Petition — Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Doca
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~ Office-Supreme Court, U.S.
SO-1537% FILED
‘ae | MAR 9 1981
EVAS,
IN THE { CLERK
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1980
PITTSTON STEVEDORING CORP.,
Petitioner,
against
JACK A. DOCA and FANNIE C. DOCA,
MARINA MERCANTE NICARAGUENSE, S.A.,
Respondents.
ee
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
——a a eeenenenenemnnmianiemaaaal
WILLIAM P. KARDARAS
Counsel for Petitioner
Pittston Stevedoring Corp.
14 Wall Street
New York, New York 10005
Of Counsel:
JAMES S. MCMAHON
JosEPH E. DONAT
>
i
Questions Presented
1. Whether, it having been judicially determined by the
Court of Appeals that longshoreman-respondent was in fact the
employee of petitioner, it is now required that any action against
such employer be dismissed in its entirety by reason of the ex-
clusivity provisions of Section 905(a) of the Longshoremen’s
and Harborworkers’ Compensation Act. (33 U.S.C. §901,
et seq.)
2. Whether, if it is determined that longshoreman-respondent
was not an employee of petitioner, Pittston, and therefore no
duties under OSHA were owed to him, the judgment should be
vacated as there is no other basis for liability against petitioner
Pittston.
“i
List of Additional Interested Parties
In addition to the parties set forth in the caption of this litiga-
tion upon information and belief, the present GOVERNMENT
OF NICARAGUA and its current governmentally controlled
steamship company, NAVIERES NICARAGUENSE ‘S.A.
(NANICA) as successor in interest to respondent Marina Mer-
cante Nicaraguense S.A. (Mamenic Lines), and Marina’s under-
writers, THE UNITED KINGDOM MUTUAL STEAMSHIP
ASSURANCE ASSOCIATION (BERMUDA) LTD., (written
through THE MILLER INSURANCE CLUB in London, Eng-
land whose New York representative is TRANSPORT MU-
TUAL SERVICES INC.,) as well as Doca’s general employer,
HAMILTON TERMINAL COMPANY and its insurer cur-
rently unknown to the petitioner and petitioner’s insurers, THE
HOME INDEMNITY COMPANY, and THE ST. PAUL IN-
SURANCE COMPANY, also may have an interest in the out-
come of this litigation.
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
QUESTIONS PRESENTED .....-- esse eset erererertese i
List OF ADDITIONAL INTERESTED PARTIES ....-+-+-+>> il
CE TEI ck acc alic deeb ae enea bebe e eas l
Deer es a eck eke Weer eane se ea 1
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED ......-+--ss+eeeee l
STATEMENT OF CASE ... ccc ccc c ccc csrccercvccees ps
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT:
t. The decision below conflicts with the decisions of
this Court and other Courts of Appeals which have held
that Section 905(a) of the Longshoremen’s and Har-
borworkers’ Compensation Act (33 U.S.C. 901 et seq.)
provides the exclusive remedy against a stevedore-em-
ee er rere eee oe Le 4
2. Assuming, arguendo that respondent Jack Doca was
not an employee of petitioner, Pittston, the Circuit
Courts are presently in disagreement as to the applica-
bility of the Occupational Safety & Health Act and reg-
ulations promulgated thereunder to a non-employer.. 8
ie rs ca ee eas a aa ew AR eRe Od 10
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
American Export Lines Inc. v. Alvez, 446 U.S. 274 (1980) 4
Beaver v. Jacuzzi Brothers Inc., 454 F. 2d 284 (8th Cir.
NR ee ess Swan hee aee 6p 4 ORE COREE Y MES 5, 6,7
=
iv
Biggart v. Texas Eastern Transmission Corp., 235 So. 2d
ee ee ED Sis os 08 keke how ba haw ae eee 7, 8
Champagne v. Penrod Drilling Company, 341 F. Supp.
1282, aff'd 459 F. 2d 1042, amended 462 F. 2d 1372,
cert. den. 409 U.S. 1113, reh. den. 410 U.S. 948.. 5, 6, 7
Matter of DeNoyer v. Cavanaugh, 221 N.Y. 273 (1917) 8
Edmonds v. Compagne Maritime Transatlantique, 443 U.S.
EE OE ec GN ES oa SAW PRCA Kae Ke lde bO es 5
Fallone v. Misericordia Hospital, 23 A.D. 2d 222, 259
N.Y.S. 2d 947, aff'd, 17 N.Y. 2d 648, 269 N.Y.S. 2d
oe ee ee ee ee ee 8
Horn v. C. L. Osborn Contracting Company, 591 F. 2d
318 (Sth Cir. 1979), reh. den. 595 F. 2d 1221...... 9
Jeter v. St. Regis Paper Co., 507 F. 2d 973 (Sth Cir.
IN te lata ee OG hae Ans Gael dik ake a Ft
Johnston v. International Freighting Corporation, 274 App.
Se Be ee Ue PE 8 ec Abs eke vee wenees 8
Land v. Dollar, 300 US. 731 (1947) 2.0... ccc ccces l
Marshall v. Knutson Construction Co., 566 F. 2d 596
Re. CBRE SERDTTIT SG ate Hane Ny ce ie a Ae a 9
Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249
Rd MEE a ee Sey fre ree en 5
The Standard Oil Company v. Anderson, 212 U.S. 215, 29
ee es Oa Se CE PER ivi dosed ead nae’ 4
Thibodaux v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 580 F. 2d 841 (Sth
Cir. 1978), cert. den. 442 U.S. 909, 99 S. Ct. 2820,
a Bic: a ee eG POD kh e's Ao 'els Ncaia'w 0% Be ow » he
Zapico v. Bucyrus—Erie Co., 579 F. 2d 714 (2d Cir.,
rar ye Ce a eeu a ae ea wars 5
Statutes and Rules:
RR ENED 8 8 ee ac a 1
v
Occupational Safety and Health Act, (29 U.S.C. §651 et
seq):
BE hy ck g wu vanlccyerecokap ae Nee elton 9
BR i acces deennianes ase eae 2, 9, 33a
BONIS oi cass dannnndseerawanenee nee 5
oo Oe, <a cain cy enn 5
WR cl cat cay coh ies apeny enn 2, 34a
Longshoremen’s and Harborworkers’ Compensation Act
(33 U.S.C. $901, et seq.):
Noy sie Can tae ons enemas 1, 33a
ee EE ee er 5
NOE Ore re 5
DN ic, cetcotka scm es i, 2, 4, 5, 33a
Code of Federal Regulations, Title 29:
29 C.F.R. $1918.91 2.0... cece ee eee eee 2, 3, 34a
Other Authorities:
Larson on Workmen’s Compensation Law ......+++++: 7
12 Moore’s Federal Practice 9434.01 .........--00055 l
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
Opinions Below
The opinion of the District Court reported at 474 F. Supp.
751 (S.D.N.Y., 1979) appears in Appendix B hereto. The
opinion of the Court of Appeals reported at 634 F. 2d 30 (2
Cir. 1980) appears in Appendix A hereto. The judgment of the
Court of Appeals appears in Appendix C hereto. The order of
the Court of Appeals denying without opinion the petition for
rehearing appears in Appendix D hereto.
Jurisdiction
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
was entered on October 1, 1980 affirming in part and remanding
in part the judgment and opinion of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York (Kevin T. Duffy,
Judge) entered on July 11, 1979.* A timely petition for rehear-
ing was subsequently denied without further opinion by the Court
of Appeals on January 7, 1981 and this petition for certiorari was
filed within 60 days of that date. This Court’s jurisdiction is in-
voked under 28 U.S.C. §1254 (1).
Statutory Provisions Involved
United States Code, Titie 33
§902 Definitions
See Appendix, p. 33a
*Finality of an order or judgment is not a prerequisite to petitioning
this Court for a writ of certiorari under 28 U.S.C. §1254 (1). Land v.
Dollar, 300 U.S. 731 (1947). See also 12 Moore’s Federal Practice
9434.01.
United States Code, Title 33
§905 Exclusiveness of Liability
See Appendix, p. 33a
United States Code, Title 29
§652 Definitions
See Appendix, p. 34a
§653 ***workmen’s compensation law or common law or
statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of employers and
employees unaffected
See Appendix, p. 34a
Code of Federal Regulations, Title 29
§1918.91 Housekeeping
See Appendix, p. 34a
Statement of Case
On July 23, 1975 respondent Jack A. Doca (hereinafter
“Doca”) was generally employed as a cargo checker by Hamil-
ton Terminal Company (hereinafter “Hamilton”) and perform-
ing work on board the M/V “COSTA RICA” owned by re-
spondent Marina Nicaraguense S.A. (hereinafter “Marina”)
when he was injured. (Appendix, p. 2a.) It is not disputed herein
that respondent Doca’s accident occurred aboard the M/V
“COSTA RICA” while the vessel was moored in navigable waters
of the United States.
Marina contracted with petitioner Pittston Stevedoring Com-
pany (hereinafter “Pittston”) to unload the vessel, and Pittston
in turn contracted with Hamilton to perform cargo checking ser-
vices. (Appendix, p. 2a). At the time of his injury Doca was
aboard the vessel at the joint request and direction of both a
Hamilton and Pittston supervisor to check cargo in a hatch.
(Appendix, p. 2a) It is contended by petitioner Pittston that
based upon the facts in the trial record and even more signifi-
cantly based upon the judicial finding and determination in the
3
opinion of the United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit,
(Appendix pp. 4a-5a) respondent Jack Doca, was a special or
borrowed employee of petitioner Pittston at the time of his
accident.
The District Court sitting without a jury awarded the Docas
damages totaling $669,127.00 finding both Marina and Pittston
jointly and severally liable for such damages to the plaintiffs.
(Appendix p. 3a) However, as to Marina and Pittston inter se,
the trial Court found Marina to be 90% liable and Pittston 10%
liable for plaintiff's accident (Appendix 3a). The liability of
Pittston was based solely upon the violation of a regulation
promulgated by the Occupational Safety and Health Adminis-
tration, 29 C.F.R. §1918.91(a) (1979) which required steve-
dores to keep their work area free of “tripping or stumbling
hazards.” (Appendix, p. 4a) The liability of respondent Marina
was based on its active negligence in first creating and thereafter
continuing to permit the existence of an accumulation of paper
and other debris in walking and working areas on the main deck
of its M/V “COSTA RICA.” (Appendix, p. 4a)
The District Court having based the liability of Pittston solely
on breach of the OSHA regulation in question, (Appendix, p.
23a-24a) petitioner Pittston appealed to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit arguing that the OSHA reg-
ulations did not apply as Doca was not its employee. However,
the Court of Appeals disagreed and affirmed the finding of lia-
bility against Pittston based upon the violation of such statutory
regulation and thereafter, based on the District Court record,
went on to find Doca to be a special or borrowed employee of
Pittston by stating:
“Pittston’s argument that its duty does not run to Doca
because Doca was not Pittston’s employee cannot be main-
tained. Since Doca’s company, Hamilton, was hired by Pitt-
ston, Doca’s relationship to Pittston was effectively that of
an employee, for purposes of the scope of the duty based
on the OSHA regulation, especially since Doca was sent
on the mission that led to his injury by a Pittston and a
4
Hamilton supervisor, acting together.” (Appendix, pp. 4a-
5a) (emphasis supplied)
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the litigation
to the District Court solely for reassessment on a limited issue of
damages having affirmed all issues of liability found by the Dis-
trict Court. (Appendix, p. 18a) No further proceedings in the
District Court have, as yet, taken place.
Petitioner then moved for rehearing based on the Court of
Appeals findings and decision that Doca was its employee. Peti-
tioner pointed out that it was required that the Court of Ap-
peals apply Section 905(a) of the Longshoremen’s Act to pre-
cluded any liability, other than for compensation, against a steve-
dore-employer. Alihough the Second Circuit took the unusual
step of calling for further briefs from the respondents herein on
the rehearing petition, the rehearing of petitioner was subse-
quently denied without further opinion. (Appendix, p. 32a).
There also exists the derivative claim of respondent Jack
Doca’s wife, Fannie Doca for loss of consortium, whose right
to recover, assuming liability, is not raised herein by reason of
this Court’s recent decision in American Export Lines Inc. v.
Alvez, 446 U.S. 274 (1980).
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
1. The decision below conflicts with the decisions of
this Court and other Courts of Appeals which have
held that Section 905(a) of the Longshoremen’s
and Harborworkers’ Compensation Act (33 U.S.C.
901 et seq.) provides the exclusive remedy against
a stevedore-employer.
Reargument having been denied, petitioner does not question
the finding of the Court of Appeals that Doca was, in effect, a
borrowed servant. The Standard Oil Company v. Andersen, 212
U.S. 215, 29 S.Ct. 252, 53 L. Ed. 480 (1909).
|
5
However, once such a determination was made, it is respect-
fully submitted that the Court of Appeals should not have pro-
ceeded to disregard the effect of the exclusivity provisions of Sec-
tion 905 (a) of the Longshoremen’s and Harborworkers’ Com-
pensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §901 et seq., (hereinafter “Longshore-
men’s Act”) which by its very terms preclude any liability on the
part of the stevedore-employer other than for compensation ben-
efits.
Such refusal by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals to apply
Section 905(a) of the Longshoremen’s Act when an OSHA em-
ployment nexus is found is in direct conflict with both the Fifth
and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeal. Jeter v. St. Regis Paper
Co., 507 F. 2d 973 (Sth Cir. 1975); Beaver v. Jacuzzi Brothers
Inc., 454 F. 2d 284 (8th Cir. 1972); see also Champagne v.
Penrod Drilling Company, 341 F. Supp. 1282, aff'd 459 F. 2d
1042, amended 462 F. 2d 1372, cert. den. 409 U.S. 1113, reh.
den. 410 U.S. 948; Thibodaux v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 580
F. 2d 841 (Sth Cir. 1978), cert. den. 442 U.S. 909, 99 S. Ct.
2820, 60 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1979).
This Court, as well as a different panel of the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit itself has recognized that compen-
sation benefits are a longshoreman’s sole remedy against his em-
ployer, regardless cf negligence. Edmonds v. Com pagne Maritime
Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 260 (1978); Northeast Marine
Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249 (1977); Zapico v. Bu-
cyrus—Erie Co., 579 F. 2d 714 (2d Cir., 1978).
It is not contested that longshoreman Doca received compen-
sation benefits by reason of his injury pursuant to the Long-
shoremen’s Act. That Doca is an “employee” of Pittston, as
that term is defined by both the Occupational Safety and Health
Act, 29 U.S.C. §652 (b) as well as the Longshoremen’s Act, 33
U.S.C. §902(3) is clear. Moreover, that Pittston is the “em-
ployer” of Doca, as that term is defined by the same statutes,
is also clear. Compare 29 U.S.C. §652(5) and 33 U.S.C.
§902(4).
6
In Jeter v. St. Regis Paper Co., 507 F. 2d 973 (Sth Cir. 1975),
although the Court ultimately found that St. Regis was not an
employer of the claimant Jeter, and that it was not obligated
to comply with certain OSHA regulations concerning the ‘Work
performed by him, it, nevertheless, recognized the very argu-
ment of appellant Pittston herein, when it stated:
“Had there been sufficient facts of control*** the fact
might have made St. Regis Jeter’s employer and Jeter’s ex-
clusive remedy would have been workmen’s compensation
benefits, which he received. Cf. Biggart v. Texas Eastern
Transmission Corp., 235 So. 2d 443 (Miss. 1970).” (507
F, 2d at 978)
Similarly, in Beaver v. Jacuzzi Brothers, Inc., 454 F. 2d 284
(8th Cir. 1972), the Court wrote:
“As a matter of common experience and of present busi-
ness practices in our economy, it is clear that an employee
may be coemployed by more than one employer even while
doing the same work. Biggart v. Texas Eastern Transmis-
sion Corp., 235 So. 2d 443, 445 (Miss. 1970).
“As Jacuzzi Brothers was an employer within the mean-
ing of the statute, plaintiff's sole remedy is that provided
by the Workmen’s Compensation Law.” 454 F. 2d 284 at
285 (emphasis supplied)
In Champagne v. Penrod Drilling Company, 341 F. Supp.
1282, aff'd 459 F. 2d 1042 amended 462 F. 2d 1372, cert.
den. 409 U.S. 1113, reh. den. 410 U.S. 948, the Disrict Court
found that decedent, Paul LeBlanc, a welder employed by Ter-
rebonne Weiders, was, in fact, the borrowed servant of Penrod
Drilling Company at the time of his death while working on an
oil drilling platform owned and being constructed by Penrod in
the Gulf of Mexico.
Having made such a determination, the Court went on to .
hold:
7
“As such, LeBlanc was a borrowed or loaned employee
and entitled to the benefits of the applicable compensation
statute against Penrod, subject te the limitations imposed.
The exclusive remedy afforded by Title 33 U.S.C. §905
is such a limitation and this suit must be dismissed. Ross
v. Delta Drilling Company (E.D.La. 1962), 213 F. Supp.
270; Touchet v. Travelers (W.D.La. 1963), 221 F. Supp.
376.” 341 F. Supp. 1282 at 1285 (emphasis supplied)
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, following such reasoning, wrote that: “It is our judg-
ment that the findings of fact are supported by substantial evi-
dence and that the legal conclusions reached are supported by
the facts found.” 459 F. 2d 1042. And, as indicated above cer-
tiorari was denied by this Court. 409 U.S. 1113.
This was also the rule in Thibodaux v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
580 F. 2d 841 (Sth Cir. 1978), cert. den., 442 U.S. 909, 99
S. Ct. 2820, 60 L.Ec. 2d 274 (1979) where the Court wrote:
“If the LHWCA is applicable to this case, and if it is determined
that the deceased was a ‘borrowed employee’ or “borrowed ser-
vant’ of ARCO, the plaintiff's exclusive remedy against ARCO
will lie in the recovery of compensation benefits under the Act.”
580 F. 2d 841 at 843.
In Biggart v. Texas Eastern Transmission Corp., 235 So. 2d,
443 (Miss., 1970), relied upon by the Fifth Circuit in Jeter as
well the Eighth Circuit in Beaver, the Supreme Court of Missis-
sippi held that because decedent Biggart was an employee of
both a pipeline contractor who paid him, as well as the pipeline
owner who controlled him, therefore, the sole and exclusive rem-
edy of his estate was under the Workmen’s Compensation Act
of Mississippi, which precluded any action against an employer.
Using as its guide the recognized authority in the field, Larson
on Workmen's Compensation Law, the Biggart Court wrote:
“This case is what Larson calls an “upside-down com-
pensation case’ in the form of a negligence action in which
8
the employee is trying to get out from compensation cover-
age to escape the exclusive provisions of the act, and the
employer is asserting compensation coverage. 1 Larson,
Workmen’s Compensation Law, §26.10 at 452.11 (1965).
. Reason and consistency required that we apply the provi-
sions of the act and the decisions interpreting it with an
equal hand, both where coverage is asserted and where the
exclusive remedy provisions of the statute are involved. . .”
235 So. 2d 443 at 447.
The courts of New York State also follow such reasoning to
preclude any liability on the part of an employer where a bor-
rowed servant relationship exists. Fallone v. Misericordia Hos-
pital, 23 A.D. 2d 222, 259 N.Y.S. 2d 947, aff'd, 17 N.Y. 2d
648, 269 N.Y.S. 2d 431, 216 N.E. 2d 594. As stated by the
Court in Matter of DeNoyer v. Cavanaugh, 221 N.Y. 273
(1917), “The fact that a workman has a general and a special
employer is not inconsistent with the relation of employer and
employee between both of them and himself.” See also, John-
ston v. International Freighting Corporation, 274 App. Div. 728,
87 N.Y.S. 2d 297.
The Second Circuit having found as a fact, based on the Dis-
trict Court record, that Jack Doca was an employee of Pittston
creates a conflict between the circuits and further violates the
provisions of the Longshoremen’s and Harborworkers Compen-
sation Act.
2. Assuming, arguendo that respondent Jack Doca was
not an employee of petitioner, Pittston, the Circuit
are presently in disagreement as to the applica-
bility of the Occupational Safety & Health Act and reg-
ulations promulgated thereunder to a non-employer.
In the alternative if this Court finds that longshoreman-re-
spondent Doca, was not an employee of Pittston it is contended
by petitioner that OSHA regulations do not apply. The Con-
9
gressional purposes and policy of OSHA (29 U.S.C. §651 et
seq.) set forth by Congress state inter alia that:
Section 651
(1) by encouraging employers and employees in their ef-
forts to reduce the number of occupational safety and health
hazards at their places of employment, and to stimulate
employers and employees to institute new and to perfect
existing programs for providing safe and healthful working
conditions;
Employees pursuant to OSHA (29 U.S.C. §652) are defined as:
(6) The term “employee” means an employee of an em-
ployer who is employed in a business of his employer which
affects commerce.
If it is determined that Doca is not an employee of Pittston,
OSHA does not apply and cannot be used as a basis of liability
against Pittston or other non-employers. Horn v. C. L. Osborn
Contracting Company, 591 F. 2d 318 (Sth Cir. 1979), reh. den.
595 F. 2d 1221; contra, Marshall v. Knutson Construction Co.,
566 F. 2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977).
Therefore, the judgment of liability against Pittston should
be vacated in its entirety since there is no other finding of negli-
gence in the District or Appellate Court decis:ons on which to
base liability against Pittston.
10
CONCLUSION
For these reasons stated above, a writ of certiorari should
issue to review the judgment and opinion of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Respectfully submitted,
WILLIAM P. KARDARAS
Counsel for Petitioner
Pitiston Stevedoring Corp.
14 Wall Street
New York, New York 10005
Of Counsel:
JAMES S. MCMAHON
JOSEPH E. DONAT
oO
la
APPENDIX A
Opinion of the Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FoR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
®
No. 629—September Term, 1979
(Argued March 5, 1980 Decided October 1, 1980)
Docket No. 79-7626
da
”
Jack A. Doca and FANNIE C. Doca,
Plaintiffs-A ppellees,
V.
MARINA MERCANTE NICARAGUENSE, S.A.
and PITTSTON STEVEDORING CorRP.,
Defendants-A ppellants.
Before:
FEINBERG, Chief Judge,
NEWMAN and KEarsE, Circuit Judges.
~—--- @ ES DEED OS
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York (Kevin T. Duffy, Judge)
holding shipowner and stevedoring company liable for injury
to cargo checker under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’
Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§901-950, and calculating dam-
ages for lost future wages by reducing the present value discount
to reflect inflation.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.
>
Sa
2a
Opinion of the Court of Appeals
Victor S. CICHANOWICZ, New York, N.Y. (Cichanowicz
& Callan, New York, N.Y., on the brief), for appellant
Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A.
GeorcGE G. KILARJIAN, New York, N.Y. (Bigham, Englar,
Jones & Houston, New York, N.Y., on the brief), for
appellant Pittston Stevedoring Corp.
Morris C1zNER, New York, N.Y. (Zimmerman & Zimmer-
man, New York, N.Y., on the brief), for appellees.
@&
NEWMAN, Circuit Judge:
This appeal from a personal injury award, made pursuant to
the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act
(LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. §§901-950 (1976), primarily requires ~
consideration of the effect of inflation in determining damages
for loss of future wages.
Plaintiff Doca was employed as a cargo checker by Hamilton
Terminal Company. He was injured when he slipped and fell
while carrying out his assigned duties aboard the M.V. Costa
Rica. Defendant Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A. (“Ma-
rina”) is the owner of the ship; it hired defendant Pittston Steve-
doring Company (“Pittston”) to unload the vessel, and Pittston
in turn hired Hamilton to perform certain services in connection
with the unloading. Doca went aboard the Costa Rica at the joint
request of a Pittston supervisor and a Hamilton supervisor to
check the hatches for the presence of some metal pipe. The path
to Hatch #4 along the offshore side of the vessel was surrounded
by garbage, but there appeared to be a clear route through the
center of it, covered with dunnage paper. In fact, there was a
turnbuckle underneath the paper; as Doca proceeded toward
Hatch #4, he tripped on the turnbuckle and struck his head on
the coaming, or rim of the hatch. As a result of this fall, Doca
suffered a cerebral concussion and cervical spine injury. This left
3a
Opinion of the Court of Appeals
Doca with a series of neurological symptoms that were found
to render him incapable of working, engaging in “most normal
recreational activities,” or having a normal sexual relationship
with his wife:
The District Court for the Southern District of New York
(Kevin T. Duffy, Judge) found both the shipowner Marina and
the stevedoring company Pittston negligent in causing Doca’s in-
jury, and, reflecting their relative responsibilities for the injury,
found Marina liable for 90% and Pittston liable for 10% of
damages totaling $669,127. These damages included, among
other items, $352,560 for Doca’s wages from the date of trial for
the 12-year remainder of his working life and $15,000 for his
wife’s loss of consortium.
Marina and Pittston appeal the judgment, raising issues con-
cerning both liability and damages. We affirm as to liability and
remand for redetermination of loss future wages.
I. Liability
The liability issues are not substantial. The District Court’s
conclusion that both Marina and Pittston were negligent is fully
supported by the evidence. The 1972 Amendments to LHWCA
had the effect of applying general tort principles regarding owners
and occupiers of land to the duty of a shipowner toward those
who come aboard for business reasons. 33 U.S.C. §905; see H.R.
Rep. No. 92-1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1972]
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4698, 4701-03; Napoli v. Hellenic
Lines, Ltd., 536 F.2d 505, 507 (2d Cir. 1976), Landon v. Lief
Hoegh & Co., 521 F. 2d 756, 762 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
1Doca’s injuries were serious by themselves, but they were exacerbated
by what the District Court found to be a post-traumatic conversion reac-
tion. This reaction probably resulted from the fact that Doca had been
injured previously, in 1950, when employed as a longshoreman, and had
been unable to work for twelve years thereafter.
4a
Opinion of the Court of Appeals
423 U.S. 1053 (1976). This duty is to maintain the property
in areasonably safe condition in the light of all the circumstances.
See W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts §61 (4th ed.
1971); Restatement (Second) of Torts §343. In the present case,
the ship’s deck was clearly in an unsafe condition; this was not
simply a matter of one turnbuckle being covered by some paper,
but of a general obstruction of the walking area by various types
of refuse. The ship’s crew had created this hazard, and the ship
was primarily responsible for it. Moreover, the crew was aware
of the hazard, as it had been pointed out to them by Pittston’s
hatch foreman, who asked them to clean it up. The ship could
have contracted with Pittston to clean the deck but it did not do
so, and thus retained its basic responsibility. The finding that
Marina was 90% responsible for the accident is amply sup-
ported.
Pittston’s liability is based on a regulation, promulgated by
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 29 C.F.R.
§1918.91(a) (1979), which requires stevedores to keep their
work area free of “tripping or stumbling hazards.” The District
Court held that this regulatory standard created a non-delegable
duty to remove the hazard. The fact that the hazard was pri-
marily the ship’s responsibility does not excuse the stevedore
from fulfilling its regulatory obligation; the stevedore was within
its rights in asking the ship’s crew to clean the deck, and pre-
sumably, it could have obtained monetary compensation for
cleaning the deck itself. But since it continued working without
making sure the deck was clean, it exposed itself to liability for
violation of a statutorily established standard. See Complaint of
Allied Towing Corp., 416 F. Supp. 1207 (E.D. Va. 1976), aff'd
in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 580 F.2d 702 (4th Cir.
1978) (LHWCA case); Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 126
N.E. 814 (1920); W. Prosser, supra, §36 at 200-03.
Pittston’s argument that its duty does not run to Doca be-
cause Doca was not Pittston’s employee cannot be maintained.
Since Doca’s company, Hamilton, was hired by Pittston, Doca’s
5a
Opinion of the Court of Appeals
relationship to Pittston was effectively that of an employee, for
purposes of the scope of the duty based on the OSHA regula-
tion, especially since Doca was sent on the mission that led to
his injury by a Pittston and a Hamilton supervisor, acting to-
gether.
The District Court was also justified in concluding that Doca
was not contributorily negligent in taking the offshore route to
Hatch #4, or in not looking under the paper. The evidence in-
dicated that it is a standard safety procedure to walk on the
offshore side of a ship when the ship is being unloaded, since
cargo is lifted over the inshore side. Of course, Doca might have
looked underneath the paper before he walked on it. But the
District Court was entitled to conclude that this would have been
more than the reasonable care required of a business invitee.
The District Court was also entitled to find that neither of
the defendants had established a valid cross-claim for indemnity.
Marina’s contractual indemnity claim is defeated by the District
Court’s finding that Pittston’s failure to observe the obligation
of the OSHA regulation does not establish breach of a warranty
of workmanship performance, even though it suffices to establish
Pittston’s negligence. The District Court also did not err in find-
ing, alternatively, that Marina’s own negligence, in the circum-
stances of this case, was sufficient to preclude an indemnity claim.
See Lopez v. Oldendorf, 545 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977); Hurdrich v. Eastmount Shipping
Corp., 503 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1974). Finally, the District Court
was entitled to reject Pittston’s tort theory indemnity claim, ap-
parently predicated on the contention that Marina’s negligence
was active and Pittston’s only passive. See Tri-State Oil Tool
Industries, Inc. v. Delta Marine Drilling Co., 410 F.2d 178
(Sth Cir. 1969), and cases there cited. The evidence of the
omissions of both defendants justified the 90-10 allocation, prop-
erly reflecting the relative responsibility of the two tortfeasors,
but did not compel a finding that Pittston must be relieved of
its share of the damages.
6a
Opinion of the Court of Appeals
II. Damages
One of the damage issues—whether an injured worker’s wife
can recover for loss of consortium under the LHWCA—has now
been authoritatively decided by American Export Lines, Inc. v.
Alvez, 48 U.S.L.W. 450) (U.S. May 12, 1980). Appellant’s
challenge to the $15,000 loss of consortium component of the
damage award is therefore rejected.’
The final and most significant question raised by this appeal
is whether and to what extent an award for lost future wages
should be adjusted because of inflation.* If an adjustment for
inflation is to be made, two approaches are available. Under
the first method the projection of current wages is increased to
reflect the fact that the employee would have received cost of
living increases to keep pace with inflation. The sum of those
increased annual wage figures is then discounted to present value
by the prevailing interest rate. See United States v. English, 521
F.2d 63, 75 (9th Cir. 1975). Under the second method the
discount rate is decreased below the prevailing interest rate to
reflect the estimated rate of inflation. This reduced discount rate
is then applied to the sum of the current wages projected to con-
tinue for each of the years for which wages will be lost. See Feld-
man v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 1271 (D. Conn.
1974), aff'd, 524 F.2d 384, 387-88 (2d Cir. 1975). If the same
estimated inflation rate is used, the “outcome of the calculation
under either approach would be very nearly identical,” Feldman,
supra, 524 F.2d at 391 (Friendly, J., concurring).
Liability in Alvez was grounded upon both negligence and unsea-
worthiness, the accident having occurred prior to the 1972 LHWCA
amendments, which eliminated liability to longshoremen based on unsea-
worthiness. However, the 1972 amendments leave unaffected the Supreme
Court’s holding that damages for joss of consortium are available, under
general maritime law, when liability is based on negligence.
8The defendants advance no serious objections to the award for wages
lost prior to trial or for pain and suffering, and they stipulated the amount
of medical costs.
7a
Opinion of the Court of Appeals
In this case the District Court took inflation into account, to
an unspecified extent, apparently by using the second approach
and adjusting for future inflation by decreasing the present value
discount. The Court did not provide a computation for its award
for loss of future earnings; however, Judge Duffy stated that he
had reached his result by “considering both probability of con-
tinued inflation and a discount to present value.” Doca infers
that Judge Duffy used a discount factor of 1% .* Defendants ob-
ject to this computation for lack of evidence to support an esti-
mate of future inflation and, more fundamentally, on the ground
that any adjustment for inflation is impermissible. Since the sig-
nificance of inflation on damage awards .or lost future wages
seems to be as persistent a problem as inflation itself, the matter
merits some examination.
In this Circuit, the issue has been considered but not resolved.
In McWeeney v. New York, New Haven, & Hartford R.R. Co.,
282 F.2d 34 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870
(1960), the issue was whether the calculation of lost future
wages should be made on the basis of gross wages or net wages
after deduction for income taxes. In rejecting a deduction for
taxes, but see Norfolk and Western Railway v. Liepelt, S.
Ct. (1980), this Court noted that whatever benefit this
gives to plaintiffs is partially offset by the absence of an upward
4Doca derives this 1% discount rate in the following manner. The dif-
ference between the award for lost wages, $352,560, and Doca‘s projec-
tion of future lost wages, $394,861. This difference represents approxi-
mately 1% of $352,560, multiplied by the 12 years for which future
wages will be lost. Expressed as a formula, the computation would have
been x + (12i) x = w, where x is the discounted value, i is the interest
rate, and w is the projection of total future wages. If the District Court
applied a 1% rate in this fashion (and we cannot be certain if the award
for lost future wages was determined on this basis), the discount factor
was incorrectly applied. The correct method is to apply to the future
wages for each year a discount factor of 1/(1 + i)", where i is the in-
terest rate and n is the year for which present value of income is sought.
See Dullard v. Berkeley Associates Co., supra, 606 F.2d at 895 n.4. The
discounted amounts for each year are then added together to determine
the total award. Standard tables are available to avoid the need for cal-
culations.
8a
Opinion of the Court of Appeals
adjustment for inflation.® A decade later in Yodice v. Konin-
klijke Nederlandsche Stoomboot Maatschappij, 443 F.2d 76 (2d
Cir. 1971), a damage award for lost wages was reversed for
reasons that included the failure to apply any discount for pres-
ent value. Judge Firnedly presciently noted that “if inflation
should continue at its present pace, courts may have to reconsider
the propriety of the long recognized charge with respect to dis-
count.” Id. at 79.
More recently this Court, in a diversity case. approved Dis-
trict Judge Blumenfeld’s use of an “ ‘inflation-adjusted discount
rate’ ” of 1.5%. Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., supra, 524
F.2d at 387. This rate was determined by subtracting the aver-
age annual change in the consumer price index over each of sev-
eral periods of years from the effective annual interest on gov-
ernment bonds held during each of the same periods, and then
selecting the average of the rates resulting from these subtrac-
tions. Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., supra, 382 F. Supp.
at 1306-12. The purpose of this method was to determine the
“ ‘real yield’” of money, the portion of interest charged on vir-
tually risk-free investments that represents only the real cost of
the money and not the additional cost the lender exacts as a
hedge against future inflation. Jd. at 1293. Judge Friendly con-
curred dubitante, noting that the decision represented a predic-
tion as to unsettled state law and not “a precedent on the in-
flation problem in a case arising under federal law.” 524 F.2d at
390, 393. In another diversity case, Dullard v. Berkeley Asso-
ciates Co., 606 F.2d 890, 896 (2d Cir. 1979), this Court was
willing to assume the propriety of an inflation-adjusted discount
rate only for purposes of ruling that even with such an adjust-
ment applicable to lost future wages, the total award in ques-
tion was excessive. Most recently, the Court, in a Federal Tort
Claims Act case, approved use of a present value discount rate
that had been reduced to 5% from the prevailing interest rate
5The other factor mentioned in McWeeney as offsetting the absence of
a deduction for income taxes is the significant portion of the plaintiff's
award that will be taken by the attorney's contingent fee 282 F.2d at 38.
9a
Opinion of the Court of Appeals
to reflect future inflation. Espana v. United States, 616 F.2d 41
(2d Cir. 1980).
Among other courts, there has been a growing recognition that
inflation should be taken into account in damage calculations.
At least four federal Courts of Appeals have explicitly so ruled,
see Steckler v. United States, 549 F.2d 1375-78 (10th Cir.
1977); United States v. English, supra, 521 F.2d at 72-76; Riha
v. Jasper Blackburn Corp., 516 F.2d 840, 843-45 (8th Cir.
1975); Bach v. Penn Central Transportation Co., 502 F.2d
1112, 1122 (6th Cir. 1974),° as have a number of state courts,
see, e.g., Beaulieu v. Elliot, 434 P.2d 665 (Alas. 1967);
Schnebly v. Baker, 217 N.W. 2d 708 (Iowa 1974); Halliburton
Co. v. Olivas, 517 S.W. 2d 349 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974). In
addition, the commentators generally favor this position. See
Dennis, Sirmon & Drinkwater, Wrongful Death Damages, 47
Miss. L.J. 173 (1976); Formuzis & O’Donnell, inflation and the
Valuation of Future Economic Losses, 38 Mont. L. Rev. 297
(1977); Henderson, The Consideration of Increased Productiv-
ity and the Discounting of Future Earnings to Present Value, 20
S.D.L. Rev. 307 (1975); Hopkins, Economics and Impaired
Earning Capacity in Personal Injury Cases, 44 Wash. L. Rev.
351 (1969); Note, Future Inflation, Prospective Damages, and
the Circuit Courts, 63 Va. L. Rev. 105 (1977).
Though the Supreme Court has yet to rule definitively on the
issue, it clearly indicated its approval of including inflation esti-
mates in future wage loss awards in Norfolk and Western Rail-
®Technically, only Bach, a Federal Employers’ Liability Act suit, was
decided under federal law. English and Steckler were cases brought under
the Federal Tort Claims Act, to which local law applied, and Riha was a
diversity case applying Nebraska law. However, in all these cases, the
relevance-of inflation was considered in light of general principles, with-
out reference to any particular source of law. See Note, Future Inflation,
Prospective Damages, and the Circuit Courts, 63 Va. L. Rev. 105 (1977).
See also Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173, 186-7 (1st Cir.
1974), explicitly relying on state law. Cf. Freeport Sulphur Co. v. S/S
Hermosa, 526 F.2d 300, 308-313 (Sth Cir. 1976) (Wisdom, J., con-
curring).
10a
Opinion of the Court of Appeals
way v. Liepelt. supra. The issue in that case, as in McWeeney,
was whether lost future wages in an F.E.L.A. case should be
estimated without deduction for estimated income taxes. The
Court ruled that such a reduction should be made. The opinion
is instructive on the issue of inflation for two reasons. First, the
Court noted that the plaintiff's economic expert had estimated
that the lost future earnings would have increased by five per-
cent a year until the wage-earners’ retirement. More significantly,
the Court rejected the argument that reduction for future income
taxes would be too speculative by noting that other aspects of
a damage award computation, specifically including “future in-
flation,” are also matters of “estimate and prediction.” ———S.
Ct. at ———. Thus, the Court not only noted that the award in-
cluded an estimate for inflation, but also used the reasonable-
ness of making such an estimate as support for similar estimates
of future taxes. See also Grunenthal v. Long Island R. Co., 393
U.S. 156 (1968), in which the Court approved a damage award
based upon anticipated wage increases attributable to inflation.
Although the view that inflation should be considered is clearly
on the increase, several federal courts including three Courts of
Appeals, have prohibited the adjustment of awards for future
wages to account for inflation. See Johnson v. Penrod Drilling
Co., 510 F.2d 234 (Sth Cir. 1975) (en banc); Magill v. West-
inghouse Electric Corp., 464 F.2d 294, 299-301 (3d Cir.
1972); Williams v. United States, 435 F.2d 804 (1st Cir. 1970).
The principal rationale for these decisions is that estimates of
future inflation are too speculative to serve as a basis for cal-
culating damages. See Penrod, supra, 510 F.2d at 241; Magill,
supra, 464 F.2d at 300; Williams, supra, 435 F.2d at 807.
We believe that the developing majority view is sound and
that inflation should be considered in estimating the present value
of lost future wages. According to the figures computed by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics, United States Department of Labor,
inflation has become a constant feature of our modern economy.
The Consumer Price Index, perhaps the leading indicator of
lla
Opinion of the Court of Appeals
inflation, has increased in all but two years since the beginning
of World War II, and in every year since 1955. This increase
was particularly pronounced during the past decade, when the
Index increased by five times as much as it had during the pre-
vious decade. In 1979, the year in which the District Court de-
cided this case, the average annual Consumer Price Index was
217.4, compared to 100 in 1967, the base year, and 72.1 in
1950.7 Whether this trend has become an inherent feature of
the international economy, irreversible by governmental action,
is a subject of spirited debate among economists. See Friedman,
The Role of Money, 58 Am. Econ. Rev. 1 (1968); Gordon,
Recent Development in the Theory of Inflation and Unemploy-
_ ment in Modern Macro-Economics (Parkin, ed. 1979); Kaldor,
Economic Growth and the Problem of Inflation, in N. Kaldor,
Essays on Economic Policy 166 (1965). But there is broad
agreement that our economy, by its very nature, is subject to
strong and persistent inflationary pressures, and that the com-
plete elimination of inflation would require Draconian meas-
ures, at the very least. See T. Dernbury & D. McDougal, Macro-
economics 287-96 (5th ed. 1976); D. Nichols & C. Reynolds,
Principles of Economics 485-95 (1971); L. Reynolds, Eco-
nomics 180-87 (4th ed. 1973); P. Samuelson, Economics 820-
37 (1976). In short, courts cannot fail to recognize that infla-
tion is a dominant factor on the current economic scene and,
despite episodic recessions, is likely to be so for the foreseeable
future.
To be sure, the idea that a person’s future income will in-
crease in dollar amount is a prediction, one based largely on
our inductive assumption that the future will resemble the past.
But using inductive inferences about economic conditions to ad-
TThus, if Doca had received a damage award for twelve years’ future
wages in 1967, fully discounted to present value at then prevailing in-
terest rates, and had invested this award at those prevailing interest rates
with the intention of drawing out one-twelfth each year, his yearly
amount, despite the interest, would have declined steadily in purchasing
power. For the final year, 1979, the money would have worth
42% of what it was worth when the award was made.
i
12a
Opinion of the Court of Appeals
just the value of an award for lost future income is hardly novel.
In fact, it underlies the practice of discounting future lost wages
to the present value of the right to receive such wages. This prac-
tice, first required by the Supreme Court in 1916, Chesapeake
& Ohio Ry. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485 (1916), and routinely fol-
lowed by courts throughout the nation ever since, see E. Devitt
& C. Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice & Instructions §85.13
(1976); Note, supra, 63 Va. L. Rev. 105, rests on the inductive
inference that interest rates will continue at their present level
or above. Discounting to present value determines the amount
of money that will produce the lost future wages if the lump sum
award (and any interest it earns) is invested at prevailing in-
terest rates. If interest rates decline after the lump sum award
is received, the plaintiff will normally fail to realize the full dol-
lar amount of the lost future wages.® If it is permissible, indeed
required by Kelly, to make a prediction about interest rates, it
seems as reasonable to make a prediction about inflation as well.
See Steckler, supra, 549 F.2d at 1377.
In fact, as Judge Blumenfeld demonstrates by the data col-
lected in Feldman, there is a fairly constant relationship between
interest and inflation rates, so that it is more reasonable to make
a prediction about the relationship of both rates than about
the level of interest rates alone. Discounting without regard to
8At a minimum the plaintiff will earn compound interest only at the
reduced prevailing interest rate. If the plaintiff invests his lump-sum
award (plus earned interest) annually, he will also suffer a decrease of
simple interest because of the reduced rates. It is possible for the plain-
tiff to avoid this latter reduction by investing his lump sum-award in
long-term bonds, corresponding to the length of time for which the wages
are lost. Yet if the plaintiff makes that type of investment, he takes the
risk that if interest rates increase, the market value of his bonds will
decrease, and he will suffer a loss each time he sells 2 bond to meet cur-
rent needs. One way to avoid that risk is to purchase a series of bonds
ranging in maturities from one year up to the number of years for which
the wages were lost. That assures that each year’s needs will be met from
the proceeds of a maturing bond, without the risk of selling a bond at a
discount. However, the average rate on such a series of short, medium,
and long-term bonds will most likely be less than the rate on long-term
bonds, which was used to discount the future wages to present value.
13a
Opinion of the Court of Appeals
inflation charges the plaintiff for that portion of the prevailing
cost of money that represents the lenders’ anticipation of in-
flation without allowing the plaintiff an offsetting addition for
inflation, either by increasing the sum to be discounted or re-
ducing the discount rate. Or, to put it another way, discount-
ing necessarily includes a prediction about inflation (the pre-
diction made by those who determine the interest rate), and
it is neither reasonable nor fair to use that prediction only to
reduce an award instead of endeavoring to determine an award
that approximates the present value of what the future wages
would have been. Economics should not be an instrument for
the undercompensation of plaintiffs. It should be used to achieve
a realistic estimate of future conditions, so that an injured plain-
tiff can be compensated for his loss as fairly and completely as
possible.°
The principal argument advanced against taking inflation into
account is that it is too speculative. There can be no doubt
that predicting next year’s inflation rate is at least as hazardous
a task as forecasting next year’s weather. This concern about
speculation persuades us to be rather cautious in determining
the way in which inflation should be taken into account, but,
for three reasons, is not sufficient to preclude any adjustment
for inflation. First, the law of damages frequently recognizes
the need to make some predictions about the future, despite the
uncertainties of doing so. Estimates of lost future profits are an
obvious example. See Autowest, Inc. v. Peugeot, Inc., 434 F.2d
556, 564-67 (2d Cir. 1970). Second, since discounting future
lost wages to present value uses an interest rate that reflects in-
flation, the issue is not whether inflation is too speculative to be
®It is worth noting that when the Supreme Court declared its present
value discount rule in 1916, it was able to look back on an era when
prices, though fluctuating, were not generally increasing. The estimated
Consumer Price Index for 1916 stood at 32.7, having varied between
25 and 51 during the course of the previous century. Looking backward
over the past four decades from 1980, rather than 1916, reveals an
entirely different economic landscape, in which prices have increased al-
most every year, often at an accelerating rate.
l4a
Opinion of the Court of Appeals
considered at all; it is whether inflation, as a component of in-
terest rates, should be considered for the defendant (by dis-
counting at the prevailing interest rate) but ignored for the plain-
tiff (by rejecting any compensating adjustment for inflation).
Finally, and most important, as Feldman illustrates, it is en-
tirely feasible to take inflation into account without making any
prediction as to the specific level of future inflation rates. All
that is needed is a prediction that in the future inflation rates
will bear approximately the same relationship to long-term in-
terest rates. that they have in the past. Essentially the only prem-
ise for that prediction is that over the course of years investors
in long-term bonds will demand returns that reflect the prospects
of future inflation. They may guess wrong in some years and
accept rates that fail to keep pace with inflation. “Yet common
sense suggests,” as Judge Friendly has pointed out, “that in-
vestors will not tolerate such a situation indefinitely.” Feldman,
supra, 524 F.2d at 392. These considerations persuade us that
inflation is not too speculative to be taken into account in de-
termining awards for future lost wages. See Norfolk and Western
Railway v. Liepelt, supra.
The next question is how inflation should be considered.
Courts have favored various methods, which can generally be
divided into two basic categories. In the first category are those
methods that submit the question of the inflation rate to the fact-
finder, so that a separate determination is made in each case.
In this category, one method treats the rate of future inflation
as a fact to be proved by evidence, presumably expert opinion.
See, e.g., United States v. English, supra, 521 F.2d at 75-76.
Another method forbids evidence, but permits the fact-finder to
apply his own knowledge and prediction in estimating a future
inflation rate. See, e.g., Bach v. Penn Central Transportation
Co., supra, 502 F.2d at 1122-23. A third method permits the
fact-finder to apply his own knowledge but also permits expert
testimony. See, e.g., Riha v. Jasper Blackburn Corp., supra, 516
F.2d at 845. In the other basic category are methods that re-
move the issue from the fact-finder and instead adopt a rule of
15a
Opinion of the Court of Appeals
law that focuses on a constant relationship between inflation and
interest rates. Using this approach, the Alaska Supreme Court
held that the inflation rate will be assumed to equal the interest
rate, thereby eliminating any discount for present value. See
Beaulieu v. Elliot, supra. A somewhat different technique was
used in Feldman, where it was observed that over a period of
years the inflation rate bore a relatively constant relationship to
the interest rate, averaging 1.5% less; the Court used this 1.5%
rate as a discount rate, reflecting the true cost of money with
the effect of inflation removed.
Having considered these alternatives, we are not prepared to
require any one particular method by which inflation should be
taken into account in estimating lost future wages. Predictive
techniques are constantly being refined, as are methods of cor-
rectly assessing the immediate past. If litigants prefer to offer
evidence as to future rates of both inflation and interest, they
are entitled to do so. We note, however, that one virtue of
the Feldman approach is that it lessens trial disputes concerning
the future impact of inflation. The average accident trial should
not be converted into a graduate seminar on economic forecast-
ing. The adjusted discount rate approach of F eldman avoids all
predictions about the level of future inflation, and focuses in-
stead only on the relationship between the inflation rate and the
interest rate. Since that relationship is relatively constant in pe-
riods of stable inflation, as the historical data set forth in Feld-
man reveal, it may frequently be possible for litigants to agree
on an adjusted discount rate, derived from that type of historica!
date. Without requiring a particular adjusted rate, we suggest
that a 2% discount rate normally be fair to both sides.
A 2% discount rate appears to be the estimate of the true
cost of money appropriate for use in a computation whose pur-
pose is to determine the present value of lost future wages. As
Judge Blumenfeld recognized in Feldman, 2% is the real yield
normally attainable during periods of low, stable rates of infla-
tion. Feldman, supra, 382 F. Supp. at 1293, 1310 (Table A-II).
16a
Opinion of the Court of Appeals
It is also a figure that lies within the narrow range bracketed by
many economists as representing the true yield of money.”
Feldman used the slightly lower rate of 1.5% to allow “a margin |
of error to compensate for unexpected increases in the rate of
inflation which may depress long term real yields.” Jd. at 1294
(footnote omitted). It may well be that during periods of un-
usually high inflation rates, interest rates will lag somewhat be-
hind the inflation rate, at least temporarily, with the result that
the interest return on a discounted lump sum award will not
fully keep pace with inflation."! But in such periods of high in-
flation, wages too will not keep pace with inflation. In the only
three years since 1947 when the rate of the annual increase in
the Consumer Price Index (CPI) exceeded 8%, the annual
rate of wage increases (non-farm weekly earnings) has been
10Although economists disagree over the validity of the assumption that
the real rate of interest is constant and consequently independent of in-
flation, cf. Fama, Interest Rates and Inflation: The Message in the En-
trails, 67 Amer. Econ. Rev. 487 (1977) (real rate constant) with Carlson,
Short-Term Interest Rates as Predicators of Inflation: A Comment, 67
Amer. Econ. Rev. 469 (1977) (real rate varies), there is substantial
opinion that during periods of stable rates of inflation, the real yield of
money, whether constant or slightly fluctuating, is approximately 2%, as
estimated in Feldman. As Sharpe has suggested, an appropriate period
for determining investor expectations of inflation and real rates of return
is 1959-1972, when actual real returns may have been fairly close to ex-
pected real returns. W. Sharpe, Investments 170 (1978). For this period
the Feldman calculation approximates 2%. Moreover, studies by econ-
omists, though taking different positions concerning the relation between
the real rate and expectations about inflation, have estimated that the
real rate of interest was between 1.5% and 3% for a similar time frame.
See, e.g., Carlson, supra, at 471 (expected real rate fluctuates around
2.5% during 1953-1975); Elliott, Measuring the Expected Real Rate of
Interest: An Exploration of Macro-economic Alternatives, 67 Amer. Econ.
Rev. 429, 440 (1977) (mean expected real rate 1.44% for 1960-1974);
Gibson, Interest Rates and Inflationary Expectations: New Evidence, 62
Amer. Econ. Rev. 854, 856 (1972) (real rate between 2% and 3% dur-
ing 1952-1970); but cf. W. Sharpe, supra, at 170 (extrapolating from
1976 study by Ibbotson & Sinquefield, average actual real rate 1.2% for
1959-1972).
11S$ee 1. Fisher, The Theory of Interest 43 (1930) (“[W]hen prices are
rising, the rate of interest tends to be high but not as high as it should
be to compensate for the rise.’’).
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Opinion of the Court of Appeals
less than the annual rate of CPI increases by at least 3 per-
centage points; in all other years since 1947, wages have in-
creased at a rate greater than the rate of increase in the CPI or
at least at a rate within 1 percentage point of the CPI per-
centage increase.'’? Thus, since there is little reason to expect
that injured plaintiffs would have received wage increases suf-
ficient to keep pace with unusually high rates of inflation, a pres-
ent value discount rate normally need not be reduced below
2% just to compensate for unusually high inflation. To do so
would ignore the basic objective of selecting a present sum of
money that will replace what the future wages would have been.
We emphasize that we are not requiring the use of an ad-
justed discount rate, nor specifying that when such a rate is
used, it must be set at 2%. Litigants are free to account for in-
flation in other ways, or, if they use the adjusted discount rate
approach, to offer evidence of a rate more appropriate than 2%.
But in the hope that disputes about the appropriate rate may be
minimized, we simply suggest the 2% rate as one that would
normally be fair for the parties to agree upon, and we authorize
district judges to use such a rate if the parties elect not to offer
any evidence on the subject of either inflation or present value
discount.
Obviously in this case the District J udge could not have been
expected to anticipate this opinion. Nevertheless, his calcula-
tion of an award for lost future wages must be reconsidered for
two reasons. First, if we assume, as the plaintiff urges, that a
12For 1974, the annual rate of increase in the CPI was 10.97%, and
the annual rate of increase in weekly non-farm wages was 6.44%.
For 1975, the comparable figures were 9.14% and 5.67%; for 1979,
11.26% and 7.66%. These earnings figures and the summary for the
years since 1974, expressed in the text, are derived from figures reported
in Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Employment and
Earnings, United States, 1909-78 3 (1979) (for years 1947-1976) and
Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Employment and Earn-
ings Supplement Revised Establishment Data 1-2 (Augusi 1980) (for
years 1977-1979). Price figures are derived from figures reported in
1980 Economic Report of the President 159 (1980).
18a
Opinion of the Court of Appeals
1% discount rate was used, there is nothing in the evidence to
support a reduction of the discount rate from prevailing interest
rates all the way down to 1%. As indicated, the lowest discount
rate we are willing to approve, in the absence of historical date
justifying a different rate, is 2%. Second, the District Court to
some extent gave duplicate consideration to the impact of in-
flation. In estimating what Doca’s future wages would have been,
the Court took into account a post-trial wage increase of 80¢
an hour, specified in Doca’s union contract to take effect on Oc-
tober 1, 1979. Having based future lost wages on this cost of
living increase, the Court then further reflected the impact of
inflation by reducing the discount rate to 1%. When a discount
rate is adjusted to reflect inflation, it must be applied to a stream
of earnings calculated without regard to inflation, even to a cost
of living increase already scheduled to occur. The certainty of
such an increase does not lessen the fact that it reflects infla-
tion, which is already accounted for by the reduced discount
rate.
We therefore vacate the damage award and remand to the
District Court for recomputation of the award for lost future
wages in accordance with this opinion. In all other respects the
judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.
19a
APPENDIX B
Opinion of the District Court
Jack A. Doca and FANNIE C. Doca, Plaintiffs,
v.
MARINA MERCANTE NICARAGUENSE S.A.
and PITTSTON STEVEDORING CorpP., Defendants.
No. 75 Civ. 5312 (KTD).
United States District Court, S. D. New York.
July 11, 1979.
OPINION
KEVIN THOMAS DUFFY, District Judge:
The plaintiff, Jack A. Doca, sues the defendants Marina Mer-
cante Nicaraguense, S.A. [hereinafter referred to as “Marina” ]
and Pittston Stevedoring Corporation [hereinafter referred to as
“Pittston”] for personal injuries sustained by him on the M/V
Costa Rica on July 23, 1975. Plaintiff Fannie C. Doca, Jack
Doca’s wife, sues both defendants for loss of consortium and Ma-
rina and Pittston have cross-claimed against each other. This
case was originally brought as a diversity action and a jury im-
panelled, but at the close of the plaintiff's case, upon motion of
defendant Marina, the jury was discharged and the matter trans-
ferred to the admiralty jurisdiction of the court.
FACTS
Jack Doca was employed as a longshoreman until a serious
accident at work in 1950 left him temporarily paralyzed. Doca
remained hospitalized after that accident for nearly two years,
finally overcoming his paralysis and returning home. Shortly
after being released from the hospital, Doca fathered his first
child and in 1957 a second child was born to the Docas.
20a
Opinion of the District Court
In 1962 Jack Doca obtained employment with Hamilton Ter-
minal Company as a cargo checker, work considerably less stren-
uous than his previous position as a long-shoreman. Although
a checker’s job does not normally require him to leave the docks,
Doca was sent aboard the M/V Costa Rica at about 2:00 p.m.
on the afternoon of July 23, 1975 to determine if a particular
load of cargo belonged on the ship. At the time, cargo from the
dock was being loaded into the ship’s #1, #2 and #4 hatches
by Pittston employees.
Doca boarded the Costa Rica at the gangway between the
ship’s #2 and #3 hatches and proceeded to hatch #2. After be-
ing told by the hatch boss that the cargo did not belong in
hatch #2, Doca went along the offshore side of hatch #3 toward
the ship’s #4 hatch. As Doca approached hatch #4 he found
the passageway between the hatch coaming and the ship’s outer
railing blocked with refuse from the stevedoring operations. Ac-
cording to Doca, pipe, planks of wood and various piles of gar-
bage laid along the ship’s outer railing with dunnage paper cov-
ering the rest of the deck up to the hatch coaming.
Doca’s testimony as to the condition of the passageway was
supported by photographs of the area and the testimony of eye-
witnesses Edward Kozak, ship foreman for Pittston, and George
Stafford, gangway man on the Costa Rica on the day of the ac-
cident. Kozak and Stafford, whom I found to be highly credible
witnesses, also testified that the debris had been in the passage-
way when they reported to work on the morning of the 23rd.
Although Kozak stated that he had informed both the ship’s
duty officer and Pittston’s supervisor of the debris at about 9:30
that morning, he and Stafford agreed that no cleaning of the
passageway was undertaken prior to Doca’s arrival.
The accident of which Doca complains occurred as he at-
tempted to cross through the obstructed passageway. According
to his testimony at trial, Doca started to walk where it appeared °
that only dunnage paper covered the deck. As he did so, he
21a
Opinion of the District Court
stepped on an object underneath the paper, causing his ankle
to give way and him to fall and strike his head against the hatch
coaming.
Stafford, who was an eyewitness to the accident, quickly ran
to Doca and found him lying on the deck in a dazed condition.
Stafford, along with a number of Pittston employees who also
came to Doca’s aid, cleared the paper away from around Doca
and found his foot resting on the deck next to a turnbuckle which
held the pipe against the ship’s outer railing. After being shown
the turnbuckle, the apparent object on which he had stepped,
Doca was assisted off the ship to receive medical attention.
LIABILITY OF THE SHIPOWNER
This action is brought pursuant to the Longshoreman’s and
Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, [hereinafter referred to as
“I HWCA”], as amended. 33 U.S.C. 901, et seq. It is generally
accepted that the 1972 amendments to the Act were intended
to establish land based principles of negligence as the standard
of care for vessels boarded by dock workers. See, e.g., Napoli
v. Transpacific Carriers Corp., 536 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1976).
Accordingly, it has been held that, analogous to the respon-
sibilities of a landowner, a shipowner owes to business invitees,
such as Doca, the duty to provide a reasonably safe place to work
and consequently must exercise reasonable care to correct non-
obvious unsafe conditions of which he has actual or construc-
tive notice. Canizzo v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d 682 (2d
Cir. 1978); see Restatement (Second of Torts) $343. Liability
has been imposed even with respect to open and obvious haz-
ards of which the shipowner has knowledge where the hazard
was of such character as to be unavoidably dangerous. Napoli,
supra; see Restatement (Second) of Torts §343A.
The decisions in this Circuit, however, have been markedly
inconsistent with respect to the shipowner’s responsibility for
unsafe conditions in areas of the ship taken over by stevedoring
22a
Opinion of the District Court
operations. One line of cases holds that the concept of a ship-
owner’s non-delegable duty to provide a safe place to work, akin
to the seaworthiness doctrine, was abolished by the 1972
LHWCA Amendments and that the shipowner need not super-
vise the stevedore’s operations and may rely upon the stevedore
to eliminate hazards of which it has notice. See Napoli, supra;
Cox v. Elota Mercante Grancolombiana, 577 F.2d 798 (2d Cir.
1978); Cannizzo, supra, dissenting opinion of J. Friendly; Lu-
brano v. Royal Netherlands S.S. Company, 572 F.2d 364 (2d
Cir. 1978), dissenting opinion of J. Moore. Opposed to these
are decisions suggesting that a shipowner’s failure to correct
an unsafe condition of which it has knowledge is negligent re-
gardless of whether the condition was in a workplace under the
stevedore’s primary control. Lopez v. A/S D/S Svendborg, 581
F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1978); Canizzo, supra. Fortunately, I need
not in this case attempt to resolve the uncertainties in Circuit
law since I believe that Marina was negligent under either for-
mulation of the shipowner’s standard of care.
As stated above, there was credible testimony that the ship’s
crew had been notified of the debris around hatch # 4. While
the crew may not have had actual knowledge of the turnbuckle
that lay underneath the scrap dunnage paper, they are certainly
chargeable with such knowledge given that the passage had been
obstructed for at least a day prior to Doca’s accident.
Since Marina must be regarded as having been aware of the
concealed turnbuckle, its failure to eliminate the hazard was
negligent, even under the most generous interpretation of the
law, unless it was entitled to assume that Pittston would remove
the debris. Not surprisingly, Marina argues that such an assump-
tion on its part was fully justified. In support of its position,
Marina points to the testimony of Pittston’s foreman Kozak,
which I found to be credible, that Pittston had actual notice of
the dangerous condition and that at least some Pittston employees
were working on the top of the deck around hatch #4. Marina
contends that these facts make plain that Pittston had a legal
23a
Opinion of the District Court
duty to remove the debris, in accordance with Occupational
Safety and Health Administration [hereinafter referred to as
“OSHA”] regulations requiring stevedores to keep working areas
“reasonably clear of lines, bridles, dunnage and all other trip-
ping or stumbling hazards.” 29 C.F.R. 1918.91(a).
Marina’s presentation of the facts and applicable law is cru-
cially incomplete, however, for it disregards the evidence of an
agreement between Pittston and Marina concerning removal of
refuse produced by stevedoring operations. Kozak’s testimony,
which was supported by past bills from Pittston to Marina, was
that Pittston would not remove stevedoring debris unless sep-
arately paid for the service, and that otherwise the job fell to
the ship’s crew. Since there was no evidence at trial that Pitt-
ston had contracted to clean on the day Doca was injured, Ma-
rina was iself obligated to remove the debris. Its argument that
it justifiably relied on Pittston to clear the obstructed passage-
way is consequently without merit.
LIABILITY OF STEVEDORE
While I have concluded that Marina was responsible for clear-
ing the offshore passageway along the ship’s #4 hatch, I believe
the evidence establishes that Pittston was concurrently negli-
gent for allowing the passageway to remain obstructed. As noted
above, Pittston received notice of the debris early in the morn-
ing on the day of the accident and there were Pittston employees
working in the general vicinity of the obstructed passageway up
to the time of Doca’s accident. By failing to clear the passage-
way, Pittston plainly violated the OSHA regulations, referred to
above, that require stevedores to keep work areas free of stum-
bling hazards.
Although Pittston’s contract with Marina assigned responsi-
bility for clearing the debris around hatch #4 to Marina, Pitt-
ston could not by contract avoid the duties placed upon it by
OSHA regulations. This is especially true in light of the evi-
i
24a
Opinion of the District Court
dence that Pittston allowed the passageway to remain obstructed
for the better part of a day and had reason to know that Marina
was delinquent in executing its responsibilities.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
Marina has presented as an affirmative defense the claim that
Doca was contributorily negligent for attempting to cross
through the debris instead of altering his path to hatch #4. The
only alternative course available to Doca, however, was along
the inshore side of hatch #3 and, #4. Although testimony at trial
indicated that the inshore passageway was unobstructed, it was
also established that routine safety procedures required use of
the offshore passageway when inshore loading of cargo was un-
derway. Cargo hoisted off of the dock over and into the ship’s
hatches would present an obvious threat to persons walking un-
derneath. Since the evidence established that the Costa Rica’s
hatch #’s 1, 2 and 4 were loading inshore at the time of Doca’s
accident, the inshore passageway did not, in fact, present Doca
with a reasonable alternative course.
Marina also claims that Doca was contributorily negligent for
having attempted to cross through the debris without first clear-
ing aside the dunnage paper so that he could see the deck. Such
a procedure by Doca would, of course, have been safer, but
Doca was required to exercise only reasonable and not the ut-
most care. Given that the true nature of the hazard posed by the
debris was concealed, Doca’s failure to stop and move aside the
dunnage paper was*not, under all the circumstances, negligent.
CROSS-CLAIMS
Since I have determined that Pittston and Marina were con-
currently negligent and will allocate damages according to their
proportionate degree of fault, the only issue remaining with re-
spect to defendants’ cross-claims is whether Marina is entitled to
25a
Opinion of the District Court
indemnity from Pittston for an alleged breach of Pittston’s war-
ranty of workmanlike performance. A shipowner’s right to such
indemnity was first recognized in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-
Atlantic Steamship Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 76 S.Ct. 232, 100
L.Ed. 133 (1956), where the Supreme Court held that a steve-
dore’s contract with the shipowner contains an implied war-
ranty of workmanlike performance, breach of which entitles the
shipowner to recover for any losses caused thereby. Pointing to
the OSHA regulations which, as I have found, Pittston failed
to observe, Marina argues that Pittston breached its warranty
and must indemnify Marina for the full amount of Marina’s lia-
bility to Doca as well as the cost of its defense.
An initial question with respect to Marina’s claim concerns
the 1972 LHWCA Amendments’ elimination of the shipowner’s
right to indemnity as against a stevedore-employer. 33 U.S.C.
§905(b). Although Pittston is not covered by the literal terms
of the statute since it did not employ Doca, it is not at all clear
that Ryan type indemnity survives even where the stevedore is
not the injured party’s employer. Certainly there is reason to
believe that Congress did not intend that the deliberate alloca-
tion of financial responsibilities established by the 1972 Amend-
ments should be contingent upon such fortuities as the identity
of the plaintiff's employer. Moreover, decisions in this Circuit
have suggested that the shipowner’s right to Ryan type indemnity
is compensation for and co-extensive with its absolute liability
for shipboard safety under the seaworthiness doctrine. See, e.g.,
Fairmount Ship. Corp. v. Chevron Internat'l Oil Co., Inc., 511
F.2d 1252 (2d Cir. 1975). Since the LHWCA Amendments
eliminated the shipowner’s seaworthiness obligation to harbor
workers, the practical justification for Ryar indemnity in this
case is open to question.
I need not, however, resolve this question of law, since I find
that Pittston did not breach its warranty of workmanlike per-
formance and that Marina was in any event barred from re-
covery by its own negligence. As discussed above, Pittston and
26a
Opinion of the District Court
Marina determined between themselves the responsibility for
clearing refuse from stevedoring operations. Since Pittston was
not, under their agreement, required to remove the debris that
caused Doca’s accident, its failure to do so did not violate any
provision, implied or otherwise, of its contract with Marina.
The fact that Pittston’s performance was not in accordance with
OSHA regulations, while sufficient to support a finding that Pitt-
ston was negligent, does not establish Pittston’s breach of an
obligation that is contractual in nature.
Even if it could be said that Pittston did not comply with its
warranty of workmanlike performance, I believe that Marina’s
own negligence would preclude its recovery of indemnity. While
the cases evidence some uncertainty, compare Hurdich v. East-
mount Shipping Corp., 503 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1974) with Ro-
driguez v. Olaf Pedersen’s Rederi A/S, 527 F.2d 1282 (2d Cir.
1975), the law in this Circuit appears to be that recovery of
indemnity is barred where the shipowner and stevedore are con-
currently negligent and the shipowner was “the party ‘best sit-
uated to adopt preventive measures.’ ” Lopez v. Oldendorf, 545
F.2d 836, 839 (2d Cir. 1976). The determination of which
party was in the better position to prevent a hazardous condi-
tion is a factual question, Hurdich, supra at 401, and in this case
I think it is clear that Marina had the better opportunity to re-
move the debris from around hatch #4, At the time of Doca’s
accident and for several hours before it, the bulk of Pittston’s
employees were working in the ship’s hold, well removed from
the obstructed passageway. The Marina’s crew was well accus-
tomed to removing refuse while stevedoring operations were un-
derway, and indeed were contractually obligated to do so on
this occasion. In light of these facts, Marina’s claim for indem-
nity is defeated by its own negligence.
THE CLAIM FOR LOSS OF CONSORTIUM
Marina has argued that Mrs. Doca’s claim for damages must
be denied because general maritime law does not recognize an
27a
Opinion of the District Court
action for loss of consortium on behalf of the wife of an injured
maritime worker. As Marina has pointed out, the Second Cir-
cuit, in [gneri v. Cie. de Transports Oceaniques, 323 F.2d 257,
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 949, 84 S.Ct. 965, 11 L.Ed.2d 969
(1963), held that compensation for loss of consortium was not
available to wives of maritime workers. Although a decision on
point by the Court of Appeals for this Circuit would ordinarily
be dispositive of the issue, I must conclude, essentially for the
reasons ably stated in Judge Lasker’s opinion in Giglio v. Farrell
Lines, Inc., 424 F.Supp. 927 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), that Igneri can
no longer be regarded as controlling.
The Court in gneri reached its conclusion after an extensive
review of maritime as well as common law principles concern-
ing a wife’s right to damages for loss of consortium. As Judge
Lasker observed in Giglio, however, there have been many
changes in this area of the law since 1963. Most significantly,
the Supreme Court, in Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414
U.S. 573, 94 S.Ct. 806, 39 L.Ed.2d 9 (1974), held that the
wife of a seaman could sue for loss of society in a maritime
wrongful death action. After noting that the majority of state
wrongful death statutes recognized such a claim, the Court con-
cluded that its decision served to “shape the remedy to comport
with the humanitarian policy of the maritime law to show
‘special solicitude’ for those who are injured within its jurisdic-
tion.” Jd. at 588, 94 S.Ct. at 816.
No distinction of substance separates claims for loss of so-
ciety and loss of consortium, and although the Fifth Circuit has
held that a wife’s consortium claim will be recognized in a mari-
- time wrongful death action but not in a maritime action for
personal injuries only, Skidmore v. Grueninger, 506 F.2d 716
(1975) and Christofferson v. Halliburton Co., 534 F.2d 1147
(1976), it seems to me clearly more consistent with the rationale
of Gaudet to permit the consortium claim in either case. Accord-
ingly, Mrs. Doca is entitled to recover damages for loss of con-
sortium attributable to her husband’s accident.
28a
Opinion of the District Court
DAMAGES
Credible medical evidence at trial established that Doca suf-
fered a cerebral concussion and a cervical spine injury as a
result of his fall on the Costa Rica. Although these injuries were
unquestionably serious, it was the opinion of each of the doc-
tors who examined Doca that his present complaints, which in-
clude headaches, dizziness, pain in the shoulder and neck area,
numbness in the hands and sexual dysfunction, have no clear
neurological basis but are instead attributable to a post-traumatic
conversion reaction, a conversion of his anxiety concerning his
injuries into specific physical symptoms. It is important to note,
however, that Doca’s physical symptoms are no less real to him
for the fact that they result from a post-traumatic conversion.
Along with his physical symptoms, Doca suffers from anxiety,
depression, insomnia and loss of sexual appetite, which I find
to be directly attributable to the accident on the Costa Rica.
The combination of Doca’s physical and mental ailments will,
again according to credible medical evidence, likely prevent him
from ever working again or from engaging in most normal re-
creational activities.
The parties have stipulated that Doca’s medical and hospital
expenses as a result of the accident are $3,697.13. In the three
years prior to his accident, Doca worked an average of 47 hours
a week. Assuming that he would have continued to work at that
pace and taking into account subsequent adjustments in his wage
scale, Doca’s lost earnings from the time of the accident to the
date of trial amount to $97,792.00.
Since I find that Doca will be unable to return to productive
work, he is also entitled to recover for future loss of earnings.
Born on May 24, 1926, Doca has a work expectancy of age
65 or approximately 12 years from the date of trial. He is thus
entitled to recover $352,560, representing his future loss of
earnings considering both probability of continued inflation and
a discount to present value.
29a
Opinion of the District Court
In calculating damages for Doca’s past and future pain and
suffering, I have been mindful of his previous work accident in
1950. After years of effort, Doca overcame the paralysis that
followed that accident and rehabilitated himself to the point
where he was able again to lead a relatively normal work and
home life. Although Doca’s accident aboard the Costa Rica did
not cause injuries nearly as severe as those he suffered in 1950,
its impact on his spirit and state of mind was understandably
similar since it left him once again disable and effectively can-
celled out the great effort of his earlier rehabilitation. The med-
ical evidence at trial indicated that prospects for improvement
in either Doca’s mental or physical condition are doubtful, and
that he faces the likelihood of substantial physical and mental
pain for the rest of his life. Taking all of these factors into ac-
count, I find that Doca is entitled to $200,000 as compensation
for his pain and suffering, both past and future.
The final item of damage to be determined is Mrs. Doca’s
claim for loss of consortium. I found credible Mrs. Doca’s testi-
mony that she and her husband have been unable to resume nor-
mal marital relations since his accident. There was also medical
evidence that Doca suffers from impotency and a loss of sexual
appetite as a result of the accident. In addition to the impair-
ment of their sexual relationship, the accident has also greatly
limited the Doca’s normal social activities and placed a general
strain on their life together. On the basis of these factors, I find
that Mrs. Doca is entitled to $15,000 as compensation for her
loss of consortium.
Settle judgment on seven (7) days’ notice. The judgment will
apportion damages with Marina to pay 90% thereof and Pitt-
ston to pay 10% which percentages accord with the propor-
tionate degree of fault of each.
30a
APPENDIX C
Judgment of the Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
for the
SECOND CIRCUIT
®
At a stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, held at the United States Courthouse in the
City of New York, on the first day of October, one thousand
nine hundred and eighty.
Present:
HON. WILFRED FEINBERG,
Chief Judge
HON. JON O. NEWMAN
HON AMALYA L. KEARSE
Circuit Judges,
JACK A. DOCA and FANNIE C. DOCA,
Plaintiffs-A ppellees
V.
MARINA MERCANTE NICARAGUENSE, S.A.
and PITTSTON STEVEDORING CORP.,
Defendants-A ppellants
79-7626
79-7637
Appeal from the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of New York.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of record
from the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York, and was argued by counsel.
3la
Judgment of the Court of Appeals
ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is now hereby or-
dered, adjudged, and decreed that the judgment of said District
Court be and it hereby is affirmed in part, vacated in part and
the action be and it hereby is remanded to said district court
for further proceedings in accordance with the opinion of this
court.
A. DANIEL FUSARO
Clerk
By:
ARTHUR HELLER
Deputy Clerk
‘al
™“
32a
APPENDIX D
Order Denying Petition for Rehearing
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND CIRCUIT
®
At a Stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals, in
and for the Second Circuit, held at the United States Court House,
in the City of New York, on the seventh day of January, one
thousand nine hundred and eighty-one.
Present:
HON. WILFRED FEINBERG,
Chief Judge
HON. JON O. NEWMAN
HON AMALYA L. KEARSE
Circuit Judges,
JACK A. DOCA and FANNIE C. DOCA,
Plaintiffs-A ppellees
V.
MARINA MERCANTE NICARAGUENSE, S.A. and
PITTSTON STEVEDORING CORPORATION.
79-7626
79-7637
A petition for a rehearing having been filed herein by coun-
sel for the appellant Pittston Stevedoring Corporation.
Upon consideration thereof, it is
Ordered that said petition be and hereby is DENIED.
A. DANIEL FUSARO
Clerk
By:
‘ ROLANNE HENRY
Deputy Clerk
33a
Statutes Involved
UNITED STATES CODE, Title 33
§902 Definitions
(3) The term “employee” means any person engaged in mari-
time employment including any longshoreman or other person
engaged in longshoring operations, and any harborworker in-
cluding a ship repairman, shipbuilder, and shipbreaker, but such
term does not include a master or member of a crew of any
vessel, or any person engaged by the master to load or unload
or repair any small vessel under eighteen tons net.
(4) The term “employer” means an employer any of whose
employees are employed in maritime employment, in whole or
in part, upon the navigable waters of the United States (includ-
ing any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way,
marine railway, or other adjoining area customarily used by an
employer in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel).
UNITED STATES CODE, Title 33:
§905 Exclusiveness of Liability.
(a) The liability of an employer prescribed in Section 904
shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such em-
ployer to the employee, his legal representative, husband or wife,
parents, dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled
to recover damages from such employer at law or in admiralty
on account of such injury or death, except that if an employer
fails to secure payment of compensation as required by this Act,
an injured employee, or his legal representative in case death
results from the injury, may elect to claim compensation under
the Act, or to maintain an action at law or in admiralty for dam-
ages on account of such injury or death. In such action the de-
fendant may not plead as a defense that the injury was caused
by the negligence of a fellow servant, or that the employee as-
sumed the risk of his employment, or that the injury was due
to the contributory negligence of the employee.
34a
Statutes Involved
UNITED STATES CODE, Title 29
§652 Definitions
(5) The term “employer” means a person engaged in a busi-
siness affecting commerce who has employees, but does not in-
clude the United States or any State or political subdivision of
a State.
(6) The term “State” includes a State of the United States,
the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Amer-
ican Samoa, Guam and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Is-
lands.
UNITED STATES CODE, Title 29:
§653 ***workmen’s compensation law or common law or
statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of employers
and employees unaffected.
(b)(4) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to supersede
or in any manner affect any workmen’s compensation law or to
enlarge or diminish or affect in any other manner the common
law or statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of employers and
employees under any law with respect to injuries, diseases or
death of employees arising out of, or in the course of employ-
ment.
CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS, Title 29
§1918.91 Housekeeping
(a) Weather deck and working areas shall be kept reasonably
clear of lines, bridles, dunnage and all other loose tripping or
stumbling hazards.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.