Joint Appendix — United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission v. Sholly

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JUL 31 1961

ALEXANU<:? L STEVAS,

Nos. 80-1640, 80-1656

In the Supreme Cuurt uf the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Petitioners

STEVEN SHOLLY, ET AL.

METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY, ET AL.,

Petitioners

PEOPLE AGAINST NUCLEAR ENERGY, ET AL.

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO JHE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

JOINT APPENDIX

PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI FILED MARCH 30, 1981

AND APRIL 2, 1981

CERTIORARI GRANTED MAY 26, 1981

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

No. 80-1640

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Petitioners

Vv.

STEVEN SHOLLY, ET AL.

No. 80-1656

METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY, ET AL.,

Petitioners

PEOPLE AGAINST NUCLEAR ENERGY, ET AL.

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Docket Entries (D.C. Cir. No. 80-1691) ......................... 1

Docket Entries (D.C. Cir. No. 80-1783))))))))) 8

Docket Entries (D.C. Cir. No. 80-1784) 15

10 C.F.R. Part 50, at 27 Fed. Reg. 5491 et seq. (June

9, 1962)—Licensing of Production and Utilization

Facilities—Technical Specifications 20

ii TABLE OF CONTENTS

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Statement of

Policy and Notice of Intent to Prepare a Program-

matic Environmental Impact Statement, November

21, 1979, published 44 Fed. Reg. 67738 (1979) .........

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Order dated Feb-

ruary 11, 1980, in Metropolitan Edison Co. et al.

(Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2), Dkt.

No. 50-820 at 45 Fed. Reg. 11282 (1980) ..................

Excerpts from NUREG-0482, Three Mile Island Nu-

clear Station, Unit 2, Technical Specifications, Ap-

pendix A to License No. DPR-7 333

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission “Order Denying

Motion for Reconsideration of CLJ-80-25 and Order

for Temporary Modification of License,” dated June

26, 1980, in Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile

Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2), Dkt. No. 50-320

Excerpt from General Public Utilities, Inc. “Planning

Study for Containment Entry and Decontamination,”

July 2, 1979, Sections 6. 0-6. 1.2

Excerpts from Three Mile Island Cleanup,“ Hearings

before the Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation of

the Senate Committee on Environmental and Public

Works, November 9, 1979, Transcript pages 1-2, 5-7,

F nn ....

Excerpts from U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s

Response to Letters from Senators Hart and sal

son, January 2, 1980, pages 2-3 sis

Excerpts from General Public Utilities, Inc.’s Response

to Questions from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Com-

mission, January 4, 1980, page ..................22-...--..<--+-

Excerpts from Report of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Com-

mission’s Special Task Force, “Evaluation and Clean-

up Activities at Three Mile Island,” February 28,

1980, pages IV-5, IV-9, and IV-22nd!˖e.mn! eee

TABLE OF CONTENTS iii

Page

Excerpt from U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s

Response to Questions from Senators Hart and Simp-

ESCA SARE ̃ ¾ 0. 84

Excerpt from Transcript of Public Hearing Conducted

by tke U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March

D ¼ TTT. 85

Excerpt from Transcript of Public Hearing Conducted

by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March

e ̃ TI.... 86

Excerpt from U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Staff’s “Final Environmental Assessment for Decon-

tamination of the Three Mile Island Unit 2, Reactor

Building Atmosphere,” NUREG-0662, May, 1980,

seen RAO rl 88

Memorandum from Donald P. bin to William M.

Regan, Jr. of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Staff regarding telephone call from Dr. Bruce P.

Dohrenwend, May 1, 1980 Ue De a 90

Excerpt from Transcript of Public Hearing Conducted

by U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, June 5,

RLU NEE SS TM RO EOS 93

Excerpt from Transcript of Meeting of Advisory Com-

mittee on Reactor Safety, June 10, 1980, pages 5-7.... 94

“Measurement of Strontium 90 Released in Venting of

the TMI Unit 2 Containment Atmosphere: June 28-

July 11, 1980,” by Joan Harvey, Ph. D., Richard

Piccione, Ph. D., and Daniel Pisello, Ph. D., reprinted

in Final Programmatic Environmental Impact State-

ment related to decontamination and disposal of

radioactive wastes resulting from March 28, 1979,

accident, Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2,

March 1981, pp. A-178 to A-180 _ oo... 97

Order Granting Petition for a Writ of Certiorari a“

80-1640) 109

Order Granting Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (No.

80-1656) 110

iv TABLE OF CONTENTS

(The opinion (Pet. App. la-27a) and judgment (id. at

47a-48a) of the court of appeals, the statement dis-

senting from the denial of rehearing en banc (id. at

29a-46a), the June 12, 1980 “Memorandum and

Order” of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (id.

at 49a-Gla) and the Commission's June 12, 1980,

“Order for Temporary Modification of License” (id.

at 62a-67a) are printed as appendices to the petition

for a writ of certiorari in No. 80-1640)

COURT OF APPEALS DOCKET ENTRIES

D.C. Cir. No. 80-1691

STEVEN SHOLLY, DONALD E. HOSSLER, PETITIONERS

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION, ET AL., and the

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RESPONDENTS

METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY, ET AL., INTERVENORS

DATE FILINGS—PROCEEDINGS

06-23-80 Petitioners’ petition for review of an order of the

NRC

06-24-80 Certified copy of petition for review was mailed to

the NRC & Attorney General

6-24-80 Petitioners’ motion for injunctive, declaratory and

other relief

6-24-80 Petitioners’ motion requesting expeditious consid-

eration of petition for review of final NRC orders

6-24-80 Petitioners’ motion for argument and hearing on

motions

6-25-80 Motion of Metropolitan Edison Company, et al.

for leave to intervene

6-26-80 Respondent’s (USA) response to petitioners’ motion

for injunction pending appeal

6-26-80 Respondent’s (NRC) opposition to petitioners’ mo-

tion for injunction pending appeal (Volumes I and II of

a blue book attached)

6-26-80 Certified Index to Record

6-26-80 Clerk’s order - granting the motion of Metropolitan

Edison Company, et al. for leave to intervene

(1)

DATE FILINGS—PROCEEDINGS

6-27-80 Intervenor's opposition to motion for an injunction

pendente Lite and other relief

6-27-80 Per Curiam order denying the motion for oral argu-

ment and denying the motion for injunctive, declaratory

and other relief, and granting motion for expeditious

consideration. The certified index to record and briefs of

the parties shall be filed under a schedule to be developed

by the parties provided only that the final brief is filed no

later than August 29, 1980; CJ Wright, Tamm (who did

not participate) and MacKinnon, CJs

6-27-80 Petitioners’ petition for rehearing and suggestion

for rehearing en banc

6-27-80 Petitioners’ motion requesting expeditious consider-

ation of petition for rehearing

6-27-80 Per Curiam order denying petitioners’ petition for

rehearing; CJ Wright and MacKinnon, CJ

6-27-80 Per Curiam order, en banc, denying petitioners’

suggestion for rehearing en banc; CJ Wright; McGowan,

Tamm, Robinson, MacKinnon, Robb, Wilkey, Wald, Mikva

and Edwards, CJs

6-28-80 Petitioners’ motion to amend petition and motion

for 5 day injunction pendente lite to allow oral argument

on petitioners’ motion for an order of mandamus direct-

ing the holding of public nuclear regulatory hearing, etc.

6-28-80 Petitioners’ formal demand for an adjudicatory

hearing prior to venting gases from Three Mile Island

Unit 2

6-28-80 Petitioners’ motion for 5 day TRO stopping the

effectuation of the NRC’s two 6/12/80 orders until

7/3/80 at 5:00 PM

6-28-80 Per Curiam order denying petitioners’ motion to

amend petition, etc; petitioners’ formal demand, etc; and

petitioners’ motion for 5 days TRO, etc.; CJ Wright; Mac-

Kinnon and Wilkey, Cs

DATE FILINGS—PROCEEDINGS

7-2-80 Intervenor’s notice of filing of executed affidavit of

Michael P. Morrell

07-16-80 Intervenor’s motion to consolidate Nos. 80-1691,

80-1783 & 80-1784

7-17-80 NRC's motion to consolidate Nos. 80-1691, 80-1783

& 80-1784 and opposition to request for emergency relief

7-28-80 Clerk's order consolidating Nos. 80-1691, 80-1783

and 80-1784

7-81-80 Clerk’s order that the following briefing schedule is

approved :

Petitioners main brief—8/1/80; Respondents’ brief—

20 days after petitioners’ brief; Intervenors’ brief—5

days after respondents’ brief; Reply brief—8/29/80

07-81-80 Petitioners’ brief

07-31-80 Appendix

07-31-80 Exhibit

08-08-80 Intervenors’ motion to dismiss petitions and to

suspend briefing and oral argument schedule

08-15-80 Petitioners’ opposition to intervenors’ motion to

dismiss and suspend briefing and oral argument schedule

08-18-80 NRC’s response to motion to dismiss

08-19-80 Clerk’s order granting intervenors’ motion to sus-

pend briefing and oral argument and all briefing and

oral argument are held in abeyance pending consideration

by the Court on the pending motion to dismiss

08-20-80 Intervenors' reply to petitioners’ opposition to mo-

tion to dismiss

08-20-80 Respondent’s (NRC) brief

08-21-80 Clerk’s order, sua sponte, that the order of 8/18/80

is vacated; the briefing will proceed on the previous

schedule and oral argument will be heard on 9/8/80; Oral

argument on intervenors’ motion to dismiss will also be

heard on 9/8/80

DATE FILINGS—PROCEEDINGS

08-22-80 Respondent’s (US) motion for leave to file brief in

typewritten form, pending printing

08-25-80 Clerk's order granting respondent’s (US) motion

to file brief in typewritten form

08-25-80 Respondent’s (US) brief in typewritten form

08-25-80 Clerk’s order, sua sponte, that the following times

are allotted for the oral argument of these cases: Peti-

tioners—30 minutes; Respondents—30 minutes (Vacated

9-5-80)

08-26-80 Intervenors’ brief

08-26-80 Intervenors’ appendix

08-27-80 Respondent’s (NRC) brief

08-27-80 Respondent’s Draft Programmatic Environmental

Impact Statement—Lodged for convenience of Court

08-29-00 NRC’s motion for leave to file reply brief

08-29-80 Petitioners’ reply brief to respondents’ brief

08-29-80 Petitioners’ reply brief on mootness

09-02-80 NRC’s motion to re-allocate time allotted for oral

argument

09-03-80 Petitioners’ opposition to NRC’s motion dated Au-

gust 29, 1980 and September 2, 1980

09-04-80 Clerk’s order granting respondent’s motion for

leave to file reply brief

09-04-80 Respondent’s reply brief

09-05-80 Clerk’s order that this Court’s order of August 25,

1980 is vacated and that the following times are allotted

for the oral argument: Petitioners—30 minutes; NRC—

20 minutes; USA—20 minutes

09-08-80 Argued before CJ Wright, Mikva and Edwards,

CJ’s

DATE FILINGS—PROCEEDINGS

09-10-80 Respondent’s (USA) brief (memorandum)

11-19-80 Opinion Per Curiam

11-19-80 Judgment by the Court, that the Court declares

that NRC acted unlawfully in refusing to hold a hearing

in connection with requested Venting Order, all in ac-

cordance with the opinion of this Court filed herein this

date

12-01-80 Petitioners’ motion for award of attorneys’ fees

12-03-80 Petitioners’ bill of costs

12-05-80 Intervenors’ (Metropolitan Edison, et al.) motion

for leave to file petition for rehearing and suggestion

for rehearing en banc with attached affidavit

12-09-80 Respondents’ opposition to raotion for award of at-

torneys’ fees

12-10-80 NRC’s motion for leave to file response to petition

for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc filed

by Metropolitan Edison, et al.

12-10-86 NRC's motion for leave to file petition for rehear-

ing out of time

12-10-80 NRC’s motion for leave to file motion for issuance

of stay of mandate

12-11-80 Petitioner's motion to award costs as penalty for

frivolous petition for rehearing

12-19-80 Intervenor’s (Public Utilities) opposition to peti-

tioners’ motion to award costs

01-06-81 Per Curiam order that the Clerk is directed to file

the petition for rehearing of the NRC; and that the Clerk

is directed to file the petition for rehearing and sug-

gestion for rehearing, en banc, of the Public Utilities;

and that the Clerk is directed to file the NRC’s response

to Public Utilities petition for rehearing and suggestion

for rehearing, en banc; CJ Wright, Mikva and Edwards,

CJ’s ;

DATE FILINGS PROCEEDINGS

01-06-81 NRC’s petition for rehearing—filed per above order

01-06-81 Intervenor’s (Public Utilities) petition for rehear-

ing and suggestion for rehearing, en banc—filed per

order of 1-6-81

01-06-81 NRC's Nsponse to intervenor’s (Public Utilities)

petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing, en

bance—filed per order of 1-6-81

61-06-81 Per Curiam order that the Clerk is directed to file

the motion of the NRC for stay of mandate; and that

the Clerk is directed to stay the issuance of this Court’s

mandate through February 10, 1981; CJ Wright, Mikva

and Edwards, CJ’s

91-06-81 NRC's motion to stay issuance of mandate—filed

per above order

01-06-81 Petitioner's opposition to NRC’s motion to stay is-

suance of mandate

02-08-81 NRC’s motion to extend stay of mandate

02-12-81 Per Curiam order granting NRC’s motion to stay

mandate and Clerk is directed to stay issuance of man-

date for a period of 30 days after disposition of the

pending petition for rehearing and suggestion for re-

hearing en banc; Wright, Mikva & Edwards, CJs

03-08-81 Per curiam order by this Court amending the opin-

ion for the Court filed on 11/19/80 as follows: (see or-

der for details).

08-04-81 ORDERED by the Court, en banc, that the sugges-

tion for rehearing en banc of the Public Utilities is

hereby denied.

03-04-81 Circuit Judge Tamm, MacKinnon, Robb and Wil-

key would grant rehearing en banc. Their statement is

attached (Opinion form).

08-04-81 Per Curiam order on consideration of the petitions

for rehearing of the NRC and Public Utilities; the afore-

said petitions are denied.

DATE FILINGS—PROCEEDINGS

02-12-81 Intervenors' motion to stay issuance of mandate

pending applications for certiorari

08-18-81 NRC's motion for further extension of stay of

mandate

03-23-81 Per Curiam order that petitioners’ motion for an

award of attorney’s fees is denied; and that petitioners’

motion to award costs as a penalty is denied; Wright,

Mikva and Edwards, CJ’s

04-08-81 Notice from Clerk, SC that petition for writ of cer-

tiorari was filed on 8/30/81 in SC No. 80-1640

04-06-81 Certified copy of notice from Clerk, Supreme Court

that a petition for writ of certiorari was filed on March

80, 1981 in SC No. 80-1640 and is now pending

04-09-81 Per Curiam order that the motions to stay the

issuance of mandate (filed by intervenors Metropolitan

Edison Co., et al. and respondent) are granted and the

Clerk is directed not to issue the mandate herein prior

to May 5, 1981; CJ Wright, Mikva and Edwards, CJ’s

04-09-81 Notice from Clerk, Supreme Court that a petition

for writ of certiorari was filed in SC No. 80-1656 on

April 2, 1981

04-29-81 ORDERED, by the Court that the opinion filed on

11/19/80 is hereby amended as follows: (see order for

details).

04-29-81 ORDERED, BY THE Court that the Statement

on Denial of Rehearing En banc filed 3/4/81 is amended

as follows: (see order for details).

06-08-81 Certified copy of order from Clerk, Supreme Court

granting petition for writ of certiorari in SC No. 80-1640

on 05/26/81

06-08-81 Certified copy of order from Clerk, Supreme Court

granting petition for writ of certiorari in SC No. 80-1656

on 06/26/81

COURT OF APPEALS DOCKET ENTRIES

D.C. Cir. No. 80-1783

(Transferred from the Third Circuit)

PEOPLE AGAINST NUCLEAR ENERGY, PETITIONER

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION;

JOHN AHEARNE; VICTOR GILINSKY; RICHARD T. KEN-

NEDY; JOSEPH M. HENDRIE; and PETER A. BRADFORD,

in their individual capacities; and the UNITED STATES,

RESPONDENTS

METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY, JERSEY

CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, and

PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRIC COMPANY, INTERVENORS

DATE FILINGS—PROCEEDINGS

07-11-80 Original proceedings transferred from USCA for

the Third Circuit (with 2 black binders)

07-11-80 Petitioner's motion for temporary stay or sus-

pension of the operation of two 6/12/80 NRC orders

pending the hearing on petitioner’s application for stay

pending review, and for early hearing thereafter (filed

in 8rd circuit)

07-11-80 Petitioner’s motion for stay (filed in 3rd Circuit)

07-11-80 Petitioner’s motion for an order setting aside the

NRC’s two 6/12/80 findings (filed in 8rd Circuit)

07-11-80 Petitioner’s motion for an order setting aside the

NRC’s 6/12/80 order making final its 6/12/80 order

(filed in 3rd circuit)

07-11-80 Petitioner's motion for entry of declaratory judg-

ment (filed in 8rd Circuit)

DATE FILINGS—PROCEEDINGS

07-11-80 Petitioner’s motion for an order granting request

for expedited briefing, oral argument, etc. (filed in 3rd

Circuit)

07-11-80 Petitioner's motion for an order directing that

briefs be submitted within 3 days and that hearing be

held in 5 days (filed in 3rd Circuit)

07-16-80 Intervenor's motion to consolidate Nos. 80-1691,

80-1783 & 80-1784

07-17-80 NRC’s motion to consolidate Nos. 80-1691, 80-1783

& 80-1784 and opposition to request for emergency relief

07-17-80 Intervenor’s opposition to petitioner’s requests for

emergency relief

07-28-80 Clerk’s order consolidating Nos. 80-1691, 80-1783

and 80-1784

07-31-80 Clerk’s order that the following brief schedule is

approved: Petitioner’s main brief—on or before 8/1/80;

Respondents’ brief—20 days after petitioners’ brief; In-

tervenors’ brief—5 days after respondents’ brief; peti-

tioners’ reply brief —8/29/80

07-31-80 15-Petitioners’ brief

07-31-80 7-appendix

07-31-80 4-Exhibits

08-08-80 4-Intervenors’ motion to dismiss petitions and to

suspend briefing and oral argument schedule

08-15-80 4-Pelitioners' opposition to intervenors’ motion to

dismiss and to suspend briefing and oral argument

schedule

08-18-80 4-NRC’s response to motion to dismiss

08-19-80 Clerk’s order granting intervenors’ motion to sus-

pend briefing and oral argument and all briefing and oral

argument are held in abeyance pending consideration by

the Court on the pending motion to dismiss (vacated

8/21/80 order)

DATE FILINGS—PROCEEDINGS

08-20-80 Intervenor’s reply to petitioners’ opposition to mo-

tion to dismiss

08-20-80 Respondent’s (NRC) brief

08-21-80 Clerk’s order, sua sponte, that the order of 8/19/80

is vacated; The briefing will proceed on the previous

schedule and oral argument will be heard on 9/8/80;

Oral argument on intervenors’ motion to dismiss will also

be heard on 9/8/80

08-22-80 Respondent’s (US) motion for leave to file type-

written brief, pending printing

08-25-80 Clerk's order granting respondent’s (US) motion

to file brief in typewritten form

08-25-80 7-Respondent’s (US) brief in typewritten form

08-25-80 Clerk’s order, sua sponte, that the following times

are allotted for the oral argument of these cases: Peti-

tions—30 minutes; Respondents—30 minutes. (Vacated

per 9-5-80 order)

08-26-80 Intervenors’ brief

08-26-80 Intervenors’ appendix

08-27-80 Respondent’s (NRC) brief

08-27-80 Respondent’s Draft Programmatic Environmental

Impact Statement—Lodged for convenience of Court

08-29-80 NRC’s motion for leave to file reply brief

08-29-80 Petitioners’ reply brief to respondents’ brief

08-29-80 Petitioners’ reply brief on mootness

09-02-80 NRC’s motion to re-allocate time allotted for oral

argument

09-08-80 Petitioners’ opposition to NRC’s motions dated

August 29, 1980 and September 2, 1980

DATE FILINGS—PROCEEDINGS

09-04-80 Clerk’s order granting respondent’s motion for

leave to file reply Lrief

09-04-80 Respondent’s reply brie*

09-05-80 Clerk’s order that this Court’s order of August 25,

1980 is vacated and that the following times are allotted

for oral argument: Petitioners—30 minutes; NRC—20

minutes ; USA—20 minutes

09-08-80 Argued before CJ Wright, Mikva and Edwards,

CJ’s

09-10-80 15-Respondent’s (USA) brief (memorandum)

11-19-80 Opinion Per Curiam

11-19-80 Judgment by the Court, that the Court declares

that NRC acted unlawfully in refusing to hold a hearing

in connection with requested Venting Order, all in ac-

cordance with the opinion of this Court filed herein this

date

12-01-80 Petitioners’ motion for award of attorneys’ fees

12-08-80 Petitioners’ bill of costs

12-05-80 Intervenors’ (Metropolitan Edison, et al.) motion

for leave to file petition for rehearing and suggestion

for rehearing en banc with attached affidavit

12-09-80 Respondents’ opposition to motion for award of

attorneys’ fees

12-10-80 NRC’s motion for leave to file response to petition

for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc filed

by Metropolitan Edison, et al.

12-10-80 NRC's motion for leave to file petition for rehear-

ing out of time

12-10-80 NRC's motion for leave to file motion for issuance

of stay of mandate

12-11-80 Petitioner’s motion to award sts as penalty for

frivolous petition for rehearing

DATE FILINGS—PROCEEDINGS

12-19-80 Intervenor (Public Utilities) opposition to peti-

tioners’ motion to award costs

01-06-81 Per Curiam order that the Clerk is directed to file

the petition for rehearing of the NRC; and that the Clerk

is directed to file the petition for rehearing and the sug-

gestion for rehearing, en banc, of the Public Utilities;

and that the Clerk is directed to file the NRC’s response

to Public Utilities petition for rehearing and suggestion

for rehearing, en banc: CJ Wright, Mikva and Edwards,

CJ’s

01-06-81 NRC’s petition for rehearing filed per order of

01-06-81

01-06-81 Intervenor’s (Public Utilities) petition for rehear-

ing and suggestion for rehearing, en banc—filed per or-

der of 1-6-81

01-06-81 NRC's response to intervenor’s (Public Utilities)

petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing,

en banc, filed per order of 1-6-81

01-06-81 Per Curiam order that the Clerk is directed to file

the motion of the NRC for stay of mandate; and that

the Clerk is directed to stay the issuance of this Court’s

mandate through February 10, 1981; CJ Wright, Mikva

and Edwards, CJ’s

01-06-81 NRC’s motion to stay issuance of mandate—filed

per above order

01-06-81 Petitioners’ opposition to NRC’s motion to stay

issuance of mandate

02-08-81 NRC’s motion to extend stay of mandate

02-12-81 Per Curiam order granting NRC’s motion to stay

mandate and Clerk is directed to stay issuance of man-

date for a period of 30 days after disposition of the

pending petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehear-

ing en banc; Wright, Mikva & Edwards, CJs

DATE FILINGS—PROCEEDINGS

02-03-81 Per Curiam order by this Court amending the

opinion for the Court filed on 11/19/80 as follows: (see

order for details).

08-04-81 ORDERED by the Court, en banc, that the sugges-

tion for rehearing en banc of the Public Utilities is

hereby denied.

08-04-81 Circuit Judge Tamm, MacKinnon, Robb and Wilkey

would grant rehearing en banc. Their statement is

attached (Opinion).

03-04-81 Per Curiam order on consideration of the petitions

for rehearing of the NRC and Public Utilities, the afore-

said petitions are denied.

03-12-81 Intervenors’ motion to stay issuance of mandate

pending application for writ of certiorari

08-18-81 NRC's motion for further extension of stay of

mandate

08-23-81 Per Curiam order that petitiop ers“ motion for an

award of attorney’s fees is denied; and that petitioners’

motion to award costs as a penalty is denied; Wright,

Mikva and Edwards, CJ’s

04-03-81 Notification from Clerk, SC that petition for writ

of certiorari was filed on 08/30/81 in SC No. 80-1640

04-06-81 Certified copy of notice from Clerk, Supreme Court

that a petition for writ of certiorari was filed in SC

No. 80-1640 on March 30, 1981 and is now pending

04-09-81 Per Curiam order that the motions to stay the is-

suance of the mandate (filed by intervenors Metropolitan

Edison Co., et al. and respondent) are granted and the

Clerk is directed not to issue the mandate herein prior

to May 5, 1981; CJ Wright, Mikva and Edwards, CJ’s

04-09-81 Notice from Clerk, Supreme Court that a petition

for writ of certiorari was filed in SC No. 80-1656 on

April 2, 1981

DATE FILINGS—PROCEEDINGS

04-29-81 ORDERED, by the Court that the Opinion filed

on 11/19/80 is hereby amended as follows: (see order

for details).

04-29-81 ORDERED, by the Court that the Statement on

Denial of Rehearing En Banc filed 3/4/81 is amended

as follows: (see order for details).

06-08-81 Certified copy of order from Clerk, Supreme Court

granting petition for writ of certiorari in SC No. 80-1640

on 05/26/81

06-08-81 Certified copy of order from Clerk, Supreme Court

granting petition for writ of certiorari in SC No. 80-1656

on 06/26/81

COURT OF APPEALS DOCKET ENTRIES

D.C. Cir. No. 80-1784

(Transferred from the Third Circuit)

IN RE: PEOPLE AGAINST NUCLEAR ENERGY, PETITIONER

DATE FILINGS—PROCEEDINGS

07-11-80 Petitioner’s petition for writ of mandamus—trans-

ferred from the United States Court of Appeals for the

Third Circuit

07-17-80 NRC’s motion to consolidate Nos. 80-1691, 80-1783,

80-1784 and opposition to request for emergency relief

07-23-80 Clerk’s order consolidating Nos. 80-1691, 80-1788

and 80-1784

07-81-80 Clerk’s order that the following briefing schedule is

approved: Petitioners’ main brief—on or before 8/1/80;

Respondents’ brief—20 days after petitioners’ brief; In-

tervenors, brief—5 days after respondents’ brief; peti-

tioners reply brief—8/29/80

07-31-80 Petitioners’ brief

07-31-80 Appendix

07-81-80 Exhibit

08-19-80 Clerk’s order granting intervenors’ motion to sus-

pend briefing and oral arguments and all briefing and

oral argument are held in abeyance pending considera-

tion by the Court on the pending motion to dismiss

(vacated 8/21/80 order)

08-20-80 4-Respondent’s (NRC) brief

08-21-80 Clerk’s order, sua sponte, that the order of 8/19/80

is vacated; The briefing will proceed on the previous

schedule and oral argument will be heard on 9/8/80;

Oral argument on intervenovs’ motion to dismiss will

also be heard on 9/8/80

DATE FILINGS—PROCEEDINGS

08-22-80 4-Respondent’s (US) motion for leave to file type-

writen brief, pending printing

08-25-80 Clerk’s order granting respondent’s (US) motion

to file brief in typewritten form

08-25-80 Respondent’s (US) brief in typewritten form

08-25-80 Clerk’s order, sua sponte, that the following times

are allotted for the ora! argument of these cases; Peti-

tioners—30 minutes; Respondents—30 minutes (Vacates

per 9-5-80 order)

08-27-80 Respondent’s (NRC) brief

08-27-80 Respondent’s Draft Programmatic Environmental

Impact Statement—Lodged for convenience of Court

08-29-80 NRC’s motion for leave to file reply brief

08-29-80 Petitioners’ reply brief to respondents’ brief

08-29-80 Petitioners’ reply brief on mootness

09-02-80 NRC’s motion to reallocate time for oral argument

09-03-80 Petitioners’ opposition to NRC’s motions filed Au-

gust 29, 1980 and September 2, 1980

09-04-80 Clerk’s order granting respondent’s motion for

leave to file reply brief

09-04-80 Respondent’s reply brief

09-05-80 Clerk’s order that this Court’s order of August 25,

1980 is vacated and that the following times are allotted

for oral argument: Petitioners—30 minutes; NRC—20

minutes ; USA—20 minutes

09-08-80 Argued before CJ Wright, Mikva and Edwards,

CJ's

09-10-80 15-Respondent’s (USA) brief (memorandum)

11-19-80 Opinion Per Curiam

DATE FILINGS—PROCEEDINGS

11-19-80 Judgment by this Court, that the Court declares

that NRC acted unlawfully in refusing to hold a hearing

in connection with requested Venting Order, all in ac-

cordance with the opinion of this Court filed herein

this date

12-01-80 Petitioners’ motion for award of attorneys’ fees

12-08-80 Petitioners’ bill of costs

12-05-80 Intervenors’ (Metropolitan Edison, et al.) motion

for leave to file petition for rehearing and suggestion for

rehearing en banc with attached affidavit

12-09-80 Respondents’ opposition to motion for award of

attorneys’ fees

12-10-80 NRC’s motion for leave to file response to petition

for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc filed

by Metropolitan Edison, et al.

12-10-80 NRC’s motion for leave to file petition for rehear-

ing out of time

12-10-80 NRC’s motion for leave to file motion for issuance

of stay of mandate

12-11-80 Petitioners’ motion for award of costs as penalty

for frivolous petition for rehearing

12-19-80 4-Intervenor’s (Public Utilities) opposition to peti-

tioners’ motion to award costs

01-06-81 Per Curiam order that the Clerk is directed to file

the petition for rehearing of the NRC; and that the

Clerk is directed to file the petition for rehearing and

suggestion for rehearing, en banc, of the Public Utilities;

and that the Clerk is directed to file the NRC’s response

to Public Utilities petition for rehearing and suggestion

for rehearing, en banc; CJ Wright, Mikva and Edwards,

Cl’s

01-06-81 NRC’s petition for rehearing filed per above order

DATE FILINGS—PROCEEDINGS

01-06-81 Intervenor’s (Public Utilities) petition for rehear-

ing and suggestion for rehearing, en banc—filed per

order of 1-6-81

01-06-81 4-NRC’s response to intervenor’s (Public Utilities)

petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing, en

banc—filed per order of 1-6-81

01-06-81 P Curiam order tnat the Clerk is directed to file

motion ? the NRC for stay of mandate; and that the

Clerk is directed to stay the issuance of this Court man-

date through February 10, 1981; CJ Wright, Mikva and

Edwards, CJ’s

01-06-81 NRC’s motion to stay issuance of mandate—filed

per above order

01-06-81 Petitioners’ opposition to NRC’s motion to stay

issuance of mandate —

02-03-81 NRC's motion to extend stay of mandate

02-12-81 Per Curiam order granting NRC’s motion to stay

mandate and Clerk is directed to stay issuance of man-

date for a period of 30 days after disposition of the

pending petition for rehearing and suggestion for re-

hearing en banc; Wright, Mikva & Edwards, CJs

8-8-81 Per curiam order by this Court amending the opinion

for the Court filed on 11/19/80 as follows: (see order

for details).

3-481 ORDERED by the Court, en banc, that the sug-

gestion for rehearing en banc of the Public Utilities is

hereby denied

8-4-81 Circuit Judges Tamm, MacKinnon, Robb and Wilkey

would grant rehearing en banc. Their Statement is

attached (Opinion).

8-4-81 Per Curiam order on consideration of the petitions

for rehearing of the NRC and Public Utilities, the

aforesaid petitions are denied.

DATE FILINGS—PROCEEDINGS

03-12-81 Intervenors’ motion to stay issuance of mandate

pending application for certiorari

03-18-81 NRC’s motion for further extension of stay of

mandate

03-23-81 Per Curiam order that petitioners’ motion for an

award of attorney’s fees is denied; and that petitioners’

motion to award costs as a penalty is denied; Wright,

Mikva and Edwards, CJ’s

04-08-81 Notification from Clerk, SC that petition for writ

of certiorari was filed in SC No. 80-1640 on 8/30/81

04-06-81 Certified copy of notice from Clerk, Supreme Court

that a petition for writ of certiorari was filed in SC

No. 80-1640 on March 30, 1981 and is now pending

04-09-81 Per Curiam order that the motions to stay the

issuance of the mandate (filed by intervenors Metropoli-

tan Edison Co., et al. and respondent) are granted and

the Clerk is directed not to issue the mandate herein

prior to May 5, 1981; CJ Wright, Mikva and Edwards,

CJ’s

04-09-81 Notice from Clerk, Supreme Court that a petition

for writ of certiorari was filed in SC No. 80-1656 on

April 2, 1981

4-29-81 ORDERED, by the Court, that the opinion filed

on 11/19/80 is hereby amended as follows: (see order

for details).

4-29-81 ORDERED, by the Court, that the Statement on

Denial of Rehearing En Banc filed 3/4/81 is amended

as follows: (see order for details).

06-08-81 Certified copy of order from Clerk, Supreme Court

granting petition for writ of certiorari in SC No. 80-1640

on 05/26/81

06-08-81 Certified copy of order from Clerk, Supreme Court

granting petition for writ of certiorari in SC No. 80-

1656 on 05/26/81

TITLE 10—ATOMIC ENERGY

Chapter I—Atomic Energy Commission

PART 50—LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND

UTILIZATION FACILITIES

Technical Specifications

Statement of considerations. The following amend-

ments are designed to clarify the extent to which licensees

may make changes, and conduct tests and experiments,

which are not specifically provided for in their facility

licenses. The amendments reflect consideration of com-

ments received following publication of an earlier draft

of these amendments in the FEDERAL REGISTER on April

8, 1961. The amendments substantially revise § 50.36

Designation of technical specifications, add a new § 50.59

Authorization of changes, tests and experiments; and

add on Appendix A, “Contents of Technical Specifica-

tions”. The revisions for §§ 50.36 and 50.59 are based

upon the provisions incorporated in License No. DPR-1

pursuant to the Commission’s Memorandum and Order

dated November 2, 1960 (in the matter of General Elec-

tric Vallecitos Boiling Water Reactor, Docket No. 50-18).

Basically the amendments provide that:

(1) Certain significant design and operating limita-

tions and procedures will be designated as technical spec-

ifications which must be adhered to in the absence of

specific authorization from the Commission. The tech-

nical specifications will reflect in such form limits in

design and procedures approved by the Commission. They

will represent in essence those parameters which define

the boundaries of licensed activity which the Commission

has evaluated and approved from a safety standpoint.

(2) The licensee may make changes in the facility,

make changes in the procedures described in the hazards

summary report, and conduct tests or experiments, unless

the proposed change, test or experiment involves a change

in the technical specifications or “an unreviewed safety

question”, as defined. Records of changes, tests and ex-

periments which do not involve a change in the technical

specifications or “an unreviewed safety question” must

be kept and included in those made available for inspec-

tion by authorized representatives of the Commission and

summarized in reports to be periodically submitted to the

Commission.

(3) If a proposed change, test or experiment involves

a change in the technical specifications or an unreviewed

safety question, it may not be carried out unless author-

ized by the Commission. The request for such authoriza-

tion must include an appropriate hazards analysis.

(4) Except as noted in paragraph (5), the Commis-

sion may authorize any proposed change, test or experi-

ment upon finding that there is reasonable assurance that

the health and safety of the public will not be endangered.

(5) With respect to power and testing reactors, the

Commission may authorize a proposed change, test or

experiment and a change in technical specifications upon

determining that it does not present significant hazards

considerations not previously described or implicit in the

hazards summary report and upon finding that there is

reasonable assurance that the public health and safety

would not be endangered. If the proposed change in-

volves significant hazards considerations not previously

described or implicit in the hazards summary report, the

proposed change, test or experiment must be referred to

the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards for re-

port and must be scheduled for public hearing.

In conjunction with the adoption of these proposed

amendments, the Commission plans to delegate app, opri-

ate authority to the staff to determine whether proposed

changes, tests and experiments involve a significant haz-

ards considerations [sic] not described or implicit in the

hazards summary report and to issue authorization for

changes which the rules does not require be referred to

the ACRS and to public hearing.

All reports, requests, determinations and authoriza-

tions will be made part of the public record of the li-

censing proceedings.

In order to provide guidance to licensees and appli-

cants, the proposed amendments would add an Appendix

A to Part 50 containing a list of matters which are

typical of those the Commission would generally expect

to be covered by technical specifications in operating

licenses. It is emphasized, however, that considerable

variation from the subjects listed in Appendix A may

be warranted in any particular case. The wide varia-

tions found in facility design and operation prevent any

listing from being complete. Conversely, it is anticipated

that some of the items listed would not be covered in

specific operating licenses because of the nature of the

particular design or proposed operation.

The proposed amendments would apply to all reactor

operating licenses. With respect to existing licenses

which do not designate particular portions of the hazards

summary report as “technical specifications”, the entire

report would be designated as “technical specifications”.

The proposed rules permit amendment of the license

upon application by the licensee, or on the Commission’s

own motion, to designate as “technica! specifications”

appropriate portions of the hazards summary report.

Notice is hereby given that pursuant to the Adminis-

trative Procedures Act and the Atomic Energy Act of

1954, as amended, the following amendments are pub-

lished as a document subject to codification, to be effective

80 days after publication in the FEDERAL REGISTER.

1. Section 50.36 is amended to read as follows:

§ 50.86 Designations of technical specifications.

(a) Each applicant for a license authorizing opera-

tion of a production or utilization facility shall, and each

applicant for a construction permit may, designate those

provisions of his hazards summary report which he pro-

poses be incorporated as technical specifications in the

license or construction permit.

(b) Each license authorizing operation of a produc-

tion or utilization facility of a type described in § 50.21

or § 50.22 will include technical specifications. The tech-

nical specifications incorporated in a license will be de-

signed to include those significant design features, operat-

ing procedures and operating limitations which are con-

sidered important in providing reasonable assurance that

the facility will be constructed and operated without un-

due hazard to public health and safety. Appendix A is

provided as a guide to the type of matters which the

Commission would generally expect to be covered by the

technical specifications. The Commission may include

technical specifications on such additional matters as the

Commission finds appropriate to provide reasonable as-

surance that the facility will be constructed and operated

without undue hazard to public health and safety; and

may omit items listed in Appendix A if such omission

is consistent with the protection of the health and safety

of the public.

(e) This section shall not be deemed to modify the

technical specifications included in any license issued prior

to the effective date of this section. A license issued

prior to the effective date of this section in which tech-

nical specifications have not been designated, shall be

deemed to include the entire hazards summary report as

technical specifications. At the initiative of the Com-

mission or the licensee, any license may be amended to

include technical specifications of the scope and con-

tent which would be required if a new license were

being issued.

2. Add the folljowing new § 50.59:

§ 50.59 Authorization of changes, tests and experiments.

(a) The holder of a license authorizing construction

or operation of a production or utilization facility may

(1) make changes in the facility as described in the

hazards summary report, (2) make changes in the pro-

cedures as described in the hazards summary report,

and (3) conduct tests or experiments not described in

the hazards summary report, unless the proposed change,

test or experiment involves a change in the technical

specifications incorporated in the license or an unre-

viewed safety question, as defined in paragraph (c) of

this section. If the proposed change, test or experiment

involves a change in the technical specifications or an

unreviewed safety question, it shall not be carried out

unless authorized by the Commission pursuant to the

procedures set forth in this section.

(b) The licensee shall maintain records of changes in

the facility and of changes in procedures made without

prior Commission approval pursuant to this section, to

the extent that such changes constitute changes in the

facility as described in the hazards summary report or

constitute changes in procedures as described in the haz-

ards summary report. The licensee shall also maintain

records of tests and experiments carried out without

prior Commission approval pursuant to this section. The

licensee shall furnish annually to the Commission, or at

such shorter intervals as may be specified in the license,

a report containing a brief description of such changes,

tests and experiments.

deemed to involve an unreviewed safety question if (1)

the probability of occurrence of an accident previously

analyzed in the hazards summary report may be in-

creased; or (2) if consequences of an accident previously

analyzed in the hazards summary report may be in-

creased; or (3) if a possibility for a nuclear accident of

a different type than any analyzed in the hazards sum-

mary report may be created.

(d) The licensee shall file a request for authorization

of a change in technical specifications or of any change,

test or experiment which requires authorization by the

Commission pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section.

The request shall include an appropriate hazards analy-

sis. Each such request shall be filed with the Atomic

Energy Commission, Attention: Director, Division of

Licensing and Regulation. The licensee shall file three

signed originals and 19 additional copies.

(e) With respect to request for changes, tests or ex-

periments or for changes in technical specifications for a

facility of a type described in § 50.21 (b) or § 50.22, or

a testing facility:

(1) If the Commission determines that the proposed

change, test or experiment presents significant hazards

considerations not described or implicit in the hazards

summary report it will refer the request to the Ad-

visory Committee on Reactor Safeguards and will order

a public hearing in accordance with applicable proce-

dures. The Commission will promptly notify the licensee

of any referrai to the Advisory Committee on Reactor

Safeguards

(2) If the Commission determines that the proposed

change, test or experiment does not present significant

hazards considerations not described or implicit in the

hazards summary report, it may authorize such change,

test or experiment, without referral to the Advisory Com-

mittee on Reactor Safeguards for a report and without

a prior public hearing, upon finding that there is reason-

able assurance that the health and safety of the public

will not be endangered.

(f) With respect to requests for changes, tests or ex-

periments or for changes in technical specifications for a

production or utilization facility which is not of a type

described in § 50.21 (b) or § 50.22 or a testing facility,

the Commission may authorize the proposed change, test,

or experiment upon finding that there is reasonable as-

surance that the health and safety of the public will not

be endangered.

(g) Any report or request for authorization submitted

by a licensee, and any determination by the Commission,

or authorization issued by the Commission, pursuant to

this section, will be made a part of the public record of

the licensing proceeding. An authorization issued by the

Commission will ineiude appropriate changes in the tech-

nical specifications.

8. Add the following Appendix A:

APPENDIX A—GUIDE TO CONTENTS OF TECHNICAL

SPECIFICATIONS FOR NUCLEAR REACTORS

1. This Appendix is a guide to matters which are

typical of those the Commission would generally expect

to be covered by technical specifications in operating li-

censes for nuciear reactors. The generalized form of the

guide results in inclusion of items not common to all

reactors, and should be used in preparation of technical

specifications for a particular facility only to the extent

the matters listed are applicable. Conversely, technical

specifications are expected to include items other than

those listed if such matters could have an effect on the

safety of operations comparable in significance to the

effect of the following items:

A. Site. 1. Physical location of the reactor plant.

2. Minimum distance to boundary of the exclusion

area.

8. Principal activities carried on within the exclusion

area.

B. Containment. 1. Design pressure and maximum

total leakage rate at design pressure of the containment

vessel (including penetrations).

2. Overall dimensions, materials of construction and

approximate free volume of containment barrier.

8. Principal types of containment vessel penetrations,

and for each type, the approximate number and methods

of closure and sealing (including piping, duct work, and

access openings).

4. Shell maximum design pressure under minimum

temperature conditions and methods of protection against

the cold.

5. Frequency, pressure, and methods of testing of the

containment vessel and penetrations.

C. Primary coolant system. 1. General system speci-

fications, and major primary system components in-

cluding:

(a) Number of loops.

(b) Number of isolation and check valves per loop.

(e) Number of steam generators per loop.

(d) Method of coolant circulation and heat removal.

(e) Number of pumps per loop.

(f) Reactor coolant piping material and size.

(g) Volume of primary coolant.

2. Principal reactor vessel design features including:

(a) Temperature and pressure rating (design and

operating).

(b) Materials of construction (base metal and clad-

ding).

(d) Types and locations of nozzle connections with re-

spect to core.

(e) Number of and types of penetrations.

(f) Type of closure and any limiting features.

3. Primary coolant specifications:

(a) Materials.

(b) Method of pressurization.

(e) Coolant chemistry limits.

(d) Impurity limits.

4. Operating variables, including:

(a) Minimum core inlet pressure.

(b) Maximum and minimum flow rate through the

core.

(e) Maximum core exit bulk temperature.

(d) Maximum heat up and cool down rates of major

components.

(e) Reactor vessel pressure limitations as a function

of temperature and integrated neutron flux.

5. Principal design features of major components, in-

cluding:

(a) Primary heat exchanger type and rating.

(b) Type of pump and pump drive.

(e) Isolation valve type and modes of operation.

(d) Check valve type and pressure design.

6. Materials and general configuration of primary sys-

tem shielding.

D. Primary plant auxiliary systems. 1. Principal de-

sign features of major components including:

(a) Relief valve types, minimum capacity, relief set-

tings, points for pressure discharge.

(b) Demineralizer type and product specifications.

(d) Coolant charging pump, number, charging rate

and pressure design.

(e) Core water injection and containment spray sys-

tem pumps, number, capacity, injection rate and design

pressure,

(f) Reactor plant component cooling system pumps

and heat exchanger, number, capacity and pressure de-

sign.

(g) Reactor plant control air design pressure, com-

pressor type and rating.

2. Operating limitations, including:

(a) Water chemistry.

(b) Minimum reserve capacity of core water injection

and containment spray systems.

(e) Maximum and minimum ambient operating tem-

perature of reactor room.

(d) Minimum level of primary shield tank water level.

E. Secondary coolant system. 1. General system de-

sign specifications, including:

(a) Coolant.

(b) Maximum pressure, operating and design.

(d) Coolant flow rate—maximum and minimum.

(e) Minimum makeup coolant temperature.

(f) Maximum differential temperature and pressure

between primary and secondary systems.

(g) Coolant chemistry limits.

2. Principal operating limitations established from

considerations of nuclear safety, including:

(a) Loading.

(b) Turbine control.

(e) Steam dumping or bypassing.

(d) Power network interconnections.

(e) Maximum radioactivity.

F. Reactor core. 1. Principal core design features,

including:

(a) Moderator material.

(b) Reflector material and thickness.

point.

(d) Minimum number of fuel thermocouples, where

provided as a safeguard.

(e) Clad material and method of bonding.

(f) Minimum number of clad thermocouples where

provided as a safeguard.

\g) Brief fuel element description including nominal

ditaensions, overall and internal element supports and

ori eing.

(h) Maximum total mass of core and of fuel in the

core.

(i) Maximum number of fuel elements in the core.

(j) Maximum fuel burnup (MWD).

(k) Meximum or minimum void coefficient of reac-

tivity, and maximum operating void fraction.

(1) Temperature and pressure reactivity coefficients,

ambient to operating.

(m) Form of burnable poison and method of attach-

ment.

(n) Maximum and minimum reactivity worth of burn-

able poison.

(o) Brief description of source including minimum

initial «trength and type.

(p) Number of passes and flow direction through the

core.

2. Principal design core temperatures and thermal

characteristics, including:

(a) Maximum thermal power.

(b) Maximum local core heat flux (maximum with re-

spect to all variables at rated power).

(e) Minimum burnout safety factor (on heat flux)

and correlation method used.

(d) Maximum fuel surface and central temperatures

at designated points.

G. Control and safety systems. 1. Reactivity control

system design and operating limits, including:

(a) Number installed and minimum number of op-

erative control elements and drives.

(b) Principal design features including control ele-

ment materials, control rod guides, minimum operating

clearances, use of followers, limits on allowable operating

temperatures and pressures and rod coupling method.

systems and of entire control systems for both operating

temperatures (hot) and cold plant conditions.

(d) Maximum reactivity worth of any individual con-

trol system component or gang, for hot and cold con-

ditions.

(e) Minimum shutdown control margin for hot and

cold conditions.

(f) Minimum number of least reactive control ele-

ments corresponding to minimum shutdown margin.

(g) Maximum reactivity addition rate by control ele-

ments.

(h) Maximum excess reactivity above cold clean eriti-

cal.

(i) Automatic modes of reactivity insertion and shut-

down and maximum total scram delay time and safety

element insertion time.

(j) Type, minimum reactivity worth, conditions of

use, and principal design features of auxiliary poison

systems.

(k) Rod position indication method and minimum ac-

curacy limits.

(1) Minimum worth of safety control elements cocked

during startup, fuel loading and other core manipula-

tions.

(m) Minimum reactor power for automatic control.

2. Nuclear instrumentation system design and oper-

ating limits including:

(a) Brief description of the system including ranges,

types, and sensitivities of instrument channels and de-

tectors, their degree of independence of operation, and

use of redundancy or coincidence circuitry.

(b) Mirimum number and ranges of operative level

safety and period safety channels during startup and

power operation.

(d) Automatic control system inputs.

8. Characteristics of safety control systems auxiliary

to the reactivity control and nuclear instrumentation sys-

tems including:

(a) Emergency power supply availability, and total

loading with respect to minimum capacity.

(b) Devices which are activated on automatic build-

ing closure.

locks.

(d) Items which may be bypassed, method of bypass-

ing, and conditions under which bypassing will be used.

(e) Conditions which would automatically cause re-

actor scram or building closure and activation points for

these actions.

(f) Devices causing scram or partial insertion of rods

and scram point settings.

(g) Instrumentation primarily or solely provided for

analysis of conditions following an accident.

H. Monitoring systems. General design features and

specific operating limits, including:

1. Stack activity discharge rate averaged over a year

and minimum number and sensitivity of operating moni-

tors.

2. Maximum instantaneous stack activity discharge

rate.

3. Fuel element failure detection equipment sensitiv-

ity, localization and sampling interval (if not continu-

ous).

4. Minimum number and sensitivity of monitors for

radiation level detection in accessible areas.

5. Minimum number and sensitivity of monitors of

liquid radioactive effluents including primary coolant

leak detectors.

6. Criticality monitors in fuel storage areas.

I. Waste disposal systems. Design and operating fea-

tures including:

1. Principal features of equipment for removal of

gases or other materials from primary and secondary

coolant, moderator, reflector, or shield; equipment ca-

pacity and mode of use (continuous or intermittent).

2. Stack height.

3. Minimum waste holdup capacities, storage and

processing methods and maximum radioactivity inven-

tories during normal operations, maintenance and refuel-

ing.

J. Ventilation systems. 1. Brief description of prin-

cipal features of systems providing safeguards functions,

including:

(a) Fans used, capacities and approximate numbers.

(b) Direction of atmospheric pressure gradient across

walls, doorways, and other important barriers of the

facility and minimum atmospheric pressure differentials

across principal barriers where pertinent to contamina-

tion control.

(d) Provisions for ventilation system closure.

(e) Provisions for relief of positive or negative pres-

sures within the enclosed areas upon ventilating system

closure.

(f) Location of ventilation system inlets and outlets.

(g) Location, type, and procedures for maintenance of

filtering or other air cleaning systems.

K. Emergency cooling and decay heat removal sys-

tems. 1. Principal system design features.

2. Minimum capacity of emergency heat exchangers.

3. Type, minimum coolant supply, flow rate, and

power requirement of emergency cooling systems.

4. Total cooling time made available by emergency

cooling systems.

5. Conditions which would automatically cause emer-

gency actions.

6. Source and availability of emergency power.

L. Fuel storage. 1. Brief descriptions of physical

means by which fuel elements are to be transported with-

in the facility, and conditions under which they are

stored.

2. Amount and arrangement (spacing) of special nu-

clear material to be stored.

8. Basic method or methods by which nuclear safety

against inadvertent criticality is assured (mass, geome-

try).

4. Procedural limitations on quantities to be removed

or inserted in storage area at any one time.

5. Means of providing personnel protections against

radiation hazards from spent fuel.

M. Experimental facilities including. 1. Brief descrip-

tion of principal design features of experimental facili-

ties.

2. Maximum excess reactivity allowed for experiments.

8. Maximum individual reactivity increase to be al-

lowed for any experiment or experimental facility by

flooding, draining, poison removal, fueled experiment ad-

dition, or other method.

4. For each loop or other experimental facility:

(a) Types of sensors for process variables, output ac-

tions, and redundant or coincidence provisions.

(b) Minimum cooling capacity to each experiment,

method of cooling, and emergency cooling provisions.

(e) General geometry, minimum pressure resistance,

and maximum leak rate of experiment containment bar-

riers.

(d) Significant controls, signals, or other safety mech-

anisms by which experiments or experimenters (manu-

ally or automatically) may shutdown the reactor.

(e) Types of experiments to be conducted and limits

on experimental programs, considering such effects as

corrosion, explosion, and instrument shadowing.

5. Argon and other activation product limitations.

N. Administrative and procedural safeguards. 1.

Brief coverage of the following: .

(a) The availability of detailed written procedures

for operations that might affect nuclear safety and for

emergencies.

(b) The manner whereby operating procedures are re-

viewed and approved for use.

2. Brief description of the following controls proce-

dures and tests: :

(a) Administrative organization and controls to the

extent that these have potential effect on safety.

(b) General operating principles having a potential

effect on safety, including those for initial startup, rou-

tine operation, maintenance, refueling, conduct and oper-

ation of experiments, power escalation from criticality

to full design power, and emergencies; minimum staffing

requirements for such operations where applicable.

(e) Posteritical schedule of maintenance and recali-

brating tests of safety system components, monitors, and

other equipment having a potential safeguards function

including items such as reactor control instruments, con-

trol rod systems, effluent release monitors, personnel pro-

tection monitors, portable detectors, building leakage and

emergency systems.

(d) Procedures for the review within the licensee’s

organization of proposed modifications in the facility or

in operating procedures, and of the design and conduct

of experiments.

(Sec. 103, 68 Stat. 936, sec. 104, 68 Stat. 937, sec. 161,

68 Stat. 948, sec. 182, 68 Stat. 953, sec. 183, 68 Stat.

954; 42 U.S.C. 2133, 2134, 2201, 2232, 2233)

Dated at Germantown, Md., this 31st day of May 1962.

For the Atomic Energy Commission

WooprorD B. McCoo.,

Secretary.

[F.R. Doc. 62-5615; Filed, June 8, 1962; 8:45 a.m.]

STATEMENT OF POLICY AND NOTICE OF

INTENT TO PREPARE A PROGRAMMATIC

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT

AGENCY: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

ACTION: Statement of Policy

SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has

decided to prepare a programmatic environmental im-

pact statement on the decontamination and disposal of

radioactive wastes resulting from the March 28, 1979

accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2. For some time

the Commission’s staff has been moving in this direction.

In the Commission’s judgment an overall study of the

decontamination and disposal process will assist the Com-

mission in carrying out its regulatory responsibilities

under the Atomic Energy Act to protect the public health

and safety as decontamination progresses. It will also

be in keeping with the purposes of the National Environ-

mental Policy Act to engage the public in the Commis-

sion’s decision-making process, and to focus on environ-

mental issues and alternatives before commitments to

specific clean-up choices are made. Additionally, in light

of the extraordinary nature of this action and the ex-

pressed interest of the President’s Council on Environ-

mental Quality in the TMI-2 clean-up, the Commission

intends to co-ordinate its actions with CEQ. In particu-

lar, before determining the scope of the programmatic

environmental impact statement the Commission will

consult with CEQ.

The Commission recognizes that there are small areas o“

uncertainty regarding the clean-up operation. For exam-

ple, the precise condition of the reactor core is not known

at this time and cannot be known until the containment

has been entered and the reactor vessel has been opened.

For this reason, it is unrealistic to expect that the pro-

grammatic impact statement will serve as a blueprint,

detailing each and every step to be taken over the com-

ing months and years with their likely impacts. That

the planned programmatic statement inevitably will have

gaps and will not be a complete guide for all future ac-

tions does not invalidate its usefulness as a planning

tool. As more information becomes available it will be

incorporated into the decision-making process, and where

appropriate supplements to the programmatic environ-

mental impact statement will be issued. As the decon-

tamination of TMI-2 progresses the Commission will

make any new information available to the public and to

the extent necessary will also prepare separate environ-

mental statements or assessments for individual portions

of the overall clean-up effort.

The development of a programmatic impact statement

will not preclude prompt Commission action when needed.

The Commission does recognize, however, that as with

its Epicor-II approval action, any action taken in the

absence of an overall impact statement will lead to argu-

ments that there has been an inadequate environmental

analysis, even where the Commission’s action itself is

supported by an environmental assessment. As in set-

tling upon the scope of the programmatic impact state-

ment, CEQ can lend assistance here. For example should

the Commission before completing its programmatic

statement decide that it is in the best interest of the

public health and safety to decontaminate the high level

waste water now in the containment building, or to purge

that building of its radioactive gases, the Commission

will consider CEQ’s advice as to the Commission’s NEPA

responsibilities. Moreover, as stated in the Commission’s

May 25 statement, any action of this kind will not be

taken until it has undergone an environmental review,

and furthermore with opportunity for public comment

provided.

However, consistent with our May 25 Statement, we

recognize that there may be emergency situations, not

now foreseen, which should they occur would require

rapid action. To the extent practicable the Commission

will consult with CEQ in these situations as well.

With the help of the public’s comments on our proposals

we intend to assure, pursuant to NEPA and the Atomic

Energy Act, that the clean-up of TMI-2 is done con-

sistently with the public health and safety, and with

awareness of the choices ahead. We are directing our

staff to include in the programmatic environmental im-

pact statement. on the decontamination and disposal of

TMI-2 wastes an overali description of the planned ac-

tivities and a schedule for their completion along with a

discussion of alternatives considered and the rationale

for choices made. We are also directing our staff to keep

us advised of their progress in these matters.

Dated at Washington, D.C. this 21st day of November,

1979.

For the Commission

/s/ Samuel J. Chilk

SAMUEL J. CHILK

Secretary of the Commission

[Docket No. 50-320]

Metropolitan Edison Co., et al. (Three Mile Island

Nuclear Station, Unit 2) ; Order

Metropolitan Edison Company, Jersey Central Power

and Light Company and Pennsylvania Electric Company

(collectively, the licensee) are the holders of Facility

Operating License No. DPR-73, which had authorized

operation of the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit

2 (TMI-2) at power levels up to 2772 megawatts thermal.

By Order for Modification of License dated July 20,

1979, the licensee’s authority to operate the facility was

suspended and the licensee’s authority was limited to

maintenance of the facility in the present shutdown cool-

ing mode (44 FR 45271). The facility, which is located

in Londonderry Township, Dauphin County, Pennsyl-

vania, is a pressurized water reactor used for the com-

mercial generation of electricity.

On March 28, 1979, an accident at the Three Mile

Island Nuclear Station Unit 2 resulted in substantial

damage to the reactor core and to certain reactor systems

and components. The facility is not capable of normal

operation and is in a shutdown condition with fuel in

the core. Although many systems were damaged or have

subsequently failed, the facility is being maintained in

a safe and stable cooling condition. The July 20, 1979

Order directed that the licensee maintain the facility in

a shutdown condition in accordance with approved op-

erating and contingency procedures with decay heat being

removed by natural convection circulation of primary

coolant through the core with heat rejection through the

“A” steam generator.

Some of the systems and components currently being

used to maintain the facility in its present mode of op-

eration were not originally included in the facility’s

Technical Specifications. In fact, in the present post-

accident status of the facility, the license itself does not

include explicit provisions or Technical Specifications for

assuring the continued maintenance of the plant in a

safe, stable condition or for coping with foreseeable off-

normal conditions. Moreover, certain portions of the

facility’s operating license relate to or govern power

operation of the facility, the authority for which was

suspended by the Order of July 20, 1979. These pro-

visions are now simply inapplicable to the facility in its

present post-accident condition. Consequently, the fa-

cility’s operating license’ should be modified so as to:

(1) Define operating parameters for the current safe,

stable, long-term cooling mode for the facility (defined

as the recovery mode), and delete all other permissible

operating modes so as to assure that operation of the

facility in other than the stable shutdown condition of

the recovery mode is precluded:

(2) Impose functional, operability, redundancy and

surveillance requirements as well as safety limits and

limiting conditions with regard to those structures, sys-

tems, equipment and components necessary to maintain

the facility in the current safe, stable shutdown condi-

tion and to cope with foreseeable off-normal conditions.

(3) Prohibit venting or purging or other treatment

of the reactor building atmosphere, the discharge of

water decontaminated by the EPICOR-II system, and the

1 Tho existing Appendix B Technical Specifications imposed for

the protection of the environment upon issuance of the TMI-2 oper-

ating license would be unchanged and would remain in effect, except

that Appendix B Technical Specifications 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3, which

identify the licensee’s pre-accident management organization for

activities addressed by the Appendix B Technical Specifications,

are deleted since those requirements will now be performed in

accordance with proposed Technical Specifications 6.1, 6.2 and 6.5

which will set forth the current requirements for the licensee’s

management organization for all licensed activities.

treatment and disposal of high-level radioactively con-

taminated water in the reactor building, until each of

these activities has been approved by the NRC, consistent

with the Commission’s Statement of Policy and Notice

of Intent to Prepare a Programmatic Environmental Im-

pact Statement (44 FR 67738).

III

For the above reasons, the Facility Operating License

has been reviewed and a new set of Technical Specifica-

tions has been developed to account for the present con-

dition of the facility and to assure the continued main-

tenance of the current safe, stable, long-term cooling con-

dition of the facility. The Staff’s safety assessment ad-

dressing the requirements of the proposed Technical

Specifications is set forth in the concurrently-issued

Safety Evaluation.

The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has also per-

formed an environmental evaluation of the requirements

that would be imposed by these proposed Technical Speci-

fications as reflected in the Environmental Assessment,

also issued concurrently. It vas determined that since

the limits on effluent releases and discharges contained

in Appendix B to the Facility Operating License are not

being changed and remain in effect, and the proposed

Technical Specifications attached to this Order do not

authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts

nor an increase in power level that the proposed Tech-

nical Specifications will not result in any significant en-

vironmental impact. Accordingly, a negative declara-

tion is being issued concurrently pursuant to 10 CFR

51.5 (e) (1) of the Commission’s regulations.

Proposed Technical Specification 6.8.1, regarding Ad-

ministrative Controls, requires that written procedures

implementing certain requirements of the modified Tech-

nical Specifications be prepared by the licensee. Pro-

_ posed Technical Specification 6.8.2 provides that these

written procedures are to be svbmitted to, and are sub-

ject to approval by the NRC prior to implementation.

Since these written procedures will implement certain re-

quirements of the proposed Technical Specifications, some

period of time will be required after its effective date for

the licensee to prepare the appropriate written proce-

dures. Based on discussions with the licensee and an

evaluation of the scope of the written procedures re-

quired, it has been determined that a period of 30 days

from the date of this Order will be sufficient for the

licensee’s preparation of the written procedures required

by proposed Technical Specification 6.8.1.

Incorporation into the license of the proposed Tech-

nical Specifications would both impose necessary require-

ments on the licensee to reflect the present condition of

the facility and to assure continued maintenance of the

current safe, stable, long-term cooling condition of the

facility, and facilitate the Commission’s enforcement pro-

gram by providing a single and readily available com-

pilation of enforceable requirements. For these reasons,

it is proposed that the license be amended so as to in-

clude the Technical Specifications set forth in Attach-

ment 1 hereto. The formal license amendment incor-

porating these proposed Technical Specifications will be-

come effective on the expiration of the period specified

below, during which the licensee or any other person

whose interest may be affected may request a hearing

or, in the event a hearing is requested and granted, on

the date specified in an order made following the hearing

or other disposition of such proceeding.

As indicated above, the July 20, 1979 Order directed

the licensee to maintain the facility in a shutdown con-

dition in accordance with approved operating and con-

tingency procedures. This Order is still in effect. The

operating and contingency procedures referred to have

evolved over the course of the past several months and

are now reflected in the requirements that have been

included in the proposed Technical Specifications set

forth in Attachment 1.

a order to eliminate any possible uncertainty as to the

nature and requirements of the operating and contin-

gency procedures referred to in the July 20, 1979 Order,

the public health, safety and interest require that that

Order be amended effective immediately, as set forth

below, pursuant to section 161.b of the Atomic Energy

Act of 1954, as amended, to include the requirements

in Attachment 1. When the proposed Technical Specifi-

cations become effective as a result of the formal amend-

ment of the Facility Operating License, they will super-

sede the July 20, 1979 Order, as amended, since there

will be no need to maintain a duplicate set of legal re-

quirements on the licensee.

Accordingly, pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of

1954, as amended, it is ordered that (1) Effective im-

mediately, the Director’s Order for Modification of Li-

cense of July 20, 1979 is amended by deleting paragraph

(2) and substituting the following:

(2) Pending further amendment of the Facility Op-

erating License, the licensee shall maintain the facility

in accordance with the requirements set forth in Attach-

ment 1 to the Director’s Order dated February 11, 1980.

(2) Effective March 21, 1980 or, in the event a hear-

ing is requested and granted, on the date specified in an

order made following the hearing or other disposition

of the proceeding, all Appendix A Technical Specifications

and Appendix B Technical Specifications 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3

to Facility Operating License No. DPR-73 in effect on

March 28, 1979 and all changes thereto issued between

that date and the date of this Order are superseded by

the propcaed Technical Specifications set forth in Attach-

ment 1 hereto.

(3) The written procedures required by proposed

Technical Specification 6.8. in Attachment 1 hereto shall

be completed and submitted to the NRC 30 days after

the date of this Order. Pending approval of the written

procedures by the NRC, the licensee shall follow the

previously approved procedures.

The licensee or any person whose interest may be

affected may, on or before Merch 21, 1980, file a request

for a hearing with respect to this Order, pursuant to

10 CFR § 2.714. As indicated, a request for a hearing

with regard to paragraph (2) of this Order shall op-

erate to stay the effectiveness of that paragraph. Ac-

cordingly, any such hearing regarding paragraph (2)

shall be conducted prior to the adoption of the formal

license amendment incorporating the Technical Specifica-

tions set forth in Attachment 1 hereto. However, a re-

quest for hearing with regard to paragraphs (1) and/or

(3) shall not operate to stay the effect of those para-

graphs. In the event a hearing is held with regard to

paragraph (1) and/or (3), however, such a hearing shall

be consolidated with any hearing that may be requested

pursuant to paragraph (2). In the event a hearing is

held, the issues shall be: (1) whether the requirements

set forth in Attachment 1 hereto (summarized in Part

II above) are necessary and sufficient for the main-

tenance of the facility to protect health and safety or to

minimize danger to life and property; and (2) whether

the provisions of this Order would significantly affect the

quality of the human environment.

A request for a hearing must be filed with the Office

of the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, DC 20555, Attention: Docketing and Serv-

ice Section, by the above date. A copy of the request

for a hearing should also be sent to the Executive Legal

Director, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Wash-

ington, DC 20555 and to George F. Trowbridge, Esq.,

Shaw, Pittman, Potts, and Trowbridge, 1800 M Street,

NW., Washington, DC 20086, attorney for the licensee.

Any questions regarding the contents of this Order should

be directed to the Chief Hearing Counsel, Office of the

Executive Legal Director, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Com-

mission, Washington, DC 20555.

For further details respect [sic] to this action, see (1)

Operating License DPR-73, as amended, (2) NUREG-

0557, “Evaluation of Long-Term Post-Accident Core Cool-

ing of Three Mile Island, Unit 2.” NRC Staff Report,

dated May, 1979, (3) Memorandum to R. Vollmer from

A. Ignatonis, “TMI-2 Plant Modifications for Cold Shut-

down, Rev. 2,” dated June 8, 1979, (4) letter to R.

Vollmer, NRC, from R. C. Arnold, Metropolitan Edison

Co., “Reactor Containment Building Atmosphere Clean-

up,” dated November 18, 1979, (5) the Commission Staff’s

related Safety Evaluation and Environmental Assessment

(NUREG-0647), and (6) the Director’s Order for Modi-

fication of License dated July 20, 1979. All of the above

documents are available for inspection at the Commis-

sion’s Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, NW., Wash-

ington, DC and at the Commission’s Local Public Docu-

ment Room at the State Library of Pennsylvania, Gov-

ernment Publications Section, Education Building, Com-

monwealth and Walnut Streets, Harrisburg, Pennsyl-

vania 17126.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 11th day of Febru-

ary, 1980.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

HAROLD R. DENTON.

Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation.

[Docket No. 50-320]

Negative Declaration Regarding Proposed Technical

Specifications for Three Mile Island Nuclear Station,

Unit No. 2

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has deter-

mined that the public health, safety and interest require

Modification of Facility Operating License No. DPR-73,

issued to Metropolitan Edison Company, et al. for opera-

tion of the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit 2

located in Londonderry Township, Dauphin County, Penn-

sylvania. This action would modify the Technical Specifi-

cations of the Facility Operating License to more accu-

rately reflect the present condition of the facility result-

ing from the March 28, 1979 accident. Some of the sys-

tems and components currently being used to maintain

the facility in its present mode of operation were not

originally included in the facility’s Technical Specifica-

tions. In fact, in the present post-accident status of the

facility, the license itself does not include explicit provi-

sions or Technical Specifications for assuring the con-

tinued maintenance of the plant in a safe, stable condi-

tion or for providing for foreseeable off-normal condi-

tions. Moreover, certain portions of the facility’s operat-

ing license relate to or govern power operation of the

facility, the authority for which was suspended by Order

for Modification of License of the Director, Office of Nu-

clear Reactor Regulation, dated July 20, 1979. These

provisions are simply inapplicable to the facility in its

present post-accident condition. Consequently, by Order

dated February 11, 1980, the Director (1) amended the

Order of July 20, 1979 effective immediately, to require

that the licensee maintain the facility in accordance with

the requirements set forth in Attachment 1 to the Order,

and (2) proposed to formally amend the Technical Speci-

fications accordingly, in the following areas: Nuclear

Safety; Core Cooling, Water Inventory and Reactor Cool-

ant System Pressure Control; Instrumentation; Contain-

ment Systems; Fire Detection and Fire Suppression;

Electrical Power; Control of Radioactive Materials in

Liquid and Gaseous Effluents; and, Review and Audit

Functions.

The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation prepared a

combined Safety Evaluation and Environmental Assess-

ment (NUREG-0647) in connection with this action. It

was determined that since the limits on effluent releases

and discharges contained in the environmental Technical

Specifications for the Facility Operating License (Ap-

pendix B) are not being changed and remain in effect, the

actions encompassed by this Order do not authorize a

change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase

in power level and will not result in any significant en-

vironmental impact. In addition, the Technical Specifi-

cations include prohibitions against the purging or other

treatment of the reactor building atmosphere, the dis-

charge or other disposal of water decontaminated by the

Epicor-II system and the treatment and discharge or

other disposal of the high-level radioactively contaminated

water now in the reactor building without further Com-

mission approval. Thus, in accordance with this finding,

no Environmental Impact Statement will be prepared.

The Safety Evaluation and Environmental Assessment

(NUREG-0647) and the Director’s Order issued Febru-

ary 11, 1980 are available for public inspection at the

Commission’s Public Document Room, 1717 H Street,

N.W., Washington, D.C., and at the Three Mile Island

Unit No. 2 Local Public Document Room in the Govern-

ment Publications Section, State Library of Pennsyl-

vania, Education Building, Commonwealth and Walnut

Streets, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Copies may be ob-

tained upon request addressed to the U.S. Nuclear Regu-

latory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, Attention:

Richard Vollmer, Director TMI-2 Support, NRR.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 11th day of Febru-

ary, 1980.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

HAROLD R. DENTON.

Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation.

NUREG-0432

THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR STATION

UNIT 2

Technical Specifications

Appendix “A”

License No. DPR-73

INTRODUCTION

On March 28, 1979, an accident occurred at the facility

which resulted in damage to the reactor core and to

certain reactor systems and components. The reactor is

being maintained in a stable cooling mode removing decay

heat by natural convection circulation of primary coolant

through the core and the “A” steam generator. The “A”

steam generator is producing steam which is condensed

in the condenser and recirculated to the “A” steam gen-

erator. An alternate means of removing decay heat from

the primary coolant is through the “B” steam generator.

The steam side of the ‘B” steam generator has been

modified to provide a water solid, closed loop cooling

system which is in turn cooled by the secondary services

closed cooling water system. Either steam generator cool-

ing mode is adequate to remove decay heat from the

primary coolant.

As a result of the core and equipment damage, various

requirements set forth in the Technical Specifications

governing operations are no longer appropriate. For

example, certain equipment required to be operable is no

longer operable as defined in the technical specifications.

Other systems not generally relied on for safe shutdown

of the reactor are being used to maintain the facility in

the stable mode of heat removal. High radioactivity in

containment and in the reactor coolant and radioactivity

in certain auxiliary areas have limited access to certain

components or have limited the ability of certain systems

or components in their original design mode. A number

of systems and components have been modified in order

to respond to the initial emergency condition.

These revised Technical Specifications are to provide as-

surance that the facility in its present status will provide

adequate safety while certain additional work activities

are carried out at the facility during the forthcoming

period of core cooling.

In addition to continuing to maintain core cooling, cer-

tain work is planned for the period during which these

revised specifications will be applicable.

(1) Systems and components presently functioning

to maintain core cooling may be modified to en-

hance their operability and reliability, and new

systems may be added to maintain recovery func-

tions.

(2) Presently non-functioning systems or compo-

nents useful to enhance safety are being re-

stored to operable status or modified to function

appropriately.

(3) Activities to maintain control over radioactive

effluents from the facility will continue with

modifications as necessary to enhance such con-

trol.

(4) Decontamination and cleanup of areas to reduce

exposure and to control radioactive materials

will continue.

These activities and modifications will be performed dur-

ing the period in which these revised specifications are

effective.

The revised Technical Specifications have been prepared

to cover the functional capability or performance levels

of systems or components required for the safe operation

of the facility. The revised Technical Specifications shall

however, in no way medify the obligation of the licensee

to take all appropriate steps needed to assure public

health and safety in connection with the facility at all

times; and shall not be deemed to prohibit or restrict the

licensee from taking any emergency action necessary to

protect the health and safety of the public in the event

of any emergency conditions that may arise during the

period governed by these revised Technical Specifications.

Detailed surveillance requirements for implementing

these specifications are set forth in the Recovery Opera-

tions Plan. The specific plant operating procedures which

are subject to review and approval by the NRC staff are

identified in Section 6.8 of the Technical Specifications.

These revised Technical Specifications will remain in

effect until superseded, and may be supplemented,

amended or modified from time to time.

* * * * *

page 3. 6-1]

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

8.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

3.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT

CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

3.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall

be maintained and all containment penetrations, includ-

ing at least two OPERABLE containment isolation valves

or a double barrier in each penetration, shall be closed

when not required open per procedures approved pursu-

ant to Specification 6.8.2. Purging or other treatment of

the containment atmosphere shall be prohibited until ap-

proved by the NRC.

APPLICABILITY: RECOVERY MODE.

ACTION:

With one containment isolation valve per containment

penetration open or inoperable, maintain the affected

penetration(s) closed with either:

a. At least one deactivated automatic valve secured

in the isolation position, and

b. At least one closed manual valve, or a blind

flange.

CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS

3.6.1.3 Each containment air lock shall be OPERABLE

with:

a. Both doors closed except when the air lock is be-

ing used for transit entry and exit through the

containment, then at least one air lock door shall

be closed.

b. An overall air lock leakage rate of less than or

equal to 0.05 L. at P., 56.2 psig.

APPLICABILITY: RECOVERY MODE.

ACTION:

With an air lock inoperable, maintain at least one door

closed and restore the air lock to OPERABLE status

within 24 hours.

— — = 7 7

BASES

FOR

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

AND

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

NOTE

The summary statements contained in this section pro-

vide the bases for the specifications of Sections 3.0 and

4.0 and are not considered a part of these technical

specifications as provided in 10 CFR 50.36.

@ * * * *

Ip ge B 8/4-6-1]

3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

BASES

3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT

3/4.6.1.1 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY must be

maintained to ensure that the radioactive materials

which were released to the containment atmosphere dur-

ing the March 28, 1979 incident will not be released to

the atmosphere.

On November 21, 1979, the Commission issued a State-

ment of Policy and Notice of Intent to Prepare a Pro-

grammatic Environmental Impact Statement addressing

the overall decontamination and cleanup activities at

TMI-2, including, among other things, the purging or

other treatment of the containment atmosphere (44 F.R.

67738). The Commission recognized in its Statement

that it may be in the best interest of the public health

and safety to purge the containment during the develop-

ment of the programmatic statement. If the need to take

such prompt action arises the Commission has stated that

it will consider the advice of the Council on Environ-

mental Quality (CEQ) as to the Commission’s NEPA

sponsibilities [sic], and moreover, will not take such action

until the activity has undergone an environmental review

with opportunity for public comment. The Commission

further recognized that there may be emergency situa-

tions, not at this time forseen, which could require rapid

action. In these situations, the Commission has indicated

its intention to consult with CEQ to the extent practic-

able. Accordingly, the purging or other treatment of the

containment atmosphere is prohibited until approved by

the NRC consistent with the foregoing.

8/4.6.13 CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS

The containment air locks must be maintained OPER-

ABLE to provide CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY. These

air locks will be used during future entries into the con-

tainment to ensure that the containment atmosphere will

not be released to the environs.

3/4.6.1. 4 INTERNAL PRESSURE

The negative pressure limit provides assurance that

the containment will not exceed its design negative pres-

sure differential. The positive pressure limit provides

assurance that leakage from the containment will be

limited for dose considerations.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Commissioners: John F. Ahearne, Chairman

Victor Gilinsky

Richard T. Kennedy

Joseph M. Hendrie

Peter A. Bradford

Docket No. 50-320

IN THE MATTER OF

METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY, ET AL.

(Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2)

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION OF CLI-80-25

AND ORDER FOR TEMPORARY

MODIFICATION OF LICENSE

On June 12, 1980, the Commission issued a Memo-

randum and Order, CLI-80-25, which approved purging

of the TMI-2 reactor building atmosphere as proposed

by the NRC staff. The staff’s proposal was described

in detail in the “Final Environmental Assessment for

Decontamination of the Three Mile Island Unit 2 Reactor

Building Atmosphere,” NUREG-0662, May 1980. This

purging can be carried out in such a manner (a “slow

purge”) that the release of radioactive effluents, pri-

marily krypton-85, will lie within the limits allowed by

the technical specifications which are part of the TMI-2

operating license. A faster rate of purging is advan-

tageous, however, for reasons discussed in the Memoran-

dum and Order. To permit a faster purge the Commis-

sion issued an accompanying Order for Temporary

Modification of License, which temporarily imposed dose

limits in place of the noble gas instantaneous and quar-

terly activity release limits contained in the TMI-2 tech-

nical specifications. Purging of the TMI-2 containment

is presently expected to begin on June 28, 1980.

The Commission received on June 23, 1980 a “Joint

Motion for Reconsideration of CLI-80-25 and Order for

Temporary Modification of License,” submitted by Steven

C. Sholly, the Newberry Township Three Mile Island

Steering Committee, and People Against Nuclear Energy

(“PANE”). The Commission has also received a study

entitled “Radiation Exposure Due to Venting TMI-2

Reactor Building Atmosphere,“ prepared by Bernd

Franke and Dieter Teufel of the Institute for Energy

and Environmental Research, Heidelberg, West Germany,

for the Three Mile Island Legal Fund, and dated June

12, 1980. The Franke/Teufel study, which arrived too

late to be included in the administrative record for the

Memorandum and Order, takes issue with the Commis-

sion’s conclusion, otherwise widely supported, that the

1 For the period of the purge the modified license will control

releases of radioactive gazes to the atmosphere by limits on the

radiological dose which car, result from such releases, in particu-

lar by requirements that doses to maximally exposed individuals

as a result of purging not exceed 15 mrem skin dose, 5 mrem

total body dose, or 20% of either of those limits over any one-hour

veriod. These offsite dose limits are in effect equivalent to the

objectives set out in 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix I, which implement

the Commission’s policy that radiation doses from nuclear power

plants shall be kept ‘‘as low as reasonably achievable” (“ALARA”).

The Commission’s Order for Temporary Modification of License

thus aimed at achieving the same level of health protection intended

by the superseded release limits while at the same time permittirg

a rapid completion of the purging process.

2 The Commission received a very brief handwritten summary

of the conclusions of this study on June 5, 1980 but was not given

the full report until June 16, 1980.

physical health impacts of purging the TMI-2 contain-

ment as proposed will be negligible. This study is cited

in the Joint Motion as evidence of the need for the

Commission to reconsider its decision to permit purging.

In view of the importance to the public of having ac-

curate information on the health risks of purging, the

Commission believes it desirable in the short period 12

maining before the purging begins to make a prompt

though necessarily brief response to the Franke/Teufel

study as well as to the motion for rec~nsideration.

Accordingly, we are attaching to this order a review

of the Franke/Teufel study prepared by the NRC tech-

nical staff. The staff’s review confirms that all radio-

nuclides potentially in the containment atmosphere, not

just krypton-85, were considered by the staff in its as-

sessment of the environmental impacts of purging the

TMI-2 reactor building. Radionuctides other han kryp-

ton-85 will not contribute significantly to offsite doses

from purging. As the staff’s review explains in detail,

the Franke/Tuefel study erred by selecting a single

erroneously calibrated measurement of the radionuclide

concentrations in the containment. This measurement

was clearly inconsistent with previously and subsequently

measured radionuclide concentrations and gave values

too large by factors of ten thousand to ten million. The

corresponding dose calculations made by the Franke/

Teufel study are thus gross over-estimates. Further-

more, the study’s concern about meterological uncertain-

ties and possible inadequacy of monitoring appear to re-

flect unawareness or misunderstanding of how the purg-

ing program is to be carried out. In sum, the Commis-

sion has found that the Franke/Teufel study provides

no reason to modify the conclusion that the proposed

venting of the TMI-2 reactor building involves negligible

impacts on physical health.

Turning now to the motion for reconsideration, we find

that the discussion above deals adequately with the first

reason offered for reconsideration, tat “[t]he Orders

do not consider in any detail the possible presence of

radionuclides other than Krypton-85 in the TMI-2 con-

tainment atmosphere.” The environmental assessment,

as well as the staff’s review of the Franke/Teufel report,

confirm that krypton-85 is by far the dominant radio-

nuclide. In any event, it should be noted that the purg-

ing will be conducted so that the dose limits established

by the Commission’s Order for Temporary Modification

of License will not be exceeded. A continual monitoring

of release activity levels and meterological conditions will

be conducted to assure that this requirement is met. Thus

if radionuclide concentrations should exceed presently ex-

pected values, this fact would become quickly apparent

and releases would be controlled or, if necessary, stopped

so that doses will remain within the allowable limits.

The Joint Motion criticized what it terms a “radio-

logical assessment” of the health risks of venting as dis-

tinct from a “public health assessment” by “public health

professionals.“ The joint petitioners also appended to

their mction a letter from Irwin Bross of the Roswell

Park Memorial Institute, Buffalo, New York, to the effect

that the genetic damage and cancer risk estimates used

by the Commission in assessing the risk of krypton vent-

ing are out of date and far too low. The short answer

to the joint petitioners’ concern about the Commission’s

assessment that purging presents ne significant physical

health risks is that there was broad agreement with this

assessment by groups with expertise oriented toward pro-

tection of public health, including the National Council

on Radiation Protection and Measurements, the U.S. De-

partment of Health and Human Services, and the Penn-

sylvania Departments of Health and Public Welfare. The

controversial views of Dr. Bross regarding radiation

health risks are known to the Commission from previous

occasions. To the extent that Dr. Bross would conclude

that purging the TMI-2 containment involves a signifi-

cant physical health risk, his views are clearly at odds

with the spectrum of scientific opinion cited here and in

the Commission’s Memorandum and Order in support of

the contrary conclusion.

The Commission thus finds that the Joint Motion pre-

sents no reason to alter the Commission’s key determi-

nation that the proposed purging of the TMI-2 contain-

ment will have a negligible impact on physical health.

The benefits of prompt purging were discussed at lengti

in the Memorandum and Order. To risk these benefits by

selecting an alternative process, which necessarily would

involve significant delay and uncertainty, in order to re-

duce already negligible radiological impacts still further

does not strike the Commission as reasonable. Accord-

ingly, the Commission finds the proposed purging entirely

consistent with the ALARA principle of keeping radia-

tion exposure “as low as reasonably achievable.”

The Joint Motion also urged that the psychological

aspects of purging “should be examined more closely”

but cited no evidence to contradict the Commission’s be-

lief that prompt purging will remove a significant source

of psychological stress related to the presence of the dis-

abled TMI-2 facility. The Commission has admitted its

lack of expertise in psychology and recognizes that more

review and study might further clarify the situation with

respect to psychological stress at TMI-2. We remain

confident, however, that stress is likely to be minimized

by proceeding promptly with a plan that poses no threat

to physical health. The Joint Motion offers no reason to

believe that further study would change that conclusion.

Accordingly, we are not persuaded that purging be de-

layed for further examination of pychological stress.

Finally, the Joint Motion criticized our finding that

the temporary license modification involves “no significant

hazards consideration” and therefore may be made im-

mediately effective. We believe the joint peti‘ioners have

misunderstood the scope of this finding, which pertains

only to the question whether changing the TMI-2 technical

specifications from release limits to dose limits involves a

significant hazards consideration. The dose limits aim at

achieving the same level of protection of public health

and safety and, in fact, do so more directly, since it is

8 See note 1 above.

the associated doses rather than the radioactive releases

themselves which are the focus of concern. Accordingly,

the Commission reaffirms its determination that the tem-

porary license modification involves no significant hazards

consideration and may therefore be made effective im-

mediately.

With regard to purging itself, the unmodified techni-

cal specifications which allow for purging were adopted

as part of the licensing proceeding for TMI-2 after full

opportunity for a public hearing. There has been ex-

tensive public participation in the purging decision

through public meetings and comments on the environ-

mental assessment. There has thus been ample oppor-

tunity for members of the public to raise any issue which

might have been brought up in an adjudicatory hearing

and to present evidence contradictory to the positions of

the NRC staff or Metropolitan Edison. The joint peti-

tioners complain that there has been no public hearing

specifically devoted to purging, but they have not indi-

cated that any relevant evidence exists which they have

somehow been prevented from bringing to the Commis-

sion’s attention. Accordingly, since the procedures by

which the Commission’s orders were developed met the

requirements of the Atomic Energy Act and have pro-

vided for a thorough consideration of the issues, we re-

ject the suggestion that these orders should be withdrawn

on procedural grounds.

For the reasons discussed above, the Commission de-

nies the motion for reconsideration of CLI-80-25 and

Order for Temporary Modification of License.

It is so ORDERED.

For the Commission

/s/ Samuel J. Chilk

SAMUEL J. CHILK

Secretary of the Commission

Dated at Washington, DC,

this 26th day of June, 1980.

REPORT BY THE

INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY AND

ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH

HEIDELBERG, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

The NRC staff has made a preliminary review of the

findings presented in the report titled “Radiation Ex-

posure Due to Venting TMI-2 Reactor Building At-

mosphere” submitted by the Institute for Energy and

Environmental Research, dated June 12, 1980. The staff

believes that the major conclusions of this report are

in error and misleading, primarily because they are based

on a highly inflated estimate of the maximum rate at

which radionuclides will be released during the venting

and an apparent lack of understanding of how the vent-

ing will be carried out and controlled.

Heidelberg Finding No. 1

Previous discussion of the venting of radioactive gases

from TMI-2 has concerned only the noble gas krypton-85.

Besides krypton-85, the atmosphere of the reactor build-

ing includes a great number of other radionuclides, some

of which would be released into the environment during

the blow off of the gases. This could lead to radiation

exposures significantly higher than those caused by kryp-

ton-85. The most important radionuclides, which have

not been sufficiently considered so far include: C 14, Co

60, Sr 89, Sr 90, Ru 106, Cs 134, Cs 137, Pu 239, Pu

241 and others. Even allowing for high filter efficiency,

a model calculation for only three of these nuclides showed

that population doses would be high enough to cause

about three additional cancer cases and an equivalent

amount of genetical damage.

Staff Comment

The NRC staff’s analysis (NUREG-0662) of the en-

vironmental impacts associated with purging the TMI-2

reactor building atmosphere is based on consideration

of all radionuclides including noble gases, transuranics,

tritium, cesiums and cobalts and other particulates. Air

samples are periodically collected and analysed [sic] to

identify all measureable forms of radioactivity. The domi-

nant and controlling radionuclide is Kr-85. Relative to

Kr-85, all other radionuclides in the reactor building

atmosphere are insignificant contributors to calculated

offsite doses from a postulated purge.

The reactor building particulate samples taken during

January through April of this year indicated Cs-137 con-

centrations ranging from 1.2 X 10* to 2.7 X 10° Ci /

ce. The particulates Co-58, Co-60, Cs-134, Sr-89, and Sr-

90 were measured at levels on the order cf 10 to 10™

pCi/ce or were below minimum detectable levels (10

Ci / ee) for the instrumentation. Gross measurements of

samples of the reactor building atmosphere taken in

April of this year indicate transuranic concentrations

no higher than 2.0 X 10° Ci/ ec. It should also be

noted that, during the postulated purge, the reactor build-

ing atmosphere will be passed through HEPA filters with

a measured filtration efficiency of at least 99.97%.

The Heidelberg group based its particulate source term

(primarily Co-60 and Cs-137), and the resulting dose

calculations and health effects predictions, on the highest

reported values for the concentrations of these isotopes,

ignoring a number of other values listed on the same

table (Table 2.1 of the Met Ed reference). Unfortu-

nately, these single highest values, which were a factor

of 10* to 10’ higher than other reported values, were

erroneous. Particulate concentrations are determined by

measuring the total radioactivity in a sample of air

passed through the particulate sampler, and then divid-

ing by the sample volume. In the case of the erroneous

values, Met Ed personnel failed to record the sample

volume. (Volumes typically were 10* to 107 ce.) A volume

of 1 ce was arbitrarily assumed by the licensee yielding

artificially high concentrations of Cs-137 and Co-60 (1.4

X 10° and 7.9% ,»Ci/ce, respectively). This resulted in

calculated dose values which are a million too high for

these isotopes.

It is unfortunate that these erroneous values were re-

ported. Nevertheless, the NRC staff believes that the

Heidelberg group used poor judgment in using these

values and ignoring the many other, lower values avail-

able to it. In estimating potential exposures and doses,

it is properly conservative to use the highest reasonable

source term. However, it is unreasonable to use a single

value or set of values when the numerous other reported

values, determined both before and after the highest

values are consistently so much lower.

Additionally, the Heidelberg group ignored the staff’s

discussion of the most recent reactor building sample

data (i.e., sample data through February 1980) which

was available to them in the staffs draft Environmental

Assessment for Decontamination of the Three Mile Island

Unit 2 Reactor Building Atmosphere, NUREG-0662

(March 1980). This discussion (see Section 5.0, Reactor

Building Airborne Activity) indicates that the latest

particulate activity levels are on the order of 1 X 10

pCi/ ce.

Finally, since the Heidelberg dose calculations are based

on a fallacious source term, they, too, are fallacious.

Heidelberg Finding No. 2

Uncertainties inherent in the meteorological models and

dose calculations mean that it is impossible to exclude

that in the proposed purge program individual skin doses

due to krypton-85 could exceed the 100 mrem limit.

Staff Comment

The Heidelberg group’s assertions regarding the uncer-

tainty of predicting dose from meteorological dispersion

characteristics at TMI are compensated for by the con-

servatisms incorporated in the actual purge conditions.

Purging the reactor building atmosphere at TMI will be

carried out using real-time meteorological measurements,

containment atmosphere sampling, radiological effluent

measurements, and an elaborate environmental monitor-

ing program. Operators will control the release rate, and

hence the dose rate, based on actual meteorological con-

ditions and these other measurements. Purging would

be stopped at any time that these combinations of meas-

urements and calculations indicate possible dose values

that begin to approach limiting values which themselves

are well below the imposed release limits.

Thus the Heidelberg group’s statement (p. 11 of the

6/12/80 report) that, given releases of Kr-85 during

unfavorable meteorological conditions, “skin doses could

reach 320 mrem at a distance of 0.5 miles from the

stack,” is incorrect and appears to have been made with-

out knowledge of how the purging will actually be carried

out.

Purging the TMI reactor building atmosphere will be

monitored and controlled to assure that the dose limits

specified by the Commission are not even closely ap-

proached, thus accommodating the discussed uncer-

tainties.

Heidelberg Finding No. 3

Estimates of health damage should consider not only

regional but also global population doses which are an

indication of all health effects caused by the release of

radioactivity. Both can be estimated only with great

uncertainty. The dose effect relation is subject to wide

scientific discussion. We cannot exclude that venting

Krypton-85 alone could cause at least one additional can-

cer case (probably skin cancer) plus one case of genetic

damage within the next century. However, nothing is

known about a potential synergism between krypton-85

beta and ultraviolet radiation.

The results calculated in NUREG-0662 do not exclude

the possibility of one cancer case in the world population

within the next 100 years as a result of purging. The

staff has used the most widely recognized radiation risk

estimates to determine the probability of cancer or genetic

effects in the 50 mile population surrounding TMI as a

result of purging. The average risk of radiation induced

fatal cancer to individuals in the 50 mile TMI population

was estimated to be 5 chances in 100 billion. Within the

world’s population, the average risk to individuals, be-

cause of further Kr-85 dilution in the earth’s atmosphere,

would be even smaller than the already negligible risk

to people within 50 miles of TMI. The global collective

dose of 100 person-rem whole body dose due to Kr-85

(in the Heidelberg estimate) is minute compared to the

annual global background radiation dose of 300 million

person-rem. It should be noted that several independent

organizations, including the National Council on Radia-

tion Protection and Measurements, the Environmental

Protection Agency, the Department of Health and Human

Services, and the Union of Concerned Scientists, have

also concluded that purging would result in negligible

public health risks. Because of the conservatism to be

used in controlling and limiting doses, even a possible

synergism between beta radiation and ultra violet radia-

tion in skin cancer induction would not be expected to

change the health effects picture markedly.

Heidelberg Finding No. 4

The environmental monitoring program cannot ensure

that all significant radiation doses to the community as

a result of decontamination of the atmosphere of the

TMI-2 reactor building atmosphere will be detected. Most

measurements are not frequent enough and are not made

at all in some important localities. Important pathways

and radionuclides are neglected.

Staff Comment

The environmental monitoring program for the postu-

lated reactor building purge is one of the most compre-

hensive programs ever developed for monitoring gaseous

effluents from a domestic commercial nuclear power plant.

The program incorporates the expertise and resources of

the EPA, DOE, NRC, State of Pennsylvania (including

trained community monitors), and the licensee. The pro-

gram includes the availability of 6 mobile (3 EPA and

3 licensee) monitoring units as well as the DOE At-

mospheric Release Advisory Capacity (ARAC) which

will provide independent predictions of the dispersion

patterns of the krypton gas. A detailed description of the

monitoring program is contained in Section 8.0 of

NUREG-0662 (final report, May 1980) including the

number and type of radiation monitoring and sampling

devices, their frequency of analysis, and the location of

the measurements. An even more detailed report is given

in the EPA report, “Long-Term Environmental Radia-

tion Surveillance Plan for Three Mile Island,” March 17,

1980. From the comments in the Heidelberg finding and

in the body of their report, it is apparent that they had

considered neither the EPA report nor the final NUREG-

0662. Most, if not all of the Heidelberg group’s comments

and criticisms are addressed in those two reports.

The radiological environmental monitoring program will

be supplemented by direct measurement via the stack

monitor of all gaseous radioactive materials discharged

during the purge as well as real time meteorological dis-

persion measurements (taken at least hourly) from the

onsite meteorological tower. Additionally, the reactor

building atmosphere will be periodically sampled during

the conduct of the purge to verify the releases measured

directly by the stack monitor. In order to verify that no

significant amounts of radionuclides other than Kr-85 are

released to the environment during purging, samples from

the established network of eighteen operating stations will

continue to be collected. Samples in the downwind sector

will be cullected' every day, rather than the three times

per week under normal conditions. In addition at least

one sample from “control” stations in each quadrant not

in the downwind trajectory will be collected and analyzed

on a daily basis.

Heidelberg Finding No. 5

As considerable health damage could be caused by vent-

ing the atmosphere of the TMI-2 reactor building, we

strongly advise against this procedure. The report of the

Union of Concerned Scientists concludes that decontami-

nation is not as urgent as stated by Met Ed and NRC.

Therefore, we strongly recommend that the alternative

methods for decontamination proposed by UCS and Prof.

Morgan be used.

Staff Comment

The NRC staff disagrees that purging the TMI-2 reactor

building atmosphere could result in “considerable health

damage.” NUREG-0662, “Final Environmental Assess-

ment for Decontamination of the Three Mile Island Unit

2 Reactor Building Atmosphere,” provides an extensive

technical basis for the NRC staff’s recommendation to

purge the reactor building atmosphere.

EXCERPT FROM

GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES, INC’s,

“PLANNING STUDY FOR CONTAINMENT ENTRY

AND DECONTAMINATION,” JULY 2, 1979

6.0 CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERIC FILTRATION

AND PURGING

6.1 Existing Situation and Design Objectives

6.1.1 Containment Atmosphere Conditions

The release of large quantities of reactor coolant to the

containment coincident with significant fuel failure has

led to extremely high airborne levels within the contain-

ment. These levels must be reduced as much as possible

to minimize operator exposures during containment de-

contamination activities. Table 6-1 presents a summary

of results from numerous containment air samples and

the MPC which is allowed in the air in controlled spaces

to indicate the magnitude of the problem. The primary

contaminants are miscellaneous fission products, noble

gases, iodine, cesium, and tritium, all of which must be

treated and/or released in a controlled manner to assure

the minimum impact on the public health and safety.

It is apparent from analysis of Table 6-1 that the actual

value of the specific activity of each of the primary con-

taminants is not accurately known. A reasonable con-

sistency in the order of magnitude of the primary radio-

isotopes does exist and this information was considered

sufficient for preliminary planning. More accurate and

precise knowledge of the containment atmosphere will be

essential prior to the start of and during cleanup opera-

tions so that an accurate evaluation of the impact of

these releases can be made.

Although the bulk of the containment atmosphere radio-

activity would be removed prior to containment entry

there will still be levels of airborne contamination inside

the containment throughout the decontamination activi-

ties. This additional airborne activity is expected from

resuspension of radionuclides which had plated out and

from the dislodging of radioactivity during remote and

manual decontamination activities.

6.1.2 Design Objectives

To evaluate and compare various system designs and

operating alternatives for cleanup of the containment

atmosphere, it is first necessary to establish objectives.

The following objectives are considered appropriate for

this aspect of the containment decontamination:

To minimize the impact on public health and safety

from containment atmosphere cleanup

To assure that operator exposures are ALARA

To comply with the established release technical

specifications

To minimize the impact of containment atmosphere

cleanup operations on the decontamination schedule

HEARINGS ON |

THREE MILE ISLAND CLEANUP

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 9, 1979

United States Senate,

Subcommittee on Nuclear

Regulation of the Committee

on Environment and Public

Works, Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 9:37 a.m., in room 4200,

Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Gary Hart (chair-

man of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Randolph, Hart and Simpson.

Senator Hart. The hearing will come to order.

Yesterday, this subcommittee ventured into largely un-

charted territory. We explored the many unknowns of

recovering from a major commercial nuclear accident.

The trip into ths [sic] new regulatory terrain was not ex-

actly a reassuring one.

For example, we learned that nearly eight months

after the Three Mile Island accident there are still no

guidelines, regulations or technical specifications from the

Nuclear Regulatory Commission to guide the cleanup and

recovery operations at Three Mile Island. We also learned

that without such regulatory guidance the ultimate costs

and duration of the operation remain very much in

doubt. Further, the utility’s ability and willingness to

bear these costs, and to assure the continuity of this

operation also are in doubt. We became familiar with

the intricacies and the hazards of each step of the clean-

up operation—from the initial step of decontaminating

the auxiliary building water to the final crucial step of

dismantling and removing the highly radioactive core.

The major lesson of yesterday’s hearing, for me at

least, was the understandable nervousness of the nearby

neighbors of the Three Mile Island plant. To quote the

Chairman of the Board of Supervisors of Newberry

Township: “Met Ed’s present piecemeal approach,” re-

ferring to the cleanup process, “is driving Newberry

Township residents batty.” Chairman Bruce Smith fur-

ther stated: “A long-range, step-by-step plan could better

prepare the community as well as the community leaders

with the problems and dangers to be confronted with the

cleanup process.”

However, testimony yesterday from utility and NRC

officials indicated that each side is, at least to some de-

gree, waiting for the other to make the first move. * * *

* * * * *

[pages 5-7] :

Senator Simpson.

Senator Simpson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair-

man.

Yesterday, we heard expressed the sincere concerns of

the residents of the local population around Three Mile

Island regarding cleanup and recovery operations at the

site. As Senator Hart has quoted, we had a most refresh-

ing witness who said that up there, the piecemeal ap-

proach was driving them batty, and everyone understood

what he was saying when he said that. It was certainly

precise.

The testimony, on balance, underscored my belief that

a new and more candid planning approach is needed by

the utility and especially by the NRC to manage the re-

covery situation. The utility witnesses stated that a

general plan for recovery and cleanup was under devel-

opment, but that much of the detail would have to be

developed as the recovery effort proceeded and as new

and possibly changing regulatory requirements were im-

posed. The NRC witnesses testified that flexibility was

needed to develop regulatory requirements as the recov-

ery process moved forward. To be sure, I think some

flexibility on the part of the utility and NRC may be

needed to tailor the cleanup program to the situation at

the site, particularly as that situation becomes more fully

known.

Nevertheless, I feel that a greater sensitivity to the

needs of the local community is essential here. We are not

dealing, as the Commission normally does, with a new ap-

plication to built [sic] a facility. Rather, we are faced with

a severely damaged plant that is now in stable condition

but which poses continuing risks to the local population

and to the workers at the site. And we are certainly

faced with a community which is already anxious as a

result, of the accident and highly skeptical of the two

organizations directly involved in the cleanup; that is, the

NRC and the utility. Given this situation, it seems to me

prudent, if not essential for the NRC to lay out in detail

for full public review the standards it expects the utility

to meet and the means it will use to ensure the com-

pliance.

Mr. Chairman, we will have the Commission with us

today, and I would be very interested in hearing reasons

why the agency cannot say definitively what it is and is

not willing to allow in terms of releases into the atmos-

phere and river during the cieanup operation, what th::

impact of those release [sic] is likely to be and what limit

should be imposed for the workers and wh it insurances

we should use to ensure the applicable standards are met.

I understand that the NRC stafi prepared a package of

new regulatory requirements somewhat along those lines

several months ago and forwarded them to the Commis-

sion. I hope that we might know the status of those pro-

pose [sic] requirements and what the Commission plans to

do concerning them. As I see it, such a set of regulatory

requirements properly validated through public review

and comment, followed by the preparation of detailed

recovery plans to meet those requirements, again sub-

ject to public scrutiny, would do much to ease the legiti-

mate local concerns.

Mr. Chairman, the second issue of our hearing today,

and one we will review carefully, is how the Commission

intends to discharge its responsibilities under the Na-

tional Environmental Policy Act of 1969. Again, the

question seems to be whether the Commission plans a

piecemeal approach to recovery or whether a more com-

prehensive approach to considering environmental im-

pacts is warranted. I think the Council on Environmen-

tal Quality will be helpful in that regard.

* * * * *

[pages 40-44]:

Senator Hart. What is the Commission's position with

regard to the desirability or requirement of an environ-

mental impact statement?

Mr. Hendrie. Well, certainly the cleanup of Three

Mile Unit 2 [sic] has to be agreed to by the NRC, by Fed-

eral authorities. It is clearly a major action in the way that

term is used in connection with NEPA, and it needs an

impact statement. I have talked this past week to Chair-

man Speth and CEQ officers—and I see we have Mr.

Yost with us this morning—about going through that

environmental analysis process in a way which fully

satisfies the intent of the legislation but also is con-

sistent with the time scales and need for action in the

decontamination program, and we are still at a fairly

preliminary stage in terms of mapping out that course

of action.

Senator Hart. I guess we are back to where we were

yesterday in terms of how much time we have for some

of these things, and I would like to get your judgment

on public and workers’ health and safety implications

of various time frames and various delays. Let me just

run through a series of them. First of all, your judg-

ment on the risks of delaying the resolution of the radio-

active atmosphere presently contained in the reactor

building and how soon you think that is going to have

to be done to protect the public health.

Mr. Hendrie. I think the sooner that it is done, the

better. I don’t think there is any pressing danger or

urgent risk. That containment has stood the test well,

and I have no doubt it will continue to do so. On the

other hand, the longer these materials are allowed to

remain in gaseous ox liquid forms, simply loose in the

containment building, the more chance there is that

somebody will open the wrong valve or something else

will happen and some of it will get out. It is a concern

oi this kind in connection with the tank in the auxiliary

building and the fact that it was just filling up and

the prospect was for having to start filling tanks in the

other unit that led me to become this concerned back

before we started the EPICOR stay to begin to pound

on the table and say we have got to move, it is going

to the dimension of an emergency situation.

Now the materials within the containment, the krypton

in the atmosphere and material there in the water, I

think I certainly wouldn’t classify it as an emergency

situation. As I say, I think that containment will keep

them in there in good shape for a good long time in [sic]

necessary. But it just adds some increment, however

small it may be, to the public risk to go for extended

periods of time without processing. We need to get on

with it.

Senator Hart. On the one hand this, but on the other

hand that. We heard testimony yesterday from the

people in the area who feel that they haven’t been dealt

with as candidly as possible. I understand on the one

hand this, but on the other hand that. But what we have

got to know and provide to the people is a sense of when.

So I guess what I am asking is a little more specific

question.

Mr. Hendrie. A schedule hasn’t been developed.

Senator Hart. When will it be developed?

Mr. Hendrie. I expected [sic] Met Ed is due to come in

with their layout of where they hope to go and some

approximate scale of time they would hope to accomplish

it; I judge from the discussion yesterday that that was

pretty close in.

Senator Hart. Well, it was late as hell, frankly, and

it is awfully hard to pin anybody down on this. Every-

body says they are waiting for somebody else. Frankly,

I am on the side of that second panel yesterday. I don’t

live there, but if I did I would want the Government

of the United States and the State of Pennsylvania and

the utility to begin to give me a little more specific an-

swers instead of they are going to move and then we are

going to move, and on the one hand this, but on the

other that. I think what people want is a sense of cer-

tainty, and I guess what I want is a sense of when they

are going to have a sense of certainty. Are we talking

about a month? Three months? Six months? Or a year?

Mr. Hendrie. There ought to be a reasonable layout,

I would think, available on a preliminary basis in several

months.

Senator Hart. Several months.

Mr. Hendrie. I think that that will not become sort

of a semi-firm schedule for a longer time than that

simply because it becomes involves [sic] in the analysis re-

quirements under NEPA; it is part of making those de-

cisions. I will point out when the staff publishes its

environmental impact statement, which is inevitably go-

ing to take some time, that that still dosen’t fix the

schedule in an absolute, concrete way, because as you

take each of these steps, you then learn a further piece

of information, and after we have done whatever is

necessary to do with the containment atmosphere, the

radioactive material in the containment atmosphere, good,

now we can start processing the water. But the sched-

ule on the processing of the containment water will be

contingent on how the gas processing goes. The entry

to the containment wil! be contingent on the processing

of water. Any extended entry to the containment will

be contingent on how well the cleanup of the residual

materials on the wall of the containment go. And all

of these affect how soon you might get down to the pri-

mary system and talk about opening the vessel and

getting the core out.

So people are simply going to have to recognize there

are certain variablities in these schedules. I think the

point your are punching, and I must say with, I regard,

good justification, is here we are some seven months or

so on down the line after we collected ourselves after the

accident and there is not that at least preliminary lay-

ing out of how do we get from here to there, “there”

being decontamination.

* * * a *

[pages 54-55]:

[Mr. Hendrie]: So I don’t regard it as a particularly

perilous situation at all.

You asked how long do we have and what are the

risks of human error. I think in view of what has hap-

pened and the care which we believe everybody is taking

with this machine, the risk of human error is pretty

small. I say that in full humility, recognizing this is the

precise machine in which human error was exercised to

put us in the situation.

Senator Hart. The last part of the situation was

how long do we have? Can you keep it a year? Five

years? Ten years?

Mr. Hendrie. I think all of those time scales—I would

think that times like five to ten years would just be

unconscionable. It is not necessary from an engineering

and health physics standpoint. To have that just sitting

there with a damaged core endlessly would be unspeak-

able. But in terms of some technological driving point

which says it is seven years, we are really getting to the

point where the remaining cladding is all going to fall

down.

Senator Hart. So somewhere between one and five

years is the level of unconscicnability and unspeakability.

Mr. Hendrie. Well, t seems to me getting anywhere

near in less than a year is practically out of the ques-

tion, and if we haven't got it out of there in five years,

why that really will be pretty poor performance.

Senator Hart. So one to five years.

Mr. Hendrie. Yes.

Senator Hart. Do we know what we are going to do

with it when we get it out?

Mr. Hendrie. The core debris, the radioactive core

debris will be placed in heavy shielded casks, and then

we will look around and say, good, now what do we do

with the casks? It is good to get it in the shielded casks,

that is the right thing to do, it is a lot less likely to be

harmful there than elsewhere. But that still isn’t the

full answer. Then there are about two options in the

time frame we are talking about. One of the them is to

keep the casks on site for some period that I can’t es-

timate for you, and the other one would be for one of the

major government processing centers to accept those

casks, where they would remain, again for a time I

can’t estimate for you, until we finally get on to solving

the high-level waste problem in this country.

EXCERPTS FROM U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION’S RESPONSE TO LETTER FROM

SENATORS HART AND SIMPSON, JANUARY 2, 1980

[pages 2-3]:

QUESTION 3:

Normally the regulations for an operating reactor allow

release of certain quantities of radiation to the river and

the atmosphere. Do you plan to adhere to these regula-

tions for the cleanup?

If not, what alternative do you propose and why?

ANSWER:

The technical specifications for releases of radioactive

materials from operating reactors are based on guidelines

Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50. Appendix I to 10 CFR

Part 50 provides numerical guides for design objective

and limiting conditions for operation to meet the criterion

of “As Low as is Reasonably Achievable” and which also

meets the standard set in EPA’s regulation 40 CFR 190

concerning radiation dose to the public from the uranium

fuel cycle. We will require that during cleanup and re-

covery operations the releases of radioactive material to

the environment are maintained within the limits speci-

fied in Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50. However, the

Commission may determine that if the public interest

requires, additional measures be taken for the protection

of the public health and safety such as a requirement for

one of the cleanup options mentioned above. The efficacy

of such additional measures will be an integral part of

the Environmental Assessment.

EXCERPT FROM GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES,

INC.’S RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS FROM THE

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION,

JANUARY 4, 1980, PAGE 6

Disposal of Krypton-85 in the Containment Building

is a prerequisite for Reactor Building decontamination.

Delays in RB decontamination represent potential safety

hazards that cannot be quantified without a better under-

standing of the actual core configuration. The additional

safety hazard arises from the increased potential for

reactor core deterioration the longer the core remains in

an unexamined state. The longer it takes to gain access

to the Reactor Building and determine the true state of

the primary coolant system, reactor pressure vessel, core

intervals and reactor fuel, the longer the uncertainty

remains as to what the ultimate risk is for further re-

leases of radioactive nuclides from the facility. Even

without this quantified risk, however, it is believed that

purging the Reactor Building of Krypton-85 represents

the most prudent path to disposal of the Krypton-85 ra-

dioactive noble gas. The potential for delays represented

by the other options represent additional risks of core

deterioration that regardless of the magnitude, justify

purging the reactor building atmosphere as soon as pos-

sible. The true answer to this question cannot be deter-

mined, in fact, until the Krypton-85 is disposed of and

access is gained to the reactor building. Only then can

the true safety hazard and radiation dose to the work

force be assessed. It is not prudent to believe that the

reactor core will remain in a safe condition indefinitely.

EXCERPTS FROM REPORT OF THE U.S. NUCLEAR

REGULATORY COMMISSION’S SPECIAL TASK

FORCE, “EVALUATION OF CLEANUP ACTIVITIES

AT THREE MILE ISLAND,” FEBRUARY 28, 1980

[page IV-5]:

C. What are the current criteria for conducting cleanup

activities?

The current criteria are contained in the Commission’s

Order of February 11, 1980. This Order establishes new

Technical Specifications governing operation of the facil-

ity in what is called a “Recovery Mode.” The specifica-

tions for release of radioactive material from the site and

for occupational exposures are consistent with (and no

more stringent than) existing Commission regulations,

guidelines and criteria applicable to a normal operating

facility. However, the Order “prohibits venting or purg-

ing or other treatment of the reactor building atmos-

phere, the discharge of water decontaminated by the

EPICOR-II system, and the treatment and disposal of

high-level radioactively contaminated water in the re-

actor building, until each of these activities has been

approved by the NRC.” These prohibitions effectively pre-

clude the planned release of any radioactive liquid or

gaseous material from TMI-2 without prior Commission

approval. Low-level solid waste (rags, clothing, etc.)

generated during cleanup operations in the auxiliary

building are permitted to be transported off site.

Notwithstanding the February 11, 1980 Order, there con-

tinues to be a lack of well-defined criteria to govern the

day-to-day activities that involve handling, and planned

or unplanned releases, of the materials covered by the

prohibitions. Such criteria, which could be based on ex-

isting Technical Specification limits with an upper bound

on allowable total quantities to be released, are essential

to the continued conduct of the cleanup operation. The

task force found no evidence that the Staff or the licensee

was preparing such interim criteria for Commission con-

sideration. Without them, the cleanup operation is being

unnecessarily prolonged, and minor unplanned releases

that would be inconsequential in a normal operating plant

are elevated to an unwarranted significance. An example

of the former is the perceived need to obtain Commission

approval to open the outer personnel air lock door which

would release about 0.05 curies of Krypton-85 (see Ap-

pendix 4). An example of the latter is the occurrence on

February 11 in which the incidental off-gassing of about

0.3 curies of Krypton-85 from some leaked primary sys-

tem water caused considerable public concern. To put

these releases in perspective, TMI-2 has been releasing

between 65 and 80 curies of Kr-85 per month in recent

months; a normal operating facility of this type may

release over a thousand curies of radioactive gasses per

month. In 1978, TMI-1 released an average of 1300

curies of radioactive gasses per month.

* * * * *

[page IV- 9]:

G. What is the relative priority of cleanup for NRC

and the licensee?

The actions of the NRC and licensee shortly after the

March 28 accident had high priority in each organiza-

tion (e.g., design and installation of the EPICOR II sys-

tem). However, this initial high priority has eroded as

time elapsed.

The licensee’s senior vice president, Mr. Robert Arnold,

stated to this task force that, due to financial difficulties,

cleanup of TMI-2 is fourth priority. GPU has placed

ahead of TMI-2 cleanup in their list of priorities: main-

tenance of a safe condition at TMI-2; preparations for

restart of TMI-1; and refueling and restart of the Oyster

Creek plant. Mr. Arnold further stated that if the pri-

ority of TMI-2 cleanup were raised above that of TMI-1

and Oyster Creek refueling and restart, an accelerated

TMI-2 cleanup schedule could be pursued. He pointed

out that GPU/Met. Ed are concerned about the Pennsyl-

vania Public Utility Commission’s actions cn proposed

rate increases. Mr. Arnold expressed concern that un-

favorable action by the PUC will further exacerbate Met.

Ed’s financial position, causing further delays in TMI-2

cleanup.

It is the Task Force’s opinion that NRC has also placed

a low priority on TMI-2 cleanup, relative to review of

operating plants, developing and implementing the TMI

Action Plan, and taking action on near-term operating

licenses. A very limited staff has been assigned to the

TMI Support Group both at Headquarters and on site.

Temporary assignments of staff continue to be made to

the on-site group which has a permanent core group of

only 3 to 4 professionals. Although the Commission itself

has not specifically placed a lower priority on reaching

decisions for TMI-2 cleanup activities, the Commission’s

lack of ensuring that definitive cleanup criteria are estab-

lished and the need for Commission approval of all activi-

ties which could provide releases has led to the staff’s

perception that the Commission considers this to be a

low priority activity.

* * * * +

[page IV-22]:

O. What are CEQ’s current views on the NRC’s NEPA

responsibilities for cleanup actions?

The Task Force met with members of the CEQ staff to

obtain its views on the Commission’s responsibilities un-

der NEPA. CEQ staff views NRC's approval of total

cleanup operations at TMI as 4 major federal action

which legally obligates the Commission to prepare an

Environmental Impact Statement. By total operations,

CEQ staff means actions extending from the reactor

cleanup through to ultimate disposal of the wastes result-

ing from that cleanup. Until that Statement is prepared,

CEQ staff believes that NRC approval of certain actions,

such as purging the radioactive gas from the contain-

ment, would be a segmentation of the entire clean-up pro-

gram in a manner inconsistent with NEPA. However,

CEQ staff recognizes that NEPA permits the NRC to

approve certain actions which could result in limited

radioactive effluents prior to completion of the Program-

matic Statement. These actions include steps to obtain

more information and data relevant to further clean-up

activities, and actions necessary to maintain TMI in a

safe and stable condition. Maintenance to ensure con-

tinued operation of the fan coolers inside the containment

was specifically referred to as an example of permitted

interim maintenance operations.

1The task force was informed that, under current plans, the

PEIS would cover delivery of the waste to a waste disposal site,

but would not address the environmental impact of disposal of the

waste at that site.

EXCERPT FROM U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION’S RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS FROM

SENATORS HART AND SIMPSON, PAGES 11-12

QUESTION 3:

Please include regulatory guidelines that will remain

stable over the period of the cleanup, consistent with

the Commission’s responsibilities to protect the public

health and safety and the environment.

ANSWER:

The staff anticipates that existing Commission regula-

tions, guidelines and criteria applicable to a normally

operating facility, will continue to be applied to cleanup

activities at TMI-2. However, we recognize that although

certain activities would otherwise be permitted at a nor-

mally operating facility, it may be warranted, in the

public interest, to prohibit them at TMI-2 even though

they could be conducted in full compliance with existing

effluent limitations in the operating license or NRC regu-

lations, until further evaluation of them is undertaken.

At this time, we have identified several such activities:

disposal of water decontaminated by EPICOR-II system,

treatment and disposal of high-level contaminated water

now in the reactor building, and venting or other treat-

ment of the reactor building atmosphere. An example of

how such a further restriction affects the cleanup plan

is shown in our analysis of the cryogenic case (see re-

sponse to Question 1). For the other three cases we

assumed that if any proposed method of treatment and

disposal meets existing Commission regulations, guide-

lines, and criteria for operating reactors, the method

would be acceptable. For the cryogenic case we assumed

that even if venting the reactor building would meet cri-

teria, it would be prohibited and that an alternative

method, which would further reduce radioactive effluents

(such as cryogenic processing of gases), would be nec-

essary.

EXCERPT FROM TRANSCRIPT OF PUBLIC

HEARING CONDUCTED BY THE U.S. NUCLEAR

REGULATORY COMMISSION, MARCH 19, 1980,

PAGE 16

MR. COLLINS: Well, let me follow up on that. Asa

result of many of those conversations that occurred that

day, there was a meeting in the White House between

DOE and NRC—

(Crowd interrupts. )

MR. COLLINS: —At which time it was resolved

that those community monitoring programs and an in-

volvement of you officials would be undertaken. Last

week we met with Mayor Reed here in Middletown to

discuss that very program with him, and we have plans

in a week to initiate a meeting with you people to dis-

cuss that.

SPEAKER: Why just Middletown?

MR. COLLINS: I’m talking about all of the local offi-

cials in the surrounding areas.

SPEAKER: I was never invited.

MR. COLLINS: No. I said the meeting is being es-

tablished. I’m not saying that we had that meeting.

(Crowd interrupts. )

MR. COLLINS: Your suggestion did not go by the

board. I did not ignore it.

SPEAKER: Maybe we could help Mr. Collins. Let’s

take a vote. Now, careful.

All for releasing the crypton [sic], applaud.

(No response.)

SPEAKER: Those against releasing the crypton [sic].

(Applause. )

EXCERPT FROM TRANSCRIPT OF PUBLIC

HEARING CONDUCTED BY THE U.S. NUCLEAR

REGULATORY COMMISSION, MARCH 21, 1980,

PAGES 16-18

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: Go ahead.

MRS. PRELESNIK: If you don’t talk too long.

REV. VASTINE: I won't talk to [sic] long, but I wand

to apologize for talking too long because I haven’t had the

chance to talk to you ever and I probably will not again.

I am saying, friend, that you know if there is vio-

lence, God help us that there won’t be, in the Harrisburg

area, if there is eruption of the population there, my

dear friend, in terms of the rush of emotion to do some-

thing, to do something that is untoward, I say, my dear

friend, that it is in your hands.

DR. COLMAN: Let me try to pick up here if I can.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: I think we both perhaps

have some roles in that. Go ahead, Doctor.

DR. COLMAN: I think perhaps Reverend Vastine is

picking up on a point that I wanted to try to emphasize

here.

The fact that we are here indicates that there is a

problem and the fact that we are having to gather our

own technical information and present it to you indicates

that there is a problem. And the fact that there were so

many people as angry as they were in Middle Town on

Wednesday and I gather in Elizabeth Town last night

indicates that there is a problem. And I think the prob-

lem really is one of distrust, absolute distrust for the

variety of authorities who have been hoping to be in con-

trol in the matter of TMI; thet includes Met. Ed., that

includes the NRC.

One of the results of that is that we need assurance

from independent experts that the new information which

we are being fed is, in fact, accurate. And I tkink in-

creasingly we are capable of drawing our own conclu-

sions once we have the facts in front of us. But I think

that what Reverend Vastine was alluding to is, I guess

really it is the main point I want to try to make here.

We have felt out of control of our own lives in that

area ever since the 28th of March last year. Every time

we are told that somethiag is about to happen, although

which there is no real assurance of our safety, we again

feel out of control. Every time we here [sic] that there is

the most minimal leak, as in yesterday’s leak, we feel again

that we are out of control.

I was at the meeting in Middle Town on Wednesday,

just for a short time because I got there late. One of the

clearest things that was coming across there was that

the people in that area seemed to be sick and tired of

listening to or speaking to people from the NRC who are

incapable of making decisions there onsite. The clearest

message that that group got across, other than its anger,

was they want you there. They want you there before

any decision is made on venting and want you to make

it in full view of the strength of the opinions that are

held in that area.

J have been tracking sort of the tone of meetings ever

since the one in Middle Town that Mr. Gilinsky was at

with Congressman Ertle. It was kind of a watershed

meeting. It became clear, I think, at that point of the

total emotional reaction of people in the area and Mr.

Gilinsky gave some indication of hearing that and that

heartened us to a degree.

I am getting scared. As a psychologist I am getting

scared. Those meetings are rowdy. Middle Town is a

reasonably rough town as they go. I was on my way

over to the Liberty Fire Hall the other night to go to

those meetings and I was warned by some high school

kids, you don’t want to go there mister, this is turning

into a heavy scene and they were right.

It is monotonic. It just seems going up. And I think

unless some mechanism can be developed so the people

in that area have a realistic understanding that they are

gaining control over the situation there by having a clear

effect on the Commission about its decision, that anger

level is going to keep on going. Wherever it goes, I don’t

want to speculate, but it is not healthy, it is not good.

EXCERPT FROM U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION STAFF'S “FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL

ASSESSMENT FOR DECONTAMINATION OF THE

THREE MILE ISLAND UNIT 2 REACTOR BUILDING

ATMOSPHERE,” NUREG-0662, MAY, 1980, PAGE 1-1

1.0 Summary and Recommendation

The NRC staff has prepared this summary of the Final

Environmental Assessment for those who prefer to fol-

low the main themes of the assessment without referring

to the technical descriptions, calculations, and other data

that provide the foundation upon which the staff’s recom-

mendation is based.

The krypton-85 (Kr-85) released into the reactor build-

ing during the accident on March 29, 1979, [sic] must be re-

moved from the building so that workers can begin the

tasks necessary to clean the building, maintain instru-

ments and equipment, and eventually remove the dam-

aged fuel from the reactor core. Those tasks must be

performed whether or not the plant ever again produces

electricity. Radiation from the krypton gas, although

thinly dispersed through the reactor building atmosphere,

nevertheless poses a threat to workers who would have

to work in the building for prolonged periods.

This Final Environmental Assessment (NUREG-0662)

presents a discussion of the information considered by the

NRC staff in arriving at its recommendation that the

preferred method for removing the krypton-85 from the

reactor building is by a kind of flushing process by which

the gases would be pushed out of the building and fresh

air pulled in.

The Metropolitan Edison Company (the licensee) on No-

vember 13, 1979, asked the NRC staff for permission to

purge or remove the reactor building atmosphere contain-

ing the krypton-85 to the outside (Ref. 1). In March

1979, the NRC staff published the draft version of this

Environmental Assessment (NUREG-0662) and two sub-

sequent Addenda for public comment (Ref. 2). The staff

has received approximately 800 comments on the draft

Environmental Assessment. Of these, approximately 195

responses generally supported the purging of the reactor

building, approximately 500 opposed it, and the remain-

ing responses were either recommended alternatives for

removing the krypton or comments that took no position

on the staff’s recommendation. Substantive comments re-

ceived by the NRC staff will be printed in Volume 2 of

this Assessment.

From this process have emerged some NRC staff conclu-

sions on four basic aspects of dealing with the reactor

building atmosphere:

—tThe potential physical health impact on the public of

using any of the proposed strategies for getting rid of

the krypton-85 is negligible.

The potential psychological impact is likely to grow

the longer it takes to reach a decision, get started, and

complete the process.

—The purging method is the quickest and the safest

for the workers on Three Mile Island to accomplish.

—Overall, no significant environmental impact would

result from use of any of the alternatives discussed in

this Assessment.

= * * = *

[SEAL]

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Washington, D.C. 20555

May 1, 1980

Docket No. 50-320

Memorandum for: Wm. H. Regan, Jr., Chief

Siting Analysis Branch, DE

From: Donald P. Cleary, Section Leader

Regional Impact Analysis Section

Siting Analysis Branch, DE

Subject: TMI-2 ATMOSPHERIC

DECONTAMINATION

On April 21, 1980, I received a telephone call from Dr.

Bruce P. Dohrenwend, Head, Social Psychiatry Research

Unit, Columbia University, responding to your letter of

April 9, 1980, which transmitted NUREG-0662 “Envi-

ronmental Assessment for Decontamination of the Three

Mile Island Unit 2 Reactor Building Atmosphere”, and

which requested comments he might have regarding psy-

chological stress associated with atmospheric decontami-

nation alternatives. Dr. Dohrenwend’s comments are pri-

marily directed toward local citizens needs to be informed

and to participate in the decisions on atmospheric de-

contamination. He emphasized the relationship between

information and participation and the level of psychologi-

cal stress within the population.

Dr. Dohrenwend found NUREG-0662 and Addendums 1

and 2 inadequate public information documents in several

respects. There is insufficient information provided on

the relative risks and consequences of the decontamination

alternatives. The reader is left with the impression that

engineering considerations, rather than possible human

consequences, are to determine the selection of an alter-

native. The central problem of maintaining an ability

to monitor and control the reactor core needs to be more

fully explained in terms of the potential risks to the

population if this ability is not maintained. He empha-

sized the urgency of clearly informing the local popula-

tion of the risks to the general public of not decontami-

nating the atmosphere quickly or not decontaminating the

atmosphere at all. Risks and potential consequences need

to be presented within a probabilistic framework which

can be comprehended by the average resident of the area.

Dr. Dohrenwend stated that NRC should intensify its

efforts to inform the public and to allow the public to

play a more active role in deliberating the relative merits

of the atmospheric decontamination alternatives. We

shouid especially communicate with and involve those

who are representative of the whole community, local

elected official, individuals from the media and from

representative community groups. In terms of repre-

sentation, greater weight should be given to residents

closer to TMI, especially within five miles as this group

appears to be under the greatest stress. To achieve the

most meaningful communication and involvement. he sug-

gested establishing a mechanism whereby a local con-

sensus can be developed on the most acceptable atmos-

pheric decontamination alternative. Such an effort should

be undertaken quickly and should be assisted with the

following:

—a summary of the findings of the various studies,

of stress, altitudes [sic] and perceptions of the

local population toward TMI;

—a thorough and clear explanation of the threats

associated with each of the alternatives; and

—heavy reliance on outside experts, who are ac-

cepted as neutral, to explain and interpret techni-

cal and scientific information required to under-

stand relative risks and consequences.

Dr. Dohrenwend emphasized his confidence that if citizens

are given adequate facts and responsibility in the deci-

sion process they will act rationally.

/s/ Donald P. Cleary

DONALD P. CLEARY

Section Leader

Regional Impact Analysis Section

Siting Analysis Branch

Division of Engineering

ce: B. Dohrenwend

EXCERPT FROM TRANSCRIPT OF PUBLIC

HEARING CONDUCTED BY U.S. NUCLEAR

REGULATORY COMMISSION,

JUNE 5, 1980, PAGE 58

COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: By “unwarrantedly

long” you are saying—

DR. BAUM: I would think anything over three or

four or five months would probably be getting to the

point of being too long.

You have to also remember that as long as the plant

remains unstable, and the uncertainty continues, that

characterizes it now, the possibility for accidental leak-

age remains. Those kinds of things are stressers.

COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: That is the real

point, I take it. You are not talking so much about

anxiety related, solely related to Krypton, as anxiety

related to the plant?

DR. BAUM: That is a primary source, yes.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: Any other questions of

this gentleman?

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Did the—the other

consultant who is here, did he want to add anything?

VOICE: That basically summarizes it.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: Fine. All right. Bernie?

DR. SNYDER: I would like to go on to the last slide.

We'll try to move along a little faster.

(Slide. )

CHAIRMAN AHERANE (sic): It is a very impor-

tant subject. There is no rush.

EXCERPT FROM TRANSCRIPT OF MEETING OF

ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFETY,

PAGES 5-7

Therefore, in order to get the venting over as soon as

possible, I believe, it appropriate to allow the waiving of

the current tech spec values. Draft orders are before us.

I hope we can make decisions today on both of those

issues.

Mr. Bickwit, would you care to summarize the two

orders you have prepared for us?

MR. BICKWIT: The first order would grant permis-

sion for the venting in accordance with the conditions

prescribed by the staff in its recommendation. The situ-

ation that you face from a legal matter is that the li-

censee may vent only if it receives approval from the

NRC.

The first order would grant that approval, subject to

the conditions imposed by the staff. It poses three ques-

tions which will have to be decided by the Commission.

These are listed toward the bottom of page 2 of the order.

It states that the Commission must decide whether

there is “sufficient need for prompt decontamination of

the containment atmosphere to justify going ahead prior

to completion of the programmatic impact statement.”

It must also “decide whether the decontamination

method recommended by the staff can be carried out con-

sistent with the Commission’s statutory mandate to en-

sure adequate protection of public health and safety”;

and three, “whether the environmental review has met

the requirements of the National Environmental Policy

Act.“

The order goes on to deal with each of those questions

and comes to the conclusion that each of them can be re-

solved in a way which will permit the action which the

staff recommends.

The second order is a modification, a temporary mod-

ification of the license which wouid relieve the licensee

from certain tech spec requirements. Because it is an

amendment to the license, an opportunity for a full

adjudicatory hearing is offered to those who could be

adversely affected by the order.

The finding is made, however, that there are no sig-

nificant hazards, [sic] considerations involved in the issu-

ance of this order. Therefore, the required hearing, if

held, would be held after the fact of the permitted

actions.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: And incorporated into the

already scheduled hearing?

MR. BICKWIT: That is right. We presently have a

proceeding in which there have been requests for hearings

with respect to changing the original tech specs for this

license. That hearing has not been granted at this point.

This order provides that if that hearing is granted, and

if a hearing is granted under this order, that the two

would be consolidated.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: All right.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Could you summarize

the modifications in the second order?

MR. BICKWIT: Yes. The present tech specs, as I

understand it, would not permit the venting either by a

fast purge or by a slow purge. The current tech specs

stand in the way of both of those actions. The fast purge

is, as I understand it, inhibited by the releases that can

be taken—that can be made in a sudden fashion, whereas

the slow purge is inhibited by the quarterly release limits.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: You mean that doing it

in a given quarter—completing it in a given quarter?

MR. BICKWIT: That’s right. So that these partic-

ular tech specs do not stand in the way of either such

action. I think I ought to ask Bernie Snyder, who has

recommended the precise limits that are incorporated in

this order to elaborate on that—what those limits are.

DR. SNYDER: On page 3 of the second order, the

limits appear, which would be substituted for the instan-

taneous and quarterly average tech spec limits, which

are 2.1.2 in the reference there.

Basically, they will be Appendix I limits, which are

(a) and (b) there. Fifteen millirem skin dose, and five

millirem total body dose.

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: Appendix I limits also

meet the EPA guidelines?

DR. SNYDER: Yes. Item (e) was added because

Appendix I does not have a rate limitation. We felt it

would be advisable in order to assure meeting, especially,

(a), the skin dose; that there would be a 20 percent or

three millirem per hour limit.

Measurement of Strontium-90

Released in Venting of the TMI

Unit 2 Containment Atmosphere:

June 28-July 11, 1980

Joan Harvey, Ph.D.

Richard G. Piccione, Ph.D.

Daniel M. Pisello, Ph.D.

This study was conducted under the auspices of Accord

Research and Educational Associates, Inc.

Permission to use this copyrighted material was granted

by Daniel M. Pisello, Joan Harvey, and Richard G. Pic-

cione.

Between June 28 and July 11, 1980, Metropolitan Edi-

son (Met Ed) vented the containment building of their

Three Mile Island (TMI) Unit 2 nuclear reactor. Prior

to the venting Met Ed reported that the building atmos-

phere contained approximately 57,000 curi

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