Jurisdictional Statement — City of Parma v. Record Revolution No. 6, Inc.

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8 Q i ] & 0 v Office-Supreme Court, U.S.

rrits Dp

MAR 3 1981

In the Supreme Court of the United States.’

October Term, 1980

«=

THE CITY OF PARMA, OHIO et al. and THE

CITY OF LAKEWOOD, OHIO et al.,

Appellants,

V.

RECORD REVOLUTION, NO. 6, INC. and ALEXANDER

J. LUKA d/b/a DAYSTAR BOUTIQUE,

Appellees.

On APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES CourRT oF APPEALS

For THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

ANDREW Boyko, Counsel of Record

Law Director, City of Parma

STEPHEN P. Bonp

Assistant Law Director

Parma City Hall

6611 Ridge Road

Parma, Ohio 44129

(216) 886-2323

WILLIAM E. BLACKIE

Law Director, City of Lakewood

Lakewood City Hall

12650 Detroit Avenue

Lakewood, Ohio 44107

(216) 521-7580

Counsel for Appellants

THE GATES LEGAL PUBLISHING CO., CLEVELAND, OHIO—TEL. (216) 621-5647

QUESTIONS PRESENTED BY THE APPEAL

1. The Model Drug Paraphernalia Act, as promulgated

by the Drug Enforcement Administration of the United

States Department of Justice and adopted by appellants

herein, defines “drug paraphernalia” as all equipment,

products and materials of any kind which are used, in-

tended for use, or designed for use in connection with a

controlled substance. The first question presented is

whether the phrase “designed for use” is so vague or over-

broad as to render the definition and, hence, the entire

Model Act unconstitutional.

2. The definition portion of the Model Drug Para-

phernalia Act contains a listing of a variety of items which

may be illicit if the requisite criminal intent is also present.

The question presented is whether the terms “roach clips”

and “miniature cocaine spoons”, as contained in that listing,

are so vague as to render the definition and, hence, the

entire Model Act unconstitutional.

3. The definition portion of the Model Drug Para-

phernalia Act contains a listing of factors which, in addi-

tion to all other logicially relevant factors, should be con-

sidered in assessing whether a defendant has the requisite

criminal intent. The question presented is whether those

factors expressly stated in the listing are so overbroad as

to render the definition and, hence, the entire Model Act

unconstitutional.

4. The Model Drug Paraphernalia Act makes it un-

lawful for any person to place any advertisement, know-

ing, or under circumstances where one reasonably should

know, that the purpose of the advertisement, in whole or

in part, is to promote the sale of objects designed or in-

tended for use as drug paraphernalia. The question pre-

II

sented is whether, in view of the territorial and constitu-

tional restrictions inherent in municipal legislation gen-

erally and in these ordinances specifically, this prohibition

impermissibly violates First Amendment rights.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Three cases were consolidated for hearing in the Court

below.

Appellant in the first case was Record Revolution No.

6, Inc. Appellees were: The City of Parma, Ohio; the

Council for the City of Parma, Ohio; John Petruska

(Mayor); Andrew Boyko (Law Director); Kenneth G.

Kuczma, Victor J. Labutta, Frank J. Houdek, Jack P.

Krise, Jr., Joseph A. Molodec, Evelyn M. Kopchak, Gerald

M. Boldt, Edward Lonjak, Doris P. Krawczyk, and William

R. Obuch (Council members); Francis Szabo (Police

Chief).

Appellant in the second case was Alexander J. Luka

d/b/a Daystar Boutique. Appellees were: The City of

Lakewood, Ohio; the Council for the City of Lakewood,

Ohio; Anthony C. Sinagra (Mayor); William E. Blackie

(Law Director); Thomas O. McBride, John G. Salmon,

Edward M. Graham, John P. Gallagher, Thomas C. Brown,

William F. Chinnock, Trudy Wendling (Council members) ;

Charles Petro (Police Chief).

Appellant in the third case was The Right Place, Inc.

Appellees were: The City of North Olmsted, Ohio; the

Council for the City of North Olmsted, Ohio; Robert W.

Swietyniowski (Mayor); Michael R. Gareau (Law Direc-

tor); Donald P. Albenze (Prosecutor); Marion R. Taylor

(Police Chief). This third case is not being appealed be-

fore this Court.

III

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED BY THE APPEAL. ............ I

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING BELOW .................. II

RRR GI TTR asain ne hseciesnsnsncdncacceliegeieleeaieres Iv

UU NN a an 1

GROUNDS ON WHICH JURISDICTION ISINVOKED 2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND _ ORDI-

SORWRD GRU WUT NT iacsescndocsonecasccnnrcsnsadedioassedlociiclesien 3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE. ooun.ncccccccccccceccocscscsoscccssecesase 4

THE QUESTIONS ARE SUBSTANTIAL .................... 8

i 8 ERMAN ia adds tuo Pan Ct eo 19

APPENDIX:

Opinion of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ........ Al

Opinion and Judgment of the District Court, Rec-

ord Revolution, No. 6, Inc. vs. City of Parma,

SE en eee eg eh Tee A54

Opinion and Judgment of the District Court, Alex-

ander J. Luka d/b/a Daystar Boutique vs. City of

RATING, TI, GE Ea once escrencccescssncosnntocoosdacsccies A103

Judgment of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ......A114

Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court .................... A116

Parma Ordinance, No. 242-79 ooo. ccccceeeccecee. A119

Parma Ordinance, No. 103-80 oo... ccccccccccccceeceoeee A127

Lakewood Ordinance, No. 5-80 2.00.0... occcccccccccccceecceeee- A130

Lakewood Ordinance, No. 29-80 .o.....ooococcccccccccecccoceeee A138

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) ...... 18

Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) oo. 10, 11

Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337

I ashi rsiaieieeapes as scctriesssnoesesdidintesntntlccestumsinvianidiotococicions 17

Califano v. Yamaski, 442 U.S. 682, 99 S, Ct. 2545 (1979) 13

Cincinnati v. Rost, 92 Ohio App. 8 (1952), appeal dis-

missed 158 Ohio St. 144 oon cece ceseeccecceeeseceeeeeeees 18

City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) .... 3

City of Sedalia v, Shell Petroleum Corp., 81 F.2d 193

Ie CIEE sensi cesettssteretscctonctsinsottaneieohvooetedcaces 18

Clifford Jacobs Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 357 F.

Supp. 564 (S.D. Olio 1973) on. eeeccececccceceseceees 14

Danovitz v. United States, 281 U.S. 389 (1580). ........ 11,12

Delaware Accessories Trade Association v. Gebelein,

No. 80-285 (D.Del. Aug. 15, 1980) o........ececesecececeeeeeeeee 8, 15

Driscoll v. Edison Light & Power Co., 307 U.S. 104

Reais Waa eerste Sehr SN ela glenn aT ee ERT 14

Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) 13

Florida Businessmen for Free Enterprise v. City of

Hollywood, No. 80-6157-Civ-NCR (S.D.Fla. Aug.

OOP TRIE Sendhil clase Sesto uc epcca ahha esdicustacasiausothacss 8

Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 887 (1979) .... 17

Geiger v. City of Eagan, 618 F.2d 26 (8th Cir. 1980) ... 9

George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373

IE. = Soalcchscancceiataticoiicamnecscstcbdonctenscncnsssercniontcdbinepeailinnieds 13

Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) ...... 14

Indiana Normal v. Sendak, No. TH 75-142-C (S.D.

DN TEI neh stetieacateic nara st Te 15

Vv

Mid-Atlantic Accessories Trade Association v. Mary-

land, No. H-80-1343 (D.Md. Nov. 11, paar 8,17

Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447 (1978) ..17-18

Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Hu-

man Rights, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) 0 10, 11

Record Museum v. Lawrence Township, 481 F. Supp.

Sa q

Robinson v. United States, 324 U.S. 282 ( | 17

Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 (1975) 0 16

Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) 2. 13

Stroh Products Co. v. Davis, 8 F.2d 773 (E.D. Mich.

tei atnontenissessvchteicnnincsesaninesrinierenninmeuncane 12

The Casbah, Inc. v. Thone, No. 80-0271 (D.Neb. Sept.

ae ee 8, 14, 16

Tobacco Accessories v. Treen, Civil No. 80-3372 (E.D.

am. Oot. 38, 19080) 9

Tower Realty v. City of East Detroit, 196 F.2d 710 (6th

Cir. 1952) ...... Ssasaeierhleteelasceieeisbeadiniinaipnneneseiseniasscncnitanamanaran 13

United States v. Brunett, 53 F.2d 219 (W.D.Mo. 1931) ....12

United States v. Hamilton, 626 F.2d 348 (4th Cir. 1980) 12

United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1972) _..11

United States v. Irwin, 354 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1965),

cert. denied 383 U.S. 967 00 17

United States v. Kiffer, 477 F.2d 349 (2d Cir. 1973),

cert. denied 414 U.S. 831 2 13

United States v. National Dairy Products Corp., 372

US. 29 (1963) nnn ecceceececcecccencencseececeseeoceceoeeoeeeccc. 13

United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974),

cert. denied 419 U.S. 1105 16-17

United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1947) oo. 16

United States v. 2265 One-Gallon Paraffined Tin Cans,

260 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1958) oo 12

VI

United States Civil Service Commission v. National

Association of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973) 13

World Imports, Inc. v. Woodbridge Township, No. 80-

1414 (D.N.J. Jume 8, 1980) occ cccccccccceececceeceeee 8,9

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions

First Amendment, United States Constitution ............ 3,5, 7

Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution .... 3,5

Title 28, United States Code, Section 1254(2) .000.0000...... 3

Title 28, United States Code, Section 1331 ...................... 2

Title 28, United States Code, Section 1343(3) 00.00.0000... 2

Title 28, United States Code, Section 2201 ..................... 2

Title 28, United States Code, Section 2202 ...................... 2

Lakewood Ordinance, No. 5-80 20..0....c.ccececesececccceceseceseeeees 2,3

Lakewood Ordinance, No. 29-80 .0..0.0....-.-ccccccecceceseoceeeeceoeen 3

Parma Ordinance, No. 242-79 .o.0...........cececccsssosccscoseccosesesee 2,3

Parma Ordinance, No, 103-80 o....0.oo.ococcccccceccecceceeeseeeeeceeee 3

Other Authorities

McQuILLIN, 5 MunicrpaL Corporations (3d Ed. Rev.)

etal toribasincsosasenoniiccsdsvucescenveeresicreocenceceseece. 18

Model Drug Paraphernalia Act by the Drug Enforce-

ment Administration of the United States Depart-

Neen acces inssscensanssneavensinncosnocet passim

Rule 10.6, Rules of the Supreme Court of the United

sect tesc etn snctecsecectnssoecooveeveracovecesnsvceerees. 1

WEBSTER’S NEw TWENTIETH CENTURY DicTIONARY (2d

scenes. sanpccncecoveveceseoseceuceconsaseree 15

October Term, 1980

THE CITY OF PARMA, OHIO et al. and THE

CITY OF LAKEWOOD, OHIO et al.,

Appellants,

V.

RECORD REVOLUTION, NO. 6, INC. and ALEXANDER

J. LUKA d/b/a DAYSTAR BOUTIQUE,

Appellees.

On APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES CourT oF APPEALS

For THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

These appeals are prosecuted by the City of Parma,

Ohio and the City of Lakewood, Ohio, and their respective

officials, from final judgments of the United States Court

of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, reversing judgments en-

tered in their favor by the United States District Court for

the Northern District of Ohio. As the two cases involve

identical questions and were consolidated by the Court of

Appeals, a single jurisdictional statement is submitted in

accordance with Rule 10.6 of this Court.

THE OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Sixth Circuit has not been officially reported but ap-

pears in the Appendix, p. Al.

2

The opinion of the United States District Court, North-

ern District of Ohio, for ihe City of Parma case, is of-

ficially reported at 492 F. Supp. 1157 (1980), and further

appears in the Appendix, p. A54. The District Court opin-

ion for the City of Lakewood case has not been officially

reported but appears in the Appendix, p. A103.

GROUNDS ON WHICH JURISDICTION

IS INVOKED

On January 7, 1980, the City Council of Parma, Ohio

enacted its Ordinance No. 242-79; on January 21, 1980, the

City Council of Lakewood, Ohio enacted its Ordinance

5-80. As subsequently amended, the two ordinances are

the same in almost all respects; and both are virtually

identical to the Model Drug Paraphernalia Act drafted

by the Drug Enforcement Administration of the United

States Department of Justice.

The initial action was filed in the District Court for

the Northern District of Ohio by Record Revolution, No.

6, Inc., against Parma and its officials, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1331, 1343(3), 2201, and 2202; it challenged the con-

stitutionality and sought declaratory and injunctive relief

against enforcement of the Parma Ordinance. Following a

hearing on the request for permanent injunction, the

District Court concluded that Parma Ordinance 242-79 is

constitutional as construed by that Court; and it entered

final judgment for the defendants.

Thereafter, a second action was brought by Alexander

J. Luka, before the same court, against Lakewood and its

officials, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(3), 2201, and

2202; he also challenged the constitutionality and sought

declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of

3

the Lakewood ordinance. On the basis of the Court’s prior

decision in the Parma case, the District Court entered final

judgment for the defendants.

An appeal was taken in both cases to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; and the two cases

were consolidated, together with a third case not presently

before this Court. The Appeals Court reversed the District

Court in a judgment entered December 8, 1980. A notice

of appeal to this Court was filed on February 4, 1980, in the

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1254(2). See City of New Orleans v. Dukes,

427 U.S. 297 (1976).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND

ORDINANCES INVOLVED

First Amendment, United States Constitution:

Congress shall make no law .. . abridging the freedom

of speech ....

Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution:

Section 1. * * * No State shall make or enforce any

law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of

citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive

any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process

of law....

Parma Ordinances 242-79 and 103-80 and Lakewood

Ordinances 5-80 and 29-80 are set forth consecutively in the

Appendix, beginning at p. A119.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In the fall of 1979, the Drug Enforcement Administra-

tion of the United States Department of Justice, at the

request of the President, drafted a “Model Drug Para-

phernalia Act” (Model Act) as a proposal for states and

municipalities across the country to adopt in coping with

the paraphernalia problem. The Cities of Parma and

Lakewood, Ohio were among the first in the country to

do so.

The Model Act can best be understood when viewed

in four essential parts. First, there is a definition which

provides that “ ‘drug paraphernalia’ means all equipment,

products and materials of any kind which are used, in-

tended for use, or designed for use” in connection with a

controlled substance. Second, as a part of the definition,

there is a list of many common forms of property that

can be paraphernalia if ‘used, intended for use, or de-

signed for use” to violate drug laws. Third, as a part of

the definition, the Act sets out several relevant factors

to be considered in determining whether the necessary

criminal intent is present, so as to constitute an object

as illicit paraphernalia. Finally, there are substantive of-

fenses, essentially prohibiting the possession, manufacture,

or delivery of paraphernalia. In the case of manufacture

or delivery, it is specifically provided that no person do

so knowing, or under circumstances where one reasonably

should know, that the paraphernalia will be used in connec-

tion with a controlled substance. It is further made un-

lawful for any person to place any advertisement knowing,

or under circumstances where one reasonably should

know, that the purpose of the advertisement, in whole or

in part, is to promote the sale of objects designed or in-

tended for use as drug paraphernalia.

5

The Parma Ordinance was the first to be challenged,

by a broad complaint alleging, inter alia, that the Ordi-

nance is vague and overbroad under the Due Process Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment and that the edvertising

prohibition is violative of the First Amendment. Unre-

butted testimony at the hearing for permanent injunction

was that a law such as the Parma Ordinance would assist

in law enforcement efforts against drug abuse. Extensive

testimony was elicited by plaintiff as to how various wit-

nesses would interpret or apply the Ordinance; however,

this evidence was rejected by both the trial court, 492

F. Supp., at 1168, and the appeals court, Slip Op., at 22,

n.15, on the theory that the Ordinance speaks for itself.

The evidence did not disclose any specific design char-

acteristic which could consistently be attributed to any

particular type of drug paraphernalia.

The trial court construed each of the three elements

of the definition, “used, intended for use, or designed for

use,” as implying and requiring a general criminal intent

on the part of a defendant. 492 F. Supp., at 1169. This

criminal intent is what separates the innocuous object

from the illicit paraphernalia. 492 F. Supp., at 1166. And,

since each of the substantive offenses relies on the term

“drug paraphernalia,” that criminal intent is also made

an element of the mental state required to convict under

any offense. 492 F. Supp., at 1167. In particular, the

trial court held that an item is designed for use with

drugs if the defendant intentionally designed or adapted

the item for use with drugs. 492 F. Supp., at 1170, n.5.

With regard to the list of items which may be para-

phernalia, the trial court held that none of the items is

per se drug paraphernalia; rather each item becomes para-

phernalia only if the requisite intent is present. There

was no iinding of vagueness since all the terms listed in

“subpart L” are generic examples of what commonly are

used with controlled substances but are not illicit unless

6

criminal intent is shown beyond a reasonable doubt. 492

F. Supp., at 1170-1, n.6.

In the case of the indicia of criminal intent, the trial

court held all but one to be valid, to the extent applicable

rules of evidence would permit their use. The sole factor

which he held to be vague he ordered severed from the

Ordinance.

As for the substantive offenses, the trial court held

that the combined requirements that the City prove both

a general criminal intent, by virtue of the definition, and

actual knowledge by the seller of the ultimate use of an

object he distributes save the Ordinance from claims of

vagueness. In doing so, however, he ordered that the

“reasonably should know” standard be stricken from the

substantive offenses. 492 F. Supp., at 1175, 1173.

Finally, with regard to the prohibition on advertising,

the trial court held that the speech which the Ordinance

restricts is not constitutionally protected, and further held

that the territorial limitations inherent in the City’s au-

thority compelled a restrictive view of the intended scope

of the Ordinance. Therefore, this restriction was not over-

broad. 49 F. Supp., at 1178-9.

In sum, the trial court held that, subject to its inter-

pretation and the severance of the two provisions noted,

the Parma Ordinance was constitutional. Subsequently,

the City of Lakewood amended its Ordinance to reflect the

deletions ordered by the court. Parma also deleted the

single indicator of intent and the “reasonably should

know” standard from one substantive offense; that stan-

dard was not deleted from the advertising prohibition.*

In all other respects, the Ordinances are now the same.

*Parma did not contest the trial court’s ruling in this regard

and does not do so before this Court. For purposes of this case.

appellants concede the vagueness of the “reasonably should

know” standard in the Parma Ordinance.

7

Following the decision in the Parma case, a second

action was brought against enforcement of the Lakewood

law, making the same allegations of unconstitutionality.

No evidentiary hearing was held. The trial court also

entered judgment in favor of Lakewood, based on its opin-

ion in the Parma case.

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for

the Sixth Circuit, the cases were consolidated and ex-

pedited. The District Court decisions were reversed and

the case vas remanded for issuance of a permanent in-

junction against enforcement of the Ordinances.

The Sixth Circuit first held that the terms “used”

and “intended for use” were not vague or overbroad;

however, focusing on the term “designed for use”, the

Court held that it referred, not to subjective intent, but

to objective design characteristics. Since no such design

characteristics were demonstrated at the trial level, this

phrase was deemed vague and overbroad. Slip Opinion,

at 26-7.

In dealing with the list of items which are common

forms of drug paraphernalia, the Appeals Court agreed

that the listing does not make the items per se parapher-

nalia; nevertheless, it held the terms “roach clips” and

“miniature cocaine spoons” to be vague. Slip Op., 30.

With reference to the listing of logical’y relevant

factors for determining what items are drug paraphernalia,

the Court held that several factors listed create the pos-

sibility of convicting on the basis of guilt by association,

and thus implied that they were unconstitutionally over-

broad. Slip Op., 32.

Finally, with regard to the advertising restriction, the

Court rejected the limitations inferred by the trial court

and, therefore, held that the Ordinance unconstitutionally

violates the First Amendment. Slip Op., at 38-9.

THE QUESTIONS ARE SUBSTANTIAL

The manufacture and merchandising of drug para-

phernalia has become a multi-million dollar industry in

this country which facilitates and glamorizes the use of

controlled substances, most often preying on the drug

fantasies of our nation’s youth. Previous attempts by

state and local authorities to control this problem through

legislation were, in large part, unsuccessful when chal-

enged on grounds of vagueness, overbreadth or a variety of

other ingenious allegations. The Model Drug Parapher-

nalia Act, as drafted by the Drug Enforcement Administra-

tion of the United States Department of Justice, was pain-

stakingly worded to deal with this problem while still care-

fully providing for the constitutional rights of parapher-

nalia devotees.

At the time of the District Court’s opinions in the cases

before this Court, there were no other authoritative court

opinions considering the Model Act’s constitutionality.

However, on the strength of the trial court’s well-reasoned

interpretation, at least ten states and untold municipal

legislatures have proceeded to adopt the Model Act. To

date, at least six United States District Judges have held

the Model Act to be constitutional. Four decisions have

held the Model Act constitutional in its entirety. Mid-

Atlantic Accessories Trade Association v. Maryland, No.

H-80-1343 (D.Md. Nov. 11, 1980); Florida Businessmen for

Free Enterprise v. City of Hollywood, No. 80-6157-Civ-

NCR (S.D.Fla. Aug. 29, 1980); Delaware Accessories Trade

Assoc. v. Gebelein, No. 80-285 (D.Del. Aug. 15, 1980);

World Imports, Inc. v. Woodbridge Township, No. 80-1414

(D.N.J. June 8, 1980). The court in The Casbah, Inc. v.

Thone, No. 80-0271 (D.Neb. Sept. 26, 1980), agreed with

the court in the case at bar in holding the Act constitutional

9

with the same two deletions. And, in Tobacco Accesso~ies

v. Treen, Civil No. 80-3372 (E.D.La. Oct. 28, 1980), a Loui-

siana statute based on the Model Act was upheld.

The same district judge decided Record Museum v.

Lawrence Township, 481 F. Supp. 768 (D.N.J. 1979) and

World Imports, Inc., supra. Yet, in the former case, deal-

ing with a locally-created law, the ordinance was held

unconstitutional; in the latter, the Model Act was upheld.

And, in Geiger v. City of Eagan, 618 F.2d 26 (8th Cir.

1980), dealing with a non-Model Act law, the Model Act

was cited as an example of a properly drawn ordinance.

618 F.2d, at 28, n.4.

In sum, to date every court in the country which has

considered the Model Act has followed the reasoning of

the district court below—except the Sixth Circuit Court

of Appeals.

Moreover, testimony presented in the trial court, and

the judgment of legislators across the country, was that

this Model Act would aid in the fight against the epidemic

problem of drug abuse. Yet, enforcement of that Act is

enjoined in Parma and Lakewood, and held in abeyance in

countless other jurisdictions, on the basis of one uncor-

roborated decision.

Furthermore, appellants are informed that the Model

Act is presently being considered by the Courts of Ap-

peals for the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits.

In view of the unanimity of the district court decisions, the

likelihood of a conflict arising among the Circuits would

seem great. Certainly this is a situation which cries out

for clarification by this Court, as the final arbiter among

the Circuits; and appellants should not be penalized simply

because they cannot presently point to the specific: Circuit

decision which will ultimately create the conflict with

the Sixth Circuit.

10

Clearly then, this case is of such importance as to

warrant plenary consideration by this Court.

But, in addition to the case’s significance in present-

ing this Court with the opportunity to rule upon the Model

Act, the individual issues are substantial and important

in their own right and warrant this Court’s consideration

in full.

First, in Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), this

Court stated, at 825, 828:

We need not decide in this case the precise ex-

tent to which the First Amendment permits regula-

tion of advertising that is related to activities the

State may legitimately regulate or even prohibit.

* * * * *

No claim has been made, nor could any be sup-

ported on this record, that the advertisement .. . re-

lated to a commodity or service that was then illegal

in either Virginia or New York, or that it otherwise

furthered a criminal scheme in Virginia."

* * * * *

14. We are not required to decide here what the First

Amendment consequences would be if the Virginia advertise-

ment promoted an activity in New York which was then

illegal in New York. An example would be an advertise-

ment announcing the availability of narcotics in New York

City when the possession and sale of narcotics was pro-

scribed in the State of New York.

This case squarely presents to the Court for review these

questions, left unanswered in Bigelow. The decision in

Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human

Rights, 413 U.S. 376 (1973), established the principle that

advertising to promote illegal acts does not constitute pro-

tected speech. ‘We have no doubt that a newspaper con-

stitutionally could be forbidden to publish a want ad pro-

posing a sale of narcotics or soliciting prostitutes.” 413

11

U.S., at 388. And see, e.g., United States v. Hunter, 459

F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1972). That principle formed the basis

for the decision of all the courts which have upheld the

Model Act’s prohibition on placing an advertisement to

promote the sale of paraphernalia.

And, using the Virginia-New York analogy of the

Court, this case does present the situation in which the

activity promoted is illegal in Virginia (Parma) and may

well be illegal in New York (Lakewood, for example).

In other words, if the Court of Appeals was correct in re-

fusing to adopt the limiting construction of the Ordinances

urged by both the Cities and the district court, then this

Court is plainly faced with the questions left open in

Bigelow as to how far jurisdictions may go in legislating

against advertising which promotes illegal acts, as they

are entitled to do under this Court’s teachings in Pittsburgh

Press.

The Sixth Circuit’s interpretation that the phrase ‘‘de-

signed for use” necessarily refers to design characteristics

which can objectively be discerned also raises a substantial

question. Specifically, that interpretation directly contra-

venes the decision of this Court in Danovitz v. United

States, 281 U.S. 389 (1930). Danovitz was a forfeiture

action under the National Prohibition Act for items de-

signed for the manufacture of contraband liquors. In up-

holding the forfeiture, this Court refused to divorce the

product from the intent of the purveyor.

... [I]f the empty containers and other objects seized

were offered for sale in such a mode as purposely

to attract purchasers who wanted them for unlawful

manufacture, as we interpret the word, they were

designed for that manufacture and could be seized.

281 U.S., at 397.

12

An entire line of cases from the Prohibition era relied

on that interpretation by this Court. See United States

v. 2265 One-Gallon Paraffined Tin Cans, 260 F.2d 105,

108-9 (5th Cir. 1958), and cases cited therein. Consistently,

the terms “intended” and “designed” have been used in

tandem to refer to the purpose of the vendor accused.

See, e.g., United States v. Brunett, 53 F.2d 219, 231 (W.D.

Mo. 1931). And the rationale behind that interpretation

has been very simply explained:

It seems to me that whatever difference there may

be in the meaning of the words “designed” and “in-

tended” is fully explained by the multiplicity of sub-

jects which the two adjectives serve; it being more

natural to say that a still is designed for the manu-

facture of unlawful liquor, and that a preparation

or compound is intended for use in the manufacture

of unlawful liquor. Stroh Products Co. v. Davis, 8

F.2d 773, 777 (E.D.Mich. 1925).

Moreover, in refusing to apply this common sense

approach, the Sixth Circuit not only challenges Danovitz,

and the Prohibition cases which followed it, but also raises

doubts about the meaning of “designed” and similar terms

as used in other contexts. For example, United States

v. Hamilton, 626 F.2d 348 (4th Cir. 1980), concerned

whether a broom handle may be a weapon or thing de-

signed to kill or injure. The court rejected the dissenting

judge’s argument that “designed” refers to objective stan-

dards and instead relied on the intent with which the

item is used, by the individual being charged.

Thus, both for its rejection of Danovitz and the ques-

tions it raises about the use of the term in other contexts,

the lower court’s construction of “designed for use” war-

rants a more complete examination by this Court.

13

Finally, the Sixth Circuit disregarded accepted rules

of construction in interpreting the Ordinances, unneces-

sarily striking them down and creating a serious problem

for any state or local government which legislates on a

matter which may be tested in court.

This Court has consistently sought an interpretation

which supports the constitutionality of legislation before

it. United States v. National Dairy Products Corp., 372

U.S. 29, 32 (1963); Califano v. Yamaski, 442 U.S. 682,

99 S. Ct. 2545, 2553 (1979); George Moore Ice Cream

Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 379 (1933). Only where there

is no constitutional construction available can the legisla-

tion be found unlawful. Screws v. United States, 325

U.S. 91, 100 (1945).

In addition, this Court has recognized that there are

limitations in the English language inherent in all legisla-

tion, which must be taken into account in testing the

constitutionality of a law. United States Civil Service

Commission v. National Association of Letter Carriers, 413

U.S. 548, 578-9 (1973). Thus, a court presumes that the

legislative body acted constitutionally, United States v.

Kiffer, 477 F.2d 349, 352 (2d Cir. 1973); and, therefore,

reasonable interpretations which support the constitu-

tionality of an ordinance are to be indulged. Tower Realty

v. City of East Detroit, 196 F.2d 710, 718 (6th Cir. 1952).

The Sixth Circuit disregarded these principles, draw-

ing a distinction between interpreting federal and state

legislation. “Our reasoning and decision in this case is

shaped by our lack of power to put a limiting construction

on the municipal ordinances.” Slip Opinion, at 19. But

that distinction is not supported by prior federal case

law. As this Court plainly stated in Erznoznik v. City

of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216 (1975):

14

[W]hen considering a facial challenge it is necessary

to proceed with caution and restraint, as invalidation

may result in unnecessary interference with a state

regulatory program. In accommodating these com-

peting interests the Court has held that a state stat-

ute should not be deemed facially invalid unless it

is not readily subject to a narrowing construction. ...

In the absence of a binding state decision, this Court has

refused to adopt an interpretation which would render

a state law unconstitutional. Driscoll v. Edison Light &

Power Co., 307 U.S. 104, 114-5 (1939). Rather this Court

has espoused Justice Frankfurter’s notion of extrapolating

what a state law means in order to provide the widest

latitude consistent with the United States Constitution.

Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972),

relying on Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 174 (1961).

And, we submit, such a rule becomes exceedingly im-

portant in a situation, such as the one before the Court,

where the federal courts refuse to abstain and also stay

enforcement of the law in question, thereby effectively

eliminating any opportunity the state agency may have

to obtain a narrowing construction from a state court.

Cf. Clifford Jacobs Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 357

F. Supp. 564, 572, n.1 (S.D.Ohio 1973).

This matter of construing the Ordinances becomes

paramount when we realize that each of the district courts

which have considered the Model Act have had no diffi-

culty in finding a construction which rendered it constitu-

tional. For example, with respect to the first issue pre-

sented to this Court, the decision in The Casbah, Inc.

v. Thone, No. 80-0271 (D.Neb. Sept. 26, 1980), states, at

8-9:

Plaintiffs claim that the “designed for use” phrase

in the definition of drug paraphernalia is vague. They

15

cite an Indiana drug paraphernalia case where the

judge was troubled by the term. Indiana Normal

v. Sendak, No. TH 75-142-C p.13 (S.D.Ind. 1980). The

Court finds that the term is not vague when it is

read in the context of the entire statute. “Designed

for use” in L.B.991 refers not to the physical char-

acteristics of an object but to the subjective intent

or plan of the person controlling the object. The

whole tenor of the statute makes clear that any ob-

ject, depending upon its use, can be drug parapher-

nalia. In fact, section two of the statute sets out

fourteen factors which are to be considered in deter-

mining if any given object is paraphernalia; those

factors focus not on the physical features of the sus-

pected item but on the context in which the item

is found. The factors are an aid in determining

whether a person “designed” the object as parapher-

nalia. The physical properties of an item may not

offer a clue about its illicit use. As the court in

Delaware Accessories Trade Assn. v. Gebelein, No.

80-285 p.5 (D.Del. 1980) said “the statute itself indi-

cates that ‘designed for use’ refers not to structure

but to intent.” In short, when “designed for use”

is integrated into the statute it is not vague nor even

easily susceptible to misunderstanding.

WEBSTER’S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DicTIONARY (2d ed.

1969) simply defines “designed,” at 493: ‘formed or done

according to design; planned; purposed; intended.” In other

words, the Ordinances plainly were subject to a readily

available narrowing construction; the Sixth Circuit refused

to adopt it.

Similarly, in considering the list of objects which may

be paraphernalia when the requisite intent is present, the

lower court admits, Slip Op., at 29, that the listed items are

16

not “per se” paraphernalia. “Because the ordinances de-

fine drug paraphernalia in terms of its use, intended use

or designed use, and because the phrase ‘such as’ introduces

the lists, the statutory language indicates that the listed

items are only examples of items which could be drug

paraphernalia.” The lower court expressed no concern

over items listed such as scales, balloons, or envelopes,

presumably because of the element of criminal intent. Yet,

the court singled out “miniature cocaine spoons” and “roach

clips” as being vague. Quite obviously, the same intent

requirement that applies to every other listed item applies

to these two as well, Again, as the Casbah court held,

at 11:

Plaintiffs complain that the statute impermissibly out-

laws items and punishes their innocent users because

of the criminal intent of others. * * * Only when

an object is used, intended for use, or designed for

use with a controlled substance does it become pro-

hibited.

Since it is agreed that there are no objective design char-

acteristics by which paraphernalia can be defined, the

terms “chillums” or “bongs” which the Sixth Circuit ap-

proved, at 29, can be no more definite than the terms

roach clips or miniature cocaine spoons. In both cases

it is the intent which is the distinguishing feature.

Once again, in considering the listing of relevant fac-

tors contained in the definition, the lower court deemed

some proper and singled out others as unlawful on the

basis of hypothetical applications of the factors. But, we

submit, such reasoning disregards the fundamental rule

that Due Process requires only “fair warning.” Rose v.

Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 50 (1975). Marginal cases are not

the proper test for determining a law’s constitutionality.

United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7 (1947); United

17

States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 442 (2d Cir. 1974). Doubt

as to certain hypothetical cases which may never arise

is not sufficient basis for declaring a law unconstitutional.

Robinson v. United States, 324 U.S. 282, 286 (1945). See

also Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337,

340 (1952); United States v. Irwin, 354 F.2d 192, 196 (2d

Cir. 1965).

Thus, once again, the lower court went needlessly

far afield rather than making a close reading of the Ordi-

nances and rendering a decision on that basis alone. As

the court held in Mid-Atlantic Accessories Trade Associa-

tion v. Maryland, No. H-80-1343 (D.Md. Nov. 11, 1980) :

The simple answer to these contentions is that

none of these factors is dispositive. These listed cri-

teria do not define drug paraphernalia but are merely

to be considered by a court or other authority along

with other relevant factors in determining whether

an object is covered by the statutory definition. They

are therefore only guides for determining whether

the necessary criminal intent exists. To convict under

the statute, a jury must still find beyond « reasonable

doubt that a defendant had the requisite criminal in-

tent. That these factors are relevant evidence does

not negate the fact that the statute clearly requires

proof of specific intent before a violation can be found.

Slip Op., at 20.

Finally, in the case of the prohibition against adver-

tising, the lower court again relied on hypothetical exam-

ples as the test of the Ordinances’ constitutionality. The

advisability of doing so is immediately called into question

as a result of this Court’s holdings that “overbreadth”

analysis applies weakly, if at all, in the commercial speech

context. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 887,

894, n.9 (1979); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S.

18

447, 462, n.20 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433

U.S. 350, 381 (1977). But, in any event, the lower court

again refused to apply that limiting construction of the

Ordinances which was readily available. In particular,

the potential problems raised by this Court’s decision in

Bigelow are of small concern when one notes that the

Model Act focuses on the act of placing an advertisement,

giving the criminal act a specific situs, and further notes

that all municipalities, including those in Ohio, have lim-

ited territory and limited legislative authority. See, e.g.,

McQUuILLIn, 5 MunIcIPpAL CorPORATIONS (3d ed. rev.) § 15.30

at 108; Cincinnati v. Rost, 92 Ohio App. 8, 10-11 (1952).

It is presumed that the governing body of the city was

legislating with reference to the conduct of business within

the territorial limits of the city. City of Sedalia v. Shell

Petroleum Corp., 81 F.2d 193, 196-7 (8th Cir. 1936).

In sum, we submit that the lower court was obliged

to give the Ordinances that construction by which they

could be rendered constitutional, as a result of repeated

decisions by this Court. The authorities noted above, and

others, make it plain that such a constitutional construction

was readily available on the basis of the language used

in the Ordinances. Yet, by failing to follow the dictates

of this Court, enforcement of these laws was needlessly

enjoined; and similar laws throughout the nation have

been held in abeyance. Again, we submit that this is

a substantial question which warrants this Court’s full

review.

19

CONCLUSION

The questions presented by this appeal are substantial

and of broad public importance. Probable jurisdiction

should therefore be noted.

Respectfully submitted,

ANDREW Boyko, Counsel of Record

Law Director, City of Parma

STEPHEN P. Bonp

Assistant Law Director

Parma City Hall

6611 Ridge Road

Parma, Ohio 44129

(216) 886-2323

WILLIAM E. BLACKIE

Law Director, City of Lakewood

Lakewood City Hall

12650 Detroit Avenue

Lakewood, Ohio 44107

(216) 521-7580

Counsel for Appellants

Al

APPENDIX

OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

(Filed December 8, 1980)

Nos. 80-3308, 80-3352, 80-3353

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THF SIXTH CIRCUIT

RECORD REVOLUTION NO. 6, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Vv.

THE CITY OF PARMA, et al.,

Defendant-Appellee (80-3308),

ALEXANDER J. LUKA d/b/a DAYSTAR BOUTIQUE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Vv.

THE CITY OF LAKEWOOD, et al.,

Defendant-Appellee (80-3352),

THE RIGHT PLACE, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Vv.

THE CITY OF NORTH OLMSTED, OHIO, et al.,

Defendant-Appellee. (80-3353).

AppEAL from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Ohio.

Before: Epwarps, Chief Circuit Judge, and MARTIN

and Jones, Circuit Judges.

Jones, Circuit Judge. Business owners in the cities

of Parma, Lakewood, and North Olmsted, Ohio have chal-

A2

lenged the constitutionality of ordinances prohibiting the

use, sale and manufacture of “drug paraphernalia.”! The

district court, in a very thoughtful and well written opin-

ion, sustained the constitutionality of the ordinances af-

ter severing certain phrases and construing the meaning

or scope of other language. Being convinced that parts

of the ordinances are vague and overbroad, in violation

of the First Amendment right of free speech and the

Fourteenth Amendment right of dues process, we reverse

and enjoin enforcement of the ordinances.

ae

A. Rationale for Model Act

The “drug paraphernalia” ordinances in Parma, Lake-

wood, and North Olmsted are based almost verbatim on

the Model Drug Paraphernalia Act drafted by the Drug

Enforcement Administration of the United States Depart-

ment of Justice. At the request of the Drug Policy Office

of the President’s Domestic Policy Council, DEA prepared

the Model Act as an amendment to the Uniform Controlled

Substances Act. In the Prefatory Note to the Model Act,

DEA described graphically the severity of the national

problem to which the Model Act responds:

[T]he availability of Drug Paraphernalia has reached

epidemic levels. An entire industry has developed

which promotes, even glamorizes, the illegal use of

drugs by adults and children alike. Sales of Drug

Paraphernalia are reported as high as three billion

dollars a year. What was a small phenomenon at

the time the Uniform Act was drafted has now mush-

roomed into an industry so well-entrenched that it

has its own trade magazines and associations.

App. 1230.

1. The three cases have been consolidated on appeal.

A3

The Justice Department determined that the law en-

forcement campaign against businesses selling drug para-

phernalia should be fought mainly by state and local offi-

cials. Statement of Irvin B. Nathan, Deputy Assistant

Attorney General, Criminal Division, before the H. R. Se-

lect Com. on Narcotics and Drug Abuse Control, November

1, 1979. App. 1216-17. The Model Act attempts to avoid

or minimize the constitutional problems of previous stat-

utes and municipal ordinances, yet to provide an effective

law to curb the sale of drug paraphernalia. Id. at 1217-18.

Mr. Nathan strongly espoused the enactment of the

Model Act by states and cities in his statement to the

House Committee on Narcotics and Drug Abuse Control.

He stated:

The positive features of such a bill are apparent.

Outlawing the open advertisement and sale of drug

paraphernalia will send a clear message to impression-

able adolescents and others that society does not con-

done the use of drugs. Governmental authority will

present a more consistent and reasoned face to the

community by refusing to let the paraphernalia in-

dustry mock the law by thriving off the wide spread

[sic] use of illegal drugs. Communities will no longer

be offended by the presence of open symbols of illegal

activity in their midst.

App. 1221-22.

In closing, Mr. Nathan added several cautionary re-

marks on the potential problems of constitutionality and

feasibility. First, he noted that ‘enforcement of such an

act by state and local authorities may prove difficult and

may divert scarce resources from more pressing drug con-

cerns.” App. 1223. Mr. Nathan further warned:

A4

Even if there were resources to permit vigorous en-

forcement, there is a significant potential for mistakes

and abuse by local authorities. There may be addi-

tional invasions of privacy if law enforcement person-

nel need see only an implement such as a pipe, rather

than any actual evidence of the drug itself, in order

to make an arrest and conduct a search. Moreover,

the prevalence of drug paraphernalia may leave law

enforcement personnel in the difficult position of hav-

ing to engage in selective enforcement, with the poten-

tial for disparate treatment of similarly situated in-

dividuals.

App. 1224. He was concerned about the possibility of “in-

creased public corruption” resulting from enforcement of

the Act. App. 1224. He also questioned the potential ef-

fectiveness of drug paraphernalia statutes. App. 1222-23.

Finally, Mr. Nathan listed several options in lieu of the

comprehensive prohibition against the use, sale or manu-

facture of drug paraphernalia, such as licensing, zoning,

forbidding sales to minors, and regulating the form of ad-

vertising. App. 1225.

B. Structure of Model Act?

The Model Act contains two main sections. The first

section sets forth at great length the definition of “drug

paraphernalia.” In the first subsection, drug paraphernalia

is defined as anything which is “used, intended for use, or

designed for use” in introducing controlled substances into

the body. A number of specific examples ere then given,

each described by the phrase “used, intended for use, or

designed for use.” One example of drug paraphernalia is

“testing equipment used, intended for use or designed for

2. The entire ordinance as codified in Parma before its

amendment is reprinted as an Addendum to our opinion.

A5

use in identifying or in analyzing the strength, effective-

ness or purity of controlled substances.” The list of ex-

amples concludes with the catchall category of “objects

used, intended for use, or designed for use in ingesting,

inhaling or otherwise introducing marihuana, cocaine,

hashish, or hashish oil into the human body,” followed by

another list of thirteen items, such as water pipes, roach

clips, chillums, and bongs.

The second subsection of the first main section of the

Model Act delineates fourteen factors that a “court or other

authority should consider, in addition to all other logically

relevant factors,” “in determining whether an object is

‘drug paraphernalia.’” These factors include the state-

ments by an owner about the item’s use, prior convictions

of the owner, national or local advertising, and the ex-

istence of lawful uses for the item.

In sum, the Model Act uses three techniques to define

“drug paraphernalia.” First, it uses the repeated phrase

“used, intended for use, or designed for use.” Second, it

lists by way of example a number of objects that could be

drug paraphernalia. Third, the Model Act sets forth nu-

merous factors to be considered in determining whether

or not an object is drug paraphernalia.

Following the extensive definition of “drug para-

phernalia,” the second main section of the Model Act de-

fines the substantive criminal offenses. The use, or the

possession with intent to use, of drug paraphernalia is pro-

hibited. Also proscribed is the delivery or manufacture of

“drug paraphernalia,” when the deliverer or manufacturer

knows or should reasonably know that the drug parapher-

nalia will be used with controlled substances. The Model

Act makes criminal the placing of any advertising in the

print media promoting the sale of objects designed or in-

tended for use as drug paraphernalia, when the person

A6

placing the advertising knows or should reasonably know

the purpose of the advertisement. The Model Act provides

for the civil forfeiture of all drug paraphernalia and a

special offense for the delivery of drug paraphernalia to

aminor. Finally, the Act states that its sections or sub-

sections are severable; in the event that any part is de-

clared unconstitutional the remaining parts can still be

given effect.

II.

A. City of Parma Ordinance No. 242-79

The City of Parma, Ohio, has long expressed its desire

to curb drug abuse in its community. In 1977, the Parma

City Council enacted a resolution urging that the possession

and private use of marihuana not be legalized. Depo. of

Victor LaButta, App. 1088. In 1978, Doris Krawczyk,

Councilwoman in Parma, received a copy of a petition

addressed to the manager of Parmatown Shopping Mall

from constituents who were angry at the sale of novelty

items, called drug paraphernalia, by the plaintiff in this

case, Record Revolution No. 6, Inc. Depo. of Doris Kraw-

ezyk, App. 924, 1043. Krawczyk requested the city law

department in April, 1978, to draft legislation to ban the

sale of drug paraphernalia, but the law department ad-

vised her that “no basis or foundation” for legislation then

existed. Depo. of Doris Krawczyk, App. 924. Krawczyk’s

interest in drug paraphernalia legislation revived in Octo-

ber, 1979, when she read an article on an ordinance enacted

in Lakewood, California that banned the sale of drug para-

phernalia to minors. Depo. of Doris Krawczyk, App. 926-27.

Then on November 14, 1979, an editorial in The Cleveland

Press informed her of the Model Drug Paraphernalia Act.

App. 1044. She obtained a copy of the Model Act and re-

quested the city law department to draft similar legisla-

tion. App. 1045.

A7

On January 7, 1980, the Parma City Council enacted

Ordinance No. 242-79, which is almost identical to the

Model Act.* The ordinance was passed as an emergency

measure and became effective immediately upon the

mayor’s signature on January 9, 1980. The Parma City

Council did not commission a study of the drug abuse

problem, but based its conclusions on the need for the

legislation on the personal experience of its members, the

statements of DEA Administrator Peter Bensinger and

Deputy Assistant Attorney General Nathan, and the testi-

mony before the Council of two Parma police officers.

Testimony of Doris Krawczyk, App. 662; Depo. of Doris

Krawezyk, App. 929-35, 941, 944; Depo. of Victor Labutta,

App. 1098-99, 1101, 1116-19. Counsel for Record Revolu-

tion No. 6, Inc. testified against the enactment of the or-

dinance before the City Council.

On January 10, 1980, Record Revolution No. 6, Inc.

filed an action in the federal district court alleging the

unconstitutionality of the Parma Ordinance and seeking

declaratory and injunctive relief. Record Revolution No.

6, Inc. is an Ohio corporation which sells retail records,

magazines, jewelry, T-shirts, and “novelty items,” such

as various kinds of pipes. At a hearing on the temporary

restraining order the next day, the City agreed not to

enforce the ordinance until the district court reached a

final decision on the merits. The district court held a

consolidated hearing on the preliminary and permanent

injunction on January 28 and 30, 1980. After allowing

time for the submission of post-trial briefs, the district

3. The ordinance is codified as §§ 620.01(dd) and 620.04

of the codified ordinances of Parma, Ohio.

4. The Parma ordinance added the term “sell” to § 620.04

(b); added all of § 620.04(e), which exempts certain medical

and other individuals from the ordinance; and limited the sever-

ability clause in § 620.04(g) to § 620.04.

A8

court issued its lengthy, comprehensive memorandum opin-

ion on April 14, 1980.

The testimony at the injunction hearing can be sum-

marized briefly. Francis Szabo, Chief of the Parma Police,

testified that the police had notified the one retailer of

suspected drug paraphernalia in Parma of the ordinance;

the police had not been trained yet to enforce the ordi-

nance; and no attempt at enforcement had been made.

App. 642-45.

Doris Krawczyk, through her in-court testimony and

her deposition, stated that the ordinance was based entirely

on the language and research of the Model Act. App.

662, 940-41, 976, 994. She also testified that she could

not identify items which violated the ordinance and that

such a determination was the responsibility of the police.

App. 673, 675, 682-83, 928-30, 933, 969, 984, 994, 997, 1003.

In her opinion, the lawfulness or unlawfulness of an item

turned on the purchaser’s intent. App. 683-84, 691, 993,

995-96.

Clarence D. Bennett, Detective of the Parma Police

with the duty of investigating organized crime and nar-

cotics, testified that the ordinance would aid the fight

against drug abuse, but that it still had not been enforced.

App. 1173, 1175. He identified certain items as drug para-

phernalia, such as all pipes with screens, all chamber pipes,

small-bowled pipes, and very small pipes, and stated that

the seller’s intent could be inferred from the item itself.

App. 712-13, 715, 717-18, 728, 731, 743, 1178, 1183, 1185-

86. He would enforce the ordinance, when other common

items were involved, only if residue of an illegal drug

were discovered on the item. App. 722, 730, 1183, 1188-

89, 1206-07. He also concluded that a policeman would

not know how to enforce the ordinance with respect to

circumstances in which the seller reasonably should have

A9

known that the purchaser would use the item with illegal

drugs. App. 742.

Herbert J. Bessai, a pipe maker and retail merchant

for 31 years, and a collector and appraiser of pipes, testi-

fied as an expert witness for plaintiff. According to his

testimony, the design of a pipe gives no indication of

whether it will be used or legal for illegal purposes. For

example, he stated that water pipes have long been used

to give the dryest, coolest smoke and that screens serve

to keep the tobacco away from the moisture in the bottom

of the pipe. App. 750, 752-53, 757. He did say on cross-

examination that he had never made a pipe out of plastic

and that plastic pipes were normally sold in “head gear

shops.” App. 773-74. He also stated on redirect examina-

tion that he was certain some of the pipes which he has

sold have been used to smoke marijuana. App. 777-78.

After Parma’s motion for dismissal at the close of

plaintiff’s case was denied, Parma called two witnesses.®

Charles J. Carter, Special Agent of the DEA in charge

of the Cleveland office, testified that the drug parapher-

nalia ordinance would assist law enforcement efforts

against drug abuse. App. 835-36.

Richard Rutt, a detective in the narcotics unit of the

Cleveland Police Department, testified as an expert in

narcotics law enforcement. In his opinion, the drug para-

phernalia ordinance would reduce drug abuse somewhat.

App. 847. He stated on cross-examination that the design

of almost every item listed in § 620.01 (L), such as a

water pipe or a screen in a pipe indicates an intent to

design, sell or use the item with illegal drugs. App. 849-

5. Bernard Survoy, Clerk of the Parma City Council, was

also called as a witness. The attorneys then stipulated to his

testimony on the authenticity of the Parma ordinance.

A10

51, 857-59, 861-62, 869-71, 875, 878-81. However, he also

testified that any pipe could be used to smoke marijuana,

that he would not call Bessai’s testimony incorrect, and

that some sellers could believe in the lawfulness of an

item on the basis of its patent. App. 852, 871.

B. City of Lakewood Ordinance No. 5-80°

The City of Lakewood enacted its drug paraphernalia

ordinance, Ordinance No. 5-80 on January 21, 1980. The

Lakewood ordinance, before its amendment on April 21,

1980, was identical to the Parma ordinance, except that

it did not provide a special offense for sales to minors.

The amending Ordinance, No. 29-80, added this special

offense and repealed original § 513.01 (cc) (2)(K) in its

entirety and the phrase “under circumstances where one

reasonably should know” from § 513.04(b), (c).

The City of Lakewood participated as amicus curiae

in the injunction hearing on the Parma ordinance. On

May 6, 1980, after the district court issued its opinion

sustaining the constitutionality of the Parma ordinance,

Alexander Luka, doing business as Daystar Boutique in

Lakewood, filed his complaint attacking the constitutional-

ity of the Lakewood drug paraphernalia ordinance and

requesting declaratory and injunctive relief. Daystar Bou-

tique is a retail establishment similar to Record Revolution

No. 6, Inc. No evidentiary hearing was held. The district

court entered summary judgment on May 8, 1980 for defen-

dants on the basis of its opinion in Record Revolution

No. 6, Inc. v. City of Parma.

6. The ordinance is codified as §§ 513.01(cc) and 513.04

of the General Offenses Code of the Codified Ordinances of the

City of Lakewood.

All

C. City of North Olmstead Ordinance No. 80-287

The City of North Olmsted enacted its drug parapher-

nalia ordinance, Ordinance No. 80-28, on May 6, 1980.

Being an emergency measure, the ordinance became effec-

tive on May 7, when signed by the mayor. The North

Olmsted ordinance is identical to the Parma drug para-

phernalia ordinance as amended. On May 7, 1980, the

Right Place, Inc., a retail establishment similar to Record

Revolution No. 6, Inc., filed a complaint challenging the

constitutionality of the North Olmsted drug paraphernalia

ordinance and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.

No evidentiary hearing was held. The district court en-

tered summary judgment for the defendants on the basis

of its decision in Record Revolution No. 6, Inc. v. City

of Parma.

D. District Court Opinion

The district court held that the Parma ordinance was

not vague or overbroad as construed. The inclusion of

“use, intended for use and designed fcr use” in the def-

inition of “drug paraphernalia” in § 620.01(dd)(1) was

held to save the ordinance from vagueness. The district

court also construed § 620.01(dd) ( 1) to refer to the

detendant’s use, intent, or design. The district court de-

clared that the ordinance dces not make the items listed

in § 620.01 (dd) (1)(A)-(L) drug paraphernalia per se,

since the element of the defendant’s use, intent, or design

must be proven. Finally, with respect to § 620.01, the

district court ruled that subsection (K) was vague, because

it created a danger of discriminatory and arbitrary enforce-

ment. Therefore, the district court severed subsection (K)

from § 620.01, pursuant to the severability clause in

§ 620.04(g).

7. The ordinance is codified at §§ 513.01(bb) and 513.04

of the Codified Ordinances of the City of North Olmstead.

Al2

The district court found § 620.04 not vague or over-

broad, except for the phrase “reasonably should know” in

§ 620.04(b) and (c). The district court severed this phrase

from those subsections. The district court held that the

transferor’s knowledge of the transferee’s intended use of

an item sufficiently protects the innocent and preserves the

section from vagueness and overbreadth. In doing so, it

rejected plaintiff's contention that due process required

proof of specific intent. The district court construed

§ 620.04(c) to apply only to advertisements placed in Parma

about “drug paraphernalia” available in Parma. As such,

this subsection was held not to infringe upon speech pro-

tected by the First Amendment. The district court did not

find any constitutional problem with § 620.04(d), (e), (f)

and (h)."*

E. Issues on Appeal

Plaintiffs raise four main arguments on appeal. First,

they contend that the district court lacked the power to

add to, sever, and construe the statutory language of the

municipal ordinances. Second, the definition of “drug

paraphernalia” is vague and overbroad, they argue, be-

cause the proscribed items are not adequately described

and the definition relies on transferred intent. Plaintiffs’

third contention is that the offenses are vague and over-

broad because proof of specific intent is not necessary,

knowledge can be inferred from facts which do not support

the inference, and the proscription on advertising includes

protected speech. Finally, they argue that the list of items

7a. On May 5, 1980, the City Council of Parma amended

its drug paraphernalia ordinance to agree in part with the district

court’s opinion. App. 1258-59. The amending ordinance, No.

103-80, repealed the original § 620.01(dd)(2)(k) and the phrase

“under circumstances where one reasonably should know” from

§ 620.04(b) only.

Al3

in § 620.01(dd)(1)(A)-(L) creates mandatory or rebut-

table presumptions, which do not rest on supportable in-

ferences.

The plaintiffs have not appealed the district court’s

other conclusions of law, which held that the ordinances

did not violate the equal protection clause, the commerce

clause, the Fourth Amendment, the impairment of con-

tracts clause, the bill of attainder clause, or the supremacy

clause through federal pre-emption.

Parma contests two adverse rulings by the district

court. The district court held that it had subject matter

jurisdiction, in that an actual case or controversy was pres-

ent. Parma has filed a motion to dismiss this appeal for

lack of an actual case or controversy. The district court

also denied Parma’s motion to abstain in order to allow the

state courts an initial opportunity to construe the ordi-

nance.

III.

A. Case or Controversy

(1) Threat of Prosecution

The City of Parma argues that this Court and the dis-

trict court lack subject matter jurisdiction because plaintff

has not been threatened with prosecution under the drug

paraphernalia ordinance.® Parma relies on the testimony

of Police Chief Szabo and Councilwoman Krawczyk. Ac-

cording to their testimony, the ordinance has still not been

enforced because Parma agreed to withhold enforcement

8. Though defendants-appellees did not file a cross-appeal,

they are permitted to advocate any ground in the record that

will require affirmance of the district court’s judgment.

9. Lakewood and North Olmstead have not challenged the

subject matter jurisdiction of this Court or the district court.

Al4

pending the district court’s hearing of the case. After that

this Court granted an injunction pending appeal. They

also testified that the ordinance would not ve enforced

until the police had been trained in its provisions and busi-

ness owners had been given public notice.

Record Revolution No. 6, Inc. seeks a declaratory judg-

ment and injunctive relief. Though the Federal Declara-

tory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, cannot remove the

jurisdictional requirement of Article III, § 1 of the Consti-

tution, a genuine threat of criminal prosecution under legis-

lation that allegedly is constitutionally defective does pre-

sent an actual case or controversy. Steffel v. Thompson,

415 U.S. 452, 458-59 (1974). The Declaratory Judgment

Act represents Congress’ judgment that, in these circum-

stances, it is unfair and may deter the exercise of consti-

tutionally protected rights to compel a person to wait

for an actual arrest or prosecution before allowing that

person to test the legislation in court.

The facts in this case demonstrate that the threat

of prosecution of Record Revolution No. 6, Inc. under

the Parma drug paraphernalia ordinance is not “imagi-

nary,” “speculative,” or “chimerical,”’ and that the threat

continues to exist at this stage of the proceedings. Id.

at 459. Councilwoman Krawczyk’s first reported desire

to enact drug paraphernalia legislation arose from the re-

ceipt of a petition from her constituents protesting the

sale of “drug paraphernalia” by Record Revolution No.

6, Inc. Depo. of Doris Krawczyk, App. 924, 1043. Kraw-ezyk

visited Record Revolution No. 6, Inc. and concluded that

the store was selling drug paraphernalia. Depo. of Doris

Krawczyk, App. 924, 928-34. The ordinance explicitly de-

cries the business activity of head shops. Though

Krawczyk testified that the ordinance was not aimed at

any particular store, she knew only one store, Record

Al5

Revolution No. 6, Inc., that would be subject to the ordi- -

nance. Depo. of Doris Krawzcyk, App. 935. The deposi-

tion testimony of Councilman Labutta and Detective Ben-

nett confirms that Record Revolution No. 6, Inc., would

be a primary target for enforcement of the ordinance.

App. 1103-04, 1106-07, 1111-12, 1114, 1180-81, 1201. Police

Chief Szabo stated that there is only one retailer in Parma

subject to the ordinance and that this retailer had received

notice of the ordinance. App. 644. According to Chief

Szabo, he had not told Record Revolution No. 6, Inc.,

that the police had no intention of enforcing the ordinance.

App. 644. In fact, every testifying police officer identi-

fied as drug paraphernalia items sold by Record Revolu-

tion No. 6, Inc. The only reason for the lack of enforce-

ment to date is the injunction pending appeal. Depo.

of Doris Krawczyk, App. 1018; Depo. of Clarence D. Ben-

nett, App. 1175. Under these circumstances, Record Revo-

lution No. 6, Inc. has plainly demonstrated a sufficient

threat of prosecution to establish the presence of an actual

case or controversy. See High Ol’ Times, Inc. v. Busbee,

621 F.2d 135, 139 (5th Cir. 1980); Tobacco Road v. City

of Novi, No. 79-71000 (E. D. Mich., June 21, 1979): Riddle

v. Clack, No. CA-3-77-0525-D (N.D. Tex, August 25, 1977).

(2) Mootness

Defendants’ amendments of their ordinances to com-

ply with the district court’s opinion raises the question of

mootness. We note, first, that the defendants have not

completely harmonized their ordinances with the district

court’s opinion. The ordinances proscribe the placement

of advertising in any printed material of prohibited items

available anywhere. In contrast, the district court con-

strued the ordinances to apply only to advertisements

placed in printed material in the three cities about pro-

hibited items available in the three cities. Also, North

Al6

Olmsted and Parma, unlike Lakewood, deleted the phrase

“or under circumstances where one reasonably should

know” from § 620.44(b) only. The district court severed

this phrase from § 620.04(c) as well.

Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of the ordi-

nances as originally enacted and as amended. The con-

tinuing vitality of these ordinances prevents this case

from being moot and distinguishes Indiana Chapter,

NORML, Inc. v. Sendak, No. 80-1305 (7th Cir., July 22,

1980) (State of Indiana repealed statute in entirety while

appeal pending).

Therefore, we hold that plaintiffs have demonstrated

an actual case or controversy. Consequently, appellees’

motion to dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction is denied.

B. Abstention

A substantial hurdle to the exercise of our jurisdiction

is the branch of abstention doctrine elaborated in Railroad

Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).?°

The Pullman doctrine counsels abstention in “narrowly

limited special circumstances,’ “where the challenged

state statute is susceptible of a construction by the state

judiciary that would avoid or modify the necessity of

reaching a federal constitutional question.” Babbitt v.

United Farm Workers National Union, 442 U.S. 289, 306

(1979), quoting Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 54 (1973).

To justify abstention, the questions of state law must

be uncertain and amenable to a construction by the state

40. Since no state criminal prosecution is pending against

plaintiffs, we do not face a question of abstention under Younger

v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) and its progeny.

A separate question, which we shall address later, is the pro-

priety of granting injunctive relief as opposed to simply awarding

a declaratory judgment.

Al7

courts that would resolve or substantially alter the federal

constitutional issues. High Ol Times, Inc. v. Busbee,

621 F.2d 135, 139 (5th Cir. 1980); D’Iorio v. County of

Delaware, 592 F.2d 681, 686 (3rd Cir, 1978). Another

factor is whether the federal court’s decision would un-

duly interfere with important state policies or regulatory

programs. 621 F.2d at 139; 592 F.2d at 686.

As a general rule, abstention is not appropriate in

cases challenging the constitutionality of ‘a statute on

grounds of vagueness and overbreadth, for the reasons

that such statutes often are not subject to a saving con-

struction, which would eliminate or narrow the federal

constitutional issues, and that delayed resolution of state

law questions implicating important federal constitutional

rights should be avoided. Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S.

528, 537 (1965); 621 F.2d at 140 n. 6; 592 F.2d at 692

n. 19. Also, the federal court should not abstain if lengthy,

piecemeal litigation in the state courts would be necessary

to define or resolve the issues of state law. Baggett

v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 378 (1964). These principles of

abstention should be applied to effectuate the more gen-

eral concerns of avoiding needless constitutional litigation

and needless friction with state adjudication and policy-

making. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 427-30 (1979) ;

Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. at 54.

The district court did not state its reasons for denying

the motion to abstain, but it did reach the correct result.

The state court could not construe ‘the ordinances to

eliminate the problems of vagueness and overbreadth.

The constitutional defect, which we will discuss later, in

the definition “drug paraphernalia” necessarily infects the

entire ordinance. Furthermore, the overbreadth of the

proscription on advertising deters business owners from

engaging in constitutionally protected conduct. Though

Al18

the Ohio courts are very capable of applying federal con-

stitutional principles, and can hear declaratory judgment

actions, Ohio Rev. Code § 2721.03, their powers of con-

struction are not limitless. State v. Young, 62 Ohio St.

2d 370, 374, 406 N.E.2d 499, 502 (1980). The Ohio courts,

like federal courts, cannot rewrite the language of a stat-

ute. Id, Only such judicial rewriting of the drug para-

phernalia ordinances could save their constitutionality.

This factor strongly undercuts the argument for absten-

tion. Amusement Devices Ass’n v. Ohio, 443 F. Supp.

1040, 1048-49 (S.D. Ohio 1977) (3-judge district court).

~ Abstention is also inappropriate in these cases because

the ordinances are challenged on their face and the ques-

tions raised are predominantly questions of federal con-

stitutional law. Steffel v.-Thompson, 415 U.S. at 474-75.

The questions of state law have a very minimal impact

on the issues before us. Finally, we must review the

constitutionality of only one ordinance in each of three

cities. Our decision will not disrupt a comprehensive

state regulatory program or ongoing procedures in state

agencies or state courts. Compare Moore v. Sims, 442

U.S. 415 (1979); Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pull-

man, Inc., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); Parker v. Turner, No.

78-1063 (6th Cir., July 3, 1980).

Therefore, we hold that the Pullman doctrine does

not require abstention from deciding the constitutionality

of the drug paraphernalia ordinances."

11. Accord, High OV Times, Inc. v. Busbee, 621 F.2d 135,

139 (5th Cir. 1980); Indiana Chapter, NORML, Inc. v. Sendak,

No. TH 75-142-C (S.D. Ind., February 4, 1980) (3-judge district

court), vacated as moot as the time of appeal, No. 80-1305 (7th

Cir., July 22, 1980); Record Museum v. Lawrence Township, 481

F. Supp. 768 (D.N.J. 1979).

Alg

IV.

A. Lack of Power to Construe Ordinances

Before discussing the merits of the vagueness and

overbreadth issues, we must first consider the extent of

our power to give a saving construction to the drug para-

phernalia ordinances. The district court construed the

drug paraphernalia ordinances by adding to, deleting from

and defining the statutory language. A federal court,

however, has very limited powers in construing state stat-

utes or municipal ordinances. For the federal court’s

interpretation of state or municipal legislation is “not

binding on the state courts and may be discredited at

any time—thus essentially rendering the federal court

decision advisory and the litigation underlying it meaning-

less.” Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. at 428. See State v.

Young, 62 Ohio St.2d at 375 n.2, 406 N.E.2d at 503 (After

citing to a federal court decision on the same state stat-

ute, the Ohio Supreme Court declared: This federal case

is not binding upon this court, and we note the decision

rendered in that case only as supporting authority). Con-

sequently, a federal court must take the state statute or

municipal ordinance as written and cannot find the stat-

ute or ordinance constitutional on the basis of a limiting

construction supplied by it rather than a state court.

Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971).

As stated in Hynes v. Mayor and Council of the Borough

of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 622 (1976), “[e]ven assuming

that a more explicit limiting interpretation of the ordi-

nance could remedy the flaws we have pointed out .. .

we are without power to remedy the defects by giving

the ordinance constitutionally precise content.” See also

Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974); Gooding v.

A20

Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520 (1972).!2 The proper course

for a federal court to follow, if a limiting construction

will save the constitutionality of a state statute or munic-

ipal ordinance and the statute or ordinance is fairly sus-

ceptible to such a construction, is to abstain pursuant to

the Pullman doctrine.

The power of a federal court to sever sections or

phrases from state legislation poses a slightly different

problem of interpreting state law. In anticipation of

litigation on the constitutionality of legislation, a state

legislature or city council may provide expressly in the

legislation for severability in the event that only parts

of the legislation are declared unconstitutional. The task

of the federal court, absent a controlling state decision, is

to ascertain whether the unconstitutional parts of the legis-

lation are so interwoven with the remainder of the statute

that the remainder cannot stand alone. This is a question

of the legislative intent and the interpretation of the legal

effect of the remainder of the legislation standing by itself.

Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm’n of Okla-

homa, 286 U.S. 210, 234-35 (1932); Dorchy v. Kansas,

264 U.S. 286, 290-91 (1924). See Emmons v. Keller, 21

Ohio St.2d 48, 254 N.E.2d 687 (1970). Abstention on

the question of severability should be considered. Dorchy

v. Kansas, 264 U.S. at 291.

12. In Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972)

the Court stated that a federal court could “extrapolate” the

“allowable meaning” of a municipal ordinance. The Court found

that the state court would construe the ordinance narrowly and

concluded that the statutory prohibitions were clear, though the

language permitted some flexibility. In effect, the Court declared

that the language of the ordinance, as it read the ordinance and

the state court would read the ordinance, was not vague. The

Court did not add, delete or narrow statutory terms. The fine

line between “extrapolation” and “construction” was recognized:

“‘Extrapolation,’ of course, is a delicate task, for it is not within

our power to construe and narrow state laws.” Id. at 110.

A21

From these principles, it will become clear from our

discussion of the issues that the district court, in its

sincere desire to uphold the constitutionality of these

municipal ordinances, exceeded the scope of its powers.

The district court should have declared the ordinances

unconstitutionally vague and overbroad on the basis of

the defects that it found in the ordinances. Our reasoning

and decision in this case is shaped by our lack of power

to put a limiting construction on the municipal ordinances,

B. Standards of Vagueness and Overbreadth

The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

includes the doctrines of void-for-vagueness and over-

breadth. These two doctrines have distinct meanings and

purposes, though a statute which is vague is also often

overbroad, The void-for-vagueness doctrine commands

any statute to give persons of common intelligence fair

notice of the persons covered and the conduct proscribed.

Colautti v. Franklin, 489 U.S. 379, 390-91 (1979). Funda-

mental fairness, as well as a proper regard for preventing

the deterrence of constitutionally protected conduct, re-

quires that persons not be compelled to guess at their

own peril the meaning and application of a statute.

Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972);

Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939). Ascer-

tainable standards of guilt are imperative in order to

protect against arbitrary, erratic, and discriminatory ar-

rests, prosecutions and convictions. Papachristou v, City

of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972); Winters v. New

York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948). Unless the statute itself

prescribes sufficiently precise standards, basic policy deci-

sions are impermissibly delegated to the personal pre-

dilections of the police, prosecutors and juries. Smith

v. Goguen, 415 U.S. at 575 (1974); Grayned v. City of

Rockford, 408 U.S. at 108. “Legislators may not so abdi-

A22

cate their responsibilities for setting the standards of

the criminal law.” 415 U.S. at 575. Finally, a greater

degree of precision is required when the statute defines

criminal offenses or impinges on activities protected by

the First Amendment. Hynes v. Mayor and Council of

Borough of Oradell, 425 U.S. at 620; Winters v. New York,

333 U.S. at 515; Diebold, Inc. v. Marshall, 585 F.2d 1327,

1336 (6th Cir. 1978). But see Rose v. Locke, 423 US.

48, 50 (1975) (per curiam).

The overbreadth doctrine prohibits a statute from

making innocent or constitutionally protected conduct crim-

inal. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973);

Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971). The

statutory language may be very clear, yet “sweep un-

necessarily broadly to invade the area of protected free-

doms.” Sawyer v. Sandstrom, 615 F.2d 311 (5th Cir.

1980). The harm from an overbroad statute is its chilling

effect on constitutionally protected or otherwise lawful

conduct.

C. Application to Drug Paraphernalia Ordinances

(1) Definition of Drug Paraphernalia

If the definition of “drug paraphernalia” is vague or

overbroad in any respect, the ordinances must be declared

unconstitutional. A precise and unambiguous definition

of “drug paraphernalia” is critical because the ordinances

seek to ban in certain circumstances only the sale of

everyday items that have a myriad of innocent, lawful,

and beneficial uses.** To pass constitutional muster, the

ordinances must specify clearly the very limited circum-

stances in which the manufacture, sale or use of these

common items is unlawful.

13. The definition of “drug paraphernalia” includes “all

equipment, products and materials of any kind.”

A23

The key phrase used by the ordinances to separate

lawful from unlawful items is “used, intended for use,

or designed for use.” The definition of “drug parapher-

nalia” turns on the state of mind of a person or his act

act with respect to an object. Plaintiffs contend first

that the ordinances violate due process by allowing a

defendant to be arrested, prosecuted and convicted on

the basis of an act or state of mind of another person.

For example, if the purchaser uses a pipe to smoke

marijuana, do the ordinances permit the seller of the

pipe to be arrested, prosecuted, or convicted on the basis

of the purchaser’s use? If the manufacturer intended

that a chamber pipe be used for ingesting hashish, and

the purchaser so uses the chamber pipe, do the ordinances

permit the seller, who lacks such intent and did not use

the chamber pipe himself to ingest hashish, to be arrested,

prosecuted, or convicted on the basis of the manufacturer’s

intent and the purchaser’s use?

These hypothetical questions explain the problem of

transferred intent. The presence of transferred intent in

the ordinances would infringe the due process clause by

failing to give the defendant proper notice of the items

defined to be drug paraphernalia and by convicting the

defendant for another person’s intent or misdeeds. The

answer to the questions requires an understanding of the

persons to whom the statute is directed. The description

of the substantive offenses informs us that four categories

of persons fall within the scope of the ordinances: manu-

facturers, wholesalers, retailers, and purchasers. Rather

than specifically defining drug paraphernalia in terms of

the state of mind or conduct of each category of person,

the ordinances merely state the proscribed conduct or

state of mind leaving the responsibility to the courts to

apply the definitions to each category.

A24

The reasoning of the district court demonstrates that

the ordinances permit a person to be arrested, prosecuted

or convicted only for that person’s own use, intent, or

design."* Due process requires this interpretation of the

ordinances. Hammerle v. United States, 6 F.2d 144

14, App. 1511, 512-13. The district court opined:

As a general rule, a crime consists of two elements:

(1) an act or omission, and (2) a state of mind - mens rea.

Although the mens rea of an offense may differ from crime

to crime, the general state of mind required is an intent to

perform the criminal act. Of course, the mens rea and the

act must occur simultaneously and the intent must be that

of the criminal defendant. Because the definition of drug

paraphernalia is referenced in each of the criminal offenses

described in this Ordinance, it is an element of each of

these offenses. Specifically, the criminal intent used to

define drug paraphernalia is an element of the mental state

required to convict under this Ordinance. Therefore, the

pertinent intent must be that of the individual charged with

having committed one of the offenses described in section

620.04(a)-(d). The court concludes that “black-letter” crim-

inal law and the intent of the MDPA draftsmen compel the

conclusion that the definition of drug paraphernalia must be

interpreted in terms of the criminal defendant’s intent and

that this construction is reasonable and sensible.

- — *

Defining all drug paraphernalia in terms of the state of

mind of the seller of the item, does not solve the problem

of transferred criminal intent. For example, if a manu-

facturer is prosecuted under section 620.04(b) and the term

“drug paraphernalia” is defined in terms of the seller’s intent,

as Perma suggests, the manufacturer of an innocent item would

be subject to criminal punishment because the seller intends

it to be used with illegal drugs. The Ordinance regulates

the following categories of conduct: use of paraphernalia with

illegal drugs, possession of paraphernalia with intent to so

use, placement of certain drug paraphernalia advertisements,

and manufacture of paraphernalia for sole use with drugs.

Therefore, defining all drug paraphernalia in terms of

the intent of an individual classifiable in any one of these

categories would cause a transferred intent problem when-

ever the definition was applied to the allegedly criminal con-

duct of individuals in one of the other categories. For this

reason the court’s construction, defining drug paraphernalia

in terms of the intent of the individual charged with violat-

ing the Ordinance, is more reasonable and sensible.

App. 511-13 (Footnote deleted).

A25

(6th Cir. 1925) (per curiam). Its conclusion is bol-

stered by the comments to the Model Act, which refer

consistently to the potential defendant as the “person in

control” of the item. App. 1236-37.15 Lest we be accused

of exceeding the scope of our authority to construe the

ordinances to save their constitutionality, it must be noted

that Ohio law would allow no other interpretation of the

ordinances. State v. Young, 62 Ohio St.2d at 376-77, 406

N.E.2d at 505-506; Chicone v. Liquor Control Comm’n

of Ohio, 20 Ohio App. 2d 43, 251 N.E.2d 864 (Ct. App.

1969). Therefore, we can extrapolate the meaning of

the ordinances on the question of whose use, intent, or

design must be present to allow the arrest, prosecution

or conviction of a person.

The statutory terms “use” or “intended for use” are

not vague or overbroad. Their meaning, as commonly

understood words of the English language, is clear, Ami-

cus suggests that “use” is vague, because the ordinance

does not delineate whether it proscribes the sale of the

same item used by the seller with controlled substances

or the same type of item. Also amicus contends that

the ordinance is vague, because it does not state when,

how long ago, or how often the item must have been

used unlawfully.’* Amicus Br. of Glassman & Browning,

15. The district court correctly rejected the testimony of

Councilwoman Krawczyk and others on this point by ruling that

the ordinance speaks for itself. App. 511-12, 671.

16. Amicus argues that this vagueness leads to absurd

results, by proposing the following hypothetical:

Two defendants sell antique ashtrays to customers who

they know will use the ashtrays in conjunction with mari-

juana. Neither defendant intends that the antique ashtray

be used in connection with illegal drugs, and neither has

designed the ashtray for use with illegal drugs, but one of

them, a former marijuana smoker, has actually used the ash-

tray himself, several years prior to the sale at issue, for

holding the butts of marijuana cigarettes. If both are prose-

(Continued on following page)

A26

Inc., 4, 13, 21. These arguments raise very marginal

problems in the application of the ordinances that do not

suggest the vagueness or overbreadth of the ordinances

in their definition of the normal, general class of offenses.

United States Civil Service Comm’n v. National Ass’n of

Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 578-79 (1973); United States

v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1947). In most cases, an item

will be defined as drug paraphernalia on the basis of its

use when the substantive offense on which the defendant

was arrested and indicted is use of drug paraphernalia.

Amicus’ hypotheticals, which focus on use by the retailer

and then delivery to a buyer seem improbable and far-

fetched. Even if such a sale would occur, the ordinances

make clear the criminal offense of using an item with

controlled substances and then transferring the item,

knowing that the transferee will use the item with con-

trolled substances. The resolution of amicus’ marginal

hypothetical situations must wait until an actual case

arises,’7

Therefore, we conclude that “used” and “intended

for use” are not vague or overbroad in defining drug

paraphernalia."®

Footnote continued—

cuted for a violation of § 620.04(b), one will presumably

be found innocent (for element no. 2 will not have been

satisfied) while the other, the marijuana user, will presum-

ably be guilty. This result would follow even though both

had precisely the same intent and knowledge.

Amicus Br. of Glassman & Browning, Inc., 13.

17. We need not address on this appeal the potential prob-

lems of double jeopardy and of inconsistency with the Ohio statute

on possession of marijuana that may arise upon a criminal convic-

tion under these ordinances.

18. The ordinances of Parma, Lakewood and North Olmsted

avoid the problems of vagueness created by defining drug para-

phernalia in terms of customary or ordinary use. This latter

definition imposes an impossible duty on a person to ferret out

the use of an item that may normally be used in underground,

(Continued on following page)

A27

The phrase “designed for use” is vague and over-

broad.’ The district court in Indiana Chapter, NORML,

Footnote continued—

illegal activity. Record Museum v. Lawrence Township, 481 F.

Supp. 768 (D. N.J., 1979); Riddle v. Clack, No. CA-3-77-0525-D

(N.D. Tex., August 25, 1977). This flawed definition also im-

poses liability on a defendant for the use of an item by another,

without the defendant knowing, intending, or participating in that

use. Id.; Bambu Sales, Inc. v. Gibson, 474 F. Supp. 1297, 1305

(D. N.J. 1979).

19. The district court concluded otherwise:

Although many if not all of the items described in the Ordi-

nance, as well as those introduced as evidence, have nu-

merous legitimate uses, it is possible that an item which has

an innocent use may be proved to have been designed for

use with illegal drugs. As District Judge Boyle noted in her

analysis of the evidence presented in Tobacco Road v. City

of Novi, _..... F. Supp. -...... (E.D. Mich.; Slip Op. C79-71000,

6/21/79):

Defendant also presented two tobacconists who testi-

fied that “paraphernalia” was the trade name for acces-

sories intended to be sold for use with controlled sub-

stances. Reviewing the Nalpac catalogues, with which

each witness was familiar, both identified many pipes

which they described as unsuitable for tobacco use and

designed for use with controlled substances. These opin-

ions were based on the size of the bowl, the material of

the pipe; and the absence of a stem, among other factors.

Each witness testified that small-bowl pipes produce a

short smoking period while tobacco smokers customarily

seek long-smoking pipes and that non-porous materials,

such as metal, glass, and acrylic, were unsuitable for to-

bacco smoking since they condensed rather than absorbed

the mositure generated by lengthy pipe smoking. Each

witnesses [sic] further testified that certain ite:ns in the

catalogue such as razor blades and a “coke” mirror had

absolutely no use in the tobacco industry.

Defendant’s evidence, on the other hand, established

that there are items clearly identifiable as being primarily

adapted or designed for the use of controlled substances.

Indeed, it is inferable that such items are clearly identified

both by manufacturers and by retailers for the com-

mercial purpose of marketing the items to be used with

controlled substances.

This court does not share the concern that the Indiana Dis-

trict Court expressed in NORML v. Sendak, supra at 12, that

the phrase “designed for use” is not of sufficient clarity to

meet the mandate of due process. An item is designed for

(Continued on following page)

A28

Inc. v. Sendak, supra, described well the unconstitutional

ambiguity of this phrase:

The term “designed” could signify only devices

that have no use or function other than as a means

to ingest a controlled substance. Alternatively, “de-

signed” could include any devices that have a legit-

imate function but could be used for ingestion of

drugs. That is, the term “designed” could sweep into

the definition of paraphernalia any device that could

be altered from its normal function to become a make-

shift drug device, such as a paper clip, tie bar, hand

mirror, spoon, or piece of aluminum foil. The defini-

tion “designed for drug use” gives no hint to those

attempting to comply with I.C. 35-48-4-8 what is in-

cluded in the definition. The definition fails to make

clear what items are included in the statutory pro-

hibition and what items are not.

App. 287. The comments to the Model Act indicate that

the ordinances would apply to items which are not solely

designed to be drug paraphernalia. App. 1237. Vague-

ness enters in our case once the ordinances begin to define

drug paraphernalia in terms of the primary adaption or

dominant purpose of the design. Then the definition

begins to depend upon the ingenuity or purpose of the

purchaser rather than the seller and upon the current

practices of the clandestine society of drug users. Geiger

Footnote continued—

use with illegal drugs within the meaning of this Ordinance

if the defendant intentionally—that is voluntarily and not

because of mistake or other innocent reasons—designed or

adapted it for use with drugs, regardless of any innocent

alternative uses.

App. 533.

However, the fact that some items may have a design solely

adapted for use with illegal drugs does not save the ordinances

as drafted from vagueness and overbreadth.

A29

v. City of Eagan, 618 F.2d 26 (8th Cir. 1980); Music Stop,

Inc. v. City of Ferndale, 488 F. Supp. 390 (E.D. Mich.,

1980).

The major ambiguity in defining drug paraphernalia

in terms of the “design” of items is the lack of any design

characteristics that distinguish lawful purposes from un-

lawful purposes. The type of object that can become,

or be used as, drug paraphernalia is limited only by the

imagination of the user. Geiger v. City of Eagan, 618

F.2d at 29. The record in our cases established the ab-

sence of any unique design characteristics.2° Plaintiffs’

expert, Herbert J. Bessai, testified that the size of a pipe,

the presence of a screen or chamber in a pipe, the mate-

rial from which the pipe is made, or the use of ice, water

or air in a pipe does not indicate a design for unlawful

use. He discussed in some detail the lawful uses of all

of these design characteristics.”! According to Bessai, the

various designed pipes have been used lawfully for cen-

turies. Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. at 50. Bessai’s testimony,

as the sole expert at trial on the making and smoking of

pipes, stands unrefuted. When asked directly if Bessai’s

testimony was incorrect, Detective Rutt of the Cleveland

Police Department’s Narcotics Unit testified that he could

not say Bessai was wrong. App. 852. Consequently, we

conclude that defining drug paraphernalia in terms of

“design” is vague and overbroad.

The testimony of Detectives Bennett and Rutt, qual-

ified experts on narcotics law enforcement, shows con-

20. The district court erred in disregarding the evidence in

the record in these cases, and in relying on evidence presented in

another case that was not before it. App. 533 (footnote 5 of dis-

trict court opinion.

21. The District court credited Bessai’s testimony, but did

not use the testimony to find the definition of drug paraphernalia

vague or overbroad. App. 534 (footnote 6 of the district court’s

opinion).

A30

vincingly the danger of arbitrary and discriminatory en-

forcement of the ordinances by the police. Detectives

Bennett and Rutt would arrest any retailer who sold

pipes with screens or chamber pipes, despite the ability

to use these pipes lawfully. App. 712-13, 717-18, 850-51.

Detective Rutt would arrest a retailer operating a “head

shop” if it sold alligator clips or cigarette papers, but

not a drug store owner selling the same items.”* App.

853, 864-65. This testimony suggests that the ordinances

would be enforced only against ‘head shops,” as desig-

nated by the local law enforcement officials. No guide-

lines have been written to prevent such selective dis-

criminatory enforcement. Because the ordinances would

permit at least the arrest and prosecution of persons by

police and prosecutors who claim to know drug parapher-

nalia when they see it, but cannot define it any more

precisely in advance, the definition of drug paraphernalia

is vague and overbroad.”

22. Note the bootstrapping nature of this definition of drug

paraphernalia, because Detective Rutt defined a head shop as a

store selling drug paraphernalia. App. 844.

23. In World Imports, Inc. v. Woodbridge Township, Civil

No. 80-1414 (D.N.J. June 8, 1980), the district court declared:

A number of retail stores commonly called headshops [sic]

specialize in selling drug paraphernalia. Only the naive or

duplicitous would contend that sales of drug paraphernalia by

headshops were intended primarily for such innocent purposes

as making a lamp from a water pipe, fashioning an article of

personal adornment from a cokespoon or feeding wounded

birds with syringes and eyedroppers. The purpose of a head-

shop is to capitalize upon, to perpetuate and augment the cur-

rent interest, particularly among the young, in items which

are obviously intended for the use with illegal drugs.

Tr: 9-10 (oral opinion upholding constitutionality of drug para-

phernalia ordinance based on Model Act). This sentiment is the

driving motivation and the practical theory behind the drug para-

phernalia ordinances. Though based on fact, such an opinion does

not resolve the problem of vagueness in defining drug parapher-

nalia, especially where the record evidence established the ab-

sence of design characteristics peculiar to use with controlled sub-

stances.

A31

The vagueness and overbreadth in the definition of

drug paraphernalia may reflect the failure of the legis-

lators in Parma, Lakewood, and North Olmsted to investi-

gate or study the drug paraphernalia industry. Parma

Mayor Petruska, Councilwoman Krawezyk and Council-

man Labutta each testified at deposition to their total

lack of familiarity with drug paraphernalia and their in-

ability to define it. App. 928-29, 933, 969, 984, 1130, 1140.

Time and time again, they stated that the definition of

drug paraphernalia was the responsibility of the police.

App. 901-02, 930, 985, 1001, 1003. The record shows be-

yond peradventure the legislators’ conscious delegation of

basic policymaking decisions to the police, prosecutors,

and juries. Due process forbids such delegation of legisla-

tive responsibility. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. at 575;

Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. at 108.

Because the definition of drug paraphernalia is vague

and overbroad, the ordinances must be declared unconsti-

tutional. The explicit terms of the ordinances, unlike the

Model Act, limit severability to the section describing the

substantive offenses. Therefore, the defective parts of the

definition cannot be severed. Moreover, the vagueness

and overbreadth of the definition infect the whole ordi-

nance.

Other parts of the ordinances have also been spiritedly

contested. Plaintiffs argue that the ordinances create an

irrebutable or rebuttable presumption that any item listed

in subsection (L) of the definitional section is drug para-

phernalia. They contend that the presumption, whether

irrebutable or rebuttable, is not supported by inferences

based on fact. County Court of Ulster County v. Allen,

442 U.S. 140 (1979).

We agree with the district court that the listed items

are not presumed to be drug paraphernalia. World Im-

A32

ports, Inc. v. Woodbridge Township, Civil No. 80-1414 (D.

N.J. June 8, 1980) at 13. Because the ordinances define

drug paraphernalia in terms of its use, intended use or

designed use, and because the phrase “such ae” introduces

the lists, the statutory language indicates that the listed

items are only examples of items which could be drug

paraphernalia. The comments to the Model Act also ex-

plain the list of items as “a detailed description of common

forms of property that can fall within the definition of

drug paraphernalia if used, intended for use, or designed

for use to violate the drug laws.” App. 1238 (emphasis

added). The statements of Deputy Assistant Attorney

General Nathan and DEA Administrator Bensinger would

tend to confirm, when read as a whole, that the list of

items is intended to serve as examples to help clarify

the definition of drug paraphernalia. App. 1064, 1217, 1219.

Furthermore, since the listed items have many lawful uses,

it is evident that the list could serve only as an example

of possible forms of drug paraphernalia. Interpreting the

listed items as drug paraphernalia per se would clearly

make the ordinances vague and overbroad.

The items listed in subsection (L) as common forms

of drug paraphernalia are described clearly for the most

part. Certain items, such as chillums, bongs, and carbure-

tion tubes and devices, are probably not familiar to the

ordinary businessman or consumer. See Depo. of Victor

Labutta, App. 1140. The comments to the Model Act sug-

gests the common usage and understanding of this

terminology among drug users and drug merchants. App.

1238. Of course, the prosecutor would have to prove the

existence of such trade argot and the defendant’s under-

standing of it. Otherwise, the danger exists that a law-

abiding businessman could be arrested, prosecuted, and

convicted on the basis of definitions known only to drug

merchants and users.

A33

The purpose of listing the common forms of drug

paraphernalia is to lend precision to the definition in order

to give more specific notice to persons potentially subject

to the ordinances. The descriptions of “roach clips” and

“miniature cocaine spoons” do not fulfill this purpose. A

roach clip is defined as any object that can be used to

hold the short end of a burning marijuana cigarette. Only

the imagination of the user limits the number of things

fitting this definition. All of these things, such as alli-

gator clips, tweezers, and paper clips, have predominantly

lawful, beneficial uses. Thus, the description of roach

clips does not identify the objects potentially covered by

the ordinances. Moreover, prohibiting the use or sale of

roach clips leads to absurd results. A smoker of a mari-

juana cigarette is potentially subject to a greater penalty

for using a paper clip to finish smoking the butt, than

for possession of the marijuana itself.

The description of a “miniature cocaine spoon” does

not give any precision to the definition of drug parapher-

nalia. The testimony demonstrates that any spoon used

for ingesting cocaine is very small. App. 861, 1131, 1203.

Does the ordinance intend to proscribe the miniature ver-

sion of an already very small spoon? Another problem

is simply the lack of any objective measure on the size

of a spoon which falls within the definition of drug para-

phernalia. Magnani v. City of Ames, No. 80-229-A (S.

D. Iowa, July 21, 1980); Music Stop, Inc. v. City of Fern-

dale, 488 F. Supp. at 393. But see: Tobacco Road v.

City of Novi, supra. Again, the description of a “mini-

ature cocaine spoon” does no+ fulfill the purpose of giv-

ing specific notice of the itezns prohibited by the ordi-

nances.

The ordinances have included a list of “logically rele-

vant factors” to be considered by the court, jury, prose-

A34

cutor, and police in determining whether an object is “drug

paraphernalia.” Plaintiffs argue that several of the factors

violate the state and federal rules of evidence. The draft-

ers of the Model Act set forth this list to minimize the

risk of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. They

did not intend the list to supercede any rules of evidence

or to interfere with the fact-finding of the trier of fact.

App. 1238. It is most likely that the Ohio courts would

interpret the ordinance in the manner intended by the

drafters of the Model Act.

Nevertheless, two comments are necessary on the proof

of an offense under the drug paraphernalia ordinances.**

First, it is most clear, from our previous discussion of

design characteristics, that the defendant’s intent for an-

other person to use an item for the ingestion of controlled

substances cannot be inferred from the item itself. Wit-

nesses declared numerous times that the intended use of

an object could be inferred from the object itself. App.

850-51, 857-59, 861-62, 865, 867, 869, 878-79, 1137-39, 1186.

However, because the objects have many lawful uses, and

because the design characteristics do not distinguish objects

intended for lawful use from objects intended for unlawful

uses, the object by itself does not provide any basis for

an inference of its intended use. Intent can be inferred

from the defendant’s statements to a purchaser, the man-

ner in which the defendant display or advertised an item,

or the instructions given by the defendant on the use

of an item with drugs.

A second flaw in the list of “logically relevant factors”

is the potential arrest, prosecution, or conviction of a person

on the impermissible theory of guilt by association. See

24. We agree with the district court, for the reasons stated by

the district court, that the factor of being a “legitimate supplier”

is both vague and overbroad. This factor has been deleted from

all three ordinances.

A35

Templeton v. United States, 151 F.2d 706 (6th Cir. 1945).

The factors include the proximity in time and space to

a direct violation of the drug laws or to the presence

of controlled substances, the statements of others, and

the advertising of others. Thus, a retailer, for example,

to avoid arrest, prosecution, or conviction, must continu-

ously police the national and local media and the activities

and statements of persons in the area of his store. The

retailer could be safe from arrest on Monday morning

when no one congregated near his store or the local nar-

cotics dealer was on the other side of town, yet be very

susceptible to arrest Monday afternoon when, unknown

to the retailer, the narcotics dealer arrived around the

corner from his store, attracting a group of persons who

bought marijuana or other controlled subs’ ances and then

came into his retail store to buy rolling papers, alligator

clips, or pipes. In short, the ordinances permit events

beyond the control of the retail owner to determine his

guilt. The danger is that the ordinances could be applied

to make a crime out of constitutionally protected or inno-

cent conduct because of the actions or statements by per-

sons other than the defendant. It is well established that

guilt must be based on personal action, statements, or

knowledge, not on association with other persons suspected

of criminal conduct. Sawyer v. Sandstrom, 615 F.2d 311,

316-17 (5th Cir. 1980).*° Because Ohio law naturally in-

25. In Sawyer, the petitioner had been convicted under a

Dade County, Florida loitering ordinance that made criminal “the

act of standing” when “a person... knowingly loiters in any

place with one or more persons knowing that a narcotic or dan-

gerous drug... is being unlawfully used or possessed.” The pe-

titioner was convicted for standing next to a drug dealer while

the dealer sold narcotics. The petitioner did not have any business

association with the drug dealer and knew him only as a friend.

The Fifth Circuit held the ordinance to be overbroad, in that it

unnecessarily infringed on the First Amendment right of as-

sociation. More than association with a felon was required to

sustain a criminal conviction. See also, Coates v. City of Cincin-

nati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203

(1961).

A36

corporates this principle of due process, we need not de-

clare the list of logically relevant factors overbroad on

its face. City of Cincinnati v. Hoffman, 31 Ohio St. 2d

163, 166, 285 N.E.2d 714 (1972), cert. denied and appeal

dismissed, 410 U.S. 920 (1973).

(2) Offenses

Plaintiffs levy two attacks on the definition of the sub-

stantive offenses. First, plaintiffs contend that the standard

of scienter must be “specific intent” to avoid the problem

of vagueness. The ordinances provide for “knowledge” as

the scienter requirement. Second, plaintiffs argue that the

prohibition on advertising is overbroad in its coverage of

area and its impact on content.

Scienter may save a statute from vagueness and over-

breadth by providing fair notice of proscribed conduct and

by distinguishing lawful from unlawful conduct. Colten

v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972); City of Columbus v. Sch-

warzwalder, 39 Ohio St.2d 61, 313 N.E.2d 798 (1974) (per

curiam). However, scienter by itself may not be sufficient

to save the constitutionality of a statute. “While the Su-

preme Court has held that some statutes must fall as im-

permissibly vague in the absence of a scienter requirement,

. . and while that court has held that the presence of a

scienter element may save a statute which otherwise

would be unconstitutionally vague, ... the Supreme Court

has never to our knowledge held that the imposition of a

scienter element upon a statute necessarily renders the

statute’s prohibitions sufficiently precise to withstand a

vagueness challenge.” Amusement Devices Ass’n v. Ohio,

443 F.Supp. at 1050-51. Accord, State v. Young, 62 Ohio

St.2d at 375-78, 406 N.E.2d at 503-505. Therefore, the effect

of the scienter standard on the vagueness and overbreadth

of a statute must be examined on a case-by-case basis in

the context of the particular statute at issue.

A37

The drug paraphernalia ordinances prohibit the de-

livery or manufacture, the possession with intent to deliver,

and the manufacture with intent to deliver of drug para-

phernalia, “knowing, or under circumstances where one

reasonably should know,” that it will be used with con-

trolled substances.”* The ordinances further make unlaw-

ful the placement of any advertisement in any printed

publication “knowing, or under circumstances where one

reasonably should know,” that the purpose of the advertise-

ment, in whole or in part, is to promote the sale of objects

intended for use or designed for use as drug paraphernalia.”

The ordinances do not define “knowledge” or “reason to

know.” Since municipal ordinances must be consistent with

general state law, presumably the definition of “knowing”

in Ohio Rev. Code § 2901.22(B) would pertain. According

to this definition “[a] person acts knowingly, regardless of

his purpose, when he is aware that his conduct will prob-

ably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain

nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when

he is aware that such circumstances probably exist.” The

drafters of the Model Act would define “knowledge”

similarly as “actual knowledge” or awareness of a “high

probability” that a certain consequence will follow one’s

action. App. 1241.

The requirement of knowledge on the part of the de-

fendant, when coupled with use or intended for use in the

definition of drug paraphernalia, does provide adequate

notice and does sufficiently prevent arrest, prosecution or

conviction of persons for innocent activities or mistake.

As stated by the district court, “convicting an individual of

selling drug paraphernalia under the ordinance requires

proof of distribution of an item by an individual who in-

26. We perceive no due process problems with the prohibition

=" use of, or possession with intent to use, drug parapher-

nalia,

A38

tends it for use with illegal drugs knowing that it will be

so used. Clearly this is not an innocent transaction.” Un-

like Amusement Devices Ass’n v. Ohio, the knowledge is

that of unlawful activities only. 443 F. Supp. at 1051. A

person who acts with knowledge that the action will aid in

criminal conduct can be held criminally responsible.

United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422

(1978); Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S.

337 (1952).

Plaintiffs rely primarily on United States v. Bryant,

461 F.2d 912 (6th Cir. 1972) and Screws v. United States,

325 U.S. 91 (1945) to argue that due process requires proof

of specific intent to violate or aid in the violation of the

drug laws. Specific intent, in the case of the drug para-

phernalia ordinances, would be manufacture, delivery or

sale of an item to another person with the intent that that

person use the item unlawfully with controlled substances.

Both Bryant and Screws are inapposite. Bryant holds

that specific intent must be proven in a prosecution for

aiding and abetting. Specific intent is necessary in such

cases of derivative criminality, as Circuit Judge Learned

Hand explained so well in United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d

401 (2d Cir. 1938). However, the drug paraphernalia or-

dinances do not penalize persons for aiding another person

to violate the drug laws. The person faces criminal li-

ability for his own actions, such as sale or manufacture of

items defined as drug paraphernalia, combined with knowl-

edge that the individual to whom the drug paraphernalia

was delivered will use it to ingest narcotics. Screws re-

quired proof of specific intent for violations of 18 U.S.C.

§§ 241 and 242, because the range of constitutional rights

protected by these criminal statutes was constantly chang-

ing. 325 U.S. at 104. In contrast, the drug paraphernalia

ordinances are self-inclusive, and the problems of vague-

A39

ness must be cured by precisely defining drug paraphernalia

and the substantive offense.

Amicus argues, by proposing a hypothetical situation,

that the requirement of knowledge is not sufficient to in-

form a person of the criminality of one’s action:

A saleswoman working in the cosmetics section of a

fashionable department store sells a beautiful compact

to a well-dressed woman who, pleased with her new

purchase, announces that the compact and mirror inside

it will be perfect for holding and preparing cocaine.

The saleswoman may have fair warning that her cus-

tomer is planning to engage in illegal conduct but

because of the vagueness of the Ordinance as to the

items covered and the ordinarily innocent nature of

the transaction, she in no sense can be said to have fair

warning that her conduct is criminal.

Amicus Br. of Glassman & Browning, Inc. at 29.

Amicus overlooks the fact that a person is not guilty

unless the item falls within the definition of drug para-

phernalia. Thus, use or intent to use an item in connection

with controlled substances must also be proven. In the

hypothetical situation suggested by amicus, the absence of

use or intended use by the sales clerk results in the com-

pact not being drug paraphernalia as defined by the ordi-

nances. The definition of drug paraphernalia in terms of

“use or intended for use” adds in part the extra measure of

protection sought by plaintiffs in arguing for a scienter

requirement of specific intent.?’

27. We also note that Ohio defines many crimes, such as

voluntary manslaughter and felonious assault, in terms of a know-

ing act. Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2903.03, 2903.11. Whether a legisla-

ture requires an intentional act or simply a knowing act is its

prerogative so long as the statute gives sufficient notice of the

conduct made criminal.

A40

The “reason to know” standard is vague and over-

broad.** The district court aptly remarked: “Defining

the offense of knowingly distributing drug paraphernalia

in terms of the weakness of an individual’s ability to per-

ceive rather than his criminal intent provides insufficient

guidance to the distributors covered by this subsection and

to those persons charged wtih the responsibility of en-

forcing it.” See also: Knoedler v. Roxbury Township,

485 F. Supp. 990, 993 (D.N.J. 1980). But see: World Im-

ports, Inc. v. Woodbridge Township, supra at 14-15. De-

tective Bennett testified that the police would not know

how to enforce the “reason to know” standard. App. 742.

Because most uses of the outlawed items are lawful and

common, the “reason to know” standard is too open-ended

and too susceptible to misapplication to satisfy the dictates

of due process.*°

Plaintiffs contend that the prohibition of advertising,

which promotes, in whole or in part, the use or sale of

drug paraphernalia, unnecessarily infringes on the First

Amendment right of free speech. The ordinances are

drafted with a broad brush to apply to any person, pub-

lisher, printer or advertiser, who places an advertisement

in the print media. The ordinances also apply without

limitation to the location of the placement of the advertise-

ments or the location at which the advertised items are

available. Plaintiffs argue that the ordinances also would

proscribe protected speech debating the current drug laws

28. This issue is not moot on appeal, since the Parma and

North Olmsted ordinances still incorporate the “reason to know”

standard in § 620.04(c).

29. The district court in World Imports, Inc. reasoned that

the “reason to know” standard could be proven as well as actual

knowledge. However, this reasoning does not respond to the

problems of vagueness or overbreadth.

30. The district court correctly decided to sever this phrase

from the ordinances.

A4l1

or extolling virtues of the use of drugs. Defendants reply

that the limitations on their organic jurisdiction under

state law must be read into the language of the ordinances,

and that, consequently, the ordinances do not exceed per-

missible bounds with respect to the location of the pro-

hibited acts. Defendants argue that the prohibition of

advertising is constitutional, because only the advertising

of illegal activity is proscribed.

Commercial speech is deserving of First Amendment

protection. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public

Service Comm’n of New York, 48 U.S.L.W. 4783 (June 20,

1980). However, the different nature of commercial

speech from non-commercial speech cricumscribes to some

extent the measure of First Amendment protection af-

forded it. For example, the overbreadth doctrine per-

mitting jus tertii and the prohibition against prior re-

straints have no force in the context of commercial speech.

Id. at 4785 n. 6, 8; Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10

(1979). After some initial confusion on the degree of

protection to be given commercial speech, the Supreme

Court in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. stated the

definitive rule:

In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part

analysis has developed. At the outset, we must deter-

mine whether the expression is protected by the First

Amendment. For commercial speech to come within

that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity

and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the

asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both

inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine

whether the regulation directly advances the govern-

mental interest asserted, and whether it is not more

extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.

48 U.S.L.W. at 4785.

A42

Our first question is whether the ordinances prohibit

only unlawful activity.** The ordinances forbid the use, sale,

or manufacture of drug paraphernalia. Because the force

of each ordinance stops at the city limits, the use, sale or

manufacture of drug paraphernalia is unlawful only in

Parma, Lakewood, and North Olmsted. Consequently, the

ordinances may prohibit the placement of advertisements

only within the city limits about “drug paraphernalia”

available within the city limits. The ordinances, as now

drafted, could infringe on protected speech in at least three

different ways. First, the ordinances could be enforced

against advertisers or publishers who place advertisements

in printed media that circulates in other cities as well as

Parma, Lakewood, and North Olmsted. Second, the ordi-

nances could prevent the residents of these three cities

from receiving information about the availability of items,

defined by the ordinances as drug paraphernalia, in other

cities that do not prohibit the use, sale or manufacture

of those items. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 824-25

(1975). Third, the ordinances’ use of the words “promote

in part” may allow the ban of speech discussing the reform

of drug laws or speech glorifying the drug culture. See

Amusement Devices Ass’n v. Ohio, 443 F. Supp. at 1051

(“facilitate”). Though the comments to the Model Act

indicate that such speech would not be proscribed, the

statutory language on its face is not so restricted. Thus,

we conclude that the ordinances do penalize protected

speech.

The regulatory interest of Parma, Lakewood and North

Olmsted in stopping drug abuse is plainly substantial. Al-

31. The Supreme Court declared in Pittsburgh Press Co. v.

Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388 (1973):

“We have no doubt that a newspaper constitutionally could be

forbidden to publish a want ad proposing a sale of narcotics or

soliciting prostitutes.” Clearly, advertising about the availability

of drug paraphernalia in Parma can be prohibited.

A43

so, the broad regulation would seem to advance this interest

directly, though its effectiveness may be questioned. Thus,

we arrive at the critical question of whether the broad

prohibition is more extensive than necessary to serve this

interest. That the ordinances would substantially curtail

a broad range of protected speech cannot be disputed.

Also, the ordinances clearly reach beyond the city limits.

The cities can legitimately protect their citizens from the

use, sale, or manufacture of “drug paraphernalia” within

city limits. However, an impenetrable wall against the

free flow of commercial speech cannot be erected around

the cities’ residents. The cities’ interest in regulation

of advertising is limited to preventing the sale of drug

paraphernalia inside their municipal boundaries. Their

legitimate interest does not include regulating the informa-

tion heard or read by their citizens about the availability

of legal “drug paraphernalia” in other locales. Bigelow

v. Virginia, 421 U.S. at 827. Hence, the ordinances ex-

ceed the scope of the legitimate interest of Parma, Lake-

wood, and North Olmsted in prohibiting the advertising

of drug paraphernalia. As the state courts could not pro-

vide a saving construction of the ordinances without sub-

stantial rewriting, we must declare this subsection of the

ordinances unconstitutional for violating the First Amend-

ment right of free speech.*”

VI.

The final issue is the propriety of injunctive relief in

addition to declaratory relief. Proper regard for the prin-

ciples of federalism obligate federal courts to grant the

relief which will intrude least on the enactment and en-

forcement of state criminal laws. Yet while sitting in

32. This section of the ordinances is also vague and over-

broad, as discussed above, for its use of the terms “reasonably

should know” and “designed for.”

A44

equity, a federal court also has the duty of awarding

the successful plaintiff full and effective relief. ‘At the

conclusion of a successful federal challenge to a state stat-

ute r local ordinance, a district court can generally pro-

tect the interests of a federal plaintiff by entering a de-

claratory judgment, and therefore the stronger injunctive

medicine will be unnecessary.” Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc.,

422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975). However, injunctive relief will

be granted if plaintiff has made “a clear showing that

an injunction is necessary in order to afford adequate

protection of constitutional rights.” Wooley v. Maynard,

430 U.S. 705, 712 (1977), quoting Spielman Motor Sales

Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89, 95 (1935). See also Douglas

v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157, 163-64 (1943). Injunc-

tive relief is often warranted when th2 plaintiff seeks

prospective relief against possible future state proceedings

in order to alleviate the present deterrent effect of the

state statute or local ordinance on his constitutionally pro-

tected or otherwise lawful conduct. Steffel v. Thompson,

415 U.S. at 463 n. 12. The crux of the inquiry is a showing

of irreparable injury necessitating equitable relief, despite

the countervailing values of federalism.

The irreparable injury to the plaintiffs’ businesses is

unquestionable. They do face a genuine threat of arrest

and prosecution if the injunctions were vacated. The

threat of enforcement of the ordinances would compel

plaintiffs to forego a substantial part of their business.

Moreover, the ordinances infringe impermissibility on the

protected commercial speech of plaintiffs. Plaintiffs seek

only prospective relief against local ordinances that have

never been enforced. We have found the ordinances to

be constitutionally defective in several significant respects.

Therefore, we hold that the award of injunctive relief

is necessary to protect plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.

A45

The grant of injunctive relief does not reflect any

disrespect for the city officials or any concern on our

part that the municipalities would not comply with a de-

claratory judgment. Defendants have exhibited consider-

able solicitude throughout the proceedings in federal court

for the protection of the constitutional rights of plaintiffs.

The defendants acted expeditiously to conform their ordi-

nances to the district court’s opinion, though their efforts

fell a little short of full conformity. We harbor no doubts

that the municipal officials will continue to perform their

duty to safeguard the public safety and welfare with due

respect for the constitutional principles that have served

our nation well for over two hundred years.

Our opinion questions not the laudable goals of the

cities’ elected officials, but the means chosen to implement

their goals. We are most cognizant of the serious problem

of drug abuse long existing in our nation. We hold only

that the drug paraphernalia ordinances fail the test of

precision demanded by the First and Fourteenth Amend-

ments of the Constitution.

V.

The judgment of the district court is reversed and

the case is remanded for issuance of a permanent injunc-

tion prohibiting the enforcement of the drug paraphernalia

ordinances in the cities of Parma, Lakewood, and North

Olmsted.

A46

ADDENDUM

ORDINANCE NO. 242-79

BY: DORIS KRAWCZYK, GERALD BOLDT, FRANK

HOUDEK, EVELYN KOPCHAK, JACK KRISE,

VICTOR LABUTTA, JOSEPH MOLODEC, WIL-

LIAM OBUCH

AN ORDINANCE ENACTING NEW SECTIONS

620.01(dd) AND 620.04 TO THE CODIFIED ORDI-

NANCES OF THE CITY OF PARMA, PROHIBIT-

ING THE SALE OF DRUG KELATED PARAPHER-

NALIA, AND DECLARING AN EMERGENCY

WHEREAS, this Council has become aware of and is

concerned over the general proliferation of “head shops”

engaged in the sale of paraphernalia associated with drug

use; and

WHEREAS, this Council finds that such establishments

serve only to entice young people to abuse substances which

are known to be harmful and unsafe for human consump-

tion; and

WHEREAS, this Council finds that this situation has

created a problem of such large proportion as to necessitate

further legislation on the subject; Now, Therefore,

BE IT ORDAINED BY THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF

PARMA, STATE OF OHIO:

Section 1. That Codified Ordinance 620.01, as enacted

by Ordinance 228-75, passed February 2, 1976, is hereby

amended by adding the following language:

“620.01 DEFINITIONS.

(dd) (1) “Drug Paraphernalia” means all equipment,

products and materials of any kind which are

A47

used, intended for use, or designed for use, in

planting, propagating, cultivating, growing, har-

vesting, manufacturing, compounding, converting,

producing, processing, preparing, testing, analyz-

ing, packaging, repackaging, storing, containing,

concealing, injecting, ingesting, inhaling, or other-

wise introducing into the human body a controlled

substance in violation of this Chapter. It includes,

but is not limited to:

(A) Kits used, intended for use, or designed for

use in planting, propagating, cultivating,

growing or harvesting of any species of plant

which is a controlled substance or from

which a controlled substance can be derived;

(B) Kits used, intended for use, or designed for

use in manufacturing, compounding, convert-

ing, producing, processing, or preparing con-

trolled substances;

(C) Isomerization devices used, intended for use,

or designed for use in increasing the potency

of any species of plant which is a controlled

substance;

(D) Testing equipment used, intended for use, or

designed for use in identifying, or in analyz-

ing the strength, effectiveness or purity of

controlled substances;

(E) Scales and balances used, intended for use, or

designed for use in weighing or measuring

controlled substances;

(F) Diluents and adulterants, such as quinine hy-

drochloride, mannitol, mannite, dextrose and

lactose, used, intended for use, or designed

for use in cutting controlled substances;

A48

(G) Separation gins and sifters used, intended for

use, or designed for use in removing twigs

and weeds from, or in otherwise cleaning or

refining, marihuana;

(H) Blenders, bowls, containers, spoons and mix-

(I)

ing devices used, intended for use, or de-

signed for use in compounding controlled

substances;

Capsules, balloons, envelopes and other con-

tainers used, intended for use, or designed

for use in packaging small quantities of con-

trolled substances;

(J) Containers and other objects used, intended

for use, or designed for use in storing or con-

cealing controlled substances;

(K) Hypodermic syringes, needles and other ob-

jects used, intended for use, or designed for

use in parenterally injecting controlled sub-

stances into the human body;

(L) Objects used, intended for use, or designed

for use in ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise

introducing marihuana, cocaine, hashish, or

hashish oil into the human body, such as:

(i) Metal, wooden, acrylic, glass, stone,

plastic, or ceramic pipes with or with-

out screens, permanent screens, has-

hish heads, or punctured metal bowls;

(ii) Water pipes;

(iii) Carburetion tubes and devices;

(iv) Smoking and carburetion masks;

(v)

(vi)

(vii)

(viii)

(ix)

(x)

(xi)

(xii)

(xiii)

A49

Roach clips: meaning objects used to

hold burning material, such as mari-

huana cigarette, that has become too

small or too short to be held in the

hand;

Miniature cocaine spoons, and cocaine

vials;

Chamber pipes;

Carburetor pipes;

Electric pipes;

Air-driven pipes;

Chillums;

Bongs;

Ice pipes or chillers;

2. In determining whether an object is “Drug para-

phernalia,” a court or other authority should con-

sider, in addition to all other logically relevant fac-

tors, the following:

(A) Statements by an owner or by anyone in con-

trol of the object concerning its use;

(B) Prior convictions, if any, of an owner, or of

anyone in control of the object, under any

City, State, or Federal law relating to any con-

trolled substance;

(C) The proximity of the object, in time and space,

to a direct violation of this Chapter;

(D) The proximity of the object to controlled sub-

stances;

(E) The existence of any residue of controlled sub-

stances on the object;

(F)

(G)

(H)

(I)

(J)

(K)

(L)

A50

Direct or circumstantial evidence of the intent

of an owner, or of anyone in control of the

object to deliver it to persons whom he knows,

or should reasonably know, intend to use the

object to facilitate a violation of this Chapter;

the innocence of an owner or of anyone in

control of the object, as to a direct violation

of this Chapter shall not prevent a finding that

the object is intended for use, or designed for

use as “Drug paraphernalia;”

Instructions, oral or written, provided with the

object concerning its use;

Descriptive materials accompanying the ob-

ject which explain or depict its use;

National and local advertising concerning its

use;

The manner in which the object is displayed

for sale;

Whether the owner, or anyone in control of

the object, is a legitimate supplier of like or

related items to the community, such as a li-

censed distributor or dealer of tobacco prod-

ucts;

Direct or circumstantial evidence of the ratio

of sales of the object(s) to the total sales of

the business enterprise;

(M) The existence and scope of legitimate uses for

(N)

the object in the community;

Expert testimony concerning its use.

A51

Section 2. That there is hereby enacted a new section

620.04 of the Codified Ordinances of the City of Parma

which shall read as follows:

“620.04 POSSESSION, MANUFACTURE, AND

SALE OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIS.

(a) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to

possess with intent to use, drug paraphernalia to plant,

propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, com-

pound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, ana-

lyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, in-

gest, inhale, or otherwise introduce into the human

body a controlled substance in violation of this Chap-

ter.

(b) It is unlawful for any person to deliver, sell,

possess with intent to deliver or sell, or manufacture

with intent to deliver or sell, drug paraphernalia,

knowing, or under circumstances where one reasonably

should know, that it will be used to plant, propagate,

cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, con-

vert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack,

repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale,

or otherwise introduce into the human body a con-

trolled substance in violation of this Chapter.

(c) It is unlawful for any person to place in

any newspaper, magazine, handbill, or other publica-

tion any advertisement, knowing, or under circum-

stances where one reasonably should know, that the

purpose of the advertisement, in whole or in part,

is to promote the sale of objects designed or intended

for use as drug paraphernalia.

(d) Any person 18 years of age or over who

violates paragraph (b) by delivering drug parapher-

nalia to a person under 18 years of age who is at

least 3 years his junior is guilty of a special offense.

A52

(e) This section does not apply to manufacturers,

practitioners, pharmacists, owners of pharmacies and

other persons whose conduct was in accordance with

Ohio R.C. Chapters 3719, 4715, 4729, 4731 and 4741.

This section shall not be construed to prohibit any

possession, manufacture, or use of hypodermics made

lawful by Section 620.09 of the Codified Ordinances.

(f) Any drug paraphernalia used in violation of

this section shall be seized and forfeited to the Mu-

nicipality.

(g) If any provision of this section or the appli-

cation thereof to any person or circumstance is held

invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions

or applications of the section which can be given effect

without the invalid provision or application, and to

this end the provisions of this section are severable.

(h) Whoever violates any of the provisions of

paragraphs (a), (b), or (c) is guilty of a misdemeanor

of the second degree. If the offender has previously

been convicted of a violation of paragraphs (a), (b),

or (c), any subsequent violation of the same paragraph

is a misdemeanor of the first degree. Whoever vio-

lates any of the provisions of paragraph (d) is guilty

of a misdemeanor of the first degree.”

Section 3. That Section 620.04 of the Codified Ordi-

nances, as enacted by Ordinance 228-75, passed Febru-

ary 2, 1976, be, and hereby it is, repealed.

Section 4. That this Ordinance is hereby declared

to be an emergency measure necessary for the immediate

preservation of the public health, safety and welfare of

the City of Parma, and for the further reason that sale

and use of drug paraphernalia is a presently-existing and

serious danger to youths which requires immediate regula-

A53

tion, and this Ordinance shall become immediately effec-

tive upon receiving the affirmative vote of two-thirds of

all members elected to Council and approval of the Mayor,

otherwise from and after the earliest period allowed by

law.

PASSED: January 7,1980 /s/ Kenneth G. Kuczma

ATTEST: PRESIDENT OF COUNCIL

/s/ Bernard J.Survoy APPROVED: January 9, 1980

a te See Betresdis

FILED WITH THE MAYOR, CITY OF PARMA,

MAYOR: January 9, 1980 OHIO

A54

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION OF THE UNITED

STATES DISTRICT COURT IN RECORD REVO-

LUTION NO. 6, INC, v. CITY OF PARMA, ET AL.

(Filed April 14, 1980)

CASE NO. C80-38

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

For THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

RECORD REVOLUTION NO. 6, INC.,

Plaintiff,

Vv.

CITY OF PARMA, OHIO, et al.,

Defendants.

Judge John M. Manos

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

On January 10, 1980 the plaintiff, Record Revolution

No. 6, Inc., filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 chal-

lenging the constitutionality of City of Parma Ordinance

No. 242-79, an ordinance regulating the distribution, ad-

vertisement and use of “drug paraphernalia.” The plain-

tiff’s verified complaint seeks declaratory as well as in-

junctive relief. This court’s subject-matter jurisdiction is

based upon 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(3), 2201, and 2202. On

January 11, 1980 a hearing was held on the motion for a

temporary restraining order filed by the plaintiff with its

complaint. At the hearing the defendants agreed not to

pursue enforcement of the Ordinance until a decision in this

case could be reached on the merits. By agreement of

A55

the parties, the court then ordered the preliminary and

permanent injunction to be consolidated for hearing. See

Rule 65(a) (2), FED. R. CIV. P. On January 28 and 30,

1980 the hearing on the permanent injunction was held and

thereafter, in accordance with the schedule set by the court,

the plaintiff submitted its post-trial brief on February 15,

1980 and the defendants submitted theirs on February 25,

1980. On February 29, 1980 the City of Lakewood, Ohio,

which enacted an ordinance substantially identical to

Parma’s No. 242-79 on January 21, 1980, filed an amicus

curiae brief." On March 3, 1980 the plaintiff filed its reply

brief. For the reasons discussed below, the court concludes

that Parma Ordinance No, 242-79 is constitutional as it is

construed herein.

I.

Record Revolution No. 6, Inc. is an Ohio corporation

which operates a retail business at 7703 Wes‘ Ridgewood

Drive, Parmatown Mall, Parma, Ohio. The plaintiff dis-

plays and advertises various items including recorded and

taped music as well as “miscellaneous novelty items.”

(Complaint, {[ 1). The defendants are: the City of Parma

(a municipal corporation organized under the laws of

Ohio), John Petruska (the Mayor of Parma), Andrew Boy-

ko (the Director of Law and Chief Prosecutor of Parma),

Francis Szabo (Chief of the Parma Police Department),

as well as Kenneth Kuczma, Victor Labutta, Frank Houdek,

Joseph Molodec, Evelyn Kopchak, Gerald Boldt, Edward

Lonjak, Doris Krawczyk and William Obuch (the members

of the Parma City Council).

On January 7, 1980 the Council of the City of Parma,

Ohio enacted Ordinance No. 242-79: “An Ordinance Enact-

ing New Sections 620.01(dd) and 620.04 To The Codified

Ordinances of The City of Parma, Prohibiting the Sale of

Drug Related Paraphernalia.” On January 9, 1980 the

A56

Ordinance was signed into law by the city’s Mayor, de-

fendant Petruska. Ordinance No. 242-79 provides as fol-

lows:

“WHEREAS, this Council has become aware of and is

concerned over the general proliferation of “head shops”

engaged in the sale of paraphernalia associated with drug

use; and

WHEREAS, this Council finds that such establishments

serve only to entice young people to abuse substances which

are known to be harmful and unsafe for human consump-

tion; and

WHEREAS, this Council finds that this situation has

created a problem of such large proportion as to necessitate

further legislation on the subject; Now, Therefore,

BE IT ORDAINED BY THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF

PARMA, STATE OF OHIO:

Section 1. That Codified Ordinance 620.01, as enacted

by Ordinance 228-75, passed February 2, 1976, is hereby

amended by adding the following language:

620.01 DEFINITIONS.

(dd)(1) “Drug Paraphernalia” means all equipment,

products and materials of any kind which are used,

intended for use, or designed for use, in planting,

propagating, cultivating, growing, harvesting, manu-

facturing, compounding, converting, producing,

processing, preparing, testing, analyzing, packag-

ing, repackaging, storing, containing, concealing, in-

jecting, ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise introduc-

ing into the human body a controlled substance in

violation of this Chapter. It includes, but is not

limited to:

A57

(A) Kits used, intended for use, or designed for

use in planting, propagating, cultivating, grow-

ing or harvesting of any species of plant which

is a controlled substance or from which a con-

trolled substance can be derived;

(B) Kits used, intended for use, or designed for use

in manufacturing, compounding, converting,

producing, processing, or preparing controlled

substances;

(C) Isomerization devices used, intended for use,

or designed for use in increasing the potency

of any species of plant which is a controlled

substance;

(D) Testing equipment used, intended for use, or

designed for use in identifying, or in analyz-

‘ing the strength, effectiveness or purity of

controlled substances;

(E) Scales and balances used, intended for use, or

designed for use in weighing or measuring con-

trolled substances;

(F) Diluents and adulterants, such as quinine hy-

drochloride, mannitol, mannite, dextrose and

lactose, used, intended for use, or designed for

use in cutting controlled substances;

(G) Separation gins and sifters used, intended for

(H)

use, or designed for use in removing twigs and

seeds from, or in otherwise cleaning or re-

fining, marihuana;

Blenders, bowls, containers, spoons and mixing

devices used, intended for use, or designed

for use in compounding controlled substances;

A58

(I) Capsules, balloons, envelopes or other con-

tainers used, intended for use, or designed for

use in packaging small quantities of controlled

substances;

(J) Containers and other objects used, intended

for use, or designed for use in storing or con-

cealing controlled substances;

(K) Hypodermic syringes, needles and other ob-

jects used, intended for use, or designed for

use in parenterally injecting controlled sub-

stances into the human body;

(L) Objects used, intended for use, or designed for

use in ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise intro-

ducing marihuana, cocaine, hashish, or hashish

oil into the human body, such as:

(i) Metal, wooden, acrylic, glass, stone,

plastic, or ceramic pipes with or with-

out screens, permanent screens, hashish

heads, or punctured metal bowls;

(ii) Water pipes;

(iii) Carburetion tubes and devices;

(iv) Smoking and carburetion masks;

(v) Roach clips: meaning objects used to

hold burning material, such as a mari-

huana cigarette, that has become too

small or too short to be held in the

hand;

(vi) Miniature cocaine spoons, and cocaine

vials;

(vii) Chamber pipes;

(viii) Carburetor pipes;

A59

(ix) Electric pipes;

(x) Air-driven pipes;

(xi) Chillums;

(xii) Bongs;

(xiii) Ice pipes or chillers;

2. In determining whether an object is “Drug para-

phernalia,” a court or other authority should con-

sider, in addition to all other logically relevant fac-

tors, the following:

(A) Statements by an owner or by anyone in con-

trol of the object concerning its use;

(B) Prior convictions, if any, of an Owner, or of

anyone in control of the object, under any

City, State, or Federal law relating to any

controlled substance;

(C) The proximity of the object, in time and space,

to a direct violation of this Chapter;

(D) The proximity of the object to controlled sub-

stances;

(E) The existence of any residue of controlled sub-

stances on the object;

(F) Direct or circumstantial evidence of the intent

of an owner, or of anyone in control of the

object to deliver it to persons whom he knows,

or should reasonably know, intend to use the

object to facilitiate a violation of this Chapter;

the innocence of an owner or of anyone in

control of the object, as to a direct violation

of this Chapter shall not prevent a finding that

the object is intended for use, or designed for

use as “Drug paraphernalia;”’

A60

(G) Instructions, oral or written, provided with

the object concerning its use;

(H) Descriptive materials accompanying the ob-

ject which explain or depict its use;

(I) National and local advertising concerning its

use;

(J) The manner in which the object is displayed

for sale;

(K) Whether the owner, or anyone in control of

the obejct, is a legitimate supplier of like or

related items to the community, such as a li-

censed distributor or dealer of tobacco prod-

ucts;

(L) Direct or circumstantial evidence of the ratio

of sales of the object(s) to the total sales of

the business enterprise;

(M) The existence and scope of legitimate uses for

the object in the community;

(N) Expert testimony concerning its use.

Section 2. That there is hereby enacted a new sec-

tion 620.04 of the Codified Ordinances of the City of Parma

which shall read as follows:

620.04 POSSESSION, MANUFACTURE, AND

SALE OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA.

(a) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to

possess with intent to use, drug paraphernalia to plant,

propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, com-

pound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, ana-

lyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, in-

gest, inhale, or otherwise introduce into the human

body a controlled substance in violation of this Chap-

ter.

A61

(b) It is unlawful for any person to deliver, sell,

possess with intent to deliver or sell, or manufacture

with intent to deliver or sell, drug paraphernalia,

knowing, or under circumstances where one reasonably

should know, that it will be used to plant, propagate,

cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, con-

vert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack,

repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale,

or otherwise introduce into the human body a con-

trolled substance in violation of this Chapter.

(c) It is unlawful for any person to\place in

any newspaper, magazine, handbill, or other publica-

tion any advertisement, knowing, or under circum-

stances where one reasonably should know, that the

purpose of the advertisement, in whole or in part,

is to promote the sale of objects designed or intended

for use as drug paraphernalia.

(d) Any person 18 years of age or over who

violates paragraph (b) by delivering drug parapher-

nalia to a person under 18 years of age who is at

least 3 years his junior is guilty of a special offense.

(e) This section does not apply to manufacturers,

practitioners, pharmacists, owners of pharmacies and

other persons whose conduct was in accordance with

Ohio R.C. Chapters 3719, 4715, 4729, 4731 and 4741.

This section shall not be construed to prohibit any

possession, manufacture, or use of hypodermics made

lawful by Section 620.09 of the Codified Ordinances.

(f) Any drug paraphernalia used in violation of

this section shall be seized and forfeited to the Mu-

nicipality.

(g) If any provision of this section or the appli-

cation thereof to any person or circumstance is held

A62

invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions

or applications of the section which can be given effect

without the invalid provision or application, and to

this end the provisions of this section are severable.

(h) Whoever violates any of the provisions of

paragraphs (a), (b), or (c) is guilty of a misdemeanor

of the second degree. If the offender has previously

been convicted of a violation of paragraphs (a), (b),

or (c), any subsequent violation of the same paragraph

is a misdemeanor of the first degree. Whoever violates

any of the provisions of paragraph (d) is guilty of

a misdemeanor of the first degree.”

Section 3. That Section 620.04 of the Codified Ordi-

nances, as enacted by Ordinance 228-75, passed February

2, 1976, be, and hereby it is, repealed.

Section 4. That this Ordinance is hereby declared

to be an emergency measure necessary for the immediate

preservation of the public health, safety and welfare of

the City of Parma, and for the further reason that sale

and use of drug paraphernalia is a presently-existing and

serious danger to youths which requires immediate regula-

tion, and this Ordinance shall become immediately effec-

tive upon receiving the affirmative vote of two-thirds of

all members elected to Council and approval of the Mayor,

otherwise from and after the earliest period allowed by

law.”

The parties have stipulated that this Ordinance is based

upon the “Model Drug Paraphernalia Act” (hereinafter

MDPA) drafted by the Drug Enforcement Administration

of the United States Department of Justice.

The MDPA is supplemented by comments which ex-

plain its provisions in terms of the drafters’ intent. Spe-

cifically, the comments indicate that the MDPA was

A63

promulgated at the behest of state authorities to enable

them to “cope” with the proliferation of drug parapher-

nalia. Since it was clearly the intent of the Parma City

Council to enact the MDPA, the court will use these com-

ments to interpret the language of the Ordinance.

The plaintiff seeks to have the Ordinance declared

invalid and unconstitutional. Its contentions are: (1) that

the enactment is inconsistent with the Due Process Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment because it is overbroad

(it prohibits commercial speech protected by the First

Amendment) and vague; (2) that it is inconsistent with

the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

because it invidiously discriminates against so-called “head

shops” and because it is not reasonably related to any

legitimate governmental objective; and (3) that it is in-

consistent with the Commerce Clause of the Constitution

(Article I, Section 8, Clause 3) because it imposes an

impermissible burden on interstate commerce. The court

will first address the vagueness and overbreadth claims,

and then separately evaluate the equal protection and

commerce clause arguments.

a.

VAGUENESS AND OVERBREADTH

In Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 92 S.

Ct. 2294 (1972), the Supreme Court defined the due process

doctrine commonly referred to as “void for vagueness”

as follows:

It is a basic principle of due process that an enact-

ment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not

clearly defined. Vague laws offend several important

values. First, because we assume that man is free

to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we

insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelli-

A64

gence a reasonable opportunity to know what is pro-

hibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws

may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning.

Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement

is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit stan-

dards for those who apply them. A vague law imper-

missibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen,

judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and

subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbi-

trary and discriminatory application. Third, but re-

lated, where a vague statute “abut[s] upon sensitive

areas of basic First Amendment freedoms,” it “operates

to inhibit the exercise of those freedoms.” Uncertain

meanings inevitably lead citizens to “ ‘steer far wider

of the unlawful zone’ .. . than if the boundaries

of the forbidden areas are clearly marked.”

Id. at 108-69, 92 S. Ct. at 2298-99 (citations omitted). Ac-

cordingly, to pass constitutional muster an ordinance must

provide notice of the conduct which it proscribes in terms

which a person of ordinary intelligence can understand,

see, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S. Ct. 612 (1976);

United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 74 S. Ct. 808 (1954) ;

Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 59 S. Ct. 618 (1939),

and provide clear guidelines for law enforcement officers,

judges and juries to follow; see, e.g., Smith v. Goguen,

415 U.S. 566, 94 S. Ct. 1242 (1974); Papachristou v. City

of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92 S. Ct. 839 (1971); Coates

v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 91 S. Ct. 1686. More-

over, if First Amendment interests are affected, a precise

ordinance “evincing a legislative judgment that certain

specific conduct be . . .. proscribed,” Edwards v. South

Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 236, 83 S. Ct. 680, 684 (1963),

assures the court that the city council has weighed the

ordinance’s impact upon First Amendment interests and

determined that other governmental policies compel reg-

A65

ulation. Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 200, 202, 82

S. Ct. 248, 271-72 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring). See

Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. at 109, n. 5, 92

S. Ct. at 2299.

The vagueness doctrine does not invalidate every ordi-

nance that could have been drafted more precisely. The

Flipside, Hoffman Estates v. Village of Hoffman Estates,

ata F. Supp. .........(N.D. Ill; Slip Op. No. C78-2114,

2/11/80). Reasonableness, not absolute certainty of drafts-

manship, is required. Tobacco Road v. City of Novi,

ERE F. Supp. ........ (E.D, Mich.; Slip Op. No. C79-71000,

6/21/79). Many ordinances are inherently ambiguous,

because “[i]n most English words and phrases there lurk

uncertainties.” Robinson v. United States, 324 U.S. 282,

286, 65 S. Ct. 666, 668 (1945). As the Court noted in

Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 USS. 337, 72

S. Ct. 329 (1952):

[F]Jew words possess the precision of mathematical

symbols, most statutes must deal with untold and un-

foreseen variations in factual situations, and the prac-

tical necessities of discharging the business of govern-

ment inevitably limit the specificity with which legis-

lators can spell out prohibitions. Consequently, no

more than a reasonable degree of certainty can be

demanded. Nor is it unfair to require that one who

deliberately goes perilously close to an area of pro-

scribed conduct shall take the risk that he may cross

the line.

The test is whether the ordinance presents “ascertainable

standards of guilt.” Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507,

68 S. Ct. 665 (1948). In United States v. Petrillo, 332

U.S. 1, 7, 67 S. Ct. 1538, 1542 (1947), the Court stated:

That there may be marginal cases in which it is diffi-

cult to determine the side of the line on which a

A66

particular fact situation falls is not sufficient reason

to hold the language too ambiguous to define a crim-

inal offense... . [T]he Constitution does not require

impossible standards.

The doctrines of vagueness and overbreadth are re-

lated: “overbroad laws, like vague ones, deter privileged

activity.” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. at 114,

92 S. Ct. at 2302. However, “fa] clear and precise enact-

ment may nevertheless be ‘overbroad’ if in its reach it

prohibits constitutionally protected conduct.’ Id. The

plaintiff claims that subsection 620.04(c) of the Ordinance

is overbroad because it unduly interferes with commercial

speech protected by the First Amendment. As this court

noted in Kucinich v. Forbes, 432 F. Supp. 1101, 1115 (N.D.

Ohio 1977), in order for a statute or ordinance to be

unconstitutionally overbroad it must, on its face: (1) re-

strict speech or other conduct protected by the Constitution

of the United States; and (2) the municipalities’ interest

in restricting the conduct must be insufficient in compari-

son to the encroachment on the constitutional right in-

volved or, if a legitimate municipal interest exists to justify

the restriction, the ordinance must fail to employ the nar-

rowest means consistent with the furtherance of that in-

terest. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 96 S. Ct. 2673

(1976); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 US. D1, 94 S. Ct. 303

(1973). The crucial question, then, is whether the Ordi-

nance sweeps within its prohibitions protected speech

which may not be punished.

To determine whether a legislative enactment meets

these constitutional requirements the same rules of con-

struction apply whether it is a statute or an ordinance.

The Flipside, Hoffman Estates v. Village of Hoffman. Es-

tates, supra (citing Martin v. King, 417 F.2d 458, 461 (10th

Cir. 1969). Among the rules of construction is the rebut-

table presumption that legislative enactments are valid

A67

unless it is shown that the statute or ordinance in ques-

tion bears no rational relationship to a legitimate legislative

purpose. United States v. Kiffer, 477 F.2d 349 (2d Cir.

1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 831. However, a stricter stan-

dard of review is required if the enactment infringes

upon the exercise of a fundamental right. Roe v. Wade,

410 U.S. 113 (1973). The court must also bear in mind

that “[t]he Office of Judges is always to make such con-

struction as to suppress the mischief and advance the

Remedy; and to suppress subtle Inventions and Evasions

for Continuance of the Mischief.” United States v. Second

National Bank of North Miami, 502 F.2d 535, 541 (Sth

Cir. 1974), cert. denied 421 U.S. 912 ( 1975) (quoting Hey-

don’s Case, 3 Co. 7a, 7b; Magdalon College Case, 11 Co.

666, ’°6b). Moreover, the court should favor an interpre-

tation of the enactment which supports constitutionality.

Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 98, 65 S. Ct. 1031 (1945).

Finally, all laws should receive a sensible construction.

United States v. Ryan, supra at 175, 52 S. Ct. at 68. As

the Court held in United States v. Ryan, 284 US. 167,

52S. Ct. 65 (1931):

A literal application of a statute which would lead

to absurd consequences is to be avoided whenever

a reasonable application can be given which is con-

sistent with the legislative purpose.

Id. at 175, 52 S. Ct. at 68 (citations omitted).

A. DEFINITION

The key to the Parma Ordinance is the definition

of drug paraphernalia contained in section 620.01 (dd) (1).

Each of the criminal offenses defined in subsections 620.04

(a)-(d) refer to “drug paraphernalia,” thereby incorporat-

ing the definition by reference. The court finds that this

definit

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Jurisdictional Statement — City of Parma v. Record Revolution No. 6, Inc. · 451 U.S. 1013 | Frix