforce the

plain meaning which a simple reading of sentence four

unambiguously conveys, i.e. that sentence four of § 189

pertains to notice and publication and has nothing remote-

ly to do with authorizing the denial of a duly requested

hearing on a license amendment.

2. The Legislative History of § 189 Lends No

Support to the Notion That Congress Intended

to Authorize the NRC to Deny a Duly Requested

Hearing on the Basis of a “No Significant

Hazards Consideration” Finding.

Petitioners devote the greatest portion of their argument

to a discussion of legislative history. U.S. Brief 15-35.

Although many fragments from the legislative record are

quoted and discussed nothing is found to modify the con-

clusion of an exhaustive discussion of the legislative

history of § 189, set forth in the brief of the United

States before the Court of Appeals, explaining the view

that § 189 does not authorize the NRC to deny a duly re-

quested hearing:

The legislative history of the 1962 amendment is

the most compelling reason for our holding this

view. Throughout the legislative history, at

crucial points, are authoritative statements that

the effect of the amendment would be only to

eliminate hearings when none was requested. It

was repeatedly said that the amendment would

not affect the right of any person to obtain a

hearing on request. Memorandum of Respon-

dent United States of America 14;

25

In fact, as admitted by petitioners, the legislative history

on sentence four of § 189 is sparse. U.S. Brief 34. Most of

the discussion of legislative history presented by peti-

tioners is simply padding in no way inconsistent with the

conclusion of the United States quoted immediately

above. Once this padding is pared away petitioners case is

seen to depend upon the following simple, though

untenable, chain of argument:

a) The Committee Report statement that the

“significant hazards consideration . . . criterion

is presently being applied by the Commission

under the terms of AEC Regulation 50.59” is

asserted by petitioners to “incorporate by

reference” all of 50.59, U.S. Brief 32, 34, rather

than at best simply adopt the administrative in-

terpretation of the “significant hazards con-

sideration” criterion apparently borrowed by

Congress from 50.59.

b) Regulation 50.59 and the Vollecitos deci-

sion which it codified is asserted to stand for the

proposition that a duly requested hearing can be

denied by the NRC on a license amendment

found by the NRC to involve no “significant

hazards consideration.”

Proposition (a) above requires little discussion to refute

the wildly expansive claim made by petitioners for what is

rather modest language. There is simply no indication

anywhere in the legislative history that Congress intended

to adopt all of 10 CFR 50.59 (1963) by reference when it

mentioned that the “significant hazards consideration”

criterion adopted by Congress in sentence four of § 189 is

also applied by the NRC under 50.59. The purpose of

Congress in including this brief allusion to 50.59 is clear

and unexceptionabl

that the term of a

cumulated a fuller

ferent context of 5

helpful reference w

While a simple re

cient to reveal that t

reference” 50.59 int

were such an intent

Vallecitos decision

the proposition tha

hearing upon maki

tion” finding.

Both Vallecitos a

datory hearing req

amendments of § 18

proceeding, i.e. on

Both the Vallecitos «

1960) and the new 1

9, 1962) were intenc

hearings on every li

requested. Both co

should order a heari

quested by an affe

50.59 anywhere sug

denied on the basis «

tion” finding. Since

required the holding

been unthinkable fo

to denying requestec

ment to that effect.

codify the Vallecitc

unrequested, hearin

find no “significant

27

result of the fourth sentence of § 189 this would mean that

affected persons would, theoretically, not necessarily have

prior notice of the authorization of the changes permitted

under the 50.59 provisions, while the right to a requested

hearing would remain unchanged. In practice however it

was clear that the Vallecitos approach, codified in 50.59,

provided both notice and opportunity for hearing. The

best evidence of the NRC’s practice under the Vallecitos

decision are actions taken with respect to license amend-

ments in the Vallecitos proceeding itself subsequent to the

November 18, 1960 decision later codified as 50.59. For

example, a September 1, 1961 license Amendment N. 17

to the Vallecitos license DPR-1 stated that,

prior public notice of proposed issuance of this

amendment is not necessary in the public interest

since [it] would not present any substantial

change in the hazards to the health and safety of

the public... .

In accordance with the Commission’s rules of

practice (10 CFR Part 2) the Commission will

direct the holding of a formal hearing on the

matter of issuance of the license amendment

upon receipt of a request therefor from the

licensee or an intervenor within 30 days after the

issuance of the amendment. 26 Fed. Reg. 8469.

This administrative practice makes clear that the NRC

accorded a hearing upon request after Vallecitos on the

kinds of issues that presented no significant hazards con-

sideration. That Congress did not “incorporate by

reference” § 50.59 in its statutory scheme did not therefore

mean that Congress disapproved the Commission’s prac-

tices — the straw man that petitioners would set up. See

U.S. Brief 34 note 27. Congress simply achieved a similar

28

result in a different manner. Once sentence three did away

altogether with mandatory hearings past the construction

permit stage, 50.59 no longer had the same pertinence to

NRC proceedings that it had before the 1962 amendments

and the portions relevant to this proceeding were eventual-

ly repealed.

Finally, the notion that “the court of appeals’ interpreta-

tion of the legislative history . . . fails to ascribe any in-

dependent purpose or effect to the fourth sentence” of

§ 189 is simply absurd. See U.S. Brief 33. The Court of

Appeals gave to the fourth sentence precisely the effect its

words and Congress intended, i.e. to permit the NRC to

waive notice and publication of amendments found to in-

volve no significant hazards consideration. If Congress

had intended to permit the NRC to deny a requested hear-

ing as well as waive notice and publication it could easily

have found the words to do so.

3. The NRC’s Own Administrative Practice

Does Not Support Its Denial of a Requested

Hearing Prior to Taking an Irreversible Act Pur-

suant to a License Amendment Found By the

NRC to Involve “No Significant Hazards Con-

sideration.”

Petitioners raise the issue that the “court of appeals er-

roneously failed to defer to the Commission’s long-

standing interpretation of Section 189(a).” U.S. Brief 39.

However the administrative practice offered in support of

this proposition simply will not bear the weight assigned to

it. Petitioners rely again principally upon the Vallecitos

decision and its codification in 50.59 which as shown

above both addressed the problem of mandatory, unre-

quested hearings and did not at all suggest that the NRC

had authority to deny requested hearings. Met Ed Brief

29

27. At the time of this administr ative practice the only pro-

blem the NRC had encountered concerning its single con-

tested proceeding was the NRC’s own failure to provide

adequate notice and hearing which, as Intervenors noted,

subjected the agency to considerable attack in Congress.

Met Ed Brief 13.

Aside from these two over-used props to petitioners’

case, both of which actually predated the enactment of

sentence four and accordingly could be of no use in

discovering administrative practice under that statute,

petitioners offer very little that can be considered even

relevant to the interpretation of sentence four.

Intevenors cite one lonely example of pure dicta from an

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board decision which sup-

ports the petitioners’ interpretation in this case. Met Ed

Brief 29-30. But this decision is simply not the practice of

the Commission itself which might be deferred to by a

court. Atomic Safety and Licensing Board members are

selected from outside the agency and do not include

members of the Commission. Cf. 10 CFR 1.11 & 2.721.

They do not form a permanent administrative organ

creating a body of precedent out of a coherent fund of ex-

perience, but rather are selected from a panel to sit as ad

hoc boards constituted for particular licensing hearings.

The boards are not involved in administering the statute

but rather take evidence and issue decisions on technical

matters. One statement, which was in fact dicta, from one

of these part time ad hoc boards in 1974 is not the kind of

administrative practice that might justify the NRC’s un-

precedented denial of a requested hearing in this case.

From the Commission itself petitioners can only offer

the bare statement that “Section 189 does permit im-

mediate effectiveness” of amendments found to involve

30

“no significant hazards consideration.” Met Ed Brief 29.

Of course this statement says no more than that prior

notice may be waived when issuing an amendment pur-

suant to the fourth sentence of § 189. Intervenor goes on

io claim that “the Commission has consistently applied its

interpretation of the Act thousands of times . . . to make

license amendments effective immediately without notice

or opportunity for a prior hearing.” Ibid. The sense in

which this statement is partially true lends no support to

petitioners’ attempt to overturn the decision of the Court

of Appeals. There is no dispute that the NRC has authori-

ty to make “license amendments effective immediately

without notice.” Similarly the proposition that a prior

hearing may also be omitted can be made literally true if

“prior” means only prior to the authorization that may be

issued without notice and does not refer to the case where

a hearing may have been requested. Taken in any other

sense this assertion is siasoly untrue. Petitioners have been

unable to provide a‘1y single instance before Three Miie

Island where the Commission denied a hearing that had

been duly requested or where request for a hearing on an

irreversible action did not suspend the effectiveness of the

amendment. This would be the only kind of administrative

practice relevant to this case, and it simply does not exist.

Because the petitioners offer, as examples of ad-

ministrative practice supportive of their attempt to over-

turn the Court of Appeals’ decision, matters that are wholly

irrelevant to the issues at stake in this case it is important,

finally, to set forth very clearly just what are the areas of

difference between petitioners and respondents.

Respondents clearly do not contend that where no hear-

ing has been requested prior to the authorization of a “no

significant hazards consideration” license amendment the

NRC must hold a hearing prior to the authorization. But

31

this nevertheless apparently forms tthe straw man at

which much of petitioners’ argument is misdirected.

Respondents simply contend, first, that in every case

where an affected party duly requests a hearing on a

license amendment a hearing cannot be denied on the

grounds of a “no significant hazards consideration” fin-

ding. Numerous references to the right to some hearing in

the petitioners’ briefs suggests that the petitioners do not

disagree with this proposition. See U.S. Brief pp. 21, 35

notes 28 (“opportunity to intervene does not necessarily re-

quire a hearing prior to initial action by the Commission”)

and 29 (§ 189 fourth sentence “does not necessarily require

that a hearing be held prior to action by the Commission”)

Met Ed Brief 16 line 4, 17 line 13, 21 lines 5-6, 25 note 21

lines 3-5. Both briefs point out that the NKC’s practice is

that it “remains willing to entertain requests for a hearing

filed after” it issues a license amendment. U.S. Brief 40

and note 33; Met Ed Brief 29. In fact the NRC followed its

practice of offering some hearing in this very case.The

problem in this case is that the offer of hearing was totally

meaningless because it involved actions that were irreversi-

ble and the NRC made the novel ruling that a request for a

hearing would not stay the effectiveness of the amend-

ment. Pet. 66a. There is nothing in any legislative history

even suggested by petitioners or any administrative prac-

tice of any kind prior to 1980 which would authorize the

NRC to issue such a ruling under any circumstances, much

less where the action authorized is irreversible.

Respondents herein have recognized from the beginning

that where a “no significant hazards consideration” find-

ing is made the basis for waiving notice, and no prior re-

quest has been made for a hearing, it will not be necesary

under § 189 for the NRC to hold a hearing priofto “initial

action approving the amendment” by the NRC.

Respondents have insisted only that a hearing on an ir-

52

reversible action be held on request prior to the final is-

suance of the amendment (after any stay) and prior to the

licensee’s taking any irreversible action pursuant to the

amendment. Therefore it appears that the “Argument” of

petitioners stated at pp. iii & 15 of the United States’ Brief

is in no way inconsistent with the respondents’ position

consistently held in the Court of Appeals and before this

Court and can be easily reconciled with the Court of Ap-

peals’ holding on the facts of this case. The hearing re-

quired to be held upon request by § 189 in the case of a

“no significant hazards consideration” finding may be

held “after initial action approving the amendment” pro-

vided it is held prior to final issuance and effectuation of

the amendment. In the case presently before this Court the

NRC contemplated a hearing only after the full and ir-

reveSible effectuation of the admendment by release of

radioactive materials into the environment. Such a hearing

would have been nothing other than meaningless.

Petitioners attempt to explain away the absurdity of

holding a hearing on an action irreversibly taken, as the

NRC proposed to do in this case, with the not quite rele-

vant observation that the “vast majority of operating

license amendments are reversible.” Met Ed Brief 34.

While it may very well be true that “[a]Jmendments deter-

mined to entail no significant hazards considerations are

not generally irreversible, thereby making meaningful the

opportunity to seek an after-the-fact hearing and judicial

review,” U.S. Brief 40 note 34, it is just as clear that for

those albeit few cases where the action authorized by an

amendment will be irreversible a hearing after effectuation

of the amendment will be meaningless. This case is not one

of the “vast majority” but rather involves, as conceded by

petitioners (Met Ed Brief 34), an action that was irreversi-

ble. Accordingly the interesting question of whether or not

a hearing on an amendment authorizing an action that is

33

not irreversible may be held after effectuation of the

amendment is not presently before the Court on the facts

of this case. The only question is whether a hearing

granted after effectuation of an admittedly irreversible ac-

tion is a meaningful hearing, assuming — as it appears —

that petitioners concede some hearing to be required by

§ 189. As the Court of Appeals simply held,’§ 189(a) re-

quired a hearing upon request on the Venting Order before

it went into effect; a hearing after the venting had been

completed would not have satisfied the statute’s require-

ment.” 651 F.Zd 791 note 28. See also Fuentes v. Shevin,

407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972)

4. This Court’s Upholding of the Plain Meaning

of § 189 So As To Accord Requested Hearings

on “No Significant Hazards Consideration”

Amendments Involving Irreversible Action Will

Not Introduce The Overwhelming Ad-

ministrative Burdens Imagined By Petitioners

Petitioners attempt to fashion a public policy argument

that if § 189 is interpreted as the Court of Appeals did in-

terpret it below to require a hearing when requested on a

“no significant hazards consideration” amendment, there

will as a result occur such a flood of hearing requests as to

“threaten the viability of the existing system of

regulation.” U.S. Brief 41. With all respect, this argument

is patent nonsense. Petitioners mention no requests for

hearings on “no significant hazards consideration amend-

ments” since the November 19, 1980 decision in this case.

Petitioners fail to cite one instance other than this case

where intervenors have ever requested a hearing on a “no

significant hazards consideration” amendment, except for

the Consumers Power Co. case where the Atomic Safety

and Licensing Board found that the hazards considerations

could be significant and granted a hearing, 7 AEC 297,

34

298 (1974). Met Ed Brief 29-30. The Court of Appeals rul-

ing in this case has in fact been the law of the District of

Columbia Circuit since the Brooks decision in 1973

without stirring a flood of hearing requests. Since peti-

tioners seemingly concede that some hearing is required,

just not a prior hearing, the grant of a meaningfully timely

hearing will not require more resources but simply better

planning. Finally, this case only deals with amendments

involving irreversible action. Petitioners themselves con-

cede that such amendments are relatively rare. This con-

cession considerably deflates their assertions about the

vast consequences of the decision in this case. Peti‘ioners’

argument about the dire consequences of the Court of Ap-

peals decision simply does not hold up against actual ex-

perience or petitioners’ own statements about the rarity of

irreversible amendments.

Not only do the circumstances of this case — a request

for a hearing on a “no significant hazards consideration”

amendment which is irreversible — seldom arise, but

numerous techniques exist for expediting the NRC pro-

ceedings which are in no way compromised by the Court

of Appeals’ decision. In any situation where the “public

health, safety or interest so requires,” the NRC is permit-

ted by regulation to make a license modification effective

immediately. See 10 CFR § 2.204. The NRC enforces a

rigorous standing requirement for intervenors. 10 CFR

§ 2.714.

Hearing examiners have authority to dispose of issues

on the pleadings where there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact, 10 CFR § 2.749 and may otherwise expedite

proceedings, e.g. 10 CFR §§ 2.757, 2.761.

The most telling reason why the fears proffered by the

’ NRC may be substantially discounted was well stated by

35

then Circuit Judge Burger in the context of standing

before the FCC. The following sage observation of Chief

Justice Burger is equally applicable to the petitioners’

“parade of fantasized horrors” in this case:

The fears of regulatory agencies that their pro-

cesses will be inundated by expansion of standing

criteria are rarely borne out. Always a restraining

factor is the expense of participation in the ad-

ministrative process, an economic reality which

will operate to limit the number of those who will

seek participation; legal and related expenses of

administrative proceedings are such that even

those with large economic interests find the costs

burdensome. Moreover, the listening public

seeking intervention in a license renewal pro-

ceeding cannot attract lawyers to represent their

cause by the prospect of lucrative contingent

fees, as can be done, for example, in rate cases.

Office of Communication of the United Church

ot Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1006 (D.C. Cir.

1966)

Petitioners’ “man bites dog” report that such intervenors

are going to “threaten the viability of the existing system

of regulation of nuclear power production, power produc-

tion itself, or both,” U.S. Brief 41, strains credulity.

36

5. The Important Interests of Due Process and

Fundamental Fairness Require That § 189 Be

Strictly and Faithfully Construed to Preserve the

Public’s Right to a Hearing Before Suffering the

Irreversible Effects of Radiation, In the Absence

of Clear and Unmistakable Evidence of Congres-

sional Intent To Deny That Right.

The public has a profound interest in NRC licensing ac-

tions. In the course of deliberation on the Atomic Energy

Act, Senator Humphrey stated:

I think it is fair to say that no single development

in the nation is more public in nature than the

atomic development, for it has been paid for by

all the taxpayers. 100 Cong. Rec. 10730 (1954).

Because of the continuing symbiotic relationship between

government and the nuclear industry (see findings of fact

in Oklahoma v. Bernstein, 5 Media L. Rep. 2313 (1980))

government has more direct responsibility for injuries suf-

fered by the public in the context of nuclear regulation

than would be the case ii: other regulatory contexts.

Because of the peculiar nature of radiation, prior

regulation to prevent releases of radiation is the chief

remedy available to those subjected to its hazards. The

NRC has been given vast discretion to balance risks and

benefits in this area, and the procedural rights granted the

public constitute the chief means by which Congress has

structured the discretion it has delegated to the NRC.

Although the procedural rights at stake in this case have

been accorded by statute, they are of a kind traditionally

considered fundamental and have been accorded a high

degree of protection by this Court.

37

i) The hearing right denied by the NRC was essential to

elemental fairness and due process for those affected by

the radiation releases.

The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution

prohibits the Federal government from depriving any per-

son of life, liberty or property without due process of law.

The intentional release of radioactive materials into the

earth’s atmosphere, whether from the containment

building of the partially melted-down Three Mile Island

reactor or from any operating power reactor, adversely af-

fects human life, burdening the public with debilitating

disease and afflicting the genetic heritage of humanity

with irreversible mutations and chromosomal aberrations.

The assault of radiation on the human cell is a sub-

microscopic event, its consequences, though serious, are

remote in time and attributable to diverse possible

etiologies. Accordingly, the precise causal relation-

ship between known quantities of radicactive mate-

rials dispersed into the environment and any particu-

lar human pathology is virtually unprovable, though

epidemiological, biostatistical, and public health studies

are showing that the generalized effects of low level radia-

tion are seriously underestimated by the radiological

theories of the NRC.

Though the injury inflicted upon life, liberty and pro-

perty interests by releases of radioactive materials into the

petitioners’ environment may not be easily identified to

particular individuals, there is no uncertainty that life in

human cells will be damaged by this radiation,? the liberty

“(I]t is generally believed that any exposure to radiation, however

small, has adverse genetic effects and those effects are cumulative.”

Green, Safety Determination in Nuclear Power Licensing: A Critical

View,” 43 Notre Dame Lawyer 633, 645 (1968).

38

to be free of disease may well be infringed, and nearby

property values may decline as animals die and suffer in-

jury. Meanwhile, those who evacuated their homes to

avoid possible injuries are deprived of their liberty of

movement and peace of mind. As the Supreme Court rul-

ed in Duke Power in light of the uncertainties about its

health and genetic effects, the emission of radiation itself

is a cognizable present injury to these interests. Duke

Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc.,

438 U.S. 59, 74 (1978). The nature of the interests involved

here, especially protection from physical assault by radia-

tion, are profound. There are few Due Process cases that

involve tort-like interferences with life and liberty interests

in the physical integrity of the person because,

prior hearings might well be dispensed with in

many circumstances in which the State’s conduct,

if not adequately justified, would constitute a

common-law tort. This would leave the injured

plaintiff in precisely the same posture as a

common-law plaintiff.... Monaghan, “Of

‘Liberty’ and ‘Property,’” 62 Cornell L.R. 405,

431 (1977).

However, the nature of low level radiation injuries, the

long latency period and problems of proving causation all

but preclude tort recovery outside the workplace, except in

such an exceptional factual circumstance as was present in

Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 585 F.Supp. 566 (W.D.

Okla. 1979), virtually the sole tort recovery for radiation

injury (autopsy conducted shortly after plutonium facility

worker’s substantial off-site contamination, which was

discovered by monitors at workplace).

For infliction of physical injury by radiation, the only

effective way to accord a potential radiation victim due

39

process is to provide access to a hearing before the injury

is inflicted. In § 189 Congress has struck a delicate balance

between due process and administrative efficiency that has

survived unchanged since 1962 through the most active

period of reactor licensing of the 1960’s and 1970’s. The

basic procedural rights accorded by Congress cannot be

eroded by administrative interpretation without raising

issues of constitutional import. This Court has stated:

The “right to be heard before being condemned

to suffer grievous loss of any kind, even though

it may not involve the stigma and hardships of a

criminal conviction, is a principle basic to our

society.” Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath,

341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J. concur-

ring). The fundamental requirement of due pro-

cess is the opportunity to be heard “at a mean-

ingful time and in a meaningful manner.” Arm-

strong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).

In Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 507-08 (1959) the

Court held:

Where administrative action has raised serious

constitutional problems, the Court has assumed

that Congress . . . intended to afford those af-

fected by the action the traditional safeguards of

due process. (citations omitted) These cases

reflect the Court’s concern that traditional forms

of fair procedure not be restricted by implication

or without the most explicit action by the

Nation’s lawmakers, even in areas where it is

possible that the Constitution presents no inhibi-

tion. (emphasis added) ©

40

While injuries from non-natural low level radiation may

be a novel twentieth century phenomenon, the procedural

rights at stake in these cases are as ancient as the traditions

of a free people. “The history of liberty has largely been

the history of observance of procedural safeguards.”

McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347, (1943)

(Frankfurter, J.). In a government of laws the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission must also be made subject to the

fundamental and minimal procedural safeguards accorded

by Congress to protect our traditional liberties. Not to do

this much in an area frought with political controversy is

to countenance and encourage the divisiveness, alienation

and stress that happens

. . . when a substantial number of people come

to believe that major decisions have been made

without their consent. If the social fabric is to

survive, the politics of manipulation and delega-

tion simply must be replaced by a politics of in-

formed consent. Wright, “Beyond Discretionary

Justice,” 81 Yale L.J. 575, 586 (1972)

The fallout of psychological stress and alienation which

resulted from the NRC’s handling of the situation underly-

ing this case is part of the record. In hearings on the

cleanup, Senator Simpson, Chairman of the Senate

Nuclear Regulation Subcommittee, noted, after hearing

“residents of the local population around Three Mile

Island,” that it was reported the NRC “approach was driv-

ing them batty.” J.A. 71. Senator Simpson sensed “a com-

munity which is already anxious as a result of the accident

and highly skeptical of the two organizations directly in-

volved in the cleanup; that is, the NRC and the utility.

Given this situation, it seems to me prudent if not essential

for the NRC to lay out in detail for full public review the

standards it expects the utility to meet and the means it will

41

use to ensure the compliance.” J.A. 72. The need for the

NRC to provide a formal means of participation in deci-

sion making about the TMI-2 cleanup was made clear by

two psychololgists. Dr. Bruce Dohrenwend, Head, Social

Psychiatry Research Unit, Columbia University pointed

out to the NRC prior to the venting the “local citizens

needs to be informed and to participate in the decisions on

atmospheric decontamination. He emphasized the rela-

tionship between information and participation and the

level of psychological stress within the population.” J.A.

90. Dr. Colman informed the NRC, after a sham “public

meeting” where the public had no apparent means for in-

fluencing decision making but was rather designed to

“sell” the public a decision already made:

As a Psychologist I am getting scared. Those

Meetings are rowdy .... I think unless some

mechanism can be developed so the people in

that area have a realistic understanding that they

are gaining control over the situation there by

having a clear effect on the Commission about its

decision, that anger level is going to keep on going.

Wherever it goes, I don’t want to speculate, but it

is not healthy, it is not good.

These behavioral scientists are expressing in the language

of their own disciplines what is perhaps the fundamental

constitutive principle of our democratic polity. As a

leading Constitutional law scholar has expressed it in

discussing the due process right to a prior hearing,

rights to interchange express the elementary idea

that to be a person rather than a thing is at least

to be consulted about what is to be done with

one. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

(1978) 503.

42

ii) The public has virtually no practical recourse

for protection against injurious releases of radia-

tion upon them other than a prior NRC hearing.

The Atomic Energy Act, as amended, has placed vast

powers in the hands of the five person Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, an independent agency whose members are

appointed to five year terms by the President with the ad-

vice and consent of the Senate, 42 U.S.C. 5841(b)

and (c). The Atomic Energy Act grants the NRC broad

rule-making and adjudicatory powers under “a regulatory

scheme which is virtually unique in the degree to which

broad responsibility is reposed in the administering agen-

cy, free of close prescription in its charter as to how it shall

proceed in achieving the statutory objectives”, Siegel v.

AEC, 400 F.2d 778, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1970)

The power granted the NRC under the Atomic Energy

Act in the area of protection against radiation hazards

wholly preempts the police powers of state and local

governments, 42 U.S.C. 2021(k); Northern States

Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971)

aff'd mem. 405 U.S. 1035 (1972). Therefore, the public

must turn to the Federal government, and, within the

Federal government, to the NRC as virtually its sole

source of regulatory protection against radiation hazards.

Cf. Train v. Colorado PIRG, 426 U.S. 1, (1976); 42

U.S.C. 6903 (27) (1976); with 40 CFR 190.10 and 42

U.S.C. 7602(g) (Supp II, 1978).

The NRC is empowered by the “Price-Anderson Act”,

42 U.S.C. 2210(e) (1976) to confer a limitation of

liability on its licensees for any damages in excess of $560

million, a small fraction of the damage that could result

from a nuclear accident. See Duke Power v. Carolina En-

vironmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, (1978). For

43

the more insidious and less dramatic forms of radiation in-

juries caused by low level radiation, problems of proof,

e.g. Mahoney v. United States, 220 F.Supp. 823 (E.D.

Tenn.) aff'd 339 F.2d 605 (6th Cir., 1964), and statutes of

limitations make any hope of receiving compensation for

injuries by damage suits at law highly speculative. The

public is accordingly not only reliant entirely upon the

NRC for its regulatory protection against radiation

hazards, but it is aiso largely dependent upon prior regula-

tion of hazards, as opposed to post hoc legal remedies for

damages, as a form of protection.

Notwithstandine such a scheme which combines in a

single agency vast responsibility for the welfare of the

public with a unique degree of untrammeled discretion, it

is nevertheless true that the remedies which the public has

been given in order to keep the NRC responsible have been

narrow and few. Unlike statutes such as the Clean Air Act

or the Safe Drinking Water Act which permit citizens’

suits, see Susquehanna Valley Alliance v. Three Mile

Island, 619 F.2d 231, 242 note 12 (3rd Cir. 1980), the

Atomic Energy Act does not create any general public

right for enforcement of environmental standards against

users Of radioactive material, id. 237-39. Licensees of the

NRC are entirely shielded by the Agency from any direct

citizens’ actions in the courts under the Atomic Energy

Act. Preemption prevents the state from creating any

other rights enforceable in state courts. Pacific Legal

Foundation v. State Energy Resources Cons. & Dev.

Com., 472 F.Supp. 191 (S.D. Cal. 1971). To protect

themselves from radiation hazards created by users of

radioactive materials, the public must rely upon the NRC

licensing and enforcement process. It is only in the narrow

framework of the NRC’s administrative proceedings that

the public is granted a forum within which it may attempt

44

to protect its interest in health and safety. Within this con-

text the public must conform to the rules and regulations

set by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and may ap-

peal the final findings and rulings of the Commission only

to a Court of Appeals where those findings, rulings and in-

terpretations are accorded favorable presumptions of ac-

curacy, reasonability, and respect, and the scope of review

and opportunity for fact-finding is narrow. See e.g. Nader

v. NRC, 513 ¥.2d 1045, 1055-56 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The

rights accorded the public by Congress in its broad delega-

tion of power to the NRC are exceedingly narrow,encom-

passing only the minimal due process rights of notice,

public adjudicatory hearing and participation contained in

§ 189. Short of electing a sympathetic president who might

gradually replace the NRC Commissioners or electing a

sympathetic Congress which might change the whole

statutory scheme for nuclear regulation, the only remedy

and protection which might be pursued by citizens, such as

the petitioners, residents in the vicinity of TMI-2, who

find themselves victim to the radiation hazards created by

an NRC licensee, is exercise of these narrow due process

rights accorded by § 189.

The authority under which the NRC exercises its discre-

tion to determine radiation hazards and to permit

degradation of the environment as a cost of producing

energy, is essentially similar to the legislative provisions —

which Justice Rehnquist would find to

violate the doctrine against uncanalized delega-

tions of legislative power

in Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum

Institute, 448 U.S. 607, 672, 675 (1980).

45

Where standards are as loose as those provided by the

Atomic Energy Act it is even more essential that all of the

procedural safeguards required by Congress be strictly en-

forced in agency decisionmaking. See K. Davis, I Ap-

MINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, Section 3.15(b) (1978) pp.

209-11. In the present case the NRC is attempting to ex-

pand its discretion so as to weaken the most fundamental

of due process safeguards which were provided by Con-

gress as a guide to agency decision making in an area of in-

herent uncertainty. In lieu of providing firm standards to

guide the substantive decisionmaking of the NRC, Con-

gress at least structured agency procedure so as to assure

that the NRC would take into account all available infor-

mation by according the public the procedural rights of

notice and hearing and participation. In light of the infor-

mation presented in formal adjudicatory hearings Con-

gress expected the NRC to develop its own precedents,

standards and rules. However, in this case the NRC took

its very first decision in the uncharted area of a reactor ac-

cident cleanup without according those procedural rights

Congress erected to assure that decisions would be well-

informed and based on all available information. While

those rights cannot be restored, they may be vindicated by

affirming the declaratory judgment entered by the Court

of Appeals below.

46

CONCLUSION

There is no support in the plain meaning of § 189 of the

Atomic Energy Act, in its legislative history, in ad-

ministrative practice under the provision, in case prece-

dent, or in reason for the NRC’s contention that it can

deny, on the basis of a “no significant hazards considera-

tion” finding, the right of an affected person to have a du-

ly requested hearing prior to final issuance and effectua-

tion of a license amendment.

The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeais for the

District of Columbia, below, should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT HAGER

Counsel of Record

DANIEL P. SHEEHAN

JOHN CLEWETT

Christic Institute

1324 North Capitol St.

Washington, D.C. 20002

(202) 797-8106

Counsel for People Against

Nuclear Energy, et al.

September 2, 1981

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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