Petition — Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Doca

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~ Office-Supreme Court, U.S.

SO-1537% FILED

‘ae | MAR 9 1981

EVAS,

IN THE { CLERK

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

PITTSTON STEVEDORING CORP.,

Petitioner,

against

JACK A. DOCA and FANNIE C. DOCA,

MARINA MERCANTE NICARAGUENSE, S.A.,

Respondents.

ee

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

——a a eeenenenenemnnmianiemaaaal

WILLIAM P. KARDARAS

Counsel for Petitioner

Pittston Stevedoring Corp.

14 Wall Street

New York, New York 10005

Of Counsel:

JAMES S. MCMAHON

JosEPH E. DONAT

>

i

Questions Presented

1. Whether, it having been judicially determined by the

Court of Appeals that longshoreman-respondent was in fact the

employee of petitioner, it is now required that any action against

such employer be dismissed in its entirety by reason of the ex-

clusivity provisions of Section 905(a) of the Longshoremen’s

and Harborworkers’ Compensation Act. (33 U.S.C. §901,

et seq.)

2. Whether, if it is determined that longshoreman-respondent

was not an employee of petitioner, Pittston, and therefore no

duties under OSHA were owed to him, the judgment should be

vacated as there is no other basis for liability against petitioner

Pittston.

“i

List of Additional Interested Parties

In addition to the parties set forth in the caption of this litiga-

tion upon information and belief, the present GOVERNMENT

OF NICARAGUA and its current governmentally controlled

steamship company, NAVIERES NICARAGUENSE ‘S.A.

(NANICA) as successor in interest to respondent Marina Mer-

cante Nicaraguense S.A. (Mamenic Lines), and Marina’s under-

writers, THE UNITED KINGDOM MUTUAL STEAMSHIP

ASSURANCE ASSOCIATION (BERMUDA) LTD., (written

through THE MILLER INSURANCE CLUB in London, Eng-

land whose New York representative is TRANSPORT MU-

TUAL SERVICES INC.,) as well as Doca’s general employer,

HAMILTON TERMINAL COMPANY and its insurer cur-

rently unknown to the petitioner and petitioner’s insurers, THE

HOME INDEMNITY COMPANY, and THE ST. PAUL IN-

SURANCE COMPANY, also may have an interest in the out-

come of this litigation.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

QUESTIONS PRESENTED .....-- esse eset erererertese i

List OF ADDITIONAL INTERESTED PARTIES ....-+-+-+>> il

CE TEI ck acc alic deeb ae enea bebe e eas l

Deer es a eck eke Weer eane se ea 1

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED ......-+--ss+eeeee l

STATEMENT OF CASE ... ccc ccc c ccc csrccercvccees ps

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT:

t. The decision below conflicts with the decisions of

this Court and other Courts of Appeals which have held

that Section 905(a) of the Longshoremen’s and Har-

borworkers’ Compensation Act (33 U.S.C. 901 et seq.)

provides the exclusive remedy against a stevedore-em-

ee er rere eee oe Le 4

2. Assuming, arguendo that respondent Jack Doca was

not an employee of petitioner, Pittston, the Circuit

Courts are presently in disagreement as to the applica-

bility of the Occupational Safety & Health Act and reg-

ulations promulgated thereunder to a non-employer.. 8

ie rs ca ee eas a aa ew AR eRe Od 10

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

American Export Lines Inc. v. Alvez, 446 U.S. 274 (1980) 4

Beaver v. Jacuzzi Brothers Inc., 454 F. 2d 284 (8th Cir.

NR ee ess Swan hee aee 6p 4 ORE COREE Y MES 5, 6,7

=

iv

Biggart v. Texas Eastern Transmission Corp., 235 So. 2d

ee ee ED Sis os 08 keke how ba haw ae eee 7, 8

Champagne v. Penrod Drilling Company, 341 F. Supp.

1282, aff'd 459 F. 2d 1042, amended 462 F. 2d 1372,

cert. den. 409 U.S. 1113, reh. den. 410 U.S. 948.. 5, 6, 7

Matter of DeNoyer v. Cavanaugh, 221 N.Y. 273 (1917) 8

Edmonds v. Compagne Maritime Transatlantique, 443 U.S.

EE OE ec GN ES oa SAW PRCA Kae Ke lde bO es 5

Fallone v. Misericordia Hospital, 23 A.D. 2d 222, 259

N.Y.S. 2d 947, aff'd, 17 N.Y. 2d 648, 269 N.Y.S. 2d

oe ee ee ee ee ee 8

Horn v. C. L. Osborn Contracting Company, 591 F. 2d

318 (Sth Cir. 1979), reh. den. 595 F. 2d 1221...... 9

Jeter v. St. Regis Paper Co., 507 F. 2d 973 (Sth Cir.

IN te lata ee OG hae Ans Gael dik ake a Ft

Johnston v. International Freighting Corporation, 274 App.

Se Be ee Ue PE 8 ec Abs eke vee wenees 8

Land v. Dollar, 300 US. 731 (1947) 2.0... ccc ccces l

Marshall v. Knutson Construction Co., 566 F. 2d 596

Re. CBRE SERDTTIT SG ate Hane Ny ce ie a Ae a 9

Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249

Rd MEE a ee Sey fre ree en 5

The Standard Oil Company v. Anderson, 212 U.S. 215, 29

ee es Oa Se CE PER ivi dosed ead nae’ 4

Thibodaux v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 580 F. 2d 841 (Sth

Cir. 1978), cert. den. 442 U.S. 909, 99 S. Ct. 2820,

a Bic: a ee eG POD kh e's Ao 'els Ncaia'w 0% Be ow » he

Zapico v. Bucyrus—Erie Co., 579 F. 2d 714 (2d Cir.,

rar ye Ce a eeu a ae ea wars 5

Statutes and Rules:

RR ENED 8 8 ee ac a 1

v

Occupational Safety and Health Act, (29 U.S.C. §651 et

seq):

BE hy ck g wu vanlccyerecokap ae Nee elton 9

BR i acces deennianes ase eae 2, 9, 33a

BONIS oi cass dannnndseerawanenee nee 5

oo Oe, <a cain cy enn 5

WR cl cat cay coh ies apeny enn 2, 34a

Longshoremen’s and Harborworkers’ Compensation Act

(33 U.S.C. $901, et seq.):

Noy sie Can tae ons enemas 1, 33a

ee EE ee er 5

NOE Ore re 5

DN ic, cetcotka scm es i, 2, 4, 5, 33a

Code of Federal Regulations, Title 29:

29 C.F.R. $1918.91 2.0... cece ee eee eee 2, 3, 34a

Other Authorities:

Larson on Workmen’s Compensation Law ......+++++: 7

12 Moore’s Federal Practice 9434.01 .........--00055 l

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Opinions Below

The opinion of the District Court reported at 474 F. Supp.

751 (S.D.N.Y., 1979) appears in Appendix B hereto. The

opinion of the Court of Appeals reported at 634 F. 2d 30 (2

Cir. 1980) appears in Appendix A hereto. The judgment of the

Court of Appeals appears in Appendix C hereto. The order of

the Court of Appeals denying without opinion the petition for

rehearing appears in Appendix D hereto.

Jurisdiction

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

was entered on October 1, 1980 affirming in part and remanding

in part the judgment and opinion of the United States District

Court for the Southern District of New York (Kevin T. Duffy,

Judge) entered on July 11, 1979.* A timely petition for rehear-

ing was subsequently denied without further opinion by the Court

of Appeals on January 7, 1981 and this petition for certiorari was

filed within 60 days of that date. This Court’s jurisdiction is in-

voked under 28 U.S.C. §1254 (1).

Statutory Provisions Involved

United States Code, Titie 33

§902 Definitions

See Appendix, p. 33a

*Finality of an order or judgment is not a prerequisite to petitioning

this Court for a writ of certiorari under 28 U.S.C. §1254 (1). Land v.

Dollar, 300 U.S. 731 (1947). See also 12 Moore’s Federal Practice

9434.01.

United States Code, Title 33

§905 Exclusiveness of Liability

See Appendix, p. 33a

United States Code, Title 29

§652 Definitions

See Appendix, p. 34a

§653 ***workmen’s compensation law or common law or

statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of employers and

employees unaffected

See Appendix, p. 34a

Code of Federal Regulations, Title 29

§1918.91 Housekeeping

See Appendix, p. 34a

Statement of Case

On July 23, 1975 respondent Jack A. Doca (hereinafter

“Doca”) was generally employed as a cargo checker by Hamil-

ton Terminal Company (hereinafter “Hamilton”) and perform-

ing work on board the M/V “COSTA RICA” owned by re-

spondent Marina Nicaraguense S.A. (hereinafter “Marina”)

when he was injured. (Appendix, p. 2a.) It is not disputed herein

that respondent Doca’s accident occurred aboard the M/V

“COSTA RICA” while the vessel was moored in navigable waters

of the United States.

Marina contracted with petitioner Pittston Stevedoring Com-

pany (hereinafter “Pittston”) to unload the vessel, and Pittston

in turn contracted with Hamilton to perform cargo checking ser-

vices. (Appendix, p. 2a). At the time of his injury Doca was

aboard the vessel at the joint request and direction of both a

Hamilton and Pittston supervisor to check cargo in a hatch.

(Appendix, p. 2a) It is contended by petitioner Pittston that

based upon the facts in the trial record and even more signifi-

cantly based upon the judicial finding and determination in the

3

opinion of the United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit,

(Appendix pp. 4a-5a) respondent Jack Doca, was a special or

borrowed employee of petitioner Pittston at the time of his

accident.

The District Court sitting without a jury awarded the Docas

damages totaling $669,127.00 finding both Marina and Pittston

jointly and severally liable for such damages to the plaintiffs.

(Appendix p. 3a) However, as to Marina and Pittston inter se,

the trial Court found Marina to be 90% liable and Pittston 10%

liable for plaintiff's accident (Appendix 3a). The liability of

Pittston was based solely upon the violation of a regulation

promulgated by the Occupational Safety and Health Adminis-

tration, 29 C.F.R. §1918.91(a) (1979) which required steve-

dores to keep their work area free of “tripping or stumbling

hazards.” (Appendix, p. 4a) The liability of respondent Marina

was based on its active negligence in first creating and thereafter

continuing to permit the existence of an accumulation of paper

and other debris in walking and working areas on the main deck

of its M/V “COSTA RICA.” (Appendix, p. 4a)

The District Court having based the liability of Pittston solely

on breach of the OSHA regulation in question, (Appendix, p.

23a-24a) petitioner Pittston appealed to the United States Court

of Appeals for the Second Circuit arguing that the OSHA reg-

ulations did not apply as Doca was not its employee. However,

the Court of Appeals disagreed and affirmed the finding of lia-

bility against Pittston based upon the violation of such statutory

regulation and thereafter, based on the District Court record,

went on to find Doca to be a special or borrowed employee of

Pittston by stating:

“Pittston’s argument that its duty does not run to Doca

because Doca was not Pittston’s employee cannot be main-

tained. Since Doca’s company, Hamilton, was hired by Pitt-

ston, Doca’s relationship to Pittston was effectively that of

an employee, for purposes of the scope of the duty based

on the OSHA regulation, especially since Doca was sent

on the mission that led to his injury by a Pittston and a

4

Hamilton supervisor, acting together.” (Appendix, pp. 4a-

5a) (emphasis supplied)

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the litigation

to the District Court solely for reassessment on a limited issue of

damages having affirmed all issues of liability found by the Dis-

trict Court. (Appendix, p. 18a) No further proceedings in the

District Court have, as yet, taken place.

Petitioner then moved for rehearing based on the Court of

Appeals findings and decision that Doca was its employee. Peti-

tioner pointed out that it was required that the Court of Ap-

peals apply Section 905(a) of the Longshoremen’s Act to pre-

cluded any liability, other than for compensation, against a steve-

dore-employer. Alihough the Second Circuit took the unusual

step of calling for further briefs from the respondents herein on

the rehearing petition, the rehearing of petitioner was subse-

quently denied without further opinion. (Appendix, p. 32a).

There also exists the derivative claim of respondent Jack

Doca’s wife, Fannie Doca for loss of consortium, whose right

to recover, assuming liability, is not raised herein by reason of

this Court’s recent decision in American Export Lines Inc. v.

Alvez, 446 U.S. 274 (1980).

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

1. The decision below conflicts with the decisions of

this Court and other Courts of Appeals which have

held that Section 905(a) of the Longshoremen’s

and Harborworkers’ Compensation Act (33 U.S.C.

901 et seq.) provides the exclusive remedy against

a stevedore-employer.

Reargument having been denied, petitioner does not question

the finding of the Court of Appeals that Doca was, in effect, a

borrowed servant. The Standard Oil Company v. Andersen, 212

U.S. 215, 29 S.Ct. 252, 53 L. Ed. 480 (1909).

|

5

However, once such a determination was made, it is respect-

fully submitted that the Court of Appeals should not have pro-

ceeded to disregard the effect of the exclusivity provisions of Sec-

tion 905 (a) of the Longshoremen’s and Harborworkers’ Com-

pensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §901 et seq., (hereinafter “Longshore-

men’s Act”) which by its very terms preclude any liability on the

part of the stevedore-employer other than for compensation ben-

efits.

Such refusal by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals to apply

Section 905(a) of the Longshoremen’s Act when an OSHA em-

ployment nexus is found is in direct conflict with both the Fifth

and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeal. Jeter v. St. Regis Paper

Co., 507 F. 2d 973 (Sth Cir. 1975); Beaver v. Jacuzzi Brothers

Inc., 454 F. 2d 284 (8th Cir. 1972); see also Champagne v.

Penrod Drilling Company, 341 F. Supp. 1282, aff'd 459 F. 2d

1042, amended 462 F. 2d 1372, cert. den. 409 U.S. 1113, reh.

den. 410 U.S. 948; Thibodaux v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 580

F. 2d 841 (Sth Cir. 1978), cert. den. 442 U.S. 909, 99 S. Ct.

2820, 60 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1979).

This Court, as well as a different panel of the Court of Ap-

peals for the Second Circuit itself has recognized that compen-

sation benefits are a longshoreman’s sole remedy against his em-

ployer, regardless cf negligence. Edmonds v. Com pagne Maritime

Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 260 (1978); Northeast Marine

Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249 (1977); Zapico v. Bu-

cyrus—Erie Co., 579 F. 2d 714 (2d Cir., 1978).

It is not contested that longshoreman Doca received compen-

sation benefits by reason of his injury pursuant to the Long-

shoremen’s Act. That Doca is an “employee” of Pittston, as

that term is defined by both the Occupational Safety and Health

Act, 29 U.S.C. §652 (b) as well as the Longshoremen’s Act, 33

U.S.C. §902(3) is clear. Moreover, that Pittston is the “em-

ployer” of Doca, as that term is defined by the same statutes,

is also clear. Compare 29 U.S.C. §652(5) and 33 U.S.C.

§902(4).

6

In Jeter v. St. Regis Paper Co., 507 F. 2d 973 (Sth Cir. 1975),

although the Court ultimately found that St. Regis was not an

employer of the claimant Jeter, and that it was not obligated

to comply with certain OSHA regulations concerning the ‘Work

performed by him, it, nevertheless, recognized the very argu-

ment of appellant Pittston herein, when it stated:

“Had there been sufficient facts of control*** the fact

might have made St. Regis Jeter’s employer and Jeter’s ex-

clusive remedy would have been workmen’s compensation

benefits, which he received. Cf. Biggart v. Texas Eastern

Transmission Corp., 235 So. 2d 443 (Miss. 1970).” (507

F, 2d at 978)

Similarly, in Beaver v. Jacuzzi Brothers, Inc., 454 F. 2d 284

(8th Cir. 1972), the Court wrote:

“As a matter of common experience and of present busi-

ness practices in our economy, it is clear that an employee

may be coemployed by more than one employer even while

doing the same work. Biggart v. Texas Eastern Transmis-

sion Corp., 235 So. 2d 443, 445 (Miss. 1970).

“As Jacuzzi Brothers was an employer within the mean-

ing of the statute, plaintiff's sole remedy is that provided

by the Workmen’s Compensation Law.” 454 F. 2d 284 at

285 (emphasis supplied)

In Champagne v. Penrod Drilling Company, 341 F. Supp.

1282, aff'd 459 F. 2d 1042 amended 462 F. 2d 1372, cert.

den. 409 U.S. 1113, reh. den. 410 U.S. 948, the Disrict Court

found that decedent, Paul LeBlanc, a welder employed by Ter-

rebonne Weiders, was, in fact, the borrowed servant of Penrod

Drilling Company at the time of his death while working on an

oil drilling platform owned and being constructed by Penrod in

the Gulf of Mexico.

Having made such a determination, the Court went on to .

hold:

7

“As such, LeBlanc was a borrowed or loaned employee

and entitled to the benefits of the applicable compensation

statute against Penrod, subject te the limitations imposed.

The exclusive remedy afforded by Title 33 U.S.C. §905

is such a limitation and this suit must be dismissed. Ross

v. Delta Drilling Company (E.D.La. 1962), 213 F. Supp.

270; Touchet v. Travelers (W.D.La. 1963), 221 F. Supp.

376.” 341 F. Supp. 1282 at 1285 (emphasis supplied)

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth

Circuit, following such reasoning, wrote that: “It is our judg-

ment that the findings of fact are supported by substantial evi-

dence and that the legal conclusions reached are supported by

the facts found.” 459 F. 2d 1042. And, as indicated above cer-

tiorari was denied by this Court. 409 U.S. 1113.

This was also the rule in Thibodaux v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,

580 F. 2d 841 (Sth Cir. 1978), cert. den., 442 U.S. 909, 99

S. Ct. 2820, 60 L.Ec. 2d 274 (1979) where the Court wrote:

“If the LHWCA is applicable to this case, and if it is determined

that the deceased was a ‘borrowed employee’ or “borrowed ser-

vant’ of ARCO, the plaintiff's exclusive remedy against ARCO

will lie in the recovery of compensation benefits under the Act.”

580 F. 2d 841 at 843.

In Biggart v. Texas Eastern Transmission Corp., 235 So. 2d,

443 (Miss., 1970), relied upon by the Fifth Circuit in Jeter as

well the Eighth Circuit in Beaver, the Supreme Court of Missis-

sippi held that because decedent Biggart was an employee of

both a pipeline contractor who paid him, as well as the pipeline

owner who controlled him, therefore, the sole and exclusive rem-

edy of his estate was under the Workmen’s Compensation Act

of Mississippi, which precluded any action against an employer.

Using as its guide the recognized authority in the field, Larson

on Workmen's Compensation Law, the Biggart Court wrote:

“This case is what Larson calls an “upside-down com-

pensation case’ in the form of a negligence action in which

8

the employee is trying to get out from compensation cover-

age to escape the exclusive provisions of the act, and the

employer is asserting compensation coverage. 1 Larson,

Workmen’s Compensation Law, §26.10 at 452.11 (1965).

. Reason and consistency required that we apply the provi-

sions of the act and the decisions interpreting it with an

equal hand, both where coverage is asserted and where the

exclusive remedy provisions of the statute are involved. . .”

235 So. 2d 443 at 447.

The courts of New York State also follow such reasoning to

preclude any liability on the part of an employer where a bor-

rowed servant relationship exists. Fallone v. Misericordia Hos-

pital, 23 A.D. 2d 222, 259 N.Y.S. 2d 947, aff'd, 17 N.Y. 2d

648, 269 N.Y.S. 2d 431, 216 N.E. 2d 594. As stated by the

Court in Matter of DeNoyer v. Cavanaugh, 221 N.Y. 273

(1917), “The fact that a workman has a general and a special

employer is not inconsistent with the relation of employer and

employee between both of them and himself.” See also, John-

ston v. International Freighting Corporation, 274 App. Div. 728,

87 N.Y.S. 2d 297.

The Second Circuit having found as a fact, based on the Dis-

trict Court record, that Jack Doca was an employee of Pittston

creates a conflict between the circuits and further violates the

provisions of the Longshoremen’s and Harborworkers Compen-

sation Act.

2. Assuming, arguendo that respondent Jack Doca was

not an employee of petitioner, Pittston, the Circuit

are presently in disagreement as to the applica-

bility of the Occupational Safety & Health Act and reg-

ulations promulgated thereunder to a non-employer.

In the alternative if this Court finds that longshoreman-re-

spondent Doca, was not an employee of Pittston it is contended

by petitioner that OSHA regulations do not apply. The Con-

9

gressional purposes and policy of OSHA (29 U.S.C. §651 et

seq.) set forth by Congress state inter alia that:

Section 651

(1) by encouraging employers and employees in their ef-

forts to reduce the number of occupational safety and health

hazards at their places of employment, and to stimulate

employers and employees to institute new and to perfect

existing programs for providing safe and healthful working

conditions;

Employees pursuant to OSHA (29 U.S.C. §652) are defined as:

(6) The term “employee” means an employee of an em-

ployer who is employed in a business of his employer which

affects commerce.

If it is determined that Doca is not an employee of Pittston,

OSHA does not apply and cannot be used as a basis of liability

against Pittston or other non-employers. Horn v. C. L. Osborn

Contracting Company, 591 F. 2d 318 (Sth Cir. 1979), reh. den.

595 F. 2d 1221; contra, Marshall v. Knutson Construction Co.,

566 F. 2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977).

Therefore, the judgment of liability against Pittston should

be vacated in its entirety since there is no other finding of negli-

gence in the District or Appellate Court decis:ons on which to

base liability against Pittston.

10

CONCLUSION

For these reasons stated above, a writ of certiorari should

issue to review the judgment and opinion of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM P. KARDARAS

Counsel for Petitioner

Pitiston Stevedoring Corp.

14 Wall Street

New York, New York 10005

Of Counsel:

JAMES S. MCMAHON

JOSEPH E. DONAT

oO

la

APPENDIX A

Opinion of the Court of Appeals

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FoR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

®

No. 629—September Term, 1979

(Argued March 5, 1980 Decided October 1, 1980)

Docket No. 79-7626

da

”

Jack A. Doca and FANNIE C. Doca,

Plaintiffs-A ppellees,

V.

MARINA MERCANTE NICARAGUENSE, S.A.

and PITTSTON STEVEDORING CorRP.,

Defendants-A ppellants.

Before:

FEINBERG, Chief Judge,

NEWMAN and KEarsE, Circuit Judges.

~—--- @ ES DEED OS

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court

for the Southern District of New York (Kevin T. Duffy, Judge)

holding shipowner and stevedoring company liable for injury

to cargo checker under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’

Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§901-950, and calculating dam-

ages for lost future wages by reducing the present value discount

to reflect inflation.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.

>

Sa

2a

Opinion of the Court of Appeals

Victor S. CICHANOWICZ, New York, N.Y. (Cichanowicz

& Callan, New York, N.Y., on the brief), for appellant

Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A.

GeorcGE G. KILARJIAN, New York, N.Y. (Bigham, Englar,

Jones & Houston, New York, N.Y., on the brief), for

appellant Pittston Stevedoring Corp.

Morris C1zNER, New York, N.Y. (Zimmerman & Zimmer-

man, New York, N.Y., on the brief), for appellees.

@&

NEWMAN, Circuit Judge:

This appeal from a personal injury award, made pursuant to

the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act

(LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. §§901-950 (1976), primarily requires ~

consideration of the effect of inflation in determining damages

for loss of future wages.

Plaintiff Doca was employed as a cargo checker by Hamilton

Terminal Company. He was injured when he slipped and fell

while carrying out his assigned duties aboard the M.V. Costa

Rica. Defendant Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A. (“Ma-

rina”) is the owner of the ship; it hired defendant Pittston Steve-

doring Company (“Pittston”) to unload the vessel, and Pittston

in turn hired Hamilton to perform certain services in connection

with the unloading. Doca went aboard the Costa Rica at the joint

request of a Pittston supervisor and a Hamilton supervisor to

check the hatches for the presence of some metal pipe. The path

to Hatch #4 along the offshore side of the vessel was surrounded

by garbage, but there appeared to be a clear route through the

center of it, covered with dunnage paper. In fact, there was a

turnbuckle underneath the paper; as Doca proceeded toward

Hatch #4, he tripped on the turnbuckle and struck his head on

the coaming, or rim of the hatch. As a result of this fall, Doca

suffered a cerebral concussion and cervical spine injury. This left

3a

Opinion of the Court of Appeals

Doca with a series of neurological symptoms that were found

to render him incapable of working, engaging in “most normal

recreational activities,” or having a normal sexual relationship

with his wife:

The District Court for the Southern District of New York

(Kevin T. Duffy, Judge) found both the shipowner Marina and

the stevedoring company Pittston negligent in causing Doca’s in-

jury, and, reflecting their relative responsibilities for the injury,

found Marina liable for 90% and Pittston liable for 10% of

damages totaling $669,127. These damages included, among

other items, $352,560 for Doca’s wages from the date of trial for

the 12-year remainder of his working life and $15,000 for his

wife’s loss of consortium.

Marina and Pittston appeal the judgment, raising issues con-

cerning both liability and damages. We affirm as to liability and

remand for redetermination of loss future wages.

I. Liability

The liability issues are not substantial. The District Court’s

conclusion that both Marina and Pittston were negligent is fully

supported by the evidence. The 1972 Amendments to LHWCA

had the effect of applying general tort principles regarding owners

and occupiers of land to the duty of a shipowner toward those

who come aboard for business reasons. 33 U.S.C. §905; see H.R.

Rep. No. 92-1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1972]

U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4698, 4701-03; Napoli v. Hellenic

Lines, Ltd., 536 F.2d 505, 507 (2d Cir. 1976), Landon v. Lief

Hoegh & Co., 521 F. 2d 756, 762 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,

1Doca’s injuries were serious by themselves, but they were exacerbated

by what the District Court found to be a post-traumatic conversion reac-

tion. This reaction probably resulted from the fact that Doca had been

injured previously, in 1950, when employed as a longshoreman, and had

been unable to work for twelve years thereafter.

4a

Opinion of the Court of Appeals

423 U.S. 1053 (1976). This duty is to maintain the property

in areasonably safe condition in the light of all the circumstances.

See W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts §61 (4th ed.

1971); Restatement (Second) of Torts §343. In the present case,

the ship’s deck was clearly in an unsafe condition; this was not

simply a matter of one turnbuckle being covered by some paper,

but of a general obstruction of the walking area by various types

of refuse. The ship’s crew had created this hazard, and the ship

was primarily responsible for it. Moreover, the crew was aware

of the hazard, as it had been pointed out to them by Pittston’s

hatch foreman, who asked them to clean it up. The ship could

have contracted with Pittston to clean the deck but it did not do

so, and thus retained its basic responsibility. The finding that

Marina was 90% responsible for the accident is amply sup-

ported.

Pittston’s liability is based on a regulation, promulgated by

the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 29 C.F.R.

§1918.91(a) (1979), which requires stevedores to keep their

work area free of “tripping or stumbling hazards.” The District

Court held that this regulatory standard created a non-delegable

duty to remove the hazard. The fact that the hazard was pri-

marily the ship’s responsibility does not excuse the stevedore

from fulfilling its regulatory obligation; the stevedore was within

its rights in asking the ship’s crew to clean the deck, and pre-

sumably, it could have obtained monetary compensation for

cleaning the deck itself. But since it continued working without

making sure the deck was clean, it exposed itself to liability for

violation of a statutorily established standard. See Complaint of

Allied Towing Corp., 416 F. Supp. 1207 (E.D. Va. 1976), aff'd

in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 580 F.2d 702 (4th Cir.

1978) (LHWCA case); Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 126

N.E. 814 (1920); W. Prosser, supra, §36 at 200-03.

Pittston’s argument that its duty does not run to Doca be-

cause Doca was not Pittston’s employee cannot be maintained.

Since Doca’s company, Hamilton, was hired by Pittston, Doca’s

5a

Opinion of the Court of Appeals

relationship to Pittston was effectively that of an employee, for

purposes of the scope of the duty based on the OSHA regula-

tion, especially since Doca was sent on the mission that led to

his injury by a Pittston and a Hamilton supervisor, acting to-

gether.

The District Court was also justified in concluding that Doca

was not contributorily negligent in taking the offshore route to

Hatch #4, or in not looking under the paper. The evidence in-

dicated that it is a standard safety procedure to walk on the

offshore side of a ship when the ship is being unloaded, since

cargo is lifted over the inshore side. Of course, Doca might have

looked underneath the paper before he walked on it. But the

District Court was entitled to conclude that this would have been

more than the reasonable care required of a business invitee.

The District Court was also entitled to find that neither of

the defendants had established a valid cross-claim for indemnity.

Marina’s contractual indemnity claim is defeated by the District

Court’s finding that Pittston’s failure to observe the obligation

of the OSHA regulation does not establish breach of a warranty

of workmanship performance, even though it suffices to establish

Pittston’s negligence. The District Court also did not err in find-

ing, alternatively, that Marina’s own negligence, in the circum-

stances of this case, was sufficient to preclude an indemnity claim.

See Lopez v. Oldendorf, 545 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.

denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977); Hurdrich v. Eastmount Shipping

Corp., 503 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1974). Finally, the District Court

was entitled to reject Pittston’s tort theory indemnity claim, ap-

parently predicated on the contention that Marina’s negligence

was active and Pittston’s only passive. See Tri-State Oil Tool

Industries, Inc. v. Delta Marine Drilling Co., 410 F.2d 178

(Sth Cir. 1969), and cases there cited. The evidence of the

omissions of both defendants justified the 90-10 allocation, prop-

erly reflecting the relative responsibility of the two tortfeasors,

but did not compel a finding that Pittston must be relieved of

its share of the damages.

6a

Opinion of the Court of Appeals

II. Damages

One of the damage issues—whether an injured worker’s wife

can recover for loss of consortium under the LHWCA—has now

been authoritatively decided by American Export Lines, Inc. v.

Alvez, 48 U.S.L.W. 450) (U.S. May 12, 1980). Appellant’s

challenge to the $15,000 loss of consortium component of the

damage award is therefore rejected.’

The final and most significant question raised by this appeal

is whether and to what extent an award for lost future wages

should be adjusted because of inflation.* If an adjustment for

inflation is to be made, two approaches are available. Under

the first method the projection of current wages is increased to

reflect the fact that the employee would have received cost of

living increases to keep pace with inflation. The sum of those

increased annual wage figures is then discounted to present value

by the prevailing interest rate. See United States v. English, 521

F.2d 63, 75 (9th Cir. 1975). Under the second method the

discount rate is decreased below the prevailing interest rate to

reflect the estimated rate of inflation. This reduced discount rate

is then applied to the sum of the current wages projected to con-

tinue for each of the years for which wages will be lost. See Feld-

man v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 1271 (D. Conn.

1974), aff'd, 524 F.2d 384, 387-88 (2d Cir. 1975). If the same

estimated inflation rate is used, the “outcome of the calculation

under either approach would be very nearly identical,” Feldman,

supra, 524 F.2d at 391 (Friendly, J., concurring).

Liability in Alvez was grounded upon both negligence and unsea-

worthiness, the accident having occurred prior to the 1972 LHWCA

amendments, which eliminated liability to longshoremen based on unsea-

worthiness. However, the 1972 amendments leave unaffected the Supreme

Court’s holding that damages for joss of consortium are available, under

general maritime law, when liability is based on negligence.

8The defendants advance no serious objections to the award for wages

lost prior to trial or for pain and suffering, and they stipulated the amount

of medical costs.

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Opinion of the Court of Appeals

In this case the District Court took inflation into account, to

an unspecified extent, apparently by using the second approach

and adjusting for future inflation by decreasing the present value

discount. The Court did not provide a computation for its award

for loss of future earnings; however, Judge Duffy stated that he

had reached his result by “considering both probability of con-

tinued inflation and a discount to present value.” Doca infers

that Judge Duffy used a discount factor of 1% .* Defendants ob-

ject to this computation for lack of evidence to support an esti-

mate of future inflation and, more fundamentally, on the ground

that any adjustment for inflation is impermissible. Since the sig-

nificance of inflation on damage awards .or lost future wages

seems to be as persistent a problem as inflation itself, the matter

merits some examination.

In this Circuit, the issue has been considered but not resolved.

In McWeeney v. New York, New Haven, & Hartford R.R. Co.,

282 F.2d 34 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870

(1960), the issue was whether the calculation of lost future

wages should be made on the basis of gross wages or net wages

after deduction for income taxes. In rejecting a deduction for

taxes, but see Norfolk and Western Railway v. Liepelt, S.

Ct. (1980), this Court noted that whatever benefit this

gives to plaintiffs is partially offset by the absence of an upward

4Doca derives this 1% discount rate in the following manner. The dif-

ference between the award for lost wages, $352,560, and Doca‘s projec-

tion of future lost wages, $394,861. This difference represents approxi-

mately 1% of $352,560, multiplied by the 12 years for which future

wages will be lost. Expressed as a formula, the computation would have

been x + (12i) x = w, where x is the discounted value, i is the interest

rate, and w is the projection of total future wages. If the District Court

applied a 1% rate in this fashion (and we cannot be certain if the award

for lost future wages was determined on this basis), the discount factor

was incorrectly applied. The correct method is to apply to the future

wages for each year a discount factor of 1/(1 + i)", where i is the in-

terest rate and n is the year for which present value of income is sought.

See Dullard v. Berkeley Associates Co., supra, 606 F.2d at 895 n.4. The

discounted amounts for each year are then added together to determine

the total award. Standard tables are available to avoid the need for cal-

culations.

8a

Opinion of the Court of Appeals

adjustment for inflation.® A decade later in Yodice v. Konin-

klijke Nederlandsche Stoomboot Maatschappij, 443 F.2d 76 (2d

Cir. 1971), a damage award for lost wages was reversed for

reasons that included the failure to apply any discount for pres-

ent value. Judge Firnedly presciently noted that “if inflation

should continue at its present pace, courts may have to reconsider

the propriety of the long recognized charge with respect to dis-

count.” Id. at 79.

More recently this Court, in a diversity case. approved Dis-

trict Judge Blumenfeld’s use of an “ ‘inflation-adjusted discount

rate’ ” of 1.5%. Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., supra, 524

F.2d at 387. This rate was determined by subtracting the aver-

age annual change in the consumer price index over each of sev-

eral periods of years from the effective annual interest on gov-

ernment bonds held during each of the same periods, and then

selecting the average of the rates resulting from these subtrac-

tions. Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., supra, 382 F. Supp.

at 1306-12. The purpose of this method was to determine the

“ ‘real yield’” of money, the portion of interest charged on vir-

tually risk-free investments that represents only the real cost of

the money and not the additional cost the lender exacts as a

hedge against future inflation. Jd. at 1293. Judge Friendly con-

curred dubitante, noting that the decision represented a predic-

tion as to unsettled state law and not “a precedent on the in-

flation problem in a case arising under federal law.” 524 F.2d at

390, 393. In another diversity case, Dullard v. Berkeley Asso-

ciates Co., 606 F.2d 890, 896 (2d Cir. 1979), this Court was

willing to assume the propriety of an inflation-adjusted discount

rate only for purposes of ruling that even with such an adjust-

ment applicable to lost future wages, the total award in ques-

tion was excessive. Most recently, the Court, in a Federal Tort

Claims Act case, approved use of a present value discount rate

that had been reduced to 5% from the prevailing interest rate

5The other factor mentioned in McWeeney as offsetting the absence of

a deduction for income taxes is the significant portion of the plaintiff's

award that will be taken by the attorney's contingent fee 282 F.2d at 38.

9a

Opinion of the Court of Appeals

to reflect future inflation. Espana v. United States, 616 F.2d 41

(2d Cir. 1980).

Among other courts, there has been a growing recognition that

inflation should be taken into account in damage calculations.

At least four federal Courts of Appeals have explicitly so ruled,

see Steckler v. United States, 549 F.2d 1375-78 (10th Cir.

1977); United States v. English, supra, 521 F.2d at 72-76; Riha

v. Jasper Blackburn Corp., 516 F.2d 840, 843-45 (8th Cir.

1975); Bach v. Penn Central Transportation Co., 502 F.2d

1112, 1122 (6th Cir. 1974),° as have a number of state courts,

see, e.g., Beaulieu v. Elliot, 434 P.2d 665 (Alas. 1967);

Schnebly v. Baker, 217 N.W. 2d 708 (Iowa 1974); Halliburton

Co. v. Olivas, 517 S.W. 2d 349 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974). In

addition, the commentators generally favor this position. See

Dennis, Sirmon & Drinkwater, Wrongful Death Damages, 47

Miss. L.J. 173 (1976); Formuzis & O’Donnell, inflation and the

Valuation of Future Economic Losses, 38 Mont. L. Rev. 297

(1977); Henderson, The Consideration of Increased Productiv-

ity and the Discounting of Future Earnings to Present Value, 20

S.D.L. Rev. 307 (1975); Hopkins, Economics and Impaired

Earning Capacity in Personal Injury Cases, 44 Wash. L. Rev.

351 (1969); Note, Future Inflation, Prospective Damages, and

the Circuit Courts, 63 Va. L. Rev. 105 (1977).

Though the Supreme Court has yet to rule definitively on the

issue, it clearly indicated its approval of including inflation esti-

mates in future wage loss awards in Norfolk and Western Rail-

®Technically, only Bach, a Federal Employers’ Liability Act suit, was

decided under federal law. English and Steckler were cases brought under

the Federal Tort Claims Act, to which local law applied, and Riha was a

diversity case applying Nebraska law. However, in all these cases, the

relevance-of inflation was considered in light of general principles, with-

out reference to any particular source of law. See Note, Future Inflation,

Prospective Damages, and the Circuit Courts, 63 Va. L. Rev. 105 (1977).

See also Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173, 186-7 (1st Cir.

1974), explicitly relying on state law. Cf. Freeport Sulphur Co. v. S/S

Hermosa, 526 F.2d 300, 308-313 (Sth Cir. 1976) (Wisdom, J., con-

curring).

10a

Opinion of the Court of Appeals

way v. Liepelt. supra. The issue in that case, as in McWeeney,

was whether lost future wages in an F.E.L.A. case should be

estimated without deduction for estimated income taxes. The

Court ruled that such a reduction should be made. The opinion

is instructive on the issue of inflation for two reasons. First, the

Court noted that the plaintiff's economic expert had estimated

that the lost future earnings would have increased by five per-

cent a year until the wage-earners’ retirement. More significantly,

the Court rejected the argument that reduction for future income

taxes would be too speculative by noting that other aspects of

a damage award computation, specifically including “future in-

flation,” are also matters of “estimate and prediction.” ———S.

Ct. at ———. Thus, the Court not only noted that the award in-

cluded an estimate for inflation, but also used the reasonable-

ness of making such an estimate as support for similar estimates

of future taxes. See also Grunenthal v. Long Island R. Co., 393

U.S. 156 (1968), in which the Court approved a damage award

based upon anticipated wage increases attributable to inflation.

Although the view that inflation should be considered is clearly

on the increase, several federal courts including three Courts of

Appeals, have prohibited the adjustment of awards for future

wages to account for inflation. See Johnson v. Penrod Drilling

Co., 510 F.2d 234 (Sth Cir. 1975) (en banc); Magill v. West-

inghouse Electric Corp., 464 F.2d 294, 299-301 (3d Cir.

1972); Williams v. United States, 435 F.2d 804 (1st Cir. 1970).

The principal rationale for these decisions is that estimates of

future inflation are too speculative to serve as a basis for cal-

culating damages. See Penrod, supra, 510 F.2d at 241; Magill,

supra, 464 F.2d at 300; Williams, supra, 435 F.2d at 807.

We believe that the developing majority view is sound and

that inflation should be considered in estimating the present value

of lost future wages. According to the figures computed by the

Bureau of Labor Statistics, United States Department of Labor,

inflation has become a constant feature of our modern economy.

The Consumer Price Index, perhaps the leading indicator of

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Opinion of the Court of Appeals

inflation, has increased in all but two years since the beginning

of World War II, and in every year since 1955. This increase

was particularly pronounced during the past decade, when the

Index increased by five times as much as it had during the pre-

vious decade. In 1979, the year in which the District Court de-

cided this case, the average annual Consumer Price Index was

217.4, compared to 100 in 1967, the base year, and 72.1 in

1950.7 Whether this trend has become an inherent feature of

the international economy, irreversible by governmental action,

is a subject of spirited debate among economists. See Friedman,

The Role of Money, 58 Am. Econ. Rev. 1 (1968); Gordon,

Recent Development in the Theory of Inflation and Unemploy-

_ ment in Modern Macro-Economics (Parkin, ed. 1979); Kaldor,

Economic Growth and the Problem of Inflation, in N. Kaldor,

Essays on Economic Policy 166 (1965). But there is broad

agreement that our economy, by its very nature, is subject to

strong and persistent inflationary pressures, and that the com-

plete elimination of inflation would require Draconian meas-

ures, at the very least. See T. Dernbury & D. McDougal, Macro-

economics 287-96 (5th ed. 1976); D. Nichols & C. Reynolds,

Principles of Economics 485-95 (1971); L. Reynolds, Eco-

nomics 180-87 (4th ed. 1973); P. Samuelson, Economics 820-

37 (1976). In short, courts cannot fail to recognize that infla-

tion is a dominant factor on the current economic scene and,

despite episodic recessions, is likely to be so for the foreseeable

future.

To be sure, the idea that a person’s future income will in-

crease in dollar amount is a prediction, one based largely on

our inductive assumption that the future will resemble the past.

But using inductive inferences about economic conditions to ad-

TThus, if Doca had received a damage award for twelve years’ future

wages in 1967, fully discounted to present value at then prevailing in-

terest rates, and had invested this award at those prevailing interest rates

with the intention of drawing out one-twelfth each year, his yearly

amount, despite the interest, would have declined steadily in purchasing

power. For the final year, 1979, the money would have worth

42% of what it was worth when the award was made.

i

12a

Opinion of the Court of Appeals

just the value of an award for lost future income is hardly novel.

In fact, it underlies the practice of discounting future lost wages

to the present value of the right to receive such wages. This prac-

tice, first required by the Supreme Court in 1916, Chesapeake

& Ohio Ry. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485 (1916), and routinely fol-

lowed by courts throughout the nation ever since, see E. Devitt

& C. Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice & Instructions §85.13

(1976); Note, supra, 63 Va. L. Rev. 105, rests on the inductive

inference that interest rates will continue at their present level

or above. Discounting to present value determines the amount

of money that will produce the lost future wages if the lump sum

award (and any interest it earns) is invested at prevailing in-

terest rates. If interest rates decline after the lump sum award

is received, the plaintiff will normally fail to realize the full dol-

lar amount of the lost future wages.® If it is permissible, indeed

required by Kelly, to make a prediction about interest rates, it

seems as reasonable to make a prediction about inflation as well.

See Steckler, supra, 549 F.2d at 1377.

In fact, as Judge Blumenfeld demonstrates by the data col-

lected in Feldman, there is a fairly constant relationship between

interest and inflation rates, so that it is more reasonable to make

a prediction about the relationship of both rates than about

the level of interest rates alone. Discounting without regard to

8At a minimum the plaintiff will earn compound interest only at the

reduced prevailing interest rate. If the plaintiff invests his lump-sum

award (plus earned interest) annually, he will also suffer a decrease of

simple interest because of the reduced rates. It is possible for the plain-

tiff to avoid this latter reduction by investing his lump sum-award in

long-term bonds, corresponding to the length of time for which the wages

are lost. Yet if the plaintiff makes that type of investment, he takes the

risk that if interest rates increase, the market value of his bonds will

decrease, and he will suffer a loss each time he sells 2 bond to meet cur-

rent needs. One way to avoid that risk is to purchase a series of bonds

ranging in maturities from one year up to the number of years for which

the wages were lost. That assures that each year’s needs will be met from

the proceeds of a maturing bond, without the risk of selling a bond at a

discount. However, the average rate on such a series of short, medium,

and long-term bonds will most likely be less than the rate on long-term

bonds, which was used to discount the future wages to present value.

13a

Opinion of the Court of Appeals

inflation charges the plaintiff for that portion of the prevailing

cost of money that represents the lenders’ anticipation of in-

flation without allowing the plaintiff an offsetting addition for

inflation, either by increasing the sum to be discounted or re-

ducing the discount rate. Or, to put it another way, discount-

ing necessarily includes a prediction about inflation (the pre-

diction made by those who determine the interest rate), and

it is neither reasonable nor fair to use that prediction only to

reduce an award instead of endeavoring to determine an award

that approximates the present value of what the future wages

would have been. Economics should not be an instrument for

the undercompensation of plaintiffs. It should be used to achieve

a realistic estimate of future conditions, so that an injured plain-

tiff can be compensated for his loss as fairly and completely as

possible.°

The principal argument advanced against taking inflation into

account is that it is too speculative. There can be no doubt

that predicting next year’s inflation rate is at least as hazardous

a task as forecasting next year’s weather. This concern about

speculation persuades us to be rather cautious in determining

the way in which inflation should be taken into account, but,

for three reasons, is not sufficient to preclude any adjustment

for inflation. First, the law of damages frequently recognizes

the need to make some predictions about the future, despite the

uncertainties of doing so. Estimates of lost future profits are an

obvious example. See Autowest, Inc. v. Peugeot, Inc., 434 F.2d

556, 564-67 (2d Cir. 1970). Second, since discounting future

lost wages to present value uses an interest rate that reflects in-

flation, the issue is not whether inflation is too speculative to be

®It is worth noting that when the Supreme Court declared its present

value discount rule in 1916, it was able to look back on an era when

prices, though fluctuating, were not generally increasing. The estimated

Consumer Price Index for 1916 stood at 32.7, having varied between

25 and 51 during the course of the previous century. Looking backward

over the past four decades from 1980, rather than 1916, reveals an

entirely different economic landscape, in which prices have increased al-

most every year, often at an accelerating rate.

l4a

Opinion of the Court of Appeals

considered at all; it is whether inflation, as a component of in-

terest rates, should be considered for the defendant (by dis-

counting at the prevailing interest rate) but ignored for the plain-

tiff (by rejecting any compensating adjustment for inflation).

Finally, and most important, as Feldman illustrates, it is en-

tirely feasible to take inflation into account without making any

prediction as to the specific level of future inflation rates. All

that is needed is a prediction that in the future inflation rates

will bear approximately the same relationship to long-term in-

terest rates. that they have in the past. Essentially the only prem-

ise for that prediction is that over the course of years investors

in long-term bonds will demand returns that reflect the prospects

of future inflation. They may guess wrong in some years and

accept rates that fail to keep pace with inflation. “Yet common

sense suggests,” as Judge Friendly has pointed out, “that in-

vestors will not tolerate such a situation indefinitely.” Feldman,

supra, 524 F.2d at 392. These considerations persuade us that

inflation is not too speculative to be taken into account in de-

termining awards for future lost wages. See Norfolk and Western

Railway v. Liepelt, supra.

The next question is how inflation should be considered.

Courts have favored various methods, which can generally be

divided into two basic categories. In the first category are those

methods that submit the question of the inflation rate to the fact-

finder, so that a separate determination is made in each case.

In this category, one method treats the rate of future inflation

as a fact to be proved by evidence, presumably expert opinion.

See, e.g., United States v. English, supra, 521 F.2d at 75-76.

Another method forbids evidence, but permits the fact-finder to

apply his own knowledge and prediction in estimating a future

inflation rate. See, e.g., Bach v. Penn Central Transportation

Co., supra, 502 F.2d at 1122-23. A third method permits the

fact-finder to apply his own knowledge but also permits expert

testimony. See, e.g., Riha v. Jasper Blackburn Corp., supra, 516

F.2d at 845. In the other basic category are methods that re-

move the issue from the fact-finder and instead adopt a rule of

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Opinion of the Court of Appeals

law that focuses on a constant relationship between inflation and

interest rates. Using this approach, the Alaska Supreme Court

held that the inflation rate will be assumed to equal the interest

rate, thereby eliminating any discount for present value. See

Beaulieu v. Elliot, supra. A somewhat different technique was

used in Feldman, where it was observed that over a period of

years the inflation rate bore a relatively constant relationship to

the interest rate, averaging 1.5% less; the Court used this 1.5%

rate as a discount rate, reflecting the true cost of money with

the effect of inflation removed.

Having considered these alternatives, we are not prepared to

require any one particular method by which inflation should be

taken into account in estimating lost future wages. Predictive

techniques are constantly being refined, as are methods of cor-

rectly assessing the immediate past. If litigants prefer to offer

evidence as to future rates of both inflation and interest, they

are entitled to do so. We note, however, that one virtue of

the Feldman approach is that it lessens trial disputes concerning

the future impact of inflation. The average accident trial should

not be converted into a graduate seminar on economic forecast-

ing. The adjusted discount rate approach of F eldman avoids all

predictions about the level of future inflation, and focuses in-

stead only on the relationship between the inflation rate and the

interest rate. Since that relationship is relatively constant in pe-

riods of stable inflation, as the historical data set forth in Feld-

man reveal, it may frequently be possible for litigants to agree

on an adjusted discount rate, derived from that type of historica!

date. Without requiring a particular adjusted rate, we suggest

that a 2% discount rate normally be fair to both sides.

A 2% discount rate appears to be the estimate of the true

cost of money appropriate for use in a computation whose pur-

pose is to determine the present value of lost future wages. As

Judge Blumenfeld recognized in Feldman, 2% is the real yield

normally attainable during periods of low, stable rates of infla-

tion. Feldman, supra, 382 F. Supp. at 1293, 1310 (Table A-II).

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Opinion of the Court of Appeals

It is also a figure that lies within the narrow range bracketed by

many economists as representing the true yield of money.”

Feldman used the slightly lower rate of 1.5% to allow “a margin |

of error to compensate for unexpected increases in the rate of

inflation which may depress long term real yields.” Jd. at 1294

(footnote omitted). It may well be that during periods of un-

usually high inflation rates, interest rates will lag somewhat be-

hind the inflation rate, at least temporarily, with the result that

the interest return on a discounted lump sum award will not

fully keep pace with inflation."! But in such periods of high in-

flation, wages too will not keep pace with inflation. In the only

three years since 1947 when the rate of the annual increase in

the Consumer Price Index (CPI) exceeded 8%, the annual

rate of wage increases (non-farm weekly earnings) has been

10Although economists disagree over the validity of the assumption that

the real rate of interest is constant and consequently independent of in-

flation, cf. Fama, Interest Rates and Inflation: The Message in the En-

trails, 67 Amer. Econ. Rev. 487 (1977) (real rate constant) with Carlson,

Short-Term Interest Rates as Predicators of Inflation: A Comment, 67

Amer. Econ. Rev. 469 (1977) (real rate varies), there is substantial

opinion that during periods of stable rates of inflation, the real yield of

money, whether constant or slightly fluctuating, is approximately 2%, as

estimated in Feldman. As Sharpe has suggested, an appropriate period

for determining investor expectations of inflation and real rates of return

is 1959-1972, when actual real returns may have been fairly close to ex-

pected real returns. W. Sharpe, Investments 170 (1978). For this period

the Feldman calculation approximates 2%. Moreover, studies by econ-

omists, though taking different positions concerning the relation between

the real rate and expectations about inflation, have estimated that the

real rate of interest was between 1.5% and 3% for a similar time frame.

See, e.g., Carlson, supra, at 471 (expected real rate fluctuates around

2.5% during 1953-1975); Elliott, Measuring the Expected Real Rate of

Interest: An Exploration of Macro-economic Alternatives, 67 Amer. Econ.

Rev. 429, 440 (1977) (mean expected real rate 1.44% for 1960-1974);

Gibson, Interest Rates and Inflationary Expectations: New Evidence, 62

Amer. Econ. Rev. 854, 856 (1972) (real rate between 2% and 3% dur-

ing 1952-1970); but cf. W. Sharpe, supra, at 170 (extrapolating from

1976 study by Ibbotson & Sinquefield, average actual real rate 1.2% for

1959-1972).

11S$ee 1. Fisher, The Theory of Interest 43 (1930) (“[W]hen prices are

rising, the rate of interest tends to be high but not as high as it should

be to compensate for the rise.’’).

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Opinion of the Court of Appeals

less than the annual rate of CPI increases by at least 3 per-

centage points; in all other years since 1947, wages have in-

creased at a rate greater than the rate of increase in the CPI or

at least at a rate within 1 percentage point of the CPI per-

centage increase.'’? Thus, since there is little reason to expect

that injured plaintiffs would have received wage increases suf-

ficient to keep pace with unusually high rates of inflation, a pres-

ent value discount rate normally need not be reduced below

2% just to compensate for unusually high inflation. To do so

would ignore the basic objective of selecting a present sum of

money that will replace what the future wages would have been.

We emphasize that we are not requiring the use of an ad-

justed discount rate, nor specifying that when such a rate is

used, it must be set at 2%. Litigants are free to account for in-

flation in other ways, or, if they use the adjusted discount rate

approach, to offer evidence of a rate more appropriate than 2%.

But in the hope that disputes about the appropriate rate may be

minimized, we simply suggest the 2% rate as one that would

normally be fair for the parties to agree upon, and we authorize

district judges to use such a rate if the parties elect not to offer

any evidence on the subject of either inflation or present value

discount.

Obviously in this case the District J udge could not have been

expected to anticipate this opinion. Nevertheless, his calcula-

tion of an award for lost future wages must be reconsidered for

two reasons. First, if we assume, as the plaintiff urges, that a

12For 1974, the annual rate of increase in the CPI was 10.97%, and

the annual rate of increase in weekly non-farm wages was 6.44%.

For 1975, the comparable figures were 9.14% and 5.67%; for 1979,

11.26% and 7.66%. These earnings figures and the summary for the

years since 1974, expressed in the text, are derived from figures reported

in Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Employment and

Earnings, United States, 1909-78 3 (1979) (for years 1947-1976) and

Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Employment and Earn-

ings Supplement Revised Establishment Data 1-2 (Augusi 1980) (for

years 1977-1979). Price figures are derived from figures reported in

1980 Economic Report of the President 159 (1980).

18a

Opinion of the Court of Appeals

1% discount rate was used, there is nothing in the evidence to

support a reduction of the discount rate from prevailing interest

rates all the way down to 1%. As indicated, the lowest discount

rate we are willing to approve, in the absence of historical date

justifying a different rate, is 2%. Second, the District Court to

some extent gave duplicate consideration to the impact of in-

flation. In estimating what Doca’s future wages would have been,

the Court took into account a post-trial wage increase of 80¢

an hour, specified in Doca’s union contract to take effect on Oc-

tober 1, 1979. Having based future lost wages on this cost of

living increase, the Court then further reflected the impact of

inflation by reducing the discount rate to 1%. When a discount

rate is adjusted to reflect inflation, it must be applied to a stream

of earnings calculated without regard to inflation, even to a cost

of living increase already scheduled to occur. The certainty of

such an increase does not lessen the fact that it reflects infla-

tion, which is already accounted for by the reduced discount

rate.

We therefore vacate the damage award and remand to the

District Court for recomputation of the award for lost future

wages in accordance with this opinion. In all other respects the

judgment is affirmed.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.

19a

APPENDIX B

Opinion of the District Court

Jack A. Doca and FANNIE C. Doca, Plaintiffs,

v.

MARINA MERCANTE NICARAGUENSE S.A.

and PITTSTON STEVEDORING CorpP., Defendants.

No. 75 Civ. 5312 (KTD).

United States District Court, S. D. New York.

July 11, 1979.

OPINION

KEVIN THOMAS DUFFY, District Judge:

The plaintiff, Jack A. Doca, sues the defendants Marina Mer-

cante Nicaraguense, S.A. [hereinafter referred to as “Marina” ]

and Pittston Stevedoring Corporation [hereinafter referred to as

“Pittston”] for personal injuries sustained by him on the M/V

Costa Rica on July 23, 1975. Plaintiff Fannie C. Doca, Jack

Doca’s wife, sues both defendants for loss of consortium and Ma-

rina and Pittston have cross-claimed against each other. This

case was originally brought as a diversity action and a jury im-

panelled, but at the close of the plaintiff's case, upon motion of

defendant Marina, the jury was discharged and the matter trans-

ferred to the admiralty jurisdiction of the court.

FACTS

Jack Doca was employed as a longshoreman until a serious

accident at work in 1950 left him temporarily paralyzed. Doca

remained hospitalized after that accident for nearly two years,

finally overcoming his paralysis and returning home. Shortly

after being released from the hospital, Doca fathered his first

child and in 1957 a second child was born to the Docas.

20a

Opinion of the District Court

In 1962 Jack Doca obtained employment with Hamilton Ter-

minal Company as a cargo checker, work considerably less stren-

uous than his previous position as a long-shoreman. Although

a checker’s job does not normally require him to leave the docks,

Doca was sent aboard the M/V Costa Rica at about 2:00 p.m.

on the afternoon of July 23, 1975 to determine if a particular

load of cargo belonged on the ship. At the time, cargo from the

dock was being loaded into the ship’s #1, #2 and #4 hatches

by Pittston employees.

Doca boarded the Costa Rica at the gangway between the

ship’s #2 and #3 hatches and proceeded to hatch #2. After be-

ing told by the hatch boss that the cargo did not belong in

hatch #2, Doca went along the offshore side of hatch #3 toward

the ship’s #4 hatch. As Doca approached hatch #4 he found

the passageway between the hatch coaming and the ship’s outer

railing blocked with refuse from the stevedoring operations. Ac-

cording to Doca, pipe, planks of wood and various piles of gar-

bage laid along the ship’s outer railing with dunnage paper cov-

ering the rest of the deck up to the hatch coaming.

Doca’s testimony as to the condition of the passageway was

supported by photographs of the area and the testimony of eye-

witnesses Edward Kozak, ship foreman for Pittston, and George

Stafford, gangway man on the Costa Rica on the day of the ac-

cident. Kozak and Stafford, whom I found to be highly credible

witnesses, also testified that the debris had been in the passage-

way when they reported to work on the morning of the 23rd.

Although Kozak stated that he had informed both the ship’s

duty officer and Pittston’s supervisor of the debris at about 9:30

that morning, he and Stafford agreed that no cleaning of the

passageway was undertaken prior to Doca’s arrival.

The accident of which Doca complains occurred as he at-

tempted to cross through the obstructed passageway. According

to his testimony at trial, Doca started to walk where it appeared °

that only dunnage paper covered the deck. As he did so, he

21a

Opinion of the District Court

stepped on an object underneath the paper, causing his ankle

to give way and him to fall and strike his head against the hatch

coaming.

Stafford, who was an eyewitness to the accident, quickly ran

to Doca and found him lying on the deck in a dazed condition.

Stafford, along with a number of Pittston employees who also

came to Doca’s aid, cleared the paper away from around Doca

and found his foot resting on the deck next to a turnbuckle which

held the pipe against the ship’s outer railing. After being shown

the turnbuckle, the apparent object on which he had stepped,

Doca was assisted off the ship to receive medical attention.

LIABILITY OF THE SHIPOWNER

This action is brought pursuant to the Longshoreman’s and

Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, [hereinafter referred to as

“I HWCA”], as amended. 33 U.S.C. 901, et seq. It is generally

accepted that the 1972 amendments to the Act were intended

to establish land based principles of negligence as the standard

of care for vessels boarded by dock workers. See, e.g., Napoli

v. Transpacific Carriers Corp., 536 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1976).

Accordingly, it has been held that, analogous to the respon-

sibilities of a landowner, a shipowner owes to business invitees,

such as Doca, the duty to provide a reasonably safe place to work

and consequently must exercise reasonable care to correct non-

obvious unsafe conditions of which he has actual or construc-

tive notice. Canizzo v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d 682 (2d

Cir. 1978); see Restatement (Second of Torts) $343. Liability

has been imposed even with respect to open and obvious haz-

ards of which the shipowner has knowledge where the hazard

was of such character as to be unavoidably dangerous. Napoli,

supra; see Restatement (Second) of Torts §343A.

The decisions in this Circuit, however, have been markedly

inconsistent with respect to the shipowner’s responsibility for

unsafe conditions in areas of the ship taken over by stevedoring

22a

Opinion of the District Court

operations. One line of cases holds that the concept of a ship-

owner’s non-delegable duty to provide a safe place to work, akin

to the seaworthiness doctrine, was abolished by the 1972

LHWCA Amendments and that the shipowner need not super-

vise the stevedore’s operations and may rely upon the stevedore

to eliminate hazards of which it has notice. See Napoli, supra;

Cox v. Elota Mercante Grancolombiana, 577 F.2d 798 (2d Cir.

1978); Cannizzo, supra, dissenting opinion of J. Friendly; Lu-

brano v. Royal Netherlands S.S. Company, 572 F.2d 364 (2d

Cir. 1978), dissenting opinion of J. Moore. Opposed to these

are decisions suggesting that a shipowner’s failure to correct

an unsafe condition of which it has knowledge is negligent re-

gardless of whether the condition was in a workplace under the

stevedore’s primary control. Lopez v. A/S D/S Svendborg, 581

F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1978); Canizzo, supra. Fortunately, I need

not in this case attempt to resolve the uncertainties in Circuit

law since I believe that Marina was negligent under either for-

mulation of the shipowner’s standard of care.

As stated above, there was credible testimony that the ship’s

crew had been notified of the debris around hatch # 4. While

the crew may not have had actual knowledge of the turnbuckle

that lay underneath the scrap dunnage paper, they are certainly

chargeable with such knowledge given that the passage had been

obstructed for at least a day prior to Doca’s accident.

Since Marina must be regarded as having been aware of the

concealed turnbuckle, its failure to eliminate the hazard was

negligent, even under the most generous interpretation of the

law, unless it was entitled to assume that Pittston would remove

the debris. Not surprisingly, Marina argues that such an assump-

tion on its part was fully justified. In support of its position,

Marina points to the testimony of Pittston’s foreman Kozak,

which I found to be credible, that Pittston had actual notice of

the dangerous condition and that at least some Pittston employees

were working on the top of the deck around hatch #4. Marina

contends that these facts make plain that Pittston had a legal

23a

Opinion of the District Court

duty to remove the debris, in accordance with Occupational

Safety and Health Administration [hereinafter referred to as

“OSHA”] regulations requiring stevedores to keep working areas

“reasonably clear of lines, bridles, dunnage and all other trip-

ping or stumbling hazards.” 29 C.F.R. 1918.91(a).

Marina’s presentation of the facts and applicable law is cru-

cially incomplete, however, for it disregards the evidence of an

agreement between Pittston and Marina concerning removal of

refuse produced by stevedoring operations. Kozak’s testimony,

which was supported by past bills from Pittston to Marina, was

that Pittston would not remove stevedoring debris unless sep-

arately paid for the service, and that otherwise the job fell to

the ship’s crew. Since there was no evidence at trial that Pitt-

ston had contracted to clean on the day Doca was injured, Ma-

rina was iself obligated to remove the debris. Its argument that

it justifiably relied on Pittston to clear the obstructed passage-

way is consequently without merit.

LIABILITY OF STEVEDORE

While I have concluded that Marina was responsible for clear-

ing the offshore passageway along the ship’s #4 hatch, I believe

the evidence establishes that Pittston was concurrently negli-

gent for allowing the passageway to remain obstructed. As noted

above, Pittston received notice of the debris early in the morn-

ing on the day of the accident and there were Pittston employees

working in the general vicinity of the obstructed passageway up

to the time of Doca’s accident. By failing to clear the passage-

way, Pittston plainly violated the OSHA regulations, referred to

above, that require stevedores to keep work areas free of stum-

bling hazards.

Although Pittston’s contract with Marina assigned responsi-

bility for clearing the debris around hatch #4 to Marina, Pitt-

ston could not by contract avoid the duties placed upon it by

OSHA regulations. This is especially true in light of the evi-

i

24a

Opinion of the District Court

dence that Pittston allowed the passageway to remain obstructed

for the better part of a day and had reason to know that Marina

was delinquent in executing its responsibilities.

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

Marina has presented as an affirmative defense the claim that

Doca was contributorily negligent for attempting to cross

through the debris instead of altering his path to hatch #4. The

only alternative course available to Doca, however, was along

the inshore side of hatch #3 and, #4. Although testimony at trial

indicated that the inshore passageway was unobstructed, it was

also established that routine safety procedures required use of

the offshore passageway when inshore loading of cargo was un-

derway. Cargo hoisted off of the dock over and into the ship’s

hatches would present an obvious threat to persons walking un-

derneath. Since the evidence established that the Costa Rica’s

hatch #’s 1, 2 and 4 were loading inshore at the time of Doca’s

accident, the inshore passageway did not, in fact, present Doca

with a reasonable alternative course.

Marina also claims that Doca was contributorily negligent for

having attempted to cross through the debris without first clear-

ing aside the dunnage paper so that he could see the deck. Such

a procedure by Doca would, of course, have been safer, but

Doca was required to exercise only reasonable and not the ut-

most care. Given that the true nature of the hazard posed by the

debris was concealed, Doca’s failure to stop and move aside the

dunnage paper was*not, under all the circumstances, negligent.

CROSS-CLAIMS

Since I have determined that Pittston and Marina were con-

currently negligent and will allocate damages according to their

proportionate degree of fault, the only issue remaining with re-

spect to defendants’ cross-claims is whether Marina is entitled to

25a

Opinion of the District Court

indemnity from Pittston for an alleged breach of Pittston’s war-

ranty of workmanlike performance. A shipowner’s right to such

indemnity was first recognized in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-

Atlantic Steamship Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 76 S.Ct. 232, 100

L.Ed. 133 (1956), where the Supreme Court held that a steve-

dore’s contract with the shipowner contains an implied war-

ranty of workmanlike performance, breach of which entitles the

shipowner to recover for any losses caused thereby. Pointing to

the OSHA regulations which, as I have found, Pittston failed

to observe, Marina argues that Pittston breached its warranty

and must indemnify Marina for the full amount of Marina’s lia-

bility to Doca as well as the cost of its defense.

An initial question with respect to Marina’s claim concerns

the 1972 LHWCA Amendments’ elimination of the shipowner’s

right to indemnity as against a stevedore-employer. 33 U.S.C.

§905(b). Although Pittston is not covered by the literal terms

of the statute since it did not employ Doca, it is not at all clear

that Ryan type indemnity survives even where the stevedore is

not the injured party’s employer. Certainly there is reason to

believe that Congress did not intend that the deliberate alloca-

tion of financial responsibilities established by the 1972 Amend-

ments should be contingent upon such fortuities as the identity

of the plaintiff's employer. Moreover, decisions in this Circuit

have suggested that the shipowner’s right to Ryan type indemnity

is compensation for and co-extensive with its absolute liability

for shipboard safety under the seaworthiness doctrine. See, e.g.,

Fairmount Ship. Corp. v. Chevron Internat'l Oil Co., Inc., 511

F.2d 1252 (2d Cir. 1975). Since the LHWCA Amendments

eliminated the shipowner’s seaworthiness obligation to harbor

workers, the practical justification for Ryar indemnity in this

case is open to question.

I need not, however, resolve this question of law, since I find

that Pittston did not breach its warranty of workmanlike per-

formance and that Marina was in any event barred from re-

covery by its own negligence. As discussed above, Pittston and

26a

Opinion of the District Court

Marina determined between themselves the responsibility for

clearing refuse from stevedoring operations. Since Pittston was

not, under their agreement, required to remove the debris that

caused Doca’s accident, its failure to do so did not violate any

provision, implied or otherwise, of its contract with Marina.

The fact that Pittston’s performance was not in accordance with

OSHA regulations, while sufficient to support a finding that Pitt-

ston was negligent, does not establish Pittston’s breach of an

obligation that is contractual in nature.

Even if it could be said that Pittston did not comply with its

warranty of workmanlike performance, I believe that Marina’s

own negligence would preclude its recovery of indemnity. While

the cases evidence some uncertainty, compare Hurdich v. East-

mount Shipping Corp., 503 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1974) with Ro-

driguez v. Olaf Pedersen’s Rederi A/S, 527 F.2d 1282 (2d Cir.

1975), the law in this Circuit appears to be that recovery of

indemnity is barred where the shipowner and stevedore are con-

currently negligent and the shipowner was “the party ‘best sit-

uated to adopt preventive measures.’ ” Lopez v. Oldendorf, 545

F.2d 836, 839 (2d Cir. 1976). The determination of which

party was in the better position to prevent a hazardous condi-

tion is a factual question, Hurdich, supra at 401, and in this case

I think it is clear that Marina had the better opportunity to re-

move the debris from around hatch #4, At the time of Doca’s

accident and for several hours before it, the bulk of Pittston’s

employees were working in the ship’s hold, well removed from

the obstructed passageway. The Marina’s crew was well accus-

tomed to removing refuse while stevedoring operations were un-

derway, and indeed were contractually obligated to do so on

this occasion. In light of these facts, Marina’s claim for indem-

nity is defeated by its own negligence.

THE CLAIM FOR LOSS OF CONSORTIUM

Marina has argued that Mrs. Doca’s claim for damages must

be denied because general maritime law does not recognize an

27a

Opinion of the District Court

action for loss of consortium on behalf of the wife of an injured

maritime worker. As Marina has pointed out, the Second Cir-

cuit, in [gneri v. Cie. de Transports Oceaniques, 323 F.2d 257,

cert. denied, 376 U.S. 949, 84 S.Ct. 965, 11 L.Ed.2d 969

(1963), held that compensation for loss of consortium was not

available to wives of maritime workers. Although a decision on

point by the Court of Appeals for this Circuit would ordinarily

be dispositive of the issue, I must conclude, essentially for the

reasons ably stated in Judge Lasker’s opinion in Giglio v. Farrell

Lines, Inc., 424 F.Supp. 927 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), that Igneri can

no longer be regarded as controlling.

The Court in gneri reached its conclusion after an extensive

review of maritime as well as common law principles concern-

ing a wife’s right to damages for loss of consortium. As Judge

Lasker observed in Giglio, however, there have been many

changes in this area of the law since 1963. Most significantly,

the Supreme Court, in Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414

U.S. 573, 94 S.Ct. 806, 39 L.Ed.2d 9 (1974), held that the

wife of a seaman could sue for loss of society in a maritime

wrongful death action. After noting that the majority of state

wrongful death statutes recognized such a claim, the Court con-

cluded that its decision served to “shape the remedy to comport

with the humanitarian policy of the maritime law to show

‘special solicitude’ for those who are injured within its jurisdic-

tion.” Jd. at 588, 94 S.Ct. at 816.

No distinction of substance separates claims for loss of so-

ciety and loss of consortium, and although the Fifth Circuit has

held that a wife’s consortium claim will be recognized in a mari-

- time wrongful death action but not in a maritime action for

personal injuries only, Skidmore v. Grueninger, 506 F.2d 716

(1975) and Christofferson v. Halliburton Co., 534 F.2d 1147

(1976), it seems to me clearly more consistent with the rationale

of Gaudet to permit the consortium claim in either case. Accord-

ingly, Mrs. Doca is entitled to recover damages for loss of con-

sortium attributable to her husband’s accident.

28a

Opinion of the District Court

DAMAGES

Credible medical evidence at trial established that Doca suf-

fered a cerebral concussion and a cervical spine injury as a

result of his fall on the Costa Rica. Although these injuries were

unquestionably serious, it was the opinion of each of the doc-

tors who examined Doca that his present complaints, which in-

clude headaches, dizziness, pain in the shoulder and neck area,

numbness in the hands and sexual dysfunction, have no clear

neurological basis but are instead attributable to a post-traumatic

conversion reaction, a conversion of his anxiety concerning his

injuries into specific physical symptoms. It is important to note,

however, that Doca’s physical symptoms are no less real to him

for the fact that they result from a post-traumatic conversion.

Along with his physical symptoms, Doca suffers from anxiety,

depression, insomnia and loss of sexual appetite, which I find

to be directly attributable to the accident on the Costa Rica.

The combination of Doca’s physical and mental ailments will,

again according to credible medical evidence, likely prevent him

from ever working again or from engaging in most normal re-

creational activities.

The parties have stipulated that Doca’s medical and hospital

expenses as a result of the accident are $3,697.13. In the three

years prior to his accident, Doca worked an average of 47 hours

a week. Assuming that he would have continued to work at that

pace and taking into account subsequent adjustments in his wage

scale, Doca’s lost earnings from the time of the accident to the

date of trial amount to $97,792.00.

Since I find that Doca will be unable to return to productive

work, he is also entitled to recover for future loss of earnings.

Born on May 24, 1926, Doca has a work expectancy of age

65 or approximately 12 years from the date of trial. He is thus

entitled to recover $352,560, representing his future loss of

earnings considering both probability of continued inflation and

a discount to present value.

29a

Opinion of the District Court

In calculating damages for Doca’s past and future pain and

suffering, I have been mindful of his previous work accident in

1950. After years of effort, Doca overcame the paralysis that

followed that accident and rehabilitated himself to the point

where he was able again to lead a relatively normal work and

home life. Although Doca’s accident aboard the Costa Rica did

not cause injuries nearly as severe as those he suffered in 1950,

its impact on his spirit and state of mind was understandably

similar since it left him once again disable and effectively can-

celled out the great effort of his earlier rehabilitation. The med-

ical evidence at trial indicated that prospects for improvement

in either Doca’s mental or physical condition are doubtful, and

that he faces the likelihood of substantial physical and mental

pain for the rest of his life. Taking all of these factors into ac-

count, I find that Doca is entitled to $200,000 as compensation

for his pain and suffering, both past and future.

The final item of damage to be determined is Mrs. Doca’s

claim for loss of consortium. I found credible Mrs. Doca’s testi-

mony that she and her husband have been unable to resume nor-

mal marital relations since his accident. There was also medical

evidence that Doca suffers from impotency and a loss of sexual

appetite as a result of the accident. In addition to the impair-

ment of their sexual relationship, the accident has also greatly

limited the Doca’s normal social activities and placed a general

strain on their life together. On the basis of these factors, I find

that Mrs. Doca is entitled to $15,000 as compensation for her

loss of consortium.

Settle judgment on seven (7) days’ notice. The judgment will

apportion damages with Marina to pay 90% thereof and Pitt-

ston to pay 10% which percentages accord with the propor-

tionate degree of fault of each.

30a

APPENDIX C

Judgment of the Court of Appeals

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

for the

SECOND CIRCUIT

®

At a stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Second Circuit, held at the United States Courthouse in the

City of New York, on the first day of October, one thousand

nine hundred and eighty.

Present:

HON. WILFRED FEINBERG,

Chief Judge

HON. JON O. NEWMAN

HON AMALYA L. KEARSE

Circuit Judges,

JACK A. DOCA and FANNIE C. DOCA,

Plaintiffs-A ppellees

V.

MARINA MERCANTE NICARAGUENSE, S.A.

and PITTSTON STEVEDORING CORP.,

Defendants-A ppellants

79-7626

79-7637

Appeal from the United States District Court for the South-

ern District of New York.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of record

from the United States District Court for the Southern District

of New York, and was argued by counsel.

3la

Judgment of the Court of Appeals

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is now hereby or-

dered, adjudged, and decreed that the judgment of said District

Court be and it hereby is affirmed in part, vacated in part and

the action be and it hereby is remanded to said district court

for further proceedings in accordance with the opinion of this

court.

A. DANIEL FUSARO

Clerk

By:

ARTHUR HELLER

Deputy Clerk

‘al

™“

32a

APPENDIX D

Order Denying Petition for Rehearing

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND CIRCUIT

®

At a Stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals, in

and for the Second Circuit, held at the United States Court House,

in the City of New York, on the seventh day of January, one

thousand nine hundred and eighty-one.

Present:

HON. WILFRED FEINBERG,

Chief Judge

HON. JON O. NEWMAN

HON AMALYA L. KEARSE

Circuit Judges,

JACK A. DOCA and FANNIE C. DOCA,

Plaintiffs-A ppellees

V.

MARINA MERCANTE NICARAGUENSE, S.A. and

PITTSTON STEVEDORING CORPORATION.

79-7626

79-7637

A petition for a rehearing having been filed herein by coun-

sel for the appellant Pittston Stevedoring Corporation.

Upon consideration thereof, it is

Ordered that said petition be and hereby is DENIED.

A. DANIEL FUSARO

Clerk

By:

‘ ROLANNE HENRY

Deputy Clerk

33a

Statutes Involved

UNITED STATES CODE, Title 33

§902 Definitions

(3) The term “employee” means any person engaged in mari-

time employment including any longshoreman or other person

engaged in longshoring operations, and any harborworker in-

cluding a ship repairman, shipbuilder, and shipbreaker, but such

term does not include a master or member of a crew of any

vessel, or any person engaged by the master to load or unload

or repair any small vessel under eighteen tons net.

(4) The term “employer” means an employer any of whose

employees are employed in maritime employment, in whole or

in part, upon the navigable waters of the United States (includ-

ing any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way,

marine railway, or other adjoining area customarily used by an

employer in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel).

UNITED STATES CODE, Title 33:

§905 Exclusiveness of Liability.

(a) The liability of an employer prescribed in Section 904

shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such em-

ployer to the employee, his legal representative, husband or wife,

parents, dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled

to recover damages from such employer at law or in admiralty

on account of such injury or death, except that if an employer

fails to secure payment of compensation as required by this Act,

an injured employee, or his legal representative in case death

results from the injury, may elect to claim compensation under

the Act, or to maintain an action at law or in admiralty for dam-

ages on account of such injury or death. In such action the de-

fendant may not plead as a defense that the injury was caused

by the negligence of a fellow servant, or that the employee as-

sumed the risk of his employment, or that the injury was due

to the contributory negligence of the employee.

34a

Statutes Involved

UNITED STATES CODE, Title 29

§652 Definitions

(5) The term “employer” means a person engaged in a busi-

siness affecting commerce who has employees, but does not in-

clude the United States or any State or political subdivision of

a State.

(6) The term “State” includes a State of the United States,

the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Amer-

ican Samoa, Guam and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Is-

lands.

UNITED STATES CODE, Title 29:

§653 ***workmen’s compensation law or common law or

statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of employers

and employees unaffected.

(b)(4) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to supersede

or in any manner affect any workmen’s compensation law or to

enlarge or diminish or affect in any other manner the common

law or statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of employers and

employees under any law with respect to injuries, diseases or

death of employees arising out of, or in the course of employ-

ment.

CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS, Title 29

§1918.91 Housekeeping

(a) Weather deck and working areas shall be kept reasonably

clear of lines, bridles, dunnage and all other loose tripping or

stumbling hazards.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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